Right/Freedom of the Press/Limitations - Restrictions

Freedom of the Press

History | Legal Codification | Philosophical Origins | Culture and Politics | Conflicts with other Rights | Limitations / Restrictions | Utilitarian / Fairness Assessments | Looking Ahead | Policy Recommendations

Is this right subject to specific limitations in event of emergency (war, brief natural disaster [weather, earthquake], long-run natural disaster [volcano, fire, disease])? Can such limitations be defined in advance with reference to the disaster in question? 🖉 edit

Freedom of the press long been shaped by state actors that often in times of emergency see individual rights as second to state interests. Emergency situations such as war, natural disaster and disease typically has allowed governments to restrict this right on the basis of emergency, national security, or fear. Though this restriction can vary on duration, emergency event, country and government type, restrictions of the freedom of the press in emergency situations has a precedent.

In the United States context, in times of war there has been legislation passed to restrict public discourse with government on the basis of national security. The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798, passed as the United States prepared for war against France, restricted speech and press critical to government which allowed for the Federalist held government under John Adams to weaken the Republican party’s effect in politics. Under this act, politicians, editors, and writers were arrested and given jail time because of their publishing against the United States government (Stone, pg. 1663). During the Civil War, President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeus corpus and allowed military officials to enact martial law. This allowed for over 300 newspapers to be shut down for publications that were sympathetic to the confederacy.

President Wilson, during World War I, enacted the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918 which stifled those who opposed his policies during wartime. “In effect, these two laws made it unlawful for any person to write or publish any statement that criticized the President, the Congress, the government, the Constitution, the war, the draft, the military, or the uniform of the military of the United States.” (Stone, pg. 1666). These two acts essentially brought back the Alien and Seditions Acts of 1798 which restricted publications opposing government during times of war. During World War I the United States government prosecuted nearly 2000 people under these acts and essentially suspended the freedom of the press concerning government accountability, opposing government, and questioning policy (Stone, pg. 1666).

By the time the Vietnam War came, a significant switch in opinion came concerning the freedom of the press during times of war. Mass protests, newspaper publications, news outlets, and other forms of press opposing the Vietnam War were condoned and even backed by judicial case. The publishing of the Pentagon Papers was backed by Supreme Court decision where the court ruled that the national security threat was not clear, or grave enough to restrict the first amendment right of free press. (Stone, pg. 1668). This stance has remained as opposition publications concerning the Korean War and occupation of Iraq have not been restricted and the freedom of the press has not seen any significant restrictions during wartime on the basis of national security in the more modern (post-World War II) context.

With respect to the COVID-19 pandemic, there have been numerous international examples of the restriction of the freedom of the press. Jordan has strengthened the censorship program present, allowing all publications to be subject to censorship concerning the pandemic. Israel has enhanced surveillance on journalists because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the effects publications can have in causing fear. In Hungary, new punishments allowing for the imprisonment of members of the press for publishing anything the government deems to be false information on the basis of starting public panic. Many countries like Greece, Japan, and Ukraine have imposed new laws allowing government to restrict what the media can do and have access to concerning public health. In Cambodia and Vanuatu, legislation has been passed that puts in place a censorship program on the basis of emergency to prevent unrest and fear. These laws prohibit publishing without government approval essentially allowing for government censorship of publications concerning the COVID-19 pandemic. Countries such as Russia, Kyrgyzstan, South Africa, Indonesia, Botswana, Algeria, and Zimbabwe have placed prison sentences as deterrents for journalists and news outlets for publishing anything the government deems untrue or could spark fear. In Liberia, Romania and Myanmar, the government has closed down news sites for publishing information that the government has deemed untrue. These were mainly ethnic minority sites (Selva 2020).

A study published in 2018 by Kodai Kusano and Markus Kemmelmeier looked into the effect natural disasters have on socio-political rights and the freedom of the press, among other things. They concluded that natural disasters cannot predict the level of freedom of the press as other economic factors have a stronger causal relationship. There was no support for their hypothesis that natural disasters will lead to lower levels of socio-political freedoms and freedom of the press (Kusano and Kemmelmeier, 2018).

It is nearly impossible to define limitations of free speech because of a given emergency as each example varies on a number of different aspects concerning, regime type, government stability, economic factors, and emergency type. Though typically when it comes down to granting the freedom of the press or regime stability, regime stability will prevail, and freedom of the press will be restricted.

References:

Geoffrey R. Stone, "Freedom of the Press in Time of War," 59 SMU Law Review 1663 (2006).

Kusano K and Kemmelmeier M (2018) Ecology of Freedom: Competitive Tests of the Role of Pathogens, Climate, and Natural Disasters in the Development of Socio-Political Freedom. Front. Psychol. 9:954. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00954

Selva, Meera. “Healing Words: How Press Freedom Is Being Threatened by the Coronavirus Pandemic.” Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, University of Oxford, 7 Apr. 2020, reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/risj-review/healing-words-how-press-freedom-being-threatened-coronavirus-pandemic.

Under American jurisprudence, what permissible exceptions exist? 🖉 edit

The Constitutional right to a free press is not absolute, and certain exceptions exist for this right as they do for other civil liberties such as free speech and free exercise. A series of landmark decisions dating back to the early Twentieth Century has gradually clarified the limits to freedom of the press, with exceptions for libel, obscenity, and imminent lawless action. Furthermore, the government’s ability to exercise prior restraint (i.e. preventing the publication of certain materials prior to their release) has been severely limited by the courts, but not entirely prohibited. In many instances, holdings for cases that do not specifically concern freedom of the press have been extended to impose new limitations (or privileges) for the press, by virtue of the content in question and the similarities that exist between the press and free speech.

Written material that is found to be libelous or defamatory is not protected by the First Amendment. The threshold for proving defamation can be strenuous, however, and especially difficult for public figures. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court took a major step in limiting the ability of government officials to sue for defamation. Following the publication of an advertisement in the New York Times that criticized the behavior of police officers in Montgomery, Alabama, the Montgomery police commissioner filed suit, alleging that the critical nature of the advertisement constituted defamation. Ruling against Montgomery, the Court asserted that “vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials” are nevertheless protected by the First Amendment. Furthermore, the justices established the Actual Malice test, contending that public officials cannot bring libel cases unless they can prove that a defendant published defamatory material with “reckless disregard” for its accuracy (Justice Brennan, 1964).

The Actual Malice Test was later affirmed in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989), in which plaintiff Daniel Connaughton filed a defamation claim against a local newspaper that ran negative articles about his campaign for local office in Hamilton, Ohio. Ruling for Connaughton, the Court affirmed Sullivan while asserting that the publication in question failed to verify its source material while ignoring obvious indications of its falsity (Justice Stevens, 1989). It should be noted, however, that this case represented an affirmation—rather than an extension—of the Sullivan test, as the justices largely limited themselves to criticizing material that displays a “reckless disregard for the truth” in the Connaughton decision. Finally, The Court expanded the Sullivan test to include both public officials and public figures in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). Following a libel suit against Hustlers Magazine by conservative commentator and Moral Majority founder Jerry Falwell Sr., the Court extended the Sullivan standard to satirical speech, given the latters’ “prominent role in public and political debate” in spite of inaccuracies that are obvious to the reasonably-minded reader.

The criminalization of obscene material was largely derived from the Hicklin test in English Common Law, a premodern system of judicial decision-making that would later influence legal proceedings in the United States. This is evidenced by the contemporary legal definition of obscenity, which largely centers around speech or actions that are sexually explicit. The Supreme Court never established a firm view on obscenity, however, until its decision in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). The Court ruled against Samuel Roth, an author who was charged with violating a federal obscenity statute due to his dissemination of obscene books in public. In light of the sexually explicit nature of the books he sold, the justices asserted that speech that is “utterly without redeeming social importance” is not protected by the First Amendment, which was never meant to give “absolute protection for every utterance” to begin with (Justice Brennan, 1957).

Given the ambiguous interpretation of obscenity in Roth, the Court would later revisit the issue and craft a more succinct definition in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). California businessman Marvin Miller disseminated explicit content through postal advertisements, and was subsequently arrested and charged under a state obscenity statute. Ruling for California, the Court reaffirmed that the distribution of obscene material without “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” did not violate the Speech or Press Clauses of the First Amendment. In superseding Roth, the justices succeeded in creating a concrete definition for obscene material that can also be employed for issues pertaining to the Press Clause.

Written or spoken words that prompt some form of public disorder are not necessarily protected under American jurisprudence. The current threshold for proving the illegality of this conduct is exceptionally high, however, due to the Imminent Lawless Action test established in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Prior to this decision, the Court adhered to the Clear and Present Danger test adopted in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), and the Bad Tendency test adopted in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). In both cases, the justices took firm positions against the permissibility of views deemed as offensive by the U.S. Government while failing to articulate a test that did not amount to the targeting of certain unpopular viewpoints by the judiciary.

The Court successfully remedied this approach in Brandenburg by overturning the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan member in Hamilton County, Ohio, who was charged under a state criminal syndicalism statute following his incendiary remarks at a Klan rally. Ruling for Brandenburg, the justices asserted that speech or press material can only be criminalized if it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action” or “likely to incite or produce such action”—a threshold that Brandenburg’s remarks, however incendiary and offensive they were, failed to clear (Per Curiam, 1969). The Imminent Lawless Action test was later affirmed in Hess v. Indiana (1973), in which an antiwar protestor was charged with disorderly conduct after exclaiming “we'll take the [explicative] street later” in response to a crackdown by campus police at Indiana University Bloomington. Ruling for Hess, the Court dismissed the aggressive nature of his comments towards law enforcement officers as “not directed to any person or group in particular,” given that the Brandenburg test required offending language to mention a target, time, or method for prospective activities (Per Curiam, 1973). Despite Hess and Brandenburg directly addressing spoken words rather than written material, it should be noted that each decision applies equally to the Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment, thereby making written threats of imminent lawless action and verbal threats equally illegal.

With few exceptions, prior restraint has largely been ruled unconstitutional in several landmark decisions that remain in force today. Prior to New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), which is often regarded as the most notable case on this subject, the Court had already denied the constitutionality of prior restraint in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), in which the justices contended that the societal harms often caused by “miscreant purveyors of scandal” (In this case, a Minnesota Newspaper that regularly engaged in antisemitic commentary in violation of a state public nuisances law) do not provide a compelling reason for government actors to impose prior restraint on the publications in question, especially when no overarching national security implications are relevant to the issue at hand (Justice Hughes, 1931).

In retrospect, the establishment of exceptions for national security issues in Near likely gave hope to the Nixon Administration in its attempt to halt the publication of the Pentagon Papers, which culminated in New York Times Co. v. United States. Ruling for the New York Times, the justices acknowledged the “heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of [prior restraint]” (Per Curiam, 1971), while arguing that issuing an injunction against various media outlets would represent a “flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the First Amendment (Concurring Opinion by Justices Black and Douglas, 1971).” Following this decision, the imposition of prior restraint was largely relegated to several unique and (relatively) unpublicized issues (see Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) or Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), which allowed prior restraint for information gained in closed-door legal proceedings and for the conduct of a student-run news publication, respectively). Following New York Times, no significant and publicized enactment of prior restraint has earned judicial approval.

References

Epstein, McGuire, and Walker, 2021. Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Rights, Liberties, and Justice. Thousand Oaks, California: Cq Press, An Imprint Of Sage Publications, Inc.

Justia. 2019. “Justia: Free Law & Legal Information for Lawyers, Students, Business and the Public.” https://www.justia.com/

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/376/254/

Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/491/657/

Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/485/46/

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/354/476/

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/413/15/

Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/395/444/

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/249/47/

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/268/652/

Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/414/105/

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/403/713/

Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/283/697/

Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/467/20/

Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/484/260/

Under international human rights laws, what permissible exceptions (often called derogations) exist? 🖉 edit

In international human rights law, freedom of the press is outlined in the International Bill of Human Rights, which encompasses the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These documents include the rights protected as well as exceptions, or derogations, if they are applicable. The UDHR is not a treaty, so states are not legally bound to it (Australian Human Rights Commission). Still, the document serves as a foundation for international human rights legislation. Article 19 of the UDHR protects the right to “receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Article 29(2) briefly states general derogations for the rights laid out in other articles:

“In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society” (United Nations General Assembly, 1948).

Unlike the UDHR, the ICCPR is legally binding to the states that ratify it. The ICCPR contains similar language in paragraph 2 of Article 19 relating to freedom of the press, but goes farther in the following paragraphs to mention restrictions. These acceptable restrictions “shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: For respect of the rights or reputations of others; For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals” (United Nations General Assembly, 1966). Additionally, Article 20(1) prohibits war propaganda, which is often distributed by means of government and independent news media and involves the strategically crafted systems of gathering and distributing information as to incite war support (Miller, 2004, 8). Freedom of the press includes the media’s right to freely publish information, but also includes the people’s right to receive accurate information, especially during times of political tension, such as war or elections when this right may be jeopardized. The 2009 Joint Declaration of the United Nations, Organization of American States, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and African Commission on Human and People’s Rights emphasized the importance of people’s access to accurate, impartial information (UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression et al., 2009). Because freedom of the press includes the ability to both receive and impart information, prohibiting war propaganda can be seen both as the protection of people’s right to receive impartial news and the limitation of the press from spreading inaccurate or violence-inciting media. Miller argues that war propaganda includes not only outward attempts to garner war support through the media, but also subtle manipulation of the media by the state to prevent effective dissent, resulting in “information dominance” by the state so they may further their military agendas (Miller, 2004, 14). Article 20(2) of the ICCPR prohibits advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that incites discrimination or violence, which applies but is not limited to freedom of the press.

The Article 4 of the ICCPR also includes measures for states of emergency and highlights the rights and articles from which states cannot derogate, including the right to life (Article 6), protection against torture (Article 7), protection against slavery (Article 8), protection against debt imprisonment (Article 11), protection against punishment for a crime that was not illegal at the time it was committed (Article 15), the right to recognition before the law (Article 16), and the right to religion and freedom of conscience (Article 18). The specified list of rights to be protected during emergencies does not include freedom of the press, meaning states are permitted to restrict the press under the conditions “that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion, or social origin” and that states inform the United Nations of the right from which they derogated, the reasons they derogated, and the date on which the derogation will end (United Nations General Assembly, 1966, Article 4(1), Article 4(3)). Hafner-Burton, Helfer, and Fariss argue that the processes outlined in derogation clauses of human rights law allow derogators to take the necessary actions during an emergency situation and signal to the international community that those actions will be temporary and carried out in a lawful manner (2011, 673-674). The United Nations includes the descriptive conditions and processes by which states can derogate from rights such as freedom of the press because otherwise states may be hesitant to ratify human rights treaties in the first place, and therefore not protect those rights at all. According to Siehr, “The common task of emergency clauses in human rights instruments is to cope with the challenge of finding a middle course between the recognition of the legitimate right of sovereign States to defend their constitutional, democratic order and the prevention of misuse of the tool of emergency rights” (Siehr, 2004, 546). This can prove to be difficult, as the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the primary body for monitoring freedom of the press and information, reported “that perpetrators of internet shutdowns often try to justify them as a ‘precautionary measure’ or as a matter related to ‘national security,’ ‘public safety,’ or ‘hate speech,’ when the underlying motivations appear strongly correlated with moments of political instability, protests, communal violence, or elections” (UNESCO, 2022, 51).

To ensure that derogations from freedom of the press, specifically those in the name of disinformation campaigns, are necessary, lawful, and transparent, UNESCO has recommended: that state restrictions freedom of the press include input from a variety of independent groups, civil society organizations, and research specialists (UNESCO, 2020, 14); that UNESCO partner with other United Nations bodies to guarantee that derogations from freedom of the press are ethical and do not violate the right more than necessary (12); that relevant media actors increase the capacity of independent press councils in their monitoring efforts (217).

References:

Australian Human Rights Commission. 2007. “What is the Universal Declaration on Human Rights?” Accessed July 5, 2024. https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/commission-general/projects/what-universal-declaration-human-rights

Hafner-Burton, Emilie, Laurence Helfer, Christopher Fariss. 2011. “Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties.” Cambridge University Press 65, no.4. 673-707. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081831100021X

Miller, David. 2004. “Information Dominance: The Philosophy of Total Propaganda Control?” in War, Media, and Propaganda: A Global Perspective, edited by Yahya Kamalipour and Nancy Snow. 7-16. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=IyQeVFowLnwC&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&dq=war+propaganda+mediums&ots=ld3JH7kqKU&sig=HmizgQAGnNbDQew_MLGqn3h9_QU#v=onepage&q&f=false

Siehr, Angelika. 2004. “Derogation Measures under Article ICCPR, with Special Consideration of the War against International Terrorism.” German Yearbook of International Law, 47. 545-593. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/gyil47&id=1&collection=journals&index=

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, International Telecommunication Union, Broadband Commission for Sustainable Development. 2020. “Balancing act: countering digital disinformation while respecting freedom of expression: Broadband Commission research report on ‘Freedom of Expression and Addressing Disinformation on the Internet'” https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000379015.locale=en

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. 2022. “Press Freedom in Times of Crisis and Transformation.” UNESCO Global Report 2021/2022: Journalism is a Public Good. 44-81. https://doi.org/10.18356/9789210015424c006

United Nations General Assembly. 1948. “Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Accessed July 5, 2024. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

United Nations General Assembly. 1966. “International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights.” Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights. Accessed July 5, 2024. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights

UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the ACHPR Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information. 2009. “Joint Statement on the Media and Elections.” Joint Declarations of the representatives of intergovernmental bodies to protect free media and expression, 2013. 53-56. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/5/99558.pdf

Is this right often perceived as threatening to government authorities? 🖉 edit

An example of why freedom of the press may appear threatening to those in power is because of the speed at which information moves, and the way it can shape critical events, like elections. Oftentimes it may seem like the news outlets have a bias, for example, “cable organizations are labeled as liberal or conservative instead of just news. Information flows on social media and Internet sites at lightning-fast speed with no way to verify accuracy” (Wermiel, 2019). In 1798, Congress passed the Sedition Act which allowed for people to be prosecuted when they “brought the president of the government into disrepute and ridicule” (Wermiel, 2019). So, freedom of the press can also appear to be threatening because it allows people to voice their concerns about the decisions of the US government. However, government officials may pass laws to ensure this doesn’t happen. This act was created because President Wilson and Congress wanted to eliminate people speaking out about their opposition to the involvement of the United States in the war (This Day in History). Freedom of the press may be perceived as threatening to government authorities when the media is able to uncover the wrongdoings or abuse of the government because it could prevent citizens from fully trusting the government in its ability to do things in the best interest of its citizens. For example, “Watergate” is “synonymous with political crime and corruption” (Watergate). President Nixon was not a big fan of freedom of the press; according to William Robinson, who worked for the New York Herald Tribune, he believed that it was a “handy refuge for subtle as well as overt character assassination” (Farell, 2014). However, even if some people in government positions may view freedom of the press as threatening, the Supreme Court has upheld the press’ right to report on anything they deem important. For example, in the Supreme Court case New York Times Company v Sullivan, the “actual malice” test was created, which requires that a public figure demonstrates that someone knew the information they were reporting was false, but proceeded to use it anyway (Oyez). So, while news outlets can post whatever they want, they run the risk of being sued for libel (the publication of false information). In order to cover up anything that government authorities may not want known, they have “made explicit attempts to silence critical media voices and strengthen outlets that serve up favorable coverage” (Repucci, 2019). It may appear that some government officials want to be seen in a positive light, and they could attempt to remove any media that depicts them in a way that’s different from that.

Wermiel, Stephen. 2019. “Freedom of the Press: Challenges to This Pillar of Democracy.” www.americanbar.org. March 26, 2019. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/insights-on-law-and-society/volume-19/insights-vol-19-issue-2/freedom-of-the-press/.

History.com Editors. 2019. “U.S. Congress Passes Sedition Act.” HISTORY. July 29, 2019. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/u-s-congress-passes-sedition-act.

FBI. “Watergate.” Federal Bureau of Investigation. https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/watergate.

Farrell, John Aloysius. 2014. “When Nixon Met the Press.” POLITICO Magazine. https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/08/nixon-and-the-media-109773/.

Oyez. 2018. “New York Times Company v. Sullivan.” Oyez. 2018. https://www.oyez.org/cases/1963/39.

Repucci, Sarah. 2019. “Media Freedom: A Downward Spiral.” Freedomhouse.org. Freedom House. 2019. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-and-media/2019/media-freedom-downward-spiral.

Is this right often curtailed by government authorities for reasons other than those which are generally viewed as permissible? 🖉 edit

Early American history was characterized by hostility to the common law of seditious libel, which restricted political speech. Legal objections sought to restrict the law's oppressive implementation, as in the Zenger case in 1735 (Rabban 1985, 799). English authors like Trenchard and Gordon (under the alias Cato) defended the truth and disregarded the notion that language's "bad tendency" might be used as a form of seditious libel (Rabban 1985, 799). Theoretical defenses of free speech highlighted its importance in limiting governmental authority and fostering good governance. The notion that free speech and the press were necessary for a free society and individual liberty was well-known in both America and England (Rabban 1985, 802). These ideas about the right to free speech were prevalent even before the Sedition Act of 1798 and had a significant impact on how the First Amendment was interpreted (Rabban 1985, 802). Early cases like the Bradford case (1694) added to the Zenger case’s questioning of the common law's long-standing definition of seditious libel. They brought up arguments that the jury should decide whether a publication was seditious and challenged the notion that true remarks might constitute libel (Rabban and Levy 1985). This demonstrated the widespread resistance to the idea of seditious libel in eighteenth-century England and colonial America. Levy however find that these early cases and thinkers such as Cato did not go far enough in their libertarianism regarding Freedom of the Press (Rabban 1985, 802). These arguments were accompanied by theoretical defenses of political expression rights. Different individuals asserted that freedom of speech and the press were crucial for limiting governmental power and upholding a free society, both in England and the American colonies. There is a grand shift between freedom of expression, seditious libel, and freedom of the press before and after the American Revolution (Rabban 1985, 804). The press enjoyed less actual freedom in the years leading up to the American Revolution than it did during the majority of the colonial period. Speaking out against the cause of the Revolution was silenced by those in favor of independence, which curbed freedom of expression (Rabban 1985, 805). Following the Revolution, many states continued to pursue seditious libel cases, and grand juries were more inclined to recommend indictments—especially in light of the Sedition Act of 1798. Seditious libel was not often challenged by libel victims in this era (Rabban 1985, 805). However, in modern-day America, most restrictions of freedom of expression, including that of the press, are limited. Slander, obscenity, pornography, sedition, incitement, fighting words, violation of copyright, trade secrets, food labeling, non-disclosure agreements, the right to privacy, public safety, and perjury are examples of common restrictions on the press. Outside of that, there are no other limits on the Press (Cornell Legal Information Institute). However, 57% of U.S. journalists are either extremely or very concerned about the freedom of the press as of 2023 (Pew Research 2023). More than 50 journalists were arrested or jailed in the US in 2021 while performing their jobs (Freedom Tracker). In 2022, reporters covering the school shooting in Uvalde were threatened with arrest, as well as prevented access from reporting in certain areas (Hernández and Farhi 2022). Journalists have been on high alert regarding potential future suppression of media in the U.S. Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, the print media tends to act mostly self-regulatory and functions without many statutory restrictions. Everyone including the media has the right to freedom of expression in the UK, according to the Human Rights Act (HRA). However, this right "may be subject to formalities, conditions, restrictions, or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society." (Murray et al. 2022). However, libel in the UK functions differently in the US for the press. Britain actually has stricter regulations on freedom of the press. Since the country's libel rules have historically made suing for libel an easy pursuit, oligarchs and other wealthy foreigners and businesses have utilized British courts to sue journalists for news they don't like (Global Campaign for Free Expression 2023). It is far easier to sue these journalists in the UK. In contrast to the US' constitutional tradition, laws in the UK penalizes speech critical of public officials. The UK allows for greater ability to protect one’s public image and reputation (Global Campaign for Free Expression 2023). In comparison to the aforementioned libel cases in the US, the limits of the media are far stricter. In conclusion, there is a complicated and developing narrative to be found in the history of press freedom and early American democracy. The harsh use of seditious libel laws was vigorously resisted in early American history, with examples like the Zenger trial questioning accepted notions of libel. The theoretical foundations of free speech as a defense against excessive political power were well-established, laying the groundwork for the First Amendment's interpretation. While there are certain limitations on the freedom of speech and the press in modern America, they are often only applicable to situations involving slander, obscenity, provocation, and issues related to public safety. However, recent instances of journalists receiving threats, being detained, and having their access restricted underscore growing worries about press freedom in the United States. The UK's libel rules albeit more relaxed have had a history of being exploited by companies upset by the media. The appropriate balance to strike in this dynamic environment between defending free speech and attending to valid concerns is still up for discussion. It is clear that while the concepts of free speech are fundamental to democratic societies, how these concepts are actually put into practice can differ greatly, with repercussions for the media, public discourse, and individual liberty. In the ever-changing world, it is crucial to be attentive to defending and upholding the core ideals of freedom of expression and the press as these difficulties are negotiated (Global Campaign for Free Expression 2023).

Bibliography



Cornell Legal Information Institute. “First Amendment.” LII / Legal Information Institute. Accessed September 22, 2023. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/first_amendment.

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