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Aristotle argues that not all forms of association are political, particularly those that stem from material needs, including family, the market, and alliances for mutual defense/benefit- these can be organized into libertarian and capitalist principles.

According to one’s needs, individuals are free to associate and disassociate within their own means of persuasion and trade, and none of this is political- or in other words, the government should have no business with the private associations of the people (Johnson 32, 2001). Regarding politically, he further argues that “It is not the case . . . that people come together for the sake of life alone, but rather for the sake of living well” (3.9.1280a31) and “the political community must be set down as existing for the sake of noble deeds and not merely for living together” (Johnson 32, 2001). He takes a stance against the dominance of individuals associating merely for political protection and gain, but he believed that the state should do more in its concern for the citizen, encouraging virtue and discouraging harm and vice (Johnson 32, 2001). He argues that the best political regime best delivers the “good life-” production and distribution of goods, both goods of the body and of the soul. Within this theory, Aristotle considers the production and distribution of bodily goods as private and the production and distribution of spiritual goods as public: “The primary goods of the soul are (1) moral and intellectual virtue, which are best produced by public education, and (2) honor, the public recognition of virtue, talent, and service rendered to the city. The principle of distributive justice is defined” (Johnson 38-39, 2001). Aristotle’s theory about freedom of association is that political associations’ ultimate goal is to help foster the virtues that are necessary in the pursuit of justice and happiness; therefore, “no legitimate regime can be indifferent to the virtue of the citizens” (Johnson 44, 2001). The polis is both the most inclusive and authoritative community according to Aristotle, seeing as Aristotle's polis is a mixed concept, fusing the political state with civil societal attributes “including economic, religious, and other forms of association” (Miller 878, 1996).

References:

Kimberley Brownlee and David Jenkins, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Freedom of Association”: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freedom-association/

Gregory R. Johnson, “The First Founding Father: Aristotle on Freedom and Popular Government,” 2001: https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/0817929223_29.pdf

Though, the traditions of Buddhist monks reveal how certain Buddhist practices restrict freedom of association. As explained by Holmes Welch, “According to the Buddha’s rule, when people become monks and nuns they lead a collective life. Not only is there no private property, but there is no thought for oneself. To take thought for oneself is to keep hold of the ego” (Welch, 146). Noted by Welch, upon entering monastic life, Buddhists are expected to relinquish all previously held associations. Therefore, observed through the expectations of monks, elements of Buddhism confine free association.

Looking to Buddhist leaders, freedom of association is ultimately upheld. For example, in a 1993 Washington address, the Dalai Lama demonstrated his admiration for the principles of democracy, particularly the liberties, such as freedom of association, it guarantees to civilians. The Dalai Lama asserts, “Irrespective of whether we are rich or poor, educated or uneducated, belonging to one nation or another, to one religion or another, adhering to this ideology or that, each of us is just a human being like everyone else.” Through his words of acceptance, the Dalai Lama conveys that Tibetan Buddhism supports the ability to freely associate with many identities. Thus, while the Five Precepts and monastic codes appear to restrict the liberties of followers, the Dalai Lama’s words affirm them.

References:

Dalai Lama, “Buddhism and Democracy,” Washington DC, 1993: https://www.dalailama.com/messages/buddhism/buddhism-and-democracy

Peek, John M. “Buddhism, Human Rights and the Japanese State.” Human Rights Quarterly 17, no. 3 (1995): 527–40. http://www.jstor.org/stable/762392.

Hobbes identifies groups that we would today call private political associations: groups formed “not by obligation of one to another, but proceeding onely from a similitude of wills and inclinations” (265). He distrusts these groups, arguing that they are “for the most part unnecessary, and savour of unlawfull designe; and are for that cause Unlawfull, and go commonly by the name of factions, or Conspiracies” (265).

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Daniel, Alex, "Speech Locked Up: John Locke, Liberalism and the Regulation of Speech" (2013). Student Works. 154. https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/154

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Association itself is key to Rousseau’s political philosophy because in his mind it is a building block for political society. In The Social Contract he writes that humans come together to form communities by surrendering certain “natural” rights and liberties in favor of certain “civil” rights and liberties, such as the protection of private property or the adherence to general ideals of justice. “The problem,” he says, “is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.” (43). While the “association” of which Rousseau writes here does not resemble the right to association that most modern states protect in one way or another, the author’s thoughts on this kind of community-building clearly influence his views on the creation of social associations within the broader community. In his “Discourse on Political Economy” Rousseau writes that Every political society is composed of other smaller societies of different kinds, each of which has its interests and its rules of conduct: but those societies which everybody perceives, because they have an external and authorised form, are not the only ones that actually exist in the State: all individuals who are united by a common interest compose as many others, either transitory or permanent, whose influence is none the less real because it is less apparent, and the proper observation of whose various relations is the true knowledge of public morals and manners. The influence of all these tacit or formal associations causes, by the influence of their will, as many different modifications of the public will. (“Discourse on Political Economy,” 211)

In this passage the modern conception of political association is more easily identified. He seems to view the formation of these “smaller societies” which exist within the State and influence the public will as more or less inevitable, though he does not express any disapproval of their existence. Rousseau expands upon these views in his discussion of the social “circles” within Genevan political society, which he describes in his “Letter to Monsieur D’Alembert on the Theater” as the Genevan equivalent of social clubs in England. Again, he points out that the formation of these circles is a natural consequence of communal association, and points out that they do not pose any great danger to the State. “Of all the kinds of relations which can bring individuals together in a city like our own,” he believes that “the circles form incontestably the most reasonable, the most decent, and the least·dangerous ones, because they neither wish nor are able to be hidden, because they are public and permitted, because order and rule prevail in them” (“Letter to Monsieur D’Alembert, 108). These “circles” serve more of a social purpose than a political one, and Rousseau notes that they could potentially have negative consequences by encouraging men to drink too much or women to gossip in excess. He believes that they can influence the general will that governs an ideal community, but these associations do not form with specific political goals in mind. Having weighed the costs and benefits that they bring, Rousseau recommends that the Genevan state should “preserve the circles, even with their faults. For these faults are not in the circles but in the men who compose them; and there is no imaginable form of social life in which the same faults do not produce more harmful effects.” (“Letter to Monsieur D’Alembert,” 110). While his advocacy for the circles’ preservation does not directly indicate Rousseau’s support for freedom of association, his work at least shows an unwillingness to restrict people’s access to associational interaction within political society.

References:

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Collected Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Translated by Allan Bloom, Publ. for Dartmouth College by Univ. Press of New England, 2004, ia800705.us.archive.org/34/items/RousseauLetterToDAlembertPoliticsTheArtsAllanBloo m_20 1811/ Rousseau%20-%20%27%27Letter%20to%20D%27Alembert%27%27%3B% 20Politics%20%26%20the%20Arts%20[Allan%20Bloom].pdf.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, and G. D. H. Cole. The Social Contract; and Discourses. Dent, 1963, Online Library of Liberty,

Officials regularly banned or destroyed objectionable literature during the period, and they punished, banished, or executed anybody who published anything negative of the emperors or the government. It is difficult to tell how later Romans governed political discourse. For most of the Republic, elite political speech was protected, but social customs and career possibilities meant that most elite Romans nevertheless maintained significant self-censorship (Watts, 1970, pp.159-60).

During his consulate in 59 B.C., Julius Caesar (rule 49 BC-44 BC) mandated the recording of regular procedures of senate proceedings. Under his orders, these stenographic reports, known as acta senatus, were published alongside the populi acta diurna, Europe’s first newssheet. Even after the civil war, Caesar allowed the senatorial sessions to be published indefinitely. Citizens of the Roman Empire generally enjoyed freedom of expression and the freedom of publishing writings. Augustus put an end to this practice, never again resumed in the history of Rome (Lintott, 2015, p.83, para.3). After that, the acta diurnal published only those sections of the senatorial discussions that the imperial emperor deemed suitable to print. By removing the full publicity that senate opponents had enjoyed since 59 B.C., Augustus deprived his senatorial opponents of the right to publish their opinions alongside those of the monarchic side in the official bulletin (Cramer, 1945, p.161).

The legislation was the same as it had been in the past, but other subjects fell within its jurisdiction, such as betrayal of an army, encouraging the common people to insurrection, or, more broadly, maladministration in public office (Cramer, 1945, p.170, para.1). Words were not penalized, but actions were. Augustus was the first to expand the scope of this legislation to include literature criticizing the administration. The new restrictions on free expression went even further. Censorship began to infiltrate educational classrooms. Professors found themselves in hot water after debating two sides of Augustus' official stance in class. For example, the case of professor Corvus showed the full ferocity of the new anti-freedom of expression and writing campaign (Cramer, 1945, p.170). Corvus once gave a public talk about the pros and cons of a woman's advice to married women to have no children. Augustus was particularly sensitive about birth control and celibacy. He has often advocated for legislation to reverse the trend of Rome's declining birthrate, particularly among the aristocratic class. Corvus was hauled into court for having harmed the state. Consequently, it became a standard practice to submit to school students of oratory the following topic for composition: “Cicero considers whether he should burn his writings, as Anthony promises him life if he does so” (Cramer, 1945, p.173, para.4).

Though no death sentence was meted out for just verbal or written criticisms on the government during Augustus' lifetime, the legal instrument for future executions was now formed (Cramer, 1945, p.171). After a formal judgement of guilty was given against their creator, a new sort of penalty was created for the new type of crime, the burning of the incriminating writings. In minor crimes, a guilty author's works may be sentenced to the stake; in graver cases, his whole lifework may be consigned to the flames under such a judgment. It was not long before the next obvious step was taken private ownership of condemned publications, as well as reading them, became a crime.

Because there was no clear system for identifying and punishing even traitorous statements, most restrictions on free speech in late antiquity stemmed from self-censorship rather than real imperial actions (Watts, 1970, p.159). People occasionally made the decision not to express what they want because they believe their words will have negative impacts. This makes self-censorship during the Roman Republic difficult to trace since it is, at its most basic, the act of a person anticipating a reaction to what he thought but never felt comfortable speaking or writing. Thus, authors often refuse to speak out or publish writings under circumstances when doing so may advertise their own weakness.

References

Lintott, A. W. (2015). The Constitution of the Roman Republic. Oxford University Press.

Watts, E. J. (1970). Introduction: Freedom of speech and self-censorship in the Roman Empire. CORE. https://core.ac.uk/display/153913094

Watts, E. J. (2020). Mortal Republic: How Rome fell into tyranny. Basic Books, an imprint of Perseus Books, LLC.

Within Aristotle’s political arguments and analyses, unlike Locke, who often writes about the preexisting natural rights of all men, Aristotle describes rights given to men within the “polis” or society against other individuals, rulers included, but not against the polis itself, referring to the government. Within this theory, justice can only be found in its truest form through the polis. However, Aristotle did recognize rights in the political community- a theory which eventually inspired the theories of natural rights (Miller 880, 1996). In his writings, Aristotle focuses less on the extents of and limits to freedom of expression and more on the value of what is said within the bounds of the freedom and the function of speech. Within freedom of expression, Aristotle focuses on the most important aspect: “logos,” the root word of the English word “logic” which means both “speech” and “reason” (Clayton 2020). Aristotle believed the ultimate purpose of speech, which was specifically assigned to men and no other animal by nature to be to determine what is right and wrong, just and unjust. In doing so, we make it possible for humans to live together justly and in pursuit of lives of virtue. Writing that we are, by nature, political animals, Aristotle claimed: “We must figure out how to live together for ourselves through the use of reason and speech, discovering justice and creating laws that make it possible for human community to survive and for the individuals in it to live virtuous lives. A group of people that has done this is a city: “[The virtue of] justice is a thing belonging to the city. For adjudication is an arrangement of the political partnership, and adjudication is judgment as to what is just” (Clayton 2020). In living according to the laws of the polis, pursuing justice, and using the virtues that separate us from other animals to form a functioning society, we can achieve individual virtue and happiness. Aristotle’s theory suggests that men are not free solely because they live in a free society, but men have certain freedoms, such as the freedom of expression, that help to govern them responsibly in the pursuit of happiness and virtue (Johnson 36, 2001). In order to attain true happiness, the free speech of a free man has a large stake in his moral virtue. Moral virtue can only be attained by a free man because an action is only moral if it is chosen. This theory can be called somewhat of a “virtuous circle of cause and effect. It implies a natural capacity for virtue that has to be actuated by virtue — a capacity for freedom that requires the exercise of freedom” (Mansfield 2018). There can be no freedom at all without the freedom of choice, and having the choice to speak freely is inherent in our society for our pursuit as a collective of virtue, justice, and happiness.

References:

Aristotle and the Origins of Natural Rights, Fred D. Miller Jr., 878, 880, Philosophy Education Society Inc., 1996 United States.

Aristotle: Politics, Edward Clayton, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2020 United States.

The First Founding Father: Aristotle on Freedom and Popular Government, Gregory R. Johnson, 30, 32, 36, 38-39, 44, Hoover Institution Press, 2001 Stanford.

In 2010, the Dalai Lama was awarded a Democracy Service Medal for his commitment to democratic principles and upholding and defending human dignity. The Dalai Lama connects the modern practice of democracy with traditional Buddhist teachings. In his 1993 speech entitled “Buddhism and Democracy,” the Dalai Lama stated, “The institution the Buddha established was the Sangha or monastic community, which functioned on largely democratic lines. Within this fraternity, individuals were equal, whatever their social class or caste origins.” According to this idea of equality, the Buddhist concern for the well-being of all justifies rights to all freedoms of belief, expression and conduct” (Caney 2001, 68). Along the Buddhist ideals of equality and the freedom to exercise control of one’s life paired with the democratic ideals of freedom and commitments to human rights, the two practices are conjoined. And although there is no specific, equivalent word in Buddhism for the word “rights,” rights are understood as a subjective entitlement (Husted, Keown, & Prebish 2012, 20). According to Charles Taylor, in Buddhism, “human rights don’t stand out, as they often do in the West, as a claim on their own, independent from the rest of our moral commitments” (Taylor 1999, 110). These rights are somewhat implicit in understanding the philosophy of Buddhism. In reaching enlightenment, one who practices Buddhism is to follow The Eightfold Path – the ultimate guide to life. The Eightfold Path outlines that followers should practice “1. Right understanding and viewpoint (based on the Four Noble Truths), 2. Right values and attitude (compassion rather than selfishness), 3. Right speech (don't tell lies, avoid harsh, abusive speech, avoid gossip), 4. Right action (help others, live honestly, don't harm living things, take care of the environment), 5. Right work (do something useful, avoid jobs which harm others), 6. Right effort (encourage good, helpful thoughts, discourage unwholesome destructive thoughts), 7. Right mindfulness (be aware of what you feel, think and do), and 8. Right meditation (calm mind, practice meditation which leads to nirvana)” (United Religions Initiative 2020). Number 3 on the path outlines the necessity of right speech, which adds a layer of responsibility to the freedom of speech – a component which is not explicitly outlined in most Western descriptions of the right to freedom of expression. Within the Buddhist teachings, lies, half-truths, insults, and gossip are strictly prohibited; ultimately, being truthful is only one component to the freedom of speech, but also non-exploitation of oneself and of others is a central principle to Buddhism (Ekachai 2015). This responsibility is what allows for each person to be not only equal, but also to have the same opportunity and potential to be who and what they desire to be. As a result, the Dalai Lama states that, “Thus not only are Buddhism and democracy compatible, they are rooted in a common understanding of the equality and potential of every individual” (Dalai Lama 1999).

In his teachings, the Buddha stresses the importance of following the Eightfold Noble Path, which consists of cultivating eight essential areas of behavior. Within the Eightfold Noble Path, the Buddha asserts the need to practice “right speech” (Walton). When following right speech, also known as Wise Speech or Virtuous Speech, one focuses on expressing themselves in meaningful and genuine ways. When our words are moral, the Buddha states, our actions will follow, resulting in flourishing morality throughout the universe. Urging followers to engage in right speech, Buddhism condemns several forms of dialogue. In this way, the codes of Buddhism can be interpreted as a hindrance to the right to free expression, as certain types of discussion are excluded from qualifying as right speech. Defined as “abstinence from false speech, abstinence from malicious speech, abstinence from harsh speech, and abstinence from from idle chatter” (Roth), right speech upholds censoring hostile or false dialogue. While the Buddha emphasizes that the intention of right speech is to promote harmony, the doctrine of right speech nevertheless condemns words associated with political or social dissent. Thus, by providing a framework for proper speech, Buddhism undermines individuals’ entitlements to free expression. Though, despite the provisions of right speech, Buddhist leaders are expected to listen to the words of their people, upholding freedom of expression. As explained by John Peek in Human Rights and the Japanese State, “The enlightened ruler need not fear being deposed if he cultivates the traits of integrity, self-control, forbearance, generosity, gentleness, selflessness, non obstinacy, and nonviolence…the King will listen carefully to the wishes of the people, Just as this is to be a government by the people, it is also to be a government of the people” (Peek, 534). Portraying a system in which individual voices are supported by leaders, Peek asserts that Buddhism welcomes free expression. Thus, while Buddhists are guided to follow right speech, Buddhist leaders are expected to respect individual expression, regardless of if they believe it to be hostile or malicious. This contributes to the belief that free expression is a human right that must be protected by governments.

References:

Buddhism and Democracy, Bstan-dzin-rgya-mtsho, Dalai Lama XIV, His Holiness The 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet, 1993 Washington D.C.

Buddhism and Free Speech, Sanitsuda Ekachai, Bangkok Post, 2015 Bangkok.

Buddhism and Human Rights, Wayne R. Husted, Damien Keown, Charles S. Prebish, 20, Curzon Press, 1998 Richmond.

Buddhism, Asian Values, and Democracy Journal of Democracy, vol. 10 no. 1, Bstan-dzin-rgya-mtsho, Dalai Lama XIV, 4, Johns Hopkins Press, 1999 Baltimore.

Buddhism: Basic Beliefs, United Religions Initiative Editors, United Religions Initiative, 2020 San Francisco.

Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights, Charles Taylor, 101, Verso, 1999 New York.

Human Rights and Global Diversity: Human Rights, Compatibility, and Diverse Cultures, Simon Caney, 68, Taylor and Francis Group, 2007.

Peek, John M. "Buddhism, Human Rights and the Japanese State." Human Rights Quarterly 17, no. 3 (1995): 534. Accessed July 8, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/762392.

Roth, Beth. “Right Speech Reconsidered - The Eightfold Path.” Tricycle, 29 Jan. 2020, tricycle.org/trikedaily/family-dharma-right-speech-reconsidered/.

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A Letter Concerning Toleration: https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/toleration.pdf

US courts, including the Supreme Court, have invoked the marketplace of ideas theory hundreds of times over the past century (Schultz & Hudson 2017). For a recent example, in 2017, the Supreme Court invalidated a federal law banning offensive terms in trademarks, drawing on the marketplace of ideas theory in its unanimous opinion (Hudson 2017).

References:

Niesen, P. ‘Speech, truth and liberty: Bentham to John Stuart Mill.’ Journal of Bentham Studies, 2019, 18(1), pp. 1–19. DOI: https://doi. org/10.14324/111.2045-757X.046.

Schultz and Hudson: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/999/marketplace-of-ideas

About twenty years after More’s speech, Thomas Wilson made a similar statement about freedom of expression in his 1553 work, The Arte of Rhetorique. Wilson was an English writer whose Protestant views led Catholic Queen Mary I of England to summon him out of his mid-sixteenth century exile in Italy to stand trial for heresy, and his Protestant tendencies seem to have guided his thoughts on freedom and liberty. In an introduction to The Arte of Rhetorique, George Herbert Mair asserts that “there is no mistaking [Wilson’s] zeal for the Reformation. It shines through everything he wrote, and the reader of the Logike and the [Rhetorique] will have no cause to wonder at the papal persecution of his works” (Mair, 1908). Perhaps this avid support for the Reformation movement influenced his thoughts on freedom, not only of the conscience but also of speech itself. A passage from The Arte states that “Freeness of speech is when we speak boldly and without fear, even to the proudest of them, whatsoever we please or have list to speak. Diogenes, herein did excell..this world wants such as he was” (Wilson, 1553). Like More, Wilson understood the value of free speech. Though he does not speak in this passage of a citizen’s right to freedom of expression, he was at least aware of the potential benefits that this liberty could have within political society. In fact, according to a 1981 article in The Sixteenth Century Journal, Wilson advanced the discourse on freedom of speech by “claiming that freedom of speech is a generally acknowledged duty to be exercised by anyone, not restricted to parliamentary debate” (Parkin-Speer, “Freedom of Speech in Sixteenth Century English Rhetorics”).

Both More and Wilson made important contributions to the Reformation-era discourse on freedom of expression, but neither would live to see England’s official legislation of the right to freedom of speech within Parliamentary debate. This only occurred after the Glorious Revolution, in which William, Prince of Orange and newly crowned King of England, signed the English Bill of Rights in 1689. The Bill reflected England’s newfound stability within the European religious community by declaring the country a “Protestant Kingdom” and forbidding any Catholic from taking the throne or marrying into the royal family (English Bill of Rights). It also became the first early-modern document to legislate freedom of expression when its text guaranteed “that the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament” (English Bill of Rights). The document went into effect near the end of the Anglican Reformation movement, over a century after Wilson’s death, so it is unclear to what extent he or More influenced its creation. While The Arte of Rhetorique w as known in academic circles, its call for freedom of speech was not fully answered by the Bill, which only guaranteed that right within Parliamentary debate. The Bill’s text more closely resembles More’s 1523 speech, which specifically refers to freedom of speech within Parliamentary debate. Scholarship has yet to establish a direct link between the Bill and either of the two documents, but it is nevertheless important to note the importance of both writers’ work in advancing English discourse on the right to freedom of expression.

REFERENCES:

Avalon Project - English Bill of Rights 1689, avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp.

More, Thomas. “Thomas More Petition for Free Speech, 1523.” The Center for Thomas More Studies, www.thomasmorestudies.org/docs/Thomas%20More%20Petition%20for%20Free%20Sp eech.pdf.

Parkin-Speer, Diane. “Freedom of Speech in Sixteenth Century English Rhetorics.” The Sixteenth Century Journal, vol. 12, no. 3, 1981, pp. 65–72. JSTOR.

We should first understand where the state and religion stand within Hegel's philosophical system. The state falls under the umbrella of "objective spirit;" it is a manifestation of spirit's rationality and freedom in concrete or 'objective' reality (i.e., it takes the form of state institutions and laws). The state, properly understood, is spirit existing in a way that is not only rational but inherently ethical. For this reason, Hegel makes it the highest manifestation of what he calls "ethical life," the stage at which ethics springs from its subjective, 'abstract' form (e.g., that of Kant's abstract morality) and becomes embodied in concrete social and political arrangments, rules, and institutions. As Hegel puts it, the state is "the building of reason into reality;" it is an objective expression of our free, rational spirit where the "end is the universal interest as such and the conservation therein of particular interests” (Hegel 1820, §270).

Hegel acknowledges that one might see the state's outward, worldly domain as distinct from the spiritual, inward orientation of religion. In his view, religion is defined by "intuition, feeling, representational knowledge, [whose] concern is God as the unrestricted principle and cause on which everything hangs;" its realm is the heart, and its object is divinity (Hegel 1820, §270). From this interpretation, one might assume that religion is fundamentally disinterested in the worldly concerns of the state. Yet, Hegel contends that the state and religion are not wholly distinct, differing in "form" but sharing the same "content" (Hegel 1820, §270) The two share the same "content" in being relations of spirit to "absolute truth." Explicating what Hegel means not only by "absolute" but also by "truth" is beyond the scope of this essay. But for simplicity, the reader might think of it as a complete, unified knowledge of reality. Religion is the spirit coming to know the "truth" of God, while the state is the "truth" of spirit rationally expressing itself in the external world. Both enterprises differ in their respective forms truth takes: in religion, knowledge comes in the form of feeling, faith, and mental representations, whereas in the state, knowledge becomes concrete in law, duty, right, and political institutions (Hegel 1820, §270). Religion and state, to Hegel, are the same free, rational truth manifesting in different shapes. Thus to imply, as liberalism does, that the religious and political realms should be completely separate is to deny that these are expressions of a common principle.

But despite this relationship, Hegel warns that religious sentiment should never have authority over the secular state. Because knowledge of the divine takes the form of "subjective idea and feeling… [that] draw a veil over everything determinate," to base the "enduring" character of laws and institutions on it will doom a state to "instability, insecurity and disorder" (Hegel 1820, §270). The religious opinion is internally disclosed and backed only by faith; it is thereby subjective and unfalsifiable (though not necessarily false). Anyone who "seeks guidance from the Lord" may claim that the dictates of the state are immoral and to be opposed (Hegel 1820, §270). Of course, this opposition to the state may remain an unexpressed belief. But it may also devolve into fanaticism that seeks to make religion equivalent to the state, i.e., to establish a theocracy. Hegel notes that when religion usurps the secular sovereignty of the state, "opinion and capricious inclination are to do the deciding" (Hegel 1820, §270). No state can be stable when the mercurial beliefs of religious zealots determine its laws, and thus an equivalency between church and state must be avoided (Hegel 1820, §270).

However, Hegel accepts that the state can incorporate religious ideas into its operations, though ultimately, the state has the final say over whether religious tenets are fit to be incorporated into law. Hegel contends that in the state, religion's "subjective truth" gets comprehended in "determinate thought" rather than faith or feeling (Hegel 1820, §270). For example, a state can make the religious precept "thou shalt not murder" into law, but not because religion says so. The state may look to religion as inspiration for or confirmation of this principle, but ultimately it must make sure this principle is rational of its own accord. To Hegel, the state has no authority over one's inner religious convictions. However, he argues that "when doctrines touch on objective principles, on thoughts of the ethical and rational, then their expression eo ipso brings the church into the domain of the state" (Hegel 1820, §270). So, the state may look to religion as a fount of ethical truth but retains sovereign authority as a secular institution over what religious convictions may rationally become law.

Finally, Hegel supports a relationship between religion and the state on practical grounds. He claims that religion is an "integrating factor in the state, implanting a sense of unity in the depths of men's minds," it imbues the citizenry with a sense of communal belonging that supports the state's function (Hegel 1820, §270). From here, Hegel makes a claim that deeply violates our notion of freedom of religion, claiming that a state should "require that all its citizens to belong to a church" (Hegel 1820, §270). In contemporary liberal thought, freedom of religion implies freedom not to worship. Though Hegel specifies that the state can not establish an official church for its citizens, he seems to believe it holds the authority to mandate participation in religious activities.

We have mapped out a hazy outline of Hegel's views on religion and state: a conception that rejects both a complete separation of church and state and a theocratic unity of religion and law. Religion and state are expressions of the same underlying "absolute truth," and thus should not be wholly alienated from each other. Likewise, religion holds practical benefits for the state, making men conscious of the communal good that the state exists to promote. However, subjective religious ideas can not, as it were, 'take the reins’ of the secular state and its laws. This would, in Hegel's view, lead to a fundamentally irrational and despotic state. It seems Hegel envisions a state whose authority remains independent from religious institutions while still drawing on the truth revealed by religion as such. Further, Hegel shows an inkling of religious tolerance (insofar as a doctrine does not reach into the state's worldly domain). However, he does not respect the right to abstain from religious practice. Hegel's picture of the relationship between religion and state diverges from our modern notion of church-state separation and personal freedom of religious practice, though he is far from supportive of religious principles holding sway over secular, political rationality.

References:

The “First-Generation” Members of the so-called 'first generation' of the Frankfurt School saw value in religion's inclination towards social justice and concern for objective, 'non-instrumental' knowledge. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, two of the school's most notable theorists, were deeply critical of "instrumental reason," human rationality directed towards mere means rather than proper ends (Horkheimer, 1944). Their critique is too detailed to be fully treated here, but simply put, instrumental reason reduces rationality as a tool for exploiting nature and fellow man (particularly as a tool in capitalism) (Horkheimer, 1944). Prioritizing this form of reason reduces the value of knowledge to mere 'usefulness' or 'practicality' at the expense of bedrock, "objective truth" (Horkheimer, 1944, 156). To the intellectuals of the early Frankfurt School, religion shared with critical theory a concern for truth about the ends of human life and society (e.g., the nature of justice and goodness), topics lost in the thoughtless dogmatism of an age defined by instrumental rationality. Further, religion also shared a spirit of practical social activism, seeking not only to outline the 'ideal world' but also to realize it (Brittain, 2012, 207). Where capitalist society had dogmatically accepted that one's ultimate aim was to use instrumental reason to extract value from nature and man, religion offered a necessary alternative towards higher truth and worldly justice. A critical theory of religion, then, could provide unique value for the project of critical theory as a whole. However, first-generation theorists largely ignored the discussion of universal human rights. We might attribute this fact to Marx's cynical view on private liberties, as expressed in his essay "On the Jewish Question." In this work, Marx claims that personal rights create a harmful division between the private or "civil sphere" and the public or "political sphere" (Marx, 1843). Such rights allowed individuals to retract from a concern for the universal, communal good into a private sense of happiness (Marx, 1843). As such, religious freedom was harmful in encouraging individuals to value their religion over their "species-being," their being part of a unified humankind (Marx, 1843). With this in view, we can understand why the early Marxist critical theorists might have discussed the value of freedom of religion: perhaps rights were irrelevant to their vision for society.

The "Second-Generation" Most of the so-called "second-generation" critical theorists (whose work began in the 1970s) put less emphasis on religion, though we can see parallels with the first-generation views in the later work of Jurgen Habermas. Early in his career, Habermas reduced religion's status to that of a primitive socializing force (Habermas 1981). The need for religious attitudes was to be overcome by secular rationality in the form of his theory of communicative action, a philosophical system Habermas hoped would ground "the social sciences in a theory of language (Habermas 1988, xiv). In the mid-1980s, Habermas became less disparaging of religion, recognizing it as a source of necessary consolation for a suffering world (Habermas 1990). This positive view continued to develop through his later career, with Habermas eventually recognizing that religious ideas were a well of moral truth necessary in combating the moral decay of the techno-capitalist age (Habermas 2006). Though Habermas continued to advocate for a separation between law and religion, he believed that the public sphere could gather valuable moral intuition from religious teachings (Habermas 2006). Though nothing like a theocracy (the direct imposition of religious authority into the state apparatus) should exist, a respectful friendship between religion and state could prove essential in preserving society's ethical integrity. Furthermore, the later Habermas also defends the individual's right to freedom of religious practice (Habermas 2006). We see here both a growing similarity and marked difference to the first-generation theorists' view of religion, with Habermas acknowledging the value of religious teachings while also endorsing a more classically liberal respect for the freedom of religion.

Human rights Habermas also engaged in a comprehensive discussion of human liberties per se. His treatment of rights is situated within his "discourse theory," in which he seeks to resolve various epistemological, political, and ethical issues by analyzing inter-subjective communication (Habermas 1992, between facts and norms). Broadly speaking, Habermas asserts that society maintains itself over time only when its constituents view it as legitimate (Habermas 1996). The dawn of modernity, with its growing differences in religious and philosophical opinions, presents a challenge here: groups seek to impose their personal views of justice and happiness on others to their detriment and embitterment (Habermas 1996). Therefore, spheres of private freedom needed to arise to resolve this tension. Insofar as individuals can pursue their own visions of happiness (without interfering with the freedom of others), society can maintain its legitimacy (Habermas 1996). Rights are the legal feature that maintains such spheres of personal liberty. But for these private rights to be legitimate, individuals must have a say in the system that grants and manages them (Habermas 1996). This demand for public rights (i.e., the right to participate in government) makes democracy "co-original" with private rights; they rationally presuppose one another (Habermas 1996). The fundamental freedoms to be protected are determined through the rational deliberation of a constitutional democracy.

Fundamentally, Judaism teaches that all people are made in God’s image, and its holy texts emphasize the value of tolerance in multiple places. Perhaps most well-known is Leviticus 19:18, which says “love your neighbor as yourself.” Even more prescriptive is Leviticus 19:34, which commands to the people of Israel that “the stranger who resides with you shall be to you as one of your citizens; you shall love him as yourself, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt.” These lines formed the basis for one of the most famous anecdotes in Judaism, where Rabbi Hillel (active in the first century BCE) summed up all of Jewish teaching as “that which is hateful to you, do not do unto your fellow. That is the entire Torah, the rest is commentary” (Shurpin n.d.).

Hillel’s dictum is often referred to as the Golden Rule, which is found in one form or another in every other world faith, but his precise wording is unique. The Golden Rule is typically stated as some variation of “treat others the way you want to be treated,” but Hillel inverts this by giving a negative formulation – i.e., how not to treat others. This phrasing is very revealing when it comes to a Jewish freedom of religion: from this, it is easy to see that one should not mistreat others because of their religious beliefs, because one would not want be treated that way by others.

As with any faith that aims to guide people’s spiritual lives, Judaism necessarily tells its adherents what they should believe, so total freedom of religion (the freedom to believe whatever one wants) is not possible within the faith. Judaism holds that anyone born to a Jewish mother is Jewish, so one doesn’t stop being a Jew if, for example, one declares that one doesn’t believe in God, but such a belief would traditionally be considered incompatible with being a “good” Jew. Possibly the single most foundational Talmudic scholar of the Middle Ages, Moses Maimonides (died 1204), outlined thirteen fundamental principles of the Jewish faith, and all concern different aspects of believing in God and other beliefs; they are customarily recited in the format “I believe…” (Chabad n.d.).

Nevertheless, a fundamental idea of freedom of thought can be seen in traditional Jewish philosophy. As far back as the medieval period, Jewish scholars sampled from as wide a range of schools of thought as possible, including classical, Christian, and Muslim thought, in their pursuit of the ultimate truth. Since the greatest intellectual centers of the medieval Jewish world were Muslim-ruled Spain and the Middle East, Jewish philosophers were especially heavily influenced by their Islamic contemporaries, and by extension, by classical Greek texts that they encountered via Arabic translations. One particularly revealing example is Saadya Gaon, who was active in the Middle East over a century before Maimonides’ birth: “Saadya was not committed to any particular philosophical school. Existing philosophical schools were the heritage of a non-Jewish culture, the rich influence of which Saadya did not try to reject. But being a Jew [in contrast to his Muslim contemporaries], he felt free to collect material gleaned from various sources” (Stroumsa 2003, 80). Evaluations of Saadya Gaon’s body of work suggest an overarching commitment to reason over dogma; to the conviction that “the praiseworthy wise person is he who makes reality his guiding principle and bases his belief thereon,” and that “the reprehensible fool … is he who sets up his personal conviction as his guiding principle, assuming that reality is patterned after his beliefs” (Stroumsa 2003, 76). To him, this free inquiry was unquestionably compatible with Judaism. Another example of this intellectual diffusion is the Jewish Neoplatonists, foremost among them Isaac Israeli (Saadya Gaon’s contemporary) and Solomon ibn Gabirol, who both drew from and refuted the pagan worldview that the original Neoplatonist school promoted (Pessin 2003, 91-106). Maimonides himself may have been more discriminating about drawing from non-Jewish traditions, but the profound influence of Aristotelian philosophy on his thought is nevertheless widely acknowledged: even in the many places where Maimonides disagreed with Aristotle, his “philosophical starting point is Aristotle, and it is from Aristotle that he develops his own philosophical positions” (Frank 2003, 145).

Moreover, a major difference between Judaism and other Abrahamic religions is that Judaism is largely unconcerned with what non-adherents believe, and thus affords a strong degree of freedom of religion to those outside the faith. In contrast to both Christianity and Islam, where it has traditionally been considered incumbent upon those faiths’ adherents to work for the conversion of people of other faiths, Judaism is decidedly not a proselytizing religion, so much so that many modern Jews regard trying to convert others to the faith as inappropriate and disrespectful. Conversion to Judaism is deliberately a difficult and drawn-out process, meant to ensure that those who seek to convert are doing so out of genuine belief.

According to Rabbi Reuven Firestone of Hebrew Union College, the Jewish aversion to proselytization came about by necessity, to protect their communities throughout the long history of Jews living as a persecuted minority in Christian and Muslim states. Starting under the Roman Empire and continuing throughout the medieval period, entire communities could be severely punished for proselytizing to the majority faith: “The rule of survival in each context required that Jews not proselytize, upon pain of death. … Such a length of time [as a minority faith] can deeply acculturate an aversion to engaging in an act that could easily bring death and destruction to the community. So proselytism, while not forbidden anywhere in Judaism, came to feel foreign and strange” (Firestone 2019).

Although only Jews are obligated to follow Jewish law, Judaism does have a separate injunction for non-Jews, known as the Noachide Laws (Korn n.d.). Believed to have been given by God to Noah after the Great Flood, the Talmud regards these as universal laws that are binding on all of Noah’s descendants (all of humanity), thus making them the only instance where Judaism claims to prescribe the behavior of non-adherents. Five of the seven Noachide Laws concern actions and not beliefs – the command to establish courts to uphold the law, and the prohibitions on murder, theft, sexual immorality, and eating the flesh of a living animal. The remaining two, which prohibit blasphemy and idolatry, are potentially problematic when it comes to respect for foreign religious beliefs: while traditional Jewish philosophy would not have regarded blasphemy and idol worship to be genuine religious expressions, the practical definitions of those terms can easily expand to encompass the sincerely held beliefs of other people and their cultures.

However, it is still very notable that non-Jews who abide by the Noachide Laws are thought to have a share in the World to Come, the closest thing Judaism has to heaven, despite not believing in the Jewish God or following any of the Jewish commandments (Korn n.d.). Therefore, at least implicitly, Judaism recognizes that other faiths also can guide a person to live a good and virtuous life – that action is ultimately more determinative of personal morality than belief – and this idea can also be found in medieval thought. Particularly interesting is the apologia commonly known as The Kuzari, by Spanish Jewish polymath Judah Halevi (died 1141), which is framed as an account of a Khazar king convening a dialogue between practitioners of different faiths. (The Khazars were an Eastern European empire whose ruling class converted from paganism to Judaism for uncertain reasons; Halevi’s account, written centuries after their conversion, purports to tell how it happened).

In Halevi’s narrative, the king describes his spiritual crisis following a dream where an angel told him that “his intentions were pleasing to God, but his actions were not” (Kogan 2003, 112). Subsequently, the king tries to “make a more zealous effort to observe the rites of his pagan religion than before,” but the angel keeps returning with the same message (Kogan 2003, 112). Eventually, the king realizes “that God was commanding him to seek out those actions that would be pleasing,” and so he gathers representatives of all the different religions for counsel (Kogan 2003, 112). It is the Jewish response (no doubt a stand-in for Halevi’s view) that he ultimately finds the most convincing, thus spurring his conversion. In his advice to the king, the Jewish philosopher seems almost unconcerned with what belief system the king follows, but only that he act with reason and justice: “the philosopher urges the king, in general terms, to purify his soul of doubts and pursue knowledge of the true realities, while keeping to the path of justice… if he still wishes, he may either create a religion for himself or follow one of the intellectual nomoi [Greek for laws or conventions] of the philosophers” (Kogan 2003, 113). Overall, Halevi defends tolerance of other beliefs as a Jewish value. With the Reconquista and the Crusades as the backdrop of his life, Halevi seems to have felt the rising anti-Jewish persecution of his time deeply – the full title of The Kuzari is Book of Refutation and Proof on Behalf of the Despised Religion.

Although Jewish thought has not had to contend with a notion of freedom of religion, as such, until relatively recently, traces of the idea can be found going back to the medieval period. While ultimately it is hard to argue that unbounded freedom of religion can exist in Judaism, especially when it comes to freedom of religion within Judaism (as is the case for any belief system), Judaism does stand out in its tolerant attitude toward the beliefs of other religions. More broadly, a certain freedom of thought, including a freedom to hold nonconforming religious opinions, can be found in some of the most renowned Jewish scholars’ commitment to rational and diverse inquiry, and overarching emphasis on action over belief.

References:

Chabad. “The Thirteen Principles of Jewish Faith.” n.d. Accessed July 5, 2023. https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/332555/jewish/Maimonides-13-Principles-of-Faith.htm

Firestone, Reuven. “Why Jews Don’t Proselytize.” Renovatio. June 12, 2019. Accessed July 5, 2023. https://renovatio.zaytuna.edu/article/why-jews-dont-proselytize

Frank, Daniel H. “Maimonides and Medieval Jewish Aristotelianism.” In The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, edited by Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman, 136-156. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Kogan, Barry S. “Judah Halevi and his use of Philosophy in The Kuzari.” In The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, edited by Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman, 111-135. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Korn, Eugene. “Noachide Covenant: Theology and Jewish Law.” Boston College Center for Christian-Jewish Learning. n.d. Accessed July 5, 2023. https://www.bc.edu/content/dam/files/research_sites/cjl/texts/cjrelations/resources/sourcebook/Noahide_covenant.htm

Pessin, Sarah. “Jewish Neoplatonism: Being above Being and Divine Emanation in Solomon ibn Gabirol and Isaac Israeli.” In The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Jewish Philosophy, edited by Daniel H. Frank and Oliver Leaman, 91-110. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Shurpin, Yehuda. “Is Hillel’s Teaching the same as the Golden Rule?” n.d. Accessed July 5, 2023. https://www.chabad.org/library/article_cdo/aid/5410546/jewish/Is-Hillels-Teaching-the-Same-as-the-Golden-Rule.htm

That said, even if freedom of religion is not absolutely necessary to the capitalist model, leading capitalist philosophers have interacted with it in unique ways, ultimately showing that freedom of religion can be defended in terms of the free market. Precursors to this connection can be found even before modern capitalism had fully developed, as when Voltaire described how commerce fosters religious tolerance in his famous commentaries on English society: “Take a view of the Royal Exchange in London, a place more venerable than many courts of justice, where the representatives of all nations meet for the benefit of mankind. There the Jew, the Mahometan, and the Christian transact together, as though they all professed the same religion, and give the name of infidel to none but bankrupts. There the Presbyterian confides in the Anabaptist, and the Churchman depends on the Quaker’s word” (National Constitution Center 2023).

Milton Friedman, the preeminent modern philosopher of capitalism, would build on this idea by discussing how the underlying principles of capitalism naturally work to promote respect for freedom of religion. In his book Capitalism and Freedom, Friedman specifically highlighted the principles of free association and private enterprise, emphasizing that they have relevance to society in realms other than the economic: “By relying primarily on voluntary cooperation and private enterprise, in both economic and other activities, we can insure that the private sector is a check on the powers of the governmental sector and an effective protection of freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought” (Friedman 2002, 3). Elsewhere in his book, Friedman pointed to the importance of competition: “[T]he preserves of discrimination in any society are the areas that are most monopolistic in character, whereas discrimination against groups of particular color or religion is least in those areas where there is the greatest freedom of competition” (Friedman 2002, 109).

For Friedrich Hayek, the capitalist system was crucial in enabling free exchange of ideas that are in demand by the public, just as it enables the free exchange of goods and services. To Hayek, capitalism (in a broader sociopolitical sense rather than strictly in an economic sense) facilitates freedom, of which freedom of religion is necessarily a part. As he wrote in The Constitution of Liberty, “the man of independent means is an even more important figure in a free society when he is not occupied with using his capital in the pursuit of material gain but uses it in the service of aims which bring no material return” (Hayek 1960, 125). Among these aims are “the propagation of new ideas in politics, morals, and religion” (Hayek 1960, 125). Hayek subsequently emphasizes how the principle of competition necessitates religious pluralism, analogously to John Stuart Mill’s marketplace of ideas: “[T]here should be no monopoly here but as many independent centers as possible able to satisfy such [spiritual] needs… representatives of all divergent views and tastes should be in a position to support with their means and their energy ideals which are not yet shared by the majority” (Hayek 1960, 125). That said, Hayek noted that freedom of religion, like any freedom, cannot be absolute: “Since there is no kind of action that may not interfere with another person's protected sphere, neither speech, nor the press, nor the exercise of religion can be completely free. … Freedom does mean and can mean only that what we may do is not dependent on the approval of any person or authority and is limited only by the same abstract rules that apply equally to all” (Hayek 1960, 155). Even so, Hayek evidently did not regard such limitations as so significant as to curtail freedom of religion; they did not represent a conflict between freedom of religion and the capitalist model.

Other philosophers, however, were not so accepting of the role of religion in the capitalist system. Von Mises did, in some parts of his work, express a view similar to Friedman and Hayek, as when he wrote, “the freedom that the market economy grants to the individual is not merely ‘economic’ as distinguished from some other kind of freedom. It implies the freedom to determine also all those issues which are considered as moral, spiritual, and intellectual” (von Mises 1990, 9). On the other hand, he also apparently considered religion (or at least the institutions of organized religion) inimical to the development of capitalism. As von Mises said, “it would seem that only a negative answer can be made to the question [of] whether it might not be possible to reconcile Christianity with a free social order based on private ownership in the means of production. A living Christianity cannot, it seems, exist side by side with Capitalism. Just as in the case of Eastern religions, Christianity must either overcome Capitalism or go under” (Glahe and Vorhies 1989).

In The Ethics of Liberty, Murray Rothbard denied the very existence of freedom of religion as a separate right, under his conception that all rights are fundamentally property rights. As he wrote, “the concept of ‘rights’ only makes sense as property rights. For not only are there no human rights which are not also property rights, but the former rights lose their absoluteness and clarity and become fuzzy and vulnerable when property rights are not used as the standard” (Rothbard 1998, 113). For Rothbard, every right is a right to ownership (of one’s body, speech, beliefs, etc.); any other account of rights creates inevitable conflicts when one person’s right interferes with the rights of others. He believes that due to such conflicts all rights must be acknowledged as not absolute, and thus (in contrast to Hayek’s view) they become abridged. Using the example of the right to freedom of speech, or “the right of everyone to say whatever he likes,” Rothbard argued that “the neglected question is: Where? Where does a man have this right? He certainly does not have it on property on which he is trespassing” (Rothbard 1998, 113). Therefore “there is no such thing as a separate ‘right to free speech’; there is only a man's property right: the right to do as he wills with his own [property] or to make voluntary agreements with other property owners” (Rothbard 1998, 113). The same would thus be true for freedom of religion as a discrete right; presumably, it should likewise be subordinated to the interests of, and subsumed into, the capitalist right to property.

The most obvious real-life application of Rothbard’s stance seems to be in workplace accommodations for religious practice. In the United States, the courts have in fact rejected his view by recognizing a separate right to practice one’s religion as it relates to employment; this goes as far back as the 1963 case Sherbert v. Verner, where the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a woman who had been denied unemployment benefits after being fired due to her Seventh-Day Adventist faith. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, religion is likewise a protected category when it comes to employment discrimination, in areas like hiring, firing, or advancement. Under the adversarial view described above, however, a business owner’s property is theirs to do with as they see fit, and they cannot be made to change the way they use their property to accommodate anyone’s beliefs; if the requirements of the job are intolerable to an employee’s religion, the business owner has no obligation to keep employing them. While the employee has the right to ownership of their beliefs, that does not extend to the right to practice those beliefs on someone else’s property.

In the thought of the leading philosophers of modern capitalism, one can find divergent views on the relationship that religion, and specifically the right to freedom of religion, has with capitalism. Nonetheless, these philosophers certainly had to contend with issues of religion, and from their writings it can be seen that freedom of religion has more relevance to a discussion of modern capitalist philosophy than may initially be apparent.

References:

Friedman, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom, 3rd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.

Glahe, Fred, and Frank Vorhies. “Religion, Liberty, and Economic Development: An Empirical Investigation.” Public Choice, 62, no. 3 (1989): 201-215.

Hayek, Friedrich. The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. National Constitution Center. “Letters Concerning the English Nation (1733).” 2023. Accessed July 14, 2023. https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/historic-document-library/detail/voltaireletters-concerning-the-english-nation-1733

Rothbard, Murray. The Ethics of Liberty. New York: New York University Press, 1998.

von Mises, Ludwig. “Human Action.” In Economic Freedom and Interventionism: An Anthology of Articles and Essays, ed. Bettina Bien Greaves, 12-19. Courtesy of the Online Library of Liberty, Liberty Fund, Inc., 1990.

Romans were notoriously open to foreign religious influence and mobility throughout the Republic (Orlin, 2008, 232). “Religion played a decisive role in the circulation of ancestral wisdom and construction of civic identity that was deeply embedded in the political culture of the Roman Republic, (Simón, 2022, 466).” The Edict of Augustus demonstrates how the early empire contributed to the continuation of this openness in stating; “Since the nation of the Jews… have been found grateful to the people of the Romans... it seems good to me and to my advisory council, that the Jews shall use their own customs in accordance with their ancestral law, just as they used to use them in the time of Hyrcanus, the high priest of their highest god; and that their sacred offerings shall be inviolable and shall be sent to Jerusalem and shall be paid to the financial officials of Jerusalem… But if anyone is detected stealing their sacred books or their sacred monies, either from a synagogue or from a mens' apartment, he shall be considered sacrilegious, and his property shall be brought into the public treasury of the Romans (Caesar Augustus, 1 BCE).” Simon Price discusses the importance of how cults represented themselves in relation to the Empire. “Some practices related explicitly to the Roman Empire in different ways; at least compatible with Roman order, dedications, sacrifices, and prayers being offered for the well-being of the emperor (Price, 2012, 16).” As supported by the Edict of Augustus, loyalty to Rome was essential, with foreign and ethnic cults such as Judaism being allowed in this context by exhibiting that loyalty. Other polytheistic religions were tolerated as Rome expanded, absorbing diversity into its borders. Foreign and ethnic cults became popular and could be traced beyond the religious boundaries of Rome, with adaptations in respect to Roman religions being critical to their survival. However, tolerance was not constant throughout history, and at some points, even foreign cults such as the Cult of Isis were subjected to restrictions and edicts from the senate or emperors. “Octavian encouraged the worship of Isis but on Roman terms: only outside the pomerium. Octavian thus achieved a double aim: accepting Egypt with the sphere of the Roman empire but also demarcating the boundary between Romans and non-Roman to recreate a clear sense of Roman identity (Orlin, 2008, 245).” This train of thought further supports the idea that religions were tolerated in relation to Roman identity through restrictions that supported order and fostered loyalty to the original bounds of Rome, commonly in respect to the religious boundary that defined the sacred city limits. Augustus, as the first emperor, wrote his edict and established the precedent of tolerance within the empire that would last among the first few emperors. Tiberius being his successor, is documented by Tacitus to heavily follow the precedent set by Augustus by publicly stating his dependence on Augustan policies, as noted throughout the books of Annals, exemplified in Annals 1.77.3-4 (Cowen, 2009, 180). Therefore tolerance did not change dramatically in the beginning, until it was under Tiberius that the crucifixion of Christ occurred. “Jesus had undergone the death penalty from the Romans under the reign of Tiberius, by the procurator Pontius Pilate (Tacitus, Annals 44:5)” However, Jesus was not sentenced to death for being Jewish or Christian, but for accusations against him claiming opposition of payment to Caesar, and incitement of anti-Rome sentiments (Blumell, 2003, 14). This is also described in Luke 23:2. Following the death of Jesus, “Pilate reported to Tiberius not only the trial and condemnation of Jesus but also subsequent events indicating his divinity…On the basis of this report, according to Tertullian, Tiberius proposed to the senate Christ's acceptance among the deities of the Roman pantheon and his admission to the cult of the Empire. It is a well-known fact that during the Republican period, the Senate had absolute authority on religious matters. The Senate, however, rejected Tiberius' proposal. The emperor, recognizing the judicial consequences for the Chris- tians of this negative decision of the senate, seemingly tried to neutralize its effects by "threatening wrath against all accusers of the Christians (Bacchiocchi, 1998,7).” The disconnect between the senate and Tiberius here shows the legal formalities necessary for establishing tolerance amongst shared powers, and the neutralization of the decision with Tiberius’ threats. Following the rule of Tiberius was Caligula who made no changes to the status of religious freedom at the time, yet his successor Claudius was accredited to reestablishing Tiberian tolerance with the Edict of Claudius on Jewish Rights. “it is right that also the Jews, who are in all the world under us, shall maintain their ancestral customs without hindrance and to them I now also command to use this my kindness rather reasonably and not to despise the religious rites of the other nations, but to observe their own laws. (Claudius, 41 CE).” Despite this Edict, it is under the rule of Claudius that a Jewish uprising occurred resulting in the expulsion of the Jews from Rome, signifying the beginning of the Jewish diaspora (Bacchiocchi, 1998, 13). Following Claudius is Emperor Nero, who changes the way Jews and Christians are perceived for centuries when he becomes the ‘First Persecutor’ of Christians (Blummell, 2003, 16). According to Tacitus Nero blamed Christians as a scapegoat for the fire that occurred during his rule in Rome; “nor all the modes of placating Heaven, could stifle scandal or dispel the belief that the fire had taken place by order. Therefore, to scotch the rumor, Nero substituted as culprits, and punished with the utmost refinements of cruelty, a class of men, loathed for their vices, whom the crowd styled Christians... First, then, the confessed members of the sect were arrested; next, on their disclosures, vast numbers were convicted, not so much on the count of arson as for hatred of the human race (Tacitus, Annals, 5:44:3-7).” Following the Rule of Nero, ten emperors would go on to permanently receive the title of “persecutor” through the records of ancient Christian writings and accounts from those such as Tacitus and Tertullian (Blummell, 2003, 4). Domitian, Trajan, Marcus Aurelius, Septimius Severus, Maximin, Decius, Valerian, Aurelian, and Diocletian would continue the persecution of Christians for the next two and half centuries until the Reign of Constantine finally allows for the religion again. Edicts and orders against the Christians took place throughout numerous rules, “Emperor Decius initiated and rigorously enforced an empire-wide persecution against the Christians commencing in 249 CE when he issued an imperial edict requiring all the inhabitants of the Roman Empire sacrifice to the gods Rome. As a result, Christians who refused to offer sacrifices were not only sought out, but they were either forced into exile or executed (Blumell, 2003, 5).” The Edict of Milan finally restored toleration for the Christians, issued by Emperor Constantine in 313, and ended the persecution of Christians. However, the acts and pursuits of punishing the Christians for centuries go back to the crucial principles of Roman political and legal thought that leadership felt necessary to maintain order; that being loyalty to Rome. Jesus and the monotheistic religions following him challenged that loyalty and security thus were perceived as a threat, therefore explaining the hostility and persecutions that took place to maintain loyalty and order as loyalty to the Roman Gods was considered loyalty to Rome. The different periods and leaderships of Rome demonstrated different levels of religious tolerance and to the extreme end, absolute intolerance. Regardless, it is an essential point to acknowledge that religion played a key part in Roman politics, survival, and identity, and for the most part, mobility and flexibility did occur with the integration of cults into the Roman religion.

References:

Bacchiocchi, Samuele. 1983. “ROME AND CHRISTIANITY UNTIL A.D. 62". Andrews University Press. Vol. 21, no. 1: 3–25. https://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1626&context=auss.

Blumell, Lincoln. 2003. “ The Early Roman Emperors and The Christians: an Examination of Early Emperors Ascribed Position and Persecutors of the Christians" 1-134 https://prism.ucalgary.ca/server/api/core/bitstreams/0652a587-f013-4b79-ae37-21575e955086/content.

Cowan, Eleanor. 2009. “Tacitus, Tiberius and Augustus.” Classical Antiquity 28, no. 2 (October): 179–210. https://doi.org/10.1525/ca.2009.28.2.179.

Orlin, Eric M. 2002. “Foreign Cults in Republican Rome: Rethinking the Pomerial Rule.” Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome 47: 1. https://doi.org/10.2307/4238789.

Orlin, Eric M. 2008. “Octavian and Egyptian Cults: Redrawing the Boundaries of Romanness.” The American Journal of Philology 129, no. 2: 231–53. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27566703.

Price, Simon. 2012. “Religious Mobility in the Roman Empire.” The Journal of Roman Studies 102: 1–19. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41724963?searchText=&searchUri=&ab_segments=&searchKey=&refreqid=fastly-default%3A21e1cabaa214dd0985aef2480469d958&seq=1

Simón, Francisco. 2022. “Religion and Rituals in Republican Rome,” January (January), 455–69. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119673675.ch33.

Tacitus. 98 AD. “The Annals” 1937 translation. Book 1-16. https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Tacitus/home.html.

Thomism refers to the teachings and beliefs of Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), a prominent Catholic theologian and philosopher whose works were heavily influenced by classical Greek and Roman thought. Much of Thomas’ work is based on a reconciliation of faith and reason to obtain true knowledge of the world and, if employed properly, of God. Freedom of religion was a nonexistent concept during the period Aquinas lived through. Despite this, one can see that spiritual arguments of the 13th century were focused on personal interpretation versus the organizational doctrine of Christianity. His magnum opus, Summa Theologica, is a systematic theological tome of what Aquinas believed to be the sum of all known learning. He employs Aristotelian logic processes to explain the relationship between God and man and how man can use faith and reason to understand God's natural world and workings.

It is important to note that while Aquinas forms his arguments for a Christian audience, he does offer insight into broader faith-centered topics, like how to define heresy and man’s right to a free conscience. To Aquinas, heresy was something that only Christians could commit, as “heresy is the species of unbelief that belongs to those who profess the Faith of Christ but corrupt its dogmas” (Summa Theologica II-II, q. 11, a. 1). Those who are not Christian cannot be heretics, based on the definition of heresy being inherent to the Christian faith. Aquinas explains further that “it is irrelevant to the corruption of the Christian Faith if someone holds a false opinion in matters that do not belong to the Faith, e.g., in geometrical matters or others of this sort, which cannot in any way pertain to the Faith. Rather, it is relevant only when someone has a false opinion with respect to the things that belong to the Faith” (ST II-II, q. 11, a. 2). Therefore, through omission, Aquinas acknowledges that peoples of other faiths are not contrary (or heretical) to Christianity, but rather believers of something else entirely. This is not to be confused with unbelief, which according to Aquinas, is a sin since that implies unbelievers are completely “without faith” (ST II-II, q. 10, a. 1).

If we can infer from the Summa that only Christians are capable of heresy, where does that leave Thomist views of freedom of religion? As established earlier, freedom of religion in our modern sense was not understood in the same way by Medieval Europeans. However, it is important to establish that Aquinas believed in a moral order that “is prior to and superior to the legal order; and this moral order is what he calls the ‘natural law’" (Thiry, 174). Humans can't act contrary to this human or natural law, as Aquinas “conceived of human beings as… possessing natural liberty in terms of self-mastery, or natural dominium” (Cornish, 559). In synthesizing Aquinas’ arguments, he “contended that all human beings, Christian or not, had a moral obligation to follow even an erroneous conscience. This principle applied to everyone never previously exposed to the Christian message… [however] it did not apply… to Christian defectors—heretics and apostates—who… should be punished” (Little). Therefore, we can conclude that while not a proponent of freedom of religion per se, Saint Thomas Aquinas did believe in the idea of a free conscience that man was obliged to follow, so long as he was not committing Christian heresy or living with an absence of faith.

Several decades after Aquinas’ death and prompted by the actions of the insurgent French King Philip, Pope Boniface VIII issued the Papal bull, Unam Sanctam, or “One Holy.” In the theoretical context of the extent of freedom of religion in Medieval Europe, this declaration put square limitations on the operational ability of political capabilities when challenged by spiritual controls. While the Unam Sanctam changed little for the average European Christian, it marks a turning point in the way in which organized religion interacted with temporal structures. Boniface explained that:

"We are informed by the texts of the gospels that in this Church and in its power are two swords; namely, the spiritual and the temporal. For when the Apostles say: ‘Behold, here are two swords‘ [Lk 22:38] that is to say, in the Church, since the Apostles were speaking, the Lord did not reply that there were too many, but sufficient. Certainly the one who denies that the temporal sword is in the power of Peter has not listened well to the word of the Lord commanding: ‘Put up thy sword into thy scabbard ‘[Mt 26:52]. Both, therefore, are in the power of the Church, that is to say, the spiritual and the material sword, but the former is to be administered for the Church but the latter by the Church; the former in the hands of the priest; the latter by the hands of kings and soldiers, but at the will and sufferance of the priest" (Papal Encyclicals Online).

Here for the first time in Christian history, the pope ordained that the political and temporal “sword” should be squarely subordinated and at the mercy of the Catholic church. In concluding his bull, Boniface stated, "Furthermore, we declare, we proclaim, we define that it is absolutely necessary for salvation that every human creature be subject to the Roman Pontiff" (Papal Encyclicals Online). Every human creature, regardless of race, creed, location, or language, was now to be governed by the spiritual (and political through subjugation) sword of the pope in Rome. While this bull was issued after Thomas Aquinas lived, this document would prove to be an instrumental point of contention for neo-Thomists in the late-Medieval period when the question of freedom of religion ceased to be purely theoretical and began to have practical implications due to the colonization of the New World.

Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546) was a crucial figure in the Spanish Scholasticism movement and a founder of the School of Salamanca, a neo-Thomist school of thought that produced innovative analyses and teachings on Spanish colonialism, Catholic superiority, and natural rights of all peoples. While Vitoria and Aquinas are formidable religious theorists, their philosophies emerged within different social, political, and religious contexts. While neo-Thomist in nature, Vitoria's works were heavily influenced by the social and political issues created by Spanish colonialism and its interactions with indigenous (non-Christian) Americans.

Drawing on Thomist beliefs in freedom of conscience and the superiority of human (or natural) law to temporal powers, Vitoria was a staunch advocate for respecting the inherent humanity of those that the Spanish encountered in the New World. Vitoria “treated [the] law as made by ‘reason and enlightenment’, not just the will. Natural law, derived from eternal law by reason, was binding on all humanity; its principles applied to mutable situations and different peoples. God was the indirect cause of human laws, which were binding on the conscience of individuals” (Izbicki et al., 2019). So, despite the different faiths of the Spaniards and indigenous Americans, human law was omnirelevant in neo-Thomist philosophy.

The second part of Vitoria’s theoretical argument focuses on the limitations of the Pope as the head of Christendom and the spiritual and temporal controls available to him. Vitoria’s arguments were set directly against what was laid out in the Unam Sanctum of 1302; he argued that the Pope did not enjoy infallible temporal and spiritual power over non-Christians. Vitoria was keen to point out that “…the Pope 'has no temporal power over the Indians or over other unbelievers’” … because “Christ had no temporal power, and so neither can his representative [i.e., the Pope] on earth’” (Ruston, 11). Unlike the two-sword metaphor used to explain the powers available to the Pope in the early 14th century, Vitoria draws the line to exclude “unbelievers” and removes them from the Pope’s jurisdiction. Here again, we see the vital importance of man’s free conscience and the role of natural law in rudimentary accounts of freedom of religion. However, Vitoria did not believe that temporal power was superior to spiritual, just that Christian laws from the Pope did not bind all humanity equally (Izbicki et al., 2019). Vitoria was a Christian and a contemporary of Saint Thomas Aquinas by two and a half centuries. Still, he was able to remove personal religiosity from his political and social opinions in a way that did not become conventional until much later in history. Vitoria took Thomist beliefs of human law and free will one step further than Aquinas in his practical arguments related to the protections indigenous Americans should enjoy in the face of the Spanish conquistadors exploring the New World.

The arguments presented by Saint Thomas and Francisco de Vitoria have surprisingly modern applications in examining their theoretical applications to contemporary understandings of human rights and freedoms. As expressed earlier, because it would be impossible to draw a straight conclusion to support or contradict how they viewed freedom of religion within the social, political, and religious climates of Medieval Europe, we must analyze their works from a theoretical perspective. Suppose we can take the (neo-)Thomist emphases on the importance of free conscience as the primary basis of freedom of religion and man’s right to have a clear conscience. In that case, we can conclude “that when a government seeks to delimit the range of free behavior so that religious beliefs and practices regarding God are excluded or suppressed, the state necessarily acts against the very structure of deliberative human freedom itself, with respect to both its deepest initial inclinations and its ultimate transcendent horizon" (White, 1159). While Thomas and Vitoria would not have shared our contemporary understanding of freedom of religion, their appreciation for the necessity of free conscience over that of ecclesiastical or political restrictions translates well to modern arguments for freedom of religion as a natural and inalienable right to be enjoyed by everyone.

REFERENCES Aquinas, Thomas. New English Translation of St. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae (Summa Theologica). Translated by Alfred Freddoso. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2023. https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/TOC.htm.

Cornish, Paul J. “Marriage, Slavery, and Natural Rights in the Political Thought of Aquinas.” The Review of Politics 60, no. 3 (1998): 545–61. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1407988.

Gundacker, Jay, and Noah Rosenblum. “Historical Context of Thomas Aquinas.” Historical Context of Thomas Aquinas; The Core Curriculum. Accessed June 20, 2023. https://www.college.columbia.edu/core/content/historical-context-thomas-aquinas.

Izbicki, Thomas and Matthias Kaufmann, "School of Salamanca", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/school-salamanca/>.

Keys, Mary M. “Aquinas’s Two Pedagogies: A Reconsideration of the Relation between Law and Moral Virtue.” American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 3 (2001): 519–31. https://doi.org/10.2307/2669236.

Little, David. “Christianity and Religious Freedom in the Medieval Period (476 – 1453 CE).” Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs. Accessed June 20, 2023. https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/christianity-and-religious-freedom-in-the-medieval-period-476-1453-ce.

O’Neill, Taylor Patrick. “Self-Destruction and the Sin of Heresy.” Church Life Journal, November 26, 2020. https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/to-choose-where-there-is-no-choice-self-destruction-and-the-sin-of-heresy/.

Pagden, Anthony. “Human Rights, Natural Rights, and Europe’s Imperial Legacy.” Political Theory 31, no. 2 (2003): 171–99. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3595699.

Pope Boniface VIII. “Unam Sanctam (1302).” Unam Sanctam One God, One Faith, One Spiritual Authority, April 27, 2017. https://www.papalencyclicals.net/bon08/b8unam.htm.

Ruston, Roger. “Justice, Peace and Dominicans 1216-1999: IV—Francisco Vitoria: The Rights of Enemies and Strangers.” New Blackfriars 80, no. 935 (1999): 4–18. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43250200.

Sarmiento, Edward. “HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE THOUGHT OF VITORIA.” Blackfriars 27, no. 319 (1946): 378–87. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43701441.

Thiry, L. “The Ethical Theory of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Interpretations and Misinterpretations.” The Journal of Religion 50, no. 2 (1970): 169–85. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1201784.

When describing his fears for the survival of freedom in the modern world, Weber refers to “individually differentiated conduct” and “individualistic freedom” being curtailed by the process of rationalization (Levine 1981, 16). Since expressing oneself and one’s sentiments is what individualized (i.e., unique to and illustrative of one’s personal qualities) conduct fundamentally consists of, Weber’s concern for individual autonomy can be translated as a concern for freedom of expression. However, one significant difference between Weber and other philosophers of freedom, from John Locke to John Rawls, is that Weber does not think of freedom in terms of rights that one is entitled to. For Weber, freedom of expression is akin to the agency to express ideas and bring them to fruition: it is less a right everyone has simply by virtue of being born, and more a quest to fulfill.

Not only that, but Weber’s ultimate focus is on the state rather than the individual: while his goal is the realization of individual expression, he regards this goal as something to be achieved through developments on a national or societal level, instead of on a personal one. Politics, for him, is “a uniquely human activity, one with the potential both to create and to manifest the responsibility and dignity of individuals in an increasingly secularized world” (Warren 1988, 31).

In his 1919 address “Politics as a Vocation,” Weber begins his exploration of how politics functions in the modern day with his famous formulation that a state is defined by its monopoly on the legitimate use of force: “the modern state is a compulsory association which organizes domination” (Weber 1919, 4). This view certainly lacks the idealism of theories grounded in the idea that the state is under a social contract with its people to uphold their rights. Nevertheless, what is often missed is that Weber’s theory requires not just for the state to be more powerful than any competitors who might also seek to exert force, but for it to exercise power in a way that is (or at least widely recognized as) normatively legitimate.

This discussion of state legitimacy would, it should be noted, have felt particularly prescient to audiences in Weber’s native Germany. Weber delivered his address only a year after the end of World War I, when the monarchy of Kaiser Wilhelm II had been broadly discredited by the devastating loss of the war, and the German people had found themselves living in a vaguely democratic republic that many on both the right and left felt had no grounds to claim their allegiance. In “Politics as a Vocation,” Weber presents three possible sources of legitimate authority: one based on tradition, one on a system of rules or laws, and one on a leader’s “extraordinary and personal gift of grace (charisma)” (Weber 1919, 2). It is this last one that is of most interest concerning how freedom of expression fits into Weber’s views. According to Weber, charismatic legitimacy consists of “absolutely personal devotion and personal confidence in revelation, heroism, or other qualities of individual leadership.” Historically, it has been displayed by “the elected war lord, the plebiscitarian ruler, the great demagogue, or the political party leader” (Weber 1919, 2).

Charismatic legitimacy is, therefore, most relevant to Weber’s vision of the fulfillment of freedom of expression through the state – one where both leaders and those under them interact with politics as a vocation, or (per his term) a calling, a word with distinctly religious connotations. Weber further defines a calling by distinguishing between ‘occasional’ and vocational political engagement: “we are all ‘occasional’ politicians when we cast our ballot or consummate a similar expression of intention, such as applauding or protesting in a ‘political’ meeting, or delivering a ‘political’ speech, etc. The whole relation of many people to politics is restricted to this” (Weber 1919, 5). Political expression requires politicians or other politically engaged people to approach politics as a vocation – as a spiritual mission that one lives to fulfill.

However, to Weber, charismatic leadership alone is insufficient for the popular will to be expressed. Although Weber is cognizant of the problems of bureaucracy, he recognizes that a charismatic leader ultimately needs an effective state apparatus to carry out their promises. To him, “the bureaucratic state order is especially important; in its most rational development, it is precisely characteristic of the modern state” (Weber 1919, 4). The seeming contradiction can potentially be resolved if one considers that throughout his works Weber invokes two distinct types of freedom, each of which interact differently with the inescapable process of the rationalization and bureaucratization of society. One is ‘situational’ freedom, referring to external constraints on one’s movements or actions; the other is freedom in the much more expansive sense of autonomy, or “the condition in which individual actors choose their own ends of action” (Levine 1981, 16). While it is easy to imagine how the rise of factory jobs and big government would restrict situational freedom, Weber believes that the modern state’s effect on personal autonomy is actually positive. This conception of autonomy can be more broadly defined as the ability to be guided by one’s own ideas; Weber calls it “a series of ultimate decisions through which the soul…chooses its own fate” (Levine 1981, 21). It can thus be said that to have autonomy, by Weber’s definition, is to have freedom of expression.

In “Politics as a Vocation,” Weber identifies a state bureaucracy as ultimately critical for the state to enable citizens’ political aspirations to come to fruition – for citizens to have autonomy, in the sense of choosing their own fates. Weber expounds on this idea in other writings on bureaucracy, as in his statements that bureaucratic organization “has usually come into power on the basis of a leveling of economic and social differences,” and that it “inevitably accompanies mass democracy” (Gerth and Mills 1946, 224). This is because mass democracy necessitates “the characteristic principle of bureaucracy: the abstract regularity of the execution of authority” (Gerth and Mills 1946, 224). Weber further elaborates on this with phrases like “‘equality before the law’ in the personal and functional sense,” the “horror of ‘privilege,’” and “the principled rejection of doing business ‘from case to case’” (Gerth and Mills 1946, 224). In today’s terms, this concept might be summarized as the rule of law: having institutions in place to ensure the state effectively and consistently carries out its functions. Weber certainly seems right that a bureaucracy in this sense would be a precondition for popular expression. As an example, in “Politics as a Vocation,” he approvingly cites the 1883 Civil Service Reform Act as creating a professional bureaucracy in the United States, replacing the “spoils” system where successive administrations distributed offices based on political allegiance (Weber 1919, 7).

Nonetheless, Weber’s account of freedom of expression, where the effective operation of the state serving as the avenue for expression of public sentiments, still seems lacking in other ways. Under Weber’s conception of the state, the people’s voice is only expressed indirectly: “the demos itself, in the sense of an inarticulate mass, never 'governs' larger associations; rather, it is governed, and its existence only changes the way in which the executive leaders are selected and the measure of influence which the demos, or better, which social circles from its midst are able to exert upon the content and the direction of administrative activities by supplementing what is called 'public opinion'” (Gerth and Mills 1946, 225).

Then again, this may not have been as much of a concern for Weber. For Weber, political expression entails a progression towards political maturity; the realization of the people’s aspirations is more of a responsibility on their part than a right. Indeed, throughout his body of work, Weber displays a deep pessimism about the political capacities of the German people. According to him (as he wrote in the 1890s), if there is any hope, it lies in the economically ascendant but politically unassertive bourgeoisie: the decaying aristocracy can no longer be trusted with power, while the working classes are led by those who “have no organic connection with the class they claim to represent” and whose “revolutionary posture in fact acts against the further advancement of the working class towards political responsibility” (Giddens 1972, 17).

Giddens goes on to explain Weber’s viewpoint thus: “Weber saw as the principal question affecting the future of Germany [as] that of whether the economically prosperous bourgeoisie could develop a political consciousness adequate enough to undertake the leadership of the nation. … there could be no question of refounding German liberalism upon a 'natural law' theory of democracy. He rejected, moreover, the classical conception of 'direct' democracy, in which the mass of the population participate in decision-making.” Ultimately, “in the modern state, leadership must be the prerogative of a minority: this is an inescapable characteristic of modern times. Any idea 'that some form of democracy’ can destroy the ‘domination of men over other men’ is ‘utopian’” (Giddens 1972, 18).

Perhaps an even bigger problem with Weber’s freedom of expression is that he necessarily views the expression of the popular (which is to say, majority) will as entailing the expression of the individual will. In his address, he never considers situations where they might not, in fact, be one and the same – where an individual might dissent from the majority. Weber’s inattention to the protection of minority views is a consequence of his lack of discussion of individual rights, or indeed of any other limits on government power (like independent legislative and judicial branches, or even regular competitive elections). He may have died before he could see them, but the 20th century would provide numerous examples of how the unfettered state is anything but conducive to freedom, by any definition of the term. While the aim of “Politics as a Vocation” may just be to explain how the state functions and acquires legitimacy, its failure to consider any substantial limits on what the bureaucratic state can do is ultimately a second reason why it is lacking as an account of freedom of expression.

In his book, Mommsen describes Weber’s view thus: “Max Weber considered the natural-law justification of democracy and the liberal constitutional state to be outmoded and an insufficient basis for a modern theory of government. The ‘rights of mankind’ were… ‘extremely rationalized fanaticisms.’” Weber acknowledged that the principle of human rights had done much good, but felt its value was limited in the modern reality: “[Weber] believed that he believed that the axioms of natural law were no longer providing clear directions for a just social order under the conditions of higher capitalism. He also felt that ‘the old individualist principles of inalienable human rights’ had lost much of their power of persuasion under the conditions of modern industrial society. He did not hesitate, on occasion, to set them aside” (Mommsen 1984, 392-393).

Another review describes these shortcomings in Weber’s vision of freedom of expression as less flaws in Weber’s reasoning, and more “symptoms of real challenges for democratic theory” (Warren 1988, 31). Weber may very well have been correct in his preoccupation with the inadequacies of democracy in modern society. Nonetheless, as Warren puts it, “these conflicts would have been less had Weber elaborated his liberal commitments in substantially democratic directions rather than the elitist direction he in fact chose” (Warren 1988, 32). As the world learned from bitter experience, the problems of democracy can only be addressed by expanding democratic participation and rights, to as wide a range of people as possible, and not by restricting them.

There is much in Weber’s political thought that is insightful, and even prescient. In his warnings of the dangers that a hyper-rationalized society posed to freedom of expression, Weber stands out from the Enlightenment thinkers who came before him, for whom rationalization must invariably lead to freedom by liberating humanity from the tyranny of dogma and superstition (Levine 1981, 5). That being said, even if it may have seemed reasonable at the time and much of the criticisms of it come with the benefit of hindsight, his account of freedom of expression is incomplete, in that it only envisions an indirect political expression for the vast majority of citizens, and neglects to recognize the need to protect dissenting voices from the state through robust limits on state power.

References:

Gerth, Hans H., and C. Wright Mills. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.

Giddens, Anthony. Politics and Sociology in the Thought of Max Weber. London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1972.

Levine, Donald. “Rationality and Freedom: Weber and Beyond.” Sociological Inquiry, 51, no. 1 (1981): 5-25, https://claremont.illiad.oclc.org/illiad/pdf/668358.pdf

Mommsen, Wolfgang. Max Weber and German Politics, 1890-1920. Translated by Michael Steinberg. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.

Warren, Mark. “Max Weber’s Liberalism for a Nietzschean World.” The American Political Science Review, 82, no. 1 (1988): 31-50, https://www-jstor-org.ccl.idm.oclc.org/stable/pdf/1958057.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab0b313bfe50f0c00080b3af5edb29a18&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1

Aristotle’s views inspired the Thomastic principles that “the maintenance of any orderly society required adherence to defined rules of conduct… From this requirement some basic laws could be deduced, such as laws forbidding murder and theft. Such laws did not have to be revealed by divine inspiration” (Wallace 537-538, 2009). These natural laws could be rationally produced and would serve as the basic moral framework necessary for the success of that society and natural, collective good while divine law would require certain revelations that are only relevant to those who accept it for their eternal good. Based upon this belief, there was clear and rational justification for a state that ran independent of central religion (Wallace 537-38).

REFERENCES:

Aristotle on Politics and Religion, Austin Cline, Dotdash Learn Religions, 2019 New York.

Though, as explained by Oliver Freiberger, this tolerance is primarily institutional rather than dogmatic (Freiberger, 186). While Buddhism condemns the persecution of other religious groups, it does not necessarily accept the practices and beliefs of other religions to be valid. Thus, as framed by Freiberger, while Buddhism promotes religious freedom, emphasized by its tenets of toleration, it does not approve of the practices of other religions. In addition to toleration, the inclusivity practiced by Buddhists connects the belief system with religious freedom. Noted by Kirstein Beise Kiblinger, modern Buddhists aim to include others in their practices, using Buddhist excerpts to justify inclusivity as a core tenet of their belief system (Freiberger, 188). Permitting anyone the ability to convert to Buddhism, the belief system stresses the importance of the freedom to select one’s religion, an essential aspect of the right to free religious exercise. Ultimately, the tenets of Buddhism can be used to bolster rights to religious freedom, the texts and practices of the religion upholding inclusivity and toleration. Throughout history, Buddhism has been characterized by a broad, decentralized variety of different teachings; thus, sometimes depending on the context and specific text, there can be differing views on freedom of religion within the Buddhist tradition (Borchert 5, 2016). The opinions of the appropriate rights for Buddhists may emphasize and support advocacy for religious freedom for Buddhists or may justify restrictions upon the religious freedom of non-Buddhists to persecute, drive out, and/or convert them (Borchert 10, 2016). More often than not however, freedom of religion is strongly encouraged within the Buddhist tradition. Just as humans have a free mind in choosing between good and evil, we also have a free mind to choose what to believe, and each person should do so in: “healthy mind and knowledge” (Khareng, Awang, Rahman, Machae, Ismail 317, 2014). Within Buddhism, freedom of religion is described in the Tripitaka, the Buddhist most sacred text, and this text describes ten lessons for the “healthy mind” in evaluating the truths of other religions or schools of thought: “(a.) be not led by report (Ma Anusasawen), (b.) be not led by tradition (Ma Paramuprai), (c.) be not led by hearsay (Ma Itikirai), (d.) be not led by the authority of texts (Ma Pithoksamupathanen), (e.) be not led by mere logic and argument alone (Ma Takukahettu), (f.) be not led by inference (Ma Nayahettu), (g.) be not led by considering appearances (Ma Akorpariwitkuken), (h.) be not led by the agreement with a considered and approved theory (Ma Thitthinichamanokkukhanuthitaya), (i.) be not led by seeming possibilities (Ma Phapuphrutai) and (j.) be not led by the idea, ‘this is our teacher’ (Ma Sammanornokhruti)” (Khareng, Awang, Rahman, Machae, Ismail 317, 2014). Throughout recent history, Buddhist thinkers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, such as the Dalai Lama or Walpola Rahula, view the Buddhist concern of alleviating suffering as a rationale to justify Buddhist concern for human rights (Borchert 55-56, 2016). In the Dalai Lama’s “The Importance of Religious Harmony,” he writes: “Each religion has its own philosophy and there are similarities as well as differences among the various traditions. What is important is what is suitable for a particular person. We should look at the underlying purpose of religion andnot merely at the abstract details of theology or metaphysics. All religions make the betterment of humanity their primary concern… Whether we like it or not, we have all been born on this earth as part of one great human family. This is not to say that all human beings are the same or that because everyone wishes for happiness that the same things will make each of them happy. Brothers and sisters resemble each other without being identical” (Borchert 66, 2016). The Dalai Lama here clearly supports religious freedom, even pointing out the similarities in differing religions. This message highlights that human dignity, equality, and freedom, which are the basics of accepted human rights are intrinsic to the ideal of Buddhist teachings. Although the UDHR’s ideas on human rights are considered Western in nature, the Buddhist teachings of the Five Precepts and the six directions champion human rights without ever coining the exact phrase. Stretching back to the third century BCE, Buddhist Emperor Asoka of India states in the 12th Edict of Asoka: “One should not honor only one’s own religion and condemn the religions of others, but one should honor others’ religions for this or that reason. In so doing, one helps one’s own religion to grow and renders service to the religions of others too. In acting otherwise one digs the grave of one’s own religion and also does harm to other religions” (Chanawangsa 4 then 9, 2011).

REFERENCES

Borchert, Thomas, “Buddhism and Religious Freedom: a sourcebook.” Berkeley Center at Georgetown, 2016. https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/buddhism-and-religious-freedom-a-sourcebook-of-scriptural-theological-and-legal-texts

Somseen Chanawangsa, “A Buddhist Perspective on Freedom of Religion,” The Journal of the Royal Institute of Thailand, Volume III, 2011

Freiberger, Oliver. “How the Buddha Dealt with Non-Buddhists.” In Religion and Identity in South Asia and Beyond: Essays in Honor of Patrick Olivelle, edited by Steven E. Lindquist, 185–96. Anthem Press, 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1gxp99q.12.

When it comes to religion, feminist theorists have the same consensus that religion reinforces the patriarchy within society and that religious freedom is important for the liberation of women. Martha Nussbaum said that “Thinking of this problem, then, we can insist that universal norms of religious toleration, freedom of association, and the other liberties are essential in order to prevent illiberal subgroups from threatening legitimate forms of pluralism” (Nussbaum 2000, 52). It is for this reason that Nussbaum believes that pluralism will free women since it will open the door for women to enter the conversation and input their ideas, but such inclusion only happens if the patriarchy is willing to embrace other ideas put forth. To the feminists this includes being plural about religious ideologies as well since if society is to accept other minority groups such as women, then all minority groups need to be allowed, including religious minorities. By giving all groups, religious or other, a setting for their voices to be heard, they eliminate the chance for a single group to rise above and dominate society by oppressing the other opposing groups. Furthermore, Charlotte Perkins Gilman noted that “It is the recognition of a new order of duties, a new scale of virtues; or rather it is the practical adoption of that order long since established by the facts of business, the science of government, and by all great religions. Our own religion in especial, the most progressive, the most social, gives no sanction whatever to our own archaic cult of home-worship" (Gilman 1904, 313). Gilman emphasis throughout her work is the importance of the home to the woman, as a place of oppression and as a place where women can fight the patriarchy by creating change within the home first. It is within the home that Gilman paints a picture for individual religious choice and expression because the home is completely private from society. However, she notes that society cannot be blind worshippers and therefore, a deeper understanding of Christianity needs to be explored within the different sects in order to liberate women and create the equality she describes. Gilman does paint a picture of religious freedom, accompanied by the idea that religion is a choice to be made by the individual in the best interest of the individual.

The feminist definition of freedom of religion follows alongside the idea that people, regardless of religion or gender, should be allowed to do as they please and live life in the manner they believe will satisfy their needs in life. It is for this reason that Nussbaum noted that, “Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing self-expressive works and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to search for the ultimate meaning of life in one’s own way. Being able to have pleasurable experiences, and to avoid non-necessary pain” (Nussbaum 2000, 79). Nussbaum contributes the freedom of any religion in order to lay the groundwork for the idea that anyone should be able to do as they please regardless of their gender or their personal life choices. In this excerpt specifically she notes on the idea that people have the liberty to make their own life decisions and that they should therefore be tolerant of the decisions that others decide to make for themselves. She goes on to describe the type of relationship the government should have with religion within different countries, pointing out the problems of having a non-secular government. For this reason, proposes the solution of a secular government that imposes moral constraint and treats one another as ends. She recognizes that religion and the values of patriarchy are closely aligned and therefore religion and women’s rights are not compatible, yet she still embraces religion since as states before, she recognizes that religion is an important institution within society. Mary Wollstonecraft went as far to say that “Yes, virtue as well as religion, has been subjected to the decisions of taste” (Wollstonecraft 1891, 85). Wollstonecraft adds to this point that would within different religions, women have different rights and liberties and by embracing all religions, there is a possibility that women will be freed from the oppressive state they reside in. However, Wollstonecraft’s version of freedom of religion is the freedom to choose among the Christian denominations. Evidence of this is shown throughout her work as she disproves of atheism and Catholicism, yet is willing to embrace other Christian sects. Wollstonecraft’s idea of personal preference when it comes to religion is something that most feminists would agree with since as stated before women might have different freedoms within different religious sects. In Her discussion of religion, matters of the influence of the patriarchy and the hold men have on institutions prevails as she describes the manner in which men maintain control.

Aside from the literal and most common forms of religion people tend to think of, feminists like MacKinnon, Friedan, and Paglia introduce a new kind of religion that they want to address within their works. It is the way people hold one another to their gender roles that creates this new institution that people follow religiously, wielding the same faith and commitment religion gets. In its essence, these specific theorists name these oppressive gender roles as the new religion because of the way people religiously adhere to these gender roles and gender stereotypes that oppress women. In this definition of religion that most feminists attempt to address rather than the literal religions that people think of when it comes to defining the freedom of religion. In this case, feminist theorists advocate for the complete abolition of this religion since it is part of the aesthetics of society that keep women oppressed and does not give them the equality they are entitled to. Despite this alternative religion, feminist theorists advocate for a complete freedom of religion within society in order to address the inequalities women face in society.

References:

Gilman, Charlotte Perkins. The Home, Its Work and Influence, by Charlotte Perkins Gilman. England: William Heinemann, 1904, 1904.

Nussbaum, Martha C. 2000. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge University Press

However, Locke prioritizes following the law over free worship, condemning religiously motivated illegal acts (Kessler 493). The following passage from A Letter demonstrates Locke’s view that humanity cannot identify a true religion: “For every church is orthodox to itself; to others, erroneous or heretical. For whatsoever any church believes, it believes to be true and the contrary unto those things it pronounce; to be error. So that the controversy between these churches about the truth of their doctrines and the purity of their worship is on both sides equal; nor is there any judge, either at Constantinople or elsewhere upon earth, by whose sentence it can be determined” (13-14). Locke separates “speculative” and “practical” beliefs, the former of which applies merely to conscience, and the latter of which influences action. Locke argues that speculative beliefs should always be respected, but identifies certain practical beliefs that should not be (Locke 30-31). These include beliefs incompatible with morality, that induce disloyalty to the state, and atheism (Kessler 494). He condemns non-belief because, “Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist” (Locke 36). He also argues for a separation of church and state, claiming that peace and security are incompatible with “religion propagated by force of arms” (Locke 15). Though a devout Christian, he rejects the application of Biblical law to modern societies; ‘“Hear, O Israel,” sufficiently restrains the obligations of the law of Moses only to that people” (Locke 28). He is unambiguous and absolute on separation, stating that “church itself is absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth and civil affairs. The boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable. He mixes heaven and earth together, things most remote and opposite, who confuses these two societies, which in their origin, their end, and their whole substance are utterly and completely different” (Locke 15).

Locke does not argue for religious freedom because it is a fundamental right, but rather as a means of maintaining a free society in general. He argued that state enforcement of religious doctrine could serve as an excuse for tyranny. Locke believed that the large number of churches in a free society would maintain that freedom because these churches would be too varied for one to subjugate others and because they could collectively rise up against a threat to their freedom (Kessler 502). Finally, Locke embraced a form of civil disobedience when the government oversteps its bounds in making laws that restrict religion. As Locke argues in A Letter, “If the law, indeed, be concerning things that lie not within the verge of the magistrate’s authority (as, for example, that the people, or any party amongst them, should be compelled to embrace a strange religion, and join in the worship and ceremonies of another Church), men are not in these cases obliged by that law, against their consciences” (33). The following passage from A Letter demonstrates Locke’s view on the benefits of religious freedom and pluralism: “Take away the partiality that is used towards them in matters of common right; change the laws, take away the penalties unto which they are subjected, and all things will immediately become safe and peaceable; nay, those that are averse to the religion of the magistrate will think themselves so much the more bound to maintain the peace of the commonwealth as their condition is better in that place than elsewhere; and all the several separate congregations, like so many guardians of the public peace, will watch one another, that nothing may be innovated or changed in the form of the government, because they can hope for nothing better than what they already enjoy—that is, an equal condition with their fellow-subjects under a just and moderate government” (38-9).

Locke describes churches in A Letter as “a society of members voluntarily uniting (Locke 9). He argues that churches should have the right to exclude members (12), and to create their own bylaws (10). Locke’s respect for association is not restricted to churches; A Letter advocates for no difference in governmental treatment between associations for philosophy, business, religion, or recreation (38). He states that, “Neighbourhood joins some and religion others. But there is only one thing which gathers people into seditious commotions, and that is oppression.”

REFERENCES:

Sanford Kessler, “John Locke's Legacy of Religious Freedom,” Polity 17:3, Spring 1985

However, there eventually came into existence: "an intermediate category of dār al-ahd, the abode of the treaty" (Crone 2004, 359). As the Rashidun and Umayyad Caliphates spread their faith and demesne across the Middle East and North Africa, Muslims were outnumbered by practitioners of Christianity, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and several other minor religions. This expected population disparity all over the eventual borders of the Caliphate led Muhammad to decree the existence of an intermediate realm. Due to the similarities between Islam, Judaism, Christianity, and Zoroastrianism, Muhammad decided that a pact or treaty could be made with these Ahl al-Kitāb or People of the Book. This treaty decided that the "kitābī's were eligible for dhimma, legal protections to match that of the Muslims themselves" this allowed these fellow believers in the one God to "live on a permanent basis in the Muslim world" and practice their religion as they pleased, as long as they "[recognized] Muslim sovereignty and [displayed] their position of inferiority by paying poll-tax (jizya)" (Crone 2004, 359). This allowed the cousins of Islam to live in their ancestral homes as long as they respected their new Islamic overlords.

Alfarabi, an influential 9th and 10th-century Islamic political philosopher, concluded in his work that "what is intended by… the human being is that he obtain happiness" (Butterworth 2015, 65). This happiness comes from accepting and learning about Muhammad's revelation in the mountains outside Mecca. In order to achieve this, humans must first receive the primary cognitions, or the first intelligible, given to them by the active intelligence (Butterworth 2015). Alfarabi says that for humans to submit to god, they first must learn the basic concepts of how the world works, and they will conclude that there is one God and that Muhammad brought the most complete revelation from Allah to the people. However, to achieve this revelation, humans must first be exposed to the evidence that proves these facts about Islam. Without these cognitions being presented to the people by god, people will be unable to achieve true happiness and submit to God. There could also be people who received all of the necessary evidence but just interpreted it differently from others; therefore, they will also not achieve true happiness (Butterworth 2015). These two examples could be allusions to Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians, people of the book who do not accept (or have not received in full) the revelations of Muhammad, and the different branches of Islam: Sunni, Shia, Ibadi, and others. The way to unify these groups into a functioning city in which people can achieve their happiness which varies "in quantity and quality in accordance with the variation in [their]... civic actions," (Butterworth 2015, 71), such as attending the Friday prayer or paying the jizya, depending on who you are. Therefore, even the non-true believers will not be able to achieve the complete happiness of accepting the revelation for themselves; they can achieve a piece of the true happiness through participating in the obligations they have when living in the city of the true Islamic faithful.

The final reference Alfarabi makes to the idea of religious freedom is a parallel when talking about his “ideal city” to the three realms created by Muhammad. The three inhabitants being the two accepted citizens of the city and the threat to the city's security: the Grass, The Weeds, and The Beasts (Butterworth 2015, 76). The Grass represents the true believers for whom the city is for and where they are nurtured to achieve their true happiness. These are the inhabitants of dār al-Islām, the true believers. Next, The Weeds, while taking up space within the city and limiting the amount of grass that can grow, is still not dangerous and are actually a diverse population, something essential for any city to be natural and healthy. These are the inhabitants of dār al-ahd, the people of the book who have accepted part of the revelation but not the whole truth. Finally, there are The Beasts or "the people who are bestial by nature"; these people are "not citizens, nor do they have any civic associations at all" (Butterworth 2015). They may be "domesticated" like slaves or hunted and slaughtered freely like wild beasts. These people are the inhabitants of dār al-kufr, the pagans who refuse to accept any part of the revelation, making them dangerous and unnecessary for the Islamic world.

Avempace also discusses the ideas of The Weeds and their relationship to the perfect Platonic city. According to Avempace, a "perfect city is that [which] is free from Weeds" (Lerner 1963, 127). However, this perfect city is an impossible utopia where everyone gets along so well that there is no need for either a "doctor nor judge," where everyone does their job, fits in their class, and does not diverge from "the opinion of the citizens" (Lerner 1963). However, this society is impossible. Therefore, Avempace accepts that "The Weeds can… exist in the four ways of life" (Lerner 1963, 128). He does not seem happy about it, saying that the more the opinions of The Weeds differ from that of the true citizen, the more apt the name is. However, Avempace also seems to think that in an imperfect city where The Weeds, the doctors, and the judges all exist, good governance should still look out for these Weeds and assist them in achieving as much happiness as possible. However, this depends "on how far [their] insight takes [them] or on (a belief) that had seized [them]" (Lerner 1963). Whether these weeds have achieved a partial revelation through other prophets, or have understood Muhammad's revelation differently, all of the citizens within the city deserve to have their happiness preserved. He describes it as "medicine of the soul," deriving from an ancient Greek physician and philosopher, Galen, who prescribed astrology and alchemy to preserve the soul and its happiness. Still, for The Weeds to have their happiness considered, they must be at least similar to the citizens or The Grass and not differ too significantly, or else they may be seen as diseasing or disintegrating the city (Lerner 1963).

REFERENCES:

Butterworth, Charles E. 2015. Alfarabi: The Political Writings, Volume II. New York. Cornell University Press.

Crone, Patricia. 2004. God’s Rule: Government and Islam. United Kingdom. Edinburgh University Press Ltd.

However, Plato knew how poorly many myths displayed the Greek gods. When creating his "city in speech," Plato discusses the dangers of poets, such as Homer, and their interpretations of the gods, specifically regarding the guardians of the city. Plato believes the city cannot run unless the gods and their stories are adequately depicted so the ordinary people can follow them; otherwise, there will be no justice and virtue. Specifically for the guardians, Plato wished for them to be raised fearing "slavery more than death," in order to do this he suggested that the poets be censored, deleting passages that make the afterlife sound like the worst possible place to end up (Plato 2004, 67). Plato wished for his Kallipolis to have not just the laws but the inner workings of the city’s citizens’ minds to be guided by the gods and their perfect divine image. This is also shown in Plato's Myth of Er, a story of a murdered soldier who returns from the dead to tell the common people what the afterlife is. This story is supposed to convince the citizens of the Kallipolis that the crimes committed by the Hellenes dictate an afterlife. However, Er recalls that while he was sitting in the judging room of the deceased that "the greater [punishments] for impiety or piety toward gods or parents" (Plato 2004, 321). This is meant to keep Greeks in line with worshiping the gods because it is a tale-telling of the fate of the impious to be eternal suffering in hades.

More evidence is given on how deeply the idea of strictly following religion affected the Greek states. In The Apology, Socrates was "tried for impiety" (Plato 2018, 29). Socrates was brought to trial and eventually sentenced to death on suspicion of going against the city's religion. The Apology shows how essential Greeks thought piety and religion were and how closely related the state religion and laws were.

REFERENCES:

Plato. 2004. The Republic. Translated by C. D. C. Reeve. Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. https://123philosophy.files.wordpress.com/2018/12/Plato-Republic.pdf

Plato. 2013. Laws. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. The Project Gutenberg EBook of Laws. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1750/1750-h/1750-h.htm

Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is one of his better-known works, in which he addresses the apparent advantages that Protestants enjoy within a capitalist system over members of various other Christian and non-Christian religious traditions. As in other works Weber seems to regard religious diversity within various nations as something of an inevitability, and as a result he does not address freedom of religion as a concept, much less as a right. However, one small passage in his introduction to The Protestant Ethic which implies that Weber held a deep personal respect for all the world’s religious sects. He stated that:

“The question of the relative value of the cultures which are compared here will not receive a single word. It is true that the path of human destiny cannot but appal him who surveys a section of it. But he will do well to keep his small personal commentary to himself, as one does at the sight of the sea or of the majestic mountains, unless he knows himself to be called and gifted to give them expression in artistic or prophetic form.” (Weber, 36) It is difficult to surmise what exactly Weber would have thought about essential rights and freedoms of the citizen because he never explicitly addresses them in his work. However, passages like this one seem to indicate that at the very least, he would not have approved of religious intolerance within a political society.

Another theme in Weber’s work which implies that he would at least oppose a society’s enforcement of religious homogeneity is his apparent ambivalence toward religious belief in general. His focus throughout The Protestant Ethic remains more on the social influences of various religious traditions, rather than the doctrines and dogmas of the faiths themselves. This becomes obvious when he writes that the capitalist system “no longer needs the support of any religious forces, and feels the attempts of religion to influence economic life, in so far as they can still be felt at all, to be as much an unjustified interference as its regulation by the State” (Weber, 62). Given the fact that Weber clearly did not view religious dogma as a necessary influence on post-industrial capitalist society, one might conclude that Weber would have viewed any attempt to limit religious freedom as an frivolous endeavour. At the very least, Weber might have been ambivalent toward religious homogeneity within political society, and therefore more likely to support religious freedom as a basic concept, if not a right.

References:

Jurgen Habermas expanded on Adorno and Horkheimer's ‘culture industry’ analysis. In providing historical context for the culture industry's triumph, Habermas emphasized how bourgeois society in the late 18th and 19th centuries was marked by the emergence of a “[public] sphere between civil society and the state, in which critical public discussion of matters of general interest was institutionally guaranteed”, and which mediated between public and private interests (Habermas, 1989, p.11). Individuals and groups could finally shape public opinion, giving direct expression to their needs and interests while influencing political practice. The bourgeois public sphere made it possible to form a realm of public opinion that opposed state power and the powerful interests that were coming to shape bourgeois society.

Habermas was fascinated by the transition from opinion to public opinion, as well as the latter’s socio-structural change. The rise of the mass press, according to him, was founded on the commercialization of the people’s engagement in the public sphere. As a result, much of the original political nature of this ‘extended public sphere’ was lost in favor of commercialism and entertainment (Habermas, 1989, p. 169). This trend may be seen in the press, which is the most important entity of the public sphere: Habermas diagnoses the merging of the formerly distinct domains of journalism and literature, as well as a blurring produced by the mass media’s response to the rise of a consumerist culture. He argued that “Editorial opinions recede behind information from press agencies and reports from correspondents; critical debate disappears behind the veil of internal decisions concerning the selection and presentation of the material.” (Habermas, 1989, p.169)

The introduction of electronic mass media into the public sphere exacerbated the situation. The news is made to resemble a story from its own structure down to stylistic detail, thus the boundary between truth and fiction is increasingly being discarded (Habermas, 1989, p.170). However, while they have a greater influence than print media, their format effectively limits interaction and deprives the public of the opportunity to disagree and think critically, leading Habermas to the conclusion that “The world fashioned by the mass media is a public sphere in appearance only”, at the same time “the integrity of the private sphere which they promise to their consumers is also an illusion.” (Habermas, 1989, p.171). Adorno and Horkheimer agree with Habermas on this point, for them, “Movies and radio need no longer pretend to be art. The truth that they are just business is made into an ideology in order to justify the rubbish they deliberately produce” (Dialectic of Enlightenment, 1944, p.121, para.1)

Habermas notes the contradiction between “the liberal public sphere’s constitutive catalogue of ‘basic rights of man’ and their de facto restriction to a certain class of men” (Habermas, 1989, p.11). The public sphere's character is becoming progressively limited; the media serve as tools of establishing and controlling consensus and promoting capitalist culture rather than fulfilling their original purpose as organs of public discussion. In favor of a staged performance, publicity loses its critical role, ideas are transmuted into symbols to which one cannot react by debating but only by identifying with. Unlike the coffee houses, Habermas pointed, “[they] were considered seedbeds of political unrest: Men have assumed to themselves a liberty […] to censure and defame the proceedings of the State” (Habermas, 1989, p.59). Throughout Structural Transformation, Habermas maintained that the mass media have evolved into monopolistic capitalist institutions. Their role in public debate has evolved from disseminating trustworthy information to shaping public opinion. To counter these developments and as a condition for a pluralist democratic debate in an open society that is not entirely dominated by the mass media. Habermas emphasized the importance of a vital and functioning public sphere, a sphere of critical publicity distinct from the state and the economy, consisting of a broad range of organizations that represent public opinion and interest groups.

From this, it is obvious that Habermas, Horkheimer and Adorno advocated for freedom of the press and freedom of speech, a press that is free from the monopolistic capitalist corporations and the influence of the state. One that informed citizens and left them to criticize freely. Habermas argued that “the press was systematically made to serve the interests of the state administration” (Habermas, 1989, p.22). At the same time, Habermas also argued that the elimination of censorship in England in the years of 1694 and 1695, gave some liberty to the press, even by a slight margin. “The elimination of the institution of censorship marked a new stage in the development of the public sphere” He stated, “It made the influx of rational-critical arguments into the press possible and allowed the latter to evolve into an instrument with whose aid political decisions could be brought before the new forum of the public” (Habermas, 1989, p.58). In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas stated clearly and explicitly that “Freedom of the press, radio, and television, as well as the right to engage in these areas, safeguards the media infrastructure of public communication; such liberties are thereby supposed to preserve an openness for competing opinions and a representative diversity of voices.” (Habermas, 1996, p.368, line.9)

Nevertheless, in comparison to the emerging media of the twentieth century, like film, radio, and television, the degree of economic concentration and technological coordination in the newspaper business appeared to be modest. Indeed, the funds for the media of the twentieth century appeared to be massive, and their propagandist power so intimidating, that in certain countries, capitalist or not, the development of these media was controlled by the government from the outset.

References:

Adorno, T. W., & Horkheimer, M. ( 1944) . Dialectic of enlightenment . Verso.

Habermas, J. ( 1989) . The structural transformation of the public Sphere an inquiry into a category of bourgeois society. MIT Press.

It is along these lines that insights towards the right to freedom of the press can readily be made. A free press is a tool which allows for an individual’s own enlightenment, and this occurs through the criticism one opens oneself by publishing a piece of writing, as well as the opportunity to critique the writings and ideas that others make. The effects of a free press is then the enlightenment of society which Kant believes necessarily results from the opening of freedom: “The public use of man’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men,” (Kant, 1991, p. 55).

Interestingly for Kant, a free press is beneficially for a leader because it contains criticisms of them. In his essay On the Common Saying: 'This May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice' , Kant describes the good ruler has his subjects suffer only by mistake and ignorance, and therefore it is the subject’s duty to express his opinion of the ruler’s actions that way the ruler can correct it. Because of this duty, Kant states: “Thus freedom of the pen is the only safeguard of the rights of the people,” with the caveat of: “although it must not transcend the bounds of respect and devotion toward the existing constitution, which should itself create a liberal attitude of mind among the subjects” (Kant, 1991, p. 85). Kant therefore has a certain idealism as to the interaction between ruler and subject with the freedom of the press. The relationship certainly is a critical one where the subject criticizes the ruler’s actions, though the relationship is not antagonistic. The liberal ruler agrees with the values of the liberal subject, and the ruler uses the subject’s input to rule in a just way. Reciprocally, the subject also has the duty to follow the laws that the ruler bestows: “In every commonwealth, there must be obedience to a generally valid coercive laws within the mechanism of the political constitution” (Ibid., pg. 85).

References:

Kant: Political Writings (ed. Reiss)

With this analysis, postmodernism gives two main insights towards the right to freedom of the press—one flattering or supportive to the right, the other critical and deconstructive. The first, supportive, insight is that the right to freedom of the press allows for the dissemination of countless micro or small narratives. The right actively prevents the “violent and tyrannical” metanarratives from imposing their “false universality” (Woods, 1999, p. 21) onto the margins that do not have the same confirming experience. A free press entirely attacks the self-legitimation which these narratives perpetrate.

The second, more cynical insight is that the right to freedom of the press is at least an important mechanism for a metanarrative and at most a metanarrative itself. In Zühtü Arslan’s account of postmodernism’s interpretation of human rights, he claims: “[T]he most important feature of the postmodern discourse which makes impossible a friendly relationship with human rights is its hostility to the concept of the autonomous subject and to the idea of universality” (Arslan, 1999, p. 196). The human subject, with his autonomy and moral importance, is one that was constructed by the contexts and contingencies of the modernists that theorized him. With this, the universalization of this right fails before it even began. Moreover, any attempt by a government to establish such a right, as well as argue for its existence, is merely an attempt at self-legitimization of its own power. The right to freedom of the press is then, counter to the first insight stated above, an attempt to defend the metanarrative already established.

In the end, postmodernism gives two contradictory insights on the right to freedom of the press. One in which the freedom of the press is a tool for the micronarratives of the marginalized to express their points of view which contrast the tyrannical meta narrative, and the other in which the freedom of the press merely another expression of the dominant metanarrative already assumed and taken for granted.

References:

Arslan, Zuhtu. “Taking Rights Less Seriously: Postmodernism and Human Rights.” Res publica (Liverpool, England) 5, no. 2 (1999): 195–.

Lyotard, Jean-François, Geoffrey Bennington, and Brian Massumi. The Postmodern Condition : a Report on Knowledge. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.

Most feminist political commentary and theory is centered around the critique of the relationship between the private and the public spheres that inherently treats women as less than compared to their male counterpart. In her political commentary Sexual Personae, Camille Paglia noted that “He has no personal life. He completely identifies private with public interest. Hence, he is unstoppable. Such men can be political geniuses or monsters” (Paglia 1990, 214). In fact, Bell Hooks would go as far to claim that men are told to dominate the private sphere despite giving women the belief that the home and the private realm will be theirs to dominate and to rule over (Hooks 1984, 120). Paglia and Hooks both demonstrate the point that the feminists paint a picture where the power of the public outweigh the power of the private and since women are taught that the private will be their realm, they are inherently less important compared to their male counterparts. Paglia also details something important in the fact that the men of society can either help or hurt women because of the power they possess in the public and the private, yet most feminists would argue that they choose to abuse women within their spheres because of the way that Hooks says that they are encouraged to dominate women any way that they can. These sentiments reflect the critiques of the relationship between the private and public spheres that dominates the arguments made by feminists on the matter of the right to privacy and hence why some are skeptical about maintain that right. Susan Moller Okin’s work Justice, Gender, and Family noted that, “If there were a clear sphere from which the state refrained from intruding, that sphere would have to be defined, and its definition would be a political issue. But in fact, the state has not just "kept out of family life. In innumerable ways, the state determines and enforces the terms of marriage” (Okin 1989, 129). To Okin, the dichotomy between the private and the public realms is central to her argument for the elimination of the private sphere because of the lack of justice maintained within this sphere. Okin uses this to further the point that there is no separation because of the state’s involvement in issues like women’s bodies and marriage that make the separation unrealistic since within the minds of men, the two are automatically linked without any clear distinctions. The feminists use examples of abortion and marriage to further prove that the lines between the state and the home are blurred and often nonexistent because the state makes decisions without consulting women or even acknowledging the boundary that should be there. Okin even claims that the boundary is artificial and only created based off the different principles that the men have on these matters. However, she highlights the lack of justice for women due to the difference in principles in men that allow them to abuse their women and belittle them from reaching their full potential within society. Some theorists see the role of the traditional woman with her duties and her obligations to the family as invasive and a problem when it comes to the right to privacy for a woman. Written in 1903, Charlotte Perkins Gilman makes the claim that, “The mother—poor invaded soul—finds even the bathroom door no bar to hammering little hands. From parlour to kitchen, from cellar to garret, she is at the mercy of children, servants, tradesmen, and callers. So chased and trodden is she that the very idea of privacy is lost to her mind; she never had any, she doesn't know what it is, and she cannot understand why her husband should wish to have any "reserves," any place or time, any thought or feeling, with which she may not make free” (Gilman 1903, 36). Gilman makes the assertion that the role women have taken on within the home means that there is no such privacy for the woman whatsoever. It is because she has other obligations as a mother, as a wife, as a caregiver that something is always expected from her and that her needs are irrelevant because she “rules” the home. She claims that there is also no possibility for individual privacy because there is no specific space for just the individual unless they are living alone. However, within the family, the individual is crowded by those around, and as stated before the role of the woman is to serve everyone and everything according to the standards set by the man. She adds that if the individual was truly private, there would be no scrutiny or judgement because the individual is truly private about their thoughts and their feelings, but this concept of privacy is only applicable to the man who rules the home and is always free to express themselves within the home. It is the woman who is continuously repressed in and out of the home and is in constant contact with the other women and servants of the neighborhood with whom they share and continuously violate the idea of privacy. In Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach by Martha Nussbaum, Nussbaum noted that, “It goes without saying that in poor families where five or six people share a single room, there is no such thing as the privacy of the individual in the middle-class American sense – although poor people will frequently seek solitude for the purpose of defecation, walking considerable distances from their dwellings” (Nussbaum 2000, 259). Nussbaum and Gilman both illustrate the life of the woman in which she is subjected to the needs of the family and expected to run the household without being given the respect that should come with the role. She continues the argument by claiming that individuals have the right to privacy within their decisional liberties, but for women and in general the home limits the space where the individual can carry out their liberties simply because the lack of space. Nussbaum decides to remedy this by claiming that the state should be allowed to intervene so long as they do so to protect only the privacy the individual has in the form of decisional liberties the individual holds. Even though she speaks in broader terms about the individual, she emphasizes the fact, as Gilman points out, that the role of the women is far more extensive than that of the man within the home and therefore, her privacy is severely more limited than that of the man within the home. In the process of the state protecting the liberties of the individual, Nussbaum would claim that the needs of the woman need to be acknowledged and enforced in order to maintain her decisional liberties. Alongside the critique of the public and private spheres mentioned above, theorists propose a reconstruction of the public and private life that would eventually liberate women from the abuse and violence they face. In her book, A Vindication of the Rights of Women with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects by Mary Wollstonecraft, she noted that “To render women truly useful members of society, I argue that they should be led, by having their understandings cultivated on a large scale, to acquire a rational affection for their country, founded on knowledge, because it is obvious that we are little interested about what we do not understand. And to render this general knowledge of due importance, I have endeavoured to shew that private duties are never properly fulfilled unless the understanding enlarges the heart; and that public virtue is only an aggregate of private” (Wollstonecraft 1792, 291). Part of the larger and general feminist argument for privacy is the reconstruction of the private and public realms so that there could possibly be the existence of the private sphere once the problems are addressed. For Wollstonecraft, part of the progression of women is to form the new public sphere around the education of the women in order to maintain the public happiness. Wollstonecraft claims that the means of some private virtue is the same as the public happiness since whatever happens within the private is brought out into the public. For that reason, Wollstonecraft argues that the public and the private are utterly the same since the state already tries to solve the problems that take place within the private space of the home. However, within the home, she notes that the role of the woman is to please the man and because of this she is denied her public and civil duties which again can be rectified by educating women and men about the opinions and the manner which society enforces. The Feminine Mystique by Betty Friedan noted that, “Their determination betrays women’s underestimated human strength and their urgent need to use it. But only the strongest, after nearly twenty years of the feminine mystique, can move on by themselves. For this is not just the private problem of each individual woman. There are implications of the feminine mystique that must be faced on a national scale” (Friedan 1963, 350-351). Friedan wanted to remedy the inequalities that she saw within the private life, by demolishing the line between the public and the private by exposing the inequalities that the women faced within the private life. In order to reform and reconstruct life to benefit women, her solution was to promote education and find something beyond the self to identify with. Her idea that was if women were able to reimagine themselves, they would be able to overcome the problems and show society the way that women should be treated. Freidan’s concept of the private however was aligned with Gilman and Nussbaum in that the duties of the woman prevent actual privacy, so she proposed another separate space away from the family in which the woman can achieve a sense of privacy. In order to reimagine themselves within the public, Friedan proposed private and public education like Wollstonecraft proposed, and suggested challenging the images of women proposed by the media. When it came to the media specifically, she wanted women to reimagine themselves using their own private image to facilitate what their version of what a woman looked like. Feminists in general proposed their own version of reconstructing the public to change the way women were viewed which usually involved exposing their problems to the public, completely ignoring the idea of the private individual. Despite the constant call for the barrier between the public and the private to be broken, there are some claims to a right to privacy made by the feminists. Catherine MacKinnon noted this in her work Toward a Feminist Theory of the State when she claimed that “The law of privacy treats the private sphere as a sphere of personal freedom. For men, it is. For women, the private is the distinctive sphere of intimate violation and abuse, neither free nor particularly personal. Men's realm of private freedom is women's realm of collective subordination.” (MacKinnon 1989, 168). Most feminist theorists agree to some sort of concept of the private and what that might look like. Most feminists were skeptical of the private because of all the abuse that took place within this sphere, hence why they wanted the government to intervene in the matters of the private. However, as MacKinnon pointed out, the private provided personal freedom that the public could not provide, hence why it was important to revisit the private sphere once the woman was reimagined and re-envisioned for the better. MacKinnon acknowledged the fact that there were legal protections about privacy for women since there were these protections for men but based on examples surrounding abortion and marriage concluded that even though it was legally available for women, it was not enforced. Specifically, the government rulings on issues like Roe v. Wade gave women the private right to choose, but she recognized that the fact that the government had a say on this matter, was an invasion of the privacy of the women to choose. Even the discussion of whether the government would fund abortions became a matter of government involvement on a woman’s decision to choose. After her discussion of this matter, she established that the right to privacy was necessary and continuously violated by the government in order to maintain control over women. Carole Pateman extends this argument within her work The Sexual Contract when she notes that, “Shultz states that there is a strong argument that private contract should not override the criminal law but, she writes, 'the idea of enforceable private agreements concerning violent sexual conduct is less offensive than a state declaration that violent sexual conduct is automatically acceptable in marriage.' Such a response begs the question about limitations to and alternatives to contract” (Pateman 1988, 185). Pateman specifically notes that the relationship between the government and the people on matters of private and public is something that is important for the safety of women and for the natural liberties for the individual. She notes that what calls the sexual contract is something women are subjected to where their abuse accumulates at home and sometimes within the public. She called for government intervention on matters of legally maintaining women’s liberties and for intervention when men within the private life continuously abused women. Pateman noted that the line between the public and the private was indefinite and used the system of marriage as an example of how the government was involved. She claimed that because the government had to keep records of marriage contracts between private individuals, marriage could be considered public, despite the specific agreements within the marriage contract is a private matter talked and agreed upon by the different parties. She still notes in the end that the government had some obligation within the private lives to reform the treatment of women and the inequalities that women face within the home, an attitude shared by most of the feminist theorists. The consensus among the feminists is that the private sphere is where women are subjects of abuse and inequalities that need to be exposed out in the public in order to help women overcome the view that men have of them. To these theorists' women face the same treatment within the public sphere as the patriarchy and the government make decisions on their behalf and subject them to the private life where they are expected to take care of the family. The primary role of the woman centers around the idea of the family and the way that the woman is supposed to take care of the family depriving her of her own privacy. Jean Bethke Elshtain adds an interesting perspective to this notion and considers that as women are liberated by their actions, the structure of the family will fall apart. She adds that the family dynamic is also changing as there are more single parent households or same-sex households that change the way the family has been thought of (Elshtain 1981, 323). This is an interesting notion as the thought of the private sphere changes for these women and the way that women are taking more charge within the world continuously challenging the private abuse at the hands of the man. The notion of the right to privacy is something constantly changing as situations change but should be broken down to expose the flaws within the system that negatively affect women.

REFERENCES:

Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought - Second Edition. NED-New edition, 2. Princeton University Press, 1981. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv131bvkg.

Friedan, Betty. The Feminine Mystique. Dell Publishing Company INC. 1973

Gilman, Charlotte Perkins. The Home. New York Charlton Company. 1910

Hooks, Bell. 1984. Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center. South End Press

Mackinnon, Catherine A. 1989. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Harvard University Press

Nussbaum, Martha C. 2000. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge University Press

Okin, Susan Moller. 1989. Justice, Gender, and the Family. Basic Books Inc.

Paglia, Camille. “Shakespeare and Dionysus: As You Like It and Antony and Cleopatra.” In Sexual Personae, 194–229. Yale University Press, 1990. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1bh4bwb.12.

Pateman, Carole. The Sexual Contract. Stanford University Press, 1988.

Kant’s idea of the private sphere stems from his emphasis on the moral relationships within the public that create a sense of wellbeing for society and the people there to allow everyone to pursue their own interests. In his essay titled “Perpetual Peace” Kant wrote that, “For in their external relations, they have already approached what the idea of right prescribes, although the reason for this is certainly not their internal moral attitudes. In the same way, we cannot expect their moral attitudes to produce a good political constitution; on the contrary, it is only through the latter that the people can be expected to attain a good level of moral culture. Thus, that mechanism of nature by which selfish inclinations are naturally opposed to one another in their external relations can be used by reason to facilitate the attainment of its own end, the reign of established right. Internal and external peace are thereby furthered and assured, so far as it lies within the power of the state itself to do so. We may therefore say that nature irresistibly wishes that right should eventually gain the upper hand” (Kant 1795, 113). Kant’s emphasis is on the peace of the community and the ways in which community control their own personal morality to maintain the community and avoid the problems that are likely to arise. Due to this, it might be reasonable to assume that Kant would say that the individuals' morals are private since they must sacrifice their ideals for the public standard set by the community, leaving the private realm the only space in which individuals can subscribe to their own ideas of the good life. Specifically, Kant would say that whatever passions people have should be subjected to the private sphere to maintain a certain level of peace and stability within society. Kant even adds that maintaining a private or “internal” sphere for selfish interests helps benefit both the public and the private sphere so that there is balance in both spheres and the people maintain the peace. For Kant, the relationship between the public and the private is dependent on the morals people hold to maintain a standard within the community and prolong a state of establishment, which requires creating some sort of separation between the two spheres. However, it should be noted that Kant places an emphasis on the public to suggest that its importance prevails above the importance of matters within the private sphere. Furthermore, Kant said that “ we cannot simply conclude by a reverse process that all maxims which can be made public are therefore also just, because the person who has decisive supremacy has no need to conceal his maxims. The condition which must be fulfilled before any kind of international right is possible is that a lawful state must already be in existence. For without this, there can be no public right, and any right which can be conceived of outside it, i.e., in a state of nature, will be merely a private right. Now we have already seen above that a federative association of states whose sole intention is to eliminate war is the only lawfol arrangement which can be reconciled with their freedom” (Kant 1795, 129). The idea of the “internal” is continued in his analysis of the state of nature in which there is only matters of the private sphere. However, when theorists reference the state of nature, they usually provide some remedy because they believe that the state of nature is imperfect and needs to be fixed for the betterment of society. Therefore, it might be reasonable to assume that Kant believes that this state of privacy needed to be fixed by creating a society in which people needed to create more public relations and establish a state that revolves around the public sphere and the interests for the public. This is not to say that he wants to get rid of the idea of privacy altogether, but it further shows his preference for the public sphere rather than the private sphere. When it comes to the government and the private sphere, Kant emphasizes the use of government as public actors acting for the public rather than public actors acting within their own private interests. He believed that the officials of the government are merely public figures that adhere to the morals established by society and because of this again, like most of society, they leave their private reasonings within the public sphere especially when making decisions for the people. Kant does paint some pictures of privacy within the realm of private property, but his idea of private property does not come without exceptions and limits when it comes to the boundaries between the private, the public, and the government. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant said that “this supreme ownership is only an idea of the civil union, designed to represent through concepts of right the need to unite the private property of all members of the people under a universal public owner; for this makes it possible to define particular ownership by means of the necessary formal principle of distribution (division of the land), rather than by principles of aggregation (which proceeds empirically from the parts to the whole). The principles of right require that the supreme proprietor should not possess any land as private property (otherwise he would become a private person), for all land belongs exclusively to the people it also has a well-authenticated objective reality which can easily be demonstrated from particular instances as they arise” (Kant 1797, 147). The reiteration of a private sphere for Kant is reimagined in the form of private property. For Kant, private property is the space in which individuals can live out their personal, private morals they had to leave behind to maintain public moral standards and public peace. The realm of private property is the space in which the government cannot interfere with the people and for Kant something the government cannot and should not acquire for themselves. If the government were to obtain their own private property, the government would become private individuals no longer invested in the public morals or the public peace they are to represent and enforce. It should be noted that Kant’s version of government is a federation of civil societies, reemphasizing the lack of power the government should have. Therefore, it is logical for Kant to believe that the government should not even own property since their role is minimized within the civil society in which the people and the public control most of the affairs. Kant’s decentralized government reinstates the idea that the higher ups within society should not be allowed to interfere with the lives of the people, leaving matters of civil society to the people based upon public morals rather than private interests. This creates a third power within society, namely the civil society that reigns over the government and the private individual as that is where all matters take place and are negotiated among the individuals of society rather than another power. In addition, Kant noted “A third kind of right is necessary for the preservation of the state-the right of inspection (ius inspectionis). This requires that no association which could influence the public welfare of society (publicum), such as an association of political or religious illuminati, may be kept secret; at the request of the police, it must not refuse to disclose its constitution. But only in cases of emergency may the police search anyone's private residence, and in each case, they must be authorised to do so by a higher authority” (Kant 1797, 149). Although the government is not as important as civil society as discussed before, it does not mean that Kant believes that it should not have any duties to protect the public peace and the public morals. For this reason, Kant grants the government some powers to protect such interests like the right to inspect or enter private realms. Although this seems contradictory of his ideas discussed earlier, it must be noted that Kant believed that individuals must not interfere with one another and have the liberty to act within their own selfish interests. To maintain this standard, Kant tasked the government with creating laws that would create a sense of freedom in which the individual has the right to do as they please until their actions interfere with others' right to freedom. This therefore is the reasoning behind allowing the government to intrude in the private homes of the individual when there is a reasonable assumption that doing so would benefit the community and its aim for peace. Again, this establishes a boundary between the public and the private realms, implying that the people have this implicit limited right to privacy, but the concept of privacy is subject to the strives towards public peace and individual liberty. Kant’s main emphasis is the peace of society and is willing to put the needs of society above the interests of the private individual to achieve his main objectives of peace and liberty. The lines between the private, the public, and the government are further blurred in his discussion of rights and the public and government punishment for going against the morals set forward by civil society. Again, in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant said that “The real definition would run thus: “Right in a thing is a right to the private use of a thing, of which I am in possession — original or derivative — in common with all others.” For this is the one condition under which it is alone possible that I can exclude every others possessor from the private use of the thing (jus contra quemlibet hujus rei possessorem). For, except by presupposing such a common collective possession, it cannot be conceived how, when I am not in actual possession of a thing, I could be injured or wronged by others who are in possession of it and use it” (Kant 1797, 49). Kant’s main emphasis is the liberty one must do as they please without limiting the liberty those around him have as well. For that reason, Kant defines “right” or liberty above as a private matter because it is his to do whatever he wants with it. It is his and no one else to determine what an individual does or thinks so long as it does not interfere with the liberty of the people around him. This is a broad interpretation of privacy especially since Kant emphasizes the needs and the wishes of the public above the individual which contradicts the very idea of the individual having the right to do as he pleases. Other than private property, every human has the private possession of this right without interference from anyone else around him. However, Kant makes it known that there are limitations to these rights in the form of adhering to the public standards of morality and upholding the peace of civil society. It is in these instances that the idea of privacy is questioned and limited because it directly contradicts the actions and the intentions of the public and the government. Besides this private right Kant describes, he wrote that, “The right of administering punishment is the right of the sovereign as the supreme power to inflict pain upon a subject on account of a crime committed by him. The head of the state cannot therefore be punished; but his supremacy may be withdrawn from him. Any transgression of the public law which makes him who commits it incapable of being a citizen, constitutes a crime, either simply as a private crime (crimen), or also as a public crime (crimen publicum). Private crimes are dealt with by a civil court; public crimes by a criminal court. Embezzlement or speculation of money or goods entrusted in trade, fraud in purchase or sale, if done before the eyes of the party who suffers, are private crimes. On the other hand, coining false money or forging bills of exchange, theft, robbery, etc., are public crimes, because the commonwealth, and not merely some particular individual, is endangered thereby. Such crimes may be divided into those of a base character (indolis abjectae) and those of a violent character (indolis violentiae). Judicial or juridical punishment (poena forensis) is to be distinguished from natural punishment (poena naturalis), in which crime as vice punishes itself, and does not as such come within the cognizance of the legislator” (Kant 1797, 104-105). Within the discussion of the right to privacy in relation to civil society, Kant discusses the ways in which the government are allowed and permitted to interact with the community. He thus concludes that when it comes to the concept of punishment, when the crime is committed in which there are no victims, the civil society will decide a punishment and in the cases in which more than one individual is involved, the state will decide a punishment. This again subjects the individual to another power, namely civil society, in which the individual not only sacrifices his own morals to, but also determines the standards for society and punishments as they see fit. This distinction between the public and the government creates another relationship between what is considered public to society and what is considered public to the government. Kant’s ideas suggest that the individual may be private from the government, but the individual cannot be private from the public in which they report to. Individuals can keep their morals private from the public, but in the end, the interests and the actions of the individual are public and subject to judgement from civil society. Compared to the relationship between the government and the people, the relationship between civil society and the private individual shows that the public is more important since it is invested in the life of the individual and since the individual is expected to subject itself to the morals established by the public. Kant’s emphasis on the public sphere and the clear difference between the public, the government, and the private sector reinstate the point that although the right to privacy is stated and valued to keep the government out of personal affairs, there are exceptions to this rule crucial for restoring justice within society.

REFERENCES:

Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysics of Morals. Edited by Mary Gregor. Cambridge University Press. 1996.

Based off an initial reading of Mill, it might be assumed that a private sphere might exist in order to develop higher faculties away from the public. For example, Mill notes that, “A person whose desires and impulses are his own—are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture—is said to have a character...Their thinking is done for them by men much like themselves, addressing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of the moment, through the newspapers” (Mill 1859, 67). From here the reader reasonably infers that Mill would advocate for individuals to remove themselves from the public in order to reach their higher faculties since if one is not in the public sphere, the conclusion is that they are in the private sphere. However, as Mill goes on to describe his argument, he uses various examples to explain his philosophy and how the issue of the private and public spheres should be addressed. In the end, he turns to uses his own harm principle to argue that the state and the government should intervene in instances where the decisions one makes affect the prospects and the lives of the people around them. Due to this belief, he argues that the private sphere is severely limited by the government’s interest to protect the people from other’s personal desires. Furthermore, Mill notes that “That, this being supposed, they cannot be acting wrongly in endeavoring to exclude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested, of instigators who cannot possibly be impartial—who have a direct personal interest on one side, and that side the one which the State believes to be wrong, and who confessedly promote it for personal objects only” (Mill 1859, 110). Alongside this argument, Mill describes several examples where government intervention is allowed when the decisions of the individual interfere with the lives and the decisions of other people. With that being said, there can be no existence of a private sphere for the government needs to protect individuals from the impulses they have that in Mill’s philosophy warrant punishment by the government. The problem with the discussion of Mill and the private sphere is that he does not make any explicit claim about the right to privacy because of the necessity of government intervention from his point of view. Mill further describes this limited aspect of privacy in which the government is allowed to intervene so long as there is reason to intervene for the good of the rest of the population. For example, Mill writes that “The State, while it respects the liberty of each in what specially regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others” (Mill 1859, 116). This statement alone, despite not referring to the topic at hand, states clearly where he would stand on the issue of the right to privacy. One might claim that there could still be a private sphere especially since Mill does not dismiss the idea all together, but what is important to mention is that the state cannot intervene in matters of right and wrong without letting the individual be somewhat public. He names another example in which he claims “If the government would make up its mind to require for every child a good education, it might save itself the trouble of providing one. It might leave to parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased, and content itself with helping to pay the school fees of the poorer class of children, and defraying the entire school expenses of those who have no one else to pay for them” (Mill 1859, 116-117). In these matters, Mill claims that the government can control and regulate the way that children pursue their higher faculties through education since it is their liberty and goal to reach these faculties for the betterment of their character and overall well-being. Mill maintains this point of view that every individual has the right to live their best life, which he believes is attainable so long as people make decisions for themselves only and the state makes decisions to make sure that others cannot infringe on the lives of others. He recognized the ways that people’s individual private actions could injure one another, despite operating within this realm of personal liberty. He saw the way that life needed regulation based on the harm principle which allowed the government to intervene on private matters and push for a stronger public sphere to share ideas. Mill by no means wanted the government to control every aspect of the life of the individual, he wanted to merely hold the individual accountable for the way their decisions affected those around them. Mill continues within his other works to paint a picture as to what he wants society to look like and describes the ways in which having a private or domestic sphere can create a form of the right to privacy. Within The Subjection of Women Mill notes that, “As regards the relations of private life it may be said generally, that their influence is, on the whole, encouraging to the softer virtues, discouraging to the sterner: though the statement must be taken with all the modifications dependent on individual character”(Mill 1861, 565-566). Mill’s main emphasis is on the morally correct and doing the necessary things in order to achieve this moral good, especially since he believes that the society around him is declining due to the lack of morality and tendency for people to avoid pursuing their higher faculties. Since women are subjected to the household and are not given a role within the public sphere, it could be argued that women then are responsible for what would have been the private sphere since the home is their responsibility to maintain. It could be asserted that there is a private sphere in which the women or those at home are responsible for the moral development of the children and those living within the home. Within his writing about the home, the government plays no role in dictating how the morals are taught, therefore alluding to this right to privacy based on the premise that the home is a private space in which the government cannot intervene. In addition, Mill adds that “There is no country of Europe in which the ablest men have not frequently experienced, and keenly appreciated, the value of the advice and help of clever and experienced women of the world, in the attainment both of private and of public objects; and there are important matters of public administration to which few men are equally competent with such women; among others, the detailed control of expenditure” (Mill 1861, 580). Here, Mill describes the full capacity of women within the public sphere and particularly within the government but understands that the standards that society have during his time leave no space for women publicly. He uses this line to reference the power and influence that women already have over the private sphere despite society’s perception of women. However, it should be noted that acting within their realm of liberty, they had this explicit right to privacy that allowed them to hold themselves accountable, therefore keeping the government out of their private lives. Therefore, Mill could take on the belief that if a private sphere should exist to develop and teach morals to children who then enter the public sphere and hopefully act within their best interests to pursue their higher faculties without intervening in the lives of others. What might be something to keep in mind about Mill and his idea of the right to privacy is the sense of Victorian morality that he writes about and his overall response to rights of any kind. He writes both works from the Victorian moral point of view which in turn is reflected in the way that he believes that society should be run and would agree about the way that life would be instructed upon these morals. It is this sense of morality that would go against most things that one might believe is not the concern of the public and Mill would want to spread his single version of morality because everyone should be morally upright according to the same standard. Despite this observation, Mill would also claim that holding oneself accountable is necessary to maintain this moral standard because individuals do not and should not depend on one another. Other than the right to privacy, his perspective on rights aligns with those of earlier philosophers so long as they fall within the utilitarian model and therefore benefit most of the people. However, this creates somewhat of a dilemma since any action or inaction could be seen to benefit the majority. The government could infringe on the inherent rights one has and claim that it be for the betterment of society that they control religion, speech, and property despite these being protected by many other philosophers. In that sense, it is hard to define from the Mill point of view what people do and do not have the right to within their system of government. The right to privacy from Mill’s perspective is one that is hard to define and comes with various limitations that allow the government to intrude on the lives of the people.

REFERENCES:

Mill, John Stuart. “On Liberty.” In John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Essays, edited by John Gray. Oxford World’s Classics, 1991.

In Rousseau's state of nature, humans act as individuals and do not intermingle with each other. Their projects never required "the joint labor of several hands," and they "lived free, healthy, honest, and happy lives" (Rousseau 1973, 92). These lives were completely independent of other humans. Humans roamed, hunted, and gathered alone; no one else had any power over him. Man was free to pursue "the only goods [he] recognized in the universe… food, a female, and sleep" (Rousseau 1973, 61). Life was simple, and humans had the right to do as they pleased, when they pleased, without anyone questioning why they were doing it. There was no overarching government or general will to encroach on the privacy of humans in nature. Humans "had no question… as to private likes or dislikes [as] all are alike" (Rousseau 2004). However, this simplicity of nature did not last forever. Eventually, humans came together to form societies due to the "two arts… which first civilized men and ruined society," metallurgy and agriculture (Rousseau 1973, 92). As society shifted from nature to civilization, humans signed a social contract to give away parts of their sovereignty to a new sovereign, the general will, a prince, a legislator, or a chief, for example. This society removed the natural freedom under which humans acted as they pleased without encroachment. However, they still held a right to privacy within a civilized society; however, it was much less than before. The second stage is where people can live in a state of the early community. This community lacks the oversight of a chief or government; however, unlike the state of nature, humans begin to associate with each other to sustain the new arts of metallurgy and agriculture. Since land is required to grow crops slowly, these early humans decided that "to secure each man his own, it had to be possible for each to have something" (Rousseau 1973, 94). This is the beginning of property, born from the manual labor of the farm, slowly allowing people to have their place where they can do whatever they want, also known as acting in their private interests. Metallurgy, on the other hand, "working metals and multiplying their uses," leads to the concept of value. People used these tools to better land plots and increase food production, among other things. Therefore, to acquire these irons and tools, people "required commodities in exchange" (Rousseau 1973, 94). These advancements gave value and worth to the ownership of items and land. As disparities began to develop between the people within these early communities, so too did the idea of jealousy and inequality (Rousseau 1973, 96). In a society with inequality and no authority to keep it in check, there then come individuals who will encroach on the privacy of other individuals. This threat to others is what slowly necessitates the tyranny of the government to establish peace and security in exchange for other losses of privacy. Once the social contract between humans and magistrates is established, people's liberties are immediately restricted compared to the state of nature and early societies. The average person signs away their liberties to their chief, establishing tyranny through the people's consent. The ordinary people sign "a contract binding on only one of the parties, where all the risk is on one side, and none on the other" (Rousseau 1973, 104). The magistrates take no risk in this exchange as they are not subject to their privacy being encroached upon, among other rights and liberties. However, just because the people sign away their freedoms to the legislature and chiefs does not mean they are entirely at the government's will. Rousseau does not believe that the government has complete control over the private actions and possessions of the common people. When discussing the right to ownership and sovereignty, Rousseau explains that the government limits how much power it has over people. Due to Rousseau's restricted discussion on privacy, we will have to look at the allusions made to it through the right to privacy. Taking the Lockean view that "'every man has a property in his person," we can assume that property "provides the foundation for the right to privacy" (DaCosta 2021, 2). If the government expects the people to respect their side of the social contract, it must uphold its end. In the case of property and privacy, Rousseau says that the government "has no right to touch the property of one or many; but he may lawfully take possession of the property of all" (Rousseau 2004). In other words, "the general and sovereign will is the master of all the others," showing that the will of the government must respect the people's privacy rights or else risk its demise (Rousseau 2004). This distinction between total and partial encroachment on rights shows Rousseau's exciting view on privacy and rights as a whole. Rousseau believed that the individual holds political rights; however, the government may take away the rights of every one in particular situations for the state's health. This general will also influence people's privacy; however, even this will is only "considered collectively and as a body, but each individual, as a subject, has his private and independent existence" (Rousseau 2004). Therefore, in a civilization, neither the general will nor the government can fully encroach on the citizens' privacy without the whole society falling apart. On the other hand, this freedom is nowhere near what it is in the state of nature, where people are entirely free to do as they please without the threat of government or general will even be considered a threat to that freedom of privacy.

REFERENCES:

Rousseau, Jean-Jaques. 1973. The Social Contract and Discourses. Translated by G. D. H. Cole. David Campbell Publishers

John Dewey’s political philosophy embraced democracy as a solution for social and political disfunction. Modern pragmatists like Robert Talisse have used the term “Deweyan Democratic Perfectionism” to reference Dewey’s idealistic theory about suffrage perfecting the function of society (Talisse 2014, p.123). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy links Dewey’s pragmatism to his political stances, reading: “As a public intellectual, Dewey was a supporter of such causes as women’s suffrage and the Settlement House movement” (Festenstein, 2019). Dewey also served as an early member and co-sponsor of organizations like the ACLU and NAACP, both of which have long fought to expand suffrage and defend minority voters against disenfranchisement. This political advocacy work speaks to the ways that pragmatism guided Dewey’s support for voting rights. In thinking that democracy can lead to perfection in society, the pragmatist would certainly support the rights of all citizens to vote. “While Dewey sometimes refers rather scathingly to the ‘machinery’ conception of democracy, he is committed to improving this machinery (by supporting the equal distribution of the franchise, for example) rather than merely dismissing it as unimportant” (Festenstein, 2019). The institutional “machine” of democracy allows citizens to pursue their interests in a collective way, and a way that pragmatists see as beneficial to society.

Dewey’s work alone cannot provide a complete understanding of pragmatism’s connections to voting rights. It is also important to consider the ways in which suffrage can shape political events as an outcome of practical application- the pragmatist’s primary tool. Citizens are generally content when their government meets their perceived needs. When public needs are not met, two different possibilities emerge. In democratic societies, citizens exercise their right to vote in a way that rewards those who seek to meet their needs and interests and punishes those who do not by legally stripping them of power. The second possibility occurs when citizens do not have the right to vote yet no longer consent to the way in which they are governed. If needs continue to go unmet, the public has no legal recourse to air their grievances and could eventually make the collective decision to work against their own government. The difference between these two scenarios is the presence of voting rights. Pragmatism dictates that the concept of voting or the ideals of democracy have merit if they succeed in practical application. The voting society described here is successful in that it has measures in place that incorporate and accommodate political dissent. Dewey himself noted that suffrage allows individuals to pursue their own interests while also making civic contributions. We can see this relate once again to Deweyan Democratic Perfectionism, encapsulated here in the idea that “democracy is a way of life in which each individual exercises and cultivates his unique capacities in a way which contributes to the flourishing of the whole society” (Talisse 2014, p.123). The belief in such a level of “perfection” underscores the pragmatic argument in favor of voting rights.

Another well-known pragmatist, William James, also studied pluralism and how it can cause disfunction when not incorporated or accepted politically. With labor strikes as the example in mind, James’ view is described: “Far from being the basis for reconciliation, we see here how the contradictory pluralism within radical empiricism explains the emergence of social insurrection, but also civil war” (Rogers-Cooper 2017, p.257). Labor strikes are an example of what James labels “radical pragmatism” because the workers seek to disrupt typical societal function but do so because it appears to them a pragmatic and effective type of political activity. If the workers are instead presented with the option to voice their approval and disapproval by voting (and they have faith that the voting system is fair and equal), then they are likely to take that option rather than bear the costs of insurrection. James’ outlook is likened to a theory known as formal democratic enclosure, which states that “elections operate ‘at the level of the demonstration’ to prevent ‘outlaw’ forms of collective politics” (Rogers-Cooper 2017, p.244). In other words, the “outlaw” approaches like strikes and insurrections are made to appear impractical if citizens feel they can express themselves sufficiently through voting. The citizens are thereby “enclosed” into the formal, regulated spheres of democracy and kept away from the populist democratic uprisings that threaten order and stability. In relation to pragmatism, James’ outlook seems to prioritize societal function similar to Dewey’s. He indicates that voting rights are beneficial as a bulwark against explicit class conflict and revolutionary sentiment.

Through the analytic lens of pragmatism, democratic choice and voting rights seem to excel. Because it reduces the threat of class conflict and improves public health outcomes, there is much evidence to conclude that suffrage improves societal function. Professor and philosophy scholar Dr. John R. Shook writes: “Pragmatism can criticize the mistakes of public democracy, but at the same time pragmatism praises public democracy as the best form of government that has been invented at this time” (2010, p.12). Given that pragmatism hinges on the results of practical application, modern democracies serve as natural experiments which provide adequate evidence that voting rights are advantageous to society.

References:

Festenstein, Matthew. 2019. “Dewey’s Political Philosophy.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2019. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/dewey-political/.

McDermid, Douglas. n.d. “Pragmatism: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed July 15, 2021. https://iep.utm.edu/pragmati/.

Rogers-Cooper, Justin. “Truth Written In Hell Fire: William James and the Destruction of Gotham.” William James Studies 13, no. 2 (2017): 240-81. Accessed August 3, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26493681.

Shook, John R. 2010. “Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Public Democracy.” Revue française d'études américaines. 124 (2): 11–28.

Aristotle outlined election features of different types of democracies that were considered democratic because of their incorporation of the assembly. The first type would be that in which offices were open to all but would be appointed in turn by magistrates. In this case few things would be decided by all in the assembly, but the assembly would decide on the passage of laws and they would approve or withhold the selection of officials by magistrates. Aristotle did not specifically explain how magistrates would go about selecting officials in this type of democracy (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1298a 9). Another type of democracy was one in which more matters were decided by the assembly, including legislation and selecting offices. Offices would be chosen by lot, except in the cases where an office required a special skill or knowledge, in which case they would be chosen by election (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1298a 24). In the final form of democracy, the assembly would decide all matters. Officials would only be necessary for organizational purposes to ensure the assembly ran properly, and officials would not have final judgment on matters (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1298a 28). In the case of democracies, Aristotle suggested paying the poor to attend the assembly and fining the rich for not. He also recommended limitations on payment for attendance in order to ensure the common people would not outweigh the rich. Aristotle wanted to avoid oligarchy by evening the influence of the rich and the poor, to ensure the common interest was at hand (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1298b 11).

Aristotle also outlined differences in voting procedures in different types of oligarchies as well as mixed regimes and aristocracies and polities. One type of oligarchy was that in which officials were elected from among those who had the requisite amount of wealth. Another type was that in which all who had the requisite amount of wealth shared in rule. There were also cases of aristocracy or polity in which case all had control over matters of war, peace, and taking audits, but magistrates had control of everything else, including laws and electing officials. This type of regime would not be democratic because officials were not chosen by all, or at least not approved by all in the assembly. However, because all still decided on other matters such as war and peace, the regime would not be an oligarchy. “Lot is a democratic feature and will make them [regimes] polities by opening up office to many; election is an oligarchic and aristocratic feature and will either confine office to the wealthy (in which case the regime will be an aristocracy in the sense in which oligarchic polities are aristocracies) or to those with a certain quality or virtue (in which case the regime will be genuinely aristocratic…)” (Simpson 2002, 345). In general, Aristotle believed that rulers should rule in the common best interest, rather than solely in their own best interest (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1279a 28). In the case of oligarchy, Aristotle recommended affording the populace the ability to give some input on political decisions, as this could promote peace, even if they were not given power in final decision making (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1298b 26).

Aristotle had two large concerns with elections, campaigning and demagoguery. In terms of campaigning, Aristotle was concerned that only the people who wanted to be in office would be, rather than the people who necessarily deserved to be in office. He believed that a man who was worthy of office should accept the position regardless of if he wanted to (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1271a 10). He also thought that campaigning “promotes love of honor, the cause, along with love of money, of most voluntary wrongs or deliberate acts of injustice” (Simpson 2002, 118). It is the pursuit of these wrongs that leads to tyranny. Additionally, regarding demagoguery, Aristotle worried that class interests would dominate elections, rather than the good of the whole. To prevent this, he recommended that the populace be divided into local groups for voting in elections. He believed that by voting in such groups, people would be less concerned with their general class interest, and would be more alert to local ties (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1305a 28).

While Aristotle strongly believed citizens should participate in politics, he did not support extending political rights to slaves, women, or laborers. He thought that slaves did not possess the intellectual skills to be able to govern themselves, and hence would be subject to the governing of others (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1254b 16-23). Similarly, women were viewed as naturally inferior to men with less capability of leading (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1259b 1-2). An important point that Aristotle emphasized was that citizens should be ruled by their equals, resulting in a reciprocal equality, unlike that between slaves and their masters or women and men, and therefore women and slaves were not considered citizens. As for laborers and artisans, Aristotle believed that “there is a need for leisure both with a view to the creation of virtue and with a view to political activities,” which laborers and artisans did not have sufficient time for (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1329a 1-2).

References:

Aristotle, Politics

According to Panini, all northern India's states and territories (janapadas) during his time were founded on the colonization or conquest of a specific area by an identified warrior group who still controlled the political life of that area (Basham, 1959) . Some of these peoples (known as janapadins by Panini) were ruled by a king who was, at least in theory, of their own blood and maybe reliant on their support (Muhlberger, 1998) . Other than that, the janapadins handled their affairs in a republican fashion. Thus, in both types of state, the government was dominated by persons classed as ksatriyas, or members of the warrior caste, as later times would describe it (Hays, 2015) . Another example is a republican federation known as the Kshudrak-Malla Sangha which posed serious resistance to Alexander the Great in the 4th century BC. Many more republican regimes in India have been mentioned by the Greeks, some of which were classified as pure democracies and others as "aristocratic republics” (Muhlberger, 1998) .

According to Prakash ( 2006) , a vote was called a 'chhanda,' which literally translates to a 'wish.' This evocative word was used to communicate the concept that voting expresses a member's free will and choice. There used to be multi-colored voting tickets called 'shalakas' (pins) for voting in the assembly . When a division was called, they were handed to members and collected by an officer of the assembly called the ‘shalaka grahak' (collector of pins). This official was chosen by the entire assembly. It was his responsibility to conduct the vote, which may be secret or open. However, Indian republics are beginning to sound extremely undemocratic by our modern standards, with real power concentrated in the hands of a few patriarchs representing the leading lineages of one privileged section of the warrior caste.

References:

Basham, A. L. ( 1959) . India as Known to Pāṇini (A Study of the Cultural Material of the Ashṭādhyāyī). By V. S. Agrawala. pp. xx + 549, 3 maps, plate. Lucknow University, 1953. Rs. 50. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 91(3-4), 181–183. https://doi.org/10. 1017/ S0035869X00118544

Muhlberger, S. ( 1998) . Democracy in Ancient India. https://www.infinityfoundation.com/mandala/h_es/h_es_muhlb_democra_frameset.htm

Prakash, A. ( 2006) . Law relating to elections: an essential revision aid for law students. Universal Law Pub.

In his discussion in “Perpetual Peace” of the traditional division of the types of government Kant classifies governments in two dimensions. The first is the “form of sovereignty” (forma imperii), concerning who rules, and here Kant identifies the traditional three forms: autocracy, aristocracy, and democracy, “the power of a prince, the power of a nobility, and the power of the people” (Kant, 1991, p. 100). The second is the “form of government” (forma regiminis) concerning how those people rule, and here Kant offers a variation on the traditional good/bad dichotomy: either republican or despotic (Kant, 1991, p.101). The term ‘republican’ in Kant’s writings, “could be interpreted to represent what nowadays is generally called parliamentary democracy” (Kant, 1991, p.25, para.2). Despotism is defined as a state of unity in which the same ruler makes and enforces rules, thus transforming an individual's private will into the public will. Kant differentiates between a republicanism and despotism emphasizing that a ‘republican’ form of government is “where the executive is separated from the legislature, and the despotic, where it is not” (Kant, 1991, p.29, para.1)

Republics require representation to guarantee that the executive authority exclusively executes the will of the people by requiring the executive to enforce only laws enacted by representatives of the people, not the executive itself. However, a republic may function with just one lawmaker if other people serve as executives (Rauscher, 2016) . Kant warns from the danger of a monarch becoming a tyrant. A monarch would enact laws in the name of the people, but the monarch's ministers would oversee enforcing them. Thus, like Rousseau, Kant is convinced that the adage of a republican government is the respect of law by the people and also by the ruler and the sovereign. (Kant, 1991, p.30, para.2). Kant's argument that such a government is republican demonstrates his belief that a republican government does not need real participation of the people in creating laws, even though elected representatives, as long as the laws are issued with the people's entire united will in mind.

When Kant addresses voting for representatives, he conforms to many of the time's prevalent biases. The right to vote necessitates, in Kant’s words, "being one's own master," (Kant, 1991, p.27), which entails owning property or having a talent that can sustain oneself. Kant classes those who are independent as ‘active’ citizens and those who are not as ‘passive’. He also excludes women from voting, claiming that “ [Women] are, on principle, disqualified. But any legislation should always be enacted and carried out as if the passive citizens too were participating” (Kant, 1991, p.27). His thesis is that these people are unsuitable to vote because they lack the ability to reason and have no free choice “being one’s own master” (Kant, 1991, p. 27). The mentally sick and the elderly who are unable to function are further instances of people who lack reason and are not their own masters. According to Kant, the presumption of being "one's own master" is essential for citizenship eligibility. For example, at least in Kant’s time, when a woman got married, her possessions became her husband's, and she is expected to completely rely on him, thus she does not own property and consequently excluded from voting (Glawson, 2017) . To summarize, Kant did not believe that married women could be active members of a state or citizens since they are incompetent and dependent by their very nature as women (Glawson, 2017) . Thus, Kant believes that just by adopting the people's point of view, a single individual or small group may properly represent the people at large. Insistence on a representative system is not the same as insisting on a representative system that is elected.

Regardless, Kant clearly believes that an elective representational democracy is preferable. Republican constitutions, he says, are more likely to prevent war because, when the people's permission is required, they will weigh the costs of war (fighting, taxes, property damage, and so on), but a non-republican ruler may be immune to such considerations. He also mentions in the "Doctrine of Right" that a republican government represents the people "by all the citizens united and acting via their delegates" (Rauscher, 2016) .

References:

Glawson, J. D. ( 2017, November 24). Immanuel Kant on Suffrage: With a Libertarian Disagreement. Medium. https://medium.com/@JoshuaGlawson/immanuel-kant-on-suffrage-with-a-libertarian-disagreement-d6f149df3658

Kant, I. ( 1991) . Kant: political writings. Cambridge University Press.

States will only be effective if they are ruled in a just manner, however, just leadership must come from just men. Socrates addresses the nature of justice both within society and pertaining to individuals in the Republic. The structure of Kallipolis is based upon both the individual and collective will to act virtuously - if the state is successful in cultivating just citizens, just policy will be enacted. A similar principle is presented in Laws, but importance is emphasized here on the role of the lawmaker, who enacts virtuous laws, and the education of citizens, which indicates virtue within a society.

The Myth of the Metals, or Noble Lie, lays out the foundation for social order in Socrates’ Kallipolis. He proposes that a noble lie is needed in order to allow for citizens to accept their position within the state, as well as to instill a sense of unity, as citizens will regard themselves as “brothers and sisters, sprung from the self same earth.” (Plato, The Republic, Book III, 414E). Justice is defined in the Republic as each of the three classes performing their respective duties, and not engaging in the affairs of the other classes. “In relation to the excellence of the city, the capacity of each person therein to engage in what belongs to himself is on an equal footing with its wisdom, its sound-mindedness and its courage (Plato, The Republic, Book IV, 433D),” thus, the city retains unity and is able to cultivate a collective virtue. Upon the basis of the individual, Socrates alludes that “a just man will not differ from a just city with respect to the form itself, of justice” (Plato, The Republic, Book IV, 435B). The argument that Socrates proposes is that the state cannot be just unless man is just, and vice versa; that justice is contingent upon practice within the individual as well as the state. A unified state is created through the enforcement of this class system, and the unified state indicates a just society.

In the Laws, the Athenian stranger proposes internal warfare is the greatest threat to a society, which he describes as the threat of faction. Here, he states that, “the highest good, however, is neither war nor civil strife (Plato, Laws, Book I, 628C)…the city itself winning a victory over itself is not to be counted among the best outcomes, but among those that are necessary” (Plato, Laws, Book I, 628D). Additionally, a distinction is made between divine goods and human goods, in which the former are composed of virtues such as wisdom, sound disposition, justice, and courage. The purpose of the law is to regulate the behavior of citizens, so that they will pursue the divine goods over human; the stranger suggests that “[the citizens] should be watched and supervised, and censure or praise should be bestowed…through the laws themselves” (Plato, Laws, Book I, 632A). The just state will ultimately arise from the virtuous citizen, and the method by which one achieves virtue is through abiding virtuous laws.

Thus, the role of the lawmaker is such that dictates virtue within society, and it is the citizen’s responsibility to follow these laws to achieve personal virtue. The stranger suggests that “the lawgiver has set out, in detail, what’s disgraceful and evil on the one hand, and what’s good and noble on the other, [and] whoever is not prepared to refrain from [evil] by every means at his disposal (Plato, Laws, Book V, 728A)… is heaping vile dishonor and deformity on his most divine possession, his soul” (Plato, Laws, Book V, 728B). Virtuous law will uphold the divine goods, and the citizen will protect his most divine element (the soul) by following the law. This law acts as a form of unity within the state, so when there is faction, this indicates that citizens are not abiding to the laws and therefore disregarding virtue itself - this is described as an “excess of [human goods] bring[ing] about enmity and faction…[which] is good neither for [citizens], nor for the city” (Plato, Laws, Book V, 729A). In the Laws this unity plays an essential role in shaping the legislation of the city-state; insofar that the citizens are not divided, the most effective state will unify if just laws are enforced. This unification is not contingent on the basis of equality, which differentiates Plato’s discourses from modern conceptions of suffrage.

Once the connection between justice in the individual and the state is established, the question of leadership arises. Who is fit to be in the ruling class, and is it possible to ensure they will not be corrupted to act in their own interests? Socrates proposes the theory of forms and the allegory of the cave as an answer to this. The philosopher king is the sole entity fit to rule, who must be trained rigorously in order to fulfill such a position. Conversely, in Laws, it is suggested that although absolute rule will be most effective in enforcing laws, it is impossible to ensure that citizens will abide by them through compulsion alone. Therefore, a system of voting including the drawing of lots is proposed, which combines both democratic and monarchic elements.

Socrates uses the allegory of the cave to establish the flawed nature of human beings. The cave is representative of the physical realm, shadows of the images of physical objects, statues of the physical objects themselves, and the fire as the Sun. What is physically tangible is easier to comprehend, however belief concerning visible things alone is perceived as a low perception of the truth. The analogy of the cave proposes that most are blind to the good, therefore they are unable to act truly virtuously.. Instead, they comprehend the intelligible realm through the means of the physical realm, as a desire for worldly possessions and physical objects. The shadows presented to them are seemingly the truth, therefore they have an unwavering belief in what is idealized to them (the statues, ie. physical objects). The only one who can truly perceive the intelligible realm and act virtuously is the philosopher - therefore, Socrates suggests that the state should be ruled by a philosopher king who is able to maintain virtue within society. Additionally, Socrates warns of the unrestrained freedom within democratic systems, which eliminate systems of law and order. He equates this to the loss of virtue within society, as the citizens become weary of authority and “don’t even pay attention to the laws, written or unwritten” (Plato, The Republic, Book VIII, 563D). The future of democracy is dependent on the sentiment of the masses, in which the rulers fear the people - Socrates compares this to the father who is subservient to his son, and the teacher who is afraid of his pupils. For fear of displeasing the public, rulers will attempt to appease the masses, and this is the tactic that will eventually lead to the rise of the tyrant. This version of Kallipolis disparages the concept of democracy and democratic rights such as suffrage, equating these systems to the downfall of society.

However, in Laws, the concept of the philosopher king is disputed. Although the Athenian states that the most efficient way to rule would be under a just tyrant and virtuous lawmaker (Plato, Laws, Book IV, 710E), it is recognized that human nature does not reflect the ideal state, and that “any [city] ruled by some mortal, and not by God, finds no escape from evils and hardships for their citizens” (Plato, Laws, Book IV, 713E). He proposes that law plays the important role of regulating the behavior of both citizens and leaders, as it “[regulates] by reason,”(Plato, Laws, Book IV, 714A) both the public and private spheres. This is presented as the divine element of reason, by which rational laws will mirror a divine rule - rational law will allow for citizens to “[obey] the immortal element within them,” (Plato, Laws, Book IV, 713E) acting rationally, and therefore virtuously. He uses the doctor analogy to support this, wherein the slave doctor represents the tyrant who rules by compulsion alone, and the free doctor represents the legislator who creates laws using both compulsion and persuasion (Plato, Laws, Book IV, 720C). Only with the cooperation of the patient, who represents the citizen, is the doctor able to successfully restore his health (Plato, Laws, Book IV, 720C). Similarly, within the state, the rational laws can only have effect within the city if the citizens are willing to adopt them - absolute rule, therefore, is not a realistic solution, as compulsion alone is not enough to ensure compliance with the laws (Plato, Laws, Book IV, 720C). The stranger concludes that the legislator should be like the free doctor, so that citizens will willingly obey the laws (Plato, Laws, Book IV, 720C). Additionally rulers should be “servants of the laws,” (Plato, Laws, Book IV, 715C) as the “salvation…of the city hinges, most of all, upon this” - the subservience of the entire populace to the laws (Plato, Laws, Book IV, 715D). The Athenian acknowledges the role of the legislator as shared with the public, and rejects the concept of absolute rule.

The proposed voting system would “maintain a mean between monarchic and democratic constitution” (Plato, Laws, Book VI, 756E), as candidates would first be nominated, and proceed through several rounds of public voting until the top thirty seven candidates were chosen (Plato, Laws, Book VI, 756C). At this point, half the candidates would be selected through a lottery, and then subject to scrutiny before appointment (Plato, Laws, Book VI, 756E). In the case of positions of office, the vote is to be cast by “all who were involved in the military” (Plato, Laws, Book VI, 753B). In the Republic, Socrates designates a specific military class in the Myth of the Metals. If a similar class system were to be assumed here, it may be reasonable to suggest that suffrage would not be universal, due to the strict class segregation argued for in Kallipolis. The Laws, however, as previously established, operate outside of Kallipolis, so it is reasonable to assume that military status would not be limited to a specific class within society. The Athenian stranger places importance on physical education in the development of good character and military training of citizens. When discussing the city-state, he exalts military exercise as amongst the noble pursuits (Plato, Laws, Book VIII, 831E), and proposes physical contests for each of the military classes - for the horsemen and chariots, archers and hoplites - where victors can win prizes (833B). He suggests that there should be three classes of competition for all members of society: one for the women, children, and men, respectively (Plato, Laws, Book VIII, 833C). The military education is not only stressed but encouraged for all and therefore the vote may be at least relatively accessible. When considering the origins of hoplite warfare, linked to the agrarian sector of Greek society (Hale, “Origins of Hoplite Warfare,” 177), it can also be assumed that citizens of various classes were involved in the Greek military. Hoplite service was also mandatory during the Classical Age and eventually became enforced by record, where conscription was based exclusively on age (Christ, “Conscription of Hoplites in Ancient Athens,” 398). Taking these points into account, the Athenian stranger would likely have been advocating for a relatively universal form of voting, as most citizens were under conscription.

The Athenian stranger proposes two types of equalities, one that is measurable by weight and number, and the other, the pure virtue of equality itself, described as the “truest and most excellent quality…the judgment of Zeus” (Plato, Laws, Book VI, 757B). This pure equality, therefore, is likened to the divine good; this divine equality acts as a form of justice itself by “giving due measure to each, according to their own nature…bestowing greater honors upon those whose excellence is greater” (Plato, Laws, Book VI, 757C). The voting system is able to merge this divine equality with its measurable counterpart - divine equality is exercised in the casting of the lots, as chance or fate determines who is best suited for leadership. The stranger explains this when discussing the appointment of priests, stating that “we should allow God to bring about what is pleasing (Plato, Laws, Book VI, 759B) to himself, by entrusting the matter to the divine chance of the lot” (Plato, Laws, Book VI, 759C), and purity is maintained through the process of scrutiny, ensuring that those who are appointed truly display qualities of integrity and legitimacy, “pure and untainted by slaughter and all such transgressions of divine precepts (Plato, Laws, Book VI, 759C). Measurable equality is seen in the nomination and subsequent rounds of voting, whereby candidates are evaluated by citizens on the basis of their character and virtue. Here, importance is stressed on the education of the selectors, as they should be “reared in lawful habits, and well enough educated to be able to decide…who deserves to be accepted as satisfactory” (Plato, Laws, Book VI,751C). If citizens are educated on principles of virtue, then this will be reflected in their scrutiny, benefiting society overall in the appointment of proper leaders.

In Plato’s Republic, Socrates disparages the democratic system for its failure to uphold virtues within both the individual and society. He argues that an “insatiable desire” (Plato, Republic, Book VIII, 562B) for freedom will lead to injustice in the state, as class divides will cease to exist and individuals are dictated by their appetitive desires. The system proposed in Laws, however, acts as an intermediary between the ideals of Kallipolis and the reality of human nature, by merging principles of absolutism with democratic practices. A measured equality is maintained through the casting of lots, and importance is stressed on the education of citizens to be able to maintain virtue within society, reflected in the appointment of leaders.

References:

Christ, Matthew R. “Conscription of Hoplites in Classical Athens,” The Classical Quarterly, 51, no. 2 ( 2001) : 398–422, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3556519

Hale, John R. “Not Patriots, Not Farmers, Not Amateurs: Greek Soldiers of Fortune and the Origins of Hoplite Warfare.” In Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece, edited by Donald Kagan and Gregory Viggiano, 176-191. Princeton University Press, 2013.

Plato. Laws, Book I. Translated by David Horan. The Dialogues of Plato, Platonic Foundation, 2021. https://www.platonicfoundation.org/laws/laws-book-1/

Plato. Laws, Book IV. Translated by David Horan. The Dialogues of Plato, Platonic Foundation, 2021. https://www.platonicfoundation.org/laws/laws-book-4/

Plato. Laws, Book V. Translated by David Horan. The Dialogues of Plato, Platonic Foundation, 2021. https://www.platonicfoundation.org/laws/laws-book-5/

Plato. Laws, Book VI. Translated by David Horan. The Dialogues of Plato, Platonic Foundation, 2021. https://www.platonicfoundation.org/laws/laws-book-6/

Plato. Republic, Book III. Translated by David Horan. The Dialogues of Plato, Platonic Foundation, 2021. https://www.platonicfoundation.org/republic/republic-book-3/

Plato. Republic, Book IV. Translated by David Horan. The Dialogues of Plato, Platonic Foundation, 2021. https://www.platonicfoundation.org/republic/republic-book-4/

While a political connection to Process Philosophy’s metaphysical and ontological claims seems far-fetched, Alfred North Whitehead—perhaps the most rigorous and defining theorist for Process Philosophy in the 20th century—claimed that the goal of philosophy is to “…voyage towards the larger generalities” of human life and behavior (Whitehead, 1979, pg. 94). This meaning that an understanding of the nature of reality will then give you access to insights of psychology, aesthetics, ethics, sociology, language, and virtually every other human enquiry and experience.

The majority of political history, static roles were assigned to rulers and their subjects. A king and his identity were stamped definitively, and this title was described as chosen by God; the king’s unchanging identity was a thing in the universe. The Process Philosophy critique of this type of conception is decidedly an aesthetic one: “People instinctively dislike being described in thing-classificatory terms…Such object-property attributions indicate a fixed nature that we naturally see as repugnant to ourselves” (pg. 14). This is to say, a political system which tries its hardest to stay the same and not go through changes in power and interactions goes against how reality is presented and organized to us, as well as what we value in ourselves and others.

With this analysis, the right to vote can clearly be understood. After thousands of years of static politics, people began to advocate for a political system which would better reflect the dynamism, novelty, and change seen in reality. The right to vote allows for processes like changes in leadership, as well as changes in the law and governance. Due to the ever-changing opinions and contexts that individuals go through, the right to vote allows for a reflection of this novelty. Such a system is empowering due to it allowing individuals to express themselves as ever changing processes themselves as opposed to static objects and it is metaphysically accurate according to our natures and the nature of reality. Also, it is telling that such political ideals came about during the Enlightenment, a period of time where understanding of the world without appeal to philosophical and religious tradition was given major emphasis. As we learned more about the world, we learned about the ideal political system.

References:

Rescher, Nicholas. Process Philosophy : a Survey of Basic Issues. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000.

Having a small and compact state is also a utilitarian view. Rousseau knows that for voters to want to participate, they will need to think that their vote matters, for example: "suppose that this state consists of ten thousand citizens… thus the sovereign is as ten thousand to one; that is to say, every member of the state has, as his own share, only one ten-thousandth part of the sovereign power, although he is subject to the whole" (Rousseau 2004) . Therefore, if you make the republic bigger, let us say this time the republic is "composed of one hundred thousand men, the position of the subjects is unchanged, and each continues to bear the whole weight of the laws, while his vote, reduced to the one hundred-thousandth part, has ten times less influence in the making of the laws" (Rousseau 2004) . This means that as the republic thrives and grows, it will become more prominent, and therefore less liberty is guaranteed through the republic's own institutions (Rousseau 2004) . However, Rousseau's apprehension toward a true democracy does not mean that he does not believe in citizens' right to vote.

Since Rousseau identifies direct or perfect democracies as implausible, he discusses the two main ways magistrates, legislators, and the prince should be appointed. Rousseau agrees with Montesquieu in that "'selection by lot… is natural to democracy'" (Rousseau 1953, 119). This is because a democracy facilitates a community "in which each member can participate unreservedly" (Watt 1981, 719), acting on their right to vote and even having "'a reasonable hope of serving his country'" (Rousseau 1953, 119). However, the act of desiring a political position, as prospective representatives would need to campaign for election, is a personal interest that Rousseau sees as a hindrance to government. Rousseau criticizes Montesquieu by pointing out that in a "democracy, public office is not an advantage but a heavy responsibility" (Rousseau 1953, 119-120). Because of this, Rousseau believes that the Venetian and Athenian system for appointing legislators is better for democracy than vote by lot. Since the "selection of rulers is a function of government, and not of sovereignty," and that "common sense, judgment, and integrity [should be] sufficient" in all candidates, then sortition, which appoints the legislators by random chance, allows for a government without infighting and personal interest influencing the functions of government (Rousseau 1953, 119-120). However, even in this system, Rousseau believes that the public should still have a say when voting to "fill those positions which demand particular talents, such as military officers" (Rousseau 1953, 121). The military is exempt from the duty which is associated with public office as it is a position which does not need to follow the general will. The government must be run by the people and not be diluted by their opinions. Therefore, the military can be elected, while the legislator must be appointed by random chance. This is where Rousseau's concept of the general will come in and starts playing a role in his view on voting.

Whether it is the public voting on a member of the government or legislators voting on policy, there will always be a majority and minority, which will form based on differing opinions about what is best for the republic. Rousseau stresses that within the assemblies of government, "the more agreement there is…, the more also does the general will prevail" (Rousseau 1953, 116). Therefore, the more "long debates, dissensions, and tumult" allowed within the assemblies leads to the "ascendancy of private and particular interests and the decline of the state" (Rousseau 1953, 116). Rousseau's solution to this dissent to the general will is "unanimous consent" (Rousseau 1953, 117). If the general will is being challenged, then the only way to refine it is only to pass legislation on which everyone agrees. While technically still allowing each magistrate to vote on policy, this leaves their votes meaning nothing unless everyone can agree. This dilutes the power of each person's vote even further, making the dissent and long discussion that Rousseau pointed to as the things that made the state's decline necessary. Therefore, while Rousseau believes that there is a right to vote, there are restrictions on the power that each person's vote holds due to the chance of the general will being deteriorated by personal interests and intrigues.

While the people's right to vote is guaranteed in democracies, Rousseau does not believe it is an inherent right in all governments. He is relatively straightforward about monarchies stating that "neither sortition nor election has any place in a monarchical government," going further to say that "the monarch is by right the sole prince and magistrate, the choice of his lieutenants belongs to him only" (Rousseau 1953, 121). Therefore, monarchs have the right to hold the sole authority in the government and do not have to give the people the power to vote due to their monarchical rights. However, even in republics, there are situations in which Rousseau believes the right to vote can be curbed. Taking from the Roman institution of the dictator, Rousseau believes that if "the greatest dangers are great enough to equal the danger of changing the public order," then the rule of law may have to be set aside to remedy the dangers (Rousseau 1953, 136). Therefore, the government must "increase the activity of the government" to counteract the issue, and Rousseau believes that "if the peril is such that the apparatus of law itself is an obstacle to security, then [the state] must appoint a supreme ruler who will silence the law" (Rousseau 1953, 137). This ruler's sole goal would be to see that "the state does not perish," and to do this the dictator will use their authority to ensure that "there is no doubt as to the general will" (Rousseau 1953, 137). The dictator will unify the government citizenry of the republic and enforce his will to save the state. However, the dictator must remove the people's voice in the assemblies and their say as to who will be legislators. They will curb the "long debates, dissensions, and tumult" which lead to the "decline of the state," effectively silencing dissenters and saving the state at the expense of the citizens' rights. Therefore, while Rousseau believes in the right to vote, he only believes that a citizen's vote should hold so much power. Furthermore, in some instances, these votes should hold no power, depending on the threats to the state and the form of government.

References:

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1953. Political Writings. Translated and edited by Frederick Watkins. The University of Wisconsin Press.

Watt, E. D. 1981. “Rousseau Réchaufée-Being Obliged, Consenting, Participating, and Obeying Only Oneself.” The Journal of Politics Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 707-719. https://www-jstor-org.libproxy.furman.edu/stable/2130633?seq=13#metadata_info_tab_contents

According to Weber, equal suffrage meant equal universal voting rights for working classes who had historically been barred from voting. In his writings on equal suffrage in modern citizenship, he clearly states that equal suffrage is “closely related to the equality of certain fates which the modern state as such creates” (Weber, 1994, p. 105). He explicitly focuses on returning soldiers’ rights, and argues that the equality of the modern state functions in the way that people are equal before death, because the “most basic needs [of physical existence] on the one hand and, on the other, that most solemn and lofty fact of all are encompassed by those equalities which the modern state offers all its citizens in a truly lasting and undoubted way: sheer physical security and the minimum for subsistence, but also the battlefield on which to die” (Weber, 1994, p.105, para.2)

Weber does not emphasize on women’s suffrage, he does, however, say that women should have the right to vote as long as “they too are ‘fighting’ the war if they do their duty” (Weber, 1994, p.78, line.14). Moreover, in “Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology”, Weber notes that “the woman is dependent because of the normal superiority of the physical and intellectual energies of the male” (Weber, 1978, p. 1007) . The Weberian Thought on voting was aiming to correct historical gender and class inequities or might at least mitigate the most severe exclusions of women, the urban working class, and the rural peasantry from power and government.

Weber's ideas for equal suffrage might be viewed as a partial erasing of historical discriminatory markings. Weber's suggestions have a deeper element to them than the more neutral sounding ‘counterweight’ to bureaucratic dominance (Weber, 1994, p.104). Equal suffrage emerged as a valuable counterbalance to both types of inequity. Weber saw that the inequities created by capitalism might be just as persistent as those created by prior, more feudal social systems. Against both, Weber advocated for a ‘positive politics’ in which “equal voting rights” means that the individual “is not considered in terms of the particular professional and family position he occupies, nor in relation to the differences of material and social situation, but purely and simply as a citizen” (Weber, 1994, p.103).

During the Russian revolution, enraged workers, students, and returning soldiers took to the streets in protest of the existing regime's ruler, Tsar Nicholas II, who had obstructed their enfranchisement and rights prior to the war and then ordered mass slaughter on the battlefield. Weber recognized their outrage at the collapsing regime, but he dismissed their demands for more revolutionary, far-reaching reform as immature. Although Weber understood the anger of Russian revolutionists against the crumbling regime, he saw it as immature and ‘childish’ (Maley, 2011, p. 99). Weber was concerned that under the Russian revolutionary circumstances of 1918– 19, people would respond out of anger and rage, which would be doubly harmful. In “Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order”, Weber had already wondered “whether such explosions unleash yet again the familiar and usual fear of the propertied classes; in other words, it depends on whether the emotional effect of undirected mass fury produces the equally emotional and equally undirected cowardice of the bourgeoisie” (Weber, 1994, p. 232)

In his wartime newspaper writings, Weber made a strategic case for the Social Democratic Party's participation as a disciplined working-class party. Though Weber considered the working class to be too “immature” to take on the role of a ruling class, he praised the discipline and self-control of the Social Democrats' political partners, the trade unions. He said approvingly that “organizations like the trade unions, but also the Social Democratic Party, create a very important counterbalance [not only against the right, but] to the rule of the street which is so typical of purely plebiscitary nations and so prone to momentary and irrational influences” (Weber, 1994, p. 231).

References:

Maley, T. ( 2011) . Democracy and the Political. In Democracy & the Political in Max Weber's Thought (pp. 77-120). Toronto; Buffalo; London: University of Toronto Press. Retrieved July 16, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3138/j.ctt2ttgq2.7

Weber, M. ( 1994) . Weber: Political Writings. United States: Cambridge University Press.