Pragmatism

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Pragmatism

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Freedom of ReligionPhilosophical OriginsPragmatism, a broad philosophical tradition that traces its origins to the United States, prioritizes action over doctrine, and holds that “an idea is like a tool developed in response to surrounding conditions, and the worth of an idea is tied to its practical effects” (Rorty et al. 2004, 1). The philosophy was pioneered by key figures like Charles S. Peirce and was later expanded upon by philosophers William James and John Dewey, among others, providing different interpretations and understanding of the movement. They utilized pragmatism as a lens through which to view public and social affairs, including human rights, liberties, religion, and ethics. For pragmatists, “theory answers to practice,” meaning that ideas such as the notion of human rights and liberties “must answer to their pragmatics, their use” (Luban 2013, 5-6). Through this approach, the right to freedom of religion is as useful as the effect it has on individuals and how it matters to us as humans, which pragmatists like James and Dewey saw as giving meaning to one’s life and shaping a moral order.

Founded in the 1870s, pragmatism is a philosophical movement that advances the idea that a claim or theory is true only if it has practical use or success and called for the testing of philosophies through the scientific method. Scholar Cheryl Misak identifies three notions that pragmatists commonly share: “that standards of objectivity are historically situated but their contingency does nothing to detract from their objectivity; that knowledge has and requires no foundation; and the importance of connecting philosophical concepts to everyday life” (Bacon 2012, ix). This last idea directly impacts how pragmatists interpret religion and the right of individuals to practice their faith, as they focus on the consequences of their existence and whether it is useful in one’s everyday life: “The pragmatist approach pushes [one] to focus on the practical effects of religion on one’s existence” (Romania 2016, 96). For a pragmatist, if the consequences of an individual practicing their religion are practical and beneficial to them then it is useful and has worth. Additionally, if the theory that all humans are born with fundamental rights, including the freedom of religion, has practical benefits and matters to individuals, then it too is useful and has worth.

William James, an American philosopher and psychologist, was an important figure in early pragmatism, with many of his works developing the tradition. He touched upon religion in his book, The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature, where he wrote on “religious experience and defined it through the ecstatic experience of individuals in their real life” (Romania 2016, 96). Instead of focusing on religious doctrine and institutions, he focused on the experience of the individual, seeing “religion as a guiding principle in daily life” and useful (Romania 2016, 96). John Dewey, another early champion of pragmatism, similarly wrote in length about religion and social life. Dewey “conceived religion as a form of access to the universal values of humanity. He naturalized religion, extending its borders to any beliefs able to move people toward the realization of the highest humanistic ends” (Romania 2016, 96). This notion of the utility and practicality of religion became common in pragmatist thought, with religion being “conceived as possessing a noetic character opening the way to access an unseen moral order and to organize one’s life consistently” (Romania 2016, 96).

The relationship between human rights and pragmatism is dependent on their effectiveness in everyday life. As Joseph Betz writes in his 1978 journal article John Dewey on Human Rights: “Doctrines of social philosophy, like other concepts, are tools and instruments used to solve problems, social problems” (23). He further argues that Dewey believes that “rights make abstract freedom effective”, meaning that legal rights, such as the right to freedom of religion and expression, are necessary to make the notion of human liberties practical and applicable (Betz 1978. 28).

Through the context of pragmatism, the right to freedom of religion is worth protecting if its practical and has beneficial results. Pragmatists such as James and Dewey believe that an individual’s religion does have worth as it holds them to a moral standard: “Both William James and John Dewey conceive the existence of an unseen moral order as central to religious belief and practice” (Romania 2016, 99). They further saw it as giving meaning to the individual’s life, with scholar David Luban stating that, “the pragmatist function of religion is rather intended as a symbolic universe people use to give meaningfulness to their lives in the long run” (99). Pragmatists view the consequences of individuals practicing their faith as overall positive: “In conclusion, pragmatist accounts of religion showed some common features: moral neutrality, practice-centrality, emphasis on the experiential dimension, symbolism, individualization of faith. They do not discuss the origins of transcendent ideals but rather assess their social validity on the practical ground of subjective gratification” (Romania 2016, 104). James and Dewey also saw human rights as necessary and useful if they served their practical purpose to solve social problems. If an individual’s religion has useful and practical effects, and protecting an individual’s right to practice that religion successfully allows them to do so, then the right to freedom of religion is positive and supported by pragmatism.

Pragmatism prioritizes the practical effects of a theory or claim, believing its consequences and usefulness to be most important when evaluating its worth. They apply this to religion and the right of an individual to practice that religion. Early pragmatists such as William James and John Dewey wrote extensively on the subject of religion, believing its effects to be overall positive for an individual and society, proving its worth. The right to freedom of religion is useful as it allows individuals to receive those positive consequences that come from practicing their faith, and thus, in the context of pragmatism, the right to freedom of religion proves its worth.

References:

Bacon, M. 2012 “Pragmatism: an introduction.” Polity.

Betz, J. (1978). John Dewey on Human Rights. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 14(1), 18–41. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40319827

Luban, David. 2013 "Human Rights Pragmatism and Human Dignity" Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works. 1317. https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1317

Romania, Vincenzo. 2016 “Pragmatism, Religion and Ethics: A Review Essay. H. Deuser Et Al, The Varieties of Transcendence: Pragmatism and the Theory of Religion, New York: Fordham University Press

Rorty, Richard, Hilary Putnam, James Conant, and Gretchen Helfrich. 2004. “What Is Pragmatism?” Think 3 (8). Cambridge University Press: 71–88. doi:10.1017/S1477175600001056.
Freedom of the PressPhilosophical OriginsDefined broadly, pragmatism is an American philosophical tradition which posits that the truth value of a statement or belief is dependent on its “successful practical consequences” (Talisse, 2008, p. 61). What makes a belief true is not how clearly or equally the belief maps onto reality, rather it is comparing the expected consequences that a belief will give us, and then comparing that expectation with what actually occurs. If the expectation and outcome are the same, that belief is considered to be true.

John Dewey was the pragmatist philosopher who dealt with politics in the most systematic way. Dewey saw democracy as a way of life and the moral ideal for human beings which led to the good life (Talisse, 2014) . Dewey states: “[D]emocracy is not an alternative to other principles of associated life. It is the idea of community of community life itself” (Dewey, 1973, p. 623). What works for the community is kept and what does not work is changed and adapted, and this dialectic never concludes: “[T]his translation is never finished. The old Adam, the unregenerate element in human nature persists” (Dewey, 1973, p. 627). It’s only through communication between the members of society that this “old Adam” is challenged—a communication where “shared interest in the consequences of interdependent activities may inform desire and effort and thereby direct action” (Ibid.). The result is a society which addresses all issues and problems of human life, including all virtues. Talisse describes this as perfectionism: “Perfectionists hold that it is the job of the state to cultivate among citizens the dispositions, habits, and virtues requisite to human flourishing”, later stating: “the perfectionist project is a task for all modes of human association” (Talisse, 2014) .

The right to freedom of the press fits clearly into Deweyan democracy, both because of its inherent sociality, as well as its nature of reasoning or problem solving. The right allows for the issues of the society to be freely expressed and then debated by citizens amongst themselves in a nationwide. This free discourse then determines which particular elements of the society should be taken out, adapted or kept, thus allowing for a constant improvement. Moreover, the expression found in a free press is what specifically allows for the criticisms and improvements of societies to be noticed and realized in the first place: “There can be no public without full publicity in respect to all consequences which concern it…Without freedom of expression, not even methods of social inquiry can be developed” (Dewey, 1973, p. 633-634).

Pragmatist Richard Rorty similarly defended democracy, and by extension the free, though he does so for radically different reasons. In fact, Rorty believed that an attempt to justify democracy and its accompanying rights was a distraction. Democracy and rights are experiments. Particular hypotheses we have towards how we will act and expected consequences that come therefrom: “If the experiment fails, our descendants may learn something important. But they will not learn a philosophical truth, any more than they will learn a religious one. They will simply get some hints about what to watch out for when setting up their next experiment” (Rorty, 1992, p. 270).

References:

Dewey, John, John J. McDermott, and John J. (John Joseph) McDermott. The Philosophy of John Dewey. New York: Putnam Sons, 1973.

Rorty, Richard. “THE PRIORITY OF DEMOCRACY TO PHILOSOPHY.” In Prospects for a Common Morality, edited by GENE OUTKA and JOHN P. REEDER, 254–78. Princeton University Press, 1993. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt7sfw3.15.

Talisse, Robert B., and Scott F. Aikin. Pragmatism : a Guide for the Perplexed. London ;: Continuum, 2008.
Voting Rights and SuffragePhilosophical OriginsThe philosophical school of pragmatism relies on the success of practical application to determine truth (McDermid, n.d.). Pragmatism has been applied most frequently to social and political issues since being linked to civic interaction by American philosopher John Dewey (Talisse 2014, p.123). This seems straightforward, however it proves difficult to objectively evaluate the success of something abstract, such as voting rights. The pragmatist would support voting rights if they were considered practical for society or were seen as making society function in a better way. Establishing the extent to which democracy makes life “better” is no simple task. Comparative political scientists have long debated which metrics offer the best comparisons of quality of life between democracies and autocracies. Likewise, Dewey and his pragmatist contemporaries explored the ways in which suffrage shapes civil and political society.

John Dewey’s political philosophy embraced democracy as a solution for social and political disfunction. Modern pragmatists like Robert Talisse have used the term “Deweyan Democratic Perfectionism” to reference Dewey’s idealistic theory about suffrage perfecting the function of society (Talisse 2014, p.123). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy links Dewey’s pragmatism to his political stances, reading: “As a public intellectual, Dewey was a supporter of such causes as women’s suffrage and the Settlement House movement” (Festenstein, 2019). Dewey also served as an early member and co-sponsor of organizations like the ACLU and NAACP, both of which have long fought to expand suffrage and defend minority voters against disenfranchisement. This political advocacy work speaks to the ways that pragmatism guided Dewey’s support for voting rights. In thinking that democracy can lead to perfection in society, the pragmatist would certainly support the rights of all citizens to vote. “While Dewey sometimes refers rather scathingly to the ‘machinery’ conception of democracy, he is committed to improving this machinery (by supporting the equal distribution of the franchise, for example) rather than merely dismissing it as unimportant” (Festenstein, 2019). The institutional “machine” of democracy allows citizens to pursue their interests in a collective way, and a way that pragmatists see as beneficial to society.

Dewey’s work alone cannot provide a complete understanding of pragmatism’s connections to voting rights. It is also important to consider the ways in which suffrage can shape political events as an outcome of practical application- the pragmatist’s primary tool. Citizens are generally content when their government meets their perceived needs. When public needs are not met, two different possibilities emerge. In democratic societies, citizens exercise their right to vote in a way that rewards those who seek to meet their needs and interests and punishes those who do not by legally stripping them of power. The second possibility occurs when citizens do not have the right to vote yet no longer consent to the way in which they are governed. If needs continue to go unmet, the public has no legal recourse to air their grievances and could eventually make the collective decision to work against their own government. The difference between these two scenarios is the presence of voting rights. Pragmatism dictates that the concept of voting or the ideals of democracy have merit if they succeed in practical application. The voting society described here is successful in that it has measures in place that incorporate and accommodate political dissent. Dewey himself noted that suffrage allows individuals to pursue their own interests while also making civic contributions. We can see this relate once again to Deweyan Democratic Perfectionism, encapsulated here in the idea that “democracy is a way of life in which each individual exercises and cultivates his unique capacities in a way which contributes to the flourishing of the whole society” (Talisse 2014, p.123). The belief in such a level of “perfection” underscores the pragmatic argument in favor of voting rights.

Another well-known pragmatist, William James, also studied pluralism and how it can cause disfunction when not incorporated or accepted politically. With labor strikes as the example in mind, James’ view is described: “Far from being the basis for reconciliation, we see here how the contradictory pluralism within radical empiricism explains the emergence of social insurrection, but also civil war” (Rogers-Cooper 2017, p.257). Labor strikes are an example of what James labels “radical pragmatism” because the workers seek to disrupt typical societal function but do so because it appears to them a pragmatic and effective type of political activity. If the workers are instead presented with the option to voice their approval and disapproval by voting (and they have faith that the voting system is fair and equal), then they are likely to take that option rather than bear the costs of insurrection. James’ outlook is likened to a theory known as formal democratic enclosure, which states that “elections operate ‘at the level of the demonstration’ to prevent ‘outlaw’ forms of collective politics” (Rogers-Cooper 2017, p.244). In other words, the “outlaw” approaches like strikes and insurrections are made to appear impractical if citizens feel they can express themselves sufficiently through voting. The citizens are thereby “enclosed” into the formal, regulated spheres of democracy and kept away from the populist democratic uprisings that threaten order and stability. In relation to pragmatism, James’ outlook seems to prioritize societal function similar to Dewey’s. He indicates that voting rights are beneficial as a bulwark against explicit class conflict and revolutionary sentiment.

Through the analytic lens of pragmatism, democratic choice and voting rights seem to excel. Because it reduces the threat of class conflict and improves public health outcomes, there is much evidence to conclude that suffrage improves societal function. Professor and philosophy scholar Dr. John R. Shook writes: “Pragmatism can criticize the mistakes of public democracy, but at the same time pragmatism praises public democracy as the best form of government that has been invented at this time” (2010, p.12). Given that pragmatism hinges on the results of practical application, modern democracies serve as natural experiments which provide adequate evidence that voting rights are advantageous to society.


References:

Festenstein, Matthew. 2019. “Dewey’s Political Philosophy.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Winter 2019. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2019/entries/dewey-political/.

McDermid, Douglas. n.d. “Pragmatism: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Accessed July 15, 2021. https://iep.utm.edu/pragmati/.

Rogers-Cooper, Justin. “Truth Written In Hell Fire: William James and the Destruction of Gotham.” William James Studies 13, no. 2 (2017): 240-81. Accessed August 3, 2021. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26493681.

Shook, John R. 2010. “Pragmatism, Pluralism, and Public Democracy.” Revue française d'études américaines. 124 (2): 11–28.

Talisse, Robert B. 2014. “Pragmatist Political Philosophy.” Philosophy Compass 9 (2): 123–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12102.