Continental Philosophy/Frankfurt School
Continental Philosophy/Frankfurt School
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| Freedom of Religion | Philosophical Origins | The notion of the freedom of religion is difficult to situate within the work of the Frankfurt School. In the early 20th century, a group of Western Marxist intellectuals founded the Institute for Social Research at Goethe University Frankfurt, an interdisciplinary research initiative that implemented a new approach to the social sciences (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Their distinctive "critical theory" revised "traditional theory," which sought merely to establish timeless, universal truths around specific subjects, seeking instead to further interpret scientific findings in a normative light (Horkheimer, 1937, 199). In other words, where traditional theory tells us merely how things are, critical theory tells us how they are and how they should be. This new project was, thus, in a sense, a radical marrying of philosophy and social sciences. As most of its 'first-generation' members took a Marxist or Freudian approach to their research, a 'freedom of religion' was not much discussed, perhaps more due to their suspicion of 'private liberties' than disdain for religion. However, we find in the work of the school's 'second-generation' thinkers (particularly in the work of Jurgen Habermas) a more complex philosophical discussion of both human rights and the relationship between religion and the state.
The “First-Generation” Members of the so-called 'first generation' of the Frankfurt School saw value in religion's inclination towards social justice and concern for objective, 'non-instrumental' knowledge. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, two of the school's most notable theorists, were deeply critical of "instrumental reason," human rationality directed towards mere means rather than proper ends (Horkheimer, 1944). Their critique is too detailed to be fully treated here, but simply put, instrumental reason reduces rationality as a tool for exploiting nature and fellow man (particularly as a tool in capitalism) (Horkheimer, 1944). Prioritizing this form of reason reduces the value of knowledge to mere 'usefulness' or 'practicality' at the expense of bedrock, "objective truth" (Horkheimer, 1944, 156). To the intellectuals of the early Frankfurt School, religion shared with critical theory a concern for truth about the ends of human life and society (e.g., the nature of justice and goodness), topics lost in the thoughtless dogmatism of an age defined by instrumental rationality. Further, religion also shared a spirit of practical social activism, seeking not only to outline the 'ideal world' but also to realize it (Brittain, 2012, 207). Where capitalist society had dogmatically accepted that one's ultimate aim was to use instrumental reason to extract value from nature and man, religion offered a necessary alternative towards higher truth and worldly justice. A critical theory of religion, then, could provide unique value for the project of critical theory as a whole. However, first-generation theorists largely ignored the discussion of universal human rights. We might attribute this fact to Marx's cynical view on private liberties, as expressed in his essay "On the Jewish Question." In this work, Marx claims that personal rights create a harmful division between the private or "civil sphere" and the public or "political sphere" (Marx, 1843). Such rights allowed individuals to retract from a concern for the universal, communal good into a private sense of happiness (Marx, 1843). As such, religious freedom was harmful in encouraging individuals to value their religion over their "species-being," their being part of a unified humankind (Marx, 1843). With this in view, we can understand why the early Marxist critical theorists might have discussed the value of freedom of religion: perhaps rights were irrelevant to their vision for society. The "Second-Generation" Most of the so-called "second-generation" critical theorists (whose work began in the 1970s) put less emphasis on religion, though we can see parallels with the first-generation views in the later work of Jurgen Habermas. Early in his career, Habermas reduced religion's status to that of a primitive socializing force (Habermas 1981). The need for religious attitudes was to be overcome by secular rationality in the form of his theory of communicative action, a philosophical system Habermas hoped would ground "the social sciences in a theory of language (Habermas 1988, xiv). In the mid-1980s, Habermas became less disparaging of religion, recognizing it as a source of necessary consolation for a suffering world (Habermas 1990). This positive view continued to develop through his later career, with Habermas eventually recognizing that religious ideas were a well of moral truth necessary in combating the moral decay of the techno-capitalist age (Habermas 2006). Though Habermas continued to advocate for a separation between law and religion, he believed that the public sphere could gather valuable moral intuition from religious teachings (Habermas 2006). Though nothing like a theocracy (the direct imposition of religious authority into the state apparatus) should exist, a respectful friendship between religion and state could prove essential in preserving society's ethical integrity. Furthermore, the later Habermas also defends the individual's right to freedom of religious practice (Habermas 2006). We see here both a growing similarity and marked difference to the first-generation theorists' view of religion, with Habermas acknowledging the value of religious teachings while also endorsing a more classically liberal respect for the freedom of religion. Human rights Habermas also engaged in a comprehensive discussion of human liberties per se. His treatment of rights is situated within his "discourse theory," in which he seeks to resolve various epistemological, political, and ethical issues by analyzing inter-subjective communication (Habermas 1992, between facts and norms). Broadly speaking, Habermas asserts that society maintains itself over time only when its constituents view it as legitimate (Habermas 1996). The dawn of modernity, with its growing differences in religious and philosophical opinions, presents a challenge here: groups seek to impose their personal views of justice and happiness on others to their detriment and embitterment (Habermas 1996). Therefore, spheres of private freedom needed to arise to resolve this tension. Insofar as individuals can pursue their own visions of happiness (without interfering with the freedom of others), society can maintain its legitimacy (Habermas 1996). Rights are the legal feature that maintains such spheres of personal liberty. But for these private rights to be legitimate, individuals must have a say in the system that grants and manages them (Habermas 1996). This demand for public rights (i.e., the right to participate in government) makes democracy "co-original" with private rights; they rationally presuppose one another (Habermas 1996). The fundamental freedoms to be protected are determined through the rational deliberation of a constitutional democracy. We find in Habermas a more coherent account of both rights and the freedom of religion than we do in the first generation of the Frankfurt School. Thinkers like Horkheimer and Adorno saw great value in a critical analysis of religion, but they left the notion of freedom of religion largely untreated. Though Habermas never gives a systematic account of why freedom of religion ought to be a sanctioned right, he asserts its intuitive importance to a healthy and just society. He also gives us much more to think about when it comes to the concept of human rights as such. This is not to say that first-generation critical theorists provide no insight into the relationship between religion and society. One can indeed gain much understanding of the topic from both scholarly eras, though later work gives us a more robust treatment of the freedom of religion. |
| Freedom of the Press | Philosophical Origins | The scholars of the Frankfurt School wrote much more on the mass culture and its effects on the public sphere rather than the freedom of the press. However, they believed that the press was an instrument by which citizens are informed and pushed to think critically, thus make decisions, and should remain so. Some of these scholars lived to witness how the Nazis employed mass culture to instill subordination to fascist culture and society. While in exile in the United States, members of the Frankfurt school came to believe that American ‘popular culture’ was similarly ideological, and that it worked to promote American capitalism's interests. In Dialectic of Enlightenment ( 1944) , Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, provided a trenchant critique of modern culture, establishing the term ‘culture industry’ to describe mass cultural forms that, in the wake of capitalism, transform the individual from an active thinking individual into an unthinking, passive consumer. Similarly, in 1962, Jürgen Habermas published Structural Transformation of The Public Sphere an Inquiry Into A Category Of Bourgeois Society, his critical investigation and analysis of the public sphere in civil society.
Jurgen Habermas expanded on Adorno and Horkheimer's ‘culture industry’ analysis. In providing historical context for the culture industry's triumph, Habermas emphasized how bourgeois society in the late 18th and 19th centuries was marked by the emergence of a “[public] sphere between civil society and the state, in which critical public discussion of matters of general interest was institutionally guaranteed”, and which mediated between public and private interests (Habermas, 1989, p.11). Individuals and groups could finally shape public opinion, giving direct expression to their needs and interests while influencing political practice. The bourgeois public sphere made it possible to form a realm of public opinion that opposed state power and the powerful interests that were coming to shape bourgeois society. Habermas was fascinated by the transition from opinion to public opinion, as well as the latter’s socio-structural change. The rise of the mass press, according to him, was founded on the commercialization of the people’s engagement in the public sphere. As a result, much of the original political nature of this ‘extended public sphere’ was lost in favor of commercialism and entertainment (Habermas, 1989, p. 169). This trend may be seen in the press, which is the most important entity of the public sphere: Habermas diagnoses the merging of the formerly distinct domains of journalism and literature, as well as a blurring produced by the mass media’s response to the rise of a consumerist culture. He argued that “Editorial opinions recede behind information from press agencies and reports from correspondents; critical debate disappears behind the veil of internal decisions concerning the selection and presentation of the material.” (Habermas, 1989, p.169) The introduction of electronic mass media into the public sphere exacerbated the situation. The news is made to resemble a story from its own structure down to stylistic detail, thus the boundary between truth and fiction is increasingly being discarded (Habermas, 1989, p.170). However, while they have a greater influence than print media, their format effectively limits interaction and deprives the public of the opportunity to disagree and think critically, leading Habermas to the conclusion that “The world fashioned by the mass media is a public sphere in appearance only”, at the same time “the integrity of the private sphere which they promise to their consumers is also an illusion.” (Habermas, 1989, p.171). Adorno and Horkheimer agree with Habermas on this point, for them, “Movies and radio need no longer pretend to be art. The truth that they are just business is made into an ideology in order to justify the rubbish they deliberately produce” (Dialectic of Enlightenment, 1944, p.121, para.1) Habermas notes the contradiction between “the liberal public sphere’s constitutive catalogue of ‘basic rights of man’ and their de facto restriction to a certain class of men” (Habermas, 1989, p.11). The public sphere's character is becoming progressively limited; the media serve as tools of establishing and controlling consensus and promoting capitalist culture rather than fulfilling their original purpose as organs of public discussion. In favor of a staged performance, publicity loses its critical role, ideas are transmuted into symbols to which one cannot react by debating but only by identifying with. Unlike the coffee houses, Habermas pointed, “[they] were considered seedbeds of political unrest: Men have assumed to themselves a liberty […] to censure and defame the proceedings of the State” (Habermas, 1989, p.59). Throughout Structural Transformation, Habermas maintained that the mass media have evolved into monopolistic capitalist institutions. Their role in public debate has evolved from disseminating trustworthy information to shaping public opinion. To counter these developments and as a condition for a pluralist democratic debate in an open society that is not entirely dominated by the mass media. Habermas emphasized the importance of a vital and functioning public sphere, a sphere of critical publicity distinct from the state and the economy, consisting of a broad range of organizations that represent public opinion and interest groups. From this, it is obvious that Habermas, Horkheimer and Adorno advocated for freedom of the press and freedom of speech, a press that is free from the monopolistic capitalist corporations and the influence of the state. One that informed citizens and left them to criticize freely. Habermas argued that “the press was systematically made to serve the interests of the state administration” (Habermas, 1989, p.22). At the same time, Habermas also argued that the elimination of censorship in England in the years of 1694 and 1695, gave some liberty to the press, even by a slight margin. “The elimination of the institution of censorship marked a new stage in the development of the public sphere” He stated, “It made the influx of rational-critical arguments into the press possible and allowed the latter to evolve into an instrument with whose aid political decisions could be brought before the new forum of the public” (Habermas, 1989, p.58). In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas stated clearly and explicitly that “Freedom of the press, radio, and television, as well as the right to engage in these areas, safeguards the media infrastructure of public communication; such liberties are thereby supposed to preserve an openness for competing opinions and a representative diversity of voices.” (Habermas, 1996, p.368, line.9) Nevertheless, in comparison to the emerging media of the twentieth century, like film, radio, and television, the degree of economic concentration and technological coordination in the newspaper business appeared to be modest. Indeed, the funds for the media of the twentieth century appeared to be massive, and their propagandist power so intimidating, that in certain countries, capitalist or not, the development of these media was controlled by the government from the outset. References: Adorno, T. W., & Horkheimer, M. ( 1944) . Dialectic of enlightenment . Verso. Habermas, J. ( 1989) . The structural transformation of the public Sphere an inquiry into a category of bourgeois society. MIT Press. Habermas, J. ( 1996) . Between facts and norms: *contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy. MIT Press. |