Voting Rights and Suffrage/Philosophical Origins/Tradition contributions/Rousseau's Thought - Revision history

Jkochan1 at 05:17, 27 March 2023

2023-03-27T05:17:50Z

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	\|question=Tradition contributions		\|question=Tradition contributions
	\|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?		\|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
			\|breakout=Rousseau's Thought
	\|pageLevel=Breakout		\|pageLevel=Breakout
	~~\|breakout=Rousseau's Thought~~
	\|contents=In Rousseau's Social Contract, he discusses how society is designed to be a give and take between governors and the governed. This relationship is probably most evident in his discussion on elections and democracy. Rousseau believes that democracy is a perfect form of government, as it holds the sovereign to the general will and separates the "maker of laws [from the one] to execute them" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 71). However, there are many flaws with democracy in Rousseau's mind, primarily being born from the inherent flaws of the people within it. People need the government to be governed as they are not perfect; therefore, there will always be problems with the "influence of private interests in public affairs" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 71). This influence of personal interest coupled with the struggle of forming a society "where the people can readily be assembled" for matters of state like a true democracy requires (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 72). For both of these requirements to be met, the government must only control a small amount of land with a small population "where each citizen… [is] well acquainted with all the rest" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 72). These criteria allow for a society that can always gather to discuss policy and legislation for each person to cast their vote on each issue presented. However, these criteria, the elimination of personal interest and a small state, are nearly impossible to establish in society sustainably. Inevitably, personal interest, corruption, or any other inhibitor will get in the way, or a city’s population will increase too much and that is why Rousseau believes that "so perfect a form of government is not for men"' (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 73).		\|contents=In Rousseau's Social Contract, he discusses how society is designed to be a give and take between governors and the governed. This relationship is probably most evident in his discussion on elections and democracy. Rousseau believes that democracy is a perfect form of government, as it holds the sovereign to the general will and separates the "maker of laws [from the one] to execute them" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 71). However, there are many flaws with democracy in Rousseau's mind, primarily being born from the inherent flaws of the people within it. People need the government to be governed as they are not perfect; therefore, there will always be problems with the "influence of private interests in public affairs" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 71). This influence of personal interest coupled with the struggle of forming a society "where the people can readily be assembled" for matters of state like a true democracy requires (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 72). For both of these requirements to be met, the government must only control a small amount of land with a small population "where each citizen… [is] well acquainted with all the rest" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 72). These criteria allow for a society that can always gather to discuss policy and legislation for each person to cast their vote on each issue presented. However, these criteria, the elimination of personal interest and a small state, are nearly impossible to establish in society sustainably. Inevitably, personal interest, corruption, or any other inhibitor will get in the way, or a city’s population will increase too much and that is why Rousseau believes that "so perfect a form of government is not for men"' (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 73).
	Having a small and compact state is also a utilitarian view. Rousseau knows that for voters to want to participate, they will need to think that their vote matters, for example: "suppose that this state consists of ten thousand citizens… thus the sovereign is as ten thousand to one; that is to say, every member of the state has, as his own share, only one ten-thousandth part of the sovereign power, although he is subject to the whole" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 2004]]) . Therefore, if you make the republic bigger, let us say this time the republic is "composed of one hundred thousand men, the position of the subjects is unchanged, and each continues to bear the whole weight of the laws, while his vote, reduced to the one hundred-thousandth part, has ten times less influence in the making of the laws" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 2004]]) . This means that as the republic thrives and grows, it will become more prominent, and therefore less liberty is guaranteed through the republic's own institutions (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 2004]]) . However, Rousseau's apprehension toward a true democracy does not mean that he does not believe in citizens' right to vote.		Having a small and compact state is also a utilitarian view. Rousseau knows that for voters to want to participate, they will need to think that their vote matters, for example: "suppose that this state consists of ten thousand citizens… thus the sovereign is as ten thousand to one; that is to say, every member of the state has, as his own share, only one ten-thousandth part of the sovereign power, although he is subject to the whole" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 2004]]) . Therefore, if you make the republic bigger, let us say this time the republic is "composed of one hundred thousand men, the position of the subjects is unchanged, and each continues to bear the whole weight of the laws, while his vote, reduced to the one hundred-thousandth part, has ten times less influence in the making of the laws" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 2004]]) . This means that as the republic thrives and grows, it will become more prominent, and therefore less liberty is guaranteed through the republic's own institutions (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 2004]]) . However, Rousseau's apprehension toward a true democracy does not mean that he does not believe in citizens' right to vote.
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	While the people's right to vote is guaranteed in democracies, Rousseau does not believe it is an inherent right in all governments. He is relatively straightforward about monarchies stating that "neither sortition nor election has any place in a monarchical government," going further to say that "the monarch is by right the sole prince and magistrate, the choice of his lieutenants belongs to him only" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 121). Therefore, monarchs have the right to hold the sole authority in the government and do not have to give the people the power to vote due to their monarchical rights. However, even in republics, there are situations in which Rousseau believes the right to vote can be curbed. Taking from the Roman institution of the dictator, Rousseau believes that if "the greatest dangers are great enough to equal the danger of changing the public order," then the rule of law may have to be set aside to remedy the dangers (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 136). Therefore, the government must "increase the activity of the government" to counteract the issue, and Rousseau believes that "if the peril is such that the apparatus of law itself is an obstacle to security, then [the state] must appoint a supreme ruler who will silence the law" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 137). This ruler's sole goal would be to see that "the state does not perish," and to do this the dictator will use their authority to ensure that "there is no doubt as to the general will" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 137). The dictator will unify the government citizenry of the republic and enforce his will to save the state. However, the dictator must remove the people's voice in the assemblies and their say as to who will be legislators. They will curb the "long debates, dissensions, and tumult" which lead to the "decline of the state," effectively silencing dissenters and saving the state at the expense of the citizens' rights. Therefore, while Rousseau believes in the right to vote, he only believes that a citizen's vote should hold so much power. Furthermore, in some instances, these votes should hold no power, depending on the threats to the state and the form of government.		While the people's right to vote is guaranteed in democracies, Rousseau does not believe it is an inherent right in all governments. He is relatively straightforward about monarchies stating that "neither sortition nor election has any place in a monarchical government," going further to say that "the monarch is by right the sole prince and magistrate, the choice of his lieutenants belongs to him only" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 121). Therefore, monarchs have the right to hold the sole authority in the government and do not have to give the people the power to vote due to their monarchical rights. However, even in republics, there are situations in which Rousseau believes the right to vote can be curbed. Taking from the Roman institution of the dictator, Rousseau believes that if "the greatest dangers are great enough to equal the danger of changing the public order," then the rule of law may have to be set aside to remedy the dangers (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 136). Therefore, the government must "increase the activity of the government" to counteract the issue, and Rousseau believes that "if the peril is such that the apparatus of law itself is an obstacle to security, then [the state] must appoint a supreme ruler who will silence the law" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 137). This ruler's sole goal would be to see that "the state does not perish," and to do this the dictator will use their authority to ensure that "there is no doubt as to the general will" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 137). The dictator will unify the government citizenry of the republic and enforce his will to save the state. However, the dictator must remove the people's voice in the assemblies and their say as to who will be legislators. They will curb the "long debates, dissensions, and tumult" which lead to the "decline of the state," effectively silencing dissenters and saving the state at the expense of the citizens' rights. Therefore, while Rousseau believes in the right to vote, he only believes that a citizen's vote should hold so much power. Furthermore, in some instances, these votes should hold no power, depending on the threats to the state and the form of government.

			References:

	Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. [[Probable year:: 1953]]. Political Writings. Translated and edited by Frederick Watkins. The University of Wisconsin Press.		Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. [[Probable year:: 1953]]. Political Writings. Translated and edited by Frederick Watkins. The University of Wisconsin Press.
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	Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. [[Probable year:: 2004]]. Emile. The Project Gutenberg EBook of Emile. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5427/5427-h/5427-h.htm#link2H_4_0002		Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. [[Probable year:: 2004]]. Emile. The Project Gutenberg EBook of Emile. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5427/5427-h/5427-h.htm#link2H_4_0002


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	\|contents=In Rousseau's Social Contract, he discusses how society is designed to be a give and take between governors and the governed. This relationship is probably most evident in his discussion on elections and democracy. Rousseau believes that democracy is a perfect form of government, as it holds the sovereign to the general will and separates the "maker of laws [from the one] to execute them" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 71). However, there are many flaws with democracy in Rousseau's mind, primarily being born from the inherent flaws of the people within it. People need the government to be governed as they are not perfect; therefore, there will always be problems with the "influence of private interests in public affairs" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 71). This influence of personal interest coupled with the struggle of forming a society "where the people can readily be assembled" for matters of state like a true democracy requires (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 72). For both of these requirements to be met, the government must only control a small amount of land with a small population "where each citizen… [is] well acquainted with all the rest" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 72). These criteria allow for a society that can always gather to discuss policy and legislation for each person to cast their vote on each issue presented. However, these criteria, the elimination of personal interest and a small state, are nearly impossible to establish in society sustainably. Inevitably, personal interest, corruption, or any other inhibitor will get in the way, or a city’s population will increase too much and that is why Rousseau believes that "so perfect a form of government is not for men"' (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 73).		\|contents=In Rousseau's Social Contract, he discusses how society is designed to be a give and take between governors and the governed. This relationship is probably most evident in his discussion on elections and democracy. Rousseau believes that democracy is a perfect form of government, as it holds the sovereign to the general will and separates the "maker of laws [from the one] to execute them" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 71). However, there are many flaws with democracy in Rousseau's mind, primarily being born from the inherent flaws of the people within it. People need the government to be governed as they are not perfect; therefore, there will always be problems with the "influence of private interests in public affairs" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 71). This influence of personal interest coupled with the struggle of forming a society "where the people can readily be assembled" for matters of state like a true democracy requires (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 72). For both of these requirements to be met, the government must only control a small amount of land with a small population "where each citizen… [is] well acquainted with all the rest" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 72). These criteria allow for a society that can always gather to discuss policy and legislation for each person to cast their vote on each issue presented. However, these criteria, the elimination of personal interest and a small state, are nearly impossible to establish in society sustainably. Inevitably, personal interest, corruption, or any other inhibitor will get in the way, or a city’s population will increase too much and that is why Rousseau believes that "so perfect a form of government is not for men"' (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 73).
	Having a small and compact state is also a utilitarian view. Rousseau knows that for voters to want to participate, they will need to think that their vote matters, for example: "suppose that this state consists of ten thousand citizens… thus the sovereign is as ten thousand to one; that is to say, every member of the state has, as his own share, only one ten-thousandth part of the sovereign power, although he is subject to the whole" (Rousseau [[Probable year::2004]]) . Therefore, if you make the republic bigger, let us say this time the republic is "composed of one hundred thousand men, the position of the subjects is unchanged, and each continues to bear the whole weight of the laws, while his vote, reduced to the one hundred-thousandth part, has ten times less influence in the making of the laws" (Rousseau [[Probable year::2004]]) . This means that as the republic thrives and grows, it will become more prominent, and therefore less liberty is guaranteed through the republic's own institutions (Rousseau [[Probable year::2004]]) . However, Rousseau's apprehension toward a true democracy does not mean that he does not believe in citizens' right to vote.		Having a small and compact state is also a utilitarian view. Rousseau knows that for voters to want to participate, they will need to think that their vote matters, for example: "suppose that this state consists of ten thousand citizens… thus the sovereign is as ten thousand to one; that is to say, every member of the state has, as his own share, only one ten-thousandth part of the sovereign power, although he is subject to the whole" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 2004]]) . Therefore, if you make the republic bigger, let us say this time the republic is "composed of one hundred thousand men, the position of the subjects is unchanged, and each continues to bear the whole weight of the laws, while his vote, reduced to the one hundred-thousandth part, has ten times less influence in the making of the laws" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 2004]]) . This means that as the republic thrives and grows, it will become more prominent, and therefore less liberty is guaranteed through the republic's own institutions (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 2004]]) . However, Rousseau's apprehension toward a true democracy does not mean that he does not believe in citizens' right to vote.

	Since Rousseau identifies direct or perfect democracies as implausible, he discusses the two main ways magistrates, legislators, and the prince should be appointed. Rousseau agrees with Montesquieu in that "'selection by lot… is natural to democracy'" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 119). This is because a democracy facilitates a community "in which each member can participate unreservedly" (Watt [[Probable year::1981]], 719), acting on their right to vote and even having "'a reasonable hope of serving his country'" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 119). However, the act of desiring a political position, as prospective representatives would need to campaign for election, is a personal interest that Rousseau sees as a hindrance to government. Rousseau criticizes Montesquieu by pointing out that in a "democracy, public office is not an advantage but a heavy responsibility" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 119-120). Because of this, Rousseau believes that the Venetian and Athenian system for appointing legislators is better for democracy than vote by lot. Since the "selection of rulers is a function of government, and not of sovereignty," and that "common sense, judgment, and integrity [should be] sufficient" in all candidates, then sortition, which appoints the legislators by random chance, allows for a government without infighting and personal interest influencing the functions of government (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 119-120). However, even in this system, Rousseau believes that the public should still have a say when voting to "fill those positions which demand particular talents, such as military officers" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 121). The military is exempt from the duty which is associated with public office as it is a position which does not need to follow the general will. The government must be run by the people and not be diluted by their opinions. Therefore, the military can be elected, while the legislator must be appointed by random chance. This is where Rousseau's concept of the general will come in and starts playing a role in his view on voting.		Since Rousseau identifies direct or perfect democracies as implausible, he discusses the two main ways magistrates, legislators, and the prince should be appointed. Rousseau agrees with Montesquieu in that "'selection by lot… is natural to democracy'" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 119). This is because a democracy facilitates a community "in which each member can participate unreservedly" (Watt [[Probable year:: 1981]], 719), acting on their right to vote and even having "'a reasonable hope of serving his country'" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 119). However, the act of desiring a political position, as prospective representatives would need to campaign for election, is a personal interest that Rousseau sees as a hindrance to government. Rousseau criticizes Montesquieu by pointing out that in a "democracy, public office is not an advantage but a heavy responsibility" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 119-120). Because of this, Rousseau believes that the Venetian and Athenian system for appointing legislators is better for democracy than vote by lot. Since the "selection of rulers is a function of government, and not of sovereignty," and that "common sense, judgment, and integrity [should be] sufficient" in all candidates, then sortition, which appoints the legislators by random chance, allows for a government without infighting and personal interest influencing the functions of government (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 119-120). However, even in this system, Rousseau believes that the public should still have a say when voting to "fill those positions which demand particular talents, such as military officers" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 121). The military is exempt from the duty which is associated with public office as it is a position which does not need to follow the general will. The government must be run by the people and not be diluted by their opinions. Therefore, the military can be elected, while the legislator must be appointed by random chance. This is where Rousseau's concept of the general will come in and starts playing a role in his view on voting.

	Whether it is the public voting on a member of the government or legislators voting on policy, there will always be a majority and minority, which will form based on differing opinions about what is best for the republic. Rousseau stresses that within the assemblies of government, "the more agreement there is…, the more also does the general will prevail" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 116). Therefore, the more "long debates, dissensions, and tumult" allowed within the assemblies leads to the "ascendancy of private and particular interests and the decline of the state" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 116). Rousseau's solution to this dissent to the general will is "unanimous consent" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 117). If the general will is being challenged, then the only way to refine it is only to pass legislation on which everyone agrees. While technically still allowing each magistrate to vote on policy, this leaves their votes meaning nothing unless everyone can agree. This dilutes the power of each person's vote even further, making the dissent and long discussion that Rousseau pointed to as the things that made the state's decline necessary. Therefore, while Rousseau believes that there is a right to vote, there are restrictions on the power that each person's vote holds due to the chance of the general will being deteriorated by personal interests and intrigues.		Whether it is the public voting on a member of the government or legislators voting on policy, there will always be a majority and minority, which will form based on differing opinions about what is best for the republic. Rousseau stresses that within the assemblies of government, "the more agreement there is…, the more also does the general will prevail" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 116). Therefore, the more "long debates, dissensions, and tumult" allowed within the assemblies leads to the "ascendancy of private and particular interests and the decline of the state" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 116). Rousseau's solution to this dissent to the general will is "unanimous consent" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 117). If the general will is being challenged, then the only way to refine it is only to pass legislation on which everyone agrees. While technically still allowing each magistrate to vote on policy, this leaves their votes meaning nothing unless everyone can agree. This dilutes the power of each person's vote even further, making the dissent and long discussion that Rousseau pointed to as the things that made the state's decline necessary. Therefore, while Rousseau believes that there is a right to vote, there are restrictions on the power that each person's vote holds due to the chance of the general will being deteriorated by personal interests and intrigues.

	While the people's right to vote is guaranteed in democracies, Rousseau does not believe it is an inherent right in all governments. He is relatively straightforward about monarchies stating that "neither sortition nor election has any place in a monarchical government," going further to say that "the monarch is by right the sole prince and magistrate, the choice of his lieutenants belongs to him only" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 121). Therefore, monarchs have the right to hold the sole authority in the government and do not have to give the people the power to vote due to their monarchical rights. However, even in republics, there are situations in which Rousseau believes the right to vote can be curbed. Taking from the Roman institution of the dictator, Rousseau believes that if "the greatest dangers are great enough to equal the danger of changing the public order," then the rule of law may have to be set aside to remedy the dangers (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 136). Therefore, the government must "increase the activity of the government" to counteract the issue, and Rousseau believes that "if the peril is such that the apparatus of law itself is an obstacle to security, then [the state] must appoint a supreme ruler who will silence the law" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 137). This ruler's sole goal would be to see that "the state does not perish," and to do this the dictator will use their authority to ensure that "there is no doubt as to the general will" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 137). The dictator will unify the government citizenry of the republic and enforce his will to save the state. However, the dictator must remove the people's voice in the assemblies and their say as to who will be legislators. They will curb the "long debates, dissensions, and tumult" which lead to the "decline of the state," effectively silencing dissenters and saving the state at the expense of the citizens' rights. Therefore, while Rousseau believes in the right to vote, he only believes that a citizen's vote should hold so much power. Furthermore, in some instances, these votes should hold no power, depending on the threats to the state and the form of government.		While the people's right to vote is guaranteed in democracies, Rousseau does not believe it is an inherent right in all governments. He is relatively straightforward about monarchies stating that "neither sortition nor election has any place in a monarchical government," going further to say that "the monarch is by right the sole prince and magistrate, the choice of his lieutenants belongs to him only" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 121). Therefore, monarchs have the right to hold the sole authority in the government and do not have to give the people the power to vote due to their monarchical rights. However, even in republics, there are situations in which Rousseau believes the right to vote can be curbed. Taking from the Roman institution of the dictator, Rousseau believes that if "the greatest dangers are great enough to equal the danger of changing the public order," then the rule of law may have to be set aside to remedy the dangers (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 136). Therefore, the government must "increase the activity of the government" to counteract the issue, and Rousseau believes that "if the peril is such that the apparatus of law itself is an obstacle to security, then [the state] must appoint a supreme ruler who will silence the law" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 137). This ruler's sole goal would be to see that "the state does not perish," and to do this the dictator will use their authority to ensure that "there is no doubt as to the general will" (Rousseau [[Probable year:: 1953]], 137). The dictator will unify the government citizenry of the republic and enforce his will to save the state. However, the dictator must remove the people's voice in the assemblies and their say as to who will be legislators. They will curb the "long debates, dissensions, and tumult" which lead to the "decline of the state," effectively silencing dissenters and saving the state at the expense of the citizens' rights. Therefore, while Rousseau believes in the right to vote, he only believes that a citizen's vote should hold so much power. Furthermore, in some instances, these votes should hold no power, depending on the threats to the state and the form of government.

	Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. [[Probable year::1953]]. Political Writings. Translated and edited by Frederick Watkins. The University of Wisconsin Press.		Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. [[Probable year:: 1953]]. Political Writings. Translated and edited by Frederick Watkins. The University of Wisconsin Press.

	Watt, E. D. [[Probable year::1981]]. “Rousseau Réchaufée-Being Obliged, Consenting, Participating, and Obeying Only Oneself.” The Journal of Politics Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 707-719. https://www-jstor-org.libproxy.furman.edu/stable/2130633?seq=13#metadata_info_tab_contents		Watt, E. D. [[Probable year:: 1981]]. “Rousseau Réchaufée-Being Obliged, Consenting, Participating, and Obeying Only Oneself.” The Journal of Politics Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 707-719. https://www-jstor-org.libproxy.furman.edu/stable/2130633?seq=13#metadata_info_tab_contents

	Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. [[Probable year::2004]]. Emile. The Project Gutenberg EBook of Emile. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5427/5427-h/5427-h.htm#link2H_4_0002		Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. [[Probable year:: 2004]]. Emile. The Project Gutenberg EBook of Emile. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5427/5427-h/5427-h.htm#link2H_4_0002


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2022-11-25T19:52:33Z

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New page

{{Right section
|right=Voting Rights and Suffrage
|section=Philosophical Origins
|question=Tradition contributions
|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
|pageLevel=Breakout
|breakout=Rousseau's Thought
|contents=In Rousseau's Social Contract, he discusses how society is designed to be a give and take between governors and the governed. This relationship is probably most evident in his discussion on elections and democracy. Rousseau believes that democracy is a perfect form of government, as it holds the sovereign to the general will and separates the "maker of laws [from the one] to execute them" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 71). However, there are many flaws with democracy in Rousseau's mind, primarily being born from the inherent flaws of the people within it. People need the government to be governed as they are not perfect; therefore, there will always be problems with the "influence of private interests in public affairs" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 71). This influence of personal interest coupled with the struggle of forming a society "where the people can readily be assembled" for matters of state like a true democracy requires (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 72). For both of these requirements to be met, the government must only control a small amount of land with a small population "where each citizen… [is] well acquainted with all the rest" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 72). These criteria allow for a society that can always gather to discuss policy and legislation for each person to cast their vote on each issue presented. However, these criteria, the elimination of personal interest and a small state, are nearly impossible to establish in society sustainably. Inevitably, personal interest, corruption, or any other inhibitor will get in the way, or a city’s population will increase too much and that is why Rousseau believes that "so perfect a form of government is not for men"' (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 73).
Having a small and compact state is also a utilitarian view. Rousseau knows that for voters to want to participate, they will need to think that their vote matters, for example: "suppose that this state consists of ten thousand citizens… thus the sovereign is as ten thousand to one; that is to say, every member of the state has, as his own share, only one ten-thousandth part of the sovereign power, although he is subject to the whole" (Rousseau [[Probable year::2004]]) . Therefore, if you make the republic bigger, let us say this time the republic is "composed of one hundred thousand men, the position of the subjects is unchanged, and each continues to bear the whole weight of the laws, while his vote, reduced to the one hundred-thousandth part, has ten times less influence in the making of the laws" (Rousseau [[Probable year::2004]]) . This means that as the republic thrives and grows, it will become more prominent, and therefore less liberty is guaranteed through the republic's own institutions (Rousseau [[Probable year::2004]]) . However, Rousseau's apprehension toward a true democracy does not mean that he does not believe in citizens' right to vote.

Since Rousseau identifies direct or perfect democracies as implausible, he discusses the two main ways magistrates, legislators, and the prince should be appointed. Rousseau agrees with Montesquieu in that "'selection by lot… is natural to democracy'" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 119). This is because a democracy facilitates a community "in which each member can participate unreservedly" (Watt [[Probable year::1981]], 719), acting on their right to vote and even having "'a reasonable hope of serving his country'" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 119). However, the act of desiring a political position, as prospective representatives would need to campaign for election, is a personal interest that Rousseau sees as a hindrance to government. Rousseau criticizes Montesquieu by pointing out that in a "democracy, public office is not an advantage but a heavy responsibility" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 119-120). Because of this, Rousseau believes that the Venetian and Athenian system for appointing legislators is better for democracy than vote by lot. Since the "selection of rulers is a function of government, and not of sovereignty," and that "common sense, judgment, and integrity [should be] sufficient" in all candidates, then sortition, which appoints the legislators by random chance, allows for a government without infighting and personal interest influencing the functions of government (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 119-120). However, even in this system, Rousseau believes that the public should still have a say when voting to "fill those positions which demand particular talents, such as military officers" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 121). The military is exempt from the duty which is associated with public office as it is a position which does not need to follow the general will. The government must be run by the people and not be diluted by their opinions. Therefore, the military can be elected, while the legislator must be appointed by random chance. This is where Rousseau's concept of the general will come in and starts playing a role in his view on voting.

Whether it is the public voting on a member of the government or legislators voting on policy, there will always be a majority and minority, which will form based on differing opinions about what is best for the republic. Rousseau stresses that within the assemblies of government, "the more agreement there is…, the more also does the general will prevail" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 116). Therefore, the more "long debates, dissensions, and tumult" allowed within the assemblies leads to the "ascendancy of private and particular interests and the decline of the state" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 116). Rousseau's solution to this dissent to the general will is "unanimous consent" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 117). If the general will is being challenged, then the only way to refine it is only to pass legislation on which everyone agrees. While technically still allowing each magistrate to vote on policy, this leaves their votes meaning nothing unless everyone can agree. This dilutes the power of each person's vote even further, making the dissent and long discussion that Rousseau pointed to as the things that made the state's decline necessary. Therefore, while Rousseau believes that there is a right to vote, there are restrictions on the power that each person's vote holds due to the chance of the general will being deteriorated by personal interests and intrigues.

While the people's right to vote is guaranteed in democracies, Rousseau does not believe it is an inherent right in all governments. He is relatively straightforward about monarchies stating that "neither sortition nor election has any place in a monarchical government," going further to say that "the monarch is by right the sole prince and magistrate, the choice of his lieutenants belongs to him only" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 121). Therefore, monarchs have the right to hold the sole authority in the government and do not have to give the people the power to vote due to their monarchical rights. However, even in republics, there are situations in which Rousseau believes the right to vote can be curbed. Taking from the Roman institution of the dictator, Rousseau believes that if "the greatest dangers are great enough to equal the danger of changing the public order," then the rule of law may have to be set aside to remedy the dangers (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 136). Therefore, the government must "increase the activity of the government" to counteract the issue, and Rousseau believes that "if the peril is such that the apparatus of law itself is an obstacle to security, then [the state] must appoint a supreme ruler who will silence the law" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 137). This ruler's sole goal would be to see that "the state does not perish," and to do this the dictator will use their authority to ensure that "there is no doubt as to the general will" (Rousseau [[Probable year::1953]], 137). The dictator will unify the government citizenry of the republic and enforce his will to save the state. However, the dictator must remove the people's voice in the assemblies and their say as to who will be legislators. They will curb the "long debates, dissensions, and tumult" which lead to the "decline of the state," effectively silencing dissenters and saving the state at the expense of the citizens' rights. Therefore, while Rousseau believes in the right to vote, he only believes that a citizen's vote should hold so much power. Furthermore, in some instances, these votes should hold no power, depending on the threats to the state and the form of government.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. [[Probable year::1953]]. Political Writings. Translated and edited by Frederick Watkins. The University of Wisconsin Press.

Watt, E. D. [[Probable year::1981]]. “Rousseau Réchaufée-Being Obliged, Consenting, Participating, and Obeying Only Oneself.” The Journal of Politics Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 707-719. https://www-jstor-org.libproxy.furman.edu/stable/2130633?seq=13#metadata_info_tab_contents

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. [[Probable year::2004]]. Emile. The Project Gutenberg EBook of Emile. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5427/5427-h/5427-h.htm#link2H_4_0002

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