Freedom of Expression/Philosophical Origins/Tradition contributions/Benthamite Utilitarianism - Revision history

Jkochan1 at 11:04, 1 May 2023

2023-05-01T11:04:54Z

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	\|contents=To Bentham, the purpose of free expression, especially press, is to identify and censure government abuses, which Bentham believed would have more positive than negative consequences. Like other liberties in Bentham’s thought, it is an instrumental right, not an intrinsic right (Niesen 2019, 4). He worried that a chilling effect would prevent the press from serving its purpose, and he opposed censoring of “bad sentiments” (something Blackstone supported) because he did not trust society’s ability to identify them. Bentham not only advocated for the protection of true statements, but of false ones, provided they were not “‘groundless’ and made with ‘wilful mendacity, accompanied with the consciousness of its falsity, or else with culpable rashness” (Niesen 5). A “wilful mendacity” standard resembles the “actual malice” standard of contemporary American jurisprudence on libel of a public figure.		\|contents=To Bentham, the purpose of free expression, especially press, is to identify and censure government abuses, which Bentham believed would have more positive than negative consequences. Like other liberties in Bentham’s thought, it is an instrumental right, not an intrinsic right (Niesen 2019, 4). He worried that a chilling effect would prevent the press from serving its purpose, and he opposed censoring of “bad sentiments” (something Blackstone supported) because he did not trust society’s ability to identify them. Bentham not only advocated for the protection of true statements, but of false ones, provided they were not “‘groundless’ and made with ‘wilful mendacity, accompanied with the consciousness of its falsity, or else with culpable rashness” (Niesen 5). A “wilful mendacity” standard resembles the “actual malice” standard of contemporary American jurisprudence on libel of a public figure.
	~~REFERENCES~~
			References:

	Niesen, P. ‘Speech, truth and liberty: Bentham to John Stuart Mill.’ Journal of Bentham Studies, 2019, 18(1), pp. 1–19. DOI: https://doi. org/10.14324/111.2045-757X.046.		Niesen, P. ‘Speech, truth and liberty: Bentham to John Stuart Mill.’ Journal of Bentham Studies, 2019, 18(1), pp. 1–19. DOI: https://doi. org/10.14324/111.2045-757X.046.
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Jkochan1 at 12:05, 6 February 2023

2023-02-06T12:05:30Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:05, 6 February 2023
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	\|question=Tradition contributions		\|question=Tradition contributions
	\|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?		\|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
			\|breakout=Benthamite Utilitarianism
	\|pageLevel=Breakout		\|pageLevel=Breakout
	~~\|breakout=Benthamite Utilitarianism~~		\|contents=To Bentham, the purpose of free expression, especially press, is to identify and censure government abuses, which Bentham believed would have more positive than negative consequences. Like other liberties in Bentham’s thought, it is an instrumental right, not an intrinsic right (Niesen 2019, 4). He worried that a chilling effect would prevent the press from serving its purpose, and he opposed censoring of “bad sentiments” (something Blackstone supported) because he did not trust society’s ability to identify them. Bentham not only advocated for the protection of true statements, but of false ones, provided they were not “‘groundless’ and made with ‘wilful mendacity, accompanied with the consciousness of its falsity, or else with culpable rashness” (Niesen 5). A “wilful mendacity” standard resembles the “actual malice” standard of contemporary American jurisprudence on libel of a public figure.
	\|contents=		REFERENCES
	To Bentham, the purpose of free expression, especially press, is to identify and censure government abuses, which Bentham believed would have more positive than negative consequences. Like other liberties in Bentham’s thought, it is an instrumental right, not an intrinsic right (Niesen ~~[[Probable year::~~ 2019]], 4). He worried that a chilling effect would prevent the press from serving its purpose, and he opposed censoring of “bad sentiments” (something Blackstone supported) because he did not trust society’s ability to identify them. Bentham not only advocated for the protection of true statements, but of false ones, provided they were not “‘groundless’ and made with ‘wilful mendacity, accompanied with the consciousness of its falsity, or else with culpable rashness” (Niesen 5). A “wilful mendacity” standard resembles the “actual malice” standard of contemporary American jurisprudence on libel of a public figure.		Niesen, P. ‘Speech, truth and liberty: Bentham to John Stuart Mill.’ Journal of Bentham Studies, 2019, 18(1), pp. 1–19. DOI: https://doi. org/10.14324/111.2045-757X.046.

	Niesen: https://~~www~~.~~scienceopen~~.~~com~~/~~document_file/75aeb0a3~~-~~96c6-44d5-9994-0e9bb0214657/Science Open/jbs20180001~~.~~pdf~~


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2022-12-28T22:09:10Z

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← Older revision		Revision as of 22:09, 28 December 2022
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	To Bentham, the purpose of free expression, especially press, is to identify and censure government abuses, which Bentham believed would have more positive than negative consequences. Like other liberties in Bentham’s thought, it is an instrumental right, not an intrinsic right (Niesen [[Probable year::2019]], 4). He worried that a chilling effect would prevent the press from serving its purpose, and he opposed censoring of “bad sentiments” (something Blackstone supported) because he did not trust society’s ability to identify them. Bentham not only advocated for the protection of true statements, but of false ones, provided they were not “‘groundless’ and made with ‘wilful mendacity, accompanied with the consciousness of its falsity, or else with culpable rashness” (Niesen 5). A “wilful mendacity” standard resembles the “actual malice” standard of contemporary American jurisprudence on libel of a public figure.		To Bentham, the purpose of free expression, especially press, is to identify and censure government abuses, which Bentham believed would have more positive than negative consequences. Like other liberties in Bentham’s thought, it is an instrumental right, not an intrinsic right (Niesen [[Probable year:: 2019]], 4). He worried that a chilling effect would prevent the press from serving its purpose, and he opposed censoring of “bad sentiments” (something Blackstone supported) because he did not trust society’s ability to identify them. Bentham not only advocated for the protection of true statements, but of false ones, provided they were not “‘groundless’ and made with ‘wilful mendacity, accompanied with the consciousness of its falsity, or else with culpable rashness” (Niesen 5). A “wilful mendacity” standard resembles the “actual malice” standard of contemporary American jurisprudence on libel of a public figure.

	Niesen: https://www.scienceopen.com/document_file/75aeb0a3-96c6-44d5-9994-0e9bb0214657/Science Open/jbs20180001.pdf		Niesen: https://www.scienceopen.com/document_file/75aeb0a3-96c6-44d5-9994-0e9bb0214657/Science Open/jbs20180001.pdf

Import-sysop: transformed

2022-11-25T19:51:13Z

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New page

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=Philosophical Origins
|question=Tradition contributions
|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
|pageLevel=Breakout
|breakout=Benthamite Utilitarianism
|contents=
To Bentham, the purpose of free expression, especially press, is to identify and censure government abuses, which Bentham believed would have more positive than negative consequences. Like other liberties in Bentham’s thought, it is an instrumental right, not an intrinsic right (Niesen [[Probable year::2019]], 4). He worried that a chilling effect would prevent the press from serving its purpose, and he opposed censoring of “bad sentiments” (something Blackstone supported) because he did not trust society’s ability to identify them. Bentham not only advocated for the protection of true statements, but of false ones, provided they were not “‘groundless’ and made with ‘wilful mendacity, accompanied with the consciousness of its falsity, or else with culpable rashness” (Niesen 5). A “wilful mendacity” standard resembles the “actual malice” standard of contemporary American jurisprudence on libel of a public figure.

Niesen: https://www.scienceopen.com/document_file/75aeb0a3-96c6-44d5-9994-0e9bb0214657/Science Open/jbs20180001.pdf

}}