Freedom of Expression/Limitations - Restrictions/Jurisprudence - Revision history

RightspediaAdmin at 11:25, 15 May 2024

2024-05-15T11:25:17Z

Jkochan1 at 12:17, 6 February 2023

2023-02-06T12:17:04Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:17, 6 February 2023
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	\|questionHeading=Under American jurisprudence, what permissible exceptions exist?		\|questionHeading=Under American jurisprudence, what permissible exceptions exist?
	\|pageLevel=Question		\|pageLevel=Question
	\|contents=Clear and Present Danger: As the Supreme Court ruled in Schenck v. US (~~[[Probable year::~~ 1919]]) , speech can be curtailed when it poses a “clear and present danger.” This case arose when a defendant was accused of violating the Espionage Act by distributing leaflets encouraging people to dodge the draft. As the majority held, the defendant’s ability to undermine the war effort constituted such a danger, akin to yelling “fire” in a crowded theatre.		\|contents=Clear and Present Danger: As the Supreme Court ruled in Schenck v. US (1919), speech can be curtailed when it poses a “clear and present danger.” This case arose when a defendant was accused of violating the Espionage Act by distributing leaflets encouraging people to dodge the draft. As the majority held, the defendant’s ability to undermine the war effort constituted such a danger, akin to yelling “fire” in a crowded theatre.
			Fighting Words: In a doctrine similar to the clear-and-present-danger test, the Supreme Court ruled in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) that the First Amendment does not protect “fighting words” - words that, as the court argued, “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Though this doctrine exists today, it has been undermined, especially by the court’s rulings protecting “hate speech” (see RAV v. St. Paul).
	Fighting Words: In a doctrine similar to the clear-and-present-danger test, the Supreme Court ruled in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (~~[[Probable year::~~ 1942]]) that the First Amendment does not protect “fighting words” - words that, as the court argued, “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Though this doctrine exists today, it has been undermined, especially by the court’s rulings protecting “hate speech” (see RAV v. St. Paul).		O’Brien Test: In US v. O’brien (1968), the Supreme Court developed a four-pronged test for determining whether the government could justifiably limit expression. “We think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” In this case, the Supreme Court held that a ban on burning draft cards did constitute a substantial government interest.
			Speech in schools: In general, public schools have greater leeway to curtail free speech, although the court’s attitudes have changed repeatedly. In Tinker v. Des Moines (1965), the Supreme Court voided suspensions on students wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam War, holding that limited speech must “materially and substantially interfere” with school activities. In Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988), the court gave considerable leniency to schools restricting student speech in a school-sponsored platform (in this case, a school newspaper), allowing it to censor an article because it was “inconsistent with the shared values of a civilized social order.” In Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986), the court allowed a public school to suspend a student for using sexual innuendo at a speech at a school assembly because such speech undermined “fundamental values of public school education.” the Supreme Court ruled similarly in Morse v. Frederick (2007), holding that schools could limit speech advocating drug use.
	O’Brien Test: In US v. O’brien (~~[[Probable year::~~ 1968]]) , the Supreme Court developed a four-pronged test for determining whether the government could justifiably limit expression. “We think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” In this case, the Supreme Court held that a ban on burning draft cards did constitute a substantial government interest.		Imminent Lawless Action: In Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969), the Supreme Court elaborated on the clear-and-present-danger test. To lack protection, certain speech must incite “imminent lawless action.” This means that the mere advocacy of violence is not enough; the speech must actually incite it. It was on these grounds that the court ruled that offensive, inflammatory speech from a klansman was protected because it did not imminently incite violence. This test has generally replaced clear and present danger, although clear and present danger is still the test used in military courts.
			Obscenity: The Supreme Court adopted a three-pronged test in Miller v. California (1973) to determine whether material is legally obscene (and therefore not protected). The prongs are as follows: “whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Pornography is often not legally obscene.
	Speech in schools: In general, public schools have greater leeway to curtail free speech, although the court’s attitudes have changed repeatedly. In Tinker v. Des Moines (~~[[Probable year::~~ 1965]]) , the Supreme Court voided suspensions on students wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam War, holding that limited speech must “materially and substantially interfere” with school activities. In Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (~~[[Probable year::~~ 1988]]) , the court gave considerable leniency to schools restricting student speech in a school-sponsored platform (in this case, a school newspaper), allowing it to censor an article because it was “inconsistent with the shared values of a civilized social order.” In Bethel School District v. Fraser (~~[[Probable year::~~ 1986]]) , the court allowed a public school to suspend a student for using sexual innuendo at a speech at a school assembly because such speech undermined “fundamental values of public school education.” the Supreme Court ruled similarly in Morse v. Frederick (~~[[Probable year::~~ 2007]]) , holding that schools could limit speech advocating drug use.		Libel: Standards for what constitutes libel differ between private citizens and public figures (who can include political figures but also celebrities, business tycoons, etc). Libel against a public person requires a statement to have been false and made negligently. Libel against a public figure, does not include good-faith mistakes that may be considered negligent. Rather, it requires material to be false, and to have been published with “actual malice” (Hustler v. Falwell, 1988).
			Intellectual property: For example, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting (1977), the court ruled that the First Amendment does not protect the right of a television station to air an entire performance without the consent of the performers.
	Imminent Lawless Action: In Brandenburg v. Ohio (~~[[Probable year::~~ 1969]]) , the Supreme Court elaborated on the clear-and-present-danger test. To lack protection, certain speech must incite “imminent lawless action.” This means that the mere advocacy of violence is not enough; the speech must actually incite it. It was on these grounds that the court ruled that offensive, inflammatory speech from a klansman was protected because it did not imminently incite violence. This test has generally replaced clear and present danger, although clear and present danger is still the test used in military courts.

	Obscenity: The Supreme Court adopted a three-pronged test in Miller v. California (~~[[Probable year::~~ 1973]]) to determine whether material is legally obscene (and therefore not protected). The prongs are as follows: “whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Pornography is often not legally obscene.

	Libel: Standards for what constitutes libel differ between private citizens and public figures (who can include political figures but also celebrities, business tycoons, etc). Libel against a public person requires a statement to have been false and made negligently. Libel against a public figure, does not include good-faith mistakes that may be considered negligent. Rather, it requires material to be false, and to have been published with “actual malice” (Hustler v. Falwell, ~~[[Probable year::~~ 1988~~]]) (Nott~~).

	Intellectual property: For example, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting (~~[[Probable year::~~ 1977]]) , the court ruled that the First Amendment does not protect the right of a television station to air an entire performance without the consent of the performers.

	Unlawful assembly: Authorities may restrict assemblies as long as the restrictions are reasonable, narrowly tailored to a specific public interest while limiting rights as little as possible, and are not content-based. For example, a city may require a permit for holding a large assembly. In Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, the Supreme Court ruled that a permitting authority could not vary its demonstration permit fees based on the anticipated cost of maintaining public order. As the court held, making such a determination would require the government to differentiate its treatment toward demonstrations based on the content of their messages.		Unlawful assembly: Authorities may restrict assemblies as long as the restrictions are reasonable, narrowly tailored to a specific public interest while limiting rights as little as possible, and are not content-based. For example, a city may require a permit for holding a large assembly. In Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, the Supreme Court ruled that a permitting authority could not vary its demonstration permit fees based on the anticipated cost of maintaining public order. As the court held, making such a determination would require the government to differentiate its treatment toward demonstrations based on the content of their messages.
			REFERENCES
			US Free Speech Cases: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educator-resources/landmark-cases/freedom-of-speech-general/
			Fighting words: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/293/chaplinsky-v-new-hampshire
			US v. Obrien: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/709/united-states-v-o-brien#:~:text=In%20United %20States%20v.,of%20an%20anti%2Dwar%20protester.
			RAV v. St. Paul: https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/270/r-a-v-v-st-paul

			Tinker v. Des Moines: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1968/21
			Bethel v. Fraser: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1667
			Morse v. Frederick: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-278
			Imminent lawless action: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/970/incitement-to-imminent-lawless-action
			Libel info: https://www.freedomforum.org/libel/
			Hustler v. Falwell: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1278
			Free press cases in the US: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educator-resources/landmark-cases/freedom-of-the-press/
			Info on assembly: https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/criminal/the-right-to-gather-has-some-restrictions.html#:~:t ext=No%20First%20Amendment%20rights%20are,raises%20a%20%E2%80%9Cclear%20and %20present
			Info on broadcast TV and radio, which includes descriptions of all relevant cases: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/broadcast-radio-and-television
	}}		}}

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2022-12-28T22:09:12Z

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← Older revision		Revision as of 22:09, 28 December 2022
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	\|questionHeading=Under American jurisprudence, what permissible exceptions exist?		\|questionHeading=Under American jurisprudence, what permissible exceptions exist?
	\|pageLevel=Question		\|pageLevel=Question
	\|contents=Clear and Present Danger: As the Supreme Court ruled in Schenck v. US ([[Probable year::1919]]) , speech can be curtailed when it poses a “clear and present danger.” This case arose when a defendant was accused of violating the Espionage Act by distributing leaflets encouraging people to dodge the draft. As the majority held, the defendant’s ability to undermine the war effort constituted such a danger, akin to yelling “fire” in a crowded theatre.		\|contents=Clear and Present Danger: As the Supreme Court ruled in Schenck v. US ([[Probable year:: 1919]]) , speech can be curtailed when it poses a “clear and present danger.” This case arose when a defendant was accused of violating the Espionage Act by distributing leaflets encouraging people to dodge the draft. As the majority held, the defendant’s ability to undermine the war effort constituted such a danger, akin to yelling “fire” in a crowded theatre.

	Fighting Words: In a doctrine similar to the clear-and-present-danger test, the Supreme Court ruled in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire ([[Probable year::1942]]) that the First Amendment does not protect “fighting words” - words that, as the court argued, “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Though this doctrine exists today, it has been undermined, especially by the court’s rulings protecting “hate speech” (see RAV v. St. Paul).		Fighting Words: In a doctrine similar to the clear-and-present-danger test, the Supreme Court ruled in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire ([[Probable year:: 1942]]) that the First Amendment does not protect “fighting words” - words that, as the court argued, “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Though this doctrine exists today, it has been undermined, especially by the court’s rulings protecting “hate speech” (see RAV v. St. Paul).

	O’Brien Test: In US v. O’brien ([[Probable year::1968]]) , the Supreme Court developed a four-pronged test for determining whether the government could justifiably limit expression. “We think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” In this case, the Supreme Court held that a ban on burning draft cards did constitute a substantial government interest.		O’Brien Test: In US v. O’brien ([[Probable year:: 1968]]) , the Supreme Court developed a four-pronged test for determining whether the government could justifiably limit expression. “We think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” In this case, the Supreme Court held that a ban on burning draft cards did constitute a substantial government interest.

	Speech in schools: In general, public schools have greater leeway to curtail free speech, although the court’s attitudes have changed repeatedly. In Tinker v. Des Moines ([[Probable year::1965]]) , the Supreme Court voided suspensions on students wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam War, holding that limited speech must “materially and substantially interfere” with school activities. In Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier ([[Probable year::1988]]) , the court gave considerable leniency to schools restricting student speech in a school-sponsored platform (in this case, a school newspaper), allowing it to censor an article because it was “inconsistent with the shared values of a civilized social order.” In Bethel School District v. Fraser ([[Probable year::1986]]) , the court allowed a public school to suspend a student for using sexual innuendo at a speech at a school assembly because such speech undermined “fundamental values of public school education.” the Supreme Court ruled similarly in Morse v. Frederick ([[Probable year::2007]]) , holding that schools could limit speech advocating drug use.		Speech in schools: In general, public schools have greater leeway to curtail free speech, although the court’s attitudes have changed repeatedly. In Tinker v. Des Moines ([[Probable year:: 1965]]) , the Supreme Court voided suspensions on students wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam War, holding that limited speech must “materially and substantially interfere” with school activities. In Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier ([[Probable year:: 1988]]) , the court gave considerable leniency to schools restricting student speech in a school-sponsored platform (in this case, a school newspaper), allowing it to censor an article because it was “inconsistent with the shared values of a civilized social order.” In Bethel School District v. Fraser ([[Probable year:: 1986]]) , the court allowed a public school to suspend a student for using sexual innuendo at a speech at a school assembly because such speech undermined “fundamental values of public school education.” the Supreme Court ruled similarly in Morse v. Frederick ([[Probable year:: 2007]]) , holding that schools could limit speech advocating drug use.

	Imminent Lawless Action: In Brandenburg v. Ohio ([[Probable year::1969]]) , the Supreme Court elaborated on the clear-and-present-danger test. To lack protection, certain speech must incite “imminent lawless action.” This means that the mere advocacy of violence is not enough; the speech must actually incite it. It was on these grounds that the court ruled that offensive, inflammatory speech from a klansman was protected because it did not imminently incite violence. This test has generally replaced clear and present danger, although clear and present danger is still the test used in military courts.		Imminent Lawless Action: In Brandenburg v. Ohio ([[Probable year:: 1969]]) , the Supreme Court elaborated on the clear-and-present-danger test. To lack protection, certain speech must incite “imminent lawless action.” This means that the mere advocacy of violence is not enough; the speech must actually incite it. It was on these grounds that the court ruled that offensive, inflammatory speech from a klansman was protected because it did not imminently incite violence. This test has generally replaced clear and present danger, although clear and present danger is still the test used in military courts.

	Obscenity: The Supreme Court adopted a three-pronged test in Miller v. California ([[Probable year::1973]]) to determine whether material is legally obscene (and therefore not protected). The prongs are as follows: “whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Pornography is often not legally obscene.		Obscenity: The Supreme Court adopted a three-pronged test in Miller v. California ([[Probable year:: 1973]]) to determine whether material is legally obscene (and therefore not protected). The prongs are as follows: “whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Pornography is often not legally obscene.

	Libel: Standards for what constitutes libel differ between private citizens and public figures (who can include political figures but also celebrities, business tycoons, etc). Libel against a public person requires a statement to have been false and made negligently. Libel against a public figure, does not include good-faith mistakes that may be considered negligent. Rather, it requires material to be false, and to have been published with “actual malice” (Hustler v. Falwell, [[Probable year::1988]]) (Nott).		Libel: Standards for what constitutes libel differ between private citizens and public figures (who can include political figures but also celebrities, business tycoons, etc). Libel against a public person requires a statement to have been false and made negligently. Libel against a public figure, does not include good-faith mistakes that may be considered negligent. Rather, it requires material to be false, and to have been published with “actual malice” (Hustler v. Falwell, [[Probable year:: 1988]]) (Nott).

	Intellectual property: For example, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting ([[Probable year::1977]]) , the court ruled that the First Amendment does not protect the right of a television station to air an entire performance without the consent of the performers.		Intellectual property: For example, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting ([[Probable year:: 1977]]) , the court ruled that the First Amendment does not protect the right of a television station to air an entire performance without the consent of the performers.

	Unlawful assembly: Authorities may restrict assemblies as long as the restrictions are reasonable, narrowly tailored to a specific public interest while limiting rights as little as possible, and are not content-based. For example, a city may require a permit for holding a large assembly. In Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, the Supreme Court ruled that a permitting authority could not vary its demonstration permit fees based on the anticipated cost of maintaining public order. As the court held, making such a determination would require the government to differentiate its treatment toward demonstrations based on the content of their messages.		Unlawful assembly: Authorities may restrict assemblies as long as the restrictions are reasonable, narrowly tailored to a specific public interest while limiting rights as little as possible, and are not content-based. For example, a city may require a permit for holding a large assembly. In Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, the Supreme Court ruled that a permitting authority could not vary its demonstration permit fees based on the anticipated cost of maintaining public order. As the court held, making such a determination would require the government to differentiate its treatment toward demonstrations based on the content of their messages.

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2022-11-25T19:51:16Z

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{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=Limitations - Restrictions
|question=Jurisprudence
|questionHeading=Under American jurisprudence, what permissible exceptions exist?
|pageLevel=Question
|contents=Clear and Present Danger: As the Supreme Court ruled in Schenck v. US ([[Probable year::1919]]) , speech can be curtailed when it poses a “clear and present danger.” This case arose when a defendant was accused of violating the Espionage Act by distributing leaflets encouraging people to dodge the draft. As the majority held, the defendant’s ability to undermine the war effort constituted such a danger, akin to yelling “fire” in a crowded theatre.

Fighting Words: In a doctrine similar to the clear-and-present-danger test, the Supreme Court ruled in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire ([[Probable year::1942]]) that the First Amendment does not protect “fighting words” - words that, as the court argued, “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Though this doctrine exists today, it has been undermined, especially by the court’s rulings protecting “hate speech” (see RAV v. St. Paul).

O’Brien Test: In US v. O’brien ([[Probable year::1968]]) , the Supreme Court developed a four-pronged test for determining whether the government could justifiably limit expression. “We think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” In this case, the Supreme Court held that a ban on burning draft cards did constitute a substantial government interest.

Speech in schools: In general, public schools have greater leeway to curtail free speech, although the court’s attitudes have changed repeatedly. In Tinker v. Des Moines ([[Probable year::1965]]) , the Supreme Court voided suspensions on students wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam War, holding that limited speech must “materially and substantially interfere” with school activities. In Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier ([[Probable year::1988]]) , the court gave considerable leniency to schools restricting student speech in a school-sponsored platform (in this case, a school newspaper), allowing it to censor an article because it was “inconsistent with the shared values of a civilized social order.” In Bethel School District v. Fraser ([[Probable year::1986]]) , the court allowed a public school to suspend a student for using sexual innuendo at a speech at a school assembly because such speech undermined “fundamental values of public school education.” the Supreme Court ruled similarly in Morse v. Frederick ([[Probable year::2007]]) , holding that schools could limit speech advocating drug use.

Imminent Lawless Action: In Brandenburg v. Ohio ([[Probable year::1969]]) , the Supreme Court elaborated on the clear-and-present-danger test. To lack protection, certain speech must incite “imminent lawless action.” This means that the mere advocacy of violence is not enough; the speech must actually incite it. It was on these grounds that the court ruled that offensive, inflammatory speech from a klansman was protected because it did not imminently incite violence. This test has generally replaced clear and present danger, although clear and present danger is still the test used in military courts.

Obscenity: The Supreme Court adopted a three-pronged test in Miller v. California ([[Probable year::1973]]) to determine whether material is legally obscene (and therefore not protected). The prongs are as follows: “whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” Pornography is often not legally obscene.

Libel: Standards for what constitutes libel differ between private citizens and public figures (who can include political figures but also celebrities, business tycoons, etc). Libel against a public person requires a statement to have been false and made negligently. Libel against a public figure, does not include good-faith mistakes that may be considered negligent. Rather, it requires material to be false, and to have been published with “actual malice” (Hustler v. Falwell, [[Probable year::1988]]) (Nott).

Intellectual property: For example, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting ([[Probable year::1977]]) , the court ruled that the First Amendment does not protect the right of a television station to air an entire performance without the consent of the performers.

Unlawful assembly: Authorities may restrict assemblies as long as the restrictions are reasonable, narrowly tailored to a specific public interest while limiting rights as little as possible, and are not content-based. For example, a city may require a permit for holding a large assembly. In Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, the Supreme Court ruled that a permitting authority could not vary its demonstration permit fees based on the anticipated cost of maintaining public order. As the court held, making such a determination would require the government to differentiate its treatment toward demonstrations based on the content of their messages.

}}

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:25, 15 May 2024
Line 14:		Line 14:
	Intellectual property: For example, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting (1977), the court ruled that the First Amendment does not protect the right of a television station to air an entire performance without the consent of the performers.		Intellectual property: For example, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting (1977), the court ruled that the First Amendment does not protect the right of a television station to air an entire performance without the consent of the performers.
	Unlawful assembly: Authorities may restrict assemblies as long as the restrictions are reasonable, narrowly tailored to a specific public interest while limiting rights as little as possible, and are not content-based. For example, a city may require a permit for holding a large assembly. In Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, the Supreme Court ruled that a permitting authority could not vary its demonstration permit fees based on the anticipated cost of maintaining public order. As the court held, making such a determination would require the government to differentiate its treatment toward demonstrations based on the content of their messages.		Unlawful assembly: Authorities may restrict assemblies as long as the restrictions are reasonable, narrowly tailored to a specific public interest while limiting rights as little as possible, and are not content-based. For example, a city may require a permit for holding a large assembly. In Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, the Supreme Court ruled that a permitting authority could not vary its demonstration permit fees based on the anticipated cost of maintaining public order. As the court held, making such a determination would require the government to differentiate its treatment toward demonstrations based on the content of their messages.
	~~REFERENCES~~
			References:

	US Free Speech Cases: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educator-resources/landmark-cases/freedom-of-speech-general/		US Free Speech Cases: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educator-resources/landmark-cases/freedom-of-speech-general/

	Fighting words: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/293/chaplinsky-v-new-hampshire		Fighting words: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/293/chaplinsky-v-new-hampshire

	US v. Obrien: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/709/united-states-v-o-brien#:~:text=In%20United %20States%20v.,of%20an%20anti%2Dwar%20protester.		US v. Obrien: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/709/united-states-v-o-brien#:~:text=In%20United %20States%20v.,of%20an%20anti%2Dwar%20protester.

	RAV v. St. Paul: https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/270/r-a-v-v-st-paul		RAV v. St. Paul: https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/270/r-a-v-v-st-paul

	Tinker v. Des Moines: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1968/21		Tinker v. Des Moines: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1968/21

	Bethel v. Fraser: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1667		Bethel v. Fraser: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1985/84-1667

	Morse v. Frederick: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-278		Morse v. Frederick: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2006/06-278

	Imminent lawless action: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/970/incitement-to-imminent-lawless-action		Imminent lawless action: https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/970/incitement-to-imminent-lawless-action
	Libel info: https://www.freedomforum.org/libel/		Libel info: https://www.freedomforum.org/libel/

	Hustler v. Falwell: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1278		Hustler v. Falwell: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1987/86-1278

	Free press cases in the US: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educator-resources/landmark-cases/freedom-of-the-press/		Free press cases in the US: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/educate/educator-resources/landmark-cases/freedom-of-the-press/

	Info on assembly: https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/criminal/the-right-to-gather-has-some-restrictions.html#:~:t ext=No%20First%20Amendment%20rights%20are,raises%20a%20%E2%80%9Cclear%20and %20present		Info on assembly: https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/criminal/the-right-to-gather-has-some-restrictions.html#:~:t ext=No%20First%20Amendment%20rights%20are,raises%20a%20%E2%80%9Cclear%20and %20present

	Info on broadcast TV and radio, which includes descriptions of all relevant cases: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/broadcast-radio-and-television		Info on broadcast TV and radio, which includes descriptions of all relevant cases: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-1/broadcast-radio-and-television
	}}		}}