Freedom of Association/History/Country sources/United Kingdom - Revision history

Saeed.l at 11:22, 4 August 2023

2023-08-04T11:22:46Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 11:22, 4 August 2023
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	Price, Richard. Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty. London: Edward and Charles Dilly and Thomas Cadell, 1776.		Price, Richard. Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty. London: Edward and Charles Dilly and Thomas Cadell, 1776.

			While there are multiple instance of implied rights of association and petition such as the Magna Carta and the Petition of Right in 1628, the first explicit right to association is Trade Union Act, 1871 which granted the right to form and join trade unions for the purpose of protecting their interests and improving working conditions.

			Trade Union Act, 1871. 1871. https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/98373/117044/F1671923749/IRL98373.pdf.
	}}		}}

Jkochan1 at 02:13, 24 April 2023

2023-04-24T02:13:47Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 02:13, 24 April 2023
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	\|question=Country sources		\|question=Country sources
	\|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?		\|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
			\|breakout=United Kingdom
	\|pageLevel=Breakout		\|pageLevel=Breakout
	~~\|breakout=United Kingdom~~		\|contents=The 1990 Human Rights Act protects the Right to assemble and associate, subject to reasonable and proportionate restrictions. The HRA primarily serves to codify the European Convention on Human Rights into British Law (the ECHR and its associated court are not related to the EU, and the UK is still a signatory).
	\|contents=The ~~[[Probable year::~~ 1990]] Human Rights Act protects the Right to assemble and associate, subject to reasonable and proportionate restrictions. The HRA primarily serves to codify the European Convention on Human Rights into British Law (the ECHR and its associated court are not related to the EU, and the UK is still a signatory).
			In 1776, Richard Price, a British writer who supported the American revolution published Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government, and the Justice and Policy of the War with America. Unlike other commentaries on civil rights, he includes discussion on free assembly. He describes a prohibition on “associating for any purposes, except when leave should be given us by a Lord Lieutenant or Viceroy” as being part of a “state of oppression which no country can endure.” Though he does not phrase it as a fundamental right, the fact that Price deems draconian restrictions on association oppressive implies a belief in at least a limited freedom of association. This is the first instance I could find of a political theorist invoking the concept of freedom of association (or the lack thereof).

			There is a more explicit case for free association in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1859). Mill lays a broad notion of individual liberty. He then argues that “from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived (16).”
			Before any British thinkers espoused freedom of association as a right, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and David Hume addressed the issue (as Boyd helpfully summarizes). Hobbes detested associations, referring to them as “lesser commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural man” (257).

	~~In [[Probable year:: 1776]], Richard Price, a British writer who supported the American revolution published Observations~~ on ~~the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government, and the Justice and Policy of the War with America~~. ~~Unlike other commentaries on civil rights~~, he ~~includes discussion on free assembly~~. ~~He describes a prohibition on “associating for any purposes~~, ~~except when leave should be given us by a Lord Lieutenant or Viceroy” as being part of a “state of oppression which no country can endure~~.” ~~Though~~ he does not ~~phrase~~ it as a fundamental right, the fact that Price deems draconian restrictions on association oppressive implies a belief in at least a limited freedom of association. This is the first instance I could find of a political theorist invoking the concept of freedom of association (or the lack thereof).		Locke disagreed with Hobbes’ cynical perspective on groups. John Locke’s “A Letter Concerning Toleration” primarily concerns religious associations, but he extends certain arguments to associations in general. The italicized text below is Boyd’s summarization (241), where sections in quotes come directly from “A Letter.” As Boyd notes, though Locke defends policies that allow freer association, he does so because of their practical benefits, not because it is a fundamental right (2008, 241).

	~~There is a more explicit case for free association in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty ([[Probable year:: 1859]])~~ . ~~Mill lays a broad notion~~ of ~~individual liberty~~. ~~He then argues that “from this liberty of each individual~~, ~~follows~~ the ~~liberty~~, ~~within~~ the ~~same limits~~, of ~~combination among individuals; freedom~~ to ~~unite~~, for ~~any purpose not involving harm to others~~: the ~~persons combining being supposed to be~~ of ~~full age~~, and ~~not forced or deceived (16).~~”		“Suppose this Business of Religion were let alone,” Locke hypothesizes, “and that there were some other Distinction made between men and men, upon account of their different Complexions, Shapes, and Features.” Under conditions of differential treatment, such persons, “united together by one common persecution,” would become just as dangerous and disruptive.26 Conversely, if the state eliminated special privileges, on the one hand, or disproportionate burdens, on the other, then supposedly intractable religious or ethnic affiliations would become matters of complete indifference, no more or less contentious than other private decisions about how to spend one’s money, manage one’s estates, or marry off one’s daughter. Finally, David Hume’s “Of Parties in General” (1742) is another important piece of Enlightenment work skeptical of associations. His position is more nuanced that Hobbes; he understands that association may exist for different purposes. Factions “of interest” are deemed less dangerous than factions “of principle.” Regarding factions of principle, he wonders the following: “But where the difference of principle is attended with no contrariety of action, but every one may follow his own way, without interfering with his neighbour, as happens in all religious controversies; what madness, what fury can beget such unhappy and such fatal divisions?”

	Before any British thinkers espoused freedom of association as a right, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and David Hume addressed the issue (as Boyd helpfully summarizes). Hobbes detested associations, referring to them as “lesser commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural man” (257).		References:

	~~Locke disagreed with Hobbes’ cynical perspective on groups. John Locke’s “A Letter Concerning Toleration” primarily concerns religious associations~~, ~~but he extends certain arguments to associations in general~~. ~~The italicized text below is Boyd’s summarization (241), where sections in quotes come directly from “A Letter~~.” ~~As Boyd notes~~, ~~though Locke defends policies that allow freer association, he does so because of their practical benefits, not because it is a fundamental right~~ (~~[[Probable year::~~ 2008~~]], 241~~).		Boyd, Richard. “THE MADISONIAN PARADOX OF FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION.” Social philosophy & policy 25, no. 2 (2008): 235–262.

	~~“Suppose this Business of Religion were let alone,”~~ Locke hypothesizes, “and that there were some other Distinction made between men and men, upon account of their different Complexions, Shapes, and Features.” Under conditions of differential treatment, such persons, “united together by one common persecution,” would become just as dangerous and disruptive.26 Conversely, if the state eliminated special privileges, on the one hand, or disproportionate burdens, on the other, then supposedly intractable religious or ethnic affiliations would become matters of complete indifference, no more or less contentious than other private decisions about how to spend one’s money, ~~manage one’s estates, or marry off one’s daughter~~.		Locke, John. “Letter Concerning Toleration”
	Finally, David Hume’s “Of Parties in General” ([[Probable year:: 1742]]) is another important piece of Enlightenment work skeptical of associations. His position is more nuanced that Hobbes; he understands that association may exist for different purposes. Factions “of interest” are deemed less dangerous than factions “of principle.” Regarding factions of principle, he wonders the following: “But where the difference of principle is attended with no contrariety of action, but every one may follow his own way, without interfering with his neighbour, as happens in all religious controversies; what madness, what fury can beget such unhappy and such fatal divisions?”

			Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty

			Price, Richard. Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty. London: Edward and Charles Dilly and Thomas Cadell, 1776.
	}}		}}

Import-sysop: transformed

2022-12-28T22:08:54Z

transformed

New page

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Association
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|pageLevel=Breakout
|breakout=United Kingdom
|contents=The [[Probable year:: 1990]] Human Rights Act protects the Right to assemble and associate, subject to reasonable and proportionate restrictions. The HRA primarily serves to codify the European Convention on Human Rights into British Law (the ECHR and its associated court are not related to the EU, and the UK is still a signatory).

In [[Probable year:: 1776]], Richard Price, a British writer who supported the American revolution published Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government, and the Justice and Policy of the War with America. Unlike other commentaries on civil rights, he includes discussion on free assembly. He describes a prohibition on “associating for any purposes, except when leave should be given us by a Lord Lieutenant or Viceroy” as being part of a “state of oppression which no country can endure.” Though he does not phrase it as a fundamental right, the fact that Price deems draconian restrictions on association oppressive implies a belief in at least a limited freedom of association. This is the first instance I could find of a political theorist invoking the concept of freedom of association (or the lack thereof).

There is a more explicit case for free association in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty ([[Probable year:: 1859]]) . Mill lays a broad notion of individual liberty. He then argues that “from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived (16).”

Before any British thinkers espoused freedom of association as a right, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and David Hume addressed the issue (as Boyd helpfully summarizes). Hobbes detested associations, referring to them as “lesser commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural man” (257).

Locke disagreed with Hobbes’ cynical perspective on groups. John Locke’s “A Letter Concerning Toleration” primarily concerns religious associations, but he extends certain arguments to associations in general. The italicized text below is Boyd’s summarization (241), where sections in quotes come directly from “A Letter.” As Boyd notes, though Locke defends policies that allow freer association, he does so because of their practical benefits, not because it is a fundamental right ([[Probable year:: 2008]], 241).

“Suppose this Business of Religion were let alone,” Locke hypothesizes, “and that there were some other Distinction made between men and men, upon account of their different Complexions, Shapes, and Features.” Under conditions of differential treatment, such persons, “united together by one common persecution,” would become just as dangerous and disruptive.26 Conversely, if the state eliminated special privileges, on the one hand, or disproportionate burdens, on the other, then supposedly intractable religious or ethnic affiliations would become matters of complete indifference, no more or less contentious than other private decisions about how to spend one’s money, manage one’s estates, or marry off one’s daughter.
Finally, David Hume’s “Of Parties in General” ([[Probable year:: 1742]]) is another important piece of Enlightenment work skeptical of associations. His position is more nuanced that Hobbes; he understands that association may exist for different purposes. Factions “of interest” are deemed less dangerous than factions “of principle.” Regarding factions of principle, he wonders the following: “But where the difference of principle is attended with no contrariety of action, but every one may follow his own way, without interfering with his neighbour, as happens in all religious controversies; what madness, what fury can beget such unhappy and such fatal divisions?”

}}