- User contributions [en]

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Platonism

2024-08-30T08:14:51Z

Ribqa651:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=Philosophical Origins
|question=Tradition contributions
|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
|breakout=Platonism
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=Plato’s The Republic presents a vision of an ideal society marked by strict social order and rigorous control over various aspects of life, including censorship of poets and a eugenics program to maintain the purity of the ruling class (Grayling 2019, 71). In books II & III of this dialogue, Socrates —generally assumed to be Plato’s mouthpiece— discusses the origins of political life, constructing in speech a just city led by philosopher-kings, and defended by guardians who are meticulously educated and shaped to embody specific virtues.

In this controlled educational framework, poetry must present gods as good and only as causes of good to ensure that the guardians do not see the gods as capricious or unjust (Plato 2016, 379b). The gods must be portrayed as unchanging and truthful, avoiding any depiction of deception to serve as role models and promote stability (380d, 381e). Additionally, all literature portraying the underworld (Hades) as a frightening place should be “expunged” to prevent guardians from fearing death, and thus encourage bravery (386b). Heroes and gods should not be shown lamenting to help guardians develop courage and emotional resilience (387e). Poetry that depicts gods engaging in “unquenchable” laughter is also inadmissible to maintain decorum and self-control among guardians (388e).

In many more instances, such as Book X of The Republic, and in Ion, Socrates shows the dangers of poetry, and specifically imitative poetry: “these works are third from what is and are easy to make for the man who doesn’t know the truth — for such a man makes what look like beings but are not” (Plato 2016, 599a). He contends that poetry can evoke emotions and passions contrary to reason and the harmonious order of the state, justifying its censorship. Socrates critiques poets (especially Homer) and rhapsodes like Ion for creating works through “divine inspiration” rather than knowledge or skill, making their works unreliable and potentially harmful for moral education (Plato 2008). It is to therefore be replaced by “a new kind of poetry which leads beyond itself, which does not present man’s only alternatives as tragic or comic, which supports the philosophic life” (Bloom in Plato 2016, p. 428).

Socrates also insists that stories should encourage self-discipline and obedience, avoiding content that promotes avarice, hubris, or impiety (Plato 2016, 389c-d, 390d, 391a). They must promote truth-telling while allowing lies only “for the benefit of the city in cases involving enemies or citizens” (389b). An example is the ‘noble lie’ which aims to naturalize the social hierarchy by claiming that citizens are born with different types of metal in their souls corresponding to their social class (414b-415d). Such rigorous control over education and content is intended to start from a very young age, as "the beginning is the most important part of every work… at that stage, it is most plastic, and each thing assimilates itself to the model whose stamp anyone wishes to give it" (377b).

These restrictive measures have led critics like Karl Popper to label Plato's philosophy as “totalitarian” and antithetical to the principles of free expression and individual rights (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xiii). Plato’s ideal society prioritizes the collective needs of the state over the freedoms of individuals, conflicting with the values of an “open society”— transparency, democratic governance, freedom of speech and thought — which Popper championed (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, n.d.). The state wields significant control over education, art, individual behavior, occupational roles, and relationships. It regulates artistic and literary expression to ensure that all content aligns with the ethical and moral standards of the ideal city. Socrates himself explicitly acknowledges this need to control speech for the greater good of the society when, before transitioning to the subject of proper diction, he asks Glaucon and Adeimantus, “So what form of speeches still remains for which we are to define the sort of thing that must and must not be said?” (Plato 2016, 392a).

And yet, when defending himself at his trial for impiety and corrupting the youth of Athens, Socrates famously rejects a hypothetical offer that he himself introduces, where the jury might agree to spare his life if he ceases his philosophizing (Plato 2003, 29c-30c). This commitment to philosophical inquiry is vividly depicted in the Apology, where Socrates makes his oft-quoted assertion that “life without…examination is not worth living” (Plato 2003, 38a). Later thinkers like Alexander Meiklejohn and John Stuart Mill would use this to argue for an expansive interpretation of freedom of expression.

For Mill, Socrates was a “moral exemplar”, demonstrating that even unpopular opinions must be heard to prevent intellectual stagnation (Dry 1994, 87). He viewed Socrates’ death as evidence of “the ill effects of suppression per se” (Dry 1994, 87). Similarly, Meiklejohn interpreted Socrates' defense as an assertion of the fundamental right to freedom of speech, akin to the protections later enshrined in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Dry 1994, 92). “Accepting Socrates’ argument [in Crito] at face value”, Meiklejohn saw his willingness to face legal punishment as a recognition of the government’s “power and the legal right to put him to death. But so far as the content of his teaching is concerned, he claims unqualified independence. ‘Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech’, he seems to be saying” (Meiklejohn as quoted by Dry, 1994, 92).

Political Scientist Murray Dry finds Meiklejohn’s understanding of the dialogue (Crito) simplistic, arguing instead that Socrates’ refusal to escape his sentence is rooted in the inherent tension between philosophy and the demands of political life (Dry 1994, 97). While both Mill and Meiklejohn view Socrates’ defense through the lens of an individual asserting his rights (to free speech and inquiry), Dry sees it as an inevitable clash between a philosopher deeply committed to his craft and the state’s authority, ultimately culminating in his execution. The arguments that Socrates uses in Crito to persuade his friend that fleeing is not an option are not intended to show that free speech is a fundamental right that should not be governed or compromised, even at the expense of one’s own life. Instead, they are designed to resonate with his “non-philosophical friend”, who is more concerned with immediate consequences and Socrates' welfare than with abstract philosophical principles (Dry, 1994, 97). By focusing on the duty to obey laws, Socrates speaks to Crito in terms he can understand and accept.

Like Meiklejohn, Dry notes a shift in Socrates’ attitude in “Apology”, from the “categorical law abidingness” described in Crito to one of defiance (Dry, 1994 97). However, while Meiklejohn tries to reconcile this difference by taking philosophy and politics to be potentially harmonious and emphasizing the compatibility of free speech and lawful obedience, Dry attributes the change to a shift in goals and context. In "Apology," Socrates aims to justify his distinctive way of life and address the philosophical and ethical imperatives that transcend human laws (Dry 1994, 98). This philosophic way of life demands a degree of detachment from public affairs, for “the true champion of justice, if he intends to survive even for a short time, must necessarily confine himself to private life and leave politics alone." (Plato 2003, 32a). This inherent tension, according to Dry, is the main theme in both Apology, and The Republic. It is also the basis on which he argues that Plato would stand for a more restrictive view of freedom of speech than the demands of liberal democracy (Dry 1994, 99).

Dry’s reasoning regarding Socrates’ argument in Crito resonates with Alan Bloom’s view that “Plato’s focus is not so much on the content of Socrates’ ideas as on the way those ideas affect and transform his listeners” (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xiii). One way Socrates does this is by tailoring his hypotheticals to his interlocutors’ critiques, which often reflect their character. Bloom cites as an example how Socrates modifies the initial description of a just city given to Adeimantus — from one that fulfills basic needs to one that is more “luxurious” — in response to Glaucon’s objections (Plato 2016, 372d-375c). Otherwise, Socrates’ proposed ideal society would be so extreme and unrealistic that it undermines “the very utopian impulses it expresses” (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xvii). As Adam Kirsch notes, Socrates himself acknowledges its impracticality when he asks Glaucon, “Do you suppose that what we say is any less good on account of our not being able to prove that it is possible to find a city the same as one in speech?”, suggesting that the theoretical model serves more to provoke thought and explore philosophical principles than to present a literal blueprint for a city (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xii). Bloom suggests that it was in fact intentionally designed to highlight the “dangers of what we could call utopianism”, making it “the greatest critique of political idealism ever written” (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xvii). This exercise — taking philosophical ideals to their logical extremes — has in turn revealed the tension between “what philosophy demands and what politics is prepared to tolerate, [bringing] into focus the precarious and subversive position of the philosopher” (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xii & xiv).

This begs the question: to what extent can Plato’s idealized constructs be taken as practical recommendations? While there is no definitive answer, the consistency of themes across multiple works, such as The Republic, Laws, and Gorgias, suggests that Plato's advocacy for control over speech was a genuine political stance rather than just a philosophical exercise. They indicate a nuanced understanding of free speech, where its value is context dependent. In "The Republic," Socrates encourages free expression among his interlocutors, as he does in many other dialogues, such as with Callicles in Gorgias (Plato 1999, para. 32). This may be because these discussions allow for one-on-one interactions moderated by Socrates, which minimizes the risk of misunderstanding and causing harm, or because open dialogue is inherent to the process of philosophical inquiry. Nonetheless, it contrasts with his position for stricter control over speech in the ideal state, which is mirrored in the statements of the Athenian Stranger in “Laws”: “Poet shall compose nothing contrary to the ideas of the lawful, or just, or beautiful, or good, which are allowed in the state…nor shall he be permitted to communicate his compositions to any private individuals until he shall have shown them to the appointed judges and the guardians of the law, and they are satisfied with them” (Plato 2008, Book VII). Such selective endorsement indicates that Plato discriminates based on the purpose and content of speech, holding a special regard for philosophical speech (or inquiry). While free speech is highly valued in the context of philosophical dialogue, it is not seen as an unqualified good in all situations. This stance likely stems from the belief that philosophy, when properly conducted, can do no harm, and is inherently aligned with the pursuit of truth and virtue; a means to the "perfection of [the] soul" (Plato 2003, "Apology," 29e).

References:

Grayling, A.C. The History of Philosophy. Penguin Random House UK, 2019, 108-115.

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. "Karl Popper: Political Philosophy." Accessed July 8, 2024. https://iep.utm.edu/popp-pol/.

Plato. Ion, trans. Benjamin Jowett, Project Gutenberg, 2008, last updated January 15, 2013, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1635/1635-h/1635-h.htm.

Plato. The Last Days of Socrates: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito and Phaedo. Translated by Hugh Tredennick and Harold Tarrant. London: Penguin Books, 2003.

Plato. The Republic of Plato. Translated with an interpretive essay by Allan Bloom. Introduction by Adam Kirsch. New York: Basic Books, 2016.

Plato. Laws. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Project Gutenberg, 2008 https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1750/1750-h/1750-h.htm.

Plato. Gorgias. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Project Gutenberg,1999, last updated April 27, 2022, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1672/1672-h/1672-h.htm.
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Platonism

2024-08-30T08:09:34Z

Ribqa651:

{{Right section
|right=Privacy Rights
|section=Philosophical Origins
|question=Tradition contributions
|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
|breakout=Platonism
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=As with many of Plato's views, it is challenging to definitively pinpoint his stance on privacy given the variability of his perspectives across different dialogues.

In The Republic, Plato, through Socrates, outlines a vision of an ideal state that significantly diminishes the role of privacy. He advocates for communal living among the guardian class, proposing that women and children be shared among all men and that no parent or child know their biological family (Plato, 457d). Moreover, “there mustn’t be private houses for them, nor land, nor any possession. Instead they must get their livelihood from the others, as a wage for guarding, and use it up in common all together” (Plato, 464c). This communal arrangement is intended to prevent personal ties and conflicts of interest, ensuring that the guardians' loyalty and dedication are solely to the state and its welfare.

This is reinforced in Plato’s The Laws, where the Athenian Stranger asserts that the highest form of state, government, and law is one in which "Friends have all things in common” (Moore, 1). He paints an ideal society (Magnesia) where private ownership and individual distinctions are entirely eliminated. Here too communal living is emphasized to the extent that women, children, and property are shared, and things naturally private become common. The Athenian Stranger contends that no state can be truer or more exalted in virtue unless it adopts these principles (Plato, Book V, para 13).

In The Apology and Crito, Plato presents a different view that, according to Konvitz, makes Socrates a pivotal figure in the development of the concept of privacy (Konvitz, 273). In The Apology, Socrates explains that he avoids public political activity because it is fraught with corruption and opposition to just actions. He argues that remaining a private citizen allows him to continue his philosophical mission of questioning, advising, and encouraging others to pursue virtue. Socrates asserts that those who fight for justice should do so privately to preserve their lives and integrity, suggesting that true philosophical work requires a degree of separation from the public sphere (Apology 31d-32a).

Similarly, in Crito, Socrates emphasizes the distinction between the physical body and the true self, which he identifies with the soul (Konvitz, 273). As he faces death, he tells Crito that the true Socrates is not the body that will be buried but the soul that transcends physical death. This conversation highlights Socrates' belief that the essence of a person lies in their inner self, not in their physical presence or public identity. His emphasis on the inner self versus the outer, physical existence underscores a key aspect of the concept of privacy: the idea that there is an inner realm of personal identity and thought that remains separate and protected from public intrusion (Konvitz, 273). By focusing on the soul as the true self, Socrates' philosophy supports the notion of a private, inviolable space where individuals can be truly themselves, free from external influence and societal roles. According to Adam Moore, this concept provided some backdrop for later debates regarding the importance of privacy and personal autonomy (Moore, 1).

These contrasting positions raise the question of how to reconcile Plato's stance on privacy. Some scholars like Adam Moore distinguish between the Socrates in The Republic and The Laws, and the Socrates in The Apology (Moore, 1). He regards the communal living ideas presented in The Republic and The Laws as representative of Plato's stance, which is “openly hostile towards privacy”, and the views in The Apology to be representative of Socrates' (Moore,1). Aristotle also critiques “Plato in the Republic,” arguing that both the end and the means of his proposed communal living are flawed: “The abolition of property will produce, not remove, dissension. Communism of wives and children will destroy natural affection” (Aristotle, Book II, Chapter 3). He further contends that the differentiation of functions is a natural law and trying to enforce absolute uniformity is impractical and unnatural.

References

Adam D. Moore, "Privacy," in The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, 11 Volume Set, 2nd ed., edited by Hugh LaFollette (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2022), accessed July 27, 2024, http://faculty.washington.edu/moore2/IEEP.pdf.

Aristotle. Politics. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Bard College. Accessed July 28, 2024. https://www.bard.edu/library/arendt/pdfs/Aristotle-Politics.pdf.

Milton R. Konvitz, "Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude," Law and Contemporary Problems 31, no. 2 (1966): 272-291, accessed July 26, 2024, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3108&context=lcp.

Plato. The Republic of Plato. Translated with an interpretive essay by Allan Bloom. Introduction by Adam Kirsch. New York: Basic Books, 2016.

Plato. Laws. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Project Gutenberg, 2008
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1750/1750-h/1750-h.htm.
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Platonism

2024-08-29T22:41:44Z

Ribqa651:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=Philosophical Origins
|question=Tradition contributions
|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
|breakout=Platonism
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=Plato’s The Republic presents a vision of an ideal society marked by strict social order and rigorous control over various aspects of life, including censorship of poets and a eugenics program to maintain the purity of the ruling class (Grayling 2019, 71). In books II & III of this dialogue, Socrates —generally assumed to be Plato’s mouthpiece— discusses the origins of political life, constructing in speech a just city led by philosopher-kings, and defended by guardians who are meticulously educated and shaped to embody specific virtues.

In this controlled educational framework, poetry must present gods as good and only as causes of good to ensure that the guardians do not see the gods as capricious or unjust (Plato 2016, 379b). The gods must be portrayed as unchanging and truthful, avoiding any depiction of deception to serve as role models and promote stability (380d, 381e). Additionally, all literature portraying the underworld (Hades) as a frightening place should be “expunged” to prevent guardians from fearing death, and thus encourage bravery (386b). Heroes and gods should not be shown lamenting to help guardians develop courage and emotional resilience (387e). Poetry that depicts gods engaging in “unquenchable” laughter is also inadmissible to maintain decorum and self-control among guardians (388e).

In many more instances, such as Book X of The Republic, and in Ion, Socrates shows the dangers of poetry, and specifically imitative poetry: “these works are third from what is and are easy to make for the man who doesn’t know the truth — for such a man makes what look like beings but are not” (Plato 2016, 599a). He contends that poetry can evoke emotions and passions contrary to reason and the harmonious order of the state, justifying its censorship. Socrates critiques poets (especially Homer) and rhapsodes like Ion for creating works through “divine inspiration” rather than knowledge or skill, making their works unreliable and potentially harmful for moral education (Plato 2008). It is to therefore be replaced by “a new kind of poetry which leads beyond itself, which does not present man’s only alternatives as tragic or comic, which supports the philosophic life” (Bloom in Plato 2016, p. 428).

Socrates also insists that stories should encourage self-discipline and obedience, avoiding content that promotes avarice, hubris, or impiety (Plato 2016, 389c-d, 390d, 391a). They must promote truth-telling while allowing lies only “for the benefit of the city in cases involving enemies or citizens” (389b). An example is the ‘noble lie’ which aims to naturalize the social hierarchy by claiming that citizens are born with different types of metal in their souls corresponding to their social class (414b-415d). Such rigorous control over education and content is intended to start from a very young age, as "the beginning is the most important part of every work… at that stage, it is most plastic, and each thing assimilates itself to the model whose stamp anyone wishes to give it" (377b).

These restrictive measures have led critics like Karl Popper to label Plato's philosophy as “totalitarian” and antithetical to the principles of free expression and individual rights (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xiii). Plato’s ideal society prioritizes the collective needs of the state over the freedoms of individuals, conflicting with the values of an “open society”— transparency, democratic governance, freedom of speech and thought — which Popper championed (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, n.d.). The state wields significant control over education, art, individual behavior, occupational roles, and relationships. It regulates artistic and literary expression to ensure that all content aligns with the ethical and moral standards of the ideal city. Socrates himself explicitly acknowledges this need to control speech for the greater good of the society when, before transitioning to the subject of proper diction, he asks Glaucon and Adeimantus, “So what form of speeches still remains for which we are to define the sort of thing that must and must not be said?” (Plato 2016, 392a).

And yet, when defending himself at his trial for impiety and corrupting the youth of Athens, Socrates famously rejects a hypothetical offer that he himself introduces, where the jury might agree to spare his life if he ceases his philosophizing (Plato 2003, 29c-30c). This commitment to philosophical inquiry is vividly depicted in the Apology, where Socrates makes his oft-quoted assertion that “life without…examination is not worth living” (Plato 2003, 38a). Later thinkers like Alexander Meiklejohn and John Stuart Mill would use this to argue for an expansive interpretation of freedom of expression.

For Mill, Socrates was a “moral exemplar”, demonstrating that even unpopular opinions must be heard to prevent intellectual stagnation (Dry 1994, 87). He viewed Socrates’ death as evidence of “the ill effects of suppression per se” (Dry 1994, 87). Similarly, Meiklejohn interpreted Socrates' defense as an assertion of the fundamental right to freedom of speech, akin to the protections later enshrined in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Dry 1994, 92). “Accepting Socrates’ argument [in Crito] at face value”, Meiklejohn saw his willingness to face legal punishment as a recognition of the government’s “power and the legal right to put him to death. But so far as the content of his teaching is concerned, he claims unqualified independence. ‘Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech’, he seems to be saying” (Meiklejohn as quoted by Dry, 1994, 92).

Political Scientist Murray Dry finds Meiklejohn’s understanding of the dialogue (Crito) simplistic, arguing instead that Socrates’ refusal to escape his sentence is rooted in the inherent tension between philosophy and the demands of political life (Dry 1994, 97). While both Mill and Meiklejohn view Socrates’ defense through the lens of an individual asserting his rights (to free speech and inquiry), Dry sees it as an inevitable clash between a philosopher deeply committed to his craft and the state’s authority, ultimately culminating in his execution. The arguments that Socrates uses in Crito to persuade his friend that fleeing is not an option are not intended to show that free speech is a fundamental right that should not be governed or compromised, even at the expense of one’s own life. Instead, they are designed to resonate with his “non-philosophical friend”, who is more concerned with immediate consequences and Socrates' welfare than with abstract philosophical principles (Dry, 1994, 97). By focusing on the duty to obey laws, Socrates speaks to Crito in terms he can understand and accept.

Like Meiklejohn, Dry notes a shift in Socrates’ attitude in “Apology”, from the “categorical law abidingness” described in Crito to one of defiance (Dry, 1994 97). However, while Meiklejohn tries to reconcile this difference by taking philosophy and politics to be potentially harmonious and emphasizing the compatibility of free speech and lawful obedience, Dry attributes the change to a shift in goals and context. In "Apology," Socrates aims to justify his distinctive way of life and address the philosophical and ethical imperatives that transcend human laws (Dry 1994, 98). This philosophic way of life demands a degree of detachment from public affairs, for “the true champion of justice, if he intends to survive even for a short time, must necessarily confine himself to private life and leave politics alone." (Plato 2003, 32a). This inherent tension, according to Dry, is the main theme in both Apology, and The Republic. It is also the basis on which he argues that Plato would stand for a more restrictive view of freedom of speech than the demands of liberal democracy (Dry 1994, 99).

Dry’s reasoning regarding Socrates’ argument in Crito resonates with Alan Bloom’s view that “Plato’s focus is not so much on the content of Socrates’ ideas as on the way those ideas affect and transform his listeners” (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xiii). One way Socrates does this is by tailoring his hypotheticals to his interlocutors’ critiques, which often reflect their character. Bloom cites as an example how Socrates modifies the initial description of a just city given to Adeimantus — from one that fulfills basic needs to one that is more “luxurious” — in response to Glaucon’s objections (Plato 2016, 372d-375c). Otherwise, Socrates’ proposed ideal society would be so extreme and unrealistic that it undermines “the very utopian impulses it expresses” (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xvii). As Adam Kirsch notes, Socrates himself acknowledges its impracticality when he asks Glaucon, “Do you suppose that what we say is any less good on account of our not being able to prove that it is possible to find a city the same as one in speech?”, suggesting that the theoretical model serves more to provoke thought and explore philosophical principles than to present a literal blueprint for a city (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xii). Bloom suggests that it was in fact intentionally designed to highlight the “dangers of what we could call utopianism”, making it “the greatest critique of political idealism ever written” (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xvii). This exercise — taking philosophical ideals to their logical extremes — has in turn revealed the tension between “what philosophy demands and what politics is prepared to tolerate, [bringing] into focus the precarious and subversive position of the philosopher” (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xii & xiv).

This begs the question: to what extent can Plato’s idealized constructs be taken as practical recommendations? While there is no definitive answer, the consistency of themes across multiple works, such as The Republic, Laws, and Gorgias, suggests that Plato's advocacy for control over speech was a genuine political stance rather than just a philosophical exercise. They indicate a nuanced understanding of free speech, where its value is context dependent. In "The Republic," Socrates encourages free expression among his interlocutors, as he does in many other dialogues, such as with Callicles in Gorgias (Plato 1999, para. 32). This may be because these discussions allow for one-on-one interactions moderated by Socrates, which minimizes the risk of misunderstanding and causing harm, or because open dialogue is inherent to the process of philosophical inquiry. Nonetheless, it contrasts with his position for stricter control over speech in the ideal state, which is mirrored in the statements of the Athenian Stranger in “Laws”: “Poet shall compose nothing contrary to the ideas of the lawful, or just, or beautiful, or good, which are allowed in the state…nor shall he be permitted to communicate his compositions to any private individuals until he shall have shown them to the appointed judges and the guardians of the law, and they are satisfied with them” (Plato 2008, Book VII). Such selective endorsement indicates that Plato discriminates based on the purpose and content of speech, holding a special regard for philosophical speech (or inquiry). While free speech is highly valued in the context of philosophical dialogue, it is not seen as an unqualified good in all situations. This stance likely stems from the belief that philosophy, when properly conducted, can do no harm, and is inherently aligned with the pursuit of truth and virtue; a means to the "perfection of [the] soul" (Plato 2003, "Apology," 29e).

References:

Grayling, A.C. The History of Philosophy. Penguin Random House UK, 2019, 108-115.

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. "Karl Popper: Political Philosophy." Accessed July 8, 2024. https://iep.utm.edu/popp-pol/.

Plato. Ion, trans. Benjamin Jowett, Project Gutenberg, 2008, last updated January 15, 2013, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1635/1635-h/1635-h.htm.

Plato. The Last Days of Socrates: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito and Phaedo. Translated by Hugh Tredennick and Harold Tarrant. London: Penguin Books, 2003.

Plato. The Republic of Plato. Translated with an interpretive essay by Allan Bloom. Introduction by Adam Kirsch. New York: Basic Books, 2016.

Plato. Laws. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Project Gutenberg, 2008 https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1750/1750-h/1750-h.htm.
Plato. Gorgias. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Project Gutenberg,1999, last updated April 27, 2022, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1672/1672-h/1672-h.htm.
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Platonism

2024-08-29T22:40:32Z

Ribqa651: Created page with "{{Right section |right=Freedom of Expression |section=Philosophical Origins |question=Tradition contributions |questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right? |breakout=Platonism |pageLevel=Breakout |contents=Plato’s The Republic presents a vision of an ideal society marked by strict social order and rigorous control over various aspects of life, including censorship of poets and a eugenics program to mai..."

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=Philosophical Origins
|question=Tradition contributions
|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
|breakout=Platonism
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=Plato’s The Republic presents a vision of an ideal society marked by strict social order and rigorous control over various aspects of life, including censorship of poets and a eugenics program to maintain the purity of the ruling class (Grayling 2019, 71). In books II & III of this dialogue, Socrates —generally assumed to be Plato’s mouthpiece— discusses the origins of political life, constructing in speech a just city led by philosopher-kings, and defended by guardians who are meticulously educated and shaped to embody specific virtues.
In this controlled educational framework, poetry must present gods as good and only as causes of good to ensure that the guardians do not see the gods as capricious or unjust (Plato 2016, 379b). The gods must be portrayed as unchanging and truthful, avoiding any depiction of deception to serve as role models and promote stability (380d, 381e). Additionally, all literature portraying the underworld (Hades) as a frightening place should be “expunged” to prevent guardians from fearing death, and thus encourage bravery (386b). Heroes and gods should not be shown lamenting to help guardians develop courage and emotional resilience (387e). Poetry that depicts gods engaging in “unquenchable” laughter is also inadmissible to maintain decorum and self-control among guardians (388e).
In many more instances, such as Book X of The Republic, and in Ion, Socrates shows the dangers of poetry, and specifically imitative poetry: “these works are third from what is and are easy to make for the man who doesn’t know the truth — for such a man makes what look like beings but are not” (Plato 2016, 599a). He contends that poetry can evoke emotions and passions contrary to reason and the harmonious order of the state, justifying its censorship. Socrates critiques poets (especially Homer) and rhapsodes like Ion for creating works through “divine inspiration” rather than knowledge or skill, making their works unreliable and potentially harmful for moral education (Plato 2008). It is to therefore be replaced by “a new kind of poetry which leads beyond itself, which does not present man’s only alternatives as tragic or comic, which supports the philosophic life” (Bloom in Plato 2016, p. 428).
Socrates also insists that stories should encourage self-discipline and obedience, avoiding content that promotes avarice, hubris, or impiety (Plato 2016, 389c-d, 390d, 391a). They must promote truth-telling while allowing lies only “for the benefit of the city in cases involving enemies or citizens” (389b). An example is the ‘noble lie’ which aims to naturalize the social hierarchy by claiming that citizens are born with different types of metal in their souls corresponding to their social class (414b-415d). Such rigorous control over education and content is intended to start from a very young age, as "the beginning is the most important part of every work… at that stage, it is most plastic, and each thing assimilates itself to the model whose stamp anyone wishes to give it" (377b).

These restrictive measures have led critics like Karl Popper to label Plato's philosophy as “totalitarian” and antithetical to the principles of free expression and individual rights (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xiii). Plato’s ideal society prioritizes the collective needs of the state over the freedoms of individuals, conflicting with the values of an “open society”— transparency, democratic governance, freedom of speech and thought — which Popper championed (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, n.d.). The state wields significant control over education, art, individual behavior, occupational roles, and relationships. It regulates artistic and literary expression to ensure that all content aligns with the ethical and moral standards of the ideal city. Socrates himself explicitly acknowledges this need to control speech for the greater good of the society when, before transitioning to the subject of proper diction, he asks Glaucon and Adeimantus, “So what form of speeches still remains for which we are to define the sort of thing that must and must not be said?” (Plato 2016, 392a).

And yet, when defending himself at his trial for impiety and corrupting the youth of Athens, Socrates famously rejects a hypothetical offer that he himself introduces, where the jury might agree to spare his life if he ceases his philosophizing (Plato 2003, 29c-30c). This commitment to philosophical inquiry is vividly depicted in the Apology, where Socrates makes his oft-quoted assertion that “life without…examination is not worth living” (Plato 2003, 38a). Later thinkers like Alexander Meiklejohn and John Stuart Mill would use this to argue for an expansive interpretation of freedom of expression.

For Mill, Socrates was a “moral exemplar”, demonstrating that even unpopular opinions must be heard to prevent intellectual stagnation (Dry 1994, 87). He viewed Socrates’ death as evidence of “the ill effects of suppression per se” (Dry 1994, 87). Similarly, Meiklejohn interpreted Socrates' defense as an assertion of the fundamental right to freedom of speech, akin to the protections later enshrined in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution (Dry 1994, 92). “Accepting Socrates’ argument [in Crito] at face value”, Meiklejohn saw his willingness to face legal punishment as a recognition of the government’s “power and the legal right to put him to death. But so far as the content of his teaching is concerned, he claims unqualified independence. ‘Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech’, he seems to be saying” (Meiklejohn as quoted by Dry, 1994, 92).

Political Scientist Murray Dry finds Meiklejohn’s understanding of the dialogue (Crito) simplistic, arguing instead that Socrates’ refusal to escape his sentence is rooted in the inherent tension between philosophy and the demands of political life (Dry 1994, 97). While both Mill and Meiklejohn view Socrates’ defense through the lens of an individual asserting his rights (to free speech and inquiry), Dry sees it as an inevitable clash between a philosopher deeply committed to his craft and the state’s authority, ultimately culminating in his execution. The arguments that Socrates uses in Crito to persuade his friend that fleeing is not an option are not intended to show that free speech is a fundamental right that should not be governed or compromised, even at the expense of one’s own life. Instead, they are designed to resonate with his “non-philosophical friend”, who is more concerned with immediate consequences and Socrates' welfare than with abstract philosophical principles (Dry, 1994, 97). By focusing on the duty to obey laws, Socrates speaks to Crito in terms he can understand and accept.

Like Meiklejohn, Dry notes a shift in Socrates’ attitude in “Apology”, from the “categorical law abidingness” described in Crito to one of defiance (Dry, 1994 97). However, while Meiklejohn tries to reconcile this difference by taking philosophy and politics to be potentially harmonious and emphasizing the compatibility of free speech and lawful obedience, Dry attributes the change to a shift in goals and context. In "Apology," Socrates aims to justify his distinctive way of life and address the philosophical and ethical imperatives that transcend human laws (Dry 1994, 98). This philosophic way of life demands a degree of detachment from public affairs, for “the true champion of justice, if he intends to survive even for a short time, must necessarily confine himself to private life and leave politics alone." (Plato 2003, 32a). This inherent tension, according to Dry, is the main theme in both Apology, and The Republic. It is also the basis on which he argues that Plato would stand for a more restrictive view of freedom of speech than the demands of liberal democracy (Dry 1994, 99).

Dry’s reasoning regarding Socrates’ argument in Crito resonates with Alan Bloom’s view that “Plato’s focus is not so much on the content of Socrates’ ideas as on the way those ideas affect and transform his listeners” (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xiii). One way Socrates does this is by tailoring his hypotheticals to his interlocutors’ critiques, which often reflect their character. Bloom cites as an example how Socrates modifies the initial description of a just city given to Adeimantus — from one that fulfills basic needs to one that is more “luxurious” — in response to Glaucon’s objections (Plato 2016, 372d-375c). Otherwise, Socrates’ proposed ideal society would be so extreme and unrealistic that it undermines “the very utopian impulses it expresses” (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xvii). As Adam Kirsch notes, Socrates himself acknowledges its impracticality when he asks Glaucon, “Do you suppose that what we say is any less good on account of our not being able to prove that it is possible to find a city the same as one in speech?”, suggesting that the theoretical model serves more to provoke thought and explore philosophical principles than to present a literal blueprint for a city (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xii). Bloom suggests that it was in fact intentionally designed to highlight the “dangers of what we could call utopianism”, making it “the greatest critique of political idealism ever written” (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xvii). This exercise — taking philosophical ideals to their logical extremes — has in turn revealed the tension between “what philosophy demands and what politics is prepared to tolerate, [bringing] into focus the precarious and subversive position of the philosopher” (Kirsch in Plato 2016, xii & xiv).

This begs the question: to what extent can Plato’s idealized constructs be taken as practical recommendations? While there is no definitive answer, the consistency of themes across multiple works, such as The Republic, Laws, and Gorgias, suggests that Plato's advocacy for control over speech was a genuine political stance rather than just a philosophical exercise. They indicate a nuanced understanding of free speech, where its value is context dependent. In "The Republic," Socrates encourages free expression among his interlocutors, as he does in many other dialogues, such as with Callicles in Gorgias (Plato 1999, para. 32). This may be because these discussions allow for one-on-one interactions moderated by Socrates, which minimizes the risk of misunderstanding and causing harm, or because open dialogue is inherent to the process of philosophical inquiry. Nonetheless, it contrasts with his position for stricter control over speech in the ideal state, which is mirrored in the statements of the Athenian Stranger in “Laws”: “Poet shall compose nothing contrary to the ideas of the lawful, or just, or beautiful, or good, which are allowed in the state…nor shall he be permitted to communicate his compositions to any private individuals until he shall have shown them to the appointed judges and the guardians of the law, and they are satisfied with them” (Plato 2008, Book VII). Such selective endorsement indicates that Plato discriminates based on the purpose and content of speech, holding a special regard for philosophical speech (or inquiry). While free speech is highly valued in the context of philosophical dialogue, it is not seen as an unqualified good in all situations. This stance likely stems from the belief that philosophy, when properly conducted, can do no harm, and is inherently aligned with the pursuit of truth and virtue; a means to the "perfection of [the] soul" (Plato 2003, "Apology," 29e).

References:

Grayling, A.C. The History of Philosophy. Penguin Random House UK, 2019, 108-115.

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. "Karl Popper: Political Philosophy." Accessed July 8, 2024. https://iep.utm.edu/popp-pol/.

Plato. Ion, trans. Benjamin Jowett, Project Gutenberg, 2008, last updated January 15, 2013, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1635/1635-h/1635-h.htm.

Plato. The Last Days of Socrates: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito and Phaedo. Translated by Hugh Tredennick and Harold Tarrant. London: Penguin Books, 2003.

Plato. The Republic of Plato. Translated with an interpretive essay by Allan Bloom. Introduction by Adam Kirsch. New York: Basic Books, 2016.

Plato. Laws. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Project Gutenberg, 2008 https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1750/1750-h/1750-h.htm.
Plato. Gorgias. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Project Gutenberg,1999, last updated April 27, 2022, https://www.gutenberg.org/files/1672/1672-h/1672-h.htm.
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Stoicism

2024-08-29T22:37:35Z

Ribqa651:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=Philosophical Origins
|question=Tradition contributions
|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
|breakout=Stoicism
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=The concept of freedom of expression can be traced back to ancient Stoicism, a school of thought that emerged in Athens in the early 3rd century BCE. Founded by Zeno of Citium and developed by prominent figures such as Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, Stoicism incorporates the “Cynic virtues of continence and self-mastery”, and offers profound insights into the nature of true freedom, rational discourse, and ethical responsibility — all of which inform our modern understanding of freedom of expression (Grayling 2019, 108).

One way it does so is by providing guidelines for appropriate speech, rooted in the belief that true freedom is inner freedom, achieved through the mastery of one's own thoughts and emotions (Grayling 2019, 113). Epictetus states, “some things are under our control, while others are not", emphasizing that true freedom lies in focusing on what we can influence and accepting the inevitable with apatheia or equanimity (Enchiridion, 1; Grayling 2019, 113). He further elaborates on this concept of self-mastery in Book II of The Discourses, where he highlights the role of the faculty of expression under the guidance of the will. Here he shows that eloquence and articulate speech, while significant, must be governed by the rational will to ensure that expressions are appropriate, rational, and ethical (Chapter 22, para 4). Marcus Aurelius echoes this in "Meditations," where he advises against being disturbed by external circumstances: "Thou must be like a promontory of the sea, against which though the waves beat continually, yet it both itself stands, and about it are those swelling waves stilled and quieted" (Meditations, 11.40). This resilience — understood within the broader context of their philosophy encompassing ethical integrity and proactive engagement — supports the Stoic belief that true freedom, including freedom of expression, comes from within and is guided by a rational and steadfast mind (Meditations, Introductions, para. 14). It encourages a form of expression that is thoughtful and measured, focused on constructive dialogue rather than reacting impusively to provocations. This corresponds to modern restrictions on speech that incites violence and promotes truthful speech without fear of societal pressure.

Central to the concepts of self-mastery and inner freedom is rational discourse, which to the Stoics was not only a means of communication but a fundamental aspect of ethical living (The Ethics of the Stoics, para 2). They view humans as rational animals, with a body and a soul, where the soul's rational part (hegemonikon) resides in the heart and governs ethics, presentations, and impulses (The Ethics of the Stoics, para 2). Rational discourse originates from this leading part, which enables humans to use reason to control their responses and actions, and is itself governed by logos, or universal reason. This belief is reflected in Diogenes Laertius' Lives of Eminent Philosophers, where he discusses Stoic philosophy and quotes Chrysippus of Soli and Antipater of Tyre as having said that "the world is ordered by reason and providence" and that "the whole world is a living being, endowed with soul and reason", respectively (Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 7.135-7.139). Humans, being part of the cosmos and therefore rational beings, are expected to align their thoughts and expressions with this cosmic rationality. Logic and dialectics play a crucial role in this process, providing the tools for clear thinking and effective reasoning. Speech is closely tied to dialectics as it enables the practice of reasoned dialogue and argumentation, which are essential for discovering and communicating truth. Stoics also believed that language naturally aligns with and captures the rational order of the world, making its study a fundamental part of their philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2023). Its mastery was required for attaining wisdom, as “the wise man is a true dialectician” (Laertius, Lives Eminent Philosophers, 7.1.85). Thus, for the Stoics, this facilitative role of free speech (though narrower in scope compared to modern views of expression) warranted its protection.

Such emphasis is also reflected in Aurelius’ gratitude towards his brother Severus for introducing him to prominent Stoic philosophers like Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dio, and Brutus, who were known for their unwavering commitment to justice and their courage in resisting tyranny (often at great personal cost). In his Meditations, Aurelius reflects on the influence of these philosophers and their dedication to a balanced constitution and “of government founded on equity and freedom of speech and of a monarchy which values above all things the freedom of the subject” (Aurelius, Meditations,1.6 as quoted by Pigliucci, 2021). This acknowledgment by Aurelius underscores the Stoic belief in the importance of speaking truth to power and the value of open discourse in maintaining justice.

However, as shown above, this freedom was not considered absolute. The "wise man" or "sage," was expected to assent only to true presentations. "If it be not fitting, do it not. If it be not true, speak it not" (Meditations, 12.14). Though the primacy of the freedom of expression is acknowledged — with Epictetus considering it as a divine gift — they also emphasize that speech should be purposeful, brief, and in service of the greater good (Discourses, 2.22, para 1). As Aurelius notes in his Meditations, one should avoid vain, deceitful, and offensive speech, “not [to] be offended with other men’s liberty of speech”, and communicate with simplicity and substance (Meditations,1.3). Public speech should be grave and modest, steering clear of affectation (Meditations, 1.7, 4.28, 8.28). He praises Apollonius for demonstrating "true liberty and unvariable steadfastness" and maintaining rationality in difficult times. He remained "not subject to be vexed" by the “incapacity of his scholars and auditors in his lectures and expositions”, showcasing calm and thoughtful communication. Similarly, he writes that Sextus exhibited "mildness" and the ability to “rationally and methodically find out and set in order all necessary determinations and instructions for a man's life" (Aurelius, Meditations, 1.5 & 1.6). These examples highlight both the distinction they make between listener and speaker (emphasizing different ethical behaviors for each role) and the careful balancing of freedom and responsibility in speech. This latter perspective directly informs modern democratic values, which uphold freedom of expression as a fundamental right while also recognizing the importance of exercising this freedom responsibly. Examples include regulations against hate speech, libel, and defamation. These legal boundaries are designed to ensure that freedom of expression is exercised in a way that respects the rights and safety of others, reflecting the Stoic emphasis on purposeful and ethical speech.

Although modern legal systems primarily regulate the speech of individuals, it can be argued that they also implicity require the sort of tolerance and thoughtful listening emphasized by the Stoics. Applying Wesley Hohfeld’s rights analysis, the right of a speaker to express their views carries with it a correlative duty, or expectation on the listener to tolerate the speech, even if offensive or disagreeable (Brady, 1972, p. 247). The two are interconnected, each influencing and shaping the boundaries and responsibilities of the other. The high standard set on speeches (such as true threats, obscenity, harassment) highlight the law’s emphasis on protecting the exchange of diverse ideas while preventing significant harm. This standard is even higher when the speech targets public officials, who are expected to endure greater levels of scrutiny and criticism due to their role in the society. According to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), it is no longer sufficient for public officials to prove mere negligence in defamation suits; instead, they must demonstrate "actual malice"—that the false statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth (Wermiel, 2021). This legal differentiation resonates with the Stoic emphasis on thoughtful and unoffended listening, particularly for those in positions of public responsibility (Stoic sages) as part of their roles in maintaining a healthy democracy. As such, though the expectation on listeners to develop a certain level of tolerance is not explicitly codified as an ethical duty in the law, it can be considered as a byproduct of the high thresholds set for limiting speech.

References

Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Edited by R.D. Hicks. Accessed June 12, 2024. https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0258%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1.

Epictetus. The Encheiridion of Epictetus. Translated by W. A. Oldfather. Accessed June 12, 2024. https://people.ucsc.edu/~jbowin/Ancient/encheiridion.pdf.

Epictetus. The Discourses of Epictetus. Translated by P.E. Matheson. 1916. Accessed June 12, 2024. https://sacred-texts.com/cla/dep/dep055.htm.

Grayling, A.C. The History of Philosophy. Penguin Random House UK, 2019, 108-115.

James B. Brady. "Law, Language and Logic: The Legal Philosophy of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld." Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 8, no. 4 (Fall 1972): 246-263. Published by Indiana University Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40319668.

Marcus Aurelius. Meditations. Translated by J. Boulton and David Widger. Project Gutenberg, June 1, 2001. Most recently updated March 9, 2021. https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2680/pg2680-images.html.

Massimo Pigliucci, "Stoics as Activists." Edited by Nigel Warburton. Aeon Essays, December 21, 2021. https://aeon.co/essays/when-stoicism-is-a-political-not-just-a-personal-virtue.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. "Stoicism." January 20, 2023. Accessed June 22, 2024. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/.

Stephen Wermiel, "Actual Malice," Free Speech Center, July 1, 2021, https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/actual-malice/.

Stoic Teacher. "What is Freedom? Is True Freedom Possible?" Medium, October 24, 2022. https://stoicteacher.medium.com/what-is-freedom-is-true-freedom-possible-a61ef702e319

"The Ethics of the Stoics." Philosophy 143 Lecture Notes. University of California, Davis. Accessed June 12, 2024. https://hume.ucdavis.edu/phi143/stoaeth.htm.
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Stoicism

2024-08-29T22:36:30Z

Ribqa651:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=Philosophical Origins
|question=Tradition contributions
|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
|breakout=Stoicism
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=The concept of freedom of expression can be traced back to ancient Stoicism, a school of thought that emerged in Athens in the early 3rd century BCE. Founded by Zeno of Citium and developed by prominent figures such as Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, Stoicism incorporates the “Cynic virtues of continence and self-mastery”, and offers profound insights into the nature of true freedom, rational discourse, and ethical responsibility — all of which inform our modern understanding of freedom of expression (Grayling 2019, 108).

One way it does so is by providing guidelines for appropriate speech, rooted in the belief that true freedom is inner freedom, achieved through the mastery of one's own thoughts and emotions (Grayling 2019, 113). Epictetus states, “some things are under our control, while others are not", emphasizing that true freedom lies in focusing on what we can influence and accepting the inevitable with apatheia or equanimity (Enchiridion, 1; Grayling 2019, 113). He further elaborates on this concept of self-mastery in Book II of The Discourses, where he highlights the role of the faculty of expression under the guidance of the will. Here he shows that eloquence and articulate speech, while significant, must be governed by the rational will to ensure that expressions are appropriate, rational, and ethical (Chapter 22, para 4). Marcus Aurelius echoes this in "Meditations," where he advises against being disturbed by external circumstances: "Thou must be like a promontory of the sea, against which though the waves beat continually, yet it both itself stands, and about it are those swelling waves stilled and quieted" (Meditations, 11.40). This resilience — understood within the broader context of their philosophy encompassing ethical integrity and proactive engagement — supports the Stoic belief that true freedom, including freedom of expression, comes from within and is guided by a rational and steadfast mind (Meditations, Introductions, para. 14). It encourages a form of expression that is thoughtful and measured, focused on constructive dialogue rather than reacting impusively to provocations. This corresponds to modern restrictions on speech that incites violence and promotes truthful speech without fear of societal pressure.

Central to the concepts of self-mastery and inner freedom is rational discourse, which to the Stoics was not only a means of communication but a fundamental aspect of ethical living (The Ethics of the Stoics, para 2). They view humans as rational animals, with a body and a soul, where the soul's rational part (hegemonikon) resides in the heart and governs ethics, presentations, and impulses (The Ethics of the Stoics, para 2). Rational discourse originates from this leading part, which enables humans to use reason to control their responses and actions, and is itself governed by logos, or universal reason. This belief is reflected in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, where he discusses Stoic philosophy and quotes Chrysippus of Soli and Antipater of Tyre as having said that "the world is ordered by reason and providence" and that "the whole world is a living being, endowed with soul and reason", respectively (Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 7.135-7.139). Humans, being part of the cosmos and therefore rational beings, are expected to align their thoughts and expressions with this cosmic rationality. Logic and dialectics play a crucial role in this process, providing the tools for clear thinking and effective reasoning. Speech is closely tied to dialectics as it enables the practice of reasoned dialogue and argumentation, which are essential for discovering and communicating truth. Stoics also believed that language naturally aligns with and captures the rational order of the world, making its study a fundamental part of their philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2023). Its mastery was required for attaining wisdom, as “the wise man is a true dialectician” (Laertius, Lives Eminent Philosophers, 7.1.85). Thus, for the Stoics, this facilitative role of free speech (though narrower in scope compared to modern views of expression) warranted its protection.

Such emphasis is also reflected in Aurelius’ gratitude towards his brother Severus for introducing him to prominent Stoic philosophers like Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dio, and Brutus, who were known for their unwavering commitment to justice and their courage in resisting tyranny (often at great personal cost). In his Meditations, Aurelius reflects on the influence of these philosophers and their dedication to a balanced constitution and “of government founded on equity and freedom of speech and of a monarchy which values above all things the freedom of the subject” (Aurelius, Meditations,1.6 as quoted by Pigliucci, 2021). This acknowledgment by Aurelius underscores the Stoic belief in the importance of speaking truth to power and the value of open discourse in maintaining justice.

However, as shown above, this freedom was not considered absolute. The "wise man" or "sage," was expected to assent only to true presentations. "If it be not fitting, do it not. If it be not true, speak it not" (Meditations, 12.14). Though the primacy of the freedom of expression is acknowledged — with Epictetus considering it as a divine gift — they also emphasize that speech should be purposeful, brief, and in service of the greater good (Discourses, 2.22, para 1). As Aurelius notes in his Meditations, one should avoid vain, deceitful, and offensive speech, “not [to] be offended with other men’s liberty of speech”, and communicate with simplicity and substance (Meditations,1.3). Public speech should be grave and modest, steering clear of affectation (Meditations, 1.7, 4.28, 8.28). He praises Apollonius for demonstrating "true liberty and unvariable steadfastness" and maintaining rationality in difficult times. He remained "not subject to be vexed" by the “incapacity of his scholars and auditors in his lectures and expositions”, showcasing calm and thoughtful communication. Similarly, he writes that Sextus exhibited "mildness" and the ability to “rationally and methodically find out and set in order all necessary determinations and instructions for a man's life" (Aurelius, Meditations, 1.5 & 1.6). These examples highlight both the distinction they make between listener and speaker (emphasizing different ethical behaviors for each role) and the careful balancing of freedom and responsibility in speech. This latter perspective directly informs modern democratic values, which uphold freedom of expression as a fundamental right while also recognizing the importance of exercising this freedom responsibly. Examples include regulations against hate speech, libel, and defamation. These legal boundaries are designed to ensure that freedom of expression is exercised in a way that respects the rights and safety of others, reflecting the Stoic emphasis on purposeful and ethical speech.

Although modern legal systems primarily regulate the speech of individuals, it can be argued that they also implicity require the sort of tolerance and thoughtful listening emphasized by the Stoics. Applying Wesley Hohfeld’s rights analysis, the right of a speaker to express their views carries with it a correlative duty, or expectation on the listener to tolerate the speech, even if offensive or disagreeable (Brady, 1972, p. 247). The two are interconnected, each influencing and shaping the boundaries and responsibilities of the other. The high standard set on speeches (such as true threats, obscenity, harassment) highlight the law’s emphasis on protecting the exchange of diverse ideas while preventing significant harm. This standard is even higher when the speech targets public officials, who are expected to endure greater levels of scrutiny and criticism due to their role in the society. According to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), it is no longer sufficient for public officials to prove mere negligence in defamation suits; instead, they must demonstrate "actual malice"—that the false statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth (Wermiel, 2021). This legal differentiation resonates with the Stoic emphasis on thoughtful and unoffended listening, particularly for those in positions of public responsibility (Stoic sages) as part of their roles in maintaining a healthy democracy. As such, though the expectation on listeners to develop a certain level of tolerance is not explicitly codified as an ethical duty in the law, it can be considered as a byproduct of the high thresholds set for limiting speech.

References

Diogenes Laertius. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Edited by R.D. Hicks. Accessed June 12, 2024. https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0258%3Abook%3D7%3Achapter%3D1.

Epictetus. The Encheiridion of Epictetus. Translated by W. A. Oldfather. Accessed June 12, 2024. https://people.ucsc.edu/~jbowin/Ancient/encheiridion.pdf.

Epictetus. The Discourses of Epictetus. Translated by P.E. Matheson. 1916. Accessed June 12, 2024. https://sacred-texts.com/cla/dep/dep055.htm.

Grayling, A.C. The History of Philosophy. Penguin Random House UK, 2019, 108-115.

James B. Brady. "Law, Language and Logic: The Legal Philosophy of Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld." Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 8, no. 4 (Fall 1972): 246-263. Published by Indiana University Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40319668.

Marcus Aurelius. Meditations. Translated by J. Boulton and David Widger. Project Gutenberg, June 1, 2001. Most recently updated March 9, 2021. https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2680/pg2680-images.html.

Massimo Pigliucci, "Stoics as Activists." Edited by Nigel Warburton. Aeon Essays, December 21, 2021. https://aeon.co/essays/when-stoicism-is-a-political-not-just-a-personal-virtue.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. "Stoicism." January 20, 2023. Accessed June 22, 2024. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/stoicism/.

Stephen Wermiel, "Actual Malice," Free Speech Center, July 1, 2021, https://firstamendment.mtsu.edu/article/actual-malice/.

Stoic Teacher. "What is Freedom? Is True Freedom Possible?" Medium, October 24, 2022. https://stoicteacher.medium.com/what-is-freedom-is-true-freedom-possible-a61ef702e319

"The Ethics of the Stoics." Philosophy 143 Lecture Notes. University of California, Davis. Accessed June 12, 2024. https://hume.ucdavis.edu/phi143/stoaeth.htm.
}}

Freedom of Association/History/Country sources/Platonism

2024-08-27T15:27:06Z

Ribqa651:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Association
|section=Philosophical Origins
|question=Tradition contributions
|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
|breakout=Platonism
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=The concept of freedom of association, understood as the right of individuals to organize and participate in groups, is a fundamental aspect of contemporary democratic societies (Human Rights House Foundation, n.d.). It encompasses the freedom to form and join groups for cultural, political, social, or economic purposes without undue interference from the state (UN Human Rights Council 2012, 5). In the context of Platonic thought, particularly as articulated in Plato's Republic through [the character of] Socrates, the idea of freedom of association is not explicitly addressed in the way it is today. However, the rigid social structure and regimentation described therein offer a valuable contrast, shedding light on Plato's perspective on the necessity of order and the implications for freedom of association.

In Republic, Plato envisions an ideal society structured along strict class lines: rulers (philosopher-kings and guardians), auxiliaries (warriors and defenders), and producers (laborers, farmers, artisans) (Grayling,2019, p. 71). This arrangement is based on the premise that “One man is naturally fitted for one task, and another for another” (Republic, Book II, 370b) and is designed to ensure that each person contributes in a manner best suited to their capability so that “the state will be happy” and in harmony (Grayling, 2019, p.72)

The rulers, or philosopher-kings, are described as the wisest and most rational individuals, who are best suited to govern the city with wisdom and justice. They are “those for whom the truth is the spectacle of which they are enamored” (Republic, 475e) and without which “there can be no cessation of troubles” (Republic, 473c-d). The second class, the auxiliaries, are responsible for protecting the city and enforcing the rulers' decisions. These individuals must be spirited and courageous, capable of performing the tasks of soldiers and guarding the city both from internal and external threat (Republic, 374a-d, 414a-434c). The third class consists of the producers, who are individuals tasked with producing the goods and services necessary for the city's survival. They are described as constituting the mass, with multifarious occupations, who supply the wants of the whole city and live by their labor (Republic, 370ba-371c).

Together, these three classes create a hierarchical structure that mirrors Plato’s doctrine of the tripartite soul, where reason, spirit, and appetites must each perform their proper function to achieve inner harmony and justice (Plato, The Republic, trans. Jowett, Introduction, para 85-100). Just as the well-ordered soul is governed by reason to maintain internal balance, the well-ordered society is governed by a ruling class that ensures each individual's actions contribute to the collective good. Plato's idea of freedom is deeply tied to this concept of inner and societal harmony, where true freedom is the ability to perform one's role without interference, thus achieving justice (Stalley, 1998, p. 146). In contrast, injustice, both in the soul and the society, arises when the natural order is disrupted, i.e., when the appetites overpower reason in the soul or when individuals overstep their roles in the state.

The process of achieving and maintaining such a society is intended to be soft, grounded in education and moral conditioning rather than overt force. “[…] the beginning is the most important part of any work, especially in the case of a young and tender thing; for that is the time at which the character is being formed and the desired impression is more readily taken” (The Republic, trans. Jowett, Book II). Education in Plato's ideal state is designed to mold citizens from a young age to accept and internalize their assigned roles. This educational system limits exposure to alternative viewpoints and associations that might challenge the established order, thereby reinforcing state control over personal affiliations.

Though such regimentation is intended to maintain social order and prevent conflicts arising from unregulated individual desires, it also means that individual choices regarding associations and roles are heavily restricted, as the state determines each person's place within the social structure. Individuals do not have the freedom to choose their profession or social group based on personal preferences; rather, they are assigned roles that align with their natural abilities, identified through careful observation (The Republic of Plato, trans. Bloom, 412e). This concept is encapsulated in the "myth of the metals,” where Socrates explains that all citizens are born from the earth and are brothers, “but the god in fashioning those of you who are fitted to hold rule, mixed gold in at their birth; this is why they are most honored: in auxiliaries, silver, and iron and bronze in the farmers and the other craftsmen” (The Republic of Plato, trans. Bloom, 415a). While people generally inherit their parents' metal, exceptions occur, allowing for some social mobility based on individual ability. The “first and foremost” task of rulers is to ensure that each person is assigned a role that corresponds to their true nature, even if it means reassigning their own children to a lower class. This tale or “noble lie” is intended to promote social harmony and acceptance of one's place in society by suggesting that each person's role is divinely ordained and suited to their natural abilities. There is little opportunity for interaction beyond what is necessary for the functioning of the state, further constraining personal freedom of association.

This is also evident in the communal lifestyle prescribed for the guardian class, where personal interests (including private property) and family ties are sacrificed for the sake of the state's harmony. “With everyone he happens to meet, he’ll hold that he’s meeting a brother, or a sister, or a father, or a son, or a daughter or their descendants or ancestors” (The Republic of Plato, trans. Bloom, 463c). Although this communal living arrangement is designed to prevent conflicts of interest, corruption, and favoritism, the freedom to form personal relationships is significantly curtailed, with the state's needs taking precedence over that of the individual’s.

References

Grayling, A.C. The History of Philosophy. Penguin Random House UK, 2019, 58-80.

Human Rights House Foundation. "Freedom of Association." Accessed June 21, 2024. https://humanrightshouse.org/we-stand-for/freedom-of association/#:~:text=Freedom%20of%20association%20is%20one,groups%2C%20either%20formally%20or%20informally.

Plato. The Republic. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. Project Gutenberg. Accessed June 20, 2024. https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/1497/pg1497-images.html.

Plato. The Republic of Plato. Translated by Allan Bloom. New York: Basic Books, 1968.

Republic. In Perseus Digital Library. Accessed June 21, 2024. https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0168%3Abook%3D5%3Asection%3D473c.

Stalley, R. F. "Plato's Doctrine of Freedom." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 98 (1998): 145-158. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Aristotelian Society. Accessed June 22, 2024. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4545279.

UN Human Rights Council. "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association." 2012. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A-HRC-20-27_en.pdf
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Stoicism

2024-08-27T15:18:12Z

Ribqa651: Created page with "{{Right section |right=Voting Rights and Suffrage |section=Philosophical Origins |question=Tradition contributions |questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right? |breakout=Stoicism |pageLevel=Breakout |contents=While ancient Stoics did not explicitly discuss voting rights, some of their concepts and principles offer insights into how it might be perceived. One such concept is the Stoic idea of natural law..."

{{Right section
|right=Voting Rights and Suffrage
|section=Philosophical Origins
|question=Tradition contributions
|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
|breakout=Stoicism
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=While ancient Stoics did not explicitly discuss voting rights, some of their concepts and principles offer insights into how it might be perceived. One such concept is the Stoic idea of natural law, which posits that there is a universal moral order inherent in the nature of the universe and human beings (Grayling, 2019, 111-112). Living in accordance with it meant aligning one’s actions with reason, which involved practicing the four cardinal virtues: wisdom (prudence), courage, justice, and temperance (moderation). These virtues, known as aretai (plural of aretē), are always good and beneficial, as opposed to “what can sometimes have value (axia)”, such as wealth, health, and honor (Garrett, 2000; Grayling, 2019, 111). According to Stoic philosophy, though we are naturally predisposed to seek the latter due to our inherent tendency to care for ourselves (oikeiosis), they are not good as such and thus do not lead to true happiness (Grayling, 2019, 111).

Justice, as one of the cardinal values, is a fundamental aspect of Stoic ethics that demands fairness and contributing to the common good. As the Roman Emperor and Stoic philosopher Marcus Aurelius (2001) states, "to care for all men generally, is agreeing to the nature of a man" (Book 3, Verse 4). It therefore goes beyond mere legalistic fairness and embodies a deeper ethical commitment to the well-being of all human beings. One way that this principle is realized is through active engagement in societal and communal affairs. Such participation allows individuals to practice the virtue of justice by advocating for policies that protect the rights and well-being of others. Voting falls within this realm of engagement, serving as a way for individuals to be involved in the political process.

Other prominent Stoic figures like Cato the Younger and Seneca also highlight the importance of such involvement in the governance of one's community. Cato the Younger, a staunch defender of the Roman Republic, emphasized the importance of participating in government to safeguard one’s happiness and well-being. His words, “Some have said that it is not the business of private men to meddle with government–a bold and dishonest saying...To say that private men have nothing to do with government is to say that private men have nothing to do with their own happiness or misery,” underscore the critical importance he placed on civic engagement for both personal fulfillment and the collective good (DePriest, n.d.). This point is further illustrated by a quote commonly attributed to Seneca: “He who does not prevent a crime when he can, encourages it”. While Seneca's focus here is on the prevention of wrongdoing, it aligns with the Stoic principle of taking proactive steps to address societal issues, which voting facilitates.

Assuming the Stoics would support the practice of voting, the question arises as to whether they would advocate for universal suffrage or impose certain restrictions or eligibility requirements. Their concept of natural law assumes humans to be rational beings that are capable of understanding and participating in the governance of society, suggesting that they might support broad participation in the voting process as a means to achieve just and rational outcomes. They would also emphasize the importance of citizens embodying the cardinal virtues in exercising their voting rights to ensure informed and rational participation in governance. Any further inferences would be speculative, as the Stoics did not write about specific political mechanisms like voting. It may be easier to discuss those on the other end of the voting process, i.e., candidates, as the Stoics have extensive discussions on ethical exemplars that provide more substantial guidance on what they might expect from those in positions of authority. Otherwise, the most that could be said without imposing modern interpretations is that the Stoics were strong proponents of civic participation and would emphasize the importance of virtue and rationality in those who engage in governance.

References:

Grayling, A.C. The History of Philosophy. Penguin Random House UK, 2019, 108-115.

Garrett, Jan. "Values in Classical Stoicism." Last modified August 2000. Accessed July 17, 2024. https://people.wku.edu/jan.garrett/stoa/stovals.htm.

Epictetus. Discourses. Translated by George Long. MIT Classics Archive. Accessed July 17, 2024. https://classics.mit.edu/Epictetus/discourses.1.one.html.

Jennings DePriest. "Naked, Starved, Deceived, and Destroyed: A Stoic’s Guide to Elections." Daily Stoic, accessed July 15, 2024. https://dailystoic.com/stoic-guide-election/.

Marcus Aurelius. Meditations. Translated by J. Boulton. Project Gutenberg. Released June 1, 2001. Last updated March 9, 2021. https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/2680/pg2680-images.html#link2H_4_0035.
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Hobbesian Thought

2024-08-20T20:20:37Z

Ribqa651:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of the Press
|section=Philosophical Origins
|question=Tradition contributions
|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
|breakout=Hobbesian Thought
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=Although Thomas Hobbes does not specifically discuss the Freedom of Press as it is understood today, he addresses the broader concept of controlling opinions and information, which can be linked to the idea of press censorship (Sturm & Bubacz 2019, p.3). His views on the matter are primarily found in his work Leviathan (2009), where he argues:

… it is annexed to the Soveraignty, to be judge of what Opinions and Doctrines are averse, and what conducing to peace; and consequently, on what occasions, how farre, and what, men are to be trusted withal, in speaking to Multitudes of people; and who shall examine the Doctrines of all bookes before they be published (Chapter 18, p.265)

Hobbes' support for censorship is deeply rooted in his broader political philosophy, particularly his concepts of the State of Nature and the Social Contract. The State of Nature is a hypothetical condition in which humans exist without any form of government or social order. In this state, life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short," characterized by constant fear and the threat of violent death due to the absence of any overarching authority to impose order (Hobbes, 2009, Chapter 13, p.159). Individuals have natural liberty, but this liberty leads to chaos and insecurity as everyone acts according to their own interests and often at the expense of others.

To escape the anarchy of the State of Nature, individuals collectively agree to form a Social Contract (Chapter 14, 176). This contract involves surrendering some of their freedoms to a sovereign authority in exchange for security and order. The sovereign, endowed with absolute authority (contingent upon fulfilling its role) is responsible for maintaining peace and preventing the return to the State of Nature. This includes the authority to regulate and censor opinions and doctrines that might incite unrest or rebellion. Given that the press disseminates information and opinions to the public, it is reasonable to assume that it would fall under the same regulatory framework Hobbes describes for public speech and books.

By controlling and censoring potentially dangerous ideas, the sovereign prevents discord and civil war, ensuring that the commonwealth remains stable. This control over opinions is essential because “the Actions of men proceed from their Opinions”, and unchecked opinions can lead to actions that disrupt social order (Chapter 18, p.265). Having lived through the chaos and violence of the English Civil War (1642-1651), Hobbes was acutely aware of the destructive potential of conflicting ideologies and uncontrolled discourse. He sought to prevent the kind of societal breakdown he had witnessed by vesting the sovereign with near-absolute authority.

This, however, does not mean that Hobbes did not recognize the importance of speech and communication for the functioning of society. He outlines proper uses of speech, such as determining causes, communicating order of events, sharing knowledge, and expressing desires, needs or goals, but also warns against abuses like self-deception, deception of others, lying, and causing harm (Chapter 5, p.67). While he sees value in the free exchange of ideas, he is concerned about the potential for speech to disrupt social order. He believes in balancing the benefits of communication with the need for maintaining peace and stability, ultimately placing the responsibility on the sovereign to manage and regulate discourse for the greater good of society.

Hobbes places this restriction not just on others but also on himself. As Jon Parkin (2015) shows, Hobbes practiced self-censorship in his writings out of concern for how his audience might react and the potential threats to peace and self-preservation that could arise from misinterpreted or misapplied ideas (p.7). He believed that freedom of thought is a natural right which falls beyond the sovereign’s authority, “as for the inward thought…are not voluntary, nor the effect of the laws, but of the unrevealed will, and of the power of God” (Hobbes, Chapter 40, p. 612). It is its public expression that he took issue with. This is particularly evident in his support for religious believers being required to publicly profess beliefs they privately find intolerable (p.3). He considered such professions of belief as mere gestures of obedience to the sovereign that need not necessarily be true.

Hobbes believed that eventually, the security provided by the sovereign would create an environment in which individuals seek to follow the principles of natural law, even without explicit commands from the sovereign (Parkin, 2015, p.6). Over time, they would internalize the importance of presenting themselves in ways that promote peace and avoid conflict. This internalization of “peaceable qualities” would further reduce the need for self-censorship, as individuals become more inclined to act in ways that align with societal stability (p.6). The press would thus operate within a framework where self-censorship is voluntary and not seen as a violation of freedom but as part of a collective effort to maintain peace.

References:

Grayling, A.C. The History of Philosophy. Penguin Random House UK, 2019.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Produced by Edward White and David Widger. Project Gutenberg, 2009. http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/3207.

Parkin, J. B. "Thomas Hobbes and the Problem of Self-Censorship." In The Art of Veiled Speech: Self-Censorship from Aristophanes to Hobbes, University of Pennsylvania Press, August 21, 2015. Accessed July 14, 2024. https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/65884/1/Thomas_Hobbes_and_the_problem_of_self_censorshipHEI.doc.

Sturm, Kristian, and Bruce Bubacz. "The Philosophy of the Freedom of Expression: Speech and Press Examined Philosophically and Implemented Legally." Honors thesis, University of Missouri — Kansas City, 2019. https://mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10355/69286/Honors_2019_Strum.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Hobbesian Thought

2024-08-20T15:12:50Z

Ribqa651:

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Hobbesian Thought

2024-08-20T15:12:08Z

Ribqa651: Created page with "{{Right section |right=Freedom of the Press |section=Philosophical Origins |question=Tradition contributions |questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right? |breakout=Hobbesian Thought |pageLevel=Breakout |contents=Although Thomas Hobbes does not specifically discuss the Freedom of Press as it is understood today, he addresses the broader concept of controlling opinions and information, which can be linked..."

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Rwanda

2024-08-20T15:00:08Z

Ribqa651:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Rwanda
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=Freedom of expression is first mentioned in Article 18 of Rwanda’s first constitution, which entered into law in 1962. However, the document does place limits on the right in accordance with other laws, public security, and the honor of others.

A more explicit and internationally aligned assertion came with the post-genocide Constitution of 2003. Article 37 of the Rwandan Constitution of 2003 states: "Freedom of thought, conscience, religion, worship and public manifestation thereof is guaranteed by the State in accordance with the law."

References:

“Constitution de la République Rwandaise.” Library of Congress. Accessed July 10, 2023. https://www.loc.gov/item/2008700213/#:~:text=Summary,from%20the%20neighboring%20Belgian%20Congo.

"Rwanda 2003 (rev. 2015) Constitution," Constitute Project, accessed June 11, 2024, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Rwanda_2015.
}}

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Russia

2024-08-20T14:54:01Z

Ribqa651:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Russia
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=Article 29 of the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation is the first assertion of freedom of expression in the country’s independent history. It provides: “1. Everyone shall be guaranteed the freedom of thought and speech. 2. Propaganda or agitation, which arouses social, racial, national, or religious hatred or hostility shall be prohibited. Propoganda of social, racial, national, religious, or linguistic supremacy shall also be prohibited. 3. Nobody shall be forced to express his thoughts and convictions or to deny them. 4. Everyone has the right to freely seek, receive, transmit, produce, and disseminate information by any legal means. The list of information, which constitute State secrets, shall be determined by federal law."

That said, under the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic this right was articulated as early as 1923 through the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

References:

“Constitution of the Russian Federation.” University of Minnesota Human Rights Library. Accessed July 17, 2023. http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/constitution-russia.html

“Constitution (Basic Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1923/24.” World Constitutions Illustrated, Heinonline. Accessed July 17, 2023. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/intcon5&i=426

“Russian Federation 1993 (rev. 2014)”. Constitute Project Accessed June 7, 2024. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Russia_2014#s166.
}}

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Romania

2024-08-20T14:43:13Z

Ribqa651:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Romania
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=Freedom of expression was first protected by Romania’s current semi-presidential regime through Article 30 of the country’s 1991 Constitution. Article 30 of the 1991 constitution reads, "(1) The freedom to express ideas, opinions, and beliefs and the freedom of creation of any kind — orally, in writing, through images, by means of sound, or by any other means of public communication — are inviolable. (2) Censorship of any kind is prohibited."

However, the right was first protected in the land when it was known as the Kingdom of Romania through the 1866 Constitution.

It was also asserted in the 1923 constitution, which was influenced by democratic principles following World War I. Article 5 of this constitution states, “Romanians, irrespective of ethnic origin, language or religion, shall enjoy freedom of conscience, freedom of education, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of association and all freedoms and rights established by law”.

References:

“Constitution of 30 June/12 July 1866, as Amended 13/25 October 1876 and 8/20 June 1884.” World Constitutions Illustrated, Heinonline. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.cow/stwar0001&i=525

“The Constitution of Romania.” President of Romania. Accessed July 17, 2023. https://www.presidency.ro/en/the-constitution-of-romania

“Constitution of 1923.” Royal House of Romania Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen
Accessed June 7, 2024. https://www.royalhouseofromaniahohenzollern-sigmaringen.com/text-constitution-of-1923.

“Romania 1991 (rev. 2003) Constitution," Constitute Project, accessed June 11, 2024, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Romania_2003.
}}

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Republic of the Congo

2024-08-20T14:37:43Z

Ribqa651:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Republic of the Congo
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=The right to freedom of expression in the Republic of the Congo was formally asserted in the Constitution adopted shortly after gaining independence from France on August 15, 1960.

Article 9 of the 1963 constitution states, “No one may be incommodated because of his opinions in so long as their manifestation does not disturb the public order established as law. Free communication of thought and opinion shall be exercised by word and the press subject to respect for the laws and regulations”.

Article 19 of the 2001 constitution also provides, “Any citizen has the right to express and to freely diffuse his opinion by words, in writing, by images or all other mean of communication…Censorship is prohibited.”

Article 25 of the 2015 guarantees freedom of expression. The article also expressly prohibits government censorship of the free media.

References:

“Constitution of the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville).” HeinOnline. Accessed June 7, 2024. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.cow/zzsn0036&id=4&collection=cow&index= (p.86)

“Congo (Republic of the) 2001.” Constitute Project. Accessed June 13, 2024. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Congo_2001.

“Congo (Republic of the) 2015 Constitution.” Constitute. Last modified 2015. Accessed September 20, 2022. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Congo_2015?lang=en.
}}

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Republic of Ireland

2024-08-20T14:34:33Z

Ribqa651:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Republic of Ireland
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=The right to freedom of expression in Ireland was formally asserted in the Irish Free State Constitution of 1922, following its independence from the UK, and later enshrined in the Constitution of Ireland (Bunreacht na hÉireann) in 1937.

Article 9 of the 1922 Constitution states, “The freedom of expression of opinion as well as the right to assemble peaceably and without arms, and to form associations or unions is guaranteed for purposes not opposed to public morality…” without discrimination on the basis of political orientation, religion, or class.

Article 40.6.1° of the 1937 Constitution also provides, “The State guarantees liberty for the exercise of the following rights, subject to public order and morality: i. The right of the citizens to express freely their convictions and opinions.”

References:

"Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) Act, 1922," Irish Statute Book, accessed June 11, 2024,
https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1922/act/1/enacted/en/print#:~:text=AN%20ACT%20TO%20ENACT%20A,6TH%20DAY%20OF%20DECEMBER%2C%201921

“Constitution of Ireland.”, Irish Statute Book, last updated 2020. Accessed June 7, 2024.
https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/cons/en/html#part13
}}

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Qatar

2024-08-20T14:32:27Z

Ribqa651:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Qatar
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=Qatar's first formal assertion of freedom of expression is relatively recent compared to many other nations. It was included in the Permanent Constitution of Qatar, which was approved in a public referendum in 2003 and adopted on June 8, 2004.
The constitution was part of broader reforms initiated by the Emir of Qatar to modernize the state and its institutions. This included greater political freedoms, though within the context of a conservative Gulf monarchy.

Article 47 of the Qatari Constitution states: “ Freedom of expression of opinion and scientific research is guaranteed in accordance with the conditions and circumstances set forth in the law.”

Article 48 adds: "Freedom of the press, printing and publication shall be guaranteed in accordance with the law."

Article 50: “Freedom to practice religious rites shall be guaranteed to all persons in accordance with the law and the requirements of the maintenance of public order and morality.”

References:

"Qatar Constitution 2004," ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, accessed June 11, 2024, https://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/mideast/QA/qatar-constitution-2004/view.
}}

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Portugal

2024-08-20T14:28:12Z

Ribqa651:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Portugal
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=Article 37 of Portugal’s 1976 Constitution is the first assertion of freedom of expression in the present-day Portuguese Republic. It provides: "Everyone shall possess the right to freely express and publicize his thoughts in words, images or by any other means, as well as the right to inform others, inform himself, and be informed without hindrance or discrimination."

Other Portuguese governments have also protected this right, with its earliest assertion found in Article 145(3) of the Kingdom of Portugal’s 1822 Constitution.

The 1911 constitution also upheld this principle, providing in Article 3(14) that “Liberty of conscience and creed is inviolable.” Sub article 13 of the same stipulates, “The expression of thought in any form whatever is completely free, and not dependent upon the previous giving of security, submission to censure, or the obtaining of previous authorization, but the abuse of this privilege is punishable in the cases and in the manner prescribed by the law.”

“Constitutional Charter of Portugal.” World Constitutions Illustrated, Heinonline. Accessed July 17, 2023. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.beal/modern0002&i=160

“Constitution of the Portuguese Republic.” University of Minnesota Human Rights Library. Accessed July 17. http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/portugal-constitution.html

“Constitution of the Republic of Portugal—Lisbon, August 21, 1911.” HeinOnline, accessed on June 7, 2024. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.cow/zzsn0036&id=4&collection=cow&index= (p. 767)

“Portugal 1976 (rev. 2005).” Constitute Project. Accessed June 7, 2024.
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Portugal_2005
}}

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Poland

2024-08-20T14:20:37Z

Ribqa651:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Poland
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=The Constitution of 1997 was the first document to protect freedom of expression in the present-day Republic of Poland, with Article 54 specifically outlining the right. Article 54 of the 1997 Constitution of Poland states: "The freedom to express opinions, to acquire and to disseminate information shall be ensured to everyone.” That said, past Polish governments have protected this right through a variety of legal documents, the earliest being the 1921 Constitution of the Republic of Poland.

Article 104 of the 1921 constitution states: “Every citizen has the right to express his ideas and opinions freely, provided that in so doing he does not violate the law.”

Article 105 of the same further stipulates: “Liberty of the Press is guaranteed. The Press shall not be subject to censorship and shall not be subsidized…”

Article 5 of the 1935 constitution reaffirms this right: “(2) The State assures its citizens the possibility of developing their personal capabilities, as also liberty of conscience, speech, and assembly. (3) The limit of these liberties is the common good.”

References:

“Constitution of the Republic of Poland, March 17 1921.” Sejm of the Republic of Poland. Accessed July 17, 2023. http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/kpol/e1921.html

“Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April, 1997.” Sejm of the Republic of Poland. Accessed July 17, 2023. https://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm

“Poland 1997,” Constitute Project, accessed June 11, 2024, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Poland_1997

“The Polish Republic,” HeinOnline, accessed June 7, 2024. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.cow/zzsn0036&id=4&collection=cow&index=
(p.77)

“Constitution of the Republic of Poland (April 23rd, 1935)”. HeinOnline. Accessed June 7, 2024. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.cow/zzsn0036&id=4&collection=cow&index= (p.12)
}}

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Poland

2024-08-20T14:17:28Z

Ribqa651:

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Poland

2024-08-20T14:15:50Z

Ribqa651:

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Libya

2024-08-20T14:11:25Z

Ribqa651:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Libya
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=The concept of freedom of expression in Libya was formally recognized in the Constitutional Proclamation of 1969 following the coup that brought Muammar Gaddafi to power. Article 13 of the proclamation states: “Freedom of opinion is guaranteed within the limits of public interest and the principles of the Revolution.”

The Constitutional Declaration of 2011, following the fall of Gaddafi, more clearly and robustly asserts the right to freedom of expression. Article 14 of this declaration states: “The State shall guarantee freedom of opinion, individual and collective expression, research, communication, press, media, printing and editing, movement, assembly, demonstration and peaceful sit-in in accordance with the statute.” The declaration also guarantees the freedom to form political parties and civil societies, regulated by law (Article 15).

References:

"Libyan Constitution 1969," ConstitutionNet, accessed June 11, 2024, https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/1969_-_libyan_constitution_english.pdf

"Libyan Constitution 2011," Constitute Project, accessed June 11, 2024, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Libya_2011.
}}

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Lebanon

2024-08-20T14:08:16Z

Ribqa651:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Lebanon
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=The right to freedom of expression in Lebanon was initially asserted in the Lebanese Constitution adopted on May 23,1926, during the French Mandate following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after WWI. It continued to serve as the basis for the protection of civil liberties in the country post-independence (1943).

Article 13 of the 1926 Lebanese Constitution states: “The freedom of opinion, expression through speech and writing, the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, and the freedom of association, are all guaranteed within the scope of the law.”

References:

"Lebanon 1926 (rev. 2004)," Constitute Project, accessed June 7, 2024,
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lebanon_2004
}}

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Latvia

2024-08-20T14:05:35Z

Ribqa651: