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Source/Freedom of Association

2022-08-03T17:41:27Z

Kbrard: /* Transcendentalism */

==What is the oldest written source that mentions this right?==
John Locke’s “A Letter Concerning Toleration” (1689) primarily concerns religious associations, but he extends certain arguments to associations in general. The text in the next paragraph is Boyd’s summarization (241), where sections in quotes come directly from “A Letter.” As Boyd notes, though Locke defends policies that allow freer association, he does so because of their practical benefits, not because it is a fundamental right (241).

“Suppose this Business of Religion were let alone,” Locke hypothesizes, “and that there were some other Distinction made between men and men, upon account of their different Complexions, Shapes, and Features.” Under conditions of differential treatment, such persons, “united together by one common persecution,” would become just as dangerous and disruptive. Conversely, if the state eliminated special privileges, on the one hand, or disproportionate burdens, on the other, then supposedly intractable religious or ethnic affiliations would become matters of complete indifference, no more or less contentious than other private decisions about how to spend one’s money, manage one’s estates, or marry off one’s daughter.

In 1776, Richard Price, a British writer who supported the American revolution published Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government, and the Justice and Policy of the War with America. Unlike other commentaries on civil rights, he includes discussion on free assembly. He describes a prohibition on “associating for any purposes, except when leave should be given us by a Lord Lieutenant or Viceroy” as being part of a “state of oppression which no country can endure.” Though he does not phrase it as a fundamental right, the fact that Price deems draconian restrictions on association oppressive implies a belief in at least a limited freedom of association.

Though Enlightenment commentators like Locke argued for and against greater freedom to associate. However, the first to mention it as an absolute right was John Stuart Mill, who argues ''in On Liberty'' that “from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived” (1859, 16).

===What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?===
====Afghanistan====
====Albania====
====Algeria====
====Andorra====
====Angola====
====Antigua and Barbuda====
====Argentina====
====Armenia====
====Australia====
Australia has detailed records of its constitutional convention, which occurred in the 1890s. In 1897. One speaker alluded to the power of free association: “The English feel the vigor of their public spirit; they have experienced the vigilance of a free press, and the power of associations and public meetings.”

====Austria====
====Azerbaijan====
====The Bahamas====
====Bahrain====
====Bangladesh====
====Barbados====
====Belarus====
====Belgium====
====Belize====
====Benin====
====Bhutan====
====Bolivia====
====Bosnia and Herzegovina====
====Botswana====
Chapter 2 of Botswana’s Constitution (1966) guarantees “freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association.”

====Brazil====
Brazil’s constitution (1988) has exceptionally detailed freedom of association provisions. Title II-I-5 states that:

- there is total freedom of association for lawful purposes, but any paramilitary association is prohibited;

- creation of associations and, as set forth in law, of cooperatives, requires no authorization, prohibiting state interference in their operations;

- associations may be compulsorily dissolved or their activities suspended only by a judicial decision, which in the former case must be a final and unappealable decision;

- no one can be compelled to join an association or to remain in one;

- when expressly authorized, associations have standing to represent their members judicially and extrajudicially

====Brunei====
====Bulgaria====
====Burkina Faso====
====Burundi====
====Cambodia====
====Cameroon====
====Canada====
Chapter 345 Section 5 of Saskatchewan’s Bill of Rights (1947) states that “every person and every class of persons shall enjoy the right to peaceable assembly with others and to form with others associations of any character under the law.”

Part 1 of the Canadian Bill of Rights (1960) lists “freedom of assembly and association” as a guaranteed right. This was an ordinary act of parliament, and it has been replaced by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, an amendment to the Canadian Constitution.

====Cape Verde====
====Central African Republic====
====Chad====
====Chile====
====China====
Chapter 2-4 of the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China (1912) states that “citizens shall have the freedom of speech, of composition, of publication, of assembly and of association.”

The 1912 Republic of China Constitution refers to the one adopted by the nationalist government on the mainland, led by Sun Yat-sen. Despite its lofty ideals, this government never really maintained power. After a period of instability and civil war, the CCP forced the nationalist government to retreat to Taiwan, which is known now as the Republic of China. Taiwan suspended its constitution, and it was under a repressive martial-law system until 1987. It is now a constitutional democracy, and freedom of association is protected in its constitution. The PRC constitution claims to protect freedom of association, among other civil liberties.

====Colombia====
====Comoros====
====Democratic Republic of the Congo====
====Republic of the Congo====
====Costa Rica====
====Croatia====
====Cuba====
====Cyprus====
====Czech Republic====
====Denmark====
====Djibouti====
====Dominica====
====Dominican Republic====
====East Timor====
====Ecuador====
====Egypt====
====El Salvador====
====Equatorial Guinea====
====Eritrea====
====Estonia====
Section II-18 of Estonia’s first constitution (1920) states that “The forming of associations and unions is free in Esthonia."

====Eswatini====
====Ethiopia====
====Fiji====
====Finland====
====France====
Title I of the French Constitution of 1791 guarantees the right of peaceful assembly.

“Liberty to citizens to assemble peaceably and without arms in accordance with police regulations.”

Though the French Constitution of 1791 protected the right to assemble, French revolutionaries considered explicitly excluding free association (Boyd 257). The French enacted a law protecting free association in 1901, and enshrined it in their constitution in 1971 (Boyd 2008, 237).

====Gabon====
====The Gambia====
====Georgia====
====Germany====
The Weimar Constitution (1919) established freedom of association.

Article 123: “All Germans have the right to assembly peacefully and unarmed without giving notice and without special permission.”

Article 124: “All Germans have the right to form associations and societies for purposes not contrary to the criminal law.”

====Ghana====
====Greece====
====Grenada====
====Guatemala====
====Guinea====
====Guinea-Bissau====
====Guyana====
====Haiti====
====Honduras====
====Hungary====
====Iceland====
====India====
The following quote was attributed to Gandhi in 1922:

“Freedom of association is truly respected when assemblies of people can discuss even revolutionary projects, the State relying upon the force of public opinion and the civil police, not the savage military at its disposal, to crush any actual outbreak of revolution that is designed to confound public opinion and the State representing it.., The fight for swaraj means a fight for this threefold freedom before all else."

Part III Article 19 of the Indian Constitution (1950) grants citizens the right to “form associations or unions” (Dalton).

====Indonesia====
====Iran====
====Iraq====
====Republic of Ireland====
Article 40 of the Irish Constitution (1940) guarantees “the right of the citizens to form associations and unions.”

====Israel====
====Italy====
Part 1 Title 1 Article 18 of the Italian Constitution (1947) states that:

- “Citizens have the right to form associations freely and without authorization for those ends that are not forbidden by criminal law.”

- “Secret associations and associations that, even indirectly, pursue political aims by means of organisations having a military character shall be forbidden.”

====Ivory Coast====
====Jamaica====
====Japan====
Chapter III Article 21 of the Japanese Constitution (1947): “Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed.”

Additionally, though finding direct texts has proven difficult, there have been political movements for greater political expression since the pre-war era. The freedom and popular rights movement existed throughout the second half of the 19th century, and its members advocated for increased freedom of assembly beginning no later than 1886 (Tierney 2013, 21).

====Jordan====
====Kazakhstan====
====Kenya====
====Kiribati====
====Kuwait====
====Kyrgyzstan====
====Laos====
====Latvia====
The Latvian Constitution added a section on fundamental rights in 1998. Article 102 states that “everyone has the right to form and join associations, political parties and other public organisations.”

====Lebanon====
====Lesotho====
====Liberia====
====Libya====
====Liechtenstein====
====Lithuania====
====Luxembourg====
====Madagascar====
====Malawi====
====Malaysia====
====Maldives====
====Mali====
====Malta====
====Marshall Islands====
====Mauritania====
====Mauritius====
====Mexico====
From Section 1 Article 9 the Mexican Constitution of 1857: “No one shall be deprived of the right peaceably to assemble or to come together for any lawful purpose; but only citizens shall be permitted to exercise this right for the purpose of taking part in the political affairs of the country. No armed assembly shall have the right to deliberate.”

====Federated States of Micronesia====
====Moldova====
====Monaco====
====Mongolia====
====Montenegro====
====Morocco====
====Mozambique====
====Myanmar====
====Namibia====
====Nauru====
====Nepal====
====Kingdom of the Netherlands====
====New Zealand====
Part 2 Section 17 of the Bill of Rights Act (1990) states that, “Everyone has the right to freedom of association.”

====Nicaragua====
====Niger====
====Nigeria====
Chapter IV Section 37 of the constitution of the Second Republic (1979) states that “every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, and any political party, trade union, or other association for the protection of his interests.”

====North Korea====
====North Macedonia====
====Norway====
====Oman====
====Pakistan====
The following is from Part II, Chapter I, Section 17 of Pakistan’s current constitution (1973).

“Every citizen shall have the right to form associations or unions, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, public order or morality.”

“Every citizen, not being in the service of Pakistan, shall have the right to form or be a member of a political party, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan and such law shall provide that where the Federal Government declares that any political party has been formed or is operating in a manner prejudicial to the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, the Federal Government shall, within fifteen days of such declaration, refer the matter to the Supreme Court whose decision on such reference shall be final.”

====Palau====
====Panama====
====Papua New Guinea====
====Paraguay====
====Peru====
====Philippines====
====Poland====
====Portugal====
Article 46 of the Portugese Constitution (1976):

“Citizens shall possess the right to freely associate with one another without requiring any authorisation, on condition that such associations are not intended to promote violence and their purposes are not contrary to the criminal law.”

“Associations shall pursue their purposes freely and without interference from the public authorities and shall not be dissolved by the state or have their activities suspended, except in such cases as the law may provide for and then only by judicial order.”

“No one shall be obliged to belong to an association, or be coerced to remain therein by any means.”

“Armed associations, military, militarised or paramilitary-type associations and organisations that are racist or display a fascist ideology shall not be permitted.”

====Qatar====
====Romania====
====Russia====
====Rwanda====
====Saint Kitts and Nevis====
====Saint Lucia====
====Saint Vincent and the Grenadines====
====Samoa====
====San Marino====
====São Tomé and Príncipe====
====Saudi Arabia====
====Senegal====
====Serbia====
====Seychelles====
====Sierra Leone====
====Singapore====
====Slovakia====
====Slovenia====
====Solomon Islands====
====Somalia====
====South Africa====
Chapter 3 section 17 of the 1993 Interim Constitution states that “every person shall have the right to freedom of association.”

====South Korea====

Chapter two Article Ten of the Constitution (1948): “All citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly and association.”

====South Sudan====
====Spain====
====Sri Lanka====
====Sudan====
====Suriname====
====Sweden====
====Switzerland====
====Syria====
====Tajikistan====
====Tanzania====
====Thailand====
====Togo====
====Tonga====
====Trinidad and Tobago====
====Tunisia====
====Turkey====
====Turkmenistan====
====Tuvalu====
====Uganda====
====Ukraine====
====United Arab Emirates====
====United Kingdom====
The 1990 Human Rights Act protects the Right to assemble and associate, subject to reasonable and proportionate restrictions. The HRA primarily serves to codify the European Convention on Human Rights into British Law (the ECHR and its associated court are not related to the EU, and the UK is still a signatory).

In 1776, Richard Price, a British writer who supported the American revolution published ''Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty'', the Principles of Government, and the Justice and Policy of the War with America. Unlike other commentaries on civil rights, he includes discussion on free assembly. He describes a prohibition on “associating for any purposes, except when leave should be given us by a Lord Lieutenant or Viceroy” as being part of a “state of oppression which no country can endure.” Though he does not phrase it as a fundamental right, the fact that Price deems draconian restrictions on association oppressive implies a belief in at least a limited freedom of association. This is the first instance I could find of a political theorist invoking the concept of freedom of association (or the lack thereof).

There is a more explicit case for free association in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1859). Mill lays a broad notion of individual liberty. He then argues that “from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived (16).”

Before any British thinkers espoused freedom of association as a right, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and David Hume addressed the issue (as Boyd helpfully summarizes). Hobbes detested associations, referring to them as “lesser commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural man” (257).

Locke disagreed with Hobbes’ cynical perspective on groups. John Locke’s “A Letter Concerning Toleration” primarily concerns religious associations, but he extends certain arguments to associations in general. The italicized text below is Boyd’s summarization (241), where sections in quotes come directly from “A Letter.” As Boyd notes, though Locke defends policies that allow freer association, he does so because of their practical benefits, not because it is a fundamental right (2008, 241).

“Suppose this Business of Religion were let alone,” Locke hypothesizes, “and that there were some other Distinction made between men and men, upon account of their different Complexions, Shapes, and Features.” Under conditions of differential treatment, such persons, “united together by one common persecution,” would become just as dangerous and disruptive.26 Conversely, if the state eliminated special privileges, on the one hand, or disproportionate burdens, on the other, then supposedly intractable religious or ethnic affiliations would become matters of complete indifference, no more or less contentious than other private decisions about how to spend one’s money, manage one’s estates, or marry off one’s daughter.
Finally, David Hume’s “Of Parties in General” (1742) is another important piece of Enlightenment work skeptical of associations. His position is more nuanced that Hobbes; he understands that association may exist for different purposes. Factions “of interest” are deemed less dangerous than factions “of principle.” Regarding factions of principle, he wonders the following: “But where the difference of principle is attended with no contrariety of action, but every one may follow his own way, without interfering with his neighbour, as happens in all religious controversies; what madness, what fury can beget such unhappy and such fatal divisions?”

====United States====
Listed at the bottom of this section is language from the State Constitutions of New Hampshire and North Carolina and the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, all from 1776, which articulate the right to assemble (assembly and association are not always interchangeable, but many constitutions group them together). These documents all contain rights to assemble written in remarkably similar language, and they describe the right as politically driven. These were the oldest references to something like the right of association in governing documents.

Despite modern views of assembly as related to association, at the time of America’s founding, it would have been better understood as related to the right to petition. According to Congress’s online annotated Constitution, the assembly clause meant that the people have a right to assemble in order to petition the government. The site says that assembly was initially seen as a “subordinate and instrumental” right ("Freedom of Assembly and Petition"). The aforementioned state constitutions should be interpreted the same way. In fact, this is even more clear in these state constitutions than in the national one. The state constitutions surround the right to assemble with expressly political language, such as the right to petition and advocacy for the “common good,” while the First Amendment’s guarantees are political, but not entirely political (it protects religion, and protected speech and press are often, but not always, political).

As Richard Boyd argues in “The Madisonian Paradox of Free Association,” America’s founders did not explicitly include free association because at least some of them were skeptical of it, worrying that certain associations would be conspiratorial or seditious. He summarizes the British Enlightenment tradition skeptical of associations, which influenced the founders (I describe this in the last few paragraphs of the UK section, on Hobbes, Locke, and Hume). James Madison, the primary author of the Bill of Rights, feared the influence of factions, which private associations furthered. As Boyd notes, Madison viewed association as a “second-order” right (page 258), whose existence is tolerable because institutions can mitigate its worst effects (page 247). The following passage from “Federalist No. 10” illustrates his attitude toward factions arising from free association:

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

As Boyd notes, there are several possible reasons why Madison may not have enumerated the right to associate. It is possible that he saw it as implied by other First-Amendment rights, such as free assembly. It also may have been seen as less important or vulnerable than other rights, and Madison may have seen it as the type of auxiliary right protected by the Ninth Amendment. Finally, the right’s exclusion may have been because the founders were too skeptical of it for its inclusion (258).

Since the 1950s and 60s, SCOTUS has, to an extent, ruled that the speech and assembly rights imply a right to associate, especially for politically expressive purposes. For example, it ruled in NAACP v. Alabama that the NAACP cannot be forced to submit a membership roster to a state government. In 2000, in Boy Scouts v. Dale, the court held that the Boy Scouts could exclude gay members (in violation of state non-dsicrimination laws) because not being able to do so would undermine their ability to express a viewpoint - expressive association.

In ''Roberts v. US Jaycees'', an organization for young business leaders’ ban on female members was challenged because it violated state non-discrimination law. This case is notable because the court identified a new form of association: intimate association. The opinion of the court states that “certain intimate human relationships be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.” The opinion places this right under the general aims of the First Amendment. The court ruled against the organization, but in so doing, it established the idea that Americans have the right to free intimate and expressive association. Still, one could argue that in a state with true freedom to associate, any group of people would be able to enact whatever membership restrictions it wanted, regardless of whether or not it falls into the categories of “expressive” or “intimate.”

Although assembly is the First-Amendment freedom that most seems to correspond with association, SCOTUS has not derived free association this way. Rather, it uses a more nebulous combination of various First-Amendment rights. As the majority held in ''NAACP v. Button'', “It is not necessary to subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly, for there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity.”

Article XVIII of North Carolina’s Constitution: “That the people have a right to assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their Representatives, and to apply to the Legislature, for redress of grievances.”
Section 21 of New Hampshire’s Constitution: “The citizens have a right in a peaceable manner to assemble for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances, or for other purposes, by petition, address, or remonstrance. No law abridging the freedom of speech shall be enacted.”

Section XVI of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights: “That the people have a right to assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress of grievances, by address, petition, or remonstrance.

====Uruguay====
====Uzbekistan====
====Vanuatu====
====Venezuela====
====Vietnam====
====Yemen====
====Zambia====
====Zimbabwe====
===Is there another noteworthy written source from the past that mentions this right?===
Pope Leo XIII forcefully argued for free association in Section 51 of ''Rerum novarum'' (1891), an extremely influential text in Catholic thought.

"Private societies, then, although they exist within the body politic, and are severally part of the commonwealth, cannot nevertheless be absolutely, and as such, prohibited by public authority. For, to enter into a "society" of this kind is the natural right of man; and the State has for its office to protect natural rights, not to destroy them."

===Is the identification of this right associated with a particular era in history, political regime, or political leader?===
This right became an element of political discourse in the late Enlightenment, especially the American Revolution. In the mid and late 1800s, writers such as Mill and Leo XIII pushed the idea into the mainstream.

===What specific events or ideas contributed to its identification as a fundamental right?===
===When was it generally accepted as a fundamental, legally-protectable right?===
===What historical forces or events, if any, contributed to a widespread belief in its importance? ===

==Legal Codification==
===Is this right protected in the Constitutions of most countries today?===
Constitutions written after 1900 very often protect free association.

As the right to free association is upheld by numerous United Nations treaties, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it would be expected that most countries maintain legal provisions protecting it. Though, investigated by UN Special Rapporteur Maina Kiai, many countries enforce legislation that explicitly restricts civilians’ entitlements to free association (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law).

For example, noted by Kiai, in Malaysia, the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 bans individuals under the age of twenty one from organizing public demonstrations. Additionally, stipulated by the same act, children under the age of fifteen cannot participate in demonstrations. Article 33 of the Constitution of Mexico, Kiai asserts, prohibits foreigners from engaging with Mexican politics. Similarly, Kiai notes that in Myanmar, Article 354 prohibits foreigners from assembling. Through these various forms of legislation, political and social association are highly restricted, as individuals are prohibited from expressing their associations through protest and civic engagement.

Additionally, Kiai presents how legal restrictions on sexual orientation limit free association in several countries. For example, in Russia, a ban on gay pride parades was upheld by Moscow’s city council in 2012. Likewise, in Nigeria, the President ushered in the Same Sex Marriage Act in 2014, prohibting gay marriage and the ability to “participate in or support gay clubs, societies, organizations, processions or meeting.” Kiai notes a similar anti-homosexuality law was signed by Uganda’s president in 2014. Demonstrated by these numerous legal restrictions to homosexuality, free association is unprotected in numerous countries, as one can often be punished for associating with a specific sexual orientation.

In the remainder of his report, Kiai continues to elaborate on numerous legal provisions that restrict free association. For example, Kiai notes how both Chile and Turkey utilize counter-terrorism legislation to restrict free association. Similarly, he explains how criminal laws in Vietnam and El Salvador often deter individuals from exercising their rights to free association, as their voices may be met with harsh penalties from their governments.

Witnessed through Kiai’s reporting, the restrictions to free association are plentiful. This ultimately demonstrates that despite its entitlement by numerous United Nations treaties, the right to free association is highly vulnerable to violation and not widely internationally upheld.

===Is it contained in the US Constitution?===
No.

The right to free association is not explicitly stated in the United States Constitution. Though, The Supreme Court has historically upheld the constitutional right to free association, invoking the Fourteenth and First Amendments (Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School). In 1958, The NAACP v. Patterson ruling established this precedent. In response to Alabama’s aims to limit the NAACP’s business within the state, the Supreme Court ruled that it was “the right of petitioner's members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment” (Oyez). Furthermore, the court asserted that freedom of association was undoubtedly covered by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Oyez), which asserts no individual may be “"deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” The court additionally demonstrated the First Amendment to protect free association, Justice Marshall Harlan claiming “Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.” Thus, while the right to free association is not explicitly described by the Constitution, as witnessed in NAACP v. Patterson, it is upheld by American constitutional law.

===Has it been interpreted as being implicit in the US Constitution?===
Since the 1950s and 60s, SCOTUS has, to an extent, ruled that the speech and assembly rights imply a right to associate, especially for politically expressive purposes. For example, it ruled in ''NAACP v. Alabama'' that the NAACP cannot be forced to submit a membership roster to a state government. In 2000, in Boy Scouts v. Dale, the court held that the Boy Scouts could exclude gay members (in violation of state non-dsicrimination laws) because not being able to do so would undermine their ability to express a viewpoint - expressive association.

In ''Roberts v. US Jaycees'', an organization for young business leaders’ ban on female members was challenged because it violated state non-discrimination law. This case is notable because the court identified a new form of association: intimate association. The opinion of the court states that “certain intimate human relationships be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.” The opinion places this right under the general aims of the First Amendment. The court ruled against the organization, but in so doing, it established the idea that Americans have the right to free intimate and expressive association. Still, one could argue that in a state with true freedom to associate, any group of people would be able to enact whatever membership restrictions it wanted, regardless of whether or not it falls into the categories of “expressive” or “intimate.”

Although assembly is the First-Amendment freedom that most seems to correspond with association, SCOTUS has not derived free association this way. Rather, it uses a more nebulous combination of various First-Amendment rights. As the majority held in NAACP v. Button, “It is not necessary to subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly, for there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity.”

===Are there any exceptions in American law to this right?===
Yes. As seen in ''Roberts v. US Jaycees,'' the right may be weighed against other state interests, especially when the association in question is neither expressive nor intimate. In that case, free association rights were curtailed to ensure adherence to non-discrimination laws.

Additionally, a significant exception to free association rights in the United States is witnessed through legislation regarding political parties. Furthermore, while one has the liberty to vote with, join, and create independent political parties, upheld by the William V. Rhodes ruling, the state can still regulate these parties if they violate other aspects of the Constitution. For example, in New York State Board of Elections vs. Lopez Torres, the court claimed,

A political party has a First Amendment right to limit its membership as it wishes, and to choose a candidate-selection process that will in its view produce the nominee who best represents its political platform. These rights are circumscribed, however, when the state gives a party a role in the election process...Then for example, the party’s racially discriminatory action may become state action that violates the Fifteenth Amendment
Demonstrated by New York State Board of Elections vs. Lopez Torres, if a party associates with discriminatory or racist behavior, it cannot be involved in the state’s election process, demonstrating a limitation on free political association.

Additionally, sections of the Federal Election Campaign Act are often interpreted to be exceptions to free association, as they require the public disclosure of individuals’ political donations. This position was echoed by the Buckley v. Valeo ruling, where the Supreme Court argued that new campaign finance laws, “impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedom of political expression and association than do its limitations on financial contributions.” Thus, witnessed by Buckley v. Valeo, campaign finance laws may be interpreted as an exception to free association, as one cannot privately financially contribute to the political party they associate with.

Within universities, freedom of association, specifically the right to associate as an exclusive religious group, may be regulated by anti-discrimination clauses. This was observed in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, where the court ruled in favor of Hastings’ College of Law’s anti-discrimintation policies, which prohibited Christian student group’s from excluding non-christians. Therefore, on university campuses, individuals must be able join any student group, regardless of their religious association. Ultimately, this decision restricted the parameters of free association, as one cannot actively discriminate on the basis of it.

Consequently, decided by Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, certain groups can legally exclude individuals from associating with them. Furthermore, if an individual’s beliefs do not coincide with the group’s mission, the individual may be prohibited from membership. Specifically, the court claimed that by mandating the Boston Veterans’ Council to include Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual individuals in their parade, the Massachusetts State Court, “violates the fundamental First Amendment rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message and, conversely, to decide what not to say.” Thus, while still restricting free association, the ruling counters Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, as individuals can be restricted from associating with certain groups if it is deemed that their identity does not conform to the group’s platform.

Ultimately, these exceptions arise from the implicit nature of the freedom of association within the Constitution, as what qualifies as “association” is highly subject to interpretation by Supreme Court justices. For this reason, depending on who is sitting on the bench, freedom of association can be left unchecked or potentially be highly restricted.

===Is this right enshrined in international and regional human rights treaties?===
Yes. It is protected explicitly in documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the American Convention on Human Rights.

Specifically, free association is upheld by Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which claims, “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”Additionally, it is enshrined in Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which claims “ Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; No one may be compelled to belong to an association.” In Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the rights to association are specifically outlined, as it upholds “In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Lastly, The International Labor Organization similarly supports freedom of association in the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which asserts that all members have “freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;”

==Philosophical Origins==
===What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?===
====Buddhism====
The Five Precepts of Buddhism condemn activity relating to “sexual misconduct, falsehoods, and intoxicants” (Peek,529), possibly limiting the ability of individuals to associate with certain behaviors or activities. While Buddhism does warn against disobeying the Five Precepts, as this may result in bad Karma, it ultimately asserts that it is the choice of the individual to decide whether or not they wish to follow the declarations of the Five Precepts (Peek, 529). Furthermore, Buddhism’s focus on moral authority, in which the individual is not subordinate to the Five Precepts, can be interpreted as allowing individuals freedom in regards to association. Demonstrated by this, although Buddhism provides guidelines for what followers ought to avoid associating with, these are merely suggestions. Thus, emphasizing the freedom of the individual, Buddhism can be seen to support the right to free association.

Though, the traditions of Buddhist monks reveal how certain Buddhist practices restrict freedom of association. As explained by Holmes Welch, “According to the Buddha’s rule, when people become monks and nuns they lead a collective life. Not only is there no private property, but there is no thought for oneself. To take thought for oneself is to keep hold of the ego” (Welch, 146). Noted by Welch, upon entering monastic life, Buddhists are expected to relinquish all previously held associations. Therefore, observed through the expectations of monks, elements of Buddhism confine free association.

Additionally, through the Eightfold Path, the eight practices Buddhists are expected to follow on their journey to nirvana, certain behaviors are limited. For example, when following the Eightfold Path, individuals are restricted from making a living off selling animals, weapons, meat, poison, and liquor (Tilakaratne, 48). Condemning certain professions and ways of life, Buddhism again appears to limit the associations of its followers, undermining the strength of the freedom of association within the belief system.

Looking to Buddhist leaders, freedom of association is ultimately upheld. For example, in a 1993 Washington address, the Dalai Lama demonstrated his admiration for the principles of democracy, particularly the liberties, such as freedom of association, it guarantees to civilians. The Dalai Lama asserts, “Irrespective of whether we are rich or poor, educated or uneducated, belonging to one nation or another, to one religion or another, adhering to this ideology or that, each of us is just a human being like everyone else.” Through his words of acceptance, the Dalai Lama conveys that Tibetan Buddhism supports the ability to freely associate with many identities. Thus, while the Five Precepts, monastic codes, and Eightfold Path appear to restrict the liberties of followers, the Dalai Lama’s words affirm them.

====Platonism====
====Aristotelian thought====
Aristotle, in his book Nicomachean Ethics, wrote that “Friendships are also important parts of our childhood and adult experience. Without them, we struggle to discover, shape, and pursue our ideas of what constitutes a good life. But, again, friendships can take many forms for many reasons, not all of which are grounded in mutual affection and convivial warmth” (Brownlee and Jenkins 2019). Friendships here form the basis of our associations in life; he ultimately argues that we as humans require association and assembly in our lives.

Aristotle argues that not all forms of association are political, particularly those that stem from material needs, including family, the market, and alliances for mutual defense/benefit- these can be organized into libertarian and capitalist principles. According to one’s needs, individuals are free to associate and disassociate within their own means of persuasion and trade, and none of this is political- or in other words, the government should have no business with the private associations of the people (Johnson 32, 2001). Regarding politically, he further argues that “It is not the case . . . that people come together for the sake of life alone, but rather for the sake of living well” (3.9.1280a31) and “the political community must be set down as existing for the sake of noble deeds and not merely for living together” (Johnson 32, 2001). He takes a stance against the dominance of individuals associating merely for political protection and gain, but he believed that the state should do more in its concern for the citizen, encouraging virtue and discouraging harm and vice (Johnson 32, 2001). He argues that the best political regime best delivers the “good life-” production and distribution of goods, both goods of the body and of the soul. Within this theory, Aristotle considers the production and distribution of bodily goods as private and the production and distribution of spiritual goods as public: “The primary goods of the soul are (1) moral and intellectual virtue, which are best produced by public education, and (2) honor, the public recognition of virtue, talent, and service rendered to the city. The principle of distributive justice is defined” (Johnson 38-39, 2001). Aristotle’s theory about freedom of association is that political associations’ ultimate goal is to help foster the virtues that are necessary in the pursuit of justice and happiness; therefore, “no legitimate regime can be indifferent to the virtue of the citizens” (Johnson 44, 2001). The polis is both the most inclusive and authoritative community according to Aristotle, seeing as Aristotle's polis is a mixed concept, fusing the political state with civil societal attributes including economic, religious, and other forms of association” (Miller 878, 1996).

====Ancient Chinese Philosophy====
Various schools of Chinese Philosophy contribute to society’s understanding of the right to free association.

Legalism, with its adherence to strict punishments for any violation of the law, limits the liberty of citizens to freely associate. At its core, Legalism restricts the ability of citizens to act freely, as under the philosophy individual’s lives become entirely controlled by administrative acts (MacCormack, 62). Furthermore, the legalist state was not concerned with the liberties of civilians. Rather, legalists focused their efforts towards strengthening the economic and military strength of the state through authoritarian power (MacCormack, 63). Thus, in the school of Legalism, there is little tolerance for associations that counter the laws of the state, undermining the right to free association.

Consequently, Confucianism emphasizes the ability of citizens to rebel against the emperor (Peek, 523). This bolsters the right to free association, as individuals are encouraged to join other political parties in the face of an unjust regime.

Though, more similarly to Legalism, additional elements of Confucianism vastly undermine the right to free association. As Confucianism evolved, the belief system began to emphasize a strict code of ethics, creating a rigid social structure (Peek, 532). This limited the ability of followers to freely associate, as they were confined to following a strict code of behavior. Thus, while Confucianism initially appears to support the right to free association, its development as a belief system has constricted the liberties of followers.

While Taoism does not discredit the right to free association, it does weaken the importance of associations as a whole. Advocating that individuals put aside their distinguishing characteristics, Taoism stresses that there “is one underlying and uniting all phenomena” among human beings (Chan, 316). Furthermore, Taoists argue that human beings must transcend their personal distinctions, diminishing the value of individuals’ associations. Thus, while Taoism does not proclaim individuals should not be able to associate themselves with certain groups, it does argue that associations are ultimately meaningless.

====Stoicism====
====Early Indian Philosophy====
====Miscellaneous Hellenistic Schools (epicureans, academics, skeptics, etc.)====
====Roman Legal and Political Thought====
====Early Christianity====
====Thomism and medieval Christianity====
====Medieval Islamic Thought====
====Medieval Judaism====
====Early Modern Rationalism====
====Absolute Idealism====
====Reformation Christianity====
Reformation Christianity, Freedom of Association
As mentioned above (section 1), John Locke’s 1689 “Letter Concerning Toleration” is
widely believed to be the first written source to address, albeit indirectly, the right to freedom of association. While it is true that no source written prior to 1689 specifically explores the right in its entirety, there were a number of Reformation-era thinkers whose work formed the basis for Locke’s belief in the benefits of granting the right to free religious association. These sources were primarily English, written by such philosophers as Richard Hooker and Thomas More, though there is some evidence that Locke drew on themes from John Calvin as well.
Among Locke’s most prominent sources of inspiration and guidance is Richard Hooker’s influential work, The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. This book, much of which was published posthumously in the late 1590s, was Hooker’s attempt to defend the fledgeling Anglican Church against attacks from the growing population of English Puritans. It explores a number of religious topics, one of which is the concept that all Churches, including those of “Rome, Corinth, Ephesus, England, and so the rest...are public Christian societies. And of such properties common unto all societies Christian, it may not be denied, that one of the very chiefest is Ecclesiastical Polity” (Hooker, 178). This idea that religious groups could be considered a “society” of people is advanced in Locke’s “Letter,” which takes the work one step further by examining one’s freedom to belong to these various religious societies. Hooker also explores this idea to some extent when he writes that “we rather incline to think it a just and reasonable cause for any Church, the state whereof is free and independent if in these things it differ from other Churches, only for that it doth not judge it so fit and expedient to be framed therein by the pattern of their example, as to be otherwise framed than they” (Hooker, 275). In this passage
Hooker essentially argues that different sects of Christianity ought to be allowed to practice their preferred faith in peace, provided they similarly respect other branches’ rights to believe and associate. Perhaps is not a surprising statement to find in a defense of the Anglican Church after it broke away from Catholicism, but Hooker’s conviction that “Churches are rather in this case like divers families than like divers servants of one family” nevertheless seems to have profoundly influenced Locke’s work in the same area (Hooker, 277).
In addition to this conceptual framework, Locke also seems to draw on Hooker for an interpretation of John Calvin’s teaching. Hooker’s Fourth Book of Laws quotes Calvin, who supposedly writes that, “Yea, sometime it profiteth and is expedient that there be difference, lest men should think that religion is tied to outward ceremonies. Always provided that there be not any emulation, nor that Churches delighted with novelty affect to have that which others have not.” (Hooker, 276). This, Hooker says, provides a basis of acceptability for different religious sects to profess their religions differently. By arguing in favor of different churches practicing differently, Hooker also implies a support for citizens’ right to belong to various churches according to how they wish to worship. It is possible that Hooker was referring to Calvin’s statement in The Institutes of the Christian Religion, which says that that “it is a well-known doctrine, and one as to which all the pious are agreed,—that the right consideration of signs does not lie merely in the outward ceremonies, but depends chiefly on the promise and the spiritual mysteries, to typify which the ceremonies themselves are appointed.” (Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, B ook IV, Chapter 16, 2). Calvin’s work then proceeds to explain the parallels between circumcision in the Jewish faith and Baptism in the Christian ones, before concluding that “Baptism has been substituted for circumcision (Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion,

Book IV, Chapter 16, 4). While this does not mean that Calvin believed in one’s right to belong to the association or religion of one’s choice, its influence on Hooker’s statement is apparent. In concert with Hooker and a number of other influences, Calvin’s philosophy guided Locke in his exploration of religious freedom and, by extension, freedom of association.
Locke’s “Letter” also displays some degree of influence from the writings of Thomas More, another Reformation-era thinker whose work addresses the citizen’s role in various religious associations. More’s famous work, Utopia, tells of a fictional country in which society is ordered and governed according to the way that More believed was best. Included in these guidelines are the principles of religious freedom, which likely had some influence on Locke’s thoughts on free association. Sanford Kessler’s “Religious Freedom in More’s ‘Utopia’” notes that “Locke's work contains arguments that are remarkably similar to More’s,” and explains that “In Utopia, religious freedom checked the threat of religious conflict by transforming a plethora of squabbling sects into tolerant, stable supporters of the government” (Kessler, “Religious Freedom”). The actual text of More’s work states that the founder of the mythical society in Utopia had “left matters open, making each person to follow his own beliefs,” (More, 110). While this does more to imply More’s support for religious freedom than for freedom of association, the idea that citizens should be able to belong to whichever religion they choose is certainly evident in Locke’s work on toleration.
Freedom of association was not directly addressed prior to Locke’s work on toleration, but it is clear that Reformation-era philosophers influenced his work. Hooker’s thoughts on religious freedom and the relationship between religious societies shaped the way that Locke thought about religious toleration, and ideas from Calvin and More also influenced his work.

Sources Used:
Calvin, Jean, and Henry Beveridge. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1845,
http://www.ntslibrary.com/PDF%20Books/Calvin%20Institutes%20of%20Christian%20 Religion.pdf, www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html.
Hooker, Richard. Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. George Routledge and Sons, 1998, https://prydain.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/the_laws_of_ecclesiastical_polity_books_i-i V.pdf.
Kessler, Sanford. “Religious Freedom in Thomas More's ‘Utopia.’” The Review of Politics, vol. 64, no. 2, 2002, pp. 207–229. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1408764. Accessed 8 July 2020.
More, Thomas. Utopia. Translated by Dominic Baker-Smith, Penguin Classics, 20012.

====Hobbesian Thought====
Hobbes distinguishes between public political networks, or bodies politic, which are authorized by the commonwealth (states and provinces, for example), and private associations (251). Hobbes is not particularly skeptical of small, private organizations made for harmless, known purposes. However, he distrusts larger organizations with nefarious or unknown intentions. He states that, “Irregular Systemes, are those which having no Representative, consist only in concourse of People; which if not forbidden by the Common-wealth, nor made on evill designe, (such as are conflux of People to markets, or shews, or any other harmelesse end,) are Lawfull. But when the Intention is evill, or (if the number be considerable) unknown, they are Unlawfull” (252). Regarding bodies politic, Hobbes argues that their representation must be limited and determined by the commonwealth, since the commonwealth’s ultimate authority cannot be supplanted (252).
Hobbes identifies groups that we would today call private political associations: groups formed “not by obligation of one to another, but proceeding onely from a similitude of wills and inclinations” (265). He distrusts these groups, arguing that they are “for the most part unnecessary, and savour of unlawfull designe; and are for that cause Unlawfull, and go commonly by the name of factions, or Conspiracies” (265).

====Lockean Thought/English Empiricism====
Locke made little mention of free expression. However, one can draw inferences based on his views on religion and association, especially since there is substantial overlap between expression and association and religion. One can infer that, if Locke advocates for certain doctrinal limitations on churches and other associations, he would support limits on the expression of those doctrines. After all, forming associations that exist to further certain viewpoints is a form of expression (take the concept of “expressive association” in US jurisprudence). In A Letter, Locke establishes some respect for freedom of opinion, writing that if an opinion does “not tend to establish domination over others, or civil impunity to the Church
in which they are taught, there can be no reason why they should not be tolerated” (36). Scholars disagree strongly over the extent to which speech would be regulated in a Lockean society (Daniel 2013, 1).

====Physiocrats====
====Scottish Enlightenment====
====Modern Capitalism====
====Rousseau's Thought====

Rousseau’s political philosophy is generally based on his assessment of familial association and its effect on human society. Most of his works describe the family as the basic form of human interaction, the creation of which is one of the first steps that the “savage man” takes toward civilization. His work does not deal with the right to freedom of association as it exists in modern political discourse, but it does reveal a support for mankind’s tendency to gather into groups with which to live, work, and prosper.

Association itself is key to Rousseau’s political philosophy because in his mind it is a building block for political society. In The Social Contract he writes that humans come together to form communities by surrendering certain “natural” rights and liberties in favor of certain “civil” rights and liberties, such as the protection of private property or the adherence to general ideals of justice. “The problem,” he says, “is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.” (43). While the “association” of which Rousseau writes here does not resemble the right to association that most modern states protect in one way or another, the author’s thoughts on this kind of community-building clearly influence his views on the creation of social associations within the broader community. In his “Discourse on Political Economy” Rousseau writes that
Every political society is composed of other smaller societies of different kinds, each of which has its interests and its rules of conduct: but those societies which everybody perceives, because they have an external and authorised form, are not the only ones that actually exist in the State: all individuals who are united by a common interest compose as many others, either transitory or permanent, whose influence is none the less real because it is less apparent, and the proper observation of whose various relations is the true knowledge of public morals and manners. The influence of all these tacit or formal associations causes, by the influence of their will, as many different modifications of the public will. (“Discourse on Political Economy,” 211)

In this passage the modern conception of political association is more easily identified. He seems to view the formation of these “smaller societies” which exist within the State and influence the public will as more or less inevitable, though he does not express any disapproval of their existence.
Rousseau expands upon these views in his discussion of the social “circles” within Genevan political society, which he describes in his “Letter to Monsieur D’Alembert on the Theater” as the Genevan equivalent of social clubs in England. Again, he points out that the formation of these circles is a natural consequence of communal association, and points out that they do not pose any great danger to the State. “Of all the kinds of relations which can bring individuals together in a city like our own,” he believes that “the circles form incontestably the most reasonable, the most decent, and the least·dangerous ones, because they neither wish nor are able to be hidden, because they are public and permitted, because order and rule prevail in them” (“Letter to Monsieur D’Alembert, 108). These “circles” serve more of a social purpose than a political one, and Rousseau notes that they could potentially have negative consequences by encouraging men to drink too much or women to gossip in excess. He believes that they can influence the general will that governs an ideal community, but these associations do not form with specific political goals in mind. Having weighed the costs and benefits that they bring, Rousseau recommends that the Genevan state should “preserve the circles, even with their faults. For these faults are not in the circles but in the men who compose them; and there is no imaginable form of social life in which the same faults do not produce more harmful effects.” (“Letter to Monsieur D’Alembert,” 110). While his advocacy for the circles’ preservation does not directly indicate Rousseau’s support for freedom of association, his work at least shows an unwillingness to restrict people’s access to associational interaction within political society.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Collected Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Translated by Allan Bloom, Publ. for Dartmouth College by Univ. Press of New England, 2004, ia800705.us.archive.org/34/items/RousseauLetterToDAlembertPoliticsTheArtsAllanBloo m_201811/Rousseau%20-%20%27%27Letter%20to%20D%27Alembert%27%27%3B% 20Politics%20%26%20the%20Arts%20%5BAllan%20Bloom%5D.pdf.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, and G. D. H. Cole. The Social Contract; and Discourses. Dent, 1963, Online Library of Liberty,
oll-resources.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/638/Rousseau_0132_EBk_v6.0.pdf.

====Kantianism====
It is natural for people within society to surround themselves with people who are like-minded and develop associations based on these commonalities that allow them to pursue experiences that they believe will benefit them. It is this natural grouping that provides the framework for the freedom of association that society values because of its ability to connect people on another level without the government regulating the practices and the function of the group. Immanuel Kant believed that individuals should be allowed to pursue their own life experiences and find joy in the things that they do, paving the way for allowing a sort of freedom of expression within his version of society. Throughout his various works, Kant describes the conditions for allowing freedom of association, despite being cautious of the effects of allowing multiple associations within society.

The freedom of association does not come without limitations within Kant’s political theory of the state. Kant claimed that, “The state thus does not have the right to arrange the inner constitution and church affairs according to its own view of what seems advantageous and to prescribe or command the faith and rituals of worship (ritus) (for this must be left entirely to the teachers and chairmen that the people has chosen), but, rather, the state has only the negative right to keep the influence of the public [religious] teachers away from the visible, political commonwealth, which could be detrimental to public peace; hence the state has the right in internal conflicts or conflicts among the various churches not to allow civil harmony to be endangered, which is thus a right of the police” (Kant 2006, 125). It is his introduction of an inner constitution that implies that there is a freedom of association based on voluntary terms. Outside of the simple definition of a church as an institution with extreme influence based on a belief in a higher authority, religion can be seen as an association since people with the same beliefs come together due to their commonalities in the things they believe. Due to this, Kant believes that there is a freedom of associations that may come together, yet they are still subjected to the public laws and the civil constitution established by the state. Kant also notes that the government is still obligated to allow the association to do as they please, but they cannot develop social laws and norms that the people must follow according to the law. All involvement in external affairs outside the state are simply joined on a voluntary basis since Kant’s focus was on the enjoyment one could derive from their life experiences, even if it meant joining another institution. Furthermore, Kant noted that “A third kind of right is necessary for the preservation of the state-the right of inspection (ius inspectionis). This requires that no association which could influence the public welfare of society (publicum), such as an association of political or religious illuminati, may be kept secret; at the request of the police, it must not refuse to disclose its constitution. But only in cases of emergency may the police search anyone's private residence, and in each case, they must be authorized to do so by a higher authority” (Kant 2006, 123). Despite the freedom of association noted before, it does not mean that such associations are free from any sort of government intervention. Kant allows such government involvement when the state believes that the institution in question can pose a threat to the commonwealth and the rule of law. Kant claims that the state can only impose negative liberties on these associations since, as noted before, they have their own inner constitutions that allow them any sort of positive liberties outside the ones given to all by the government. In addition, these institutions must be public to allow the state to monitor its affairs to again make sure that it does not interfere with the government laws or the welfare of the community. The idea of freedom of association is still a strong pillar within Kant’s vision of society and like the people consenting to the government rule, these associations must be consented to by the people who choose to associate themselves with it.

The state’s involvement in public affairs whether they are a part of the association is necessary for the preservation of the individuals within society that allows them to follow their own life path. Due to this sentiment, Kant wrote that “In the case of a crime on the part of a subject that makes any association with him a danger for the state, the ruler has the right of banishment (that is, deportation) to a province in a foreign country where he will not enjoy any of the rights of a citizen” (Kant 2006, 134). Kant’s main concern is the well-being of the rest of society outside the association and the ways that the association will affect those outside and around the association in question. Therefore, the state has the obligation to monitor the associations and interfere when the rights of others are violated, putting the civil constitution above any inner constitutions. This contributes to Kant’s purpose of the government, which is to consent to the social contract in exchange for protection of rights from the government against others. The state must take responsibility for the rights and liberties that individuals have even if it means involving themselves in the lives of the people to protect them. In addition, when discussing the history of humankind, Kant claimed that “At the level of culture at which the human race still stands, therefore, war is an indispensable means of bringing about progress in culture. And only after culture has been perfected (only God knows when this would be) would a lasting peace be salutary for us and only through such culture would it become possible. We are thus, as concerns this point, most likely ourselves to blame for the ills about which we so loudly complain. And the holy scripture is completely right to portray an amalgamation of peoples into a single society and their complete liberation from external threats as a hindrance, since their culture had but hardly begun, to all further culture, and as a descent into incurable corruption” (Kant 2006, 35). Although Kant’s approves of the freedom of association, he remains skeptical about what allowing these groups to come together means for the rest of society and for the state. He acknowledges that these communities form to create their own culture and remains skeptical because he recognizes that without plurality or too much plurality within society, problems arise. Specifically, he claims that with associations there is always a risk of corruption since people are trying to spread their lifestyle to others, imposing on others’ freedoms and liberties to do as they please. Kant wants to make sure that there is a freedom to associate, but with this right is the necessity for it to stay public and for the government to involve itself in the matters of the community to make sure that the possibility of corruption does not become a reality. Regardless of this possibility, Kant does believe that society can create associations that will not affect the individuals outside of the group and therefore allows for association among the people.

Despite allowing freedom of association within society, Kant sees the dangers behind it and the way that the group can affect the whole society. His main concern is the corruption that could be a result of the groups that will change the way that people enjoy the liberties that the government has been tasked with to protect. Due to the belief in pursuits for personal satisfaction, Kant believes that this includes pursuing associations that satisfy the individual so long as it adheres to the standards set by the government and if it does not interfere with the interests individuals outside of the association. Most of Kant’s examples pertain to the obvious religious associations within society but also reference the unions, family, political parties, corporations, and other civil society associations, all of which change the way that society functions and the way individuals choose to live their lives. Kant believes in the freedom of association with the belief that the government and the overall well-being of society should transcend the needs and the beliefs set forth by the associations.

Bibliography

Kant, Immanuel, Pauline. Kleingeld, Jeremy. Waldron, Michael W. Doyle, and Allen W. Wood. Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.

====German Idealism====
====Benthamite Utilitarianism====

Bentham approached freedom of association as he did free expression: as a means of political advocacy and dissent. In Chapter IV Section 24 of A Fragment on Government, he advocates for “the liberty of public association; or the security with which malecontents may communicate their sentiments, concert their plans, and practise every mode of opposition short of actual revolt, before the executive power can be legally justified in disturbing them.”

A Fragment on Government: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/A_fragment_on_government/Chapter_4

====Millian Utilitarianism====

While Bentham’s free association is a political right, in On Liberty, Mill advocates for near-universal free association: “from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived” (Mill 1859, 16). In his introduction, Mill makes clear that his ideas of liberty come from utilitarianism, not natural rights, stating that, “I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of a man as a progressive being” (14).

On Liberty: https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/mill/liberty.pdf Schofield: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/1896809.pdf

====Current Utilitarianism====
====Transcendentalism====
The transcendentalist movement started in the 1800s and centers itself around the individuality of mankind and the ways that they adhere to their moral standards. This sense of individuality advocated for was challenged by the growing associations and the inevitable developments of the era in which the world continuously relied on one another. Alongside the freedom of association, transcendentalists were tasked with writing their theory based on the changes and the development of these new phenomena. Henry David Thoreau, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Margaret Fuller all represent the thoughts of the transcendentalists as they try to describe their own version of society while remedying the present problems. With some exceptions and some flexibility on the issue, most transcendentalists would agree that there should not be freedom of association since these groups stifle the moral integrity of the individual by putting the efforts of the group above the individual.

Henry David Thoreau discusses the presence of associations within society and the ways that they affect the moral standards people hold themselves to. Specifically, Thoreau said, “I hear of a convention to be held at Baltimore, or elsewhere, for the selection of a candidate for the Presidency, made up chiefly of editors, and men who are politicians by profession; but I think, what is it to any independent, intelligent, and respectable man what decision they may come to, shall we not have the advantage of his wisdom and honesty, nevertheless? Can we not count upon some independent votes? Are there not many individuals in the country who do not attend conventions?” (Thoreau 1849, 13). Thoreau specifically has a problem with the morality of society and the way that just because majorities form, it does not mean that justice is achieved in society. Thoreau says that humans need to hold themselves accountable when it comes to being morally just and with the presence of associations, people no longer hold themselves accountable morally. He says that associations influence one another rather than making decisions for themselves and because of this justice cannot be fully achieved. One fundamental pillar of transcendentalism is the solitary aspect that allows the individual to become their best selves morally and breaking down large institutions like the government. When discussing associations that fall under the political discussion, Thoreau notes above that it is the independent individual that can make the best most reasonable decision based on their morals and their own personal integrity. For this reason, freedom of association would infringe on this integrity because people would no longer need to hold themselves accountable and would rely on the institution for their own morals even though it might not mean achieving justice. Thoreau continues his discussion on associations as he notes that, “You must live within yourself, and depend upon yourself, always tucked up and ready for a start, and not have many affairs” (Thoreau 1849, 23). Thoreau and the transcendentalists all concur that that best way to become the best an individual could be is through the solitary efforts to live life as one pleases rather than intertwining themselves with the lives of others and living life according to their standards. Specifically, Thoreau notes that individuals should not have many affairs meanings that associations they have should be limited to the necessities of human life therefore limiting the freedom of association. Thoreau’s overall objective is to be morally sound according to one’s own principles and this could be achieved by righting the wrongs one commits and by standing up for the things one might believe are wrong. It was this concept of civil disobedience that contradicts the concept of freedom of association since humans do not stand up to their community out of fear of being excommunicated. With this fear, people are not as likely to commit acts of civil disobedience as Thoreau encourages to maintain a moral standard within society.

Other transcendentalists like Ralph Waldo Emerson carried the conversation about associations forward, by even allowing some associations while remaining skeptical of their effects on society. He initially disproves of associations claiming that “We think all other distinctions and ties will be slight and fugitive, this of caste or fashion for example; yet come from year to year and see how permanent that is, in this Boston or New York life of man, where too it has not the least countenance from the law of the land. Not in Egypt or in India a firmer or more impassable line. Here are associations whose ties go over and under and through it, a meeting of merchants, a military corps, a college class, a fire-club, a professional association, a political, a religious convention;—the persons seem to draw inseparably near; yet, that assembly once dispersed, its members will not in the year meet again. Each returns to his degree in the scale of good society, porcelain remains porcelain, and earthen earthen. The objects of fashion may be frivolous, or fashion may be objectless, but the nature of this union and selection can be neither frivolous nor accidental” (Emerson 1844, 387). In describing what is reality when it comes to freedom of association, Emerson notes that most interactions between people are surface level and have no true moral value to the people involved. Emerson understands that associations are not necessary and might cause more damage to society by numbing people from taking accountability for their actions in society. He also understands that by joining these associations individuals no longer focus on their own self-reliance and begin to need one another more, when people should be living off their own thoughts and capabilities according to Emerson. Emerson focuses on the fact that being self-reliant will contribute to a person’s higher self and therefore the people should actively pursue their own version of what would be their higher self. However, being a part of associations or institutions, would stifle this potential because rather than pursuing a higher individual self, based on individual actions, people become geared towards an agenda that is not of their own and therefore in no way contributing to the development of their higher self. Emerson even notes above that these associations have no other value than what society assigns to them considering that these people can separate themselves from one another for an extended period and when they reconvene nothing has changed. It is the fact that Emerson believes that these associations are very disposable and surface level that makes him question whether these associations are good for society and should be allowed. Emerson carries this thought forward as he notes that “Friendship and association are very fine things, and a grand phalanx of the best of the human race, banded for some catholic object; yes, excellent; but remember that no society can ever be so large as one man. He, in his friendship, in his natural and momentary associations, doubles or multiplies himself; but in the hour in which he mortgages himself to two or ten or twenty, he dwarfs himself below the stature of one” (Emerson 1844, 456- 457). Emerson holds the idea of self-reliance, as Thoreau does, but differs in his approach to freedom of association. Emerson holds that these types of associations should be allowed to exist so long as people retain their individuality and use the associations to further their capabilities within society. However, Emerson is still cautious of these institutions since the ones present were corrupt and lost sight of the original mission of forming the association in the first place. Emerson still believes, as the others do, the importance of being self-reliant but allows these associations for the sole purpose of allowing people to pursue their higher faculties. He believes that in an ideal world, these associations can be good, but the problems come when people begin to rely on them for everything rather than doing things themselves. Emerson concludes that there should be freedom of association with limitations, which differs from the other transcendentalists, but resembles the others in that the associations one forms are toxic and should be secondary when compared to the ability to advance one’s higher self. This is to say that Emerson remains pessimistic about the presence of associations but acknowledges that they have a place within society.

Margaret Fuller puts the discussion of association into different terms as she criticizes institutions and similar associations as harmful to minorities. She carries this notion and criticism of institutions forward as she notes that “This author, beginning like the many in assault upon bad institutions, and external ills, yet deepening the experience through comparative freedom, sees at last that the only efficient remedy must come from individual character. These bad institutions, indeed, it may always be replied, prevent individuals from forming good character, therefore we must remove them” (Fuller 1855,76). Fuller concludes that institutions are detrimental to the state of society due to the oppressive nature they take when it comes to minorities like women and the slave population. Fuller takes more of a feminist approach to the transcendentalist movement in the ways that she describes the way that society in general has abused women and minorities, hence why she believes that being more self-reliant is important. To her, self-reliance frees the oppressed from the chains of discrimination as people can move away from the abusive environments and into a sphere where the individual can live as they please. Although Fuller’s work specifies about the status of women, most transcendentalists were also abolitionists and again used the same argument that the institutions society formed, stifle the progress of the individual and should therefore be relinquished to do as they please. Like the others, Fuller is concerned with the moral character of the individual and the way that the individual should hold themselves accountable for their moral being. However, she notes that one cannot achieve sound principles because these institutions instill the same values within people so that they do not come to their own conclusions about what principles and ideologies they want to live by. Fuller would have a problem with freedom of association since it is these associations that keep people oppressed and prevent them from moving towards a higher moral standard. Furthermore, in his discussion of resembling sentiments from others, Fuller notes that “Fourier says, As the institutions, so the men! All follies are excusable and natural under bad institutions. Goethe thinks, As the man, so the institutions! There is no excuse for ignorance and folly. A man can grow in any place, if he will. Ay! but, Goethe, bad institutions are prison-walls and impure air, that make him stupid, so that he does not will” (Fuller 1855, 124). Continuing Fuller’s sentiments from before, is the idea that these institutions make people unpleasant due to the things individuals are taught within these institutions. However, what is worth noting is the interchangeability between the words “institution” and “association”. Institutions usually are pillars within society that hold significance and influence the rest of society, while associations are groupings according to similarities between individuals and may or may not influence the rest of society. Fuller specifically names religion as one of the institutions that stifle human progress in society, but from the early discussion of what an association is, religion can be classified as an association as well. It is because of the similarity between the two word’s definition that implicitly asserts that Fuller would not be in favor of the freedom of association because of the brutal treatment of minorities within society. Fuller values the moral standing of the individual and believes that it only progresses through the individual and the decision they make through their own personal actions and decisions. Like most of the other transcendentalists, freedom of association is not encouraged since they value independents acting in their own moral interests rather than the interests of society.

Transcendentalists face the problem of retaining a level of individuality in a world that is increasingly becoming reliant on one another, playing out the exact problem that the authors describe above. The world now has become increasingly corrupt as Emerson describes and people submit themselves to the agenda of their associates rather than thinking and developing for themselves and for their own private efforts. Transcendentalists now would push for the independence of the individual from associations that they claim poison the integrity of society, preventing people from fully developing their higher beings.

Bibliography

Emerson, Ralph Waldo. 1940. The Complete Essays and Other Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson edited by Brooks Atkinson. The Modern Library New York.

Fuller, Margaret. Woman in the Nineteenth Century : and Kindred Papers Relating to the Sphere, Condition and Duties, of Woman. Massachusetts: J. P. Jewett ; Jewett Proctor & Worthington ; Sheldon, Lamport, 1855, 1855.

Thoreau, Henry David. Civil Disobedience. New York, New York: Open Road Media Integrated Media, 2015.

====Marxism====

One central idea of Marx’s theory is the free association of producers. That is, workers are able to freely determine what associations and organizations they can form to contribute to the economy (Fetscher, 1973, 459). Though this is not what one would conventionally describe as free association - which usually refers more to civic and political groups - it is an interesting contribution to the study of free association.
In Volume One of Capital, Marx states the following:
“The lifeprocess of society, which is based on the process of material production, does not strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men, and is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan. This, however, demands for society a certain material groundwork or set of conditions of existence which in their turn are the spontaneous product of a long and painful process of development” (1867).

Fetscher: UMD library

Marx 1867: https://web.stanford.edu/~davies/Symbsys100-Spring0708/Marx-Commodity-Fetishism.pdf

====Early Sociology====
====Pragmatism====
====Weberian Thought====
====Process Philosophy====
====Social Darwinism====
====British Idealism (19th cen.)====
====Continental Philosophy/Frankfurt School====
====Behaviorism====
====Feminist Thought====
Harriet Taylor, a feminist philosopher from the 19th century, wrote about the restrictions that limit women to the private sphere. Men, according to Taylor, decided that the private and domestic sphere is women’s “proper sphere”; however, she argues that any group’s proper sphere is the “largest and highest which they are able to attain to” (Taylor). Taylor argues that this is not possible without complete liberty and, if men are convinced of their mental superiority, should not be an issue if women and men are afforded the same opportunities (Taylor). This argument can be adapted to freedom of association because it essentially concludes that both women and men have the equal opportunity to associate with organizations if he or she can prove his or her worth.

In the Constitution, there are two interpreted freedom of associations. The First Amendment includes the freedom of expressive association. The Fourteenth Amendment includes the freedom of intimate association. Intimate association is an individual’s right to form/maintain close personal relationships without interference from the government (Hudson, 2009). Expressive association, recognized in NAACP v. Alabama (1958), refers to the right of individuals to congregate or association for expressive purposes, such as advancing a political opinion (Hudson, 2009). In Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984), Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion. Brennan concluded that the Jaycees could not exclude women from membership because their purpose as an economic organization for the advancement of young men was not jeopardized if women were members (Bernstein, 2009). Justice O’Connor concurred, but distinguished between expressive and non-expressive groups, which exist for other purposes (Bernstein, 2009). O’Connor concluded that the Jaycees primarily existed for economic reasons, not expressive ones, and, as such, could not exclude women on the basis that it would compromise their mission (Bernstein, 2009).

====Postmodernism====
===Are there any philosophical or moral traditions that dispute the classification of this right as a fundamental right?===
===What do the major legal theories (positive law, natural law, critical legal studies, etc.) say about this right?===

In Roberts v. US Jaycees, the Supreme Court noted that US jurisprudence has created two constitutionally protected categories of association: expressive (e.g. interest groups and political parties) and intimate (e.g. friends and family). There is little originalism present in key expressive-association rulings. NAACP v. Alabama (1959), the first case where the Supreme Court held that a right to expressive association exists, did not draw on originalism. There is also little originalism present in the intimate-association jurisprudence, though it has been influenced by long-standing common-law ideas.
The Supreme court established the idea of intimate association in Roberts, holding that it “has long recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State.” The majority opinion cites Meyers v. Nebraska (1923), a case that helped establish a right to make individual educational choices. The opinion cites old ideas going beyond education, stating that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to “marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Though it does not embrace originalism, the ruling does invoke historical common-law understandings that may have existed when the Constitution was written.

As Richard Boyd argues in “The Madisonian Paradox of Free Association,” America’s founders explicitly chose not to include free association in the Bill of Rights. James Madison, the primary author of the Bill of Rights, feared the influence of factions, which private associations furthered. Boyd writes that Madison viewed association as a “second-order” right (Boyd 2008, 258), whose existence is tolerable because institutions can mitigate its worst effects (247). The following passage from “Federalist No. 10” illustrates his attitude toward factions arising from free association:
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
Boyd suggests several possible reasons why Madison may not have enumerated the right to associate. It is possible that he saw it as implied by other First-Amendment rights, such as free assembly. It also may have been seen as less important or vulnerable than other rights, and Madison may have seen it as the type of auxiliary right protected by the Ninth Amendment. Finally, the right’s exclusion may have been because the founders were too skeptical of it for its inclusion (258).

Despite modern views of assembly as related to association, at the time of America’s founding, it would have been better understood as related to the right to petition. According to Congress’s online annotated Constitution, the assembly clause meant that the people have a right to assemble in order to petition the government. The site says that assembly was initially seen as a “subordinate and instrumental” right. The state constitutions mentioned in my original piece on freedom of association should be interpreted the same way. In fact, this is even more clear in these state constitutions than in the national one. The state constitutions surround the right to assemble with expressly political language, such as the right to petition and advocacy for the “common good,” while the First Amendment’s guarantees are political, but not entirely political (it protects religion, and protected speech and press are often, but not always, political).

The opinion in NAACP v. Alabama derives freedom of expressive association from a combination of speech, assembly, and the Fourteenth Amendment, not merely freedom of assembly. It states that, “Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly. It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”

NAACP v. Alabama: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/357/449

Meyer v. Nebraska: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/262/390

Richard Boyd, “The Madisonian Paradox of Freedom of Association”:
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/madisonian-parad
ox-of-freedom-of-association/ABDB2F9951FD811C0AC84F76327EBACC

List of key expressive association rulings:
https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/encyclopedia/case/142/expressive-association

Congress Annotated Constitution: (“Freedom of Assembly and Petition”)https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1_4_1/#:~:text=First%20Amendm ent%3A,for%20a%20redress%20of%20grievances.

==Culture and Politics==
===Is this right interpreted and exercised in different ways in different countries? Focus on particular countries in which the right is interpreted distinctively===
===Is this right exercised in different ways depending on the political governance regime in place (democracy, autocracy, hybrid regime)?===
===Is there general and widespread belief that this right is a fundamental right that should generally be protected (and that exceptions should be rare)?===
===Does public polling reveal insights about the right as experienced in different countries?===
The World Bank measures freedom of association across 156 countries using a scale ranging from 0 ( very low freedom of association) to 1(very high freedom of association). Looking at high income countries, with the exception of Israel, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Singapore, freedom of association is generally reported to be above the world median. Additionally, among wealthier countries, the World Bank data demonstrates that levels of freedom of association have remained generally fixed since 1975, when the data was first collected. In particular, the data reveals Burundi, China, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Vietnam, and Yemen to have very low levels of freedom of association (below 0.3). Countries with very high levels of freedom of association (above 0.8) were more numerous, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Trinidad and Tobago, Switzerland, Sweden, Sri Lanka, Spain, South Africa, Slovenia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Portugal, Peru, Papua New Guinea, Panama, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Namibia, Mongolia, Mexico, Mauritius, Malawi, Liberia, Latvia, South Korea, Japan, Jamaica, Italy, Ireland, Honduras, Greece, Ghana, Estonia, Denmark, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Costa Rica, Canada, Benin, Belgium, Australia, and Albania.

An Open Government Partnership (OGP) report reveals additional insights about freedom of association. The report surveys individuals within 78 OGP partnered countries about elements of freedom of association. Furthermore, the survey presents that approximately 25% of freedom of association issues within OGP countries are rooted in restrictive laws on foreign funding. Additionally, the survey demonstrates that OGP countries presenting challenges to freedom of association generally have not taken actions towards better protecting the right in the future. When asked to respond to “In practice, people can freely join any political organization they want”, the majority of OGP countries responded “Agree” or “Strongly Agree”. Though, when asked to reply to “In practice, people can freely join any (unforbidden) political organization they want”, a large number of OGP countries, approximately 20%, responded “Disagree” . This finding demonstrates that in reality, freedom of association may be less protected by countries’ governments than it is perceived to be.

Within the International Labor Organization, the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) addresses violations of freedom of association. In their 2018 annual report, the CFA reported 402 freedom of association complaints from Africa, 410 from Asian and the Pacific, 657 from Europe, 1,681 from Latin America and 186 from North America. Furthermore, their data reveals decreases in complaints in Africa, Asia and the Pacfic, and North America and increases in complaints in Latin America in 2018. 100% of the freedom of association cases examined by the CFA were brought about by workers, rather than employers. 50% of these workers were from the private sector. Violations of trade union rights and civil liberties composed the majority of freedom of association cases investigated by the CFA.

==Conflicts with other Rights==
===Are there other specific fundamental rights that tend to conflict with this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?===
The right to associate - specifically, the right for associations to exclude people from membership for whatever reason they want - may conflict with the right not to face discrimination based on immutable characteristics such as race and gender. The US Supreme Court has decided cases where an association’s decision to exclude members conflicts with non-discrimination law. In Roberts v. US Jaycees ( 1984), the court rejected the free-association claim of a male-only business organization because its association was neither “expressive” nor “intimate.” In Boy Scouts v. Dale (2000), however, the court held that the Boy Scouts of America could exclude gay members because not being able to do so would violate the organization’s right to expressive association.
Free expression is critical to the practice of free association. The US Supreme Court explicitly protects “expressive” association because many associations exist to express a particular viewpoint. If a government restricts the advocacy of certain ideas, it will almost certainly restrict the activity of groups whose purpose is to express those ideas. Additionally, freedom of association depends on the free exercise of religion. As Locke wrote in A Letter Concerning Toleration, a church is a “a society of members voluntarily uniting” (Locke 1689, 9). Religious observance often requires worship in large groups, so restricting these religious practices entails the abridgement of free association.
Roberts v. US Jaycees: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/468/609 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-699
A Letter Concerning Toleration: https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/toleration.pdf

===Are there other specific rights that are critical to the exercise of this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?===
===Is there a perception that this right is above or higher than other fundamental rights, or in general, that it has a particular place in a hierarchy of rights?===

Numerous scholars offer interpretations of the hierarchy of rights, placing freedom of association at differing levels of importance. Noted by Tom Farer in “The Hierarchy of Human Rights”, human rights are non-negotiable, and thus are prioritized within the hierarchy. As to why certain rights remain at the top of the hierarchy, Farer answers “because all other rights are dependent on them.” Furthermore, Farer claims that a consensus among United States human rights organizations is that the rights to life, physical security, and due process are essential human rights. Excluding freedom of association from his selection of non-negotiable human rights, Farer undermines its importance within the hierarchy of rights. Thus, Farer emphasizes that the rights to life, physical security, and due process hold precedence over the right to free association.

Fernando Surez Muller argues that there is a select group of fundamental rights that are essential to the exercise of all other rights. With this, Muller emphasizes that certain rights must be prioritized in order for others to be functionally implemented. When analyzing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Muller interprets freedom of association to be a right of particular importance. Muller argues that the rights to communication and expression are impossible to exercise without the right of free association, claiming, “Related to this transcendental right to communication (cell 6) are also all mobility rights (mentioned in articles 13 to 15) because communication is not only a matter of expression but it is also a matter of transporting and receiving the message and this requires freedom of association.” Thus, from Muller’s perspective, freedom of association maintains a high position within the hierarchy of human rights.

Explained by Kimberley Brownlee and David Jenkins of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the right to associate often only pertains to certain associations. Because of this, different rights to different associations have varying ranks within the hierarchy of rights. Brownlee and Jenkins claim “However, since not all associations operate according to either implicit or explicit declarations of consent, exactly what counts as consent is a difficult thing to assess: How do we know when association is free? This problem is exacerbated by the hierarchical form that many associations take.” For this reason, Brownlee and Jenkins note that explicit associations, group identifications that are easy to identify and thus protect, are often prioritized within the hierarchy of rights.

===What specific examples of hierarchies, manifestos, constitutions, or prioritized descriptions of rights cite this right’s high status? Low status? No status at all?===

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights places freedom of association at a high position of value. The document asserts: “ Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; No one may be compelled to belong to an association.” While the document does not enumerate human rights in hierarchical order, the platform of the United Nations and the inclusion of the freedom of association within the document suffices the right’s universally accepted importance and position of high status.

Additionally, the inclusion of freedom of association within the European Convention on Human Rights emphasizes the value of the right. Asserting the importance of freedom of association, Article 11 claims, “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.” Stressing freedom of association to be an essential human right, the Convention echoes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, upholding the value of freedom of association.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms similarly elevates freedom of association to a high status. Within its fundamental freedoms section, the charter emphasizes “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: a. Freedom of conscience and religion; freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication; freedom of peaceful assembly; and freedom of association.” Explicitly stating that the freedom of association is one of the four fundamental freedoms, the Charter clearly asserts that freedom of association is essential to the liberty of individuals. Given the select group of fundamental freedoms, the placement of freedom of association within the list demonstrates its uplifted position within the greater hierarchy of human rights.

In the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the International Labour Organization additionally upholds the pertinence of freedom of association. Within the declaration, the ILO asserts four categories to be promoted by member states, including freedom of association. Similar to The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, by only including a select group of rights, the Declaration affirms the high status of these freedoms. Thus, the inclusion of freedom of association within the four categories asserts its importance

===How does federalism change, if at all, the exercise or application of this right? What examples of this can one point to?===

Differences in state and federal law contribute to varying levels of freedom of association across the United States. While Supreme Court cases such as Bates v. Little Rock, Shelton v. Tucker, Roberts vs. United States Jaycees, Boy Scouts of America vs. Dale, and Christian Legal Society vs. Martinez upheld the right to freedom of association, the right continues to be violated across states. Furthermore, despite its support from the Supreme Court, the system of federalism often leads to the restriction of freedom of association by local courts and authorities.

Particularly in South Florida, Lance Compa investigates how nursing home workers’ rights to free association have been violated. Furthermore, Compa explains how federalism exacerbates these violations. Noting the Palm Garden nursing home case, Copa discusses how nursing home workers were threatened with pay and benefit cuts if they decided to join unions. Additionally, Compa notes Palm Garden’s personnel manual, which states, “This is a non-union health center...if you are approached to join a union, we sincerely hope you will consider the individual freedoms you could give up, and the countless risks you could be taking.” After workers were in fact fired for joining unions, Compa notes, the NLRB asserted that Palm Garden must reinstate employees, as they had violated the workers’ right to free association. Still rejecting rehiring the employees, Compa explains that Palm Garden appealed to federal court, where the case still remains pending indefinitely. Furthermore, while the Supreme Court may uphold freedom of association, this does not mean the right can be strictly enforced throughout the United States, as appealing to federal courts demonstrates a significant challenge.

Additionally, Compa notes how freedom of association has been restricted for food processing workers. Specifically, Compa discusses the abuses faced by Smithfield workers in North Carolina, a state dominated by the food processing industry. Firing union activists and actively intimidating and discriminating against organizing workers, the Smithfield Plant violated its workers' freedom of association in numerous ways. Compa stresses that these abuses were ultimately the result of federalism, a system that contributes to the restriction of freedom of association. Compa states, “Instead of fulfilling the affirmative responsibility of government authorities to protect workers’ rights, state power was used to interfere with workers’ freedom of association in violation of international human rights norms.” Noting how local police were permitted to intimidate workers at the Smithfield Plant, Copa affirms how local authorities restrict freedom of association, countering federal law. This demonstrates how the division of state and federal power can weaken the strength of freedom of association, as local governments can discreetly work to limit the right.

==Limitations / Restrictions==
===What are the typical exceptions or limitations placed on this right?===
Restricting certain groupings and gatherings that are involved, or likely involved in crimes as was seen with the response to the formation of the Ku Klux Klan as a vigilante association, is a typical exception to the right of freedom of association (Australian Law Reform Commission 2016). In response to the crimes committed by the organization, Congress passed a Force Act in 1870 and the Ku Klux Klan Act in 1871, which authorized the suppression of disturbances to the peace by force (Gruberg). This was in effort to stop terrorist organizations through heavy punishments, such as the suspension of habeas corpus under these acts. These acts were eventually found by the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional and were repealed; however, although direct restrictions upon the group (who was behind the 1963 bombing of a black church in Alabama, numerous murders including that of three civil rights workers in 1964 Mississippi, and other criminal efforts to impose white supremacy on the masses and restrict the rights of African Americans) and its freedom of assembly and association have not been able to lawfully prevent such crimes in the name of violations of the freedom of association, modern civil rights laws and increased national surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation have indirectly impacted the KKK’s and other criminally-involved groups’ (such as terrorist groups like ISIL) freedoms of association and assembly. The First Amendment of the US Constitution grants the right to “peaceable assembly,” and any indication of unpeaceable assembly warrants government interference. When also the association infringes upon another group’s freedoms of association, endangers public safety and order, or does not benefit/or harms social need, as can be seen with the efforts of the KKK to restrict black Americans rights to vote and peaceably assemble, necessary limitations are placed upon the right.

In terms of certain limitations on peaceable assembly, the government has the right to limit this freedom based upon “time, place and manner” restrictions: “Time, place and manner restrictions are content-neutral limitations imposed by the government on expressive activity (O'Neill). These restrictions come in many forms including imposing limits on the noise level of speech, capping the number of protesters who may occupy a given forum, barring early-morning or late-evening demonstrations, and restricting the size or placement of signs on government property. ” These limits ultimately regard the facilitation of legitimate regulatory goals, such as preventing traffic congestion or preventing interference with nearby activities.

Religious rights often conflict with the right to free association. As observed in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, where a Christian student organization argued their First Amendment right to prohibit non-christians from their group, religious associations have used their rights to religious freedom to restrict certain individuals from associating with them. Though, as the Supreme Court ultimately ruled against the Christian Legal Society, rights to free association were ultimately upheld over contradicting religious rights.

A similar issued was observed in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group. Though, in this case, the Supreme Court asserted the right of groups to prohibit membership from individuals whose beliefs do not coincide with the group mission.Furthermore, Hurley exhibited how religious rights can counter rights to free association, as the decision emphasized that certain individuals could be blocked from associating with religious groups on the basis of their identity.

Rights to public safety additionally contradict rights to free association. This is often the argument made when prosecuting individuals associating with criminal and terrorist groups. For example in City of Chicago v. Morales, the Supreme Court upheld a Chicago law which criminalized public gang association, asserting that gang members had no constitutional rights to free association (Cole). Exhibited by the court’s decision, individuals are not constitutionally protected to align with criminal groups, as the public’s right to safety against such groups weighs against personal rights to association.

In regards to the right to free political association, parties hold a contradicting First Amendment right to limit party membership. Furthermore, while a candidate can identify as associating with a specific political party on a ballot, that party has the ability to disassociate from them (Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School). Through this, a candidate often cannot freely affiliate with the party they associate with, exhibiting a contradiction to the right to free association.

===Under American jurisprudence, what permissible exceptions exist?===
The freedom of association is derivative from the First Amendment which guarantees the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition (Hudson 2020). These freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition all form sub-categories of the freedom of association. Collectively, this right permits a group to act in the collective interest of its members and to maintain private associations and assemblies without government interference. The legal problems regarding its practice have only recently arisen- particularly from the loyalty investigations of the Communist Party membership and a series of other cases in the 1950s and 1960s in relation to the activities of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute 2020). For example, in 1958, with the case of the NAACP v. Alabama, the right to freedom of association was strengthened and supported by the Supreme Court who ruled in favor of the NAACP’s decision to withhold a list of members in the organization from the government (Hudson 2020). In response to Brown v. Board of Education 1954, Alabama authorities was closely investigating the NAACP under the foreign corporation law. The NAACP complied with the state’s request of its business records, including its charter and list of organizational officers and staff. They refused, however, to give lists of rank-and-file members due to confidentiality, potential economic reprisal attacks, and potential repression. Giving up the lists, civil rights activists said, would dissuade members and potential recruits from associating with the organization, ultimately violating their right of association.

Prior to this case the Court had supported a stronger suppression of the freedoms of association and assembly regarding organizations that were alleged to be involved in subversive and unlawful activities. In 1928’s New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman and 1951’s Dennis v. United States the Court had ruled in favor of government efforts to restrict and limit the rights of assembly and speech of both the KKK and the Communist Party (U.S. Supreme Court 1928, 1951). In this case, however, the Court said NAACP did not cause harm to government or society, and they had complied with the demands of the Alabama government sufficiently; therefore they were justified and protected by law in their decision to withhold membership lists.

Later, in the 1967 case of United States v. Robel in which Eugene Robel, an inactive member of the Communist Party, was charged with violating the Subversive Activities Control Act when he continued his work at the Todd Pacific Shipyards, a location that was deemed by the Secretary of Defense to be a defense facility (U.S. Supreme Court 2020). Under the Act, his actions was illegal due to his membership to the Communist Party and members of the Party’s legal inability to remain employed at a location deemed a “defense facility”. The Supreme Court ruled that the “defense facility” employment provision was an unconstitutional abridgment of the right of association regardless of its application solely to active Party members. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that the provision was overbroad while Justice William J. Brennan added that the designation of defense facilities being a power given to the Secretary of Defense was unconstitutional because the Act provided no meaningful standards for the Secretary to follow. This case was a milestone because, once tested, the Court upheld the broad freedoms of association and continued the prohibition of government interference and bias towards any individual based upon an affiliated association. Later cases regarding the Bar examine and admission to the bar further backed this right. In 1971’s Baird v. State Bar of Arizona and Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, the Supreme Court established that the government could only deny admission to the bar if an applicant’s membership in a group advocating overthrow of the government (such as the Communist Party) was legitimately coupled with the specific intent to achieve that end (U.S. Supreme Court 1971).

These cases established that organized groups in association that gather in efforts to advance political, economic, religious, or cultural matters may gather without government interference (and particularly without government knowledge of listed members) unless the group explicitly poses a threat to society or engages in criminal activity.

Under American jurisprudence, permissible exceptions to the freedom involve matters of internal affairs such as discrimination cases. In the 1976 case of Runyon v. McCrary, discrimination based upon race was established as a limitation to a body’s freedom of association after two children were denied access to certain private schools in Virginia as a result of the schools’ admitted segregationist school policies (U.S. Supreme Court 1976). Later, in the Roberts v. United States Jaycees court case of 1984, the court ruled that the Jaycees, an organization of young business leaders that only fully accepted male members and who claimed that the anti-discrimination laws that forced them to accept qualified women was a breach of their freedom of association, lacked “the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude women,” ultimately prohibiting their exclusion of women (Bernstein 2020).

Also, if the state has a compelling interest, it can justifiably limit associations’ rights to organizational autonomy (Alexander 2008, 14). Here, the state would be setting limits and requirements for how a group is organizationally run and made up. By giving an organization a quota, the state forces a particular pattern of inclusion that is in the public interest. For example, the US government is permitted to work to create less segregated schools, involving programs like the Moving to Opportunity (MTO). It is permitted to do in efforts to promote certain patterns of inclusion and acceptance within communities and associations (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1992).

===Under international human rights laws, what permissible exceptions (often called derogations) exist?===
In Article 22 of the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the right to freedom of association is granted to all, including joining trade unions (United Nations 1966). Restrictions can only be placed on this right if the restrictions are prescribed by the state’s law and “are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Similarly, in Europe, derogations are permissible only when “prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” as is stated in Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (European Court of Human Rights 1953, 12). And Article 16 of the American Convention on Human Rights mirrors the decree of the ICCPR (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1969).

Regarding the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and its adoption of Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, this body is in place to protect the labor interests of those around the world, and they are prohibited by international law to formulate and/or apply law so as to prejudice against any group (Swepston 1998, 172).

===Have political theorists or philosophers discussed the permissibility of exceptions to this right?===

Freedom of association is an essential facet of modern democracy, yet it is often overlooked in political discourse on the natural rights and liberties of the citizen. This could be due to the fact that freedom of association and assembly are often so closely related to freedoms of speech and expression, or it could be because it is so difficult for political theorists to decide which association should be allowed and which can be justifiably restricted. Whatever the case, the debate over exceptions to the right of free association continues to change and evolve even in the modern era.

John Locke is one of the earliest proponents of natural right theory; his second “Treatise on Government” famously outlines humankind’s three essential rights to life, liberty, and property (Locke, “Treatise on Government”). He does not specifically mention people’s freedom of association, but scholars point to his writings on religious assembly as an indication of his stance on the right. In a George Mason University publication, Eric Claeys refers to a passage from Locke’s “Letter Concerning Toleration,” which states that a church is simply a “free and voluntary society” (Locke, “A Letter Concerning Toleration”), saying that “if one reads the same passage from the Letter with an eye toward issues about associational freedom, Locke is making a far more radical point: All private societies, churches and otherwise, deserve a presumption of associational freedom” (Claeys, “The Private Society and the Liberal Public Good in John Locke’s Thought”). In light of Claeys’ assessment, it is easy to observe Locke’s thoughts on the freedom of association in the constitution that he wrote for the Carolina Colony in 1669. For example, Article 103 of this document states that “no person whatsoever shall speak anything in their religious assembly irreverently or seditiously of the government or governors, or of state matters” (Locke, “The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina: March 1, 1669”). This reveals a reluctance on Locke’s part to allow any association of citizens to gather in opposition of the established government, perhaps because he understands the potential threat that this could pose to political society. His position on the freedom of association is made all the more clear in his 108th Article, which stipulates that “assemblies, upon what presence soever of religion, not observing and performing the above said rules, shall not be esteemed as churches, but unlawful meetings, and be punished as other riots” (Locke, “The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina: March 1, 1669”). The “above said rules” to which Locke refers consist mostly of provisions to ensure free membership and movement between various religious establishments, but the classification of non compliant assemblies as “unlawful” or “riots” implies a Locke’s hesitation to allow totally free and unrestricted assembly.

Subsequent political theorists built upon Locke’s theory of rights and liberties, and a number of them elected to deal with the right to freedom of association more directly. The United States Constitution, much of which rests upon Lockean political theory, is one of the first documents to directly address freedom of assembly in its text. Perhaps the buildup to the American Revolution, in which groups like the Sons of Liberty and the Stamp Act Congress were outlawed and broken up by the British government, affected the Constitutional Convention’s decision to include assembly in the Bill of Rights. The Constitution’s First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances” (The Constitution of the United States of America). The Constitutional Convention, led by prominent statesman James Madison, used the word peaceably to signal that citizens were not entitled to the complete freedom of assembly if such activity could potentially generate violence or unrest (Law Library of Congress, “The Right to Peaceable Assembly”). The Cornell Law Review writes that this guarantee gradually came to protect citizens’ rights to participate in organizations that regularly utilize their members’ constitutional rights to freely assemble and petition the government. It states that over time, “Supreme Court decisions gradually determined that “the right of association is derivative from the First Amendment guarantees of speech, assembly, and petition” (Legal Information Institute, “Right of Association”). While Madison and his colleagues did not directly address freedom of association in the Constitution’s text, they did lay the groundwork for its realization years later.

French diplomat Alexis De Tocqueville traveled to the United States in the early 1800s in order to observe the country, and in 1835 he published his findings in his first volume of Democracy in America. In this work the Frenchman sung praise for the American system of government, applauding it for spreading liberty and freedom within its borders. However, even de Tocqueville understood the danger inherent in the guarantee of totally unrestrained freedom of association. Linking the freedom of association to such constitutional rights as the freedom of petition and freedom of the press, he writes that “it cannot be denied that the unrestrained liberty of association for political purposes is the privilege which a people is longest in learning how to exercise. If it does not throw the nation into anarchy, it perpetually augments the chances of that calamity” (De Tocqueville, Democracy in America). De Tocqueville goes on to explain that American association is generally peaceful because citizens tend only to use it to oppose political groups, but he nevertheless must address the danger inherent in the guarantee of unrestricted freedom of association. Even in what he sees as a most ideal form of government, the Frenchman recognizes the risks inherent in unrestricted freedom when it comes to assembly and association.

Decades later, John Stuart Mill came to a similar conclusion in his 1859 work, On Liberty. Mill was familiar with the American system of government, as evidenced by his mentions of American religious toleration and prohibition of “fermented” drinks, so it is possible that his thinking was influenced in some way by Madison’s work on the Constitution (Mill, “On Liberty”). In his work, Mill advances the theory that humans band together solely for the purpose of protection, and that therefore we can never have the authority to restrain others’ liberty. However, he notes that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (Mill, “On Liberty”). Later on, he explicitly asserts that “freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived” (Mill, “On Liberty”). Clearly, Mill is aware of the dangers implicit in the creation of total freedom of assembly, and he agrees with the Constitutional Convention that this important right can permissibly be subject to certain regulations and limitations.

The political and philosophical debate over freedom and association and its acceptable limitations evolved dramatically in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Writing just over a century after Mill, First Amendment scholar Thomas Emerson produced an article entitled “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,” in which he addresses a number of issues relating to freedom of association by assessing court precedents and the lessons of history. Like the documents from Mill and Madison, Emerson’s article holds that complete freedom of association would be detrimental to society. Using the example of an organization whose sole aim is to perpetrate a successful bank robbery, Emerson points out that “some types of association need, and are entitled to, greater protection than others” (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,”). He goes on to state that “the legal doctrine that protects associational rights must be able to distinguish between them and to afford the required measure of protection in each case” (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression”). Taking into account twentieth-century court decisions, Emerson explains that “the Supreme Court, in recognizing an independent "right of association," has undertaken to give that right constitutional protection primarily through application of a balancing test” (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression”).

This balancing test is incredibly important in determining the constitutionality of certain restrictions on citizens’ association because it must avoid violating citizens’ unequivocal right to free expression while still preventing the perpetration of unlawful action (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,”). The case of NAACP v. Alabama is one case in which the Supreme Court attempted to find this balance. This instance in which the NAACP argued that the state of Alabama could not constitutionally require the organization to disclose a list of its members, proved incredibly important to our modern understanding of the right to association. Writing the majority opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan II explained that “it is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” (Franklin, “NAACP v. Alabama”). This differed from other contemporary cases, such as New York ex. rel Bryant v. Zimmerman, in which the Supreme Court had ruled in favor of the state’s ability to restrict association related to the Ku Klux Klan. The difference, Harlan explained, was that unlike the KKK, the NAACP did not present a threat to society. For this reason, the organization and the members involved were protected under the First Amendment’s protection of citizens’ freedom to peaceably assemble (Franklin, “NAACP v. Alabama”). Harlan, like Madison, Locke, and Mill, understood the importance of restricting free association in order to preserve the peace in society.

The right to free association is famously difficult to address because the general consensus is that association should not be completely free. For that reason, political theorists and philosophers have gone to great lengths over the centuries to define exactly when and why free association should be limited or left alone. The general consensus is that assembly and association are detrimental to society when they lead to violence or unrest, but as with other rights it is difficult for theorists to decide exactly what criteria turn a given gathering from an expression of free assembly into a potential threat to civil society.

“John Locke, Two Treatises (1689) - Online Library of Liberty,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/john-locke-two-treatises-1689.

Locke, John, “A Letter Concerning Toleration,” trans. William Pope, 1689, accessed at https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/toleration.pdf, 9.

Eric R. Claeys, “The Private Society and the Liberal Public Good in John Locke's Thought,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2007, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1027965.

“Constitution of the United States of America,” Bill of Rights Institute, October 3, 2019, https://billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/constitution/?utm_source=GOOGLE. 5

“Right to Peaceful Assembly” (Law Library of Congress, 2014), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/peaceful-assembly/right-to-peaceful-assembly.pdf.

John Stuart Mill, “Mill, ‘On Liberty,’” in The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill: On Liberty, ed. Jonathan Reiley (New York, NY: Routledge, 1998), 45.

Thomas I. Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,” The Yale Law Journal 74, no. 1 (1964): p. 1, https://doi.org/10.2307/794804

===Should this right be limited when limiting it would jeopardize democratic norms?===
===Is this right often perceived as threatening to government authorities?===
===Is this right often curtailed by government authorities for reasons other than those which are generally viewed as permissible?===
===Is this right at times curtailed by private actors?===

Philosophers and political theorists generally agree that it is sometimes necessary to curtail free association, but this agreement does not answer questions of which forms assembly and association can permissibly be restricted, how they should be limited, or who should control their regulation. It often falls to the government to decide when to step in during times of popular uprising or violent protest, but history also shows a number of instances in which private actors have curtailed citizens’ right to free association or assembly.

The most common way for private actors can curtail free association is by prohibiting assembly and demonstration on their privately-owned property. In U.S. law, there exists a precedent that protects citizens’ right to free association on public property precisely because the right is not guaranteed when it is practiced on private property. This doctrine was first introduced in 1936, when Jersey City mayor Frank Hague issued an ordinance prohibiting members of the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) from gathering in a public space and distributing “communist” literature (Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,”). The CIO, with the help of the American Civil Liberties Union, successfully argued that the New Jersey ordinance was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Hague appealed to the Supreme Court, which upheld the original decision and struck the ordinance down (Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,”). Justice Owen Roberts justified the decision for Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization by likening public spaces such as streets and parks to public forums, in which the free flow of ideas and discourse must be protected under the First Amendment. He made this ruling because he recognized that private actors retained the right to curtail citizens’ right to association when that association occurred on private property. In order to preserve the right to peaceable assembly, the Court’s decision set the precedent for the “public forum” doctrine, which continues to protect the right to association in public spaces to this day (Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,”). Writing for The First Amendment Encyclopedia, David Hudson writes that “in the Court’s forum-based approach, the government can impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in all three categories of property, but has limited ability to impose content-based restrictions on traditional or designated public forums” (Hudson, “Public Forum Doctrine | The First Amendment Encyclopedia,”). The doctrine specifically aims to protect peaceful association on public property because the right is not guaranteed when assembly occurs on private property.

One example of a private actor using its ownership of property to curtail free association can be observed in the 1994 case of Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. In this case, the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida filed a suit against anti-abortion protestors who had been blocking entrances to the building, harrassing abortion patients, and demonstrating outside of staff members’ homes (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). A court order was issued, ordering protestors to refrain from trespassing on Center property, blocking its entrances, and abusing staff and patients. When the court order was violated, the “the court created a 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveways (including the public sidewalk) within which all antiabortion speech was banned. It also prohibited excessive noise and images that patients could see or hear during surgery and recovery” (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). The Supreme Court later upheld the buffer zone rules, but struck down the prohibition of protestors’ practice of showing images to clients. It also ruled that the Florida court’s 300-foot buffer zone that prohibited protestors from approaching clients and staff at the Center and at their homes was too restrictive of First Amendment rights (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). The ruling, according to Chief Justice Rhenquist, sought to preserve protestors’ right to association and assembly while still protecting the patients and clients from intimidation and abuse (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). It also serves as a reminder that private citizens still reserve the right to curtail free association if said association makes them feel unsafe or threatened.

Both the Madsen and Hague cases illustrate that judges, in particular, have immense power to determine the breadth of citizens’ right to freedom of association as guaranteed in the First Amendment. For example, in the case of Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Supreme Court determined that free expression in the form of a rock concert in New York’s Central Park could be subject to volume regulations under the First Amendment (O'Neill, “Time, Place and Manner Restrictions”). This decision, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, led to the creation of a test to determine whether assembly and expression could be restricted. The test asks whether the regulation is “content neutral,” whether it is “narrowly tailored” to fit a specific governmental interest, and whether it still provides ample opportunity for the message to be communicated (O'Neill, “Time, Place and Manner Restrictions”). If a regulation passes all three prongs of this test, then it can legally restrict or control the time, place, or manner in which assemblies like protests are carried out. The Law Library of Congress writes that since Kennedy’s decision, “the Supreme Court has held that it is constitutionally permissible for the government to require that a permit for an assembly be obtained in advance” (“Right to Peaceful Assembly: United States | Law Library of Congress”). Kennedy’s ruling also allows the government to “make special regulations that impose additional requirements for assemblies that take place near major public events” (“Right to Peaceful Assembly: United States | Law Library of Congress”). This legal doctrine has significantly shaped the way in which state and federal governments treat freedom of association and the right to peaceable assembly. While the Supreme Court can hardly be considered a private actor, Justices like Kennedy rely on personal study and private experience to create policy that affects American freedom of association as a whole.

Citizens within a political society have the right to free association as long as it is peaceable and does not infringe upon others’ rights or liberties. This principle lends itself to a number of complexities because its parameters for free association are so vague, but over the past few centuries the United States has worked to define when and how private actors can curtail others’ right to free association. The result is that the Supreme Court, and the justices that make it up, have set out precedents that test whether certain forms of association are constitutional and which ones can justifiably be restricted. The definition of public spaces as areas of free association and creation of buffer zones for private properties represent significant steps forward in this effort.

Lynne Chandler Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,” Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, accessed June 16, 2020, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/619/hague-v-committee-for-industrial-organization.

David L Hudson, “Public Forum Doctrine | The First Amendment Encyclopedia,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/824/public-forum-doctrine.

“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. | The First ...,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/10/madsen-v-women-s-health-center-inc.

Kevin Francis O'Neill, “Time, Place and Manner Restrictions,” Time, Place and Manner Restrictions, accessed June 17, 2020, https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1023/time-place-and-manner-restrictions.

“Right to Peaceful Assembly: United States | Law Library of Congress,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/peaceful-assembly/us.php.

===Is this right subject to specific limitations in event of emergency (war, brief natural disaster [weather, earthquake], long-run natural disaster [volcano, fire, disease])? Can such limitations be defined in advance with reference to the disaster in question?===

The right to freedom of association is not an absolute right because it is subject to certain limitations. Political thinkers and legal experts generally agree that assembly and association can be justifiably restricted if it conflicts with other citizens’ security, liberty, or property. Another case in which the right is subject to certain limitations is in a case of emergency or long-run disaster. Recent history shows a number of instances in which the U.S. government has justified the restriction of the right to free association during times of war and natural disaster. Interestingly, it did not effectively curtail citizens’ right to free association during the recent COVID-19 pandemic.

Freedom of association most often restricted in the event of war. In his work, “The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly,” Washington University scholar John D. Inazu briefly explores the effect that World War I had on citizens’ right to gather and discuss the country’s affairs. He writes that during the late World War I years, “the freedom of assembly was constrained by shortsighted legislation like the Espionage Act of 1917 (and its 1918 amendments) and the Immigration Act of 1918, and the Justice Department’s infamous Palmer Raids in 1920” (Inazu, “The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly”). William Riggs of the First Amendment Encyclopedia similarly notes that the Vietnam War era, in particular, saw drastic reductions in Americans’ rights to peaceable assembly and association. He writes that “the war in Vietnam quickly became the focus of major protests that resulted in increased government attempts to limit First Amendment protections. These efforts mostly dealt with the right to assemble and what constituted appropriate free speech criticism of the war” (“Vietnam War | The First Amendment Encyclopedia,”). The U.S. government broadly justified these restrictions by arguing that they were made in the interest of national security, claiming wartime as an acceptable time for the limitation of free association.

Recently, the United States government has also walked back citizens’ right to freedom of association when dealing with natural disasters. A 2020 Congressional report on First Amendment rights during the COVID-19 pandemic notes that when public health and safety are at risk, the government is justified in its restriction of certain freedoms to widely assemble as long as these regulations aim to protect citizens’ essential rights, such as those to life or property. It notes that the government is justified in restricting freedoms of association at certain times of the day, as long as this action is taken with the explicit purpose of protecting citizens from further harms. “For example,” it says, “in upholding a county curfew following Hurricane Andrew, the Eleventh Circuit asked only whether the government (1) took that action in “good faith,” (2) with ‘some factual basis’ that the restrictions were ‘necessary to maintain order’” (Killion, CRS Report, “U.S. Library of Congress”). The report argues that “curfews, increased “police powers,” and other measures that are considered “essential to the public safety [and] health” all constitute acceptable restrictions of First Amendment rights-such as the right to freedom of peaceable assembly- during times of natural crisis (Killion, CRS Report, “U.S. Library of Congress”).

The recent COVID-19 crisis created another instance in which citizens’ right to freedom of association was called into question. The pandemic caused widespread and dramatic change within global society as the country entered a state of total lockdown, and in the process it raised a number of legal, moral, and philosophical questions about association and assembly. In June 2020, for example, plaintiffs Ron Givens and Christine Bish filed a lawsuit against California State officials after being denied permission to hold a protest outside the California State Capitol building. The assembly, which aimed to protest the state’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, was not allowed to take place because of the potential health risks it would create. In response to this denial, the Department of Justice filed a Friend-of-the-Court brief which argued that California’s de facto ban on public demonstrations directly conflicts with First Amendment guarantees and should therefore be struck down (“Department of Justice Files Friend-of-the-Court Brief in Support of Free Speech Challenge to California's COVID-19 Ban on In-Person Political Protests,”). The debate over pandemic restrictions and First Amendment rights became even more heated as the Black Lives Matter Movement sparked major demonstrations in major cities all over the country as citizens gathered to protest police actions in the murder of George Floyd. An MSN report on the protests in Boston notes that “Black Lives Matter Boston and Violence in Boston, two activist organizations who are expected to hold a protest in the city Tuesday evening, urged anyone who is at high risk due to COVID-19 to stay home. Organizers also asked participants to wear gloves and masks and bring hand sanitizer” (“Protesting amid the coronavirus crisis: Massachusetts officials say they respect demonstrators' 1st Amendment rights, urge them to take health precautions though,”). The DOJ’s Friend-of-the-Court brief, in addition to reports on the Boston protests, indicate that the U.S. government has largely decided to allow citizens to exercise the right to free association and assembly, despite the potential danger it could pose.

The right to freedom of association is subject to a number of limitations. Periods of war, natural disaster, and global pandemic all create conditions in which the United States has considered placing restrictions on the right to peaceable assembly. In the two former cases, it has generally been able to regulate its citizens’ exercise of their right to freely associate with one another. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that while the government may seek to limit its citizens’ assembly, it is not always able to enforce its regulations.

COVID-19 has demonstrated that freedom of association may be limited due to disease. The virus has prompted governments to limit the size of many types of gatherings, which tends to limit freedom of association. Certain associations, such as organized sports teams and churches, have their operations heavily restricted. Still, these restrictions do not limit one’s ability to associate with certain groups of people - just where and how these groups meet.
The French government, for example, enacted a “State of Sanitary Emergency” to fight the virus, and the text of the legislation gives the government the power to “decide, by decree, and upon the recommendation of the minister of health, general measures limiting the freedom to go and come, the freedom to enterprise and the freedom to congregate as well as allowing him to proceed with requisitions of any goods and services necessary to fight against the sanitary disaster” (Momtaz 2020). Like in the US, freedom of association is not explicitly granted in the Constitution, but its Constitutional Council interpreted it as existing.

Curfews are also often instituted in response to disaster and unrest. For example, the mayor of New Orleans instituted a curfew following Hurricane Katrina (Rushton 2015). Various US cities enacted curfews in response to recent riots/looting (11 PM in Washington, DC in early June, for example).
During times of conflict, governments may seek to limit associations that benefit the enemy. In 1954, Congress outlawed the Communist Party, charging that it was an instrument of a hostile foreign power. It has never been enforced (Auerbach 2020). The President of the US has the authority to declare martial law, though only under specific circumstances: during foreign invasion or civil war and when civilian courts can no longer operate (Feldman 2005, 1036). The latter restriction was cemented in Ex Parte Milligan ( 1864), where the Supreme Court struck down the conviction of a confederate sympathizer by a military tribunal (Feldman 1033). Though there are no explicit rules regarding freedom of association, federal regulations grant broad power to military authorities to restrict civil liberties where it is necessary for civil order (Feldman 1037-8). In Milligan, the court wrote that martial law “destroys every guarantee of the Constitution and effectively renders the military independent of and superior to the civil power” (Feldman 1037-8).
Several cases have tested the ability of governors to impose state-level martial law. In Moyer v. Peabody ( 1909), a case arose when the governor of Colorado imposed martial law to quell a labor dispute. The court held that, “When it comes to a decision by the head of the State upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment.” The court later elaborated that state declarations of martial law should be subject to a proportionality test - the remedy must directly relate to the problem it addresses (Feldman 1034). In Duncan v Kahanamoku (1946), the use of military tribunals in Hawaii after the attack on Pearl Harbour was invalidated. The Supreme Court held that under the Hawaiian Organic Act (this act gave the state the authority to institute martial law) the use of such tribunals is only allowed during a period of actual war. The court did, however, leave the possibility open that such action was constitutional (Feldman 1034-5).
France provides another good example of emergency power - it has Constitutional provisions providing for states of emergency and states of siege. Though precise statutory and constitutional justifications for restrictions have evolved over time (France has repeatedly replaced its constitution), it has long used emergencies to justify restrictions on freedom of association. During World War I, France prohibited protests and marches, and ordered the closure of gathering places such as bars and restaurants. France has instituted similar restrictions in response to later emergencies, such as a 1955 uprising in Algeria (Feldman 1031).

“Dennis v. United States | The First Amendment Encyclopedia,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/190/dennis-v-united-states.

“Vietnam War | The First Amendment Encyclopedia,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1101/vietnam-war.

“Freedom of Association in the Wake of Coronavirus,” Freedom of Association in the Wake of Coronavirus § (n.d.).
“Department of Justice Files Friend-of-the-Court Brief in Support of Free Speech Challenge to California's COVID-19 Ban on In-Person Political Protests,” The United States Department of Justice, June 11, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-files-friend-court-brief-support-free-speech-challenge-californias- covid.

“Protesting amid the coronavirus crisis: Massachusetts officials say they respect demonstrators' 1st Amendment rights, urge them to take health precautions though,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/protesting-amid-the-coronavirus-crisis-massachusetts-officials-say-they-respec t-demonstrators-1st-amendment-rights-urge-them-to-take-health-precautions-though/ar-BB14VG4l.

Momtaz:
https://www.politico.eu/article/french-government-declares-state-of-sanitary-emergency/

Rushton:
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/08/24/timeline-hurricane-katrina-and-afterma th/32003013/

Association in France:
https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/global-languages/21g-053-understanding-contemporary-french-politi cs-spring-2014/readings/MIT21G_053S14_Constitu.pdf

Communist Control Act: https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/congress-passes-communist-control-act

Auerbach: https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/communist -control-act-1954

Feldman: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1666&co ntext=cilj

==Utilitarian / Fairness Assessments==
===Is there a cost attached to protecting and enforcing this right? What kinds of costs are implicated?===
====Short-term economic cost in general====
====Long-term economic cost in general====
====Cost to those least able to economically absorb the cost====
====Cost to perceived democratic legitimacy====
====Cost to consistency or coherence of the law as a whole====
====Cost to the legitimacy or effectiveness of other rights====
====Cost to considerations of social equality====
====Cost to other non-material goods not so far specified====
===What are the financial consequences, if any, of making this right a legally protectable right?===
===Are there any groups that are uniquely disadvantaged by the exercise of this right?===
===Are there any groups that uniquely benefit from the exercise of this right?===
===Are there instances when this fundamental right can lead to unfairness or inequities?===
===Are there objective ways to measure the utilitarian nature of this right?===
===If so, where can one draw the line: when does this right stop being useful or economically viable?===
==Looking Ahead==
===How can we expect this right to change and evolve in the years ahead?===
===How is the future likely to shape the exercise of this right?===
===Will the exercise or protection of this right be affected by technological changes?===
===Under what conditions would this right become irrelevant?===
===Are questions of fairness and utility pertaining to this right likely to change in the years ahead?===
==Policy Recommendations==
===Can the practice or exercise of this right be shaped through executive action?===
===In the US context, are there particular parties with a stake or interest in amending or reconceptualizing this right?===
===In the US context, can this right be altered legislatively, or would it require a constitutional amendment?===
===Is this right best addressed at the national level? The sub-national level? The international level?===
===To what extent is this right shaped primarily by judicial decisions?===
===If this right is best addressed through the amendment process, how should it proceed?===
===If this right were unlimited, what might be the consequences (positive and negative)?===
===If this right were eliminated, what might be the consequences (positive and negative)?===

Source/Freedom of Association

2022-08-03T17:40:17Z

Kbrard: /* Kantianism */

==What is the oldest written source that mentions this right?==
John Locke’s “A Letter Concerning Toleration” (1689) primarily concerns religious associations, but he extends certain arguments to associations in general. The text in the next paragraph is Boyd’s summarization (241), where sections in quotes come directly from “A Letter.” As Boyd notes, though Locke defends policies that allow freer association, he does so because of their practical benefits, not because it is a fundamental right (241).

“Suppose this Business of Religion were let alone,” Locke hypothesizes, “and that there were some other Distinction made between men and men, upon account of their different Complexions, Shapes, and Features.” Under conditions of differential treatment, such persons, “united together by one common persecution,” would become just as dangerous and disruptive. Conversely, if the state eliminated special privileges, on the one hand, or disproportionate burdens, on the other, then supposedly intractable religious or ethnic affiliations would become matters of complete indifference, no more or less contentious than other private decisions about how to spend one’s money, manage one’s estates, or marry off one’s daughter.

In 1776, Richard Price, a British writer who supported the American revolution published Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government, and the Justice and Policy of the War with America. Unlike other commentaries on civil rights, he includes discussion on free assembly. He describes a prohibition on “associating for any purposes, except when leave should be given us by a Lord Lieutenant or Viceroy” as being part of a “state of oppression which no country can endure.” Though he does not phrase it as a fundamental right, the fact that Price deems draconian restrictions on association oppressive implies a belief in at least a limited freedom of association.

Though Enlightenment commentators like Locke argued for and against greater freedom to associate. However, the first to mention it as an absolute right was John Stuart Mill, who argues ''in On Liberty'' that “from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived” (1859, 16).

===What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?===
====Afghanistan====
====Albania====
====Algeria====
====Andorra====
====Angola====
====Antigua and Barbuda====
====Argentina====
====Armenia====
====Australia====
Australia has detailed records of its constitutional convention, which occurred in the 1890s. In 1897. One speaker alluded to the power of free association: “The English feel the vigor of their public spirit; they have experienced the vigilance of a free press, and the power of associations and public meetings.”

====Austria====
====Azerbaijan====
====The Bahamas====
====Bahrain====
====Bangladesh====
====Barbados====
====Belarus====
====Belgium====
====Belize====
====Benin====
====Bhutan====
====Bolivia====
====Bosnia and Herzegovina====
====Botswana====
Chapter 2 of Botswana’s Constitution (1966) guarantees “freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association.”

====Brazil====
Brazil’s constitution (1988) has exceptionally detailed freedom of association provisions. Title II-I-5 states that:

- there is total freedom of association for lawful purposes, but any paramilitary association is prohibited;

- creation of associations and, as set forth in law, of cooperatives, requires no authorization, prohibiting state interference in their operations;

- associations may be compulsorily dissolved or their activities suspended only by a judicial decision, which in the former case must be a final and unappealable decision;

- no one can be compelled to join an association or to remain in one;

- when expressly authorized, associations have standing to represent their members judicially and extrajudicially

====Brunei====
====Bulgaria====
====Burkina Faso====
====Burundi====
====Cambodia====
====Cameroon====
====Canada====
Chapter 345 Section 5 of Saskatchewan’s Bill of Rights (1947) states that “every person and every class of persons shall enjoy the right to peaceable assembly with others and to form with others associations of any character under the law.”

Part 1 of the Canadian Bill of Rights (1960) lists “freedom of assembly and association” as a guaranteed right. This was an ordinary act of parliament, and it has been replaced by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, an amendment to the Canadian Constitution.

====Cape Verde====
====Central African Republic====
====Chad====
====Chile====
====China====
Chapter 2-4 of the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China (1912) states that “citizens shall have the freedom of speech, of composition, of publication, of assembly and of association.”

The 1912 Republic of China Constitution refers to the one adopted by the nationalist government on the mainland, led by Sun Yat-sen. Despite its lofty ideals, this government never really maintained power. After a period of instability and civil war, the CCP forced the nationalist government to retreat to Taiwan, which is known now as the Republic of China. Taiwan suspended its constitution, and it was under a repressive martial-law system until 1987. It is now a constitutional democracy, and freedom of association is protected in its constitution. The PRC constitution claims to protect freedom of association, among other civil liberties.

====Colombia====
====Comoros====
====Democratic Republic of the Congo====
====Republic of the Congo====
====Costa Rica====
====Croatia====
====Cuba====
====Cyprus====
====Czech Republic====
====Denmark====
====Djibouti====
====Dominica====
====Dominican Republic====
====East Timor====
====Ecuador====
====Egypt====
====El Salvador====
====Equatorial Guinea====
====Eritrea====
====Estonia====
Section II-18 of Estonia’s first constitution (1920) states that “The forming of associations and unions is free in Esthonia."

====Eswatini====
====Ethiopia====
====Fiji====
====Finland====
====France====
Title I of the French Constitution of 1791 guarantees the right of peaceful assembly.

“Liberty to citizens to assemble peaceably and without arms in accordance with police regulations.”

Though the French Constitution of 1791 protected the right to assemble, French revolutionaries considered explicitly excluding free association (Boyd 257). The French enacted a law protecting free association in 1901, and enshrined it in their constitution in 1971 (Boyd 2008, 237).

====Gabon====
====The Gambia====
====Georgia====
====Germany====
The Weimar Constitution (1919) established freedom of association.

Article 123: “All Germans have the right to assembly peacefully and unarmed without giving notice and without special permission.”

Article 124: “All Germans have the right to form associations and societies for purposes not contrary to the criminal law.”

====Ghana====
====Greece====
====Grenada====
====Guatemala====
====Guinea====
====Guinea-Bissau====
====Guyana====
====Haiti====
====Honduras====
====Hungary====
====Iceland====
====India====
The following quote was attributed to Gandhi in 1922:

“Freedom of association is truly respected when assemblies of people can discuss even revolutionary projects, the State relying upon the force of public opinion and the civil police, not the savage military at its disposal, to crush any actual outbreak of revolution that is designed to confound public opinion and the State representing it.., The fight for swaraj means a fight for this threefold freedom before all else."

Part III Article 19 of the Indian Constitution (1950) grants citizens the right to “form associations or unions” (Dalton).

====Indonesia====
====Iran====
====Iraq====
====Republic of Ireland====
Article 40 of the Irish Constitution (1940) guarantees “the right of the citizens to form associations and unions.”

====Israel====
====Italy====
Part 1 Title 1 Article 18 of the Italian Constitution (1947) states that:

- “Citizens have the right to form associations freely and without authorization for those ends that are not forbidden by criminal law.”

- “Secret associations and associations that, even indirectly, pursue political aims by means of organisations having a military character shall be forbidden.”

====Ivory Coast====
====Jamaica====
====Japan====
Chapter III Article 21 of the Japanese Constitution (1947): “Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed.”

Additionally, though finding direct texts has proven difficult, there have been political movements for greater political expression since the pre-war era. The freedom and popular rights movement existed throughout the second half of the 19th century, and its members advocated for increased freedom of assembly beginning no later than 1886 (Tierney 2013, 21).

====Jordan====
====Kazakhstan====
====Kenya====
====Kiribati====
====Kuwait====
====Kyrgyzstan====
====Laos====
====Latvia====
The Latvian Constitution added a section on fundamental rights in 1998. Article 102 states that “everyone has the right to form and join associations, political parties and other public organisations.”

====Lebanon====
====Lesotho====
====Liberia====
====Libya====
====Liechtenstein====
====Lithuania====
====Luxembourg====
====Madagascar====
====Malawi====
====Malaysia====
====Maldives====
====Mali====
====Malta====
====Marshall Islands====
====Mauritania====
====Mauritius====
====Mexico====
From Section 1 Article 9 the Mexican Constitution of 1857: “No one shall be deprived of the right peaceably to assemble or to come together for any lawful purpose; but only citizens shall be permitted to exercise this right for the purpose of taking part in the political affairs of the country. No armed assembly shall have the right to deliberate.”

====Federated States of Micronesia====
====Moldova====
====Monaco====
====Mongolia====
====Montenegro====
====Morocco====
====Mozambique====
====Myanmar====
====Namibia====
====Nauru====
====Nepal====
====Kingdom of the Netherlands====
====New Zealand====
Part 2 Section 17 of the Bill of Rights Act (1990) states that, “Everyone has the right to freedom of association.”

====Nicaragua====
====Niger====
====Nigeria====
Chapter IV Section 37 of the constitution of the Second Republic (1979) states that “every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, and any political party, trade union, or other association for the protection of his interests.”

====North Korea====
====North Macedonia====
====Norway====
====Oman====
====Pakistan====
The following is from Part II, Chapter I, Section 17 of Pakistan’s current constitution (1973).

“Every citizen shall have the right to form associations or unions, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, public order or morality.”

“Every citizen, not being in the service of Pakistan, shall have the right to form or be a member of a political party, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan and such law shall provide that where the Federal Government declares that any political party has been formed or is operating in a manner prejudicial to the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, the Federal Government shall, within fifteen days of such declaration, refer the matter to the Supreme Court whose decision on such reference shall be final.”

====Palau====
====Panama====
====Papua New Guinea====
====Paraguay====
====Peru====
====Philippines====
====Poland====
====Portugal====
Article 46 of the Portugese Constitution (1976):

“Citizens shall possess the right to freely associate with one another without requiring any authorisation, on condition that such associations are not intended to promote violence and their purposes are not contrary to the criminal law.”

“Associations shall pursue their purposes freely and without interference from the public authorities and shall not be dissolved by the state or have their activities suspended, except in such cases as the law may provide for and then only by judicial order.”

“No one shall be obliged to belong to an association, or be coerced to remain therein by any means.”

“Armed associations, military, militarised or paramilitary-type associations and organisations that are racist or display a fascist ideology shall not be permitted.”

====Qatar====
====Romania====
====Russia====
====Rwanda====
====Saint Kitts and Nevis====
====Saint Lucia====
====Saint Vincent and the Grenadines====
====Samoa====
====San Marino====
====São Tomé and Príncipe====
====Saudi Arabia====
====Senegal====
====Serbia====
====Seychelles====
====Sierra Leone====
====Singapore====
====Slovakia====
====Slovenia====
====Solomon Islands====
====Somalia====
====South Africa====
Chapter 3 section 17 of the 1993 Interim Constitution states that “every person shall have the right to freedom of association.”

====South Korea====

Chapter two Article Ten of the Constitution (1948): “All citizens shall enjoy freedom of speech and the press, and freedom of assembly and association.”

====South Sudan====
====Spain====
====Sri Lanka====
====Sudan====
====Suriname====
====Sweden====
====Switzerland====
====Syria====
====Tajikistan====
====Tanzania====
====Thailand====
====Togo====
====Tonga====
====Trinidad and Tobago====
====Tunisia====
====Turkey====
====Turkmenistan====
====Tuvalu====
====Uganda====
====Ukraine====
====United Arab Emirates====
====United Kingdom====
The 1990 Human Rights Act protects the Right to assemble and associate, subject to reasonable and proportionate restrictions. The HRA primarily serves to codify the European Convention on Human Rights into British Law (the ECHR and its associated court are not related to the EU, and the UK is still a signatory).

In 1776, Richard Price, a British writer who supported the American revolution published ''Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty'', the Principles of Government, and the Justice and Policy of the War with America. Unlike other commentaries on civil rights, he includes discussion on free assembly. He describes a prohibition on “associating for any purposes, except when leave should be given us by a Lord Lieutenant or Viceroy” as being part of a “state of oppression which no country can endure.” Though he does not phrase it as a fundamental right, the fact that Price deems draconian restrictions on association oppressive implies a belief in at least a limited freedom of association. This is the first instance I could find of a political theorist invoking the concept of freedom of association (or the lack thereof).

There is a more explicit case for free association in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1859). Mill lays a broad notion of individual liberty. He then argues that “from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived (16).”

Before any British thinkers espoused freedom of association as a right, John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and David Hume addressed the issue (as Boyd helpfully summarizes). Hobbes detested associations, referring to them as “lesser commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails of a natural man” (257).

Locke disagreed with Hobbes’ cynical perspective on groups. John Locke’s “A Letter Concerning Toleration” primarily concerns religious associations, but he extends certain arguments to associations in general. The italicized text below is Boyd’s summarization (241), where sections in quotes come directly from “A Letter.” As Boyd notes, though Locke defends policies that allow freer association, he does so because of their practical benefits, not because it is a fundamental right (2008, 241).

“Suppose this Business of Religion were let alone,” Locke hypothesizes, “and that there were some other Distinction made between men and men, upon account of their different Complexions, Shapes, and Features.” Under conditions of differential treatment, such persons, “united together by one common persecution,” would become just as dangerous and disruptive.26 Conversely, if the state eliminated special privileges, on the one hand, or disproportionate burdens, on the other, then supposedly intractable religious or ethnic affiliations would become matters of complete indifference, no more or less contentious than other private decisions about how to spend one’s money, manage one’s estates, or marry off one’s daughter.
Finally, David Hume’s “Of Parties in General” (1742) is another important piece of Enlightenment work skeptical of associations. His position is more nuanced that Hobbes; he understands that association may exist for different purposes. Factions “of interest” are deemed less dangerous than factions “of principle.” Regarding factions of principle, he wonders the following: “But where the difference of principle is attended with no contrariety of action, but every one may follow his own way, without interfering with his neighbour, as happens in all religious controversies; what madness, what fury can beget such unhappy and such fatal divisions?”

====United States====
Listed at the bottom of this section is language from the State Constitutions of New Hampshire and North Carolina and the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, all from 1776, which articulate the right to assemble (assembly and association are not always interchangeable, but many constitutions group them together). These documents all contain rights to assemble written in remarkably similar language, and they describe the right as politically driven. These were the oldest references to something like the right of association in governing documents.

Despite modern views of assembly as related to association, at the time of America’s founding, it would have been better understood as related to the right to petition. According to Congress’s online annotated Constitution, the assembly clause meant that the people have a right to assemble in order to petition the government. The site says that assembly was initially seen as a “subordinate and instrumental” right ("Freedom of Assembly and Petition"). The aforementioned state constitutions should be interpreted the same way. In fact, this is even more clear in these state constitutions than in the national one. The state constitutions surround the right to assemble with expressly political language, such as the right to petition and advocacy for the “common good,” while the First Amendment’s guarantees are political, but not entirely political (it protects religion, and protected speech and press are often, but not always, political).

As Richard Boyd argues in “The Madisonian Paradox of Free Association,” America’s founders did not explicitly include free association because at least some of them were skeptical of it, worrying that certain associations would be conspiratorial or seditious. He summarizes the British Enlightenment tradition skeptical of associations, which influenced the founders (I describe this in the last few paragraphs of the UK section, on Hobbes, Locke, and Hume). James Madison, the primary author of the Bill of Rights, feared the influence of factions, which private associations furthered. As Boyd notes, Madison viewed association as a “second-order” right (page 258), whose existence is tolerable because institutions can mitigate its worst effects (page 247). The following passage from “Federalist No. 10” illustrates his attitude toward factions arising from free association:

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

As Boyd notes, there are several possible reasons why Madison may not have enumerated the right to associate. It is possible that he saw it as implied by other First-Amendment rights, such as free assembly. It also may have been seen as less important or vulnerable than other rights, and Madison may have seen it as the type of auxiliary right protected by the Ninth Amendment. Finally, the right’s exclusion may have been because the founders were too skeptical of it for its inclusion (258).

Since the 1950s and 60s, SCOTUS has, to an extent, ruled that the speech and assembly rights imply a right to associate, especially for politically expressive purposes. For example, it ruled in NAACP v. Alabama that the NAACP cannot be forced to submit a membership roster to a state government. In 2000, in Boy Scouts v. Dale, the court held that the Boy Scouts could exclude gay members (in violation of state non-dsicrimination laws) because not being able to do so would undermine their ability to express a viewpoint - expressive association.

In ''Roberts v. US Jaycees'', an organization for young business leaders’ ban on female members was challenged because it violated state non-discrimination law. This case is notable because the court identified a new form of association: intimate association. The opinion of the court states that “certain intimate human relationships be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.” The opinion places this right under the general aims of the First Amendment. The court ruled against the organization, but in so doing, it established the idea that Americans have the right to free intimate and expressive association. Still, one could argue that in a state with true freedom to associate, any group of people would be able to enact whatever membership restrictions it wanted, regardless of whether or not it falls into the categories of “expressive” or “intimate.”

Although assembly is the First-Amendment freedom that most seems to correspond with association, SCOTUS has not derived free association this way. Rather, it uses a more nebulous combination of various First-Amendment rights. As the majority held in ''NAACP v. Button'', “It is not necessary to subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly, for there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity.”

Article XVIII of North Carolina’s Constitution: “That the people have a right to assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their Representatives, and to apply to the Legislature, for redress of grievances.”
Section 21 of New Hampshire’s Constitution: “The citizens have a right in a peaceable manner to assemble for their common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances, or for other purposes, by petition, address, or remonstrance. No law abridging the freedom of speech shall be enacted.”

Section XVI of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights: “That the people have a right to assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress of grievances, by address, petition, or remonstrance.

====Uruguay====
====Uzbekistan====
====Vanuatu====
====Venezuela====
====Vietnam====
====Yemen====
====Zambia====
====Zimbabwe====
===Is there another noteworthy written source from the past that mentions this right?===
Pope Leo XIII forcefully argued for free association in Section 51 of ''Rerum novarum'' (1891), an extremely influential text in Catholic thought.

"Private societies, then, although they exist within the body politic, and are severally part of the commonwealth, cannot nevertheless be absolutely, and as such, prohibited by public authority. For, to enter into a "society" of this kind is the natural right of man; and the State has for its office to protect natural rights, not to destroy them."

===Is the identification of this right associated with a particular era in history, political regime, or political leader?===
This right became an element of political discourse in the late Enlightenment, especially the American Revolution. In the mid and late 1800s, writers such as Mill and Leo XIII pushed the idea into the mainstream.

===What specific events or ideas contributed to its identification as a fundamental right?===
===When was it generally accepted as a fundamental, legally-protectable right?===
===What historical forces or events, if any, contributed to a widespread belief in its importance? ===

==Legal Codification==
===Is this right protected in the Constitutions of most countries today?===
Constitutions written after 1900 very often protect free association.

As the right to free association is upheld by numerous United Nations treaties, for example, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it would be expected that most countries maintain legal provisions protecting it. Though, investigated by UN Special Rapporteur Maina Kiai, many countries enforce legislation that explicitly restricts civilians’ entitlements to free association (International Center for Not-for-Profit Law).

For example, noted by Kiai, in Malaysia, the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 bans individuals under the age of twenty one from organizing public demonstrations. Additionally, stipulated by the same act, children under the age of fifteen cannot participate in demonstrations. Article 33 of the Constitution of Mexico, Kiai asserts, prohibits foreigners from engaging with Mexican politics. Similarly, Kiai notes that in Myanmar, Article 354 prohibits foreigners from assembling. Through these various forms of legislation, political and social association are highly restricted, as individuals are prohibited from expressing their associations through protest and civic engagement.

Additionally, Kiai presents how legal restrictions on sexual orientation limit free association in several countries. For example, in Russia, a ban on gay pride parades was upheld by Moscow’s city council in 2012. Likewise, in Nigeria, the President ushered in the Same Sex Marriage Act in 2014, prohibting gay marriage and the ability to “participate in or support gay clubs, societies, organizations, processions or meeting.” Kiai notes a similar anti-homosexuality law was signed by Uganda’s president in 2014. Demonstrated by these numerous legal restrictions to homosexuality, free association is unprotected in numerous countries, as one can often be punished for associating with a specific sexual orientation.

In the remainder of his report, Kiai continues to elaborate on numerous legal provisions that restrict free association. For example, Kiai notes how both Chile and Turkey utilize counter-terrorism legislation to restrict free association. Similarly, he explains how criminal laws in Vietnam and El Salvador often deter individuals from exercising their rights to free association, as their voices may be met with harsh penalties from their governments.

Witnessed through Kiai’s reporting, the restrictions to free association are plentiful. This ultimately demonstrates that despite its entitlement by numerous United Nations treaties, the right to free association is highly vulnerable to violation and not widely internationally upheld.

===Is it contained in the US Constitution?===
No.

The right to free association is not explicitly stated in the United States Constitution. Though, The Supreme Court has historically upheld the constitutional right to free association, invoking the Fourteenth and First Amendments (Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School). In 1958, The NAACP v. Patterson ruling established this precedent. In response to Alabama’s aims to limit the NAACP’s business within the state, the Supreme Court ruled that it was “the right of petitioner's members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in doing so as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment” (Oyez). Furthermore, the court asserted that freedom of association was undoubtedly covered by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Oyez), which asserts no individual may be “"deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” The court additionally demonstrated the First Amendment to protect free association, Justice Marshall Harlan claiming “Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.” Thus, while the right to free association is not explicitly described by the Constitution, as witnessed in NAACP v. Patterson, it is upheld by American constitutional law.

===Has it been interpreted as being implicit in the US Constitution?===
Since the 1950s and 60s, SCOTUS has, to an extent, ruled that the speech and assembly rights imply a right to associate, especially for politically expressive purposes. For example, it ruled in ''NAACP v. Alabama'' that the NAACP cannot be forced to submit a membership roster to a state government. In 2000, in Boy Scouts v. Dale, the court held that the Boy Scouts could exclude gay members (in violation of state non-dsicrimination laws) because not being able to do so would undermine their ability to express a viewpoint - expressive association.

In ''Roberts v. US Jaycees'', an organization for young business leaders’ ban on female members was challenged because it violated state non-discrimination law. This case is notable because the court identified a new form of association: intimate association. The opinion of the court states that “certain intimate human relationships be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.” The opinion places this right under the general aims of the First Amendment. The court ruled against the organization, but in so doing, it established the idea that Americans have the right to free intimate and expressive association. Still, one could argue that in a state with true freedom to associate, any group of people would be able to enact whatever membership restrictions it wanted, regardless of whether or not it falls into the categories of “expressive” or “intimate.”

Although assembly is the First-Amendment freedom that most seems to correspond with association, SCOTUS has not derived free association this way. Rather, it uses a more nebulous combination of various First-Amendment rights. As the majority held in NAACP v. Button, “It is not necessary to subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly, for there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity.”

===Are there any exceptions in American law to this right?===
Yes. As seen in ''Roberts v. US Jaycees,'' the right may be weighed against other state interests, especially when the association in question is neither expressive nor intimate. In that case, free association rights were curtailed to ensure adherence to non-discrimination laws.

Additionally, a significant exception to free association rights in the United States is witnessed through legislation regarding political parties. Furthermore, while one has the liberty to vote with, join, and create independent political parties, upheld by the William V. Rhodes ruling, the state can still regulate these parties if they violate other aspects of the Constitution. For example, in New York State Board of Elections vs. Lopez Torres, the court claimed,

A political party has a First Amendment right to limit its membership as it wishes, and to choose a candidate-selection process that will in its view produce the nominee who best represents its political platform. These rights are circumscribed, however, when the state gives a party a role in the election process...Then for example, the party’s racially discriminatory action may become state action that violates the Fifteenth Amendment
Demonstrated by New York State Board of Elections vs. Lopez Torres, if a party associates with discriminatory or racist behavior, it cannot be involved in the state’s election process, demonstrating a limitation on free political association.

Additionally, sections of the Federal Election Campaign Act are often interpreted to be exceptions to free association, as they require the public disclosure of individuals’ political donations. This position was echoed by the Buckley v. Valeo ruling, where the Supreme Court argued that new campaign finance laws, “impose significantly more severe restrictions on protected freedom of political expression and association than do its limitations on financial contributions.” Thus, witnessed by Buckley v. Valeo, campaign finance laws may be interpreted as an exception to free association, as one cannot privately financially contribute to the political party they associate with.

Within universities, freedom of association, specifically the right to associate as an exclusive religious group, may be regulated by anti-discrimination clauses. This was observed in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, where the court ruled in favor of Hastings’ College of Law’s anti-discrimintation policies, which prohibited Christian student group’s from excluding non-christians. Therefore, on university campuses, individuals must be able join any student group, regardless of their religious association. Ultimately, this decision restricted the parameters of free association, as one cannot actively discriminate on the basis of it.

Consequently, decided by Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, certain groups can legally exclude individuals from associating with them. Furthermore, if an individual’s beliefs do not coincide with the group’s mission, the individual may be prohibited from membership. Specifically, the court claimed that by mandating the Boston Veterans’ Council to include Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual individuals in their parade, the Massachusetts State Court, “violates the fundamental First Amendment rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message and, conversely, to decide what not to say.” Thus, while still restricting free association, the ruling counters Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, as individuals can be restricted from associating with certain groups if it is deemed that their identity does not conform to the group’s platform.

Ultimately, these exceptions arise from the implicit nature of the freedom of association within the Constitution, as what qualifies as “association” is highly subject to interpretation by Supreme Court justices. For this reason, depending on who is sitting on the bench, freedom of association can be left unchecked or potentially be highly restricted.

===Is this right enshrined in international and regional human rights treaties?===
Yes. It is protected explicitly in documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the American Convention on Human Rights.

Specifically, free association is upheld by Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which claims, “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.”Additionally, it is enshrined in Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which claims “ Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; No one may be compelled to belong to an association.” In Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the rights to association are specifically outlined, as it upholds “In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Lastly, The International Labor Organization similarly supports freedom of association in the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which asserts that all members have “freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;”

==Philosophical Origins==
===What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?===
====Buddhism====
The Five Precepts of Buddhism condemn activity relating to “sexual misconduct, falsehoods, and intoxicants” (Peek,529), possibly limiting the ability of individuals to associate with certain behaviors or activities. While Buddhism does warn against disobeying the Five Precepts, as this may result in bad Karma, it ultimately asserts that it is the choice of the individual to decide whether or not they wish to follow the declarations of the Five Precepts (Peek, 529). Furthermore, Buddhism’s focus on moral authority, in which the individual is not subordinate to the Five Precepts, can be interpreted as allowing individuals freedom in regards to association. Demonstrated by this, although Buddhism provides guidelines for what followers ought to avoid associating with, these are merely suggestions. Thus, emphasizing the freedom of the individual, Buddhism can be seen to support the right to free association.

Though, the traditions of Buddhist monks reveal how certain Buddhist practices restrict freedom of association. As explained by Holmes Welch, “According to the Buddha’s rule, when people become monks and nuns they lead a collective life. Not only is there no private property, but there is no thought for oneself. To take thought for oneself is to keep hold of the ego” (Welch, 146). Noted by Welch, upon entering monastic life, Buddhists are expected to relinquish all previously held associations. Therefore, observed through the expectations of monks, elements of Buddhism confine free association.

Additionally, through the Eightfold Path, the eight practices Buddhists are expected to follow on their journey to nirvana, certain behaviors are limited. For example, when following the Eightfold Path, individuals are restricted from making a living off selling animals, weapons, meat, poison, and liquor (Tilakaratne, 48). Condemning certain professions and ways of life, Buddhism again appears to limit the associations of its followers, undermining the strength of the freedom of association within the belief system.

Looking to Buddhist leaders, freedom of association is ultimately upheld. For example, in a 1993 Washington address, the Dalai Lama demonstrated his admiration for the principles of democracy, particularly the liberties, such as freedom of association, it guarantees to civilians. The Dalai Lama asserts, “Irrespective of whether we are rich or poor, educated or uneducated, belonging to one nation or another, to one religion or another, adhering to this ideology or that, each of us is just a human being like everyone else.” Through his words of acceptance, the Dalai Lama conveys that Tibetan Buddhism supports the ability to freely associate with many identities. Thus, while the Five Precepts, monastic codes, and Eightfold Path appear to restrict the liberties of followers, the Dalai Lama’s words affirm them.

====Platonism====
====Aristotelian thought====
Aristotle, in his book Nicomachean Ethics, wrote that “Friendships are also important parts of our childhood and adult experience. Without them, we struggle to discover, shape, and pursue our ideas of what constitutes a good life. But, again, friendships can take many forms for many reasons, not all of which are grounded in mutual affection and convivial warmth” (Brownlee and Jenkins 2019). Friendships here form the basis of our associations in life; he ultimately argues that we as humans require association and assembly in our lives.

Aristotle argues that not all forms of association are political, particularly those that stem from material needs, including family, the market, and alliances for mutual defense/benefit- these can be organized into libertarian and capitalist principles. According to one’s needs, individuals are free to associate and disassociate within their own means of persuasion and trade, and none of this is political- or in other words, the government should have no business with the private associations of the people (Johnson 32, 2001). Regarding politically, he further argues that “It is not the case . . . that people come together for the sake of life alone, but rather for the sake of living well” (3.9.1280a31) and “the political community must be set down as existing for the sake of noble deeds and not merely for living together” (Johnson 32, 2001). He takes a stance against the dominance of individuals associating merely for political protection and gain, but he believed that the state should do more in its concern for the citizen, encouraging virtue and discouraging harm and vice (Johnson 32, 2001). He argues that the best political regime best delivers the “good life-” production and distribution of goods, both goods of the body and of the soul. Within this theory, Aristotle considers the production and distribution of bodily goods as private and the production and distribution of spiritual goods as public: “The primary goods of the soul are (1) moral and intellectual virtue, which are best produced by public education, and (2) honor, the public recognition of virtue, talent, and service rendered to the city. The principle of distributive justice is defined” (Johnson 38-39, 2001). Aristotle’s theory about freedom of association is that political associations’ ultimate goal is to help foster the virtues that are necessary in the pursuit of justice and happiness; therefore, “no legitimate regime can be indifferent to the virtue of the citizens” (Johnson 44, 2001). The polis is both the most inclusive and authoritative community according to Aristotle, seeing as Aristotle's polis is a mixed concept, fusing the political state with civil societal attributes including economic, religious, and other forms of association” (Miller 878, 1996).

====Ancient Chinese Philosophy====
Various schools of Chinese Philosophy contribute to society’s understanding of the right to free association.

Legalism, with its adherence to strict punishments for any violation of the law, limits the liberty of citizens to freely associate. At its core, Legalism restricts the ability of citizens to act freely, as under the philosophy individual’s lives become entirely controlled by administrative acts (MacCormack, 62). Furthermore, the legalist state was not concerned with the liberties of civilians. Rather, legalists focused their efforts towards strengthening the economic and military strength of the state through authoritarian power (MacCormack, 63). Thus, in the school of Legalism, there is little tolerance for associations that counter the laws of the state, undermining the right to free association.

Consequently, Confucianism emphasizes the ability of citizens to rebel against the emperor (Peek, 523). This bolsters the right to free association, as individuals are encouraged to join other political parties in the face of an unjust regime.

Though, more similarly to Legalism, additional elements of Confucianism vastly undermine the right to free association. As Confucianism evolved, the belief system began to emphasize a strict code of ethics, creating a rigid social structure (Peek, 532). This limited the ability of followers to freely associate, as they were confined to following a strict code of behavior. Thus, while Confucianism initially appears to support the right to free association, its development as a belief system has constricted the liberties of followers.

While Taoism does not discredit the right to free association, it does weaken the importance of associations as a whole. Advocating that individuals put aside their distinguishing characteristics, Taoism stresses that there “is one underlying and uniting all phenomena” among human beings (Chan, 316). Furthermore, Taoists argue that human beings must transcend their personal distinctions, diminishing the value of individuals’ associations. Thus, while Taoism does not proclaim individuals should not be able to associate themselves with certain groups, it does argue that associations are ultimately meaningless.

====Stoicism====
====Early Indian Philosophy====
====Miscellaneous Hellenistic Schools (epicureans, academics, skeptics, etc.)====
====Roman Legal and Political Thought====
====Early Christianity====
====Thomism and medieval Christianity====
====Medieval Islamic Thought====
====Medieval Judaism====
====Early Modern Rationalism====
====Absolute Idealism====
====Reformation Christianity====
Reformation Christianity, Freedom of Association
As mentioned above (section 1), John Locke’s 1689 “Letter Concerning Toleration” is
widely believed to be the first written source to address, albeit indirectly, the right to freedom of association. While it is true that no source written prior to 1689 specifically explores the right in its entirety, there were a number of Reformation-era thinkers whose work formed the basis for Locke’s belief in the benefits of granting the right to free religious association. These sources were primarily English, written by such philosophers as Richard Hooker and Thomas More, though there is some evidence that Locke drew on themes from John Calvin as well.
Among Locke’s most prominent sources of inspiration and guidance is Richard Hooker’s influential work, The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. This book, much of which was published posthumously in the late 1590s, was Hooker’s attempt to defend the fledgeling Anglican Church against attacks from the growing population of English Puritans. It explores a number of religious topics, one of which is the concept that all Churches, including those of “Rome, Corinth, Ephesus, England, and so the rest...are public Christian societies. And of such properties common unto all societies Christian, it may not be denied, that one of the very chiefest is Ecclesiastical Polity” (Hooker, 178). This idea that religious groups could be considered a “society” of people is advanced in Locke’s “Letter,” which takes the work one step further by examining one’s freedom to belong to these various religious societies. Hooker also explores this idea to some extent when he writes that “we rather incline to think it a just and reasonable cause for any Church, the state whereof is free and independent if in these things it differ from other Churches, only for that it doth not judge it so fit and expedient to be framed therein by the pattern of their example, as to be otherwise framed than they” (Hooker, 275). In this passage
Hooker essentially argues that different sects of Christianity ought to be allowed to practice their preferred faith in peace, provided they similarly respect other branches’ rights to believe and associate. Perhaps is not a surprising statement to find in a defense of the Anglican Church after it broke away from Catholicism, but Hooker’s conviction that “Churches are rather in this case like divers families than like divers servants of one family” nevertheless seems to have profoundly influenced Locke’s work in the same area (Hooker, 277).
In addition to this conceptual framework, Locke also seems to draw on Hooker for an interpretation of John Calvin’s teaching. Hooker’s Fourth Book of Laws quotes Calvin, who supposedly writes that, “Yea, sometime it profiteth and is expedient that there be difference, lest men should think that religion is tied to outward ceremonies. Always provided that there be not any emulation, nor that Churches delighted with novelty affect to have that which others have not.” (Hooker, 276). This, Hooker says, provides a basis of acceptability for different religious sects to profess their religions differently. By arguing in favor of different churches practicing differently, Hooker also implies a support for citizens’ right to belong to various churches according to how they wish to worship. It is possible that Hooker was referring to Calvin’s statement in The Institutes of the Christian Religion, which says that that “it is a well-known doctrine, and one as to which all the pious are agreed,—that the right consideration of signs does not lie merely in the outward ceremonies, but depends chiefly on the promise and the spiritual mysteries, to typify which the ceremonies themselves are appointed.” (Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, B ook IV, Chapter 16, 2). Calvin’s work then proceeds to explain the parallels between circumcision in the Jewish faith and Baptism in the Christian ones, before concluding that “Baptism has been substituted for circumcision (Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion,

Book IV, Chapter 16, 4). While this does not mean that Calvin believed in one’s right to belong to the association or religion of one’s choice, its influence on Hooker’s statement is apparent. In concert with Hooker and a number of other influences, Calvin’s philosophy guided Locke in his exploration of religious freedom and, by extension, freedom of association.
Locke’s “Letter” also displays some degree of influence from the writings of Thomas More, another Reformation-era thinker whose work addresses the citizen’s role in various religious associations. More’s famous work, Utopia, tells of a fictional country in which society is ordered and governed according to the way that More believed was best. Included in these guidelines are the principles of religious freedom, which likely had some influence on Locke’s thoughts on free association. Sanford Kessler’s “Religious Freedom in More’s ‘Utopia’” notes that “Locke's work contains arguments that are remarkably similar to More’s,” and explains that “In Utopia, religious freedom checked the threat of religious conflict by transforming a plethora of squabbling sects into tolerant, stable supporters of the government” (Kessler, “Religious Freedom”). The actual text of More’s work states that the founder of the mythical society in Utopia had “left matters open, making each person to follow his own beliefs,” (More, 110). While this does more to imply More’s support for religious freedom than for freedom of association, the idea that citizens should be able to belong to whichever religion they choose is certainly evident in Locke’s work on toleration.
Freedom of association was not directly addressed prior to Locke’s work on toleration, but it is clear that Reformation-era philosophers influenced his work. Hooker’s thoughts on religious freedom and the relationship between religious societies shaped the way that Locke thought about religious toleration, and ideas from Calvin and More also influenced his work.

Sources Used:
Calvin, Jean, and Henry Beveridge. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1845,
http://www.ntslibrary.com/PDF%20Books/Calvin%20Institutes%20of%20Christian%20 Religion.pdf, www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html.
Hooker, Richard. Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. George Routledge and Sons, 1998, https://prydain.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/the_laws_of_ecclesiastical_polity_books_i-i V.pdf.
Kessler, Sanford. “Religious Freedom in Thomas More's ‘Utopia.’” The Review of Politics, vol. 64, no. 2, 2002, pp. 207–229. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1408764. Accessed 8 July 2020.
More, Thomas. Utopia. Translated by Dominic Baker-Smith, Penguin Classics, 20012.

====Hobbesian Thought====
Hobbes distinguishes between public political networks, or bodies politic, which are authorized by the commonwealth (states and provinces, for example), and private associations (251). Hobbes is not particularly skeptical of small, private organizations made for harmless, known purposes. However, he distrusts larger organizations with nefarious or unknown intentions. He states that, “Irregular Systemes, are those which having no Representative, consist only in concourse of People; which if not forbidden by the Common-wealth, nor made on evill designe, (such as are conflux of People to markets, or shews, or any other harmelesse end,) are Lawfull. But when the Intention is evill, or (if the number be considerable) unknown, they are Unlawfull” (252). Regarding bodies politic, Hobbes argues that their representation must be limited and determined by the commonwealth, since the commonwealth’s ultimate authority cannot be supplanted (252).
Hobbes identifies groups that we would today call private political associations: groups formed “not by obligation of one to another, but proceeding onely from a similitude of wills and inclinations” (265). He distrusts these groups, arguing that they are “for the most part unnecessary, and savour of unlawfull designe; and are for that cause Unlawfull, and go commonly by the name of factions, or Conspiracies” (265).

====Lockean Thought/English Empiricism====
Locke made little mention of free expression. However, one can draw inferences based on his views on religion and association, especially since there is substantial overlap between expression and association and religion. One can infer that, if Locke advocates for certain doctrinal limitations on churches and other associations, he would support limits on the expression of those doctrines. After all, forming associations that exist to further certain viewpoints is a form of expression (take the concept of “expressive association” in US jurisprudence). In A Letter, Locke establishes some respect for freedom of opinion, writing that if an opinion does “not tend to establish domination over others, or civil impunity to the Church
in which they are taught, there can be no reason why they should not be tolerated” (36). Scholars disagree strongly over the extent to which speech would be regulated in a Lockean society (Daniel 2013, 1).

====Physiocrats====
====Scottish Enlightenment====
====Modern Capitalism====
====Rousseau's Thought====

Rousseau’s political philosophy is generally based on his assessment of familial association and its effect on human society. Most of his works describe the family as the basic form of human interaction, the creation of which is one of the first steps that the “savage man” takes toward civilization. His work does not deal with the right to freedom of association as it exists in modern political discourse, but it does reveal a support for mankind’s tendency to gather into groups with which to live, work, and prosper.

Association itself is key to Rousseau’s political philosophy because in his mind it is a building block for political society. In The Social Contract he writes that humans come together to form communities by surrendering certain “natural” rights and liberties in favor of certain “civil” rights and liberties, such as the protection of private property or the adherence to general ideals of justice. “The problem,” he says, “is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.” (43). While the “association” of which Rousseau writes here does not resemble the right to association that most modern states protect in one way or another, the author’s thoughts on this kind of community-building clearly influence his views on the creation of social associations within the broader community. In his “Discourse on Political Economy” Rousseau writes that
Every political society is composed of other smaller societies of different kinds, each of which has its interests and its rules of conduct: but those societies which everybody perceives, because they have an external and authorised form, are not the only ones that actually exist in the State: all individuals who are united by a common interest compose as many others, either transitory or permanent, whose influence is none the less real because it is less apparent, and the proper observation of whose various relations is the true knowledge of public morals and manners. The influence of all these tacit or formal associations causes, by the influence of their will, as many different modifications of the public will. (“Discourse on Political Economy,” 211)

In this passage the modern conception of political association is more easily identified. He seems to view the formation of these “smaller societies” which exist within the State and influence the public will as more or less inevitable, though he does not express any disapproval of their existence.
Rousseau expands upon these views in his discussion of the social “circles” within Genevan political society, which he describes in his “Letter to Monsieur D’Alembert on the Theater” as the Genevan equivalent of social clubs in England. Again, he points out that the formation of these circles is a natural consequence of communal association, and points out that they do not pose any great danger to the State. “Of all the kinds of relations which can bring individuals together in a city like our own,” he believes that “the circles form incontestably the most reasonable, the most decent, and the least·dangerous ones, because they neither wish nor are able to be hidden, because they are public and permitted, because order and rule prevail in them” (“Letter to Monsieur D’Alembert, 108). These “circles” serve more of a social purpose than a political one, and Rousseau notes that they could potentially have negative consequences by encouraging men to drink too much or women to gossip in excess. He believes that they can influence the general will that governs an ideal community, but these associations do not form with specific political goals in mind. Having weighed the costs and benefits that they bring, Rousseau recommends that the Genevan state should “preserve the circles, even with their faults. For these faults are not in the circles but in the men who compose them; and there is no imaginable form of social life in which the same faults do not produce more harmful effects.” (“Letter to Monsieur D’Alembert,” 110). While his advocacy for the circles’ preservation does not directly indicate Rousseau’s support for freedom of association, his work at least shows an unwillingness to restrict people’s access to associational interaction within political society.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Collected Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Translated by Allan Bloom, Publ. for Dartmouth College by Univ. Press of New England, 2004, ia800705.us.archive.org/34/items/RousseauLetterToDAlembertPoliticsTheArtsAllanBloo m_201811/Rousseau%20-%20%27%27Letter%20to%20D%27Alembert%27%27%3B% 20Politics%20%26%20the%20Arts%20%5BAllan%20Bloom%5D.pdf.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, and G. D. H. Cole. The Social Contract; and Discourses. Dent, 1963, Online Library of Liberty,
oll-resources.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/638/Rousseau_0132_EBk_v6.0.pdf.

====Kantianism====
It is natural for people within society to surround themselves with people who are like-minded and develop associations based on these commonalities that allow them to pursue experiences that they believe will benefit them. It is this natural grouping that provides the framework for the freedom of association that society values because of its ability to connect people on another level without the government regulating the practices and the function of the group. Immanuel Kant believed that individuals should be allowed to pursue their own life experiences and find joy in the things that they do, paving the way for allowing a sort of freedom of expression within his version of society. Throughout his various works, Kant describes the conditions for allowing freedom of association, despite being cautious of the effects of allowing multiple associations within society.

The freedom of association does not come without limitations within Kant’s political theory of the state. Kant claimed that, “The state thus does not have the right to arrange the inner constitution and church affairs according to its own view of what seems advantageous and to prescribe or command the faith and rituals of worship (ritus) (for this must be left entirely to the teachers and chairmen that the people has chosen), but, rather, the state has only the negative right to keep the influence of the public [religious] teachers away from the visible, political commonwealth, which could be detrimental to public peace; hence the state has the right in internal conflicts or conflicts among the various churches not to allow civil harmony to be endangered, which is thus a right of the police” (Kant 2006, 125). It is his introduction of an inner constitution that implies that there is a freedom of association based on voluntary terms. Outside of the simple definition of a church as an institution with extreme influence based on a belief in a higher authority, religion can be seen as an association since people with the same beliefs come together due to their commonalities in the things they believe. Due to this, Kant believes that there is a freedom of associations that may come together, yet they are still subjected to the public laws and the civil constitution established by the state. Kant also notes that the government is still obligated to allow the association to do as they please, but they cannot develop social laws and norms that the people must follow according to the law. All involvement in external affairs outside the state are simply joined on a voluntary basis since Kant’s focus was on the enjoyment one could derive from their life experiences, even if it meant joining another institution. Furthermore, Kant noted that “A third kind of right is necessary for the preservation of the state-the right of inspection (ius inspectionis). This requires that no association which could influence the public welfare of society (publicum), such as an association of political or religious illuminati, may be kept secret; at the request of the police, it must not refuse to disclose its constitution. But only in cases of emergency may the police search anyone's private residence, and in each case, they must be authorized to do so by a higher authority” (Kant 2006, 123). Despite the freedom of association noted before, it does not mean that such associations are free from any sort of government intervention. Kant allows such government involvement when the state believes that the institution in question can pose a threat to the commonwealth and the rule of law. Kant claims that the state can only impose negative liberties on these associations since, as noted before, they have their own inner constitutions that allow them any sort of positive liberties outside the ones given to all by the government. In addition, these institutions must be public to allow the state to monitor its affairs to again make sure that it does not interfere with the government laws or the welfare of the community. The idea of freedom of association is still a strong pillar within Kant’s vision of society and like the people consenting to the government rule, these associations must be consented to by the people who choose to associate themselves with it.

The state’s involvement in public affairs whether they are a part of the association is necessary for the preservation of the individuals within society that allows them to follow their own life path. Due to this sentiment, Kant wrote that “In the case of a crime on the part of a subject that makes any association with him a danger for the state, the ruler has the right of banishment (that is, deportation) to a province in a foreign country where he will not enjoy any of the rights of a citizen” (Kant 2006, 134). Kant’s main concern is the well-being of the rest of society outside the association and the ways that the association will affect those outside and around the association in question. Therefore, the state has the obligation to monitor the associations and interfere when the rights of others are violated, putting the civil constitution above any inner constitutions. This contributes to Kant’s purpose of the government, which is to consent to the social contract in exchange for protection of rights from the government against others. The state must take responsibility for the rights and liberties that individuals have even if it means involving themselves in the lives of the people to protect them. In addition, when discussing the history of humankind, Kant claimed that “At the level of culture at which the human race still stands, therefore, war is an indispensable means of bringing about progress in culture. And only after culture has been perfected (only God knows when this would be) would a lasting peace be salutary for us and only through such culture would it become possible. We are thus, as concerns this point, most likely ourselves to blame for the ills about which we so loudly complain. And the holy scripture is completely right to portray an amalgamation of peoples into a single society and their complete liberation from external threats as a hindrance, since their culture had but hardly begun, to all further culture, and as a descent into incurable corruption” (Kant 2006, 35). Although Kant’s approves of the freedom of association, he remains skeptical about what allowing these groups to come together means for the rest of society and for the state. He acknowledges that these communities form to create their own culture and remains skeptical because he recognizes that without plurality or too much plurality within society, problems arise. Specifically, he claims that with associations there is always a risk of corruption since people are trying to spread their lifestyle to others, imposing on others’ freedoms and liberties to do as they please. Kant wants to make sure that there is a freedom to associate, but with this right is the necessity for it to stay public and for the government to involve itself in the matters of the community to make sure that the possibility of corruption does not become a reality. Regardless of this possibility, Kant does believe that society can create associations that will not affect the individuals outside of the group and therefore allows for association among the people.

Despite allowing freedom of association within society, Kant sees the dangers behind it and the way that the group can affect the whole society. His main concern is the corruption that could be a result of the groups that will change the way that people enjoy the liberties that the government has been tasked with to protect. Due to the belief in pursuits for personal satisfaction, Kant believes that this includes pursuing associations that satisfy the individual so long as it adheres to the standards set by the government and if it does not interfere with the interests individuals outside of the association. Most of Kant’s examples pertain to the obvious religious associations within society but also reference the unions, family, political parties, corporations, and other civil society associations, all of which change the way that society functions and the way individuals choose to live their lives. Kant believes in the freedom of association with the belief that the government and the overall well-being of society should transcend the needs and the beliefs set forth by the associations.

Bibliography

Kant, Immanuel, Pauline. Kleingeld, Jeremy. Waldron, Michael W. Doyle, and Allen W. Wood. Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.

====German Idealism====
====Benthamite Utilitarianism====

Bentham approached freedom of association as he did free expression: as a means of political advocacy and dissent. In Chapter IV Section 24 of A Fragment on Government, he advocates for “the liberty of public association; or the security with which malecontents may communicate their sentiments, concert their plans, and practise every mode of opposition short of actual revolt, before the executive power can be legally justified in disturbing them.”

A Fragment on Government: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/A_fragment_on_government/Chapter_4

====Millian Utilitarianism====

While Bentham’s free association is a political right, in On Liberty, Mill advocates for near-universal free association: “from this liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among individuals; freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived” (Mill 1859, 16). In his introduction, Mill makes clear that his ideas of liberty come from utilitarianism, not natural rights, stating that, “I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded on the permanent interests of a man as a progressive being” (14).

On Liberty: https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/mill/liberty.pdf Schofield: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/1896809.pdf

====Current Utilitarianism====
====Transcendentalism====
====Marxism====

One central idea of Marx’s theory is the free association of producers. That is, workers are able to freely determine what associations and organizations they can form to contribute to the economy (Fetscher, 1973, 459). Though this is not what one would conventionally describe as free association - which usually refers more to civic and political groups - it is an interesting contribution to the study of free association.
In Volume One of Capital, Marx states the following:
“The lifeprocess of society, which is based on the process of material production, does not strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men, and is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan. This, however, demands for society a certain material groundwork or set of conditions of existence which in their turn are the spontaneous product of a long and painful process of development” (1867).

Fetscher: UMD library

Marx 1867: https://web.stanford.edu/~davies/Symbsys100-Spring0708/Marx-Commodity-Fetishism.pdf

====Early Sociology====
====Pragmatism====
====Weberian Thought====
====Process Philosophy====
====Social Darwinism====
====British Idealism (19th cen.)====
====Continental Philosophy/Frankfurt School====
====Behaviorism====
====Feminist Thought====
Harriet Taylor, a feminist philosopher from the 19th century, wrote about the restrictions that limit women to the private sphere. Men, according to Taylor, decided that the private and domestic sphere is women’s “proper sphere”; however, she argues that any group’s proper sphere is the “largest and highest which they are able to attain to” (Taylor). Taylor argues that this is not possible without complete liberty and, if men are convinced of their mental superiority, should not be an issue if women and men are afforded the same opportunities (Taylor). This argument can be adapted to freedom of association because it essentially concludes that both women and men have the equal opportunity to associate with organizations if he or she can prove his or her worth.

In the Constitution, there are two interpreted freedom of associations. The First Amendment includes the freedom of expressive association. The Fourteenth Amendment includes the freedom of intimate association. Intimate association is an individual’s right to form/maintain close personal relationships without interference from the government (Hudson, 2009). Expressive association, recognized in NAACP v. Alabama (1958), refers to the right of individuals to congregate or association for expressive purposes, such as advancing a political opinion (Hudson, 2009). In Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984), Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion. Brennan concluded that the Jaycees could not exclude women from membership because their purpose as an economic organization for the advancement of young men was not jeopardized if women were members (Bernstein, 2009). Justice O’Connor concurred, but distinguished between expressive and non-expressive groups, which exist for other purposes (Bernstein, 2009). O’Connor concluded that the Jaycees primarily existed for economic reasons, not expressive ones, and, as such, could not exclude women on the basis that it would compromise their mission (Bernstein, 2009).

====Postmodernism====
===Are there any philosophical or moral traditions that dispute the classification of this right as a fundamental right?===
===What do the major legal theories (positive law, natural law, critical legal studies, etc.) say about this right?===

In Roberts v. US Jaycees, the Supreme Court noted that US jurisprudence has created two constitutionally protected categories of association: expressive (e.g. interest groups and political parties) and intimate (e.g. friends and family). There is little originalism present in key expressive-association rulings. NAACP v. Alabama (1959), the first case where the Supreme Court held that a right to expressive association exists, did not draw on originalism. There is also little originalism present in the intimate-association jurisprudence, though it has been influenced by long-standing common-law ideas.
The Supreme court established the idea of intimate association in Roberts, holding that it “has long recognized that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State.” The majority opinion cites Meyers v. Nebraska (1923), a case that helped establish a right to make individual educational choices. The opinion cites old ideas going beyond education, stating that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right to “marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Though it does not embrace originalism, the ruling does invoke historical common-law understandings that may have existed when the Constitution was written.

As Richard Boyd argues in “The Madisonian Paradox of Free Association,” America’s founders explicitly chose not to include free association in the Bill of Rights. James Madison, the primary author of the Bill of Rights, feared the influence of factions, which private associations furthered. Boyd writes that Madison viewed association as a “second-order” right (Boyd 2008, 258), whose existence is tolerable because institutions can mitigate its worst effects (247). The following passage from “Federalist No. 10” illustrates his attitude toward factions arising from free association:
It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
Boyd suggests several possible reasons why Madison may not have enumerated the right to associate. It is possible that he saw it as implied by other First-Amendment rights, such as free assembly. It also may have been seen as less important or vulnerable than other rights, and Madison may have seen it as the type of auxiliary right protected by the Ninth Amendment. Finally, the right’s exclusion may have been because the founders were too skeptical of it for its inclusion (258).

Despite modern views of assembly as related to association, at the time of America’s founding, it would have been better understood as related to the right to petition. According to Congress’s online annotated Constitution, the assembly clause meant that the people have a right to assemble in order to petition the government. The site says that assembly was initially seen as a “subordinate and instrumental” right. The state constitutions mentioned in my original piece on freedom of association should be interpreted the same way. In fact, this is even more clear in these state constitutions than in the national one. The state constitutions surround the right to assemble with expressly political language, such as the right to petition and advocacy for the “common good,” while the First Amendment’s guarantees are political, but not entirely political (it protects religion, and protected speech and press are often, but not always, political).

The opinion in NAACP v. Alabama derives freedom of expressive association from a combination of speech, assembly, and the Fourteenth Amendment, not merely freedom of assembly. It states that, “Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly. It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”

NAACP v. Alabama: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/357/449

Meyer v. Nebraska: https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/262/390

Richard Boyd, “The Madisonian Paradox of Freedom of Association”:
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/madisonian-parad
ox-of-freedom-of-association/ABDB2F9951FD811C0AC84F76327EBACC

List of key expressive association rulings:
https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/encyclopedia/case/142/expressive-association

Congress Annotated Constitution: (“Freedom of Assembly and Petition”)https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt1_4_1/#:~:text=First%20Amendm ent%3A,for%20a%20redress%20of%20grievances.

==Culture and Politics==
===Is this right interpreted and exercised in different ways in different countries? Focus on particular countries in which the right is interpreted distinctively===
===Is this right exercised in different ways depending on the political governance regime in place (democracy, autocracy, hybrid regime)?===
===Is there general and widespread belief that this right is a fundamental right that should generally be protected (and that exceptions should be rare)?===
===Does public polling reveal insights about the right as experienced in different countries?===
The World Bank measures freedom of association across 156 countries using a scale ranging from 0 ( very low freedom of association) to 1(very high freedom of association). Looking at high income countries, with the exception of Israel, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Singapore, freedom of association is generally reported to be above the world median. Additionally, among wealthier countries, the World Bank data demonstrates that levels of freedom of association have remained generally fixed since 1975, when the data was first collected. In particular, the data reveals Burundi, China, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Vietnam, and Yemen to have very low levels of freedom of association (below 0.3). Countries with very high levels of freedom of association (above 0.8) were more numerous, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Trinidad and Tobago, Switzerland, Sweden, Sri Lanka, Spain, South Africa, Slovenia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Portugal, Peru, Papua New Guinea, Panama, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Namibia, Mongolia, Mexico, Mauritius, Malawi, Liberia, Latvia, South Korea, Japan, Jamaica, Italy, Ireland, Honduras, Greece, Ghana, Estonia, Denmark, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Costa Rica, Canada, Benin, Belgium, Australia, and Albania.

An Open Government Partnership (OGP) report reveals additional insights about freedom of association. The report surveys individuals within 78 OGP partnered countries about elements of freedom of association. Furthermore, the survey presents that approximately 25% of freedom of association issues within OGP countries are rooted in restrictive laws on foreign funding. Additionally, the survey demonstrates that OGP countries presenting challenges to freedom of association generally have not taken actions towards better protecting the right in the future. When asked to respond to “In practice, people can freely join any political organization they want”, the majority of OGP countries responded “Agree” or “Strongly Agree”. Though, when asked to reply to “In practice, people can freely join any (unforbidden) political organization they want”, a large number of OGP countries, approximately 20%, responded “Disagree” . This finding demonstrates that in reality, freedom of association may be less protected by countries’ governments than it is perceived to be.

Within the International Labor Organization, the Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) addresses violations of freedom of association. In their 2018 annual report, the CFA reported 402 freedom of association complaints from Africa, 410 from Asian and the Pacific, 657 from Europe, 1,681 from Latin America and 186 from North America. Furthermore, their data reveals decreases in complaints in Africa, Asia and the Pacfic, and North America and increases in complaints in Latin America in 2018. 100% of the freedom of association cases examined by the CFA were brought about by workers, rather than employers. 50% of these workers were from the private sector. Violations of trade union rights and civil liberties composed the majority of freedom of association cases investigated by the CFA.

==Conflicts with other Rights==
===Are there other specific fundamental rights that tend to conflict with this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?===
The right to associate - specifically, the right for associations to exclude people from membership for whatever reason they want - may conflict with the right not to face discrimination based on immutable characteristics such as race and gender. The US Supreme Court has decided cases where an association’s decision to exclude members conflicts with non-discrimination law. In Roberts v. US Jaycees ( 1984), the court rejected the free-association claim of a male-only business organization because its association was neither “expressive” nor “intimate.” In Boy Scouts v. Dale (2000), however, the court held that the Boy Scouts of America could exclude gay members because not being able to do so would violate the organization’s right to expressive association.
Free expression is critical to the practice of free association. The US Supreme Court explicitly protects “expressive” association because many associations exist to express a particular viewpoint. If a government restricts the advocacy of certain ideas, it will almost certainly restrict the activity of groups whose purpose is to express those ideas. Additionally, freedom of association depends on the free exercise of religion. As Locke wrote in A Letter Concerning Toleration, a church is a “a society of members voluntarily uniting” (Locke 1689, 9). Religious observance often requires worship in large groups, so restricting these religious practices entails the abridgement of free association.
Roberts v. US Jaycees: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/468/609 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale: https://www.oyez.org/cases/1999/99-699
A Letter Concerning Toleration: https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/toleration.pdf

===Are there other specific rights that are critical to the exercise of this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?===
===Is there a perception that this right is above or higher than other fundamental rights, or in general, that it has a particular place in a hierarchy of rights?===

Numerous scholars offer interpretations of the hierarchy of rights, placing freedom of association at differing levels of importance. Noted by Tom Farer in “The Hierarchy of Human Rights”, human rights are non-negotiable, and thus are prioritized within the hierarchy. As to why certain rights remain at the top of the hierarchy, Farer answers “because all other rights are dependent on them.” Furthermore, Farer claims that a consensus among United States human rights organizations is that the rights to life, physical security, and due process are essential human rights. Excluding freedom of association from his selection of non-negotiable human rights, Farer undermines its importance within the hierarchy of rights. Thus, Farer emphasizes that the rights to life, physical security, and due process hold precedence over the right to free association.

Fernando Surez Muller argues that there is a select group of fundamental rights that are essential to the exercise of all other rights. With this, Muller emphasizes that certain rights must be prioritized in order for others to be functionally implemented. When analyzing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Muller interprets freedom of association to be a right of particular importance. Muller argues that the rights to communication and expression are impossible to exercise without the right of free association, claiming, “Related to this transcendental right to communication (cell 6) are also all mobility rights (mentioned in articles 13 to 15) because communication is not only a matter of expression but it is also a matter of transporting and receiving the message and this requires freedom of association.” Thus, from Muller’s perspective, freedom of association maintains a high position within the hierarchy of human rights.

Explained by Kimberley Brownlee and David Jenkins of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the right to associate often only pertains to certain associations. Because of this, different rights to different associations have varying ranks within the hierarchy of rights. Brownlee and Jenkins claim “However, since not all associations operate according to either implicit or explicit declarations of consent, exactly what counts as consent is a difficult thing to assess: How do we know when association is free? This problem is exacerbated by the hierarchical form that many associations take.” For this reason, Brownlee and Jenkins note that explicit associations, group identifications that are easy to identify and thus protect, are often prioritized within the hierarchy of rights.

===What specific examples of hierarchies, manifestos, constitutions, or prioritized descriptions of rights cite this right’s high status? Low status? No status at all?===

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights places freedom of association at a high position of value. The document asserts: “ Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; No one may be compelled to belong to an association.” While the document does not enumerate human rights in hierarchical order, the platform of the United Nations and the inclusion of the freedom of association within the document suffices the right’s universally accepted importance and position of high status.

Additionally, the inclusion of freedom of association within the European Convention on Human Rights emphasizes the value of the right. Asserting the importance of freedom of association, Article 11 claims, “Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.” Stressing freedom of association to be an essential human right, the Convention echoes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, upholding the value of freedom of association.

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms similarly elevates freedom of association to a high status. Within its fundamental freedoms section, the charter emphasizes “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: a. Freedom of conscience and religion; freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication; freedom of peaceful assembly; and freedom of association.” Explicitly stating that the freedom of association is one of the four fundamental freedoms, the Charter clearly asserts that freedom of association is essential to the liberty of individuals. Given the select group of fundamental freedoms, the placement of freedom of association within the list demonstrates its uplifted position within the greater hierarchy of human rights.

In the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the International Labour Organization additionally upholds the pertinence of freedom of association. Within the declaration, the ILO asserts four categories to be promoted by member states, including freedom of association. Similar to The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, by only including a select group of rights, the Declaration affirms the high status of these freedoms. Thus, the inclusion of freedom of association within the four categories asserts its importance

===How does federalism change, if at all, the exercise or application of this right? What examples of this can one point to?===

Differences in state and federal law contribute to varying levels of freedom of association across the United States. While Supreme Court cases such as Bates v. Little Rock, Shelton v. Tucker, Roberts vs. United States Jaycees, Boy Scouts of America vs. Dale, and Christian Legal Society vs. Martinez upheld the right to freedom of association, the right continues to be violated across states. Furthermore, despite its support from the Supreme Court, the system of federalism often leads to the restriction of freedom of association by local courts and authorities.

Particularly in South Florida, Lance Compa investigates how nursing home workers’ rights to free association have been violated. Furthermore, Compa explains how federalism exacerbates these violations. Noting the Palm Garden nursing home case, Copa discusses how nursing home workers were threatened with pay and benefit cuts if they decided to join unions. Additionally, Compa notes Palm Garden’s personnel manual, which states, “This is a non-union health center...if you are approached to join a union, we sincerely hope you will consider the individual freedoms you could give up, and the countless risks you could be taking.” After workers were in fact fired for joining unions, Compa notes, the NLRB asserted that Palm Garden must reinstate employees, as they had violated the workers’ right to free association. Still rejecting rehiring the employees, Compa explains that Palm Garden appealed to federal court, where the case still remains pending indefinitely. Furthermore, while the Supreme Court may uphold freedom of association, this does not mean the right can be strictly enforced throughout the United States, as appealing to federal courts demonstrates a significant challenge.

Additionally, Compa notes how freedom of association has been restricted for food processing workers. Specifically, Compa discusses the abuses faced by Smithfield workers in North Carolina, a state dominated by the food processing industry. Firing union activists and actively intimidating and discriminating against organizing workers, the Smithfield Plant violated its workers' freedom of association in numerous ways. Compa stresses that these abuses were ultimately the result of federalism, a system that contributes to the restriction of freedom of association. Compa states, “Instead of fulfilling the affirmative responsibility of government authorities to protect workers’ rights, state power was used to interfere with workers’ freedom of association in violation of international human rights norms.” Noting how local police were permitted to intimidate workers at the Smithfield Plant, Copa affirms how local authorities restrict freedom of association, countering federal law. This demonstrates how the division of state and federal power can weaken the strength of freedom of association, as local governments can discreetly work to limit the right.

==Limitations / Restrictions==
===What are the typical exceptions or limitations placed on this right?===
Restricting certain groupings and gatherings that are involved, or likely involved in crimes as was seen with the response to the formation of the Ku Klux Klan as a vigilante association, is a typical exception to the right of freedom of association (Australian Law Reform Commission 2016). In response to the crimes committed by the organization, Congress passed a Force Act in 1870 and the Ku Klux Klan Act in 1871, which authorized the suppression of disturbances to the peace by force (Gruberg). This was in effort to stop terrorist organizations through heavy punishments, such as the suspension of habeas corpus under these acts. These acts were eventually found by the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional and were repealed; however, although direct restrictions upon the group (who was behind the 1963 bombing of a black church in Alabama, numerous murders including that of three civil rights workers in 1964 Mississippi, and other criminal efforts to impose white supremacy on the masses and restrict the rights of African Americans) and its freedom of assembly and association have not been able to lawfully prevent such crimes in the name of violations of the freedom of association, modern civil rights laws and increased national surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation have indirectly impacted the KKK’s and other criminally-involved groups’ (such as terrorist groups like ISIL) freedoms of association and assembly. The First Amendment of the US Constitution grants the right to “peaceable assembly,” and any indication of unpeaceable assembly warrants government interference. When also the association infringes upon another group’s freedoms of association, endangers public safety and order, or does not benefit/or harms social need, as can be seen with the efforts of the KKK to restrict black Americans rights to vote and peaceably assemble, necessary limitations are placed upon the right.

In terms of certain limitations on peaceable assembly, the government has the right to limit this freedom based upon “time, place and manner” restrictions: “Time, place and manner restrictions are content-neutral limitations imposed by the government on expressive activity (O'Neill). These restrictions come in many forms including imposing limits on the noise level of speech, capping the number of protesters who may occupy a given forum, barring early-morning or late-evening demonstrations, and restricting the size or placement of signs on government property. ” These limits ultimately regard the facilitation of legitimate regulatory goals, such as preventing traffic congestion or preventing interference with nearby activities.

Religious rights often conflict with the right to free association. As observed in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, where a Christian student organization argued their First Amendment right to prohibit non-christians from their group, religious associations have used their rights to religious freedom to restrict certain individuals from associating with them. Though, as the Supreme Court ultimately ruled against the Christian Legal Society, rights to free association were ultimately upheld over contradicting religious rights.

A similar issued was observed in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group. Though, in this case, the Supreme Court asserted the right of groups to prohibit membership from individuals whose beliefs do not coincide with the group mission.Furthermore, Hurley exhibited how religious rights can counter rights to free association, as the decision emphasized that certain individuals could be blocked from associating with religious groups on the basis of their identity.

Rights to public safety additionally contradict rights to free association. This is often the argument made when prosecuting individuals associating with criminal and terrorist groups. For example in City of Chicago v. Morales, the Supreme Court upheld a Chicago law which criminalized public gang association, asserting that gang members had no constitutional rights to free association (Cole). Exhibited by the court’s decision, individuals are not constitutionally protected to align with criminal groups, as the public’s right to safety against such groups weighs against personal rights to association.

In regards to the right to free political association, parties hold a contradicting First Amendment right to limit party membership. Furthermore, while a candidate can identify as associating with a specific political party on a ballot, that party has the ability to disassociate from them (Legal Information Institute, Cornell Law School). Through this, a candidate often cannot freely affiliate with the party they associate with, exhibiting a contradiction to the right to free association.

===Under American jurisprudence, what permissible exceptions exist?===
The freedom of association is derivative from the First Amendment which guarantees the freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition (Hudson 2020). These freedoms of speech, assembly, and petition all form sub-categories of the freedom of association. Collectively, this right permits a group to act in the collective interest of its members and to maintain private associations and assemblies without government interference. The legal problems regarding its practice have only recently arisen- particularly from the loyalty investigations of the Communist Party membership and a series of other cases in the 1950s and 1960s in relation to the activities of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute 2020). For example, in 1958, with the case of the NAACP v. Alabama, the right to freedom of association was strengthened and supported by the Supreme Court who ruled in favor of the NAACP’s decision to withhold a list of members in the organization from the government (Hudson 2020). In response to Brown v. Board of Education 1954, Alabama authorities was closely investigating the NAACP under the foreign corporation law. The NAACP complied with the state’s request of its business records, including its charter and list of organizational officers and staff. They refused, however, to give lists of rank-and-file members due to confidentiality, potential economic reprisal attacks, and potential repression. Giving up the lists, civil rights activists said, would dissuade members and potential recruits from associating with the organization, ultimately violating their right of association.

Prior to this case the Court had supported a stronger suppression of the freedoms of association and assembly regarding organizations that were alleged to be involved in subversive and unlawful activities. In 1928’s New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman and 1951’s Dennis v. United States the Court had ruled in favor of government efforts to restrict and limit the rights of assembly and speech of both the KKK and the Communist Party (U.S. Supreme Court 1928, 1951). In this case, however, the Court said NAACP did not cause harm to government or society, and they had complied with the demands of the Alabama government sufficiently; therefore they were justified and protected by law in their decision to withhold membership lists.

Later, in the 1967 case of United States v. Robel in which Eugene Robel, an inactive member of the Communist Party, was charged with violating the Subversive Activities Control Act when he continued his work at the Todd Pacific Shipyards, a location that was deemed by the Secretary of Defense to be a defense facility (U.S. Supreme Court 2020). Under the Act, his actions was illegal due to his membership to the Communist Party and members of the Party’s legal inability to remain employed at a location deemed a “defense facility”. The Supreme Court ruled that the “defense facility” employment provision was an unconstitutional abridgment of the right of association regardless of its application solely to active Party members. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that the provision was overbroad while Justice William J. Brennan added that the designation of defense facilities being a power given to the Secretary of Defense was unconstitutional because the Act provided no meaningful standards for the Secretary to follow. This case was a milestone because, once tested, the Court upheld the broad freedoms of association and continued the prohibition of government interference and bias towards any individual based upon an affiliated association. Later cases regarding the Bar examine and admission to the bar further backed this right. In 1971’s Baird v. State Bar of Arizona and Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond, the Supreme Court established that the government could only deny admission to the bar if an applicant’s membership in a group advocating overthrow of the government (such as the Communist Party) was legitimately coupled with the specific intent to achieve that end (U.S. Supreme Court 1971).

These cases established that organized groups in association that gather in efforts to advance political, economic, religious, or cultural matters may gather without government interference (and particularly without government knowledge of listed members) unless the group explicitly poses a threat to society or engages in criminal activity.

Under American jurisprudence, permissible exceptions to the freedom involve matters of internal affairs such as discrimination cases. In the 1976 case of Runyon v. McCrary, discrimination based upon race was established as a limitation to a body’s freedom of association after two children were denied access to certain private schools in Virginia as a result of the schools’ admitted segregationist school policies (U.S. Supreme Court 1976). Later, in the Roberts v. United States Jaycees court case of 1984, the court ruled that the Jaycees, an organization of young business leaders that only fully accepted male members and who claimed that the anti-discrimination laws that forced them to accept qualified women was a breach of their freedom of association, lacked “the distinctive characteristics that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of its members to exclude women,” ultimately prohibiting their exclusion of women (Bernstein 2020).

Also, if the state has a compelling interest, it can justifiably limit associations’ rights to organizational autonomy (Alexander 2008, 14). Here, the state would be setting limits and requirements for how a group is organizationally run and made up. By giving an organization a quota, the state forces a particular pattern of inclusion that is in the public interest. For example, the US government is permitted to work to create less segregated schools, involving programs like the Moving to Opportunity (MTO). It is permitted to do in efforts to promote certain patterns of inclusion and acceptance within communities and associations (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1992).

===Under international human rights laws, what permissible exceptions (often called derogations) exist?===
In Article 22 of the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the right to freedom of association is granted to all, including joining trade unions (United Nations 1966). Restrictions can only be placed on this right if the restrictions are prescribed by the state’s law and “are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Similarly, in Europe, derogations are permissible only when “prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” as is stated in Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (European Court of Human Rights 1953, 12). And Article 16 of the American Convention on Human Rights mirrors the decree of the ICCPR (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1969).

Regarding the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and its adoption of Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize, this body is in place to protect the labor interests of those around the world, and they are prohibited by international law to formulate and/or apply law so as to prejudice against any group (Swepston 1998, 172).

===Have political theorists or philosophers discussed the permissibility of exceptions to this right?===

Freedom of association is an essential facet of modern democracy, yet it is often overlooked in political discourse on the natural rights and liberties of the citizen. This could be due to the fact that freedom of association and assembly are often so closely related to freedoms of speech and expression, or it could be because it is so difficult for political theorists to decide which association should be allowed and which can be justifiably restricted. Whatever the case, the debate over exceptions to the right of free association continues to change and evolve even in the modern era.

John Locke is one of the earliest proponents of natural right theory; his second “Treatise on Government” famously outlines humankind’s three essential rights to life, liberty, and property (Locke, “Treatise on Government”). He does not specifically mention people’s freedom of association, but scholars point to his writings on religious assembly as an indication of his stance on the right. In a George Mason University publication, Eric Claeys refers to a passage from Locke’s “Letter Concerning Toleration,” which states that a church is simply a “free and voluntary society” (Locke, “A Letter Concerning Toleration”), saying that “if one reads the same passage from the Letter with an eye toward issues about associational freedom, Locke is making a far more radical point: All private societies, churches and otherwise, deserve a presumption of associational freedom” (Claeys, “The Private Society and the Liberal Public Good in John Locke’s Thought”). In light of Claeys’ assessment, it is easy to observe Locke’s thoughts on the freedom of association in the constitution that he wrote for the Carolina Colony in 1669. For example, Article 103 of this document states that “no person whatsoever shall speak anything in their religious assembly irreverently or seditiously of the government or governors, or of state matters” (Locke, “The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina: March 1, 1669”). This reveals a reluctance on Locke’s part to allow any association of citizens to gather in opposition of the established government, perhaps because he understands the potential threat that this could pose to political society. His position on the freedom of association is made all the more clear in his 108th Article, which stipulates that “assemblies, upon what presence soever of religion, not observing and performing the above said rules, shall not be esteemed as churches, but unlawful meetings, and be punished as other riots” (Locke, “The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina: March 1, 1669”). The “above said rules” to which Locke refers consist mostly of provisions to ensure free membership and movement between various religious establishments, but the classification of non compliant assemblies as “unlawful” or “riots” implies a Locke’s hesitation to allow totally free and unrestricted assembly.

Subsequent political theorists built upon Locke’s theory of rights and liberties, and a number of them elected to deal with the right to freedom of association more directly. The United States Constitution, much of which rests upon Lockean political theory, is one of the first documents to directly address freedom of assembly in its text. Perhaps the buildup to the American Revolution, in which groups like the Sons of Liberty and the Stamp Act Congress were outlawed and broken up by the British government, affected the Constitutional Convention’s decision to include assembly in the Bill of Rights. The Constitution’s First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances” (The Constitution of the United States of America). The Constitutional Convention, led by prominent statesman James Madison, used the word peaceably to signal that citizens were not entitled to the complete freedom of assembly if such activity could potentially generate violence or unrest (Law Library of Congress, “The Right to Peaceable Assembly”). The Cornell Law Review writes that this guarantee gradually came to protect citizens’ rights to participate in organizations that regularly utilize their members’ constitutional rights to freely assemble and petition the government. It states that over time, “Supreme Court decisions gradually determined that “the right of association is derivative from the First Amendment guarantees of speech, assembly, and petition” (Legal Information Institute, “Right of Association”). While Madison and his colleagues did not directly address freedom of association in the Constitution’s text, they did lay the groundwork for its realization years later.

French diplomat Alexis De Tocqueville traveled to the United States in the early 1800s in order to observe the country, and in 1835 he published his findings in his first volume of Democracy in America. In this work the Frenchman sung praise for the American system of government, applauding it for spreading liberty and freedom within its borders. However, even de Tocqueville understood the danger inherent in the guarantee of totally unrestrained freedom of association. Linking the freedom of association to such constitutional rights as the freedom of petition and freedom of the press, he writes that “it cannot be denied that the unrestrained liberty of association for political purposes is the privilege which a people is longest in learning how to exercise. If it does not throw the nation into anarchy, it perpetually augments the chances of that calamity” (De Tocqueville, Democracy in America). De Tocqueville goes on to explain that American association is generally peaceful because citizens tend only to use it to oppose political groups, but he nevertheless must address the danger inherent in the guarantee of unrestricted freedom of association. Even in what he sees as a most ideal form of government, the Frenchman recognizes the risks inherent in unrestricted freedom when it comes to assembly and association.

Decades later, John Stuart Mill came to a similar conclusion in his 1859 work, On Liberty. Mill was familiar with the American system of government, as evidenced by his mentions of American religious toleration and prohibition of “fermented” drinks, so it is possible that his thinking was influenced in some way by Madison’s work on the Constitution (Mill, “On Liberty”). In his work, Mill advances the theory that humans band together solely for the purpose of protection, and that therefore we can never have the authority to restrain others’ liberty. However, he notes that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (Mill, “On Liberty”). Later on, he explicitly asserts that “freedom to unite, for any purpose not involving harm to others: the persons combining being supposed to be of full age, and not forced or deceived” (Mill, “On Liberty”). Clearly, Mill is aware of the dangers implicit in the creation of total freedom of assembly, and he agrees with the Constitutional Convention that this important right can permissibly be subject to certain regulations and limitations.

The political and philosophical debate over freedom and association and its acceptable limitations evolved dramatically in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Writing just over a century after Mill, First Amendment scholar Thomas Emerson produced an article entitled “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,” in which he addresses a number of issues relating to freedom of association by assessing court precedents and the lessons of history. Like the documents from Mill and Madison, Emerson’s article holds that complete freedom of association would be detrimental to society. Using the example of an organization whose sole aim is to perpetrate a successful bank robbery, Emerson points out that “some types of association need, and are entitled to, greater protection than others” (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,”). He goes on to state that “the legal doctrine that protects associational rights must be able to distinguish between them and to afford the required measure of protection in each case” (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression”). Taking into account twentieth-century court decisions, Emerson explains that “the Supreme Court, in recognizing an independent "right of association," has undertaken to give that right constitutional protection primarily through application of a balancing test” (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression”).

This balancing test is incredibly important in determining the constitutionality of certain restrictions on citizens’ association because it must avoid violating citizens’ unequivocal right to free expression while still preventing the perpetration of unlawful action (Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,”). The case of NAACP v. Alabama is one case in which the Supreme Court attempted to find this balance. This instance in which the NAACP argued that the state of Alabama could not constitutionally require the organization to disclose a list of its members, proved incredibly important to our modern understanding of the right to association. Writing the majority opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan II explained that “it is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” (Franklin, “NAACP v. Alabama”). This differed from other contemporary cases, such as New York ex. rel Bryant v. Zimmerman, in which the Supreme Court had ruled in favor of the state’s ability to restrict association related to the Ku Klux Klan. The difference, Harlan explained, was that unlike the KKK, the NAACP did not present a threat to society. For this reason, the organization and the members involved were protected under the First Amendment’s protection of citizens’ freedom to peaceably assemble (Franklin, “NAACP v. Alabama”). Harlan, like Madison, Locke, and Mill, understood the importance of restricting free association in order to preserve the peace in society.

The right to free association is famously difficult to address because the general consensus is that association should not be completely free. For that reason, political theorists and philosophers have gone to great lengths over the centuries to define exactly when and why free association should be limited or left alone. The general consensus is that assembly and association are detrimental to society when they lead to violence or unrest, but as with other rights it is difficult for theorists to decide exactly what criteria turn a given gathering from an expression of free assembly into a potential threat to civil society.

“John Locke, Two Treatises (1689) - Online Library of Liberty,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/john-locke-two-treatises-1689.

Locke, John, “A Letter Concerning Toleration,” trans. William Pope, 1689, accessed at https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/toleration.pdf, 9.

Eric R. Claeys, “The Private Society and the Liberal Public Good in John Locke's Thought,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2007, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1027965.

“Constitution of the United States of America,” Bill of Rights Institute, October 3, 2019, https://billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/constitution/?utm_source=GOOGLE. 5

“Right to Peaceful Assembly” (Law Library of Congress, 2014), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/peaceful-assembly/right-to-peaceful-assembly.pdf.

John Stuart Mill, “Mill, ‘On Liberty,’” in The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill: On Liberty, ed. Jonathan Reiley (New York, NY: Routledge, 1998), 45.

Thomas I. Emerson, “Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression,” The Yale Law Journal 74, no. 1 (1964): p. 1, https://doi.org/10.2307/794804

===Should this right be limited when limiting it would jeopardize democratic norms?===
===Is this right often perceived as threatening to government authorities?===
===Is this right often curtailed by government authorities for reasons other than those which are generally viewed as permissible?===
===Is this right at times curtailed by private actors?===

Philosophers and political theorists generally agree that it is sometimes necessary to curtail free association, but this agreement does not answer questions of which forms assembly and association can permissibly be restricted, how they should be limited, or who should control their regulation. It often falls to the government to decide when to step in during times of popular uprising or violent protest, but history also shows a number of instances in which private actors have curtailed citizens’ right to free association or assembly.

The most common way for private actors can curtail free association is by prohibiting assembly and demonstration on their privately-owned property. In U.S. law, there exists a precedent that protects citizens’ right to free association on public property precisely because the right is not guaranteed when it is practiced on private property. This doctrine was first introduced in 1936, when Jersey City mayor Frank Hague issued an ordinance prohibiting members of the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) from gathering in a public space and distributing “communist” literature (Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,”). The CIO, with the help of the American Civil Liberties Union, successfully argued that the New Jersey ordinance was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Hague appealed to the Supreme Court, which upheld the original decision and struck the ordinance down (Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,”). Justice Owen Roberts justified the decision for Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization by likening public spaces such as streets and parks to public forums, in which the free flow of ideas and discourse must be protected under the First Amendment. He made this ruling because he recognized that private actors retained the right to curtail citizens’ right to association when that association occurred on private property. In order to preserve the right to peaceable assembly, the Court’s decision set the precedent for the “public forum” doctrine, which continues to protect the right to association in public spaces to this day (Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,”). Writing for The First Amendment Encyclopedia, David Hudson writes that “in the Court’s forum-based approach, the government can impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech in all three categories of property, but has limited ability to impose content-based restrictions on traditional or designated public forums” (Hudson, “Public Forum Doctrine | The First Amendment Encyclopedia,”). The doctrine specifically aims to protect peaceful association on public property because the right is not guaranteed when assembly occurs on private property.

One example of a private actor using its ownership of property to curtail free association can be observed in the 1994 case of Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. In this case, the Aware Woman Center for Choice in Melbourne, Florida filed a suit against anti-abortion protestors who had been blocking entrances to the building, harrassing abortion patients, and demonstrating outside of staff members’ homes (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). A court order was issued, ordering protestors to refrain from trespassing on Center property, blocking its entrances, and abusing staff and patients. When the court order was violated, the “the court created a 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrances and driveways (including the public sidewalk) within which all antiabortion speech was banned. It also prohibited excessive noise and images that patients could see or hear during surgery and recovery” (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). The Supreme Court later upheld the buffer zone rules, but struck down the prohibition of protestors’ practice of showing images to clients. It also ruled that the Florida court’s 300-foot buffer zone that prohibited protestors from approaching clients and staff at the Center and at their homes was too restrictive of First Amendment rights (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). The ruling, according to Chief Justice Rhenquist, sought to preserve protestors’ right to association and assembly while still protecting the patients and clients from intimidation and abuse (“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.”). It also serves as a reminder that private citizens still reserve the right to curtail free association if said association makes them feel unsafe or threatened.

Both the Madsen and Hague cases illustrate that judges, in particular, have immense power to determine the breadth of citizens’ right to freedom of association as guaranteed in the First Amendment. For example, in the case of Ward v. Rock Against Racism, the Supreme Court determined that free expression in the form of a rock concert in New York’s Central Park could be subject to volume regulations under the First Amendment (O'Neill, “Time, Place and Manner Restrictions”). This decision, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, led to the creation of a test to determine whether assembly and expression could be restricted. The test asks whether the regulation is “content neutral,” whether it is “narrowly tailored” to fit a specific governmental interest, and whether it still provides ample opportunity for the message to be communicated (O'Neill, “Time, Place and Manner Restrictions”). If a regulation passes all three prongs of this test, then it can legally restrict or control the time, place, or manner in which assemblies like protests are carried out. The Law Library of Congress writes that since Kennedy’s decision, “the Supreme Court has held that it is constitutionally permissible for the government to require that a permit for an assembly be obtained in advance” (“Right to Peaceful Assembly: United States | Law Library of Congress”). Kennedy’s ruling also allows the government to “make special regulations that impose additional requirements for assemblies that take place near major public events” (“Right to Peaceful Assembly: United States | Law Library of Congress”). This legal doctrine has significantly shaped the way in which state and federal governments treat freedom of association and the right to peaceable assembly. While the Supreme Court can hardly be considered a private actor, Justices like Kennedy rely on personal study and private experience to create policy that affects American freedom of association as a whole.

Citizens within a political society have the right to free association as long as it is peaceable and does not infringe upon others’ rights or liberties. This principle lends itself to a number of complexities because its parameters for free association are so vague, but over the past few centuries the United States has worked to define when and how private actors can curtail others’ right to free association. The result is that the Supreme Court, and the justices that make it up, have set out precedents that test whether certain forms of association are constitutional and which ones can justifiably be restricted. The definition of public spaces as areas of free association and creation of buffer zones for private properties represent significant steps forward in this effort.

Lynne Chandler Garcia, “Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,” Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, accessed June 16, 2020, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/619/hague-v-committee-for-industrial-organization.

David L Hudson, “Public Forum Doctrine | The First Amendment Encyclopedia,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/824/public-forum-doctrine.

“Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc. | The First ...,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/10/madsen-v-women-s-health-center-inc.

Kevin Francis O'Neill, “Time, Place and Manner Restrictions,” Time, Place and Manner Restrictions, accessed June 17, 2020, https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1023/time-place-and-manner-restrictions.

“Right to Peaceful Assembly: United States | Law Library of Congress,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/peaceful-assembly/us.php.

===Is this right subject to specific limitations in event of emergency (war, brief natural disaster [weather, earthquake], long-run natural disaster [volcano, fire, disease])? Can such limitations be defined in advance with reference to the disaster in question?===

The right to freedom of association is not an absolute right because it is subject to certain limitations. Political thinkers and legal experts generally agree that assembly and association can be justifiably restricted if it conflicts with other citizens’ security, liberty, or property. Another case in which the right is subject to certain limitations is in a case of emergency or long-run disaster. Recent history shows a number of instances in which the U.S. government has justified the restriction of the right to free association during times of war and natural disaster. Interestingly, it did not effectively curtail citizens’ right to free association during the recent COVID-19 pandemic.

Freedom of association most often restricted in the event of war. In his work, “The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly,” Washington University scholar John D. Inazu briefly explores the effect that World War I had on citizens’ right to gather and discuss the country’s affairs. He writes that during the late World War I years, “the freedom of assembly was constrained by shortsighted legislation like the Espionage Act of 1917 (and its 1918 amendments) and the Immigration Act of 1918, and the Justice Department’s infamous Palmer Raids in 1920” (Inazu, “The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly”). William Riggs of the First Amendment Encyclopedia similarly notes that the Vietnam War era, in particular, saw drastic reductions in Americans’ rights to peaceable assembly and association. He writes that “the war in Vietnam quickly became the focus of major protests that resulted in increased government attempts to limit First Amendment protections. These efforts mostly dealt with the right to assemble and what constituted appropriate free speech criticism of the war” (“Vietnam War | The First Amendment Encyclopedia,”). The U.S. government broadly justified these restrictions by arguing that they were made in the interest of national security, claiming wartime as an acceptable time for the limitation of free association.

Recently, the United States government has also walked back citizens’ right to freedom of association when dealing with natural disasters. A 2020 Congressional report on First Amendment rights during the COVID-19 pandemic notes that when public health and safety are at risk, the government is justified in its restriction of certain freedoms to widely assemble as long as these regulations aim to protect citizens’ essential rights, such as those to life or property. It notes that the government is justified in restricting freedoms of association at certain times of the day, as long as this action is taken with the explicit purpose of protecting citizens from further harms. “For example,” it says, “in upholding a county curfew following Hurricane Andrew, the Eleventh Circuit asked only whether the government (1) took that action in “good faith,” (2) with ‘some factual basis’ that the restrictions were ‘necessary to maintain order’” (Killion, CRS Report, “U.S. Library of Congress”). The report argues that “curfews, increased “police powers,” and other measures that are considered “essential to the public safety [and] health” all constitute acceptable restrictions of First Amendment rights-such as the right to freedom of peaceable assembly- during times of natural crisis (Killion, CRS Report, “U.S. Library of Congress”).

The recent COVID-19 crisis created another instance in which citizens’ right to freedom of association was called into question. The pandemic caused widespread and dramatic change within global society as the country entered a state of total lockdown, and in the process it raised a number of legal, moral, and philosophical questions about association and assembly. In June 2020, for example, plaintiffs Ron Givens and Christine Bish filed a lawsuit against California State officials after being denied permission to hold a protest outside the California State Capitol building. The assembly, which aimed to protest the state’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, was not allowed to take place because of the potential health risks it would create. In response to this denial, the Department of Justice filed a Friend-of-the-Court brief which argued that California’s de facto ban on public demonstrations directly conflicts with First Amendment guarantees and should therefore be struck down (“Department of Justice Files Friend-of-the-Court Brief in Support of Free Speech Challenge to California's COVID-19 Ban on In-Person Political Protests,”). The debate over pandemic restrictions and First Amendment rights became even more heated as the Black Lives Matter Movement sparked major demonstrations in major cities all over the country as citizens gathered to protest police actions in the murder of George Floyd. An MSN report on the protests in Boston notes that “Black Lives Matter Boston and Violence in Boston, two activist organizations who are expected to hold a protest in the city Tuesday evening, urged anyone who is at high risk due to COVID-19 to stay home. Organizers also asked participants to wear gloves and masks and bring hand sanitizer” (“Protesting amid the coronavirus crisis: Massachusetts officials say they respect demonstrators' 1st Amendment rights, urge them to take health precautions though,”). The DOJ’s Friend-of-the-Court brief, in addition to reports on the Boston protests, indicate that the U.S. government has largely decided to allow citizens to exercise the right to free association and assembly, despite the potential danger it could pose.

The right to freedom of association is subject to a number of limitations. Periods of war, natural disaster, and global pandemic all create conditions in which the United States has considered placing restrictions on the right to peaceable assembly. In the two former cases, it has generally been able to regulate its citizens’ exercise of their right to freely associate with one another. However, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown that while the government may seek to limit its citizens’ assembly, it is not always able to enforce its regulations.

COVID-19 has demonstrated that freedom of association may be limited due to disease. The virus has prompted governments to limit the size of many types of gatherings, which tends to limit freedom of association. Certain associations, such as organized sports teams and churches, have their operations heavily restricted. Still, these restrictions do not limit one’s ability to associate with certain groups of people - just where and how these groups meet.
The French government, for example, enacted a “State of Sanitary Emergency” to fight the virus, and the text of the legislation gives the government the power to “decide, by decree, and upon the recommendation of the minister of health, general measures limiting the freedom to go and come, the freedom to enterprise and the freedom to congregate as well as allowing him to proceed with requisitions of any goods and services necessary to fight against the sanitary disaster” (Momtaz 2020). Like in the US, freedom of association is not explicitly granted in the Constitution, but its Constitutional Council interpreted it as existing.

Curfews are also often instituted in response to disaster and unrest. For example, the mayor of New Orleans instituted a curfew following Hurricane Katrina (Rushton 2015). Various US cities enacted curfews in response to recent riots/looting (11 PM in Washington, DC in early June, for example).
During times of conflict, governments may seek to limit associations that benefit the enemy. In 1954, Congress outlawed the Communist Party, charging that it was an instrument of a hostile foreign power. It has never been enforced (Auerbach 2020). The President of the US has the authority to declare martial law, though only under specific circumstances: during foreign invasion or civil war and when civilian courts can no longer operate (Feldman 2005, 1036). The latter restriction was cemented in Ex Parte Milligan ( 1864), where the Supreme Court struck down the conviction of a confederate sympathizer by a military tribunal (Feldman 1033). Though there are no explicit rules regarding freedom of association, federal regulations grant broad power to military authorities to restrict civil liberties where it is necessary for civil order (Feldman 1037-8). In Milligan, the court wrote that martial law “destroys every guarantee of the Constitution and effectively renders the military independent of and superior to the civil power” (Feldman 1037-8).
Several cases have tested the ability of governors to impose state-level martial law. In Moyer v. Peabody ( 1909), a case arose when the governor of Colorado imposed martial law to quell a labor dispute. The court held that, “When it comes to a decision by the head of the State upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment.” The court later elaborated that state declarations of martial law should be subject to a proportionality test - the remedy must directly relate to the problem it addresses (Feldman 1034). In Duncan v Kahanamoku (1946), the use of military tribunals in Hawaii after the attack on Pearl Harbour was invalidated. The Supreme Court held that under the Hawaiian Organic Act (this act gave the state the authority to institute martial law) the use of such tribunals is only allowed during a period of actual war. The court did, however, leave the possibility open that such action was constitutional (Feldman 1034-5).
France provides another good example of emergency power - it has Constitutional provisions providing for states of emergency and states of siege. Though precise statutory and constitutional justifications for restrictions have evolved over time (France has repeatedly replaced its constitution), it has long used emergencies to justify restrictions on freedom of association. During World War I, France prohibited protests and marches, and ordered the closure of gathering places such as bars and restaurants. France has instituted similar restrictions in response to later emergencies, such as a 1955 uprising in Algeria (Feldman 1031).

“Dennis v. United States | The First Amendment Encyclopedia,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/190/dennis-v-united-states.

“Vietnam War | The First Amendment Encyclopedia,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1101/vietnam-war.

“Freedom of Association in the Wake of Coronavirus,” Freedom of Association in the Wake of Coronavirus § (n.d.).
“Department of Justice Files Friend-of-the-Court Brief in Support of Free Speech Challenge to California's COVID-19 Ban on In-Person Political Protests,” The United States Department of Justice, June 11, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-files-friend-court-brief-support-free-speech-challenge-californias- covid.

“Protesting amid the coronavirus crisis: Massachusetts officials say they respect demonstrators' 1st Amendment rights, urge them to take health precautions though,” accessed June 19, 2020, https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/protesting-amid-the-coronavirus-crisis-massachusetts-officials-say-they-respec t-demonstrators-1st-amendment-rights-urge-them-to-take-health-precautions-though/ar-BB14VG4l.

Momtaz:
https://www.politico.eu/article/french-government-declares-state-of-sanitary-emergency/

Rushton:
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/08/24/timeline-hurricane-katrina-and-afterma th/32003013/

Association in France:
https://ocw.mit.edu/courses/global-languages/21g-053-understanding-contemporary-french-politi cs-spring-2014/readings/MIT21G_053S14_Constitu.pdf

Communist Control Act: https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/congress-passes-communist-control-act

Auerbach: https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/communist -control-act-1954

Feldman: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1666&co ntext=cilj

==Utilitarian / Fairness Assessments==
===Is there a cost attached to protecting and enforcing this right? What kinds of costs are implicated?===
====Short-term economic cost in general====
====Long-term economic cost in general====
====Cost to those least able to economically absorb the cost====
====Cost to perceived democratic legitimacy====
====Cost to consistency or coherence of the law as a whole====
====Cost to the legitimacy or effectiveness of other rights====
====Cost to considerations of social equality====
====Cost to other non-material goods not so far specified====
===What are the financial consequences, if any, of making this right a legally protectable right?===
===Are there any groups that are uniquely disadvantaged by the exercise of this right?===
===Are there any groups that uniquely benefit from the exercise of this right?===
===Are there instances when this fundamental right can lead to unfairness or inequities?===
===Are there objective ways to measure the utilitarian nature of this right?===
===If so, where can one draw the line: when does this right stop being useful or economically viable?===
==Looking Ahead==
===How can we expect this right to change and evolve in the years ahead?===
===How is the future likely to shape the exercise of this right?===
===Will the exercise or protection of this right be affected by technological changes?===
===Under what conditions would this right become irrelevant?===
===Are questions of fairness and utility pertaining to this right likely to change in the years ahead?===
==Policy Recommendations==
===Can the practice or exercise of this right be shaped through executive action?===
===In the US context, are there particular parties with a stake or interest in amending or reconceptualizing this right?===
===In the US context, can this right be altered legislatively, or would it require a constitutional amendment?===
===Is this right best addressed at the national level? The sub-national level? The international level?===
===To what extent is this right shaped primarily by judicial decisions?===
===If this right is best addressed through the amendment process, how should it proceed?===
===If this right were unlimited, what might be the consequences (positive and negative)?===
===If this right were eliminated, what might be the consequences (positive and negative)?===

Source/Freedom of Religion

2022-08-03T17:36:42Z

Kbrard: /* Feminist Thought */

==History==
===What is the oldest source in any country that mentions this right?===
The Edict of Toleration by Galerius in April of 311 ended Christian persecutions and granted their right to exist (Keresztes, "From the Great Persecution to the Peace of Galerius," 390). This preceded the Edict of Milan by two years, which permanently declared religious toleration and protection for Christians within the Roman Empire (Britannica, "Edict of Milan").

===What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right? BUILD IN COLLAPSE EXPAND TOGGLE===
====Afghanistan====
Its new constitution abides by the UHRD and Sharia law; it is constructed to defer to Sharia law in areas of blasphemy, apostasy, and conversion. However, minority religious communities do face some degree of discrimination (U.S. Department of State, "2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Afghanistan," 1).

====Albania====

====Algeria====
====Andorra====
====Angola====
====Antigua and Barbuda====
====Argentina====
The Constitution establishes freedom of religion, but also gives preferential status to the Roman Catholic Church (U.S. Department of State, "ARGENTINA 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT").

====Armenia====
====Australia====
====Austria====
====Azerbaijan====
====The Bahamas====
====Bahrain====
====Bangladesh====
The Constitution declares Bangladesh to be an Islamic state, but ensures equal status of minority religions. However, minority religious have faced discrimination and pressure to migrate to India (Atkins, "Challenges to Religious Freedom in Bangladesh").

====Barbados====
====Belarus====
====Belgium====
====Belize====
====Benin====
====Bhutan====
Bhutan is majority Buddhist and freedom of religion is guaranteed in the Constitution, but requires religious groups to register. As of now, only Buddhist and Hindu groups are registered and Christian organizations have not received an answer (U.S. Department of State, "BHUTAN 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT").

====Bolivia====
====Bosnia and Herzegovina====
====Botswana====
====Brazil====
The Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience and religious practice. In addition, it prohibits the state from favoring one religion over others (U.S. Department of State, "2016 Report on International Religious Freedom - Brazil").

====Brunei====
====Bulgaria====
====Burkina Faso====
====Burundi====
====Cambodia====
====Cameroon====
====Canada====
====Cape Verde====
====Central African Republic====
====Chad====
====Chile====
====China====
The Constitution establishes freedom of religion, but limits it to "normal religious activity" without defining normal. Religious groups are controlled if they are perceived to be a threat by the Communist Party. In recent years, there has been a campaign of religious persecution of the Uighurs in the Xinjiang province (U.S. Department of State, "CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, XINJIANG, HONG KONG, AND MACAU) 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT").

====Colombia====
The Constitution establishes freedom of religion, but gives preferential status to the Roman Catholic Church (Humanists International, "The Freedom of Thought Report").

====Comoros====
====Democratic Republic of the Congo====
====Republic of the Congo====
====Costa Rica====
====Croatia====
====Cuba====
====Cyprus====
====Czech Republic====
====Denmark====
Freedom of religion is guaranteed in the Constitution, but establishes the Evangelical Lutheran Church as the national church. Religious groups are required to register with the government. In recent years, there have been indications of restrictions of this freedom, such as banning face masks and mandatory religious teachings in pre-schools (U.S. Department of State, "DENMARK 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT").

====Djibouti====
====Dominica====
====Dominican Republic====
====East Timor====
====Ecuador====
====Egypt====
====El Salvador====
====Equatorial Guinea====
====Eritrea====
====Estonia====
====Eswatini====
====Ethiopia====
====Fiji====
====Finland====
====France====
The earliest documentation of freedom of religion in France is the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1798 (Britannica, "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen," Article 10). The Law of Secularism, passed in 1905, establishes the separation of church and state, but favors traditionally "French" religions such as Catholicism, at the expense of others, like Islam (U.S. Department of State, "FRANCE 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT").

====Gabon====
====The Gambia====
====Georgia====
====Germany====
Religious freedom and secularism are guaranteed in the Constitution. The various autonomous states regulate the existence and activities of religious groups within their borders (U.S. Department of State, "GERMANY 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT").

====Ghana====
====Greece====
====Grenada====
====Guatemala====
====Guinea====
====Guinea-Bissau====
====Guyana====
====Haiti====
====Honduras====
====Hungary====
====Iceland====
====India====
====Indonesia====
====Iran====
====Iraq====
====Republic of Ireland====
Freedom of religion is guaranteed in the Constitution and religious groups are not required to register with the government. In terms of schooling, religion classes are permitted but parents can opt their students out (U.S. Department of State, "IRELAND 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT").

====Israel====
====Italy====
====Ivory Coast====
====Jamaica====
====Japan====
The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion (Sumimoto, "RELIGIOUS FREEDOM PROBLEMS IN JAPAN: BACKGROUND AND CURRENT PROSPECTS").

====Jordan====
====Kazakhstan====
The Constitution defines it as a secular state and ensures freedom of religion. Some missionary organizations are banned, as well as religious sects such as Sufism, Baptists, Seventh-day Adventists, and Presbyterians (U.S. Department of State, "KAZAKHSTAN 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT").

====Kenya====
====Kiribati====
====Kuwait====
====Kyrgyzstan====
The Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience and religion and bans religious groups from inciting hatred towards others. It requires religious groups to register, but maintains bans on twenty-one "extremist" religious groups (U.S. Department of State, "KYRGYZ REPUBLIC 2017 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT").

====Laos====
====Latvia====
====Lebanon====
====Lesotho====
====Liberia====
====Libya====
====Liechtenstein====
====Lithuania====
====Luxembourg====
====Madagascar====
====Malawi====
====Malaysia====
====Maldives====
The Constitution designates Islam as the state religion, requires all citizens to be Muslim and requires all public officials to be Sunni Muslim (U.S. Department of State, "MALDIVES 2019 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT").

====Mali====
====Malta====
====Marshall Islands====
====Mauritania====
====Mauritius====
====Mexico====
====Federated States of Micronesia====
====Moldova====
====Monaco====
====Mongolia====
====Montenegro====
====Morocco====
====Mozambique====
====Myanmar====
====Namibia====
====Nauru====
====Nepal====
The new constitution guarantees religious freedom, but bans conversions to Hinduism (Nazir-Ali, "Christianity in South and Central Asia," 382).

====Kingdom of the Netherlands====
====New Zealand====
====Nicaragua====
====Niger====
====Nigeria====
====North Korea====
====North Macedonia====
====Norway====
In 1845, the Dissenter Law gave Norwegians the right to secede for the state church and regulated the formulation of nonconformist sects. In 1964, it was amended to be included in the Constitution and the right to form denominations was expanded to include all religions five years later (Hale, "The Development of Religious Freedom in Norway," 56).

====Oman====
====Pakistan====
The Constitution designates Islam as the state religion and requires that all government laws be consistent with Islamic law. Despite this, the Constitution contains the right to religious freedom, though its implementation is disputed (U.S. Department of State, "Pakistan," 1).

====Palau====
====Panama====
====Papua New Guinea====
====Paraguay====
====Peru====
====Philippines====
====Poland====
====Portugal====
====Qatar====
====Romania====
====Russia====
The Constitution establishes freedom of religion and recognizes four "traditional" religions--Christianity, Judaism, Islam and Buddhism. Preference is given to the Russian Orthodox Church (U.S. Department of State, "RUSSIA 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT").

====Rwanda====
====Saint Kitts and Nevis====
====Saint Lucia====
====Saint Vincent and the Grenadines====
====Samoa====
====San Marino====
====São Tomé and Príncipe====
====Saudi Arabia====
====Senegal====
====Serbia====
====Seychelles====
====Sierra Leone====
====Singapore====
====Slovakia====
====Slovenia====
====Solomon Islands====
====Somalia====
====South Africa====
====South Korea====
====South Sudan====
====Spain====
Freedom of religion is established within the Constitution and established a secular state. The Catholic Church, however, has established itself as a central player within Spanish politics, with its prominent role in the People's Party. It also has special privileges within Spanish society (U.S. Department of State, "SPAIN 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT").

====Sri Lanka====
The Constitution provides freedom of thought and religion. It recognizes four religions (Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam). It also designates Buddhism as the state religion, thus giving it priority (U.S. Department of State, "2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Sri Lanka").

====Sudan====
====Suriname====
====Sweden====
====Switzerland====
====Syria====
====Tajikistan====
The Constitution provides religious freedom and establishes separation between church and state. All religious activity is required to be reported to the state. An amendment to current law (enforced in January 2018) permits restrictions on religious activity for the sole purpose of ensuring the rights and freedoms of others, as well as banning one religious sect from being state ideology (U.S. Department of State, "2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Tajikistan").

====Tanzania====
====Thailand====
====Togo====
====Tonga====
====Trinidad and Tobago====
====Tunisia====
====Turkey====
====Turkmenistan====
The Constitution ensures a secular state, but is significantly limited. The state requires that all religious organizations must register--as of now, only Sunni Muslims and Russian Orthodoxes are registered (U.S. Department of State, "UZBEKISTAN 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT").

====Tuvalu====
====Uganda====
====Ukraine====
====United Arab Emirates====
====United Kingdom====
The Toleration Act of 1689 allowed nonconformist religions, with the exception of Roman Catholicism, to practice. However, social penalties still persisted (U.K. Parliament, "Catholics and nonconformists"). The Human Rights Act of 1998 established the fundamental rights of citizens within the UK, including freedom of religion (Equality and Human Rights Commission, "The Human Rights Act," Article 9).

====United States====

====Uruguay====
====Uzbekistan====
The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and separation of church and state (U.S. Department of State, "UZBEKISTAN 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT").

====Vanuatu====
====Venezuela====
====Vietnam====
====Yemen====
====Zambia====
====Zimbabwe====
===Is there another noteworthy written source from the past that mentions this right?===
The Edict of Milan, as noted above, came two years after the Edict of Toleration by Galerius and granted religious toleration within the Roman Empire. The Magna Carta, signed in 1215 in England, provided the foundations for the rights of men, including freedom of religion (Britannica, "Magna Carta").

===Is the identification of this right associated with a particular era in history, political regime, or political leader?===

Religious freedom, while commonplace in modern liberal democracies, was not always identified as a natural right with which people were born. Historical narratives describe the “Dark Ages” between the fall of the Roman Empire and the advent of early modernity as a period in which the world was divided between various civilizations according to the religions which they professed. Religious pluralism did not become more widespread until toleration and freedom of religion were identified as potential rights. In Western civilization, this occurred during the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The Reformation was one of the most influential movements in the course of western history. As leaders like Martin Luther, and John Calvin led Christian communities to break from traditional Catholicism, the rate of religious pluralism rose within Europe and led to a series of religious wars that defined the sixteenth century. In an early attempt to mediate these conflicts, German rulers negotiated the 1555 Peace of Augsburg. Andrea Walsham writes that this document “established the principle of cuius regio, eius religio, by which individual rulers were permitted to choose whether Catholicism or Protestantism should be professed in their states” (Walsham, “Reformation Legacies,” 231.) Thus, in addition to legalizing the practice of multiple religions within the German states, the adoption of cuius regio, eius religio also meant that religion would no longer be forced upon a principality by outside forces. The idea that Christian rulers could have the right to choose their own religion, and that this choice would be respected, represents an early step toward the principles of religious pluralism and toleration. The Peace of Augsburg did not lend religious agency to the subjects living within these principalities, but it did show European leaders that cooperation was possible between rulers who belonged to differing faiths.

The seventeenth century was an especially bloody one which included such conflicts as the English Civil War, the French Wars of Religion, and the vicious Thirty Years’ War. Religious plurality invariably led to violence in the seventeenth century, but these conflicts were often followed by important agreements that fostered some level of religious toleration. In 1598, following the religious battles between Catholics and Protestants in France, the French King Henry (IV) of Navarre signed the Edict of Nantes, which “gave Protestants permission to practice their faith openly, albeit within strict limits and as second-class citizens” (Walsham, “Reformation Legacies,” 231). The Thirty Years’ War famously concluded with the Peace of Westphalia, which decreed (among other things) that while each state should have the right to establish an official religion, they were also obligated to allow their subjects the opportunity to practice different Christian denominations without fear of persecution (Christenson, “Liberty of the Exercise of Religion in the Peace of Westphalia,” 740). By favoring religious toleration, Westphalia’s signatories recognized that only religious toleration would reduce the potential for future conflict between the various sects of Christianity. Documents like the Edict of Nantes and the Peace of Westphalia ultimately failed to end religious persecution and conflict within Europe, but they still reveal a heightened awareness of the need for leaders to tolerate religious plurality within their borders.

As the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries wore on, European intelligentsia began exploring the concept of religious freedom more directly. Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire and Baruch Spinoza led the intellectual charge in support of freedom of conscience and thought, while political leaders such as Roger Williams and Thomas Jefferson incorporated principles of religious freedom and the separation of church and state into their state building efforts in North America. While legal guarantees of the right to religious freedom would not be made until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the modern right to freedom of religion is rooted in Reformation-era efforts to mediate religious conflict and incorporate religious toleration into budding European nation-states.

===What specific events or ideas contributed to its identification as a fundamental right?===

After witnessing the horror of religious warfare during the Reformation era, European philosophy began to explore the idea of religious toleration within political society. As the Enlightenment movement gained momentum during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, western civilization turned to science, empiricism, and reason as sources of wisdom and knowledge. This movement was accompanied by a shift away from purely religious discourse as innovative thinkers began to take up more secular pursuits than they could have in centuries past. With this shift thinkers like Locke, Voltaire, Spinoza, and Williams began to question whether states had the right to dictate their subjects’ religious beliefs. These questions led these Enlightenment thinkers to begin believing that political society would better respect its citizens’ rights if it were to adopt policies of religious toleration.

Religious pluralism became a reality in Enlightenment-era Europe. The Protestant Reformation of the previous centuries had given rise to a number of Protestant-dominated secular states which had carved out a right to remain independent of the Catholic Church after decades of bloodshed and warfare. In the following centuries, thinkers like Spinoza and Voltaire reflected upon the dangers that intolerance can pose to a peaceful society. In 1670 Spinoza’s anonymously published “Treatise on Theology and Politics” radically asserted that “men are very prone to error on religious subjects, and, according to the diversity of their dispositions, are wont with considerable stir to put forward their own inventions, as experience more than sufficiently attests.” (Spinoza, “The Chief Works of Benedict De Spinoza,” 163). However, rather than calling for the abolition of religious toleration, Spinoza uses this idea that religious difference breeds conflict to suggest that states should abandon any effort to control their citizens’ beliefs, and should instead simply protect the people’s right to their own thoughts. In a state built on principles of toleration instead of religious unity, religious conflict would be less likely. A century later, Voltaire came to a similar conclusion in his 1775 “Treatise on Tolerance.” In this work, the Frenchman writes that “toleration, in fine, never led to civil war; intolerance has covered the earth with carnage,” and asserts that “the whole of our continent shows us that we must neither preach nor practise intolerance” (Voltaire, “Toleration and Other Essays-Online Library of Liberty”). By linking the idea of religious toleration to the need for states to maintain law and order within society, both Spinoza and Voltaire began to identify religious freedom as an essential facet of a well-ordered state.

Another important Enlightenment idea that contributed to the identification of the right to religious freedom was the argument that God may will that religious toleration be extended throughout the Christian world. After centuries of warfare, much of it based on the principle that members of the one true religion must fight infidels in the name of God, this was a relatively novel idea. In his 1644 work, The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution, Roger Williams rejects this idea and states that “it is the will and command of God, that (since the coming of his Son the Lord Jesus) a permission of the most pagan, Jewish, Turkish, or Antichristian consciences and worships, be granted to all men in all nations and countries...” (Williams, “The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution”). The Tenant even goes as far as to claim that “God requireth not an uniformity of religion to be enacted and enforced in any civil state…”(Williams, “The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution”). Williams’ work was not well-received by his audience in England, especially considering that the country was still in the midst of a religiously-motivated civil war. However, the idea that the civil state should not enforce any religion was hugely influential in the colony of Rhode Island, of which Williams is considered the sole founder. Decades later, in 1689 following the French King Louis XIV’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes, Locke wrote something very similar in his “Letter Concerning Toleration.” In this letter, he asserts that “the toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion is so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ...that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to perceive the necessity and advantage of it in so clear a light” (Locke, “A Letter Concerning Toleration”). The desire to follow God’s will had long guided European thoughts about the connection between church and state, but thinkers like Williams and Locke presented important challenges to this notion. This allowed for discussion over the right to religious freedom to flourish as the Enlightenment wore on.

Though discourse on religious toleration was still considered fairly radical during the seventeenth century, Enlightenment philosophers also questioned whether it was indeed even possible for a state to dictate its citizens’ religious beliefs. Spinoza’s “Treatise” is heavily concerned with the idea that a person’s right to think freely is a natural right which cannot be deprived by any political society. He writes that “however unlimited, therefore, the power of a sovereign may be, however implicitly it is trusted as the exponent of law and religion, it can never prevent men from forming judgments according to their intellect, or being influenced by any given emotion” (Spinoza, “The Chief Works of Benedict De Spinoza,” 194). This, Spinoza believes, necessarily implies that a state could never enforce a person’s belief or religious faith because it is not possible for a state to take a person’s mastery of their own thoughts. Voltaire expresses a similar sentiment in his essays when he states that “it does not depend on man to believe or not to believe: but it depends on him to respect the usages of his country” (Voltaire, “Toleration and Other Essays-Online Library of Liberty”). Writing about a century after Spinoza, Voltaire also explored the idea that the state is unable to change how a citizen believes, as long as the belief is not inherently detrimental to the state itself. With this in mind, Voltaire advances the idea that because states cannot change its citizens’ beliefs, it should embrace a diversity of beliefs by incorporating the principle of religious freedom into its governance.

Among the most radical Enlightenment-era ideas concerning religious toleration was the thought that civil states did not have the inherent right to dictate citizens’ religion at all. Locke’s “Letter” asserts that “nobody, therefore, in fine, neither single persons nor churches, nay, nor even commonwealths, have any just title to invade the civil rights and worldly goods of each other upon pretence of religion” (Locke, “A Letter Concerning Toleration”). Spinoza similarly states that “government which attempts to control minds is accounted tyrannical, and it is considered an abuse of sovereignty and a usurpation of the rights of subjects” (Spinoza, “The Chief Works of Benedict De Spinoza,” 194). This idea that citizens of a political society could have the innate right to decide their own thoughts and religion built upon the initial identification of religion as a multifaceted issue, which originated centuries earlier during the Reformation. As early as 1644, former Massachusetts Puritain Roger Williams rather controversially wrote that “all civil states and their officers of justice in their respective constitutions and administrations are proved essentially civil, and therefore not judges, governors, or defenders of the Spiritual or Christian state and worship” (Williams, “The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution”). The principle that civil states could not serve as spiritual authorities directly influenced the development of political states such as the Rhode Island Colony and the United States of America, in which freedom of religion was identified as an essential right with which the government could not interfere.

Though the idea of a right to religious freedom was first conceived during the religious wars of the Reformation era, Enlightenment thinkers deserve credit for identifying religious freedom as an essential right. Questions of whether God’s will dictated religious uniformity, the dangers of combating religious pluralism, as well as issues of citizen and states’ rights all contributed, decades and centuries after they were originally pondered, to the inclusion of religious freedom in mainstream political discourse. Williams and Locke both made important contributions to the growing American discussion of essential rights and liberties, while writings from thinkers like Spinoza and Voltaire gradually invited Europeans to consider the benefits of granting religious freedom to their subjects.

===When was it generally accepted as a fundamental, legally-protectable right?===

Religious freedom was originally identified as a fundamental right when Enlightenment thinkers began to question whether political society has the obligation, or even the right, to decide its citizens’ religion. At the time, the widespread conclusion was that religious toleration and freedom of belief were preferable to religious uniformity and faith-based oppression. Around the same time in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, political documents began to identify religious freedom as a fundamental, legally-protectable right with which the state had no right to interfere. Among the first western states to legislate freedom of religion were the English North American colony of Rhode Island, a few of its fellow American colonies, and the United States itself. There was some historical precedent for government-legislated religious toleration in the form of the 1598 Edict of Nantes and the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, but the Rhode Island Charter and the United States Constitution were among the first documents to completely prohibit governments from interfering in their citizens’ religious affairs.

The founding of the Rhode Island and Providence Plantations is accredited to Roger Williams, a preacher who was banished from the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1635 and went on to purchase from the Narragansett Native Americans a plot of land that would become the city of Providence, Rhode Island (Smithsonian Institution, “God, Government and Roger Williams’ Big Idea”). He was banished for holding religious views that contrasted with those upon which the Massachusetts Bay Colony was founded, and it is likely that this experience influenced his thoughts about religious freedom and the value of toleration within political society. He expresses these views quite effectively in his 1644 work, The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution, which states that “the permission of other consciences and worships than a state professeth, only can (according to God) procure a firm and lasting peace, (good assurance being taken according to the wisdom of civil state for uniformity of civil obedience from all forts)” (Williams, “The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution,”). The Rhode Island Charter, which Williams secured from Parliament in July 1663, reflects this view. It states that:

"No person within the said colony, at any time hereafter, shall be any wise molested, punished, disquieted, or called in question, for any differences in opinion in matters of religion, and do not actually disturb the civil peace of our said colony; but that all and every person and persons may, from time to time, and at all times hereafter, freely and fully have and enjoy his and their own judgments and consciences, in matters of religious concernments, throughout the tract of lance hereafter mentioned." (“Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations - July 15, 1663”)

By prohibiting the molestation, punishment, disquieting, and questioning of any citizen on the basis of religion, the Charter sets a clear guarantee that those living within the colony had the legal right to religious freedom. This was groundbreaking not only because it was the first of the thirteen original American colonies to guarantee total religious freedom, but also because unlike most contemporary acts of toleration, the Charter did not exclude Quaker and Jewish citizens from enjoying the religious freedom that it promised.

Of course, Rhode Island was not the only one of the thirteen original American colonies to identify religious freedom as a fundamental, legally protectable right. Colonies like Maryland and Pennsylvania are also noteworthy for their inclusion of religious groups that made up the English minority. Maryland famously welcomed Catholics inside its borders, and Pennsylvania was originally founded as a Quaker colony under William Penn. As the colonies grew they became examples to contemporary Enlightenment thinkers, who looked to their example as proof that religious toleration was a desirable principle within any system of government. In his work on religious toleration, Voltaire writes of Philadelphia that “discord and controversy are unknown in the happy country they have made for themselves; and the very name of their chief town, Philadelphia, which unceasingly reminds them that all men are brothers, is an example and a shame to nations that are yet ignorant of toleration” (Voltaire, “Toleration and Other Essays - Online Library of Liberty,”). The benefits of religious freedom were well-known by the time of the American Revolution, which explains why religious freedom was such an important building block of the early republic. The Constitution of the United States was also one of the first documents to identify religious freedom as a fundamental, legally protectable right. Its First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (“United States Bill of Rights, Amendment I”). The inclusion of this language in such an influential document represents an important step in the identification of religious freedom as a fundamental legal right.

It should be noted, however, that the First Amendment does not explicitly separate church and state within the United States government. The principle of church and state separation was not explicitly outlined until 1802, when President Thomas Jefferson outlined it in a letter to the Baptist community of Danbury, Connecticut. It was written in response to community leaders’ complaint that religious freedom was being treated as a privilege, not a right within their state. They wrote that “our sentiments are uniformly on the side of religious liberty--that religion is at all times and places a matter between God and individuals--that no man ought to suffer in name, person, or effects on account of his religious opinions--that the legitimate power of civil government extends no further than to punish the man who works ill to his neighbors” (“Jefferson's Wall of Separation Letter - The U.S. Constitution Online,”). In response, Jefferson famously asserted that “I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between Church & State” (“Jefferson's Wall of Separation Letter - The U.S. Constitution Online,”). This separation to which he refers is built upon Enlightenment ideals set out by thinkers like Locke and Spinoza, and it represents the realization of a movement for religious freedom that originated centuries before with the Protestant Reformation.

Religious freedom is a right with a long history, and for centuries after it first came into question within the western world it was debated and considered. Thinkers like Locke and Voltaire championed it, and documents such as the Treaty of Westphalia and the Edict of Nantes made important strides toward realizing it as a legally protectable right. However, many of the first true instances of legally protected religious freedom occurred in American documents such as the Rhode Island Charter and the United States Constitution. These landmark pieces of legislation framed the modern American stance on religious toleration and the right to freedom of belief.

===What historical forces or events, if any, contributed to a widespread belief in its importance? ===

Widespread belief in the importance of religious freedom within a liberal democratic society developed over centuries of religious separation, conflict, discourse. Over the past five hundred years Western civilization has transitioned from a uniformly Christian bloc of nations into a set of states defined by religious diversity and built upon the principles of toleration and religious freedom. Three major forces drove that transformation: The violence caused by religious intolerance, the increasing value of free thought, and the success of religiously free states. Over time, all three of these historical forces led to the widespread belief in the importance of religious freedom within western society.

The first historical force that led to the original identification of religious freedom as a valuable right was the horror and devastation that Europe witnessed during the Reformation era as a result of religious conflicts. The widespread destruction that took place during such conflicts as the Schmalkaldic Wars, the French Wars of Religion, and the English Civil War showed Europeans how difficult it would be to preserve religious unity within their borders, which led some to question the value of religious homogeneity. The Thirty Years War, especially, led to the identification of religious tolerance as an alternative to the religiously-motivated violence when it concluded with the landmark Peace of Westphalia. Voltaire’s assessment that “Germany would be a desert strewn with the bones of Catholics, Protestants, and Anabaptists, slain by each other, if the Peace of Westphalia had not at length brought freedom of conscience” reveals how important the war, and the treaty that ended it, really were to the identification of religious freedom as an important civil right (Voltaire, “Toleration and Other Essays - Online Library of Liberty”). Historian Gordon Christenson similarly notes that the principle of religious tolerance had been included in previous Reformation-era treaties, but the Peace of Westphalia’s explicit use of the principle as a peacekeeping measure reveals that it had broken into mainstream political thought by the end of the war (Walsham, “Reformation Legacies,” 231.)

As the dust settled after years of religious conflict, a second historical force also contributed to the widespread belief in the right of religious freedom. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Enlightenment thinkers reflected upon the Reformation wars and the state of European politics, and began to advocate for the freedom of thought and faith within political society. In 1669 Spinoza concluded that “a government would be most harsh which deprived the individual of his freedom of saying and teaching what he thought; and would be moderate if such freedom were granted” (Spinoza, “The Chief Works of Benedict De Spinoza,” 195), Two decades later, Locke came to a similar conclusion when his “Letter Concerning Toleration” specifically outlined the principle of religious toleration by asserting that “no private person has any right in any manner to prejudice another person in his civil enjoyments because he is of another church or religion” (Locke, “A Letter Concerning Toleration,”). Though the identification of religious freedom as a fundamental right did not immediately lead to its universal adoption among western states, it did represent a significant advancement in the field of religious rights. Going forward, rulers and state builders were more conscious of religious toleration as a viable alternative to forcing religious uniformity within their borders. About a century later, this Locke sentiment was directly incorporated into the American Bill of Rights, which prohibits the creation of any law that might restrict the free practice of religion(Constitution of the United States of America).

Over time the ideas of toleration and the freedom of thought became more widespread, which led a number of states to explore religious freedom as a principle upon which strong nations could be built. Among the first political leaders to embrace the principle of religious freedom was Roger Williams, who founded the English colony of Rhode Island after he was banished from the Massachusetts Bay Colony. As the colony grew over the next several years, he drafted a compact under which it could be governed. Smithsonian Magazine writes that “the most significant element was what the compact did not say. It did not propose to build a model of God’s kingdom on earth, as did Massachusetts...the compact did not even ask God’s blessing. It made no mention of God at all” (Smithsonian Institution, “God, Government and Roger Williams' Big Idea,”). Shortly afterward Williams traveled to England in order to secure a charter from an English Parliament that was itself in the midst of a Civil War. The charter was granted, and the committee that granted it “left all decisions about religion to the “greater Part”—the majority—knowing the majority would keep the state out of matters of worship. Soul liberty now had official sanction” (Smithsonian Institution, “God, Government and Roger Williams' Big Idea,”). The establishment of the Rhode island colony greatly benefitted the growing belief in religious freedom as a fundamental right because it proved that a political society defined by toleration could find success despite the lack of uniform religion. This idea heavily influenced the drafting of the United States Constitution, and over the next two centuries freedom of religion came to be a defining feature for liberal democracies.

Over the past five centuries, western civilization underwent a number of historical changes that led it to lose faith in the benefits of religious homogeneity and instead come to support freedom of belief and universal toleration. As it slowly began to understand the dangers of promoting state-led religious uniformity, the western world began to explore ideas of plurality and acceptance before eventually embracing them in political entities such as Rhode Island and the United States. Modern democracies still struggle to guarantee the right to freedom of religion at times, but after five hundred years of development western society at least recognizes it as a fundamental human right.

==Legal Codification==
===Is this right protected in the Constitutions of most countries today?===
Most countries in the modern world protect freedom of religion in their constitutions; however, the extent to which the right is truly protected in practice ranges from state to state. The U.S. State Department names and publicly shames eight “Countries of Particular Concern” that systematically and consistently violate religious freedom rights within their borders: Burma, China, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan (Pellot 2014). The Freedom of Thought Report by Humanists International found that you can be put to death for expressing atheism in an astonishing thirteen countries. Also, in thirty-nine countries the law mandates a prison sentence for blasphemy, including six surprising western countries: Iceland (up to three months), Denmark (up to four months), New Zealand (up to a year), Poland (up to two years), Germany (up to three years) and Greece (up to three years). Although the right may be protected in many states' constitutions, freedom of religion is severely lacking in many countries around the world.

Pellot, Brian PellotBrian, and Global Strategy. “The Worst Countries for Religious Freedom.” Index on Censorship, 28 Sept. 2018, www.indexoncensorship.org/2014/01/worst-countries-religious-freedom/.

===Is it contained in the US Constitution?===

Yes this right is protected in the First Amendment of the US Constitution. It permits that all people have the right to practice his/her own religion, or that they have the choice to practice no religion at all. There is no established religion in the US, and under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the government is prohibited from advancing or advocating any religion in any way. Also, under the Free Exercise Clause, the government cannot penalize a person for choosing or not choosing to worship in any particular way (ACLU 2020).

“Your Right to Religious Freedom.” American Civil Liberties Union, www.aclu.org/other/your-right-religious-freedom.

===Has it been interpreted as being implicit in the US Constitution?===
The right is explicitly protected both in the Bill of Rights, but also in Article VI of the Constitution. This article prohibits religious discrimination in the formation of the government under the No Religious Test Clause. The clause, stating that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States,” promotes the freedom of religion and religious equality in all manners of life, starting from within the government itself (Brownstein and Campbell 2020)

===Are there any exceptions in American law to this right?===
Based upon the Constitution and the First Amendment, the federal government is, by law, not permitted to limit the exercising of one’s right to freedom of religion, but this specific clause did not apply at the state level (Lutz 2013). Eventually the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, extending more religious freedoms as a guaranteed right to the states. However, in the actual application of the freedom of religion, the US relies upon Supreme Court decisions as a guide to the manner in which the right is exercised. In 1878, in the case of Reynolds v. United States, the Mormon Church legally challenged the 1862 Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act in efforts to continue their polygamist practices according to their beliefs and interpretations of their religion. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the US, citing that the law did not interfere with religious belief nor did it selectively target religious practice. In essence, “while the freedom to believe is absolute, the freedom to act on those beliefs is not” (Freedom Forum Institute 2020). Chief Justice Morrison Waite wrote, “To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and, in effect, permit every citizen to become a law unto himself” (Lutz 2013).

This decision was later reinforced in 1990, with the case of Employment Division v. Smith. After Alred Smith was fired from his job for using peyote, a controversial and, at that time, illegal hallucinogenic plant used in some religious rituals within the Native American Church, he sued the employment division under the law’s protection of “free exercise” (Cornell Legal Information Institute 2020). The Court ruled in favor of the Employment Division citing that the reason for the termination was work-related misconduct. Scalia stated that, allowing this kind of exemption from the law “would open the prospect of constitutionally required exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.” Eventually in 1994, however, this decision was reversed with the passing of the H.R. 4230 amendment to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act which protected the use of peyote in religious ceremonies.

Also notably, the Sherbert v. Verner case of 1963 established the four-part “Sherbert test.” This test is also referred to as the “compelling interest” test. The test’s four parts are that: “For the individual, the court must 1. determine whether the person has a claim involving a sincere religious belief, and 2. whether the government action places a substantial burden on the person’s ability to act on that belief. Next, if these two elements are established, then the government must prove that 1. it is acting in furtherance of a “compelling state interest,” and that 2. it has pursued that interest in the manner least restrictive, or least burdensome, to religion” (Freedom Forum Institute 2020).

However, the test was undermined in the ruling of the Employment Division v. Smith case because of the court’s implication that one could not legally and successfully challenge an infringement upon free exercise if the unintended result was to break laws that were generally applicable to all (and it permitted that the government did not have to justify this infringement by proving a compelling state interest). Also, these rulings were all made at the federal level; many states still control the ultimate application of “free exercise,” and as a result, the interpretation varies in differing states.

Another notable case is the 1968 case of Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises (Justia 2020). This case backed anti-discriminatory statutes after a barbecue chain refused to serve black people with the justification of the owner being that his beliefs compelled him to segregate races within his restaurants. This case was monumental because it well-established the limit to freedom of religion that allows for the weaponizing of one’s rights against another man.

The courts also uses other tests in determining decisions regarding freedom of religion. The three-part Lemon test from the 1971 decision Lemon v. Kurtzman (which prohibited state funding of religious schools) states that 1. a court must first determine whether the law or government action in question has a compelling state and secular interest, underlining the idea that government should only concern itself in civil matters and should interfere with matters of individual religion as little as possible. 2. The state action must be proved to have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. And 3. the court must consider whether the action in question excessively entangles religion and government(Pacelle Jr.). Although criticized by several Supreme Court justices, some courts still use this test in establishment-clause cases. However, in the 1997 decision Agostini v. Felton, the Supreme Court finally modified the Lemon test in that it combined the entanglement and primary effects prongs of the test.

The endorsement test, proposed by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in her concurring opinion in the 1984 case of Lynch v. Donnelly, asks whether a particular government action amounts to an endorsement of religion (Hudson Jr.). This test has sometimes been assumed to fall into the Lemon test. It is similar to the first two prongs of the Lemon test by subjecting the challenged government act to the criteria of having the purpose or effect of endorsing religion. This test typically is invoked where the government is involved in expressive activities such as graduation prayers, religious signs on government property, religion in the curriculum, etc.

Under the coercion test, the government does not violate the establishment clause unless it provides direct aid to religion in a way that would establish a state church or unless it coerces people to practice a religion against their will (Vile). However, this test is subject to varying interpretations, as is demonstrated in the conflicting cases of Allegheny County v. ACLU in 1989 and the 1992 case of Lee v. Weisman, in which Justices Kennedy and Antonin Scalia, applying the same test, reached different results (FindLaw 2020). Although freedom of religion is well-protected by the Constitution, debates over its application, protections from/of, and limitations to the right are an ongoing debate in the legal and free world.

A Brief History of Peyote, www.peyote.org/.

“Establishment Clause Overview.” Freedom Forum Institute, www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-religion/establishment-clause-overview/.

“FindLaw's United States Supreme Court Case and Opinions.” Findlaw, caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/492/573.html.

Jr, David L. Hudson. Endorsement Test, mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/833/endorsement-test.

Jr, Richard L. Pacelle. Lemon Test, www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/834/lemon-test.

Lutz, Zak. “Limits of Religious Freedom.” Harvard Political Review, 6 Nov. 2015, harvardpolitics.com/covers/limits-of-religious-freedom/.

McGovern, Geoff. Lynch v. Donnelly, mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/737/lynch-v-donnelly.

“Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968).” Justia Law, supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/390/400/.

“The No Religious Test Clause.” Article VI | The National Constitution Center, constitutioncenter.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/article-vi/clauses/32.

Vile, John R. Coercion Test, www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/899/coercion-test.

“What Does ‘Free Exercise’ of Religion Mean under the First Amendment?” Freedom Forum Institute, www.freedomforuminstitute.org/about/faq/what-does-free-exercise-of-religion-mean-under-the-first-amendment/.

===Is this right enshrined in international and regional human rights treaties?===

Yes, the freedom of religion is protected under several international human rights conventions, treaties, and decrees. This right is protected in article 18 of the UN’s 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 18 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and also in the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner).

The right is also protected by relevant articles within the following conventions and treaties: 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 1969 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 1981 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the 1990 UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the 1951 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

However, despite the writings and workings of all these conventions, treaties, and declarations, freedom of religion is still commonly suppressed in many areas of the world (Janis 2002). There is no effective international supervision of rights to religious freedom and diversity. However, regional European human rights law does in fact have tangible supervision of and consequences regarding the suppression of the freedom of religion. Article 9 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms protects right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.

“FindLaw's United States Supreme Court Case and Opinions.” Findlaw, caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/492/573.html.

“Global Restrictions on Religion.” Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project, 30 May 2020, www.pewforum.org/2009/12/17/global-restrictions-on-religion/.

Human Rights Library- University of Minnesota, hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/studyguides/religion.html.

“International Religious Freedom Report for 2017.” Wilson Center, www.wilsoncenter.org/article/international-religious-freedom-report-for-2017.

“International Standards - Framework for Communications.” OHCHR, www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomReligion/Pages/Standards.aspx.

“Religion and International Law.” ASIL, 17 Nov. 2002, www.asil.org/insights/volume/7/issue/13/religion-and-international-law.

U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State, 2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom//index.htm.

“You Can Be Put to Death for Atheism in 13 Countries around the World.” Humanists International, 1 Feb. 2019, humanists.international/2013/12/you-can-be-put-death-atheism-13-countries-around-world/.

==Philosophical Origins==
===What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?===
====Buddhism====
Encouraging religious toleration, Buddhism is often seen to promote religious freedom. This belief is rooted in the teachings of the historical Buddha, who is believed to have preached the importance of allowing individuals to worship other religions. Kulatissa Nanda Jayatilleke emphasizes this, claiming “The Buddhist attitude to other religions has from its inception been one of critical tolerance” (Freiberger, 187). As noted by Jayatilleke, toleration is foundational to Buddhism, demonstrating the belief system’s adherence to the principles of free religious exercise.

Though, as explained by Oliver Freiberger, this tolerance is primarily institutional rather than dogmatic (Freiberger, 186). While Buddhism condemns the persecution of other religious groups, it does not necessarily accept the practices and beliefs of other religions to be valid. Thus, as framed by Freiberger, while Buddhism promotes religious freedom, emphasized by its tenets of toleration, it does not approve of the practices of other religions.

In addition to toleration, the inclusivity practiced by Buddhists connects the belief system with religious freedom. Noted by Kirstein Beise Kiblinger, modern Buddhists aim to include others in their practices, using Buddhist excerpts to justify inclusivity as a core tenet of their belief system (Freiberger, 188). Permitting anyone the ability to convert to Buddhism, the belief system stresses the importance of the freedom to select one’s religion, an essential aspect of the right to free religious exercise.

Ultimately, the tenets of Buddhism can be used to bolster rights to religious freedom, the texts and practices of the religion upholding inclusivity and toleration.

Throughout history, Buddhism has been characterized by a broad, decentralized variety of different teachings; thus, sometimes depending on the context and specific text, there can be differing views on freedom of religion within the Buddhist tradition (Borchert 5, 2016). The opinions of the appropriate rights for Buddhists may emphasize and support advocacy for religious freedom for Buddhists or may justify restrictions upon the religious freedom of non-Buddhists to persecute, drive out, and/or convert them (as in Myanmar and the political unrest there today) (Borchert 10, 2014).

More often than not however, freedom of religion is strongly encouraged within the Buddhist tradition. Just as humans have a free mind in choosing between good and evil, we also have a free mind to choose what to believe, and each person should do so in: “healthy mind and knowledge” (Khareng, Awang, Rahman, Machae, Ismail 317, 2014). Within Buddhism, freedom of religion is described in the Tripitaka, the Buddhist most sacred text, and this text describes ten lessons for the “healthy mind” in evaluating the truths of other religions or schools of thought: “(a.) be not led by report (Ma Anusasawen), (b.) be not led by tradition (Ma Paramuprai), (c.) be not led by hearsay (Ma Itikirai), (d.) be not led by the authority of texts (Ma Pithoksamupathanen), (e.) be not led by mere logic and argument alone (Ma Takukahettu), (f.) be not led by inference (Ma Nayahettu), (g.) be not led by considering appearances (Ma Akorpariwitkuken), (h.) be not led by the agreement with a considered and approved theory (Ma Thitthinichamanokkukhanuthitaya), (i.) be not led by seeming possibilities (Ma Phapuphrutai) and (j.) be not led by the idea, ‘this is our teacher’ (Ma Sammanornokhruti)” (Khareng, Awang, Rahman, Machae, Ismail 317, 2014).

Throughout recent history, Buddhist thinkers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, such as the Dalai Lama or Walpola Rahula, view the Buddhist concern of alleviating suffering as a rationale to justify Buddhist concern for human rights (Borchert 55-56, 2016). In the Dalai Lama’s “The Importance of Religious Harmony,” he writes: “Each religion has its own philosophy and there are similarities as well as differences among the various traditions. What is important is what is suitable for a particular person. We should look at the underlying purpose of religion andnot merely at the abstract details of theology or metaphysics. All religions make
the betterment of humanity their primary concern… Whether we like it or not, we have all been born on this earth as part of one great human family. This is not to say that all human beings are the same or that because everyone wishes for happiness that the same things will make each of them happy. Brothers and sisters resemble each other without being identical” (Borchert 66, 2016). The Dalai Lama here clearly supports religious freedom, even pointing out the similarities in differing religions.

This message highlights that human dignity, equality, and freedom, which are the basics of accepted human rights are intrinsic to the ideal of Buddhist teachings. Although the UDHR’s ideas on human rights are considered Western in nature, the Buddist teachings of the Five Precepts and the six directions champion human rights without ever coining the exact phrase.
Stretching back to the third century BCE, Buddhist Emperor Asoka of India states in the 12th Edict of Asoka: “One should not honor only one’s own religion and condemn the religions
of others, but one should honor others’ religions for this or that reason. In so doing, one helps one’s own religion to grow and renders service to the religions of others too. In acting otherwise one digs the grave of one’s own religion and also does harm to other religions” (Chanawangsa 4 then 9, 2011).

====Platonism====
====Aristotelian thought====
Aristotle disagreed strongly with the concept of religion, but he believed people’s religious belief could be used both in the state’s favor. Regarding the relationship between politics and religion, in the work “Politics,” Aristotle writes, “A tyrant must put on the appearance of uncommon devotion to religion. Subjects are less apprehensive of illegal treatment from a ruler whom they consider god-fearing and pious. On the other hand, they do less easily move against him, believing that he has the gods on his side” (Cline 2019). He believed that implementing religion into the workings of a government gives a tyrant the ability to keep people at a distance, ignoring their disapproval of how they are being ruled and any challenges to the structure of the government itself. When sanctioned by divine order, people find a government much more difficult to question, let alone change (Cline 2019).

Although he held these cynical views toward the idea of religion within the government, Aristotle did construct a “ministry of religious affairs” into his ideal polis. This ministry would make it possible for religious affairs within the polis to be monitored and fostered in one way or another, depending on the polis. Despite his aversion to religion, Aristotle understood religious practice to inevitably exist within any polis, and he decided that this belief should then at least be put to its best use. (Gerson 2018). This use can be by imitation of the divine, regarding their intellectual virtues, that are to foster moral choice or freedoms to speak, behave, or practice whatever religion one sees fit in pursuing justice and seeking to live a virtuous life. In doing this, a polis takes another step in the direction of justice and virtue, once again separating our capacity from that of animals. (Gerson 2018). These views were the beginnings of the ideas behind the freedom of religion that we are free to practice today.

Aristotle’s views inspired the Thomastic principles that “the maintenance of any orderly society required adherence to defined rules of conduct… From this requirement some basic laws could be deduced, such as laws forbidding murder and theft. Such laws did not have to be revealed
by divine inspiration” (Wallace 537-538, 2009). These natural laws could be rationally produced and would serve as the basic moral framework necessary for the success of that society and natural, collective good while divine law would require certain revelations that are only relevant to those who accept it for their eternal good. Based upon this belief, there was clear and rational justification for a state that ran independent of central religion (Wallace 537-38).

====Ancient Chinese Philosophy====
The three primary ancient Chinese philosophies, Confucianism, Legalism, and Taoism, represent various attitudes regarding the rights to religious freedom.

Founded on the premise of reforming a corrupted society during the Spring and Autumn period, Confucianism initially strongly opposed the customs of other belief systems. For example, noted by Robert Cummings Neville, in their attempts to strengthen their philosophy, Confucians actively worked to suppress beliefs such as superstition, which persisted throughout Chinese culture at the time (Neville, 26). Additionally, noted by Neville, Confucianism has a self-serving definition of toleration. Neville asserts, “Relative to toleration, the principle is that anything in the wider environment can be tolerated so long as the narrower environment can flourish” (Neville, 30). Witnessed through this narrow denotation of “tolerance”, Confucianism emphasizes a sense of dogmatic ethnocentrism, in which other religions may be permitted, but only to the extent that Confucianism can thrive as the prevailing belief system. In this way, Confucianism undermines the idea of unfettered religious freedom.

Legalism, which focuses solely on preserving the strength and stability of the state, emphasizes that “law should replace morality” (Winston, 313). Furthermore, Legalist scholar Han Feizi emphasizes law to be within total control of the sovereign, undermining the individual liberties of citizens (Winston, 315). While not directly related to freedom of religion, the Legalist sovereign's unilateral power over the law emphasizes that individuals have no natural entitlements. This weakens the perceived strength of civilians’ rights to religion, as through Han Feizi’s teachings, civilians would only be permitted to worship as directed by the Sovereign.

Contrary to Confucianism and Legalism, Taoism, which emphasizes peace and harmony, is more tolerant of other groups, encompassing the principles of the right to religious freedom. Explained by Liu Jinguang, a Senior Fellow at the Center for Religious Research of China, unliked other belief systems, “Chinese Taoism has the fine tradition of upholding and promoting harmony… mutual respect and peaceful co-existence of different culture,, nationalities and religions are the foundations for building a harmonious word” (Jinguang, 207). As Taoism embraces not only toleration, but acceptance, of other faiths, it upholds the necessity of religious freedom for world harmony. Therefore, Taoism distinctly argues the importance of religious rights, allowing for the co-existence of numerous religious groups.

====Stoicism====
====Early Indian Philosophy====
====Miscellaneous Hellenistic Schools (epicureans, academics, skeptics, etc.)====
====Roman Legal and Political Thought====
====Early Christianity====
====Thomism and medieval Christianity====
====Medieval Islamic Thought====
====Medieval Judaism====
====Early Modern Rationalism====

The early-modern rationalist tradition has its roots in the European Enlightenment movement of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Though famous philosophers like Kant and Descartes came to define the era through their work on method and idealism, thinkers like Spinoza and Leibniz were also influential in their writings on metaphysics, religion, and political philosophy. Both thinkers’ works contributed to a developing discourse on the rights and duties of the sovereign within political society.

It is important to note that the early-modern definition of a “right” differs significantly from its modern meaning. Leibniz’s work, for example, was influential in his time because of his conviction that “right” implies an intrinsic moral permissibility in an actor to complete an action that does not negatively impact society. In an article entitled “The Grounds of Right and Obligation in Leibniz and Hobbes,” Christopher Johns explains that “for Leibniz right (jus) is a permissive power, that is, the power of doing whatever is consistent with public utility” (Johns, 2009). Ultimately, Leibniz is especially significant because his works of political philosophy are some of the first to assert that a sovereign’s “right” to do something does not necessarily imply moral justification. In his “Reflections on the Common Concept of Justice,” the German philosopher writes that “the error of those who have made justice depend upon power comes in part from their confusion of Right with law. Right cannot be unjust; this would be a contradiction. But law can be, for it is power which gives and maintains law; and if this power lacks wisdom or good will, it can give and maintain very bad laws” (Leibniz, 564). This idea that a sovereign is not justified in all of its actions clashes with that of earlier theorists like Thomas Hobbes, and both Leibniz and Spinoza use it to imply that the sovereign ought not to wield unmitigated power over its subjects. Leibniz asserts this idea as a general theory which can apply to religious freedom, though his near-contemporary Benedictus de Spinoza dealt more specifically with the issue.

While Spinoza also generally refrains from arguing against the sovereign’s right to do as it pleases, his writings do imply an understanding that a sovereign’s ability to dictate laws to its citizens is not entirely justified. In fact, his Theological-Political Treatise reveals his strong support for religious toleration. Spinoza’s exploration of the intersection between faith and sovereignty within this work leads him to first conclude that no sovereign entity can claim to rule a society simply by religious right. This is because humans are so prone to disagreement within religious discourse, meaning “the rights of the state would be dependent on every man’s judgment and passions” if sovereignty based its authority in divine right (Spinoza, 163). Through an analysis of the Biblical Hebrew state he further proposes that:
“We may now clearly see from what I have said:— I. How hurtful to religion and the state is the concession to ministers of religion of any power of issuing decrees or transacting the business of government: how, on the contrary, far greater stability is afforded, if the said ministers are only allowed to give answers to questions duly put to them, and are, as a rule, obliged to preach and practise the received and accepted doctrines.” (Spinoza, 182)

In addition to laying out one of the earliest arguments in favor of the separation of church and state, this Spinoza passage lays the groundwork for his assertion that the state ought not to compel its citizens to follow any one religion. Near the end of his discourse he states that though the government may have the “right” (or at least, the ability) to dictate whatever terms it pleases to its subjects, “a government would be most harsh which deprived the individual of his freedom of saying and teaching what he thought; and would be moderate if such freedom were granted” (Spinoza, 195). Ultimately, both Spinoza asserts the impermissibility of a sovereign’s use of power to force belief or faith upon its subjects.

Taken together, writings from early-modern rationalists like Leibniz and Spinoza present interesting arguments about the rights of sovereign and citizen as they relate to religious freedom. Leibniz’s declaration that the sovereign’s laws are not necessarily just opens the door for a discussion about the permissibility of lawbreaking, while Spinoza’s conclusion that rulers err when they attempt to dictate religion to their citizens give philosophers license to question state-enforced religious homogeneity. Though neither philosopher states unequivocally that a citizen has an innate right to practice whatever religion they choose, both seem to have agreed that the state is not morally justified in all of its attempts to control certain aspects of its citizens’ lives. Leibniz argues this point very generally, while Spinoza speaks specifically to the dangers of religious influence over a sovereign within political society.

Britain., Great. “The Statutes of the Realm : Printed by Command of His Majesty King George the Third, in Pursuance of an Address of the House of Commons of Great Britain. From V.1.” HathiTrust, babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000017915496.

Johns, Christopher. “The Grounds of Right and Obligation in Leibniz and Hobbes.” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 62, no. 3, 2009, pp. 551–574. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40387825. Accessed 30 July 2020.

“Reflections on the Common Concept of Justice (1702[?]).” Philosophical Papers and
Letters, by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Leroy E. Loemker, Kluwer Academic, 1989.

Spinoza, Benedictus de, and R. H. M. Elwes. The Chief Works of Benedict De Spinoza. G. Bell, 1891, oll-resources.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1710/Spinoza_1321.01_EBk_v6.0.pdf.

====Absolute Idealism====
====Reformation Christianity====

Freedoms of expression, religion, and conscience were not formally addressed in Reformation Christian thought, but discourse on rights and liberties relating to speech, press, and belief are apparent in Reformation thinkers’ writings and speeches. Leading figures in the Lutheran and Calvinist movements began to explore the permissibility of disagreement with Catholic dogma and the Pope himself. This usually arose, not from a discussion of rights and liberties, but rather from the idea that one ought not to be compelled to profess a faith in which they do not believe.
The right to freedom of religion, often referred to as one’s “freedom of conscience” in early modern texts, is partially rooted in the writings of Martin Luther during the early decades of the Protestant Reformation. Luther’s “Open Letter to the Christian Nobility” provides the basis for the Lutheran doctrine of the “priesthood of all believers,” which explains that all Christians have the capacity to understand and interpret God’s messages without the need of ordained Church officials. In his “Letter” Luther writes that “all Christians are truly of the ‘spiritual estate,’ and there is among them no difference at all but that of office” (Luther, 1520). This idea that all Christians have the right to decide for themselves what to believe about their faith was important to the Reformation movement because it was used to justify the vast expansion of different religious denominations that formed over the next few centuries. If Christians were free to believe what they felt was true, then they would have no problem forming new religious communities based on various interpretations of sacred texts. Later in his life Luther would rein in the “priesthood of all believers” doctrine as various beliefs sprang up which he considered heretical, but the doctrine survived to influence subsequent thinkers’ ideas about religious freedom and the rights of believers.
Luther further affected the discourse on religious freedom when he faced down the Catholic authorities against whom he had written in his “Letter.” He famously expressed an unwillingness to retract a heretical statement in the face of Catholic scrutiny at the Diet of Worms. The Diet was called in order to determine whether or not the German monk had broken Church law in the creation of his ninety-five theses, and it ultimately found Luther’s work heretical and asked him to revoke his statements. In response, Luther declared that, “if I were to revoke what I have written on that subject, what should I do but strengthen this [pope’s] tyranny, and open a wider door to so many and flagrant impieties? Bearing down all resistance with fresh fury, we should behold these proud men swell, foam, and rage more than ever!” (Luther, 1521) The idea that Luther could strengthen the pope’s unjust authority by revoking statements that he believed to be true imply his belief that in a just society, a person should be able to profess their beliefs without fear of punishment. While Luther’s speech did not propose any theory of inalienable liberty or right to freedom of belief, it did contribute to a discourse addressing the permissibility of religious restriction.

Interestingly, Luther’s disagreement with traditional church dogma also led some of his opponents to think about the utility of religious discourse between opposing viewpoints. In a famous exchange of ideas in a series of open letters, Northern Renaissance thinker Desiderius Erasmus engaged Luther in a debate on human free will. The contents of the debate did not themselves have much to do with the origins of the right to religious freedom, but Erasmus’ words in his opening letter imply that the Dutchman at least supported the free exchange of ideas among religious groups. When opening his letter Erasmus writes that “I do not consider Luther himself would be indignant if anybody should find occasion to differ from him, since he permits himself to call in question the decrees, not only of all the doctors of the Church, but of all the schools, councils, and popes” (Erasmus, 1524). This passage, which at first glance seems nothing more than a jab at Luther, takes on new meaning when Erasmus subsequently proposes that the two men “pursue the matter without recrimination, because this is more fitting for Christian men, and because in this way the truth, which is so often lost amid too much wrangling, may be more surely perceived” (Erasmus, 1524). By framing the debate as a mutually beneficial effort to find religious truth rather than a contest between opposing religious viewpoints, Erasmus implies a support for the free exchange of religious belief, if nothing else. His words do not betray any innate support for religious pluralism or toleration, but the appeal to debate as “the way to truth” nevertheless went on to influence subsequent scholars such as Locke and Voltaire, both of whom championed ideas of toleration and religious pluralism.

Three decades after Luther initially resisted the Church’s attempts to censor him, Theodore Beza began to explore ideas of rights and responsibilities as they relate to magistrates and subjects. Beza was a French theologian living in Geneva during the Reformation, and historians widely view him as the pseudo-successor to John Calvin. His work, On the Rights of Magistrates, explains his views on tyranny and a subject’s responsibility to resist it. While Beza’s work does not specifically mention a citizen’s right to freedom of religion it further advances the idea that a regime cannot justifiably restrict its citizens’ expression or belief. After explaining that magistrates should not be able to restrict citizens’ faith in Chapter Ten of Rights, Beza writes that “if [a magistrate] acts otherwise I declare that he is practicing manifest tyranny; and with due allowance for the observations made above, (his subjects) will be all the more free to oppose him as we are bound to set greater store and value by the salvation of our souls and the freedom of our conscience than by any other matters however desirable” (Beza, 1574). While this “opposition” according to one’s freedom of conscience does not specifically refer to a subject’s ability to practice religion against the ruler’s wishes, it does imply a certain level of basic freedom to express one’s beliefs in the face of tyranny. Like Luther, Beza saw Catholic dogma and papal absolutism as an expression of such tyranny, which both reformers felt a responsibility to resist.

Luther, Erasmus, and Beza all explored the idea that one might justifiably hold beliefs that conflict with religious authorities or regimes. While they certainly proposed this idea in the hopes of preserving their own doctrines and beliefs, their effort provided a base upon which subsequent thinkers could expand theories of free conscience and religious practice. This would not be integrated into the rhetoric of rights and liberties for another century or so, but these sources reveal that the modern right to freedom of religion can trace certain roots all the way back to Reformation Christianity.

Beza, Theodore. Theodore Beza, On the Rights of the Magistrates. Edited by Patrick S. Poole. Translated by Henry-Louis Gonin, constitution.org/cmt/beza/magistrates.htm.

More, Thomas. “Thomas More Petition for Free Speech, 1523.” The Center for Thomas More Studies,
www.thomasmorestudies.org/docs/Thomas%20More%20Petition%20for%20Free%20Sp eech.pdf.

Luther, Martin. Martin Luther’s Speech at the Imperial Diet in Worms (18 April 1521). San Jose State University,
www.sjsu.edu/people/james.lindahl/courses/Hum1B/s3/Luther-Speech-Worms-1521.

Luther, Martin. An Open Letter to The Christian Nobility by Martin Luther (1483-1546).Translated by C. M. Jacobs, www.projectwittenberg.org/pub/resources/text/wittenberg/luther/web/nblty-03.html.
“On the Freedom of the Will: A Diatribe or Discourse by Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam.”

Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation, by Martin Luther et al., Westminster Press,
Philadelphia, pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4318/ff6f297d5fe96224fa4d89cd6fb3c9c0608b.pdf. Accessed 7 July 2020.

====Hobbesian Thought====
Despite Hobbes’ often totalitarian views, Hobbes advocates at least some liberty of expression, religion, and association. Hobbes only supported restrictions on liberty when it would have a tangible benefit to the state. In Elements of Law, he argues “that there be no restraint of natural liberty, but what is necessary for the good of the commonwealth” (1640, 9-4). In Behemoth, he even argues that “suppression of doctrines does but unite and exasperate, that is, increase both the malice and power of them that have already believed them” (Hobbes 1681).
Although Hobbes’ preference is liberty, he does not seem to have a particularly high standard for classifying ideas as seditious. He considered Christian views that violating conscience is a sin and that sanctity and faith are achieved through relations with the supernatural, not reason, to be seditious (Curley 1). One can see how these views would hurt a state - the idea about violating conscience could promote disobedience. Still, these views are nowhere near problematic to meet the standards for censorship employed by most modern Western governments.
Leviathan: https://www.fulltextarchive.com/pdfs/Leviathan.pdf
Curley: https://sites01.lsu.edu/faculty/voegelin/wp-content/uploads/sites/80/2015/09/Edwin-Curley.pdf Elements of Law: http://library.um.edu.mo/ebooks/b13602317.pdf
Behemoth:
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/hobbes-the-english-works-vol-vi-dialogue-behemoth-rhetoric

====Lockean Thought/English Empiricism====
In A Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke advocates for religious freedom, albeit with qualification. He claims that toleration is the “chief characteristic mark of the true Church” (Locke 1689, 3). Locke justifies toleration by arguing that religious controversies cannot be solved by human beings, and since no religion has an objective claim to truth over another (not just between Christian denominations, but between, in the example he uses, Muslims, Christians and Jews), all religions must be tolerated (Kessler 1985, 490-91). However, Locke prioritizes following the law over free worship, condemning religiously motivated illegal acts (Kessler 493). The following passage from A Letter demonstrates Locke’s view that humanity cannot identify a true religion:
“For every church is orthodox to itself; to others, erroneous or heretical. For whatsoever any church believes, it believes to be true and the contrary unto those things it pronounce; to be error. So that the controversy between these churches about the truth of their doctrines and the purity of their worship is on both sides equal; nor is there any judge, either at Constantinople or elsewhere upon earth, by whose sentence it can be determined” (13-14).
Locke separates “speculative” and “practical” beliefs, the former of which applies merely to conscience, and the latter of which influences action. Locke argues that speculative beliefs should always be respected, but identifies certain practical beliefs that should not be (Locke 30-31). These include beliefs incompatible with morality, that induce disloyalty to the state, and atheism (Kessler 494). He condemns non-belief because, “Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist” (Locke 36).
He also argues for a separation of church and state, claiming that peace and security are incompatible with “religion propagated by force of arms” (Locke 15). Though a devout
Christian, he rejects the application of Biblical law to modern societies; ‘“Hear, O Israel,” sufficiently restrains the obligations of the law of Moses only to that people” (Locke 28). He is unambiguous and absolute on separation, stating that “church itself is absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth and civil affairs. The boundaries on both sides are fixed and immovable. He mixes heaven and earth together, things most remote and opposite, who confuses these two societies, which in their origin, their end, and their whole substance are utterly and completely different” (Locke 15).
Locke does not argue for religious freedom because it is a fundamental right, but rather as a means of maintaining a free society in general. He argued that state enforcement of religious doctrine could serve as an excuse for tyranny. Locke believed that the large number of churches in a free society would maintain that freedom because these churches would be too varied for one to subjugate others and because they could collectively rise up against a threat to their freedom (Kessler 502). Finally, Locke embraced a form of civil disobedience when the government oversteps its bounds in making laws that restrict religion. As Locke argues in A Letter, “If the law, indeed, be concerning things that lie not within the verge of the magistrate’s authority (as, for example, that the people, or any party amongst them, should be compelled to embrace a strange religion, and join in the worship and ceremonies of another Church), men are not in these cases obliged by that law, against their consciences” (33). The following passage from A Letter demonstrates Locke’s view on the benefits of religious freedom and pluralism:
“Take away the partiality that is used towards them in matters of common right; change the laws, take away the penalties unto which they are subjected, and all things will immediately become safe and peaceable; nay, those that are averse to the religion of the magistrate will think

themselves so much the more bound to maintain the peace of the commonwealth as their condition is better in that place than elsewhere; and all the several separate congregations, like so many guardians of the public peace, will watch one another, that nothing may be innovated or changed in the form of the government, because they can hope for nothing better than what they already enjoy—that is, an equal condition with their fellow-subjects under a just and moderate government” (38-9).
Locke describes churches in A Letter as “a society of members voluntarily uniting (Locke 9). He argues that churches should have the right to exclude members (12), and to create their own bylaws (10). Locke’s respect for association is not restricted to churches; A Letter advocates for no difference in governmental treatment between associations for philosophy, business, religion, or recreation (38). He states that, “Neighbourhood joins some and religion others. But there is only one thing which gathers people into seditious commotions, and that is oppression.” Still, religious associations - and, as Claeys interprets, associations as a whole - are subject to the aforementioned restrictions on practical beliefs (Claeys 2007, 27-28).

====Physiocrats====
====Scottish Enlightenment====
====Modern Capitalism====
====Rousseau's Thought====

Rousseau’s works of political philosophy are among the first modern sources to discuss at length the rights of the citizen within political society. A contemporary of such thinkers as Voltaire and Locke, his work contributed to the growing Enlightenment movement of the eighteenth century. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Rousseau’s work conveys an air of skepticism about the importance and centrality of religion as a cornerstone for a successful society. Indeed, while his “Discourses on the Origin of Inequality” and The Social Contract certainly affirm the existence of a Supreme Being and even seem to advocate for the Christian faith at times, his discussions of rights and religion ultimately conclude that it is both unnecessary and even destructive for states to impose any belief upon their citizens.

One of Rousseau’s most important contributions to political theory is his description of the “Social Contract,” an arrangement by which various citizens agree to live in a community governed by the collective “Sovereign,” thereby giving up certain natural rights and liberties in exchange for civil rights and liberties. He writes that “What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and an unlimited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting; what he gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses” (The Social Contract, 47). The Sovereign governs according to the General Will of the people, which is collectively determined by all citizens living together under the social contract. In Rousseau’s words, “the social compact sets up among the citizens an equality of such a kind, that they all bind themselves to observe the same conditions and should therefore all enjoy the same rights” (The Social Contract, 55). The equality of rights that the social contract creates among citizens is the basis of Rousseau’s belief in religious toleration. It implies that the community does not have the legitimate right to limit any citizen’s religious belief because as a citizen, a member of a minority religion would not wish to restrict religious freedom. Thus, the general will could never legislate against an individual’s religious beliefs.

Of course, there are a number of cases in which Rousseau more directly advocates for religious toleration within the ideal political society. Being native to Calvinist-dominated Geneva, it would have been easy for Rousseau to praise religious homogeneity as a republican virtue. He did not do so, however, because he did not view religion as a strong base for sustainable government. In The Social Contract he notes that while Christian states often grow to be very strong, “the sacred cult has always remained or again become independent of the Sovereign, and there has been no necessary link between it and the body of the State” (The Social Contract, 1 29). Rousseau even goes as far as to imply that Christianity is incompatible with the creation of a perfect state because it opens the state up to abuses from figures like Cromwell and Cateline, bad Christians who brought turmoil to their Christian states (The Social Contract, 1 32). In the end, he concludes that religion should be practiced freely, because “the dogmas of that religion concern the State and its members only so far as they have reference to morality and to the duties which he who professes them is bound to do to others. Each man may have, over and above, what opinions he pleases, without it being the Sovereign’s business to take cognisance of them” (The Social Contract, 133). His position becomes even more clear in his “Letter to Monsieur D’Alembert on the Theater,” in which he writes that “in general, I am the friend of every peaceful religion in which the Eternal Being is served according to the reason he gave us. When a man cannot believe what he finds absurd, it is not his fault; it is that of his reason” (“Letter,” 11). Simply put: because a person cannot be forced to believe any one religion, it is unreasonable for a state to refuse religious liberty to its citizens.

Rousseau’s toleration did have one limitation, however, which he shared with his pseudo-contemporary John Locke. Rousseau believed that the State ought not be able to dictate its citizens’ religions to them, but he did hold that all members of a political society should at least believe in a divine being of some kind. The Social Contract states that “it matters very much to the community that each citizen should have a religion,” because “that will make him love his duty” (133). Rousseau believed that good citizens must have some kind of religion to hold them accountable under the Social Contract. He advocates for the State to establish some basic moral code to which its citizens must abide, arguing that “while [the Sovereign] can compel no one to believe them, it can banish from the State whoever does not believe them—it can banish him, not for impiety, but as an anti-social being, incapable of truly loving the laws and justice, and of sacrificing, at need, his life to his duty.” (The Social Contract, 133). Even in this caveat, however, it is evident that Rousseau’s problem is not with atheism itself. His objection is to the inclusion of any citizen who cannot be trusted to look out for their fellows’ best interests within the context of the wider political society. As long as one is capable of this, he believes, the citizen should be free to practice whatever faith they desire.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Collected Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Translated by Allan Bloom, Publ. for Dartmouth College by Univ. Press of New England, 2004, ia800705.us.archive.org/34/items/RousseauLetterToDAlembertPoliticsTheArtsAllanBloo m_201811/Rousseau%20-%20%27%27Letter%20to%20D%27Alembert%27%27%3B% 20Politics%20%26%20the%20Arts%20%5BAllan%20Bloom%5D.pdf.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, and G. D. H. Cole. The Social Contract; and Discourses. Dent, 1963, Online Library of Liberty,oll-resources.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/638/Rousseau_0132_EBk_v6.0.pdf.

====Kantianism====
====German Idealism====
====Benthamite Utilitarianism====

Bentham’s utilitarianism was often fervently anti-religious; as Jake E. Crimmins writes, “ always the aim in view was to test the institutions, practices, rituals, doctrines, and beliefs of religion against the standard of utility. The results of this test were invariably negative and stand as a compelling testimony to Bentham's unmitigated atheism and to his desire to sweep away all religion in order to construct society anew according to the principles of his secular utilitarianism” (1986, 96). Bentham’s writings support greater religious freedom. For example, he argued in favor of a law tolerating Unitarianism, against blasphemy laws and laws criminalizing religious dissent, and against citizens being forced to take religious oaths (96). He argued that the state should recuse itself from all matters of religion, arguing unambiguously for both the separation of church and state and universal free exercise. In his Constitutional Code, Bentham writes that in his ideal state, the following would be true:

“For the business of religion, there is no department: there is no Minister. Of no opinion on the subject of religion, does this Constitution take any cognizance. It allows not of reward in any shape for the professing or advocating of any particular opinion on the subject of religion. It allows not of punishment in any shape for the professing or advocating of any particular opinion on the subject of religion. It leaves to each individual, after hearing any such arguments as he chooses to hear, to decide for himself on each occasion, what opinion has the truth on its side” (Bowring).

Crimmins - Bentham on Religion and the Secular Society: Accessed through UMD library

Bowing: https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/bentham-the-works-of-jeremy-bentham-vol-9-constitutional-code George: https://www.anselm.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Institute%20of%20SA%20Studies/George .pdf

====Millian Utilitarianism====

Though Mill was a less forceful advocate for religious freedom and non-establishment than Bentham, his harm principle - that the only reason to restrict liberty is to prevent harm to others - extends to religion (George). In On Liberty, Mill argued against any attempt to impose religion on another person:

“The notion that it is one man’s duty that another should be religious, was the foundation of all the religious persecutions ever perpetrated, and, if admitted, would fully justify them. Though the feeling which breaks out in the repeated attempts to stop railway travelling on Sunday, in the resistance to the opening of Museums, and the like, has not the cruelty of the old persecutors, the state of mind indicated by it is fundamentally the same” (Mill 1859, 84).

George: https://www.anselm.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Institute%20of%20SA%20Studies/George .pdf

On Liberty: https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/mill/liberty.pdf Schofield: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/1896809.pdf

====Current Utilitarianism====
====Transcendentalism====
====Marxism====

Marx famously described religion as “the opiate of the masses.” Despite his personal rejection of religion, he was less keen on establishing an atheist society than many believe. First, Marx did not view religion as an evil in it of itself. Rather, he viewed religion as an unfortunate symptom of the prevailing social order whose overthrow he sought (Lobkowicz, 1964, 319-20). Lobkowicz argues that Marxist governments, unlike Marx himself, saw religion as “antirevolutionary,” preventing society from charting Marx’s course (323). In his “Critique of the Gotha Program,” Marx argues that “everyone should be able to attend his religious as well as his bodily needs without the police sticking their noses in” (1875).

Marx 1875: https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/Marx_Critque_of_the_Gotha_Program me.pdf

Lobkowicz 1964: Accessed through UMD library

====Early Sociology====
====Pragmatism====
====Weberian Thought====

Max Weber is best known for his work on sociology, economics, and religion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While most of his work focused explicitly on the socio-economic dynamics that define post-industrial western capitalism, his work on religious influences within capitalist systems provides some insight into his thoughts on religious toleration and diversity. He does not write broadly of rights or freedoms within a political society, but his thoughts on religion in general seem to indicate a tacit support for basic religious toleration.

Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is one of his better-known works, in which he addresses the apparent advantages that Protestants enjoy within a capitalist system over members of various other Christian and non-Christian religious traditions. As in other works Weber seems to regard religious diversity within various nations as something of an inevitability, and as a result he does not address freedom of religion as a concept, much less as a right. However, one small passage in his introduction to The Protestant Ethic which implies that Weber held a deep personal respect for all the world’s religious sects. He stated that:

“The question of the relative value of the cultures which are compared here will not receive a single word. It is true that the path of human destiny cannot but appal him who surveys a section of it. But he will do well to keep his small personal commentary to himself, as one does at the sight of the sea or of the majestic mountains, unless he knows himself to be called and gifted to give them expression in artistic or prophetic form.” (Weber, 36)
It is difficult to surmise what exactly Weber would have thought about essential rights and freedoms of the citizen because he never explicitly addresses them in his work. However, passages like this one seem to indicate that at the very least, he would not have approved of religious intolerance within a political society.

Another theme in Weber’s work which implies that he would at least oppose a society’s enforcement of religious homogeneity is his apparent ambivalence toward religious belief in general. His focus throughout The Protestant Ethic remains more on the social influences of various religious traditions, rather than the doctrines and dogmas of the faiths themselves. This becomes obvious when he writes that the capitalist system “no longer needs the support of any religious forces, and feels the attempts of religion to influence economic life, in so far as they can still be felt at all, to be as much an unjustified interference as its regulation by the State” (Weber, 62). Given the fact that Weber clearly did not view religious dogma as a necessary influence on post-industrial capitalist society, one might conclude that Weber would have viewed any attempt to limit religious freedom as an frivolous endeavour. At the very least, Weber might have been ambivalent toward religious homogeneity within political society, and therefore more likely to support religious freedom as a basic concept, if not a right.

====Process Philosophy====
====Social Darwinism====
====British Idealism (19th cen.)====
====Continental Philosophy/Frankfurt School====
====Behaviorism====
====Feminist Thought====
Freedom of religion has been a pillar within the American culture from the very moment the Pilgrims landed in Plymouth. However, upholding this idea has been relatively controversial since people need a religion to explain their existence or explain why things do and do not happen. For feminist theorists, religion exists as part of the reason why the patriarchy rules over women, subjecting them to the unfair treatment that they experience in their day to day lives due to the values set forth. It is for this reason that most feminist theorists are conflicted when it comes to freedom of religion, especially since their conversation about religion surrounds the ways that Christianity disenfranchises women.

When it comes to religion, feminist theorists have the same consensus that religion reinforces the patriarchy within society and that religious freedom is important for the liberation of women. Martha Nussbaum said that “Thinking of this problem, then, we can insist that universal norms of religious toleration, freedom of association, and the other liberties are essential in order to prevent illiberal subgroups from threatening legitimate forms of pluralism” (Nussbaum 2000, 52). It is for this reason that Nussbaum believes that pluralism will free women since it will open the door for women to enter the conversation and input their ideas, but such inclusion only happens if the patriarchy is willing to embrace other ideas put forth. To the feminists this includes being plural about religious ideologies as well since if society is to accept other minority groups such as women, then all minority groups need to be allowed, including religious minorities. By giving all groups, religious or other, a setting for their voices to be heard, they eliminate the chance for a single group to rise above and dominate society by oppressing the other opposing groups. Furthermore, Charlotte Perkins Gilman noted that “It is the recognition of a new order of duties, a new scale of virtues; or rather it is the practical adoption of that order long since established by the facts of business, the science of government, and by all great religions. Our own religion in especial, the most progressive, the most social, gives no sanction whatever to our own archaic cult of home-worship" (Gilman 1904, 313). Gilman emphasis throughout her work is the importance of the home to the woman, as a place of oppression and as a place where women can fight the patriarchy by creating change within the home first. It is within the home that Gilman paints a picture for individual religious choice and expression because the home is completely private from society. However, she notes that society cannot be blind worshippers and therefore, a deeper understanding of Christianity needs to be explored within the different sects in order to liberate women and create the equality she describes. Gilman does paint a picture of religious freedom, accompanied by the idea that religion is a choice to be made by the individual in the best interest of the individual.

The feminist definition of freedom of religion follows alongside the idea that people, regardless of religion or gender, should be allowed to do as they please and live life in the manner they believe will satisfy their needs in life. It is for this reason that Nussbaum noted that, “Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing self-expressive works and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to search for the ultimate meaning of life in one’s own way. Being able to have pleasurable experiences, and to avoid non-necessary pain” (Nussbaum 2000, 79). Nussbaum contributes the freedom of any religion in order to lay the groundwork for the idea that anyone should be able to do as they please regardless of their gender or their personal life choices. In this excerpt specifically she notes on the idea that people have the liberty to make their own life decisions and that they should therefore be tolerant of the decisions that others decide to make for themselves. She goes on to describe the type of relationship the government should have with religion within different countries, pointing out the problems of having a non-secular government. For this reason, proposes the solution of a secular government that imposes moral constraint and treats one another as ends. She recognizes that religion and the values of patriarchy are closely aligned and therefore religion and women’s rights are not compatible, yet she still embraces religion since as states before, she recognizes that religion is an important institution within society. Mary Wollstonecraft went as far to say that “Yes, virtue as well as religion, has been subjected to the decisions of taste” (Wollstonecraft 1891, 85). Wollstonecraft adds to this point that would within different religions, women have different rights and liberties and by embracing all religions, there is a possibility that women will be freed from the oppressive state they reside in. However, Wollstonecraft’s version of freedom of religion is the freedom to choose among the Christian denominations. Evidence of this is shown throughout her work as she disproves of atheism and Catholicism, yet is willing to embrace other Christian sects. Wollstonecraft’s idea of personal preference when it comes to religion is something that most feminists would agree with since as stated before women might have different freedoms within different religious sects. In Her discussion of religion, matters of the influence of the patriarchy and the hold men have on institutions prevails as she describes the manner in which men maintain control.

Aside from the literal and most common forms of religion people tend to think of, feminists like MacKinnon, Friedan, and Paglia introduce a new kind of religion that they want to address within their works. It is the way people hold one another to their gender roles that creates this new institution that people follow religiously, wielding the same faith and commitment religion gets. In its essence, these specific theorists name these oppressive gender roles as the new religion because of the way people religiously adhere to these gender roles and gender stereotypes that oppress women. In this definition of religion that most feminists attempt to address rather than the literal religions that people think of when it comes to defining the freedom of religion. In this case, feminist theorists advocate for the complete abolition of this religion since it is part of the aesthetics of society that keep women oppressed and does not give them the equality they are entitled to. Despite this alternative religion, feminist theorists advocate for a complete freedom of religion within society in order to address the inequalities women face in society.

Bibliography

Gilman, Charlotte Perkins. The Home, Its Work and Influence, by Charlotte Perkins Gilman. England: William Heinemann, 1904, 1904.

Nussbaum, Martha C. 2000. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge University Press

Wollstonecraft, Mary. A Vindication of the Rights of Woman with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects. No place, unknown, or undetermined: Humboldt Publishing Co., 1891.

====Postmodernism====
===Are there any philosophical or moral traditions that dispute the classification of this right as a fundamental right?===
===What do the major legal theories (positive law, natural law, critical legal studies, etc.) say about this right?===

Originalists disagree on the proper interpretation of the Free-Exercise Clause. In Employment Division v. Smith (1990), Justice Scalia, who was one of the legal community’s foremost originalists, issued the opinion of the court, arguing that the clause does not provide for religious exceptions to generally applicable law. In the case, a Native American was fired from his job and denied unemployment benefits for using Peyote, a substance sometimes smoked during religious ceremonies. The court had previously ruled in Sherbert v. Verner (1963) that the First Amendment does provide for that type of exception unless there is a compelling reason to enforce the law anyway (Munoz 1083). As Munoz argues, the Continental Congress’s deliberations may settle this dispute. The Congress considered and rejected a constitutional right not to join state militias for religious reasons, indicating opposition to religious exceptions to general laws (1085).
Scalia in Employment Division v. Smith: “We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition.”
Originalists tend to take a narrow view of the establishment clause. According to Middle Tennessee State University, Scalia believed the clause “only bars official activities that may promote the activities of a particular sect.” He believed the government may, therefore, promote religion over nonreligion, and that government acknowledgment and accommodation is acceptable (Curry and Hudson 2017). In Lee v. Weisman (1992), a prayer-in-schools case, Scalia issued a dissenting opinion in which he argued that whether a practice was acceptable early in the nation’s history should help inform whether or not it violates the Establishment Clause. In
this case, he viewed prayer in schools as acceptable in part because of the long tradition of prayer in government-sponsored gatherings.
Scalia in Lee v. Weisman: “In holding that the Establishment Clause prohibits invocations and benedictions at public-school graduation ceremonies, the Court—with nary a mention that it is doing so—lays waste a tradition that is as old as public-school graduation ceremonies themselves, and that is a component of an even more longstanding American tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God at public celebrations generally.”
In a case from this June, Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, Justice Thomas went even further, arguing that, “As I have explained in previous cases, at the founding, the Clause served only to ‘protec[t] States, and by extension their citizens, from the imposition of an established religion by the Federal Government”’ (p. 2).

Munoz: https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=9420940680730001010910981140831230860340 080590680890431021271071040850000730891130761030520380601050291090030690661211 201080260520780270280480911210290090881160250670750410221101001200720910030790 82021094097027125023004126080023120030064020093085097&EXT=pdf

Employment Division v. Smith: https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/364/employment-division-department-of-human-resour ces-of-oregon-v-smith

Curry and Hudson:https://www.mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/1356/antonin-scalia

Lee V. Weisman: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/505/577/

Espinoza v. Montana: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/18-1195_g314.pdf

==Culture and Politics==
===Is this right interpreted and exercised in different ways in different countries? Focus on particular countries in which the right is interpreted distinctively===

The right to freedom of religion is interpreted and expressed in a number of different ways all over the world. Most modern states’ constitutions recognize freedoms of belief, faith, and practice of religion within their borders, so long as that practice does not pose a danger to the state or society. Many of these countries respect their citizens’ right to freedom of religion, though some do place certain restrictions on the right by requiring religious organizations to register, outlawing certain religious practices, or restricting religious toleration to a few choice faiths.
The United States was one of the earliest countries to embrace the principle of freedom of religion, but its implementation of that right within its legal framework is rather unusual. While the country was founded upon the principles of liberty and freedom, it does not specify the right to religious freedom within its Constitution. Rather, the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (United States Bill of Rights, Article I). This means that the government must respect the people’s religious freedom, but it does not specifically establish the right to the free practice of faith or belief. Of course, the right has been exercised freely throughout the country’s history, and over the years the courts have determined that the right is implied within the Constitution.
Canada also guarantees the right to religious freedom, but it does so more directly than the United States. Its constitution guarantees that “freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion, expression, and the right to equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination based on religion” (U.S. State Department, “Canada,” 2018, 1). By directly invoking freedom of religion in its legal system, Canada leaves less to interpretation than the United States Bill of Rights. It also allows citizens to protect their own right to religious freedom by appealing directly to the right in legal cases. A 2018 U.S. State Department report on Canadian religious freedom notes that while Canadian law “imposes ‘reasonable limits’ on the exercise of these religious rights only where such restrictions can be ‘demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society,’” the law also “permits individuals to sue the government for ‘violations’ of religious freedom.” (U.S. State Department, “Canada,” 2018, 3).

Of course, not every country that guarantees the right to freedom of religion allows its citizens to exercise that right. The People’s Republic of China, for instance, guarantees its citizens the right to freedom of religion, but places heavy restrictions on the practice of that freedom. The U.S. State Department reports that the PRC government “limits protections for religious practice to ‘normal religious activities’ and does not define ‘normal,’” and that it “continues to exercise control over religion and restrict the activities and personal freedom of religious adherents when the government perceived these as threatening state or Chinese Communist Party (CCP) interests” (U.S. State Department, “China,” 2018, 1). The report also states that in 2018 “there continued to be reports of deaths in custody and that the government tortured, physically abused, arrested, detained, sentenced to prison, or harassed adherents of both registered and unregistered religious groups for activities related to their religious beliefs and practices” (U.S. State Department, “China,” 2018, 1). Reports show that Muslims have recently been the most heavily targeted religious group as the Chinese government continues to crack down on religious expression.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is guilty of similar rights violations. While the North Korean constitution also guarantees freedom of religion for its citizens, the State Department reports that within the country“there was an almost complete denial by the government of the rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and in many instances, violations of human rights committed by the government constituted crimes against humanity” (U.S. State Department, “North Korea,” 2018, 1). While information on the North Korean government is notoriously difficult to acquire, accounts from witnesses and refugees indicate that the country is reluctant to allow the free practice of religion, and that it actively represses the people’s exercise of this right through the use of force. The State Department reports that “one [North Korean] refugee said there was no religious freedom in the country, and another said that if someone were found to be a Christian, he or she would immediately be shot.” (U.S. State Department, “North Korea,” 2018, 3). Such horrific conditions prove that while many states may claim to respect their citizens’ freedom of religion, this right is often subject to heavy regulation and restriction.

Iran is almost unique in its treatment of religious freedom, because its government does not guarantee the right at all. “The constitution defines the country as an Islamic republic, and specifies Twelver Ja’afari Shia Islam as the official state religion. It states all laws and regulations must be based on “Islamic criteria” and an official interpretation of sharia” (U.S. State Department, “Iran,” 2018, 3). The discussion of other religions is restricted within the country, and the constitution states that “no one may be ‘subjected to questioning and aggression for merely holding an opinion.’” According to the State Department, the law also “prohibits Muslim citizens from changing or renouncing their religious beliefs” (U.S. State Department, “Iran,” 2018, 3). This does not mean that minority religions are outlawed; recognized minority groups are allowed to operate private schools, though they are subject to a number of restrictions (U.S. State Department, “Iran,” 2018, 7). In such a theocracy, the exercise of religious freedom is very difficult and exceedingly dangerous.

Different countries interpret the right to freedom of religion in a number of varying ways, and this often leads governments to restrict their citizens’ exercise of that right. Most modern states guarantee the right within their constitutions, but the actual protection of citizens’ freedom of religion is not always observed in states controlled by authoritarian or oppressive regimes.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. IRAN 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IRAN-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FRE EDOM-REPORT.pdf.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, XINJIANG, HONG KONG, AND MACAU) 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CHINA-INCLUSIVE-2018-INTERNATIONAL-R ELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

Ochab, Ewelina U. “Is China Conducting A Crackdown On Religion?” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 20 Apr. 2019,
www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2019/04/20/is-china-conducting-a-crackdown-on-religion/.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. ITALY 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ITALY-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FR EEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. IRAN 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IRAN-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FRE EDOM-REPORT.pdf.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK) 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/KOREA-DEM-REP-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RE LIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. RUSSIA 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/RUSSIA-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-F REEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

U.S. Mission Egypt | 23 June, 2019 | Topics: News. “2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Egypt.” U.S. Embassy in Egypt, 27 June 2019, eg.usembassy.gov/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom-egypt/.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. BELARUS 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/BELARUS-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS -FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. CANADA 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CANADA-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS- FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. NEW ZEALAND 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/NEW-ZEALAND-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELI GIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

===Is this right exercised in different ways depending on the political governance regime in place (democracy, autocracy, hybrid regime)?===

Regime type affects all facets of political life within a country, and the exercise of religious freedom is no exception. As might be expected, governments and societies in democratic states like New Zealand and Canada tend to show greater levels of respect for religious freedom than states with different regime types. Citizens living in states controlled by hybrid regimes tend to still experience some level of religious freedom, but this right is severely restricted by government-required registries and heavy oversight of religious practice. Autocracies, predictably, are the regime type that shows the least respect for their citizens’ right to religious freedom.

The right to religious freedom is expressed openly and without fear in the world’s most democratic states. Countries like New Zealand and Canada, both of which are listed among the most democratic states in the word, both stipulate in their constitutions that citizens shall enjoy total freedom of faith, belief, and religion. A 2018 U.S. State Department report on religious freedom in Canada mentions a constitutional guarantee that citizens shall enjoy “freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief, opinion, expression, and the right to equal protection and benefit of the law without discrimination based on religion” (U.S. State Department, “Canada,” 2018, 1). New Zealand’s constitution makes a very similar guarantee, and both countries are reported to enjoy high levels of religious liberty. Discrimination on the basis of religion is usually outlawed in democratic states, and while religious intolerance may sometimes be observed in the form of citizen anti-semitism or vandalism, democratic governments as a whole work to limit any religious injustice within their borders. Even democracies with obvious religious majorities like Italy tend to allow the free exercise of religious practices, though most do require religious organizations to register with the government in order to receive tax exemptions (U.S. State Department, “Italy,” 2018, 1).

Hybrid regimes usually exert more significant influence over the exercise of religious freedom within their borders. Egypt, for example, is a state governed by limited democracy which also shows clear autocratic tendencies. In Egypt, “The constitution states that ‘freedom of belief is absolute’ and ‘the freedom of practicing religious rituals and establishing worship places for the followers of divine (i.e. Abrahamic) religions is a right regulated by law’” (U.S. State Department, “Egypt,” 2018). However, U.S. State Department reports show that these freedoms are subject to a number of restrictions. It mentions that Muslim citizens are prohibited from converting to a new relition under Egyptian law, and it notes that the Ministry of Interior Religious Affairs Department has the power to deny religious groups official recognition if they are determined to pose a threat to the nation (U.S. State Department, “Egypt,” 2018). A U.S. State Department report on religious freedom in Russia reveals a similar willingness within the Russian government to restrict religious practices if they are deemed “extremist” or “dangerous” (U.S. State Department, “Russia,” 2018). In hybrid regimes like Russia and Egypt, religious practice is protected but heavily regulated.

Autocratic regimes are generally the most restrictive of religious freedom. China, perhaps the world’s most powerful autocracy, shows the lack of respect that it has for its citizens’ religious convictions in its treatment of Muslims, in particular. The constitution of the People’s Republic of China allows for the free practice of approved religions, but a Forbes article from 2019 reports that “China is participating in the practice of forced conversion whereby Muslims are forced to ‘eat pork and drink alcohol’” (Ochab, “Is China Conducting a Crackdown On Religion?” 2019). A U.S. State Department report from 2018 similarly notes that “there continue to be reports of deaths in custody and that the government tortured, physically abused, arrested, detained, sentenced to prison, or harassed adherents of both registered and unregistered religious groups for activities related to their religious beliefs and practices” (U.S. State Department, “China,” 2018). Belarus, which is ruled by an authoritarian dictatorial regime, imposes similar restrictions on the free practice of religion. Like China, North Korea, and a number of other autocratic nations, Belarus guarantees religious freedom within its constitution but fails to guarantee this right for its citizens. However, a State Department report notes that Belarusian law “prohibits religious activities directed against the sovereignty of the state, its constitutional system, and ‘civic harmony’” (U.S. State Department, “Belarus,” 2018). It states that the Belarusian regime bans all religious activity by unregistered groups, and explains that there are a number of administrative and legal obstacles that prevent most religious organizations from being officially recognized (U.S. State Department, “Belarus,” 2018).

Regime type plays a significant role in determining the extent to which a government protects the exercise of religious freedom. In general, the more democratic a regime is, the more likely it is to guarantee and respect its citizens’ right to freedom of religion.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. IRAN 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IRAN-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FRE EDOM-REPORT.pdf.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, XINJIANG, HONG KONG, AND MACAU) 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CHINA-INCLUSIVE-2018-INTERNATIONAL-R ELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

Ochab, Ewelina U. “Is China Conducting A Crackdown On Religion?” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 20 Apr. 2019,
www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2019/04/20/is-china-conducting-a-crackdown-on-religion/.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. ITALY 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ITALY-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FR EEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. IRAN 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IRAN-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FRE EDOM-REPORT.pdf.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK) 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/KOREA-DEM-REP-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RE LIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. RUSSIA 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/RUSSIA-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-F REEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

U.S. Mission Egypt | 23 June, 2019 | Topics: News. “2018 Report on International Religious Freedom: Egypt.” U.S. Embassy in Egypt, 27 June 2019, eg.usembassy.gov/2018-report-on-international-religious-freedom-egypt/.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. BELARUS 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/BELARUS-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS -FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. CANADA 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CANADA-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS- FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

United States, Congress, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. NEW ZEALAND 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT. International Religious Freedom Report for 2018, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/NEW-ZEALAND-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELI GIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf.

===Is there general and widespread belief that this right is a fundamental right that should generally be protected (and that exceptions should be rare)?===
===Does public polling reveal insights about the right as experienced in different countries?===
==Conflicts with other Rights==
===Are there other specific fundamental rights that tend to conflict with this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?===
Freedom of religion is more than just the freedom to worship as one pleases, but it is a right granted to all in efforts to prevent discrimination based upon one’s core values and beliefs, and it protects against the imposition of values and beliefs upon people both from society and from the government (The Heritage Foundation, 2020). More precisely, the freedom of religion possess two main components: “The first is the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which means the right to hold or to change one’s religion or belief and which cannot be restricted under any circumstances. The second is the right to manifest one’s religion or belief, which, according to Articles 9(2) ECHR and 18(3) ICCPR, can be restricted but only if the restriction is prescribed by law and is necessary – Article 9(2) adds here ‘in a democratic society’ – for the protection of public safety, public health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Donald and Howard 2, 2015). The practice of freedom of religion often conflicts with several other guaranteed freedoms due to its intersectional nature, and can therefore, legally be restricted when it encroaches upon other fundamental and guaranteed human rights.

In 2015, when the US Supreme Court deemed same-sex marriage constitutional, religious freedom cases flooded state legislatures and courthouses, many of which were seeking exceptions to anti-LGBTQIA+ legislature under the basis of religious beliefs (Russell-Kraft, 2017). Some of these cases, including the previous 2013 case of Elane Photography v. Willock, represent the power of the freedom of expression, the freedom to be married, and the right to not be discriminated against, to undermine certain instances of the practice of the freedom of religion. This case was between two women who sought to hire photography company Elane Photography for their wedding ceremony and the named photography company who refused to provide services due to religious reasons. The case eventually was ruled in favor of the same-sex couple citing that the state of New Mexico prohibited any discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and that the claims of the photographer for her freedom of religion and speech were not protected in this case due to the (Russell-Kraft, 2017). The Constitution does indeed “have competing values; the requirements of the free exercise and the establishment clauses, freedom of association, and anti-discrimination on the basis of faith don’t always add up” (Russell-Kraft, 2017).

When dealing with cases in which freedom or religion seems to conflict with other guaranteed rights, international human rights law has historically precedented certain principles to consider in settling the matter:

“These include the principles of: non-discrimination, meaning that there is no ‘right to discriminate;…’ neutrality and impartiality of the state as between religions and as between religious and nonreligious forms of belief; respect for others to believe and the duty of the state to create a level playing field between different groups of different religions or beliefs or no religion or belief, which may be summarized as respecting the believer rather than the belief; pluralism and tolerance, which includes that there is no right not to be offended; institutional and personal autonomy; proportionality in determining whether an interference with the right to manifest one’s religion is justified: the restriction must have a legitimate aim and the means used to achieve that aim must be proportionate and necessary…; no hierarchy of rights, meaning that in each instance, an attempt is made to maximize each of the rights engaged and to ensure that none is inappropriately sacrificed; and, legality, i.e. that restrictions on rights must be clear, publicly accessible, non-retrospective, and that people must be able to understand the circumstances in which restrictions might be imposed and foresee the consequences of their actions with a degree of certainty” (Donald and Howard, 2015)

All this is ultimately to outline the considerations necessary to consider when dealing with encroachments upon and/or suppression of the freedom of religion due to society’s necessity of freedom of conscience. Freedom of conscience is ultimately necessary and fundamental to the workings of democracy. One example regarding the right to non-discrimination and freedom of conscience favoring the rights of freedom of religion is the 2013 case of Eweida and Others v UK. The outcome of this case saw a contrary ruling to that of the Elane Photography v. Willock case. This case saw two of the applicants, a registrar of birth, deaths and marriages (Ladele) and a relationship counsellor (McFarlane), deny their services to same-sex couples due to their company policies regarding their Christian, religious beliefs. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) deemed that the freedom to not to be discriminated against on the ground of sexual orientation is, in fact, protected under the Convention on human rights and that difference in treatment requires significant and legal justification and legitimate reasoning for doing so; however, in this case, the court found that the applicants’ actions complied with their company policies and therefore did not constitute discrimination (Donald and Howard 7, 2015). The two opposing cases demonstrate the flexibility and conflicting natures of fundamental rights such as that of conscience and non-discrimination both for and against the practice of freedom of religion.

The ECtHR recognizes further the conflicting rights of people to teach others about their religion or belief in contrast with the right of other people to be free from interference with their own freedom of religion or belief (which encompasses their right to be free from religion or belief): “For example, the European Centre for Law and Justice has argued within the Council of Europe for a ‘general provision reaffirming the fundamental right to freedom of religious opinion’ and argues that the concept of hate speech should ‘never end in a limitation of free speech’ (emphasis added). However, this is not entirely possible, seeing as international human rights laws draw limitations to ensure that conflicting rights in each particular case are proportionally balanced so that neither right in question is inappropriately sacrificed” (Donald and Howard 9, 2015).

Lastly, even the freedom of assembly, which is guaranteed by Articles 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights comes into conflict with the freedom of religion. Some instances of peaceable assemblies such as LBGTQIA+ rallies have been prohibited and/or confined to venues out of public sight: “Where these events are not prohibited and do take place, there is often inadequate protection of participants by law enforcement agencies. This not only infringes the right of LGBTI people to freedom of expression and assembly, but it also makes them vulnerable to discrimination, abuse and violence… Despite these principles, claims based on religious conscience expressed in morally absolute terms persist” (Donald and Howard 10, 14, 2015).

The rights of non-practicing individuals often conflict with the rights to freedom of religion. Furthermore, the concept of “freedom from religion” questions the strength of freedom of religion, as many believe that non-practicing individuals have an equally important right to not be subjected to religious practices (Sapir, Gidon, and Statman). Often this results in conflict between state power and religious rights, as the state is often expected to protect the rights of non-religious individuals. Gidon Sapir and Daniel Statman note how freedom from religion manifests itself, claiming “a law prohibiting the sale of goods on the sabbath would violate the would-be vendors freedom from religion.” Demonstrated by Sapir and Statman, religious rights may be contested when they conflict with the laws prescribed by the state upholding the rights of non-practicing individuals, for example that stores can operate on the sabbath day. In this way, the rights of non-religious individuals, as supported by the state, can act to diminish the power of religious rights.

Additionally, conflicts of religious rights and the rights to free association have been notably observed throughout American jurisprudence. Most predominantly, this issue manifests itself in issues pertaining to First Amendment rights and civil rights. For example, the right for an individual to identify as LGBTQ+ has often been at odds with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. This was observed in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commision, when a Colorado bakery asserted their First Amendment rights to deny a gay couple service, arguing that “it would displease God to create cakes for same-sex marriages.” In response to the bakery’s actions, the couple sued, claiming that their rights to non-discrimination as protected by Colorado’s Anti-Discrimination Act had been violated. Although challenged by the couple’s discrimination case, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commision ultimately demonstrated that the right to free religious exercise has historically infringed upon individual’s rights to non-discrimination, as the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the bakery, claiming that under the Free Exercise Clause the bakery was permitted to deny service to the couple. Thus, while civil rights often create a legitimate conflict with religious rights, religious rights often take precedence.

Though, as the issue of discrimination and religious rights has evolved, the strength of the First Amendment has weakened, reinforcing Civil Rights. Observed by the Bostock v. Clayton County decision, the Supreme Court now upholds that discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals is a violation of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act (Hollis-Brusky). This landmark decision curtails many of the arguments, such as those made by the justices in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commision, which had previously bolstered the rights to religious freedom over the rights of LGBTQ+ individuals. Furthermore, unlike the justices concluded in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commision, Bostock’s support of the primacy of civil rights undermines the belief that the First Amendment can be used to legally protect individuals who discriminate against LGBTQ+ individuals. Thus, exhibited by the Bostock v. Clayton County case, freedom of religion, specifically the Free Exercise Clause, can be limited by civil rights to non-discrimination.

===Are there other specific rights that are critical to the exercise of this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?===
When dealing with cases in which freedom or religion seems to conflict with other guaranteed rights, international human rights law has historically precedented certain principles to consider in settling the matter:

“These include the principles of: non-discrimination, meaning that there is no ‘right to discriminate;…’ neutrality and impartiality of the state as between religions and as between religious and nonreligious forms of belief; respect for others to believe and the duty of the state to create a level playing field between different groups of different religions or beliefs or no religion or belief, which may be summarized as respecting the believer rather than the belief; pluralism and tolerance, which includes that there is no right not to be offended; institutional and personal autonomy; proportionality in determining whether an interference with the right to manifest one’s religion is justified: the restriction must have a legitimate aim and the means used to achieve that aim must be proportionate and necessary…; no hierarchy of rights, meaning that in each instance, an attempt is made to maximize each of the rights engaged and to ensure that none is inappropriately sacrificed; and, legality, i.e. that restrictions on rights must be clear, publicly accessible, non-retrospective, and that people must be able to understand the circumstances in which restrictions might be imposed and foresee the consequences of their actions with a degree of certainty” (Donald and Howard, 2015)

All this is ultimately to outline the considerations necessary to consider when dealing with encroachments upon and/or suppression of the freedom of religion due to society’s necessity of freedom of conscience. Freedom of conscience is ultimately necessary and fundamental to the workings of democracy. The right to freedom of religion falls well under the category to the right to freedom of conscience. And within this category, the right against religious discrimination is a distinct and complimentary right to freedom of religion: “Religious freedom is best understood as protecting our interest in religious adherence (and non-adherence), understood from the committed perspective of the (non)adherent. This internal, committed perspective generates a capacious and realistic conception of religious adherence, which reflects the staggering plurality of forms of religiosity (or lack thereof) as extant in contemporary societies” (Norton and Khaitan 1125, 2019).

One example regarding the right to non-discrimination and freedom of conscience working in tandem with the freedom of religion is the 2013 case of Eweida and Others v UK. This case saw two of the applicants, a registrar of birth, deaths and marriages (Ladele) and a relationship counsellor (McFarlane), deny their services to same-sex couples due to their company policies regarding their Christian, religious beliefs. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) deemed the court found that the applicants’ actions complied with their company policies and therefore did not constitute discrimination (Donald and Howard 7, 2015). The workings of freedom of religion and the expression of said religion as well as conscientious objection work in tandem to support the right to freedom of religion.

===Is there a perception that this right is above or higher than other fundamental rights, or in general, that it has a particular place in a hierarchy of rights?===

Freedom of religion often conflicts with other human rights. Specifically in contemporary times, other fundamental rights are often prioritized over religious rights. In particular, this is observed with LGBTQ+ rights. Explained by Dr Alice Donald and Erica Howard of Middlesex University, the rights to religious freedom and anti-discrimination are both globally upheld as fundamental rights. Though, Donald and Howard argue, ultimately LGBTQ+ individuals’ rights to non-discrimination hold precedence over religious rights.

Explaining how religious freedom is enshrined in numerous human rights treaties, Donald and Howard do not shy from acknowledging the importance of freedom of religion. Though, later explaining its intersectionality with anti-discrimination rights, which they further assert to be a fundamental human right, Donald and Howard ultimately uphold the importance and prioritization of LGBTQ+ rights. In this way, Donald and Howard diminish the dominance of freedom of religion within the hierarchy of fundamental rights. Donald and Howard assert, “As mentioned, the right to manifest one’s religion or belief can be restricted if this is necessary for the protection of public safety, public order, health or morals or the rights of others. The latter includes the right of others not to be discriminated against.” Thus, as explained by Donald and Howard, the right to anti-discrimination places the right to free religious exercise at a lower position within the hierarchy of rights.

Though, recent United States court cases have countered Donald and Howard’s positions, denoting a higher status to freedom of religion. Furthermore, within American jurisprudence, freedom of religion holds a particularly higher position in the hierarchy of rights. This was most notably observed in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, where the court defended a baker’s denial of services to a gay couple on the grounds of religion. Upholding the ability of the baker to discriminate against the gay couple, the court asserted the dominance of religious rights over anti-discrimination laws. Noted by Justice Gorsuch, “The Constitution protects not just popular religious exercises from the condemnation of civil authorities. It protects them all.” Through this, the court demonstrated that religious rights hold a principal position above other fundamental rights within the United States.

===What specific examples of hierarchies, manifestos, constitutions, or prioritized descriptions of rights cite this right’s high status? Low status? No status at all?===

Explained by Donald and Howard, freedom of religion is upheld by all major human right treaties. Demonstrated by this, freedom of religion is prioritized within international human rights law. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 18(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 9(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms all protect individuals’ freedom of religion, which includes “freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.” Present in each of these major treaties, freedom of religion is observed to be highly respected and prioritized by the United Nations.

Additionally, freedom of religion is enshrined in most constitutions, demonstrating its high status. For example, only 43 countries, 20% of all nations, assert a state religion in their constitutions, denying religious freedom. As the majority of countries do not uphold a state religion, they allow for degrees of religious freedom. Observed by this trend among the majority of countries, there is a general global consensus that freedom of religion is a highly regarded fundamental right.

===How does federalism change, if at all, the exercise or application of this right? What examples of this can one point to?===

In regards to gay marriage and religious freedom, two often interconnected topics, federalism is particularly apparent. Furthermore, many conservatives argue that states should be able to use religious rights in deciding whether or not gay marriage is legal. Robert A. Levy of the Cato Institute explains how technically, this position is legally valid, as “Clearly, federalism allows states to decide whether to recognize both same-sex and conventional marriages, or assign a different label, or privatize marriage altogether.” In this way, Levy emphasizes that due to federalism, depending on the region of the country, religious rights may be used to justify denying gay couples the ability to marry. Though, ultimately Levy questions the realistic strengths of federalism, asserting that the Constitution’s limits on discrimination outweigh the powers allocated to the states by federalism. Thus, according to Levy, federalism does not allow for states to exercise religious rights in a way that permits them to discriminate against LGBTQ+ individuals. Following this logic, federalism can be viewed to weaken the exercise of religious freedom.

Additionally, states’ varying approaches to school prayer demonstrate how religious rights are subject to federalism. Although federal law prohibits prayer in public schools, upholding it to be a violation of the establishment clause, certain school districts have acted to protect school prayer. For example, nearly forty years after Engel v. Vitale and Abington School District v. Schempp, which struck down on school prayer, Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe proved school prayer was still alive in certain states, as the case presented a situation of student-led prayer prior to high school football games. Demonstrated by Santa Fe, while federal law may prohibit school-mandated prayer, certain states may permit public school districts to contradict these laws with student lead prayer. Furthermore, depending on the state, the degree of secularism within public schools may differ. This emphasizes how federalism can bolster religious rights, as state’s rights may permit them to evoke certain religious practices misaligned with federal law.

Lastly, state constitutions additionally demonstrate how federalism affects religious freedom. Noted by Christopher Hammons, numerous states invoke religion in their constitutions, asserting God to be “the foundation of order, liberty, and good government.” The emphasis on god and direct religious references within certain state’s constitutions demonstrate how federalism, which provides states with specific liberties, allows for a varying image of religious freedom throughout the United States.

==Limitations / Restrictions==
===What are the typical exceptions or limitations placed on this right?===

Government Favortism of Religions: Often, a government will claim a favored religion (“A Closer Look”), and this may come at the expense of other groups’ freedom. For example, Greece has an anti-proselytism law designed to protect the Greek Orthodox religion.

Registration: Many countries require religious groups to register with a relevant agency to operate (“A Closer Look 2019”).

National Security: For example, in 2017, due to a recent incident, Israel banned Muslim men under 50 from visiting the Western Wall (there is some conflicting reporting as to whether the ban extended to non-Muslim men as well). Israel has similarly restricted other sites during times of tension, such as Jerusalem’s Aqsa mosque (Baker 2017). Given that the Western Wall is a sacred site to Muslims, restricting access should be considered a restriction on Muslim practice. The ban still restricted the ability of people to freely worship even if it extended to non-Muslims. Expression in Public: For example, many European countries ban religious dress in public places (“A Closer Look 2019”).

Blasphemy: 71 countries, spread between the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Europe, have anti-blasphemy laws (Bandow 2018).

“A Closer Look” https://www.pewforum.org/2019/07/15/a-closer-look-at-how-religious-restrictions-have-risen-around-the-world/

===Under American jurisprudence, what permissible exceptions exist?===

The Supreme Court ruled in Employment Division v. Smith (1990) that the First Amendment does not provide for religious exemptions to a generally applicable law. In the case, a Native American was fired from his job and denied unemployment benefits for using Peyote, a substance sometimes smoked during religious ceremonies. The court had previously ruled in Sherbert v. Verner (1963) that the First Amendment does provide for that type of exception unless there is a compelling reason to enforce the law anyway (Munoz 2008, 1083).
However, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal (2006) appears to undermine this ruling. In that case, a religious group claimed the right to use a drug called hoasca. The Supreme Court held that, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the government is obligated to grant religious exemptions to general laws unless the government can demonstrate a compelling state interest in regulating the drug’s religious use (“Gonzales v. Centro”).
Pandemic: The COVID-19 pandemic has caused many governments to limit religious gatherings. For example, at the outset of the pandemic, Maryland banned gatherings of more than ten people, including religious services (Pitts 2020).
Ensuring Success of a Government Operation: In Goldman v. Weinberger (1986), the court upheld an Air Force ban on headgear, which was challenged by an Orthodox Jew seeking to wear a yarmulke while on duty. The court found that the Air Force had a legitimate interest in ensuring obedience and conformity (“Landmark”).
Non-Discrimination Law (a notable non-exception): In a landmark case, Masterpiece Cake Shop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission ( 2017), the Supreme Court decided that Colorado anti-discrimination law could not compel a baker to violate his religious beliefs by baking a cake for a same-sex wedding (“Masterpiece”).

Munoz:
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=9420940680730001010910981140831230860340 080590680890431021271071040850000730891130761030520380601050291090030690661211 201080260520780270280480911210290090881160250670750410221101001200720910030790 82021094097027125023004126080023120030064020093085097&EXT=pdf

“Landmark”: https://billofrightsinstitute.org/cases/

“Gonzalez v. Centro”: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1084

“Masterpiece”: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-111

Gomes: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2450&context=lawreview

Koev: http://web.a.ebscohost.com.proxy-um.researchport.umd.edu/ehost/detail/detail?vid=1&sid=bb31 f9a9-0997-4bb0-a34c-eeb97b46b9c7%40sdc-v-sessmgr01&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2Z Q%3d%3d#AN=136782604&db=asn

===Under international human rights laws, what permissible exceptions (often called derogations) exist?===

Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The UDHR provides for exceptions to human rights “determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.”
American Convention on Human Rights: Article 12-3 of the convention states that religious practice may “be subject only to the limitations prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals, or the rights or freedoms of others.” The relevant court has “recognized that a state can limit the exercise of free religious expression when there is a conflict with other rights or when such expression constitutes a threat to society or political stability” (Gomes 2009, 98).
European Convention on Human Rights: Article 9-2 states that “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted a right not to have one’s religious views insulted by the public and has condoned state action against blasphemy (Koev 2019).
In Valsamis v. Greece (1996), the court ruled against a defendant seeking a religious a religious exemption from a school-sponsored activity (Coev 2019).

In Eweida and others v. UK (2013), the court ruled against civil servants who refused to register same-sex marriages (Coev 2019).
In Sahin v. Turkey ( 2004), the court upheld restricts on beards and headscarves for Muslim university students to “reconcile the interests of various groups” (Coev 2019).
In SAS v. France, t he court upheld a ban on public face coverings because the face coverings would intrude on concepts of secularism and liberty (because, the court argued, face coverings symbolize subservience).

Universal Declaration of Human Rights: https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/

Gomes: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2450&context=lawreview

Koev: http://web.a.ebscohost.com.proxy-um.researchport.umd.edu/ehost/detail/detail?vid=1&sid=bb31 f9a9-0997-4bb0-a34c-eeb97b46b9c7%40sdc-v-sessmgr01&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2Z Q%3d%3d#AN=136782604&db=asn

===Have political theorists or philosophers discussed the permissibility of exceptions to this right?===
The conflict of civil and religious rights has presented several exceptions to the right to free religious exercise. Specifically, stemming from the Supreme Court’s ruling in favor of marriage equality in 2015, many anti-discrimination laws have passed, restricting the right to unfettered religious exercise. Several scholars have argued in favor of these exceptions. In discussing the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, Suzanne Goldberg states, “After many years of battles in which the religious right had hammered the message that gay people were somehow seeking “special rights” when advocating for laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination, the court added its authoritative view that the “special rights” rhetoric was meaningless” (Goldberg, 237). Emulated by Goldberg, as civil rights, such as marriage equality, are not “special rights", they must be protected equally to the First Amendment right to free religious exercise. Ultimately, Goldberg conveys the sentiment that within American jurisprudence, the right to free religious exercise is prima facie, and thus can be subject to numerous exceptions.

Additionally, in regards to criminal law violations, William P Marshall of the University of Chicago Law Review supports the need for exceptions to the Free Exercise Clause. Furthermore, Marshall condemns the belief that religious activity, as protected by the Free Exercise Clause, should be exempt from criminal laws. In defending the Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith decision, which confirmed the state’s ability to withhold unemployment benefits from workers fired for using illegal drugs for religious purposes, Marshall argues that if the Supreme Court were to permit religious exemptions to criminal laws, strengthening First Amendment Rights, they would have to engage in dangerous “constitutional balancing” (Marshall, 311). As explained by Marshall, this balancing would force the court to weigh the interests of religious groups against the interests of states, resulting in inconsistent rulings. Thus, presenting a clear exception to freedom of religion, Marshall argues that First Amendment rights, specifically the right to free religious exercise, do not exempt one from criminal prosecution.

Between the positions of Marshall and Goldberg, lies Ira C. Lupu of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. While Lupu dismisses the Smith decision, claiming religious rights should have been accommodated in that particular case, he still argues for limitations on religious expression, claiming, “every person may pursue religious freedom to the extent that it is fully compatible with the equal pursuit of religious freedom by others” (Lupu, 558). Similar to Goldberg, Lupu asserts that religious expression can be curtailed when it restricts the liberties of others. Thus, Lupu emphasizes that although certain religious practices should be exempt from the law, such as the peyote drinking incident in Smith, religious expression should not be left legally unrestricted.

===Should this right be limited when limiting it would jeopardize democratic norms?===
===Is this right often perceived as threatening to government authorities?===
===Is this right often curtailed by government authorities for reasons other than those which are generally viewed as permissible?===
===Is this right at times curtailed by private actors?===
Private companies have often been found to institute policies that restrict employees’ rights to religious freedom. Such policies directly violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, a provision meant to bolster religious freedom by prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of religion (EEOC).

Such discriminatory policies were observed in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores. Furthermore, the case revealed Abercrombie’s “Look Policy”, which involved discriminatory hiring procedures towards Muslim individuals (Oyez). Affirmed by the Supreme Court, this policy was a direct violation of the Civil Rights Act, Justice Scalia upholding Title VII claiming, “An employer may not make an applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions” (Justia Law). Demonstrated by the court’s decision, one’s entitlements to religious freedom in the workplace, as upheld by Title VII, are curtailed by discriminatory hiring practices such as the “Look Policy”.

In addition to violating their Title VII entitlements, many individuals argue that their employers’ practices restrict their First Amendment rights to free religious exercise. For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, Adell Sherbert argued that her firing due to her refusal to work Saturdays, her Sabbath day, was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment (Oyez). The Supreme Court concurred with Sherbert, emphasizing that the firing restricted Sherbert’s ability to freely practice her religion. Emphasized by the case, firing someone on the basis of their religion, in addition to likely being a violation of the Civil Rights Act, is a direct breach of the First Amendment. Thus, witnessed by instances such as those that precipitated Sherbert, First Amendment religious rights are often infringed upon by employment policies.

===Is this right subject to specific limitations in event of emergency (war, brief natural disaster [weather, earthquake], long-run natural disaster [volcano, fire, disease])? Can such limitations be defined in advance with reference to the disaster in question?===

In the United States, certain religious practices have been limited during times of disease. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, limitations on free religious exercise have been visibly witnessed, demonstrating how the right is subject to restrictions during a health crisis. This was observed in the beginning of the pandemic, when many houses of worship challenged their closures by state governments, arguing that such actions violated their rights to free religious exercise. Though, when a specific California church’s case was brought to the Supreme Court, the closures were upheld as constitutional, Chief Justice Roberts arguing, “Although California’s guidelines place restrictions on places of worship, those restrictions appear consistent with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment” (New York Times). Emphasized by the California case, in times of disease, certain religious practices, such as attending largely populated church services, can be restricted if they do not correspond with federal public health guidelines. Thus, witnessed through the closing of churches as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, a disaster can alter the Supreme court’s constitutional interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused many governments to limit religious gatherings. For example, at the outset of the pandemic, Maryland banned gatherings of more than ten people, including religious services (Pitts 2020).
Terrorism has justified bans on Muslim veils in public places, a restriction on the free exercise of religion. From a 2019 piece by the London Schools of Economics’ Stuti Manchanda and Nilay Saiya:
“Proponents of restrictions on Muslim veils make three main arguments. First, they claim that enveloping Islamic veils present a physical security threat, insofar as Muslim women might use these traditional Islamic garments to conceal weapons or explosives. ‘You could carry a rocket launcher under your veil,’ as the former President of Latvia, Vaira Vike-Freiberga, put it. Similarly, Paul Nuttall, former leader of the UK Independence Party, justified banning the burqa on similar physical security grounds: ‘Obviously we have a heightened security risk at the moment and for CCTV to be effective, in an age of heightened terror, you need to be able to see people’s faces.’ Finally, British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, compared Muslim women in veils to letter boxes and bank robbers.”
Israel has restricted Muslim practices to respond to terrorism. In 2017, due to a recent incident, Israel banned Muslim men under 50 from visiting the Western Wall (there is some conflicting reporting as to whether the ban extended to non-Muslim men as well). Israel has similarly restricted other sites during times of tension, such as Jerusalem’s Aqsa mosque (Baker 2017). Given that the Western Wall is a sacred site to Muslims, restricting access should be considered a restriction on Muslim practice. The ban still restricted the ability of people to freely worship even if it extended to non-Muslims. Certain US anti-terror policies, though stopping short of restricting Muslim religious practices, have significantly impacted Muslims. In Response to 9-11, Congress passed the USA Patriot Act. The act’s provisions included those designed to facilitate search warrants on suspected terrorists, enable increased surveillance, and prevent terrorists from exploiting the immigration system. These provisions and post-attack suspicion of Muslims have led law-enforcement agencies to disproportionately target them. A 2006 piece by Xavier University’s Kam C. Wong referred to Muslim-Americans’ situation as a “virtual internment camp” (194). Wong cites staggering data on Muslim-Americans between 2001 and 2005; using conservative estimates, 90,000 had been detained, raided, or questioned by the FBI.
Similarly, the NYPD ran a controversial program after 9-11 surveilling Muslims. According to the ACLU, its methods included undercover officers in Muslim communities, tracking individuals who had changed their name, and recording information on people who attended Muslim services. The ACLU even claims that the program interfered with Muslim practice by instilling fear that religious doctrine may be misinterpreted by law enforcement (“Factsheet”). From the report:
“The NYPD’s suspicionless surveillance has forced religious leaders to censor what they say to their congregants, for fear anything they say could be taken out of context by police officers or informants. Some religious leaders feel they must regularly record their sermons to defend themselves against potential NYPD mischaracterizations. Disruptions resulting from unlawful NYPD surveillance have also diverted time and resources away from religious education and counseling. Muslims have reported feeling pressure to avoid appearing overtly religious, for example, by changing their dress or the length of their beards.

Pitts: https://www.baltimoresun.com/coronavirus/bs-md-ci-churches-reopening-20200606-mgrlkn2kdj d77ealcnnu5lmsoe-story.html

Manchada and Saiya: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2019/12/17/why-veil-restrictions-increase-the-risk-of-terroris m-in-europe/

Examples of conflicting reporting:
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/07/28/jerusalem-shrine-friday/519212001/
and
https://www.france24.com/en/israeli-police-security-measures-prepare-prayers-jerusalem-holy-si te-temple-mount-al-aqsa-mosque

Baker: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-palestinians-israel/muslim-men-over-50-pray-at-jeru salems-aqsa-mosque-amid-tight-security-idUSKBN0IK0PR20141031

History.com Editors: https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/patriot-act

Wong: https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1111&context=mjrl “Factsheet” https://www.aclu.org/other/factsheet-nypd-muslim-surveillance-program

==Utilitarian / Fairness Assessments==
===Is there a cost attached to protecting and enforcing this right? What kinds of costs are implicated?===
====Short-term economic cost in general====
====Long-term economic cost in general====
====Cost to those least able to economically absorb the cost====
====Cost to perceived democratic legitimacy====
====Cost to consistency or coherence of the law as a whole====
====Cost to the legitimacy or effectiveness of other rights====
====Cost to considerations of social equality====
====Cost to other non-material goods not so far specified====
===What are the financial consequences, if any, of making this right a legally protectable right?===
===Are there any groups that are uniquely disadvantaged by the exercise of this right?===
===Are there any groups that uniquely benefit from the exercise of this right?===
===Are there instances when this fundamental right can lead to unfairness or inequities?===
===Are there objective ways to measure the utilitarian nature of this right?===
===If so, where can one draw the line: when does this right stop being useful or economically viable?===
==Looking Ahead==
===How can we expect this right to change and evolve in the years ahead?===
===How is the future likely to shape the exercise of this right?===
===Will the exercise or protection of this right be affected by technological changes?===
===Under what conditions would this right become irrelevant?===
===Are questions of fairness and utility pertaining to this right likely to change in the years ahead?===
==Policy Recommendations==
===Can the practice or exercise of this right be shaped through executive action?===
===In the US context, are there particular parties with a stake or interest in amending or reconceptualizing this right?===
===In the US context, can this right be altered legislatively, or would it require a constitutional amendment?===
===Is this right best addressed at the national level? The sub-national level? The international level?===
===To what extent is this right shaped primarily by judicial decisions?===
===If this right is best addressed through the amendment process, how should it proceed?===
===If this right were unlimited, what might be the consequences (positive and negative)?===
===If this right were eliminated, what might be the consequences (positive and negative)?===

Source/Voting Rights and Suffrage

2022-08-03T17:33:10Z

Kbrard: /* Hobbesian Thought */

==History==
===What is the oldest source in any country that mentions this right?===
Multiple 5th-Century BC sources outline the importance of citizen voting to early Athenian democracy. Thucydides’s The History of the Peloponnesian War includes several allusions to the importance of citizen participation in democracy. The first instance comes in Chapter VI, the funeral oration of Pericles:

"Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighboring states; we are rather a pattern to
others than imitators ourselves. Its administration favors the many instead of the few; this is why it is called a democracy…instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling-block in the way of action, we think it an indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all." (Thucydides, VI)

The description of participatory democracy as “indispensable” evokes an importance that moves beyond simply advocating for the benefits of democracy. Rather, it implies an intrinsic importance that more closely mirrors that of a political right. The early political foundations of democracy appear again in Chapter XIX during a speech from Athenagoras:

"It will be said, perhaps, that democracy is neither wise nor equitable, but that the holders of property are also the best fitted to rule. I say, on the contrary, first, that the word demos, or people, includes the whole state, oligarchy only a part; next, that if the best guardians of property are the rich, and the best counsellors the wise, none can hear and decide so well as the many; and that all these talents, severally and collectively, have their just place in a democracy." (Thucydides, XIX)

Aristotle also outlines the inner workings of early Athenian democracy after the reforms of Solon and includes several allusions to the intrinsic importance of suffrage in The Constitution of the Athenians, most likely written between 328 and 322 BC. In his discussion of the importance of individuals’ right to appeal grievances in Athenian court, Aristotle states that “when the democracy is master of the voting-power, it is master of the constitution,” and that “the masses have owed their strength” to Athens’s democratic institutions (Avalon Project). While there is no explicit mention of suffrage as a “right” per se, Aristotle’s emphasis on “voting-power” as a fundamental element of Athenian civil society serves as one of the older examples of voting as a “right.” However, it is important to note that voting in Ancient Athens, while highly valued and perceived as a right for some, was not universal, and only free adult men, whose parents were also Athenian, were granted the right to vote. Athenian democracy was also significantly more participatory and direct than contemporary democratic institutions, as all adult Athenian men were compelled to serve in local governmental assemblies where they would then vote on decrees and other forms of legislation (Blackwell).

While there is not much explicitly-written, primary evidence for the existence of voting rights before the Athenians, previous forms of government that predate democracy also played important roles in the conception of suffrage as a right, particularly in Mesopotamia. For example, “when Mesopotamian elders were unable to agree” on governmental decisions, “they opened their assembly to junior aristocrats and commoners” (Schemeil 104). Additionally, Assyrian merchant colonies’ judicial systems were “not vested in any one individual but resided in a general assembly of all colonists” and were called at the discretion of senior colonists (Jacobsen 161). Early conceptions of proto-democratic political institutions from all parts of the world often arose out of the need to maintain peace and political stability after prolonged conflict between various sects and social groups.

===What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right? BUILD IN COLLAPSE EXPAND TOGGLE===
====Afghanistan====
The earliest Afghan constitution was written during the reign of Emir Abdur Rahman Khan in the 1890s followed by the 1923 version. The 1964 Constitution of Afghanistan turned Afghanistan into a modern democracy, and the right to vote was established in Article 46. The 1964 Constitution of Afghanistan granted women equal rights including universal suffrage and the right to run for office (University of Nebraska, "Constitution of Afghanistan").

====Albania====
Article 45 of the Republic of Albania’s 1998 Constitution guarantees the right to vote to the People of Albania so they can exercise their power through their elected representatives in the Parliament (Berhani, I. "Elections and Implementation of the Law of Elections in Albania").

====Algeria====
Algeria gained independence from France in 1962 and a new Constitution was passed the following year. In the 1989 Constitution under Article 62, all people meeting the legal requirements have the right to vote and to be elected (Constitute Project, "Algeria 1989").

====Andorra====
Article 24 of the 1993 Constitution states that all citizens of age and in full use of their rights are guaranteed suffrage (Constitute Project, "Andorra 1993").

====Angola====
The constitution of 1975 established a one-party state headed by a president who was also chairman of the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), which declared itself a Marxist-Leninist party in 1977. Under Article 54 of the Angolan Constitution every citizen of age has the right to vote (Britannica, "Angola").

====Antigua and Barbuda====
Universal suffrage was introduced in Antigua and Barbuda in 1951 (National Encyclopedia, "Antigua and Barbuda- Politics, government, and taxation").

====Argentina====
In 1983, Argentina returned to democracy after almost eight years of authoritarian rule. In April 1994 elections were held to form a Constituent Assembly because of the provisions made to the 1853 Constitution. Under the new Constitution the president is directly elected for a four-year term by universal adult suffrage (ACE Project, “Electoral Systems- Argentina").

====Armenia====
Article 48 of the 1995 Constitution grants the people the right to vote and the right to participate in a referendum (Constitute Project, "Armenia’s Constitution of 1995 with Amendments through 2015").

====Australia====
In the 1850s under the Constitutions of Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia, Aboriginal men had the same right to vote as other male British subjects aged over 21. The first federal electoral Act, the Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902, granted men and women of all states the right to vote (National Museum Australia, “Australians’ right to vote”).

====Austria====
In Austria, universal suffrage for men was introduced by the Voting Rights Act of 1907 and the country was one of the first in Europe to introduce women’s suffrage in 1918 (Metropole, “Your Right to Vote in Austria”).

====Azerbaijan====
Section 3 of the Constitution of Azerbaijan established the major rights and freedoms of citizens of Azerbaijan, including human rights, property rights, equality rights, the right to vote and freedom of speech. According to the Law passed in the parliament, in 1919, Azerbaijan all citizens of the Republic who had reached the age of 20 were granted voting rights (Azerbaijan, “Interesting Facts”).

====The Bahamas====
The Bahamas Parliamentary Elections Act of 1992 specifies the registration of voters, how the electoral broadcasting council shall conduct its work, how elections are performed and how nominations are seeked (Political Database of the Americas, “Bahamas: Parliamentary Elections Act, 1992”).

====Bahrain====
Under Chapter I, Article 1 of the 2002 Constitution all citizens are able to participate in public affairs and political rights such as voting (Constitute Project, "Bahrain's Constitution of 2002").

====Bangladesh====
The Constitution of 1972, under section VII, states the Qualifications for registration as voter and grants the right to people who are eligible to vote (Laws of Bangladesh, “The Constitution of the People‌‌‍’s Republic of Bangladesh”).

====Barbados====
Barbados Independence Order of 1966 and the Constitution of Barbados established the right to vote for all citizens (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, “Barbados”).

====Belarus====
Article 38 of the 1994 Constitution of the Republic of Belarus states that citizens have the right to vote freely and officials must be elected through a secret ballot (Constitute Project, Belarus's Constitution of 1994 with Amendments through 2004).

====Belgium====
Beglain citizens are automatically registered on the electoral rolls when reaching the age of 18 and are subject to compulsory voting under Article 62 of the Belgian Constitution (Legislationline, “The Belgian Constitution”).

====Belize====
The 31 members of the House of Representatives are directly elected to five-year terms and the Senate has 12 seats. The ruling party, the opposition, and several civil associations select the senators, who are then appointed by the governor general. (Freedom House, “Belize”).

====Benin====
The president is elected by popular vote for up to two five-year terms and Delegates to the 83-member, unicameral National Assembly serve four-year terms and are elected by proportional representation. The April 2019 legislative elections were not free or fair, as the implementation of new electoral rules effectively prevented all opposition parties from participating (Freedom House, “Benin”).

====Bhutan====
The Constitution provides for a bicameral Parliament, with a 25-seat upper house, the National Council, and a 47-seat lower house, the National Assembly. Members of both houses serve five-year terms. The king appoints five members of the nonpartisan National Council, and the remaining 20 are popularly elected as independents, while the National Assembly is entirely elected (Freedom House, “Bhutan”).

====Bolivia====
Section 2 Article 26 of the Constitution grants the right for universal suffrage for all people (Constitute Project, “Bolivia’'s Constitution of 2009”).

====Bosnia and Herzegovina====
In accordance with Article II 1, Article IV 1.2 and 4.a and the Article V 1.a of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Article V of the Annex 3 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Election Law Of Bosnia And Herzegovina was developed in 2001 to promote free and fair elections (Legislationline, “Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina”).

====Botswana====
Botswana has a unicameral, 65-seat National Assembly. Voters directly elect 57 members to five-year terms, while 6 members are nominated by the president and approved by the National Assembly (Freedom House, “Botswana”).

====Brazil====
Chapter IV, Political Rights, Article 14 of the Brazilian Constitution grants universal suffrage with compulsory voting to those over the age of 18 (Constitute Project, “Brazil's Constitution of 1988 with Amendments through 2017”).

====Brunei====
The unicameral Legislative Council has no political standing independent of the sultan, who appoints most members. Brunei has not held direct legislative elections since 1962 (Freedom House, "Brunei").

====Bulgaria====
Under the 1991 Constitution Article 42, every citizen above the age of 18 is free to participate in elections of state and local authorities and in referendums (Constitute Project, "Bulgaria's Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 2015").

====Burkina Faso====
Under Article 33 of Title II in the Constitution of Burkina Faso, suffrage is direct or indirect and is universal, equal and secret (Constitute Project, “Burkina Faso's Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 2015”).

====Burundi====
Under Article 8 of Title I, of The State and of The Sovereignty of The People, all Brudians are granted universal suffrage if they are 18 years of age (Constitute Project, “Burundi's Constitution of 2005”).

====Cambodia====
Khmer citizens 18 years or older are granted the right to vote through universal suffrage under Article 34 of the Constitution (Constitute Project, “Cambodia's Constitution of 1993 with Amendments through 2008”).

====Cameroon====
Under Part I, The State and Sovereignty, Article 2 of the Cameroon Constitution, voting is equal, secret and by universal suffrage. It is granted to every citizen 20 years of age and older (Constitute Project, “Cameroon's Constitution of 1972 with Amendments through 2008”).

====Canada====
In 1876, only men who were 21 years of age or older, and who owned property were able to vote in federal elections. In 1918 Canadian women were given the right to vote in federal elections if they met the same eligibility criteria as men. The 1982 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms affirms the right of every Canadian citizen to vote and to stand as a candidate (Elections Canada, “A Brief History of Federal Voting Rights in Canada”).

====Cape Verde====
Under Chapter II, Rights, Liberties and Guarantees in Political Participation, Article 54 of the Cape Verde Constitution all citizens at least 18 years of age have the right to vote and participate in political life directly and through freely elected representatives (Constitute Project, “Cape Verde's Constitution of 1980 with Amendments through 1992”).

====Central African Republic====
The Constitution of the Central African Republic states under Title II, Of the State and Of Sovereignty, Article 19 that universal suffrage may be direct or indirect as every citizen over 18 has a duty to vote (Constitute Project, “Central African Republic's Constitution of 2004 with Amendments through 2010”).

====Chad====
Universal suffrage is granted directly or indirectly and is equal and secret for those 18 years of age or older under Title I, Of the State and Of Sovereignty, Article 6 of the Constitution of Chad (Constitute Project, “Chad's Constitution of 1996 with Amendments through 2005”).

====Chile====
The Constitution of Chile, Chapter II, Nationality and Citizenship, Article 13 grants Chileans who have reached 18 years of age voting rights. (Constitute Project, “Chile's Constitution of 1980 with Amendments through 2015”).

====China====
Under Chapter II, The Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens, Article 34 all citizens 18 years of age have the right to vote and stand for election without discrimination. (Constitute Project, “China (People’s Republic of)'s Constitution of 1982 with Amendments through 2018”).

====Colombia====
Under Title III, Chapter II, all citizens 18 years of age have the right to vote in all elections. In addition, an Act may grant Alien’s who reside in Colombia the right to vote in municipal and district level elections. (Constitute Project, “Colombia’s Constitution of 1991 with revisions through 2015”).

====Comoros====
According to Title I, Article 4, suffrage can be indirect or direct and is universal, equal and secret. All Comorians of either sex who are in possession of their civi and political rights may vote as provided for by the statute. (Constitute Project, "Comoros's Constitution of 2001 with Amendments through 2009").

====Democratic Republic of the Congo====
Section II Sovereignty, Article 5 establishes the conditions of organization of the elections and of the referendum. Suffrage is universal, equal, secret and can be direct or indirect. Without prejudice to the provisions of article 70, 102 and 106 all Congolese of both sexes, of 18 years of age, and enjoying their civil and political rights are electors and eligible. (Constitute Project, “Congo (Democratic Republic of the)'s Constitution of 2005 with Amendments through 2011”).

====Republic of the Congo====
Under Title I, Of The State and Of Sovereignty, Article 6, suffrage is direct or indirect and is free, equal and secret. Established by the law all Congolese 18 years of age, enjoying their civil and political rights are electors. (“Congo (Republic of the)'s Constitution of 2015”).

====Costa Rica====
According to Title VIII, Chapter II, all birthright citizens 18 years or older and naturalized citizens, 12 months or greater after naturalization, have the right to suffrage facilities. (Constitute Project, “Costa Rica’s Constitution of 1949 with revisions through 2020).

====Croatia====
Under Title II, Article 45, all birthright citizens 18 years or older, have access to universal, and equal suffrage through secret and direct ballots to determine the Croatian Parliament, President of the Republic of Croatia, and the European Parliament. (Constitute Project, “Croatia’s Constitution of 1991 with revisions through 2013).

====Cuba====
Article 205 of Cuba’s Constitution states that voting is the right of all Cuban citizens over the age of 16 unless they have been judicially disqualified to vote. Article 104 states that the National Assembly of the People’s Power is made up of representatives elected via direct, free, and secret elections. Additionally, Article 126 states that the President is elected by similar principles. (Constitute Project, “Cuba’s Constitution of 2019).

====Cyprus====
Under Article 63, Part II, all birthright citizens at the age of 18 years or older are eligible to be electors in either the Greek or Turkish electoral list based on their own nationality. Within each list the elector may vote for their respective representative. (Constitute Project, “Cyprus’ Constitution of 1960 with revisions through 2013).

====Czech Republic====
According to Chapter I, Article 56, all citizens at the age of 18 years or older have a right to direct and universal voting. Under Chapter 2, this voting is done by secret ballot and is based on proportional representation. (Constitute Project, “Czech Republic’s Constitution of 1993 with revisions through 2013).

====Denmark====
Under Part 4, all citizens who are permanent residents of Denmark and are at the age of suffrage, which is set by referendum, can vote in Folketing elections. (Constitute Project, “Denmark’s Constitution of 1953).

====Djibouti====
Under Title I, Article V, all Djiboutian nationals of majority have a right to Suffrage regardless of gender. (Constitute Project, “Djibouti’s Constitution of 1992 with revisions through 2010).

====Dominica====
Under Chapter III, Part 1, any resident who is a birthright citizen or naturalized citizen of Dominica and is over the age of 18 has a right to suffrage via a secret and unimposed ballot unless this right has been taken away by Parliament. (Constitute Project, “Dominica’s Constitution of 1978 with revisions through 2014).

====Dominican Republic====
Article 208 in the Dominican Republic’s constitution grants the right of universal, direct, free, and secret suffrage to all citizens over the age of 18, with the exceptions of Members of the Armed Forces and individuals whose rights have been revoked by courts. (Constitute Project, “Dominican Republic’s Constitution of 2015).

====East Timor====
Article 47 of the Constitution grants those over the age of 17 the right to vote. Voting constitutes a civic duty and is personal (Constitute Project, “Timor-Leste's Constitution of 2002”).

====Ecuador====
Under Article 62 of the Constitution of Ecuador voting is mandatory for those over the age of 18. Voting is optional for those between the ages of 16-18 and elderly persons 65 years of age and older (Constitute Project, “Ecuador's Constitution of 2008”).

====Egypt====
Part II, Rights and Freedoms, Article 55 of the Egyptian Constitution grants universal suffrage and compulsory voting for every Egyptian citizen over 18. If one fails to vote, they can receive a fine or even imprisonment, but a significant percentage of eligible voters do not vote (Constitute Project, “Egypt's Constitution of 2012”).

====El Salvador====
The Constitution of El Salvador grants its citizens political rights under Chapter III, Citizens, Their Political Rights and Duties in The Electoral Body. Article 71 allows those over the age of 18 to vote and Article 72 secures the exercise of suffrage (Constitute Project, “El Salvador's Constitution of 1983 with Amendments through 2014”)

====Equatorial Guinea====
Under the First Title, Fundamental Principles of the State, Article 2 of the Constitution of Equatorial Guinea grants the people with sovereignty to be exercised by way of universal suffrage (Constitute Project, “Equatorial Guinea's Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 2012”).

====Eritrea====
Eritrea is a militarized authoritarian state and there has not been a national election since the independence from Ethiopia in 1993 (Freedom House, “Eritrea”).

====Estonia====
Chapter III, The People, Article 56 allows for the supreme power of state to be exercised by the people through citizens with the right to vote. Article 57 grants the right to vote to those of the age of 18 (Constitute Project, “Estonia's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2015”).

====Eswatini====
Under Chapter VII, The Legislature, Section 88, Qualifications as a Voter, a person is qualified to vote if they are of the age of 18 and a citizen or ordinarily resident in Swaziland (Constitute Project, “Eswatini Constitution of 2005”).

====Ethiopia====
Article 38 of the Ethopian Constitution grants every Ethiopian national that is 18 years of age, without any discrimination, to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly and through freely chosen representatives through universal and equal suffrage (Constitute Project, “Ethiopia's Constitution of 1994”).

====Fiji====
According to Chapter 3, Parliament, Part B, Composition, Section 55, Voter Qualifications and Registration, of the Constitution of Fiji every citizen who is 18 years of age has the right to be registered as a voter, in the manner and form prescribed by a written law governing elections or registration of voters. (Constitute Project, “Fiji's Constitution of 2013”)

====Finland====
Section 14 of the Finish Constitution grants universal suffrage to every Finnish citizen who has reached 18 years of age and has the right to vote in national elections and referendums (Constitute Project, “Finland's Constitution of 1999 with Amendments through 2011”).

====France====
Under Article 3 of the French Constitution suffrage may be direct or indirect and will always be universal, equal and secret. (Constitute Project, “France's Constitution of 1958 with Amendments through 2008”)

====Gabon====
Under Title I, Article 4, Suffrage can be direct or indirect, is universal and secret. Gabonese citizens must be at least 18 years of age to vote. (Constitute Project, “Gabon’s Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 2011”).

====The Gambia====
According to Chapter 5, Article 39, every citizen over the age of 18 and of sound mind is eligible to vote in universal elections through a secret ballot to freely elect representatives. (Constitute Project, “Gambia’s (The) Constitution of 1996 with Amendments through 2018”).

====Georgia====
Under Article 37 and Article 74 of Georgia’s Constitution, citizens have the right to vote in local elections and for members of Parliament in fair and free elections by secret ballots. (Constitute Project, “Georgia’s Constitution of 1995 with revisions through 2018”).

====Germany====
Under Article 37 of Germany’s constitution, every citizen over the age of 18 is allowed to vote in elections. Members of the German Butdestag are elected every four years via free, equal, direct, and secret elections (Constitute Project, “Germany’s Constitution of 1949 with Amendments through 2014”).

====Ghana====
Under Chapter 7, Article 42, every citizen over the age of 18 and of sound mind is eligible to vote in public elections and referendum via secret ballot. (Constitute Project, “Ghana’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 1996”).

====Greece====
Under Section III, Article 51, every citizen who has met the minimum age requirement of 18, is not legally incapactiated, and has not had the right revoked for criminal actions must vote for members of Parliament via direct and secret ballots.(Constitute Project, “Greece’s Constitution of 1975 with Amendments through 2008”).

====Grenada====
Under Chapter III, Part I, any citizen who is 18 years of age or older may vote for his/her district representative for the House of Representatives unless that right has been legally revoked by Parliament. (Constitute Project, “Grenada’s Constitution of 1973, Reinstated in 1991 and with Amendments through 1992”).

====Guatemala====
Under Chapter II, any citizen, by definition over 18 years of age, has the freedom of suffrage. Citizens may cast secret ballots to elect the Congress of the Republic, President, and Vice-President. (Consitute Project, “Guatemala’s Constitution of 1985 with Amendments through 1993”).

====Guinea====
Under Guinea’s Constitution, the President and members of the legislature are elected via free, equal, direct, and secret elections. All citizens are allowed to vote as long as they are over 18 and meet citizenship requirements. (Constitute Project, “Guinea’s Constitution of 2010”).

====Guinea-Bissau====
According to Section II, Article 63, The President of the Republic is elected through universal, secret suffrage of the electing citizens. Electing citizens must be 18 years or older. (Constitute Project, “Guinea-Bissau’s Constitution of 1984 with Amendments through 1996”).

====Guyana====
According to Title II, persons 18 years or upwards and either a citizen of Guyana or a commonwealth citizen who has also been a Guyana resident for 1 year may vote in elections for Parliament. (Constitute Project, “Guyana’s Constitution of 1980 with Amendments through 2016”).

====Haiti====
Under Article 17, Haitians 21 years or older may participate in universal voting regardless of sex or marital status. (Constitute Project, “Haitian Constitution of 1987 with Amendments through 2012”).

====Honduras====
According to Article 5, voting is seen as a public duty. All Honduras citizens, by definition over the age of 18, are obligated to vote in universal, egalitarian, direct, free, and secret elections. (Constitute Project, “Honduras’ Constitution of 1982 with Amendments through 2013”).

====Hungary====
Under Articles 2 and 35, members of the National Assembly and of Local government are elected via fair and equal elections. (Constitute Project, “Hungry’s Constitution of 2011 with Amendments through 2016”).

====Iceland====
Under Article 33, all Icelandic citizens of the age of 18 or older have the right to vote in Althingi. Permanent naturalized Icelandic citizens is a requirement for non-birthright persons who wish to vote. Under Article 5, such persons may also vote for president. (Constitute Project, “Iceland’s Constitution of 1944 with Amendments through 2013”).

====India====
Article 326 of the Constitution provides that the elections to the House of the People and to the Legislative Assembly of every State shall be on the basis of adult suffrage. The Constitution Act of 1988, the Sixty-first Amendment changed the age of voting to 18 (Government of India, “The Constitution (Sixty-first Amendment) Act, 1988”).

====Indonesia====
Citizens of Indonesia vote for members of the People’s Representative Council as long as they are over 17 and have a valid voter ID card. (Constitute Project, “Indonesia’s Constitution of 1945, reinstated in 1959 with Amendments through 2002”).

====Iran====
Under Article 62, the Islamaic Consultative Assembly is elected directly by the people through a secret ballot. Eligible voters must either be birthright citizens of the Islamic Republic of Iran or naturalized citizens and of an age dictated by referendums and law. Under Article 6, the President and referendums must also be voted on by the public. (Constitute Project, “Iran’s (Islamic Republic of) Constitution of 1979 with Amendments through 1989”).

====Iraq====
In Article 20, the Iraqi Constitution states that all citizens shall have the right to vote, elect, and run for office. The voting age in Iraq is 18 years old. (Constitute Project, “Iraq’s Constitution of 2005”).

====Republic of Ireland====
Under Article 16, all Irish citizens over the age of 18 have the right to universal elections of the Dáil Éireann. Under Article 12, all Irish citizens who have the right to vote for the Dáil Éireann have the right to vote for the President through Single Transferable Vote elections. (Constitute Project, “Ireland’s Constitution of 1937 with Amendments through 2019”).

====Israel====
Under Article 5, all Israeli Nationals over the age of 18 have the right to vote in elections to the Knesset, unless a court has deprived them of that right. (Constitute Project, “Israel’s Constitution of 1958 with Amendments through 2019”).

====Italy====
Under Article 48, any citizen, regardless of gender, who has attained majority is entitled to vote. The vote is free, secret, and a civic duty. The Chamber of Deputies is elected via universal suffrage, the Senate of the Republic is elected via regional voting, (Constitute Project, “Italy’s Constitution of 1947 with Amendments through 2020”).

====Ivory Coast====
Under Article 48, any citizen, regardless of gender, who has attained majority is entitled to vote. The vote is free, secret, and a civic duty. The Chamber of Deputies is elected via universal suffrage, the Senate of the Republic is elected via regional voting, (Constitute Project, “Italy’s Constitution of 1947 with Amendments through 2020”).

====Jamaica====
According to Article 37, any Jamaican citizen 21 years or older may be an elector in elections for the House of Representatives. Any naturalized citizen may also vote in elections for the House of Representatives as long as they have been naturalized for at least 12 months prior to registering to vote. (Constitute Project, “Jamaica’s Constitution of 1962 with Amendments through 2015”).

====Japan====
According to Article 15, Japanese citizens have an inalienable right to elect their public officials, both local and to the house of representatives. Universal adult suffrage is guaranteed to all citizens above an age set by referendum. (Constitute Project, “Japan’s Constitution of 1946 with Amendments”).

====Jordan====
According to Article 67, the House of Representatives shall be composed of members elected by general, secret and direct elections by the citizens of Jordan which will be defined by law. (Constitute Project, “Jordan’s Constitution of 1952 with Amendments through 2016”).

====Kazakhstan====
According to Article 86, local representatives shall be elected by the of-age population through universal, secret suffrage for a five year term. In addition, under Article 41, the President of the Republic shall also be elected by the of-age population through universal suffrage via a secret ballot. (Constitute Project, “Kazakhstan’s Constitution of 1995 with Amendments through 2017”).

====Kenya====
Under Article 38, every citizen has the right to free and fair elections based on universal suffrage. Every citizen over the age of 18 can register as a voter, vote by secret ballot or in a referendum, and run for elected office. (Constitute Project, “Kazakhstan’s Constitution of 2010”).

====Kiribati====
Under Article 64, every citizen of Kiribati who is over 18 and is a resident of one of the electoral districts established by the Kiribati constitution is entitled to be an elector in the district in which he is a resident. The person may then vote for his representative in the Maneaba ni Maungatabu. (Constitute Project, “Kiribati’s Constitution of 1979 with Amendments through 2013”).

====Kuwait====
Under Article 87, citizens have a right to elect members of The National Assembly every 4 years or if the Emir calls for a special election after dissolving The National Assembly. (Constitute Project, “Kuwait’s Constitution of 1979, reinstated in 1992”).

====Kyrgyzstan====
Under Article 2, all citizens over the age of 18 are entitled to universal suffrage by equal and direct elections with secret ballots. Citizens vote for the President of the country and members of the Jogorku Kenesh. (Constitute Project, “Kyrgyzstan’s Constitution of 2010, with Amendments through 2016”)

====Laos====
Under Article 4, members of the National Assembly and the Local People’s Assemblies are voted into office via equal and direct voting with secret ballots. The voting age in Laos is 18 years old. (Constitute Project, Laos’s Constitution of 1991, with Amendments through 2015)

====Latvia====
Under Chapter II, Article 6, The Saeima shall be elected in general, equal, and direct elections and by secret ballot through proportional representation by Latvian citizens over 18 years of age. Citizens who are eligible to vote for The Saeima are also eligible to vote in national referendums according to Chapter III, Article 80 of the Latvian Constitution. (Constitute Project, “Latvia’s Constitution of 1992, reinstated in 1991, with Amendments through 2016”).

====Lebanon====
Under Article 21, every Lebanese citizen twenty-one years or older has the right to vote in public elections. Elections elect members to the Board of Deputies. (Constitute Project, Lebanon’s Constitution of 1926 with Amendments through 2004”).

====Lesotho====
Under Article 57, Citizens of Lesotho who are 18 years of age or older and reside in Lesotho may vote in elections to The National Assembly, which is the first chamber of the Lesotho government. (Constitute Project, “Lesotho’ Constitution of 1993 with Amendments through 2018”).

====Liberia====
Under Article 83, Citizens of Liberia may vote for the President, Vice-President, members of the Senate, members of The House of Representatives, and referendum once they meet the legal adult age as dictated by law. (Constitute Project, Liberia’s Constitution of 1986”).

====Libya====
Under Article 18, The National Transitional Council is the electoral body responsible for electing the President of Libya. This council consists of members of the local councils throughout the country. (Constitute Project, Libya’s Constitution of 2011 with Amendments through 2012”).

====Liechtenstein====
According to Article 46, Parliament shall consist of 25 publicly selected representatives that will be elected through secret, universal, and direct suffrage by Liechtenstein citizens over the age set by law. (Constitute Project, “Liechtenstein’s Constitution of 1921 with Amendments through 2011”).

====Lithuania====
According to Article 78, any citizen who has reached the age of 18 by election day has a right to vote in public, direct, and secret elections for the President of the Republic. Under Article 34, those who are eligible to vote for the President of the Republic may also participate in the elections of the Seimas. (Constitute Project, “Lithuania’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2019”).

====Luxembourg====
Under Article 32bis, The Deputies of the Chamber of Deputies are elected by universal suffrage following the rules of proportional representation. Any Luxembourg citizen of the age of 18 or older is eligible to vote in these elections according to Article 52. (Constitute Project, “Luxembourg’s Constitution of 1868 with Amendments through 2009”).

====Madagascar====
Under Article 5, Madagascar’s Constitution grants universal suffrage via direct and indirect elections. The voting age in Madagascar is 18 years old. Additionally, Article 45 states that the President of the Republic is voted into office every 5 years by universal direct suffrage. (Constitute Project, “Madagascar's Constitution of 2010 ”).

====Malawi====
Under Article 77, an eligible voter must be a citizen of Malawi or a Malawi resident of at least 7 years, 18 years of age or older, and a resident of the constituency of which they are trying to vote. If all of these are true, the voter may participate in general elections, by-elections, presidential elections, local government elections, and referendums. (Constitute Project, “Malawi’s Constitution of 1994 with Amendments through 2017”).

====Malaysia====
Under Article 119, every citizen of Malaysia who is the age of 21 years or older, is a resident in a constituency, and is registered as an elector in the constituency in which he/she resides is eligible to vote in elections to the House of Representatives or the Legislative Assembly. (Constitute Project, “ Malaysia’s Constitution of 1957 with Amendments through 2007”).

====Maldives====
According to Article 26, every citizen over the age of 18 has the right to vote in elections and public referendums via secret ballots and run for office in the Maldives. According to Article 10, the President is elected by universal suffrage. (Constitute Project, “Maldives’s Constitution of 2008 ”).

====Mali====
According to Article 27, suffrage is granted to all citizens of Mali over the age of 18 to participate in universal, equal, and secret elections. The President of Mali is elected every 5 years by an absolute majority of votes. Additionally, under Article 61, the Deputies are elected every 5 years via universal suffrage. (Constitute Project, “Mali’s Constitution of 1992 ”).

====Malta====
According to Article 57, a citizen of Malta over the age of 18 and currently residing in Malta may vote in secret elections via transferable voting. These public elections are used to determine the members of the House of Representatives through proportional representation. (Constitute Project, “Malta’s Constitution of 1964 with Amendments through 2016”).

====Marshall Islands====
According to Section 3, elections of the members of Nitijela shall be conducted via a secret ballot system based on universal suffrage of those who have attained the age of 18 years or greater unless they are certified insane or are currently serving time for a felony. (Constitute Project, “Marshall Islands’ Constitution of 1979 with Amendments through 1995”).

====Mauritania====
Under Article 3, suffrage, both indirect and direct, must be universal, equal, and secret and is a right provided to everyone who has met the legal age requirement regardless of gender. Article 26 states that The President is elected by universal suffrage. Under Article 47, the Deputies to the National Assembly are elected via direct suffrage, however the senators are elected via indirect suffrage in order to represent the all territories of The Republic. (Constitute Project, “Mauritania’s Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 2012”).

====Mauritius====
Under Article 42, a person may be an elector if they are a citizen of at least 18 years of age and reside in the constituency in which they wish to vote. Electors shall elect members of The Parliament of Mauritius which consists of 70 members and elects the President. (Constitute Project, “Mauritius’ Constitution of 1968 with Amendments through 2016”).

====Mexico====
Under Article 52, Mexicans of 18 years of age or older may participate in public elections. The House of Representatives shall be elected 1/3rd through uninominal voting and 2/3rds through proportional representation. All 128 senators shall be elected via majority voting by their own state. Under Article 41, elections of the legislative branch and executive branch shall be free, authentic, and periodical through universal and direct voting. (Constitute Project, “Mexico’s Constitution of 1917 with Amendments through 2015”).

====Federated States of Micronesia====
Under Article VI, a citizen of 18 years of age or greater may vote in secret national elections to the Senate. Law shall determine the length of time one must be a resident to register to vote. Conviction of a crime and insanity remove ones ability to vote. (Constitute Project, “Micronesia’s (Federal States of) Constitution of 1978 with Amendments through 1990”).

====Moldova====
Under Article 38, all citizens who have attained 18 years of age have a right to suffrage unless prevented by law. Article 61 states that elections for the Parliament shall be elected by universal, direct, equal, secret, and freely expressed suffrage. Under Article 78, the President shall be elected by similarly run elections with a majority needed to become elected. If a majority is not found after the first ballot, a second ballot will be voted upon with the top two candidates to determine the winner. (Constitute Project, “Moldova’s (Republic of) Constitution of 1994 with Amendments through 2016”).

====Monaco====
According to Article 53, the 24 members of The National Council are elected by direct universal suffrage. Electors are Monegasque citizens, of either gender, who have reached 18 years of age. (Constitute Project, “Monaco’s Constitution of 1962 with Amendments through 2002”).

====Mongolia====
According to Article 21, members of The State Great Hural shall be elected by citizens who are qualified to vote, via universal, free, and direct voting. Under Article 31, each political party in The State Great Hural may provide one nominated presidential candidate which the citizens may vote on. (Constitute Project, “Mongolia’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2001”).

====Montenegro====
The Constitution of Montenegro states that citizens (age 18 or older) are entitled to vote in national elections for members of Parliament and for the President. (Constitute Project, “Montenegro’s Constitution of 2007 with Amendments through 2013”).

====Morocco====
Article 2 of Morocco’s Constitution states that representatives are elected by the people via principles of universal and free suffrage. Article 30 expands on the claim to universal suffrage stating that voting is a “personal right and national duty” granted to Moroccan citizens (age 18 and older). (Constitute Project, “Morocco’s Constitution of 2011”).

====Mozambique====
Under Article 73, citizens of Mozambique are granted the right of universal, direct, and equal suffrage by secret ballot. Citizens of Mozambique can vote once they are 18 years old. (Constitute Project, “Mozambique’s Constitution of 2004 with Amendments through 2007”).

====Myanmar====
Article 391 of Myanmar’s Constitution states that citizens at least 18 years old have the right to vote for each Hluttaw of their constituency. The only individuals that are not allowed to vote are those 1) “members of religious orders,” 2) those serving sentences, 3) incompetent individuals, 4) individuals otherwise disqualified by law. (Constitute Project, “Myanmar’s Constitution of 2008 with Amendments through 2015”).

====Namibia====
Under Article 17, every citizen of Namibia, who has reached the age of 18, has a right to suffrage. Article 28 states that the President shall be elected under direct, universal, and equal suffrage. The National Assembly, under Article 46, shall be composed of 96 members who are elected by general, direct, and secret ballot. 8 other members shall be appointed by the President. (Constitute Project, “Namibia’s Constitution of 1990 with Amendments through 2014”).

====Nauru====
Article 84 states that citizens of Nauru can vote for members of Parliament and for referendums based on the principles of universal suffrage. The voting age in Nauru is 20 years old. (Constitute Project, “Nauru’s Constitution of 1968 with Amendments through 2015”).

====Nepal====
Under Article 84, any Nepali citizen who has attained the age of 18 years has a right to suffrage. The House of Representatives consists of 165 members to be elected through the post electoral system and 110 elected through a proportional representation electoral system. The National Assembly is voted upon by local elected leaders according to Article 86. According to Article 62, members from The National Assembly and The House of Representatives make up an electoral college to elect the President. (Constitute Project, “ Nepal’s Constitution of 2015 with Amendments through 2016”).

====Kingdom of the Netherlands====
Article 4 of the Dutch Constitution states that every Dutch citizen has the right to elect members of Parliament and run for office, so long as they are over the age of 18. The voting age is set by Parliament. (Constitute Project, “ Kingdom of the Netherland's Constitution of 1814 with Amendments through 2008”).

====New Zealand====
Article 12 of New Zealand’s Constitution grants citizens over the age of 18 the electoral rights of voting for members of the House of Representatives by secret ballot and to run to be a member of the House of Representatives. (Constitute Project, “New Zealand’s Constitution of 1852 with Amendments through 2014”).

====Nicaragua====
Under Article 2 of Nicaragua’s Constitution, Nicaraguan citizens are granted the right of “sovereign power through their representatives” via equal, direct, universal and secret suffrage. Articles 132, 146, and 178 grant the right for citizens to vote for the President, legislators in the National Assembly, and local officials. (Constitute Project, “ Nicaragua’s Constitution of 1987 with Amendments through 2014”).

====Niger====
Article 7 of Niger’s Constitution grants Nigerian citizens over the age of 18 or “emancipated minors'' the right to direct and indirect suffrage via equal, free, and secret ballots. Articles 47 and 84 states that the President and The Deputies are elected via universal suffrage (Constitute Project, “ Niger’s Constitution of 2010 with Amendments through 2017”).

====Nigeria====
Article 4 of Nigeria’s Constitution grants citizens the right to vote for members of the House of Assembly. Article 117 states that any citizen over the age of 18 that is registered to vote may do so in these elections. (Constitute Project, “ Nigeria’s Constitution of 1999 with Amendments through 2011”).

====North Korea====
Under Article 6, citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are granted the right of universal, equal and direct suffrage. Citizens over the age of 17 can vote for members of the Supreme People’s Assembly according to Article 89 and the local People’s Assembly under Article 138. (Constitute Project, “ North Korea’s Constitution of 1972 with Amendments through 2016”).

====North Macedonia====
Article 22 in the Constitution of North Macedonia grants citizens over the age of 18 the right to vote in universal and direct elections with secret ballots. If a person is “deprived of the right to practice their profession by a court verdict,” they lose their right to vote. Citizens vote for the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia under Article 62 and the President of the Republic under Article 81. (Constitute Project, “North Macedonia (Republic of)'s Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 2011”).

====Norway====
Article 50 of Norway’s Constitution grants nearly all citizens over the age of 18 the right to vote. Citizens residing outside Norway during the election or who “Suffer from a seriously weakened mental state” are subject to the determination of law on whether or not they may vote. (Constitute Project, “Norway's Constitution of 1814 with Amendments through 2014”).

====Oman====
Under Article 58bis 9 of Oman’s Constitution, members of the Majlis Al Shura are elected through direct and secret votes. Citizens of Oman must be 21 or older to vote for these members. (Constitute Project, “ Oman’s Constitution of 1996 with Amendments through 2011”).

====Pakistan====
Article 51 states that an individual in Pakistan may vote if they are a citizen, are over the age of 18, are registered to vote, and have a sound mind. Members of the National Assembly are elected via direct and free suffrage. (Constitute Project, “ Pakistan’s Constitution of 1973, reinstated in 2002 with Amendments through 2018”).

====Palau====
Article 7 of the Constitution of Palau grants citizens over the age of 18 the right to vote in National and state elections. The Olbiil Era Kelulau (the legislative body) determines the residency requirements of voting in these elections. (Constitute Project, “Palau’s Constitution of 1981 with Amendments through 1992”).

====Panama====
Article 135 states that it is the right and duty of all citizens of Panama to vote in their free, universal, direct, and secret elections. The voting age in Panama is 18. Article 150 states that the members of the National Assembly of Panama are voted into office. (Constitute Project, “ Panama’s Constitution of 1972 with Amendments through 2004”).

====Papua New Guinea====
Under articles 50 and 126 all citizens over the age of 18 may vote unless they are serving a sentence over 9 months, have been convicted of a crime or have dual citizenship. Voters elect the members of Parliament via universal suffrage. (Constitute Project, “ Papua New Guinea’s Constitution of 1975 with Amendments through 2016”).

====Paraguay====
Article 118 of Paraguay’s Constitution states that it is the right and duty of citizens to vote in their universal, direct, equal and secret elections. Article 120 states that the voting age is 18 and that Paraguayan citizens living abroad may also vote. (Constitute Project, “ Paraguay’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2011”).

====Peru====
Under articles 111 and 191 the President and the Regional Governors are elected through universal suffrage. The voting age in Peru is 18 years of age. (Constitute Project, “ Peru’s Constitution of 1993 with Amendments through 2021”).

====Philippines====
Article 5 of the Constitution of the Philippines concerns suffrage, stating that citizens over the age of 18 that have resided in the country for the previous year are entitled to vote. Article 6 states that the members of the Senate, House of Representatives, and the President are elected to office by universal suffrage. (Constitute Project, “ Philippines’s Constitution of 1987”).

====Poland====
Article 62 of the Polish Constitution grants citizens over the age of 18 the right to vote for the President and representatives of the Sejm and Senate and participate in referendums. Article 127 states that the President of the Republic is elected by the people every 5 years via universal, direct, and secret voting. (Constitute Project, “ Poland’s Constitution of 1997 with Amendments through 2009”).

====Portugal====
Article 10 states that political power is exercised via universal, direct, and secret suffrage granted to citizens of Portugal (over 18 years of age). Article 121 states that the President of the Republic is elected via universal, direct, and secret suffrage. (Constitute Project, “ Portugal’s Constitution of 1976 with Amendments through 2005”).

====Qatar====
Under article 93 of Qatar’s Constitution the President is elected via secret ballot by the majority of votes from attending members of the Council. Qatar is not a democracy and therefore citizens have not traditionally had the right to vote for political officials. (Constitute Project, “ Qatar’s Constitution of 2003”).

====Romania====
Article 36 of Romania’s Constitution grants citizens over the age of 18 who are mentally sound and have not had voting privileges revoked in court may vote. Articles 62 and 81 state that The Chamber of Deputies and the President are elected via universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage (Constitute Project, “ Romania’s Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 2003”).

====Russia====
Article 81 states that the President is elected every 6 years via universal, equal, and direct suffrage by a secret ballot. The voting age in Russia is 18 years of age. (Constitute Project, “ Russia’s Constitution of 1993 with Amendments through 2014”).

====Rwanda====
Article 2 grants universal and equal suffrage to all Rwandan citizens via direct and indirect elections. The voting age in Rwanda is 18 years old. Article 75 states that the Chamber of Deputies is elected to office via direct universal suffrage. (Constitute Project, “ Rwanda’s Constitution of 2003 with Amendments through 2015”).

====Saint Kitts and Nevis====
Under article 29 of the Constitution all citizens over the age of 18 are entitled to universal suffrage by secret ballot for the purpose of electing Representatives. Article 38 also grants these same individuals the right to vote in referendums. (Constitute Project, “ Saint Kitts and Nevis’s Constitution of 1983”).

====Saint Lucia====
Article 33 grants citizens (over the age of 18) the right to vote for members of the House of Representatives via universal suffrage by secret ballot. (Constitute Project, “ Saint Lucia’s Constitution of 1978”).

====Saint Vincent and the Grenadines====
Under article 27 all citizens who are over the age of 18 and meet proper residence requirements are entitled to vote for representatives based on the principles of universal suffrage by secret ballot. (Constitute Project, “Saint Vincent and the Grenadines’s Constitution of 1979”).

====Samoa====
The Constitution of Samoa has little mention of universal and direct suffrage because the Head of State is appointed by the Legislative Assembly. Members of the Legislative Assembly are elected to represent the 41 territorial villages, however the specifics of voter laws and processes are not described. It is known, however, that the voting age is 21. (Constitute Project, “Samoa’s Constitution of 1962 with Amendments through 2017”).

====San Marino====
According to Article 7, suffrage is universal, secret, and direct and is granted to all citizens of the country over the legal voting age of 18. (Policing Law, “San Marino’s Constitution of 1974”).

====São Tomé and Príncipe====
Article 58 of the Constitution grants all citizens over the age of18 the right to vote as long as they are competent. Article 78 states that the President of the Republic is elected by universal, free, direct, and secret suffrage. (Constitute Project, “São Tomé and Príncipes’s Constitution of 1975 with Amendments through 2003”).

====Saudi Arabia====
Citizens of Saudi Arabia do not typically have the consistent and direct right to vote in elections, especially for national offices. Elections have been held intermittently in recent history. (Constitute Project, “Saudi Arabia’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2013”).

====Senegal====
Article 3 of Senegal’s Constitution grants Senegalese citizens over the age of 18 the right to direct and indirect suffrage by equal and secret ballot. Articles 26 and 59 state that the President and the representative assembly are elected via universal suffrage. (Constitute Project, “ Senegal’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2013”).

====Serbia====
Under article 52 of Serbia’s Constitution all individuals of the proper age (18 years old) and working status are entitled to universal, free, and direct voting by secret ballot. (Constitute Project, “Serbia’s Constitution of 2006”).

====Seychelles====
Under article 24 of the Constitution of Seychelles all citizens over the age of 18 have the right to be registered as a voter as well as to participate in public affairs and run for office. Both the President and members of the National Assembly are elected into office. (Constitute Project, “Seychelles’s Constitution of 1993 with Amendments through 2017”).

====Sierra Leone====
According to article 31 of Sierra Leone’s Constitution, citizens over the age of 18 with a sound mind of the right to register to vote. Article 42 states that the President of Sierra Leone is voted on by these electors. (Constitute Project, “Sierra Leone’s Constitution of 1991, reinstated in 1996 with Amendments through 2013”).

====Singapore====
According to the Constitution of Singapore, citizens vote in two types of elections, parliamentary and presidential. Citizens of Singapore can vote once they are 21 years of age. (Constitute Project, “Singapore’s Constitution of 1963 with Amendments through 2016”).

====Slovakia====
Article 30 of Slovakia’s Constitution states that the right to vote granted to Slovakian citizens is universal, equal and direct. Additionally, it states that citizens have the right to vote for their national representatives and in municipal elections. The voting age in Slovakia is 18 years old. (Constitute Project, “Slovakia’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2017”).

====Slovenia====
Under Article 43, all citizens over the age of 18 can vote in the universal and equal elections. Additionally, in some cases, aliens of Slovenia may vote as determined by the law. Article 80 states that the members of the National Assembly are elected via these universal and equal elections. (Constitute Project, “Slovenia’s Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 2016”).

====Solomon Islands====
The Preamble to the Constitution of the Solomon Islands states that their government is based on the principles of universal suffrage. Article 56 explands on this notion, stating that citizens must be registered to vote. The voting age is 18 years old. (Constitute Project, “Solomon Islands’s Constitution of 1978 with Amendments through 2018”).

====Somalia====
Under article 141 of Somalia’s Constitution eligible voters have the right to vote in referendums and by secret ballot in elections. The voting age in Somalia is 18 years old. (Constitute Project, “ Somalia’s Constitution of 2012”).

====South Africa====
Articles 1 and 19 of South Africa’s Constitution make note of adult citizens’ right to universal, equal, and fair elections as well as to run for political office. Article 47 states that these adult citizens have the right to elect the members of the National Assembly.(Constitute Project, “South Africa’s Constitution of 1996 with Amendments through 2012”).

====South Korea====
According to Article 24 of South Korea’s Constitution, all citizens (over the age of 19) are allowed to vote in elections. Article 67 states that the President of South Korea should be elected based on the principles of universal and direct suffrage. (Constitute Project, “South Korea’s Constitution of 1948 with Amendments through 1987”).

====South Sudan====
Article 56 of South Sudan’s Constitution states that members of the National Legislative Assembly are voted into office based on the principles of universal and fair suffrage by adult citizens of the nation, age 17 and older. (Constitute Project, “South Sudan’s Constitution of 2011 with Amendments through 2013”).

====Spain====
Under article 23 of Spain’s Constitution adult citizens (over the age of 18) have the right to participate in public affairs and elect their representatives through universal and free elections. (Constitute Project, “ Spain’s Constitution of 1978 with Amendments through 2011”).

====Sri Lanka====
Under Article 88 of Sri Lanka’s Constitution, all adult citizens have the right to elect the President and Members of the Parliament, as well as vote on a referendum, as long as they are registered to vote and are over the age of 18. (Constitute Project, “Sri Lanka’s Constitution of 1978 with Amendments through 2015”).

====Sudan====
Sudan’s Constitution grants citizens the right to vote for the President as well as members of the National Legislature. Citizens of Sudan can vote in these elections once they are 17 years old. (Constitute Project, “Sudan’s Constitution of 2019”).

====Suriname====
Article 54 of Suriname’s Constitution gives adult citizens over the age of 18 the right to vote as long as they are registered voters. Articles 57 and 58 states that citizens have the right to vote for the members of the National Assembly barring their right to vote has not been revoked by the courts (Constitute Project, “Suriname’s Constitution of 1987 with Amendments through 1992”).

====Sweden====
The Preamble of Sweden’s Constitution notes that their democracy is founded upon the principles of universal suffrage. Article 4 expands on this notion stating that all citizens (at home or abroad) over the age of 18 can vote for the members of the Riksdag. (Constitute Project, “Sweden’s Constitution of 1974 with Amendments through 2012”).

====Switzerland====
Article 136 of the Swiss Constitution lays out the political right for Swiss citizens, stating that all Swiss citizens over the age of 18 (unless they are mentally incapable of doing so) may vote in their free elections. The Swiss legislature can create mandatory and optional referendums. (Constitute Project, “Switzerland’s Constitution of 1999 with Amendments through 2014”).

====Syria====
Under Article 59 of Syria’s Constitution all citizens over the age of 18 and meet the proper “conditions” have the right to vote in elections. Article 57 states that the members of the People’s Assembly are elected by these voters.(Constitute Project, “Syria’s Constitution of 2012”).

====Tajikistan====
Under Articles 49 and 65, members of the Majlisi Namoyandagon and the President of Tajikistan are elected in universal and free elections by secret ballot. Citizens in Tajikistan can vote if they are over the age of 18. (Constitute Project, “Tajikistan’s Constitution of 1994 with Amendments through 2016”).

====Tanzania====
Article 5 in Tanzania’s Constitution grants all citizens over the age of 18 the right to vote in any election. Members of Parliament and the President are elected by the people. (Constitute Project, “Tanzania’s Constitution of 1977 with Amendments through 2005”).

====Thailand====
Article 95 of the Thai Constitution grants Thai citizens of 5 years or more that are registered and are at least 18 years old the right to vote. Article 85 states that members of the House of Representatives of Thailand are elected via direct suffrage by secret ballot. (Constitute Project, “Thailand’s Constitution of 2017”).

====Togo====
Under article 5 of the Constitution of Togo grants all citizens over the age of 18 the right to universal, equal, and secret suffrage. Articles 52, 59, and 141 state that the Deputies, President, and territorial collectivities are voted into office based on the principles of universal suffrage. (Constitute Project, “Togo’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2007”).

====Tonga====
Tongan citizens over the age of 21 who are not nobles, insane or disabled by the definitions of the 23rd Article can vote for representatives, according to Article 64. Citizens living abroad may also vote as long as they are registered. (Constitute Project, “Tonga’s Constitution of 1875 with Amendments through 2013”).

====Trinidad and Tobago====
Under Article 51, citizens 18 years or older and that have proper residence may vote and run for office. Eligible voters elect the members of the legislature and the President. (Constitute Project, “Trinidad and Tobago’s Constitution of 1976 with Amendments through 2007”).

====Tunisia====
Under Article 54, Tunisian citizens are eligible voters if they are at least 18 years old. Article 55 states that these voters elect the members of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People via principles of universal, free, direct, and secret suffrage. (Constitute Project, “Tunisia’s Constitution of 2014”).

====Turkey====
Article 67 of Turkey’s Constitution gives its citizens (18 years old or older) the right to vote, run for office, and engage in political activity. Some members of the Armed Forces and individuals convicted of crimes cannot vote. Articles 75 and 101 grant voters the right to elect the members of the Grand National Assembly and the President via universal suffrage. (Constitute Project, “Turkey’s Constitution of 1982 with Amendments through 2017”).

====Turkmenistan====
Under Article 119, citizens of Turkmenistan who are at least 18 years old can vote for the President of Turkmenistan, the deputies of the Mejlis, and members of the People’s Council. (Constitute Project, “Turkmenistan’s Constitution of 2008 with Amendments through 2016”).

====Tuvalu====
Article 87 of the Tuvalu Constitution states that the members of Parliament are voted into office by voting age (18 years old) adults based on the principles of universal suffrage. (Constitute Project, “Tuvalu’s Constitution of 1986 with Amendments through 2010”).

====Uganda====
Articles 78 and 103 grant citizens of Uganda the right to vote for representatives and the President through processes of universal suffrage by secret ballot. The voting age in Uganda is 18 years old. (Constitute Project, “Uganda’s Constitution of 1995 with Amendments through 2017”).

====Ukraine====
Articles 70 and 71 of Ukraine’s Constitution lay out the rights of voters. Ukrainian citizens age 18 or older who are not deemed incompetent can vote in local and national elections based on the principles of universal suffrage. (Constitute Project, “Ukraine’s Constitution of 1996 with Amendments through 2016”).

====United Arab Emirates====
Under article 46 of section 1, The Supreme Council of the Union, each Emirate shall have a single vote in the deliberations of the council. According to article 49 decisions of the council and procedural matters shall be taken by majority vote. Article 61 states that the decisions are secret and in an evenly divided vote the Chairman’s vote shall prevail. There are no political parties and, until the beginning of the 21st century, no elections were held. Now, an electoral college meets every four years to select half of the members of the advisory Federal National Council, the other half is designated by appointment. (Constitute Project, “United Arab Emirates's Constitution of 1971 with Amendments through 2004”)

====United Kingdom====
The Reform Act of 1832 was the first piece of legislation to expand voting rights in the United Kingdom. It established that men above the age of 21 who were freeholders of property could vote. Universal suffrage was established with the Representation of the People Act 1969, which extended the right to vote to all persons of age (Anglotopia, "The History of Voting Rights in the United Kingdom")

====United States====
U.S. election laws first were seen in Article 1 of the Constitution, which gave states the responsibility to oversee federal elections. Since then, many Constitutional amendments and federal laws have been put in place to protect voting rights such as the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-sixth Amendment (USA Gov, "Voting and Elections").

====Uruguay====
Chapter 2 article 77 of the 1966 Constitution of Uruguay states that since every citizen is a member of the sovereignty of the nation, they are eligible to vote and participate in the electoral process (Constitute Project, "Uruguay's Constitution of 1966, Reinstated in 1985, with Amendments through 2004").

====Uzbekistan====
The law on Election of Citizens' Suffrage in 1994 granted Citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan the right to take part in public and state affairs both as directly and through their representatives (Legislaionline, "Law on Election of Citizens' Suffrage").

====Vanuatu====
The 1980 Constitution under Chapter 1, National Sovereignty, The Electoral Franchise and Political Parties, entitles every citizen of age thee right to vote (Constitute Project, "Vanuatu's Constitution of 1980 with Amendments through 2013").

====Venezuela====
Under the 1999 Constitution of Venezuela, Article 64, all Venezuelans over the age of 18 have the right to vote (Constitute Project, Venezuela's Constitution of 1999 with Amendments through 2009).

====Vietnam====
According to Chapter I, Political System, Article 7 of the Vietnmaese Constitution the elections are held in accordance with the principles of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage. Under Chapter II, Human Rights and Citizen’s Fundamental Rights and Duties, Article 27 citizens of the age of 18 have the right to vote (Constitute Project, “Vietnam’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2013”).

====Yemen====
Under Part Three, Organization of the State Authorities, Chapter 1, Article 63 of the Yemeni Constitution, The members of the House of Representatives shall be elected in a secret free and equal vote directly by the people (Constitute Project, “Yemen's Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 2001”).

====Zambia====
Article 75, clause 1 of the 1991 Constitution grants every citizen of Zambia who has attained the age of eighteen years is entitled to be registered as a voter (Election Access, "Zambia").

====Zimbabwe====
According to ZImbabwe’s Constitution, Chapter 7, Elections, Part one, Electoral Systems and Processes, Number 155, Principles of the Electoral System, elections must be held regularly and referendums to which the Constitution applies must be peaceful, free, conducted by a secret ballot and based on universal suffrage and equality (Constitute Project, “Zimbabwe's Constitution of 2013”).

===Is there another noteworthy written source from the past that mentions this right?===
Other noteworthy written sources that mention an implicit right to vote in a more modern context include Thomas Rainsborough during the British Putney Debates in 1647, where he stated, “I do think that the poorest man in England is not at all bound in a strict sense to that Government that he hath not had a voice to put Himself under.” Rainsborough’s speech at the Putney Debates also alluded to a divine right to vote:

"I do think the main cause why Almighty God gave men reason, it was that they should make use of that reason…every man born in England cannot, ought not, neither by the law of God nor the law of nature, to be exempted from the choice of those who are to make laws for him to live under." (Rainsborough)

In the United States, the 1776 Constitution of Virginia was one of the first written sources to establish a protected right to vote, stating that “all men, having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with, and attachment to, the community, have the right of suffrage.” Federalist 52, written by James Madison, also alludes to the importance of voting rights, stating “the definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican government” (Avalon Project). Similar to earlier conceptions of democracy as a means of quelling the potential for rebellion, concessions to expand voting rights in Great Britain, in particular, were in large part made by political leaders to “prevent the necessity of revolution” among the population (National Archives). In both of these cases, however, the right to vote was granted solely to property-owning men, and it would not be until the mid-19th Century that the connection between the right to vote and property ownership would be removed in both Great Britain and the United States. Additionally, perceptions of suffrage as a universal right have come about much more recently, with New Zealand becoming the first country to legally recognize suffrage as a universal right in 1893 under Part One of the Electoral Act, which outlined that “every person of the age of twenty-one years or upwards who has resided for one year in the colony” was eligible to vote.

===Is the identification of this right associated with a particular era in history, political regime, or political leader?===
===What specific events or ideas contributed to its identification as a fundamental right?===
===When was it generally accepted as a fundamental, legally-protectable right?===
===What historical forces or events, if any, contributed to a widespread belief in its importance? ===
==Legal Codification==
===Is this right protected in the Constitutions of most countries today?===
===Is it contained in the US Constitution?===
===Has it been interpreted as being implicit in the US Constitution?===
===Are there any exceptions in American law to this right?===
===Is this right enshrined in international and regional human rights treaties?===
==Philosophical Origins==
===What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?===
====Buddhism====
====Platonism====
In the Republic and Laws, these dialogues of Plato attempt to firstly address the conception of the ideal state, and further, the practices and implementation of such a state. Plato’s Republic provides an insight into the possibility of a new system of governance, outlined primarily with the guided discussion of Socrates. Throughout the series, Socrates defines the nature of justice and the conditions under which one would be incentivized to act justly, drawing parallels between the state and the individual. Socrates argues that the just state will provide stability and prosperity to society. Plato’s Laws comes to a similar conclusion about the just state, however, justice here is maintained through the enforcement of virtuous law. Throughout several dialogues with the Athenian stranger, the conception of the state is presented through a more democratic lens. Although Plato does not officially endorse voting rights, the system in Laws is a controlled form of voting, whereby citizens nominate candidates, who are then selected through subsequent rounds of voting and the drawing of lots. Emphasis is placed on the scrutiny of final candidates to ensure that virtuous people are put into authoritative positions.

States will only be effective if they are ruled in a just manner, however, just leadership must come from just men. Socrates addresses the nature of justice both within society and pertaining to individuals in the Republic. The structure of Kallipolis is based upon both the individual and collective will to act virtuously - if the state is successful in cultivating just citizens, just policy will be enacted. A similar principle is presented in Laws, but importance is emphasized here on the role of the lawmaker, who enacts virtuous laws, and the education of citizens, which indicates virtue within a society.

The Myth of the Metals, or Noble Lie, lays out the foundation for social order in Socrates’ Kallipolis. He proposes that a noble lie is needed in order to allow for citizens to accept their position within the state, as well as to instill a sense of unity, as citizens will regard themselves as “brothers and sisters, sprung from the self same earth.” (Plato, The Republic, Book III, 414E). Justice is defined in the Republic as each of the three classes performing their respective duties, and not engaging in the affairs of the other classes. “In relation to the excellence of the city, the capacity of each person therein to engage in what belongs to himself is on an equal footing with its wisdom, its sound-mindedness and its courage (Plato, The Republic, Book IV, 433D),” thus, the city retains unity and is able to cultivate a collective virtue. Upon the basis of the individual, Socrates alludes that “a just man will not differ from a just city with respect to the form itself, of justice” (Plato, The Republic, Book IV, 435B). The argument that Socrates proposes is that the state cannot be just unless man is just, and vice versa; that justice is contingent upon practice within the individual as well as the state. A unified state is created through the enforcement of this class system, and the unified state indicates a just society.

In the Laws, the Athenian stranger proposes internal warfare is the greatest threat to a society, which he describes as the threat of faction. Here, he states that, “the highest good, however, is neither war nor civil strife (Plato, Laws, Book I, 628C)…the city itself winning a victory over itself is not to be counted among the best outcomes, but among those that are necessary” (Plato, Laws, Book I, 628D). Additionally, a distinction is made between divine goods and human goods, in which the former are composed of virtues such as wisdom, sound disposition, justice, and courage. The purpose of the law is to regulate the behavior of citizens, so that they will pursue the divine goods over human; the stranger suggests that “[the citizens] should be watched and supervised, and censure or praise should be bestowed…through the laws themselves” (Plato, Laws, Book I, 632A). The just state will ultimately arise from the virtuous citizen, and the method by which one achieves virtue is through abiding virtuous laws.

Thus, the role of the lawmaker is such that dictates virtue within society, and it is the citizen’s responsibility to follow these laws to achieve personal virtue. The stranger suggests that “the lawgiver has set out, in detail, what’s disgraceful and evil on the one hand, and what’s good and noble on the other, [and] whoever is not prepared to refrain from [evil] by every means at his disposal (Plato, Laws, Book V, 728A)… is heaping vile dishonor and deformity on his most divine possession, his soul” (Plato, Laws, Book V, 728B). Virtuous law will uphold the divine goods, and the citizen will protect his most divine element (the soul) by following the law. This law acts as a form of unity within the state, so when there is faction, this indicates that citizens are not abiding to the laws and therefore disregarding virtue itself - this is described as an “excess of [human goods] bring[ing] about enmity and faction…[which] is good neither for [citizens], nor for the city” (Plato, Laws, Book V, 729A). In the Laws this unity plays an essential role in shaping the legislation of the city-state; insofar that the citizens are not divided, the most effective state will unify if just laws are enforced. This unification is not contingent on the basis of equality, which differentiates Plato’s discourses from modern conceptions of suffrage.

Once the connection between justice in the individual and the state is established, the question of leadership arises. Who is fit to be in the ruling class, and is it possible to ensure they will not be corrupted to act in their own interests? Socrates proposes the theory of forms and the allegory of the cave as an answer to this. The philosopher king is the sole entity fit to rule, who must be trained rigorously in order to fulfill such a position. Conversely, in Laws, it is suggested that although absolute rule will be most effective in enforcing laws, it is impossible to ensure that citizens will abide by them through compulsion alone. Therefore, a system of voting including the drawing of lots is proposed, which combines both democratic and monarchic elements.

Socrates uses the allegory of the cave to establish the flawed nature of human beings. The cave is representative of the physical realm, shadows of the images of physical objects, statues of the physical objects themselves, and the fire as the Sun. What is physically tangible is easier to comprehend, however belief concerning visible things alone is perceived as a low perception of the truth. The analogy of the cave proposes that most are blind to the good, therefore they are unable to act truly virtuously.. Instead, they comprehend the intelligible realm through the means of the physical realm, as a desire for worldly possessions and physical objects. The shadows presented to them are seemingly the truth, therefore they have an unwavering belief in what is idealized to them (the statues, ie. physical objects). The only one who can truly perceive the intelligible realm and act virtuously is the philosopher - therefore, Socrates suggests that the state should be ruled by a philosopher king who is able to maintain virtue within society. Additionally, Socrates warns of the unrestrained freedom within democratic systems, which eliminate systems of law and order. He equates this to the loss of virtue within society, as the citizens become weary of authority and “don’t even pay attention to the laws, written or unwritten” (Plato, The Republic, Book VIII, 563D). The future of democracy is dependent on the sentiment of the masses, in which the rulers fear the people - Socrates compares this to the father who is subservient to his son, and the teacher who is afraid of his pupils. For fear of displeasing the public, rulers will attempt to appease the masses, and this is the tactic that will eventually lead to the rise of the tyrant. This version of Kallipolis disparages the concept of democracy and democratic rights such as suffrage, equating these systems to the downfall of society.

However, in Laws, the concept of the philosopher king is disputed. Although the Athenian states that the most efficient way to rule would be under a just tyrant and virtuous lawmaker (Plato, Laws, Book IV, 710E), it is recognized that human nature does not reflect the ideal state, and that “any [city] ruled by some mortal, and not by God, finds no escape from evils and hardships for their citizens” (Plato, Laws, Book IV, 713E). He proposes that law plays the important role of regulating the behavior of both citizens and leaders, as it “[regulates] by reason,”(Plato, Laws, Book IV, 714A) both the public and private spheres. This is presented as the divine element of reason, by which rational laws will mirror a divine rule - rational law will allow for citizens to “[obey] the immortal element within them,” (Plato, Laws, Book IV, 713E) acting rationally, and therefore virtuously. He uses the doctor analogy to support this, wherein the slave doctor represents the tyrant who rules by compulsion alone, and the free doctor represents the legislator who creates laws using both compulsion and persuasion (Plato, Laws, Book IV, 720C). Only with the cooperation of the patient, who represents the citizen, is the doctor able to successfully restore his health (Plato, Laws, Book IV, 720C). Similarly, within the state, the rational laws can only have effect within the city if the citizens are willing to adopt them - absolute rule, therefore, is not a realistic solution, as compulsion alone is not enough to ensure compliance with the laws (Plato, Laws, Book IV, 720C). The stranger concludes that the legislator should be like the free doctor, so that citizens will willingly obey the laws (Plato, Laws, Book IV, 720C). Additionally rulers should be “servants of the laws,” (Plato, Laws, Book IV, 715C) as the “salvation…of the city hinges, most of all, upon this” - the subservience of the entire populace to the laws (Plato, Laws, Book IV, 715D). The Athenian acknowledges the role of the legislator as shared with the public, and rejects the concept of absolute rule.

The proposed voting system would “maintain a mean between monarchic and democratic constitution” (Plato, Laws, Book VI, 756E), as candidates would first be nominated, and proceed through several rounds of public voting until the top thirty seven candidates were chosen (Plato, Laws, Book VI, 756C). At this point, half the candidates would be selected through a lottery, and then subject to scrutiny before appointment (Plato, Laws, Book VI, 756E). In the case of positions of office, the vote is to be cast by “all who were involved in the military” (Plato, Laws, Book VI, 753B). In the Republic, Socrates designates a specific military class in the Myth of the Metals. If a similar class system were to be assumed here, it may be reasonable to suggest that suffrage would not be universal, due to the strict class segregation argued for in Kallipolis. The Laws, however, as previously established, operate outside of Kallipolis, so it is reasonable to assume that military status would not be limited to a specific class within society. The Athenian stranger places importance on physical education in the development of good character and military training of citizens. When discussing the city-state, he exalts military exercise as amongst the noble pursuits (Plato, Laws, Book VIII, 831E), and proposes physical contests for each of the military classes - for the horsemen and chariots, archers and hoplites - where victors can win prizes (833B). He suggests that there should be three classes of competition for all members of society: one for the women, children, and men, respectively (Plato, Laws, Book VIII, 833C). The military education is not only stressed but encouraged for all and therefore the vote may be at least relatively accessible. When considering the origins of hoplite warfare, linked to the agrarian sector of Greek society (Hale, “Origins of Hoplite Warfare,” 177), it can also be assumed that citizens of various classes were involved in the Greek military. Hoplite service was also mandatory during the Classical Age and eventually became enforced by record, where conscription was based exclusively on age (Christ, “Conscription of Hoplites in Ancient Athens,” 398). Taking these points into account, the Athenian stranger would likely have been advocating for a relatively universal form of voting, as most citizens were under conscription.

The Athenian stranger proposes two types of equalities, one that is measurable by weight and number, and the other, the pure virtue of equality itself, described as the “truest and most excellent quality…the judgment of Zeus” (Plato, Laws, Book VI, 757B). This pure equality, therefore, is likened to the divine good; this divine equality acts as a form of justice itself by “giving due measure to each, according to their own nature…bestowing greater honors upon those whose excellence is greater” (Plato, Laws, Book VI, 757C). The voting system is able to merge this divine equality with its measurable counterpart - divine equality is exercised in the casting of the lots, as chance or fate determines who is best suited for leadership. The stranger explains this when discussing the appointment of priests, stating that “we should allow God to bring about what is pleasing (Plato, Laws, Book VI, 759B) to himself, by entrusting the matter to the divine chance of the lot” (Plato, Laws, Book VI, 759C), and purity is maintained through the process of scrutiny, ensuring that those who are appointed truly display qualities of integrity and legitimacy, “pure and untainted by slaughter and all such transgressions of divine precepts'' (Plato, Laws, Book VI, 759C). Measurable equality is seen in the nomination and subsequent rounds of voting, whereby candidates are evaluated by citizens on the basis of their character and virtue. Here, importance is stressed on the education of the selectors, as they should be “reared in lawful habits, and well enough educated to be able to decide…who deserves to be accepted as satisfactory” (Plato, Laws, Book VI,751C). If citizens are educated on principles of virtue, then this will be reflected in their scrutiny, benefiting society overall in the appointment of proper leaders.

In Plato’s Republic, Socrates disparages the democratic system for its failure to uphold virtues within both the individual and society. He argues that an “insatiable desire” (Plato, Republic, Book VIII, 562B) for freedom will lead to injustice in the state, as class divides will cease to exist and individuals are dictated by their appetitive desires. The system proposed in Laws, however, acts as an intermediary between the ideals of Kallipolis and the reality of human nature, by merging principles of absolutism with democratic practices. A measured equality is maintained through the casting of lots, and importance is stressed on the education of citizens to be able to maintain virtue within society, reflected in the appointment of leaders.

Christ, Matthew R. “Conscription of Hoplites in Classical Athens,” The Classical Quarterly, 51, no. 2 (2001): 398–422, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3556519

Hale, John R. “Not Patriots, Not Farmers, Not Amateurs: Greek Soldiers of Fortune and the Origins of Hoplite Warfare.” In Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece, edited by Donald Kagan and Gregory Viggiano, 176-191. Princeton University Press, 2013.

Plato. Laws, Book I. Translated by David Horan. The Dialogues of Plato, Platonic Foundation, 2021. https://www.platonicfoundation.org/laws/laws-book-1/

Plato. Laws, Book IV. Translated by David Horan. The Dialogues of Plato, Platonic Foundation, 2021. https://www.platonicfoundation.org/laws/laws-book-4/

Plato. Laws, Book V. Translated by David Horan. The Dialogues of Plato, Platonic Foundation, 2021. https://www.platonicfoundation.org/laws/laws-book-5/

Plato. Laws, Book VI. Translated by David Horan. The Dialogues of Plato, Platonic Foundation, 2021.https://www.platonicfoundation.org/laws/laws-book-6/

Plato. Republic, Book III. Translated by David Horan. The Dialogues of Plato, Platonic Foundation, 2021. https://www.platonicfoundation.org/republic/republic-book-3/

Plato. Republic, Book IV. Translated by David Horan. The Dialogues of Plato, Platonic Foundation, 2021. https://www.platonicfoundation.org/republic/republic-book-4/

Plato. Republic, Book VIII. Translated by David Horan. The Dialogues of Plato, Platonic Foundation, 2021. https://www.platonicfoundation.org/republic/republic-book-8/

====Aristotelian thought====
An Aristotelian approach to voting is complex, in part because democracies of his day functioned differently than those today. Aristotle broke the selection of officials into three main categories. The first was selection of officials by lot in which case office would be open to all citizens. Aristotle viewed selection by lot to be a democratic feature. The second category was selecting officials by means of elections, which he considered to be more oligarchic and aristocratic. The third category was a combination of the first two, in which some members were elected for the purpose of certain matters and others were chosen either by lot from all or by lot from a preselected group, or these two groups worked together in the same offices (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1298b5).

Aristotle outlined election features of different types of democracies that were considered democratic because of their incorporation of the assembly. The first type would be that in which offices were open to all but would be appointed in turn by magistrates. In this case few things would be decided by all in the assembly, but the assembly would decide on the passage of laws and they would approve or withhold the selection of officials by magistrates. Aristotle did not specifically explain how magistrates would go about selecting officials in this type of democracy (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1298a9). Another type of democracy was one in which more matters were decided by the assembly, including legislation and selecting offices. Offices would be chosen by lot, except in the cases where an office required a special skill or knowledge, in which case they would be chosen by election (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1298a24). In the final form of democracy, the assembly would decide all matters. Officials would only be necessary for organizational purposes to ensure the assembly ran properly, and officials would not have final judgment on matters (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1298a28). In the case of democracies, Aristotle suggested paying the poor to attend the assembly and fining the rich for not. He also recommended limitations on payment for attendance in order to ensure the common people would not outweigh the rich. Aristotle wanted to avoid oligarchy by evening the influence of the rich and the poor, to ensure the common interest was at hand (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1298b11).

Aristotle also outlined differences in voting procedures in different types of oligarchies as well as mixed regimes and aristocracies and polities. One type of oligarchy was that in which officials were elected from among those who had the requisite amount of wealth. Another type was that in which all who had the requisite amount of wealth shared in rule. There were also cases of aristocracy or polity in which case all had control over matters of war, peace, and taking audits, but magistrates had control of everything else, including laws and electing officials. This type of regime would not be democratic because officials were not chosen by all, or at least not approved by all in the assembly. However, because all still decided on other matters such as war and peace, the regime would not be an oligarchy. “Lot is a democratic feature and will make them [regimes] polities by opening up office to many; election is an oligarchic and aristocratic feature and will either confine office to the wealthy (in which case the regime will be an aristocracy in the sense in which oligarchic polities are aristocracies) or to those with a certain quality or virtue (in which case the regime will be genuinely aristocratic…)” (Simpson 2002, 345). In general, Aristotle believed that rulers should rule in the common best interest, rather than solely in their own best interest (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1279a28). In the case of oligarchy, Aristotle recommended affording the populace the ability to give some input on political decisions, as this could promote peace, even if they were not given power in final decision making (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1298b26).

Aristotle had two large concerns with elections, campaigning and demagoguery. In terms of campaigning, Aristotle was concerned that only the people who wanted to be in office would be, rather than the people who necessarily deserved to be in office. He believed that a man who was worthy of office should accept the position regardless of if he wanted to (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1271a10). He also thought that campaigning “promotes love of honor, the cause, along with love of money, of most voluntary wrongs or deliberate acts of injustice” (Simpson 2002, 118). It is the pursuit of these wrongs that leads to tyranny. Additionally, regarding demagoguery, Aristotle worried that class interests would dominate elections, rather than the good of the whole. To prevent this, he recommended that the populace be divided into local groups for voting in elections. He believed that by voting in such groups, people would be less concerned with their general class interest, and would be more alert to local ties (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1305a28).

While Aristotle strongly believed citizens should participate in politics, he did not support extending political rights to slaves, women, or laborers. He thought that slaves did not possess the intellectual skills to be able to govern themselves, and hence would be subject to the governing of others (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1254b16-23). Similarly, women were viewed as naturally inferior to men with less capability of leading (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1259b1-2). An important point that Aristotle emphasized was that citizens should be ruled by their equals, resulting in a reciprocal equality, unlike that between slaves and their masters or women and men, and therefore women and slaves were not considered citizens. As for laborers and artisans, Aristotle believed that “there is a need for leisure both with a view to the creation of virtue and with a view to political activities,” which laborers and artisans did not have sufficient time for (Aristotle 350 B.C.E., 1329a1-2).

====Ancient Chinese Philosophy====

'''Confucianism'''

Confucianism presents that a virtuous person, and therefore a virtuous society, can only come about through the understanding of an individual’s place within their society, and the eager participation in the rites and rituals of the society by that individual (Mark, 2020). If both these things are realized, there will be a righteous and happy culture.

The two major parts of understanding one’s place in their social system is honoring ones familial and social superiors: “Filial piety and fraternal submission,--are they not the root of all benevolent actions?” (''Analects'', 1.2). Within the Analects, there are many rules emphasizing the actions and attitudes one must take to those one should honor. Confucianism proposes that interest in oneself is limiting and: “To subdue one’s self and return to propriety, is perfect virtue”.

This importance on the collective can harshly rub against one of the founding traditions towards the right to vote, as the right usually implies a dissatisfaction found within the current leadership when the right is expressed—certainly the modern origins of voting were led by that dissatisfaction. In fact, the insistence of usurping the power traditionally given to political superiors is greatly disrespectful and damaging under the Confucian view: “The requisites of government are that there be sufficiency of food, sufficiency of military equipment, and the confidence of the people in their ruler” (12.7). Confucianism reveals the highly individual nature of the right to vote which rises from a discontent towards the present politics.

Confucianism can reveal the other, more collective side of the right to vote as well, however. The overcoming of the self is key for Confucianism which is realized when: “…one de-emphasizes the boundaries between oneself and others, and gives one’s own and others’ concerns as much weight as is appropriate to the situation” (Chang & Kalmanson, 2010, pg. 109). This is immanently compatible with the right to vote. Moreover, public rituals were seen as the path towards peace and virtue: “In practicing the rules of [ritual] propriety, a natural ease is to be prized. This is the Way of the ancient kings, a quality of excellence, and in things small and great follow them” (''Analects'', 1.12). Later: “The management of a state demands the rules of [ritual] propriety” (11.26). Under this lens, the right to vote is a ritual with which the current political and social order is being upheld, as well as an opportunity for citizens to participate together. Confucianism reveals how the right to vote is also a modern ritual of political participation,

Confucianism shows how the right to vote has a paradoxical nature. On the one hand, it is a mechanism that allows citizens to privately disrespect their leaders and voice their resentment with the qualities of their current political system. At the same time, voting also acts as a modern-day ritual that is experienced with other citizens.

'''Taoism'''

Central to Taoism is the full acceptance of the Tao. Describing the Tao is difficult as the very first lines of the Laozi texts state: “The tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao. The name that can be named is not the ternal Name” (''Tao Te Ching'', 1). This notwithstanding, the Tao is akin to the source and substance of nature (James, 2015). It both creates and holds everything that is existing. With this expansiveness, the ambitions and anxieties of man’s daily life are unimportant and giving them special attention would be a personal mistake: “Heaven and earth are not like humans, they are impartial” (Tao Te Ching, 5).

The strivings that people have create a paradoxical relationship between our ambition and their outcomes and this relationship is found all throughout the foundational text: “The pride of wealth and position brings about their own misfortune” (9). What we strive towards will usually bring what we are trying to avoid. The Taoist prescription to this issue is wu wei, which is a type of nonattached, spontaneous action. With wu wei, one doesn’t struggle to get anywhere, rather they are just expressing their natures as part of the Tao: “To win true merit, to preserve just fame, the personality must be retiring. This is the heavenly [Tao]” (9).

The connection between Taoism and the right to vote can be readily made. The Taoist political life and rule is decidedly hands off. If it were intentional and active, one would reach similar problems to the ones that result from striving for things in one’s daily life. The Taoist errs on the side of not-intervening: “Among people the more restrictions and prohibitions there are, the poorer they become…The more laws and orders are issued the more thieves and robbers abound” (57). Later it states: “If a ruler practices wu wei the people will reform themselves” (57). The implication is that the more active a society’s politics is, the worse outcomes will occur for the state and its people. This shows that the Taoist has a preference towards a freer politics where the ruling forces are not apparent: “When great men rule, subjects know little of their existence…How carefully a wise ruler chooses his words. He performs deeds, and accumulates merit! Under such a ruler the people think they are ruling themselves” (17). Many have taken the Tao Te Ching as advocating for anarchism (Irwin, 2014; Rapp, 2012; Stamatov, 2014), and despite the inclusion of a ruler in most of its political references, this interpretation is quite proximal.

As with Confucianism, Taoism provides two insights about the right to vote. On one hand, the right to vote for citizens is a decidedly more emphasized version of the allowance for people’s self-reformation. While this reformation decidedly occurs through the changing of one’s rulers, voting rights allow the people to go their own way, and live according to the ever changing, spontaneous desires and ideas that they hold, and the elected leadership reflects that.

On the other hand, Taoism shows that the right to vote can come from a misguided ambition to change society, usually for unnecessary reasons. It is this discontented impulse which is responsible for the right to vote, and according to Taoism, this impulse brings with it dire consequences. Under this view, voting is unnecessary, and just another expression of man caring for things that are not his business. Of course, voting could also be an act of concession where the voter chooses for what their society already believes and approves of. Voting in this way is not to change anything, but rather to continue what is already present. However, it is arguable that the Taoist would still be against this as this prevents the spontaneous change present in the Tao.

====Stoicism====
====Early Indian Philosophy====

In early Indian philosophy, there is little or no mention of voting rights. However, many ancient scriptures in different civilizations mention representative forms of government. In various regions of ancient India, republican governments existed. During the nineteenth century, research into the Buddhist Pali Canon revealed existing republicanism at the time. (Muhlberger, 1998). The Pali Canon provides a far more complete, though somewhat oblique, account of democratic institutions in Indian Philosophy, confirming and expanding on Panini's vision. The Maha-parinibbana-suttanta, the Mahavagga, and the Kullavagga are three of the Canon's oldest and most revered parts. Taken together, they preserve the Buddha's teachings for the proper operation of the Buddhist monastic community – the Sangha – after his death. (Muhlberger, 1998). They were the most reliable source on voting processes in a corporate body during the early Buddhist period. They also provide some insight into the development of democratic thought.

According to Panini, all northern India's states and territories (janapadas) during his time were founded on the colonization or conquest of a specific area by an identified warrior group who still controlled the political life of that area (Basham, 1959). Some of these peoples (known as janapadins by Panini) were ruled by a king who was, at least in theory, of their own blood and maybe reliant on their support (Muhlberger, 1998). Other than that, the janapadins handled their affairs in a republican fashion. Thus, in both types of state, the government was dominated by persons classed as ksatriyas, or members of the warrior caste, as later times would describe it (Hays, 2015). Another example is a republican federation known as the Kshudrak-Malla Sangha which posed serious resistance to Alexander the Great in the 4th century BC. Many more republican regimes in India have been mentioned by the Greeks, some of which were classified as pure democracies and others as "aristocratic republics” (Muhlberger, 1998).

According to Prakash (2006), a vote was called a 'chhanda,' which literally translates to a 'wish.' This evocative word was used to communicate the concept that voting expresses a member's free will and choice. There used to be multi-colored voting tickets called 'shalakas' (pins) for voting in the assembly . When a division was called, they were handed to members and collected by an officer of the assembly called the ‘shalaka grahak' (collector of pins). This official was chosen by the entire assembly. It was his responsibility to conduct the vote, which may be secret or open. However, Indian republics are beginning to sound extremely undemocratic by our modern standards, with real power concentrated in the hands of a few patriarchs representing the leading lineages of one privileged section of the warrior caste.

References:

Basham, A. L. (1959). India as Known to Pāṇini (A Study of the Cultural Material of the Ashṭādhyāyī). By V. S. Agrawala. pp. xx + 549, 3 maps, plate. Lucknow University, 1953. Rs. 50. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 91(3-4), 181–183. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0035869X00118544

Muhlberger, S. (1998). Democracy in Ancient India. https://www.infinityfoundation.com/mandala/h_es/h_es_muhlb_democra_frameset.htm

Prakash, A. (2006). Law relating to elections: an essential revision aid for law students. Universal Law Pub.

Hays, J. (2015). ANCIENT INDIA IN THE TIME OF THE BUDDHA. Facts and Details. http://factsanddetails.com/india/History/sub7_1a/entry-4105.html

====Miscellaneous Hellenistic Schools (epicureans, academics, skeptics, etc.)====
====Roman Legal and Political Thought====
The Constitution of Ancient Rome consisted largely of unwritten laws and was commonly enforced according to precedent and tradition. Hence, the right to vote and to participate in the electoral process was not written explicitly within the Constitution of the Roman Republic (Lintott 2015, 3). Greek historian Polybius did explain, however, that “the people had the right to make or rescind any law,” and he emphasized the sovereignty of the Roman people who would validate Roman political decisions (Atkins 2018, 9). Within Ancient Rome, voting assemblies would give their approval of the laws and the magistrates. Such assemblies were referred to as “the people,” and these groups, which excluded women and slaves, would represent the Roman citizens (Atkins 2018, 19). This differed from a system of “one-man, one-vote” as was employed in Athens. The three assemblies of Rome included the Curiate Assembly, the Tribal Assembly, and the Centuriate Assembly. Roman assemblies were formed on the basis of wealth, military status, and sometimes religion (Hall 1964, 270). The election of consuls, the gathering of assemblies, and other voting procedures were not explained within the Constitution or in any specific legislature, however, they were commonly referred to in books from religious colleges, which had some authority at the time (Lintott 2015, 4).

The right to vote was often limited by the fact that not all votes carried the same weight. The successive order in which groups voted could have influenced election outcomes and the speed with which election outcomes reached a majority. Members of the higher class were commonly in assemblies with fewer people, allowing their individual voice and vote to be more impactful than that of someone from a lower class in a larger assembly. Similarly, group decisions dictated the vote, rather than individual votes. It is likely that more powerful men or families within each assembly would have had more power and influence over their assembly (Hall 1964, 270). To this extent, voting blocks could be organized in order to favor certain political agendas (Atkins 2018, 21). The sovereignty of the citizens of Rome was subject to limitations. In Rome, the citizens were limited insofar as the electoral decisions made by voting assemblies had to be approved by the Roman aristocratic council. Citizens taking part in voting assemblies were not given the ability to propose new legislation, rather they were only able to vote for or against legislation introduced by magistrates (Atkins 2018, 19).

Roman historian Titus Livius was more concerned with achieving political ownership rather than equal citizen participation. Livius argued that “equal liberty” for the people meant that they would be able to elect whoever they wanted to the magistrate. To this extent, “equal liberty” meant citizens having complete decision making power over who would govern (Atkins 2018, 51). Gaius Canuleius, like Livius, supported opening up the consulship to allow plebeians to join, though he was more concerned with equal citizen participation, suggesting that all citizens should have an equal vote in order to avoid domination (Atkins 2018, 52). Although Ancient Rome did not necessarily achieve to the fullest extent such political ownership or equal citizen participation, and hence there is some debate over whether Ancient Rome truly was a democracy, Romans did recognize the need for checks and balances in a stable regime.

====Early Christianity====
====Thomism and medieval Christianity====
====Medieval Islamic Thought====
====Medieval Judaism====
====Early Modern Rationalism====
====Absolute Idealism====
====Reformation Christianity====
====Hobbesian Thought====
In discussing his argument about the social contract theory and the idea that people must give the government their consent to be ruled, Thomas Hobbes explores the right to vote and what that would look like in a government with absolute authority and power over the people. When it comes to the right to vote, Hobbes would say that every individual has the right to vote on who they consent to govern them, but upon voting for the form of government and its leaders, the existence of right to vote is dependent on the type of government they consent to.

Hobbes claims that individuals have the right to vote and should exercise their right in order to consent to a form of government and therefore leave the warring state of nature. In his book De Cive Hobbes noted that, “for it is not from nature that the consent of the major part should be received for the consent of all, neither is it true in tumults, but it proceeds from civill institution, and is then onely true, when that Man or Court which hath the supreme power, assembling his subjects, by reason of the greatnesse of their number, allowes those that are elected a power of speaking for those who elected them, and will have the major part of voyces, in such matters as are by him propounded to be discust, to be as effectuall as the whole” (Hobbes 1651, 89). Hobbes’ revolutionary idea for his time was the idea that the people consent to being governed and determine the type of absolute government which they consent to. Hobbes’ main concern was how these types of government would be consented to and who would be allowed to run these governments according to the desires of the people. To remedy this question, Hobbes claims that the people should be allowed to vote on who to consent to and because voting is the only way to measure the sentiments of the people. Hobbes views the right to vote in general as the means of consenting to a government that will make decisions in the best interests of the people and without this initial vote, there is not true consent the people can give to a government. Hobbes does notes that the type of government agreed upon after the initial voting determines whether this right to vote stays intact during the life of the individual.

The right to vote is to allow initial consent to be governed by a governing body or group and changes according to the government in place. Throughout De Cive, Hobbes continued this theme writing that, “a Councell of many men, consists either of all the Citizens, (insomuch as every man of them hath a Right to Vote, and an interest in the ordering of the greatest affaires, if he will himselfe) or of a part onely; from whence there arise three sorts of Government: The one, when the Power is in a Councell, where every Citizen hath a right to Vote, and it is call'd a DEMOCRATY. The other, when it is in a Councell, where not all, but some part onely have their suffrages, and we call it an ARISTOCRATY. The third is that, when the Supreme Authority rests onely in one, and it is stiled a MONARCHY. In the first, he that governes is called demos, The PEOPLE. In the second, the NOBLES. In the third, the MONARCH” (Hobbes 1651, 91). Throughout his initial description of the idea of consenting to being governed, Hobbes goes on to describe what voting looks like within each system of government in which the people vote differently. However, despite the differences in the right to vote according to types of government, there is a consistent pattern that if the government were to dissolve and resort to the warring state of nature, then the right to vote for every citizen is restored and the people have the right to consent to a new form of government which they vote on and reestablish consent. The different forms of government have varying levels of voting, but most voting is held in order to re-establish the government and reconsent to a new body because the people have the inherent right to consent to the government that is formed. However, Hobbes makes the point that once the people have used their right to vote to consent to a government, the government uses their absolute power to make the best decisions on behalf of the community and the common good. This feeds into the idea that the right to vote only pertains to giving consent to being governed by a certain government.

Hobbes’ views on voting vary according to the form of government the people consent to. Specifically in his book titled Elements of Law, Hobbes details that within a democracy, “The first in order of time of these three sorts is democracy, and it must be so of necessity, because an aristocracy and a monarchy, require nomination of persons agreed upon; which agreement in a great multitude of men must consist in the consent of the major part; and where the votes of the major part involve the votes of the rest, there is actually a democracy” (Hobbes 1640, 119). Within his democracy the people have the inherent right to vote in which the people decide the direction of the government by a majority rule which is the most fundamental part of the democracy according to Hobbes. He notes that the democratic form of government is not perfect since the decision-making process would have to take time and quick decisions are hard to arrive upon especially in times where quick decisions are needed for the good of the community. It is within this democratic process that power is lost, especially since coming upon a single decision is hard to make when there are various voices with different opinions about the state of the government. The idea of democracy is important to Hobbes when it comes to initially consenting to the government and choosing the type of government that the people will allow themselves to be governed by.

Throughout his work, Hobbes details what each form of government looks like once consented to and his form of aristocracy poses very interesting insights into what the right to vote looks like in this form of government. In his most famous work titled, The Leviathan, Hobbes wrote that, “A Common-wealth is said to be Instituted, when a Multitude of men do Agree, and Covenant, Every One With Every One, that to whatsoever Man, or Assembly Of Men, shall be given by the major part, the Right to Present the Person of them all, (that is to say, to be their Representative;) every one, as well he that Voted For It, as he that Voted Against It, shall Authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men” (Hobbes 1651, 144). Compared to democracy, the aristocracy is more limited when it comes to the right to vote. Like the democracy there is this inherent right to vote in order to establish the government and the assemblymen, but once given the power, the assembly retains the power and no longer requires the votes from the people to make decisions. They are given absolute power to make decisions for the people according to their thoughts on the state of the community and the state of the government. Each member of the state is allowed to vote on the initial assemblymen and each citizen consents to each member being given power, but after the assembly is responsible for ruling and deliberating on the issues of the state. The people are just expected to follow the rules of this assembly because they consented to being governed by these individuals and only upon returning to the state of nature, is this right to vote restored in order to re-establish consent to the government. One might assume that when a member of the assembly resigns or dies the people get to elect a new member, but according to Hobbes the right to vote is still not granted. Hobbes remedies this situation by claiming that those within the government should elect a new member to replace the others because they have more power and should therefore choose on behalf of the government. Hobbes does not describe how this body would return to the state of nature under an assembly so if the other representatives continue to elect one another, the right to vote may not ever exist for the citizen after they have consented to the larger government.

Finally, Hobbes spoke specifically about the monarchy and what voting would look like when a single ruler had absolute power upon being given consent to govern. When it comes to the right to vote within the monarchy, like the other forms of government, the individual has the right to vote on who they want to govern them, but like the aristocracy, once electing a monarch, the people lose the right to vote. Like the aristocracy, by voting they are consenting to who they want to govern them, thus giving them absolute power over the public and the decisions made on their behalf as well. Like the assembly, the monarch makes decisions for the public based on being given the consent to make decisions for the people. Hobbes argues that this is the best form of government because of the immediate decision made by the monarch that will increase the efficiency of the government for the people. Further discussing the monarchy within The Leviathan, Hobbes continued his argument stating that, “And first, concerning an Elective King, whose power is limited to his life, as it is in many places of Christendome at this day; or to certaine Yeares or Moneths, as the Dictators power amongst the Romans; If he have Right to appoint his Successor, he is no more Elective but Hereditary. But if he have no Power to elect his Successor, then there is some other Man, or Assembly known, which after his decease may elect a new, or else the Common-wealth dieth, and dissolveth with him, and returneth to the condition of Warre. If it be known who have the power to give the Soveraigntie after his death, it is known also that the Soveraigntie was in them before: For none have right to give that which they have not right to possesse, and keep to themselves, if they think good. But if there be none that can give the Soveraigntie, after the decease of him that was first elected; then has he power, nay he is obliged by the Law of Nature, to provide, by establishing his Successor, to keep those that had trusted him with the Government, from relapsing into the miserable condition of Civill warre. And consequently he was, when elected, a Soveraign absolute” (Hobbes 1651, 161). The monarch differs from the aristocracy when it comes to the process of succession in the cases of retirement or death of the monarch. Unlike the aristocracy in which new members are voted in by the current members, the new monarch is either determined by the old king or by the people in the case in which the old leader has not appointed someone new due to his absolute power. Hobbes claims that the monarch has the absolute power and authority to nominate a new successor in the case of his demise, but if he does not appoint someone new, the people have the right to vote in someone new since they are reduced to the state of nature again. Within the monarchy, Hobbes points out that returning to the state of nature is a more frequent phenomenon when the monarch dies and there is no successor to automatically take the position. In the case that there is no clear successor, society returns to the state of nature in which the people must vote and reconsent to being governed by some entity and therefore, their right to vote is restored.

When it comes to rights in general, Thomas Hobbes’ views of the government and the relationship it has with the people is an interesting concept considering how centralized he believes that the power the government should have. His overall belief holds that if the people consent to the government, the government should be allowed to wield unlimited power since the people gave the government permission to rule as they do. What is interesting and important about this perspective is the way that the modern take on rights has built upon the idea of consent but moved away from the absolutist view on government that Hobbes proposes. It is held true today that the government has enough power to protect the people, but not so much that it can infringe on the rights of the people because of their own values and goals. The same holds true for the right to vote today and the way that ultimately the people hold power through the means of voting and electing people rather than allowing the government to have absolute power as Hobbes proposes. The right to vote was and always will be a contested right that varies as people debate the relationship between the government and the people.

Bibliography

Hobbes, Thomas. De Cive. Cambridge University Press. 1998.

Hobbes, Thomas. Elements of Law. Oxford University Press New York. 1994.

Hobbes Thomas. Leviathan. New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, INC. London: J.M. Dent and Sons, Limited. 1950

====Lockean Thought/English Empiricism====
====Physiocrats====
====Scottish Enlightenment====
====Modern Capitalism====
====Rousseau's Thought====
====Kantianism====

Kant thought that citizens of a state could only be property-owning male or active members of society, and that they were the only individuals who could vote (Kant, 1991, p.27, para.1). With that in mind, as well as his hypothetical social contract theory, maintaining a just state under Kantianism seems unlikely. This is especially true when victims of the system, such as women, youth, the poor, minorities, and others, do not have a voice in what happens to them or their lives through voting and representation. Kant's system is geared on keeping the property owner and independent, while keeping the rest of society silent and dependent (Glawson, 2016). One might expect from this emphasis that Kant would insist that the proper political system is one that not only allows individuals to think for themselves about political issues, but also contains a mechanism such as voting to translate those well-reasoned opinions into government policy.

In his discussion in “Perpetual Peace” of the traditional division of the types of government Kant classifies governments in two dimensions. The first is the “form of sovereignty” (forma imperii), concerning who rules, and here Kant identifies the traditional three forms: autocracy, aristocracy, and democracy, “the power of a prince, the power of a nobility, and the power of the people” (Kant, 1991, p. 100). The second is the “form of government” (forma regiminis) concerning how those people rule, and here Kant offers a variation on the traditional good/bad dichotomy: either republican or despotic (Kant, 1991, p.101). The term ‘republican’ in Kant’s writings, “could be interpreted to represent what nowadays is generally called parliamentary democracy” (Kant, 1991, p.25, para.2). Despotism is defined as a state of unity in which the same ruler makes and enforces rules, thus transforming an individual's private will into the public will. Kant differentiates between a republicanism and despotism emphasizing that a ‘republican’ form of government is “where the executive is separated from the legislature, and the despotic, where it is not” (Kant, 1991, p.29, para.1)

Republics require representation to guarantee that the executive authority exclusively executes the will of the people by requiring the executive to enforce only laws enacted by representatives of the people, not the executive itself. However, a republic may function with just one lawmaker if other people serve as executives (Rauscher, 2016). Kant warns from the danger of a monarch becoming a tyrant. A monarch would enact laws in the name of the people, but the monarch's ministers would oversee enforcing them. Thus, like Rousseau, Kant is convinced that the adage of a republican government is the respect of law by the people and also by the ruler and the sovereign. (Kant, 1991, p.30, para.2). Kant's argument that such a government is republican demonstrates his belief that a republican government does not need real participation of the people in creating laws, even though elected representatives, as long as the laws are issued with the people's entire united will in mind.

When Kant addresses voting for representatives, he conforms to many of the time's prevalent biases. The right to vote necessitates, in Kant’s words, "being one's own master," (Kant, 1991, p.27), which entails owning property or having a talent that can sustain oneself. Kant classes those who are independent as ‘active’ citizens and those who are not as ‘passive’. He also excludes women from voting, claiming that “ [Women] are, on principle, disqualified. But any legislation should always be enacted and carried out as if the passive citizens too were participating” (Kant, 1991, p.27). His thesis is that these people are unsuitable to vote because they lack the ability to reason and have no free choice “being one’s own master” (Kant, 1991, p. 27). The mentally sick and the elderly who are unable to function are further instances of people who lack reason and are not their own masters. According to Kant, the presumption of being "one's own master" is essential for citizenship eligibility. For example, at least in Kant’s time, when a woman got married, her possessions became her husband's, and she is expected to completely rely on him, thus she does not own property and consequently excluded from voting (Glawson, 2017). To summarize, Kant did not believe that married women could be active members of a state or citizens since they are incompetent and dependent by their very nature as women (Glawson, 2017). Thus, Kant believes that just by adopting the people's point of view, a single individual or small group may properly represent the people at large. Insistence on a representative system is not the same as insisting on a representative system that is elected.

Regardless, Kant clearly believes that an elective representational democracy is preferable. Republican constitutions, he says, are more likely to prevent war because, when the people's permission is required, they will weigh the costs of war (fighting, taxes, property damage, and so on), but a non-republican ruler may be immune to such considerations. He also mentions in the "Doctrine of Right" that a republican government represents the people "by all the citizens united and acting via their delegates" (Rauscher, 2016).

References:

Glawson, J. D. (2017, November 24). Immanuel Kant on Suffrage: With a Libertarian Disagreement. Medium. https://medium.com/@JoshuaGlawson/immanuel-kant-on-suffrage-with-a-libertarian-disagreement-d6f149df3658

Kant, I. (1991). Kant: political writings. Cambridge University Press.

Rauscher, F. (2016, September 1). Kant's social and political philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-social-political/

====German Idealism====
====Benthamite Utilitarianism====
====Millian Utilitarianism====
====Current Utilitarianism====
====Transcendentalism====
====Marxism====
====Early Sociology====
====Pragmatism====
====Weberian Thought====

Weberian Thought (3.1.31)
Through the democratic process in which citizens elect their representatives to government, Weberian Thought held the promise that it would be possible to rewrite the historically authoritarian regime of Prussia (Germany at Weber’s time) perpetuated by Junkers, wealthy conservative landowners, and monarchists before the war. (Maley, 2011, p.76). Weber envisioned his model as a counterpoint to both the left's Social Democrats and the right's monarchists and Junkers.

According to Weber, equal suffrage meant equal universal voting rights for working classes who had historically been barred from voting. In his writings on equal suffrage in modern citizenship, he clearly states that equal suffrage is “closely related to the equality of certain fates which the modern state as such creates” (Weber, 1994, p. 105). He explicitly focuses on returning soldiers’ rights, and argues that the equality of the modern state functions in the way that people are equal before death, because the
“most basic needs [of physical existence] on the one hand and, on the other, that most solemn and lofty fact of all are encompassed by those equalities which the modern state offers all its citizens in a truly lasting and undoubted way: sheer physical security and the minimum for subsistence, but also the battlefield on which to die” (Weber, 1994, p.105, para.2)

Weber does not emphasize on women’s suffrage, he does, however, say that women should have the right to vote as long as “they too are ‘fighting’ the war if they do their duty” (Weber, 1994, p.78, line.14). Moreover, in “Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology”, Weber notes that “the woman is dependent because of the normal superiority of the physical and intellectual energies of the male” (Weber, 1978, p.1007). The Weberian Thought on voting was aiming to correct historical gender and class inequities or might at least mitigate the most severe exclusions of women, the urban working class, and the rural peasantry from power and government.

Weber's ideas for equal suffrage might be viewed as a partial erasing of historical discriminatory markings. Weber's suggestions have a deeper element to them than the more neutral sounding ‘counterweight’ to bureaucratic dominance (Weber, 1994, p.104). Equal suffrage emerged as a valuable counterbalance to both types of inequity. Weber saw that the inequities created by capitalism might be just as persistent as those created by prior, more feudal social systems. Against both, Weber advocated for a ‘positive politics’ in which “equal voting rights” means that the individual “is not considered in terms of the particular professional and family position he occupies, nor in relation to the differences of material and social situation, but purely and simply as a citizen” (Weber, 1994, p.103).

During the Russian revolution, enraged workers, students, and returning soldiers took to the streets in protest of the existing regime's ruler, Tsar Nicholas II, who had obstructed their enfranchisement and rights prior to the war and then ordered mass slaughter on the battlefield. Weber recognized their outrage at the collapsing regime, but he dismissed their demands for more revolutionary, far-reaching reform as immature. Although Weber understood the anger of Russian revolutionists against the crumbling regime, he saw it as immature and ‘childish’ (Maley, 2011, p. 99). Weber was concerned that under the Russian revolutionary circumstances of 1918–19, people would respond out of anger and rage, which would be doubly harmful. In “Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order”, Weber had already wondered “whether such explosions unleash yet again the familiar and usual fear of the propertied classes; in other words, it depends on whether the emotional effect of undirected mass fury produces the equally emotional and equally undirected cowardice of the bourgeoisie” (Weber, 1994, p. 232)

In his wartime newspaper writings, Weber made a strategic case for the Social Democratic Party's participation as a disciplined working-class party. Though Weber considered the working class to be too “immature” to take on the role of a ruling class, he praised the discipline and self-control of the Social Democrats' political partners, the trade unions. He said approvingly that “organizations like the trade unions, but also the Social Democratic Party, create a very important counterbalance [not only against the right, but] to the rule of the street which is so typical of purely plebiscitary nations and so prone to momentary and irrational influences” (Weber, 1994, p. 231).

References:

Maley, T. (2011). Democracy and the Political. In Democracy & the Political in Max Weber's Thought (pp. 77-120). Toronto; Buffalo; London: University of Toronto Press. Retrieved July 16, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3138/j.ctt2ttgq2.7

Weber, M. (1994). Weber: Political Writings. United States: Cambridge University Press.

Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology. University of California Press.

====Process Philosophy====

Process philosophy is a philosophical tradition that describes reality as primarily being made up of processes or events, rather than objects (Rescher, 2000, pg. 4). This means that when we look at supposedly static objects in our world, we are actually seeing a constantly changing event or an action taking place, and things that seem like they are static are just processes that are relatively more stable than others. Nicholas Rescher describes the main claim succinctly: “Even on the surface of it, verbs have as good a claim to reality as nouns. For process theorists, ''becoming'' is no less important than ''being''…The phenomenology of change is stressed precisely because the difference between a museum and the real world of an ever-changing nature is to be seen as crucial to our understanding of reality” (pg. 4).

While a political connection to Process Philosophy’s metaphysical and ontological claims seems far-fetched, Alfred North Whitehead—perhaps the most rigorous and defining theorist for Process Philosophy in the 20th century—claimed that the goal of philosophy is to “…voyage towards the larger generalities” of human life and behavior (Whitehead, 1979, pg. 94). This meaning that an understanding of the nature of reality will then give you access to insights of psychology, aesthetics, ethics, sociology, language, and virtually every other human enquiry and experience.

The majority of political history, static roles were assigned to rulers and their subjects. A king and his identity were stamped definitively, and this title was described as chosen by God; the king’s unchanging identity was a thing ''in'' the universe. The Process Philosophy critique of this type of conception is decidedly an aesthetic one: “People instinctively dislike being described in thing-classificatory terms…Such object-property attributions indicate a fixed nature that we naturally see as repugnant to ourselves” (pg. 14). This is to say, a political system which tries its hardest to stay the same and not go through changes in power and interactions goes against how reality is presented and organized to us, as well as what we value in ourselves and others.

With this analysis, the right to vote can clearly be understood. After thousands of years of static politics, people began to advocate for a political system which would better reflect the dynamism, novelty, and change seen in reality. The right to vote allows for processes like changes in leadership, as well as changes in the law and governance. Due to the ever-changing opinions and contexts that individuals go through, the right to vote allows for a reflection of this novelty. Such a system is empowering due to it allowing individuals to express themselves as ever changing processes themselves as opposed to static objects and it is metaphysically accurate according to our natures and the nature of reality. Also, it is telling that such political ideals came about during the Enlightenment, a period of time where understanding of the world without appeal to philosophical and religious tradition was given major emphasis. As we learned more about the world, we learned about the ideal political system.

====Social Darwinism====

Social Darwinism held that human life in society was a fight for survival guided by the principle of "survival of the fittest", proposed by British philosopher and scientist Herbert Spencer. In his later publications, Spencer's devotion to the right of universal suffrage waned. While he views universal suffrage in Social Statics (1851) as a reliable way of keeping government from overstepping its bounds in safeguarding moral rights, he concludes in Principles of Ethics that universal suffrage fails to do so successfully, and therefore abandons his support for it. He subsequently came to the conclusion that universal suffrage posed more of a danger to moral rights than it did to defend them (Spencer on Voting, 1879). Over-legislation was promoted by universal suffrage, especially when it was extended to women, as it allowed the government to take on tasks that were not its responsibility.

Spencer understood that liberalism's fundamental objective has never been to grant people the right to vote, but rather to limit government authority. In Social Statics (1981), he states that “The function of Liberalism in the past was that of putting a limit to the powers of kings. The function of true Liberalism in the future will be that of putting a limit to the powers of Parliaments” (Spencer, 1981, p. 166). The primary motivation for expanding suffrage is to limit or prevent the government's role from expanding. When this aim is challenged, the law of equal freedom may be jeopardized less by suffrage restrictions than by their removal, according to Social Statics (Miller, 1982, p. 492).

Spencer's work emphasizes the importance of changes in the pattern of interrelationships between the individual and the state in social evolution. The gradual decline of government's function in people's lives, according to Spencer, is the key to optimal social evolution in the future (Miller, 1982, p. 493). Before the publication of Social Statics in 1851, Spencer thought that universal suffrage would eliminate class legislation and protect the interests of the entire community. He even criticized the association of ignorance to the working class saying that “it is a great error to suppose that ignorance is peculiar to the unenfranchised.” (Spencer, 1851, p.232, para. 4). In 1860, Spencer emphasized once more that extending suffrage is only justifiable when it is utilized to preserve or extend individual liberty. However, he praised the suffrage expansion brought about by the Reform Bill of 1867, a good example of the triumph of feeling over intellect.

Spencer's views on women's suffrage are similar to his views on allowing workers to vote. Spencer calls for unlimited political equality for women in Social Statics (1851). He portrays women as being cognitively and physically inferior to men in this book, despite the fact that history shows that some women are equal to men in both regards. They have thrived as rulers, scientists, authors, and artists despite institutional constraints (Miller, 1982, p. 494). If many women are inferior, then many men are as well. In either case, the inferior should not be denied the chance to use the faculties they have. However, Spencer had concluded by 1892 that women could not be trusted with unfettered franchise. His rationale was that women are less capable of abstract thinking than males and are more influenced by emotional appeals. Spencer does not give explicit reasoning as to why this is the case. He simply notes in Social Statics (1851) that “[a woman’s] faculties are less powerful [..] because woman is mentally inferior to man she has less extensive rights, amount to ? Just this,--that because woman has weaker faculties than man, she ought not to have like liberty with him to exercise the faculties she has!” (Spencer, 1851, p.158). In addition, “A further difference between men and women is due to the fact that men are liable to military service for the defense of the country in time of war. Since this burden does not fall upon women, they are not entitled to the franchise, until a state of permanent peace has been attained” (Elliot, 2019, p. 205).

References:

Elliot, H., Williams, B. (2019). Makers of the Nineteenth Century Herbert Spencer. United States: Creative Media Partners, LLC.

Miller, W. (1982). HERBERT SPENCER'S DRIFT TO CONSERVATISM. History of Political Thought, 3(3), 483-497. Retrieved July 25, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/26212267

Spencer on voting as a poor instrument for protecting our rights to life, liberty, and property (1879). Online Library of Liberty. (n.d.). https://oll.libertyfund.org/quote/spencer-on-voting-as-a-poor-instrument-for-protecting-our-rights-to-life-liberty-and-property-1879.

Spencer, H. (1851). Social Statics . Online Library of Liberty. https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/spencer-social-statics-1851

Spencer, H. (1981). The Man versus the State, with Six Essays on Government, Society and Freedom (LF ed.). Online Library of Liberty. https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/mack-the-man-versus-the-state-with-six-essays-on-government-society-and-freedom-lf-ed#Spencer_0020_330

====British Idealism (19th cen.)====
====Continental Philosophy/Frankfurt School====
====Behaviorism====

The understanding of how and why human beings act was and still is often described as a dualistic interaction between mind and body. Usually this is described in terms of feelings. We feel a certain way, and that feeling prompts us to act. We eat because we feel like eating. We attack others because we feel angry. This causal explanation for behavior is taken for granted, but in the 19th century, a group of psychologists believed that behavior could be studied, not as an effect of the non-observable, ethereal mind, but rather as the outcome of changes from the environment. This was behaviorism, and William Baum states: “the central idea in behaviorism can be stated simply: ''A science of behavior is possible''” (Baum, 2017, pg. 3).

One of the most influential behaviorists, BF Skinner, was a radical behaviorist where instead of merely positing that only behavior could be objectively observed, went one step further in saying that all interior phenomena was a behavior like any other, and was subject to and created by the same environmental pressures as external behavior.

According to Skinner, all of our behavior and dispositions are determined by our environment. What we call freedom is merely the ability to free ourselves from “harmful contacts” (Skinner, 1971, pg. 32). Slavery is when we are unable to escape of avoid harm, and what Skinner calls the “literature of freedom”—philosophical and political traditions based around rights, emancipation, and the immorality of oppression—are merely ways to “..induce people to escape from or attack those who act to control them aversively” (pg. 35). The idea of freedom as an inherent right towards autonomy in one’s actions and beliefs is wholeheartedly rejected by Skinner, and instead is reduced to being able to do what one desires when the desire arises; a desire whose arising the individual has nothing to do with.

Dignity is an attribute that we use to describe someone’s character—character of course meaning a quality essential to someone’s internality, something that a radical behaviorist is very skeptical of. We do not respect someone’s action if it is done automatically, instead we value the individual who does a particular action ''despite'' whatever the environment compels them to do: “We give credit generosity when there are no obvious reasons for behaving differently…” (pg. 72). Our caring towards dignified action and character then reveals a blind spot that we have towards reality—if every behavior we do is determined and selected by the environment, no one deserves any credit towards their action, and no one is dignified for acting in a certain way.

Democracy and the right to vote for behaviorists like Skinner are then merely an expression of the fundamental biological mechanism of avoiding or escaping harmful contacts. If it weren’t for the aversive state of affairs that were present in the past, the right to vote would have never come about. Voting rights came about as a way to justify the public’s resistance to the restrictors, and this is in great contrast with the “literature of freedom’s” claim that the right to vote is a way to uphold god given rights. Voting, at base, was a way to control the behavior of those in power.

====Feminist Thought====
====Postmodernism====
Postmodernism evolved during the late 20th century in opposition to modernism and as a response to the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment encouraged a shift from intellectual dependence on the church and theology to a belief in a universal moral and intellectual historical experience legitimated by reason (Woods 1999, 227). Modernism supports the belief in this type of organization of knowledge and the human experience, suggesting that such reasoning would be unified by scientific thinking, teleology, and rationality. Modernism uses reason and scientific procedure to establish universal truths from which knowledge can be claimed and order established. The Enlightenment led to the spread of democratic values in the west, and likewise, influenced the creation of modern democratic institutions, a form of reason in practice (Gaete 1991, 149). An important change that stemmed from modernism and the Enlightenment was the acceptance of human rights as ethical truths. The statement, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights,” within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations (United Nations 1948) was offered as a universal truth that would provide social order based on the objective reasoning suggested by modernism (Gaete 1991, 149). For example, from this claim, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights could uphold that “The will of the people shall be the basis of authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be universal and equal in suffrage…” (United Nations 1948). From the acceptance of the initial statement of objective rights as a universal truth, equal political participation and voting rights could be theoretically promised.

The postmodern response to modernism reflects a difference in attitude, but does not imply that postmodernism will supersede modernism. In this way, postmodern thinking offers a critique of reason (Woods 1999, 9). According to Sabina Lovibond, “Postmodernism… rejects the doctrine of the unity of reason. It refuses to conceive of humanity as a unitary subject striving towards the goal of perfect coherence (in its common stock of beliefs) or of perfect cohesion and stability (in its political practice)” (Lovibond 1990). Modernism relies on metanarratives, an overarching pattern and interpretation of society, while postmodernism rejects this idea of an “all-encompassing rationality” (Woods 1990, 10).

There are two relevant points to consider regarding postmodernism in relation to voting rights. First off, postmodernists are largely opposed to the hierarchical structure of government and tend to question their trust in institutionalized government (Green & Roberts 2012, 85). Philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard who helped to formulate postmodernism suggests that postmodernists are suspicious of political narratives. Examples of such narratives include the idea of progress that is associated with the Enlightenment and ‘social liberation’ associated with Marxism. Lyotard refers to these types of narratives as “violent” and “tyrannical” for attempting to impose a universal pattern on human experience and knowledge. Instead, Lyotard believes knowledge can only be understood as partial and nonexclusive. According to Lyotard, “Scientists, technicians, and instruments are purchased not to find truth, but to augment power” (Lyotard 1997, 46). Postmodernists are opposed to this type of hierarchical structure, suggesting that older proponents of modernism were “being blind to the destructive and oppressive nature of all totalising ideologies” (Arslan 1999, 205). In terms of voting rights, this ‘totalising ideology’ may be the claim that voting rights provide the best method of citizen political participation. Postmodernists would instead suggest that the human experience is constantly changing and developing, so this ‘totalising ideology’ may not be all inclusive. While they may be in favor of voting rights in practice, they would reject the idea of voting rights and human rights as universal truths, suggesting that successful political commitments are not necessarily the result of institutional calls to universal truths, but rather of continued innovation (Woods 1999, 13).

The second point to consider with regard to voting rights is that postmodernists believe that the marginalized should be accounted for. Postmodernists suggest that meaning is constantly evolving and is contingent on situational factors and dependent on the interpreter. For the individual, postmodernism means liberation from fixed identities. Postmodernists do not believe that metanarratives can describe each individual, but rather believe that identity can be diverse despite sharing a common situation (Woods 1990, 44). They argue, “There must be an attempt to recoup the power of the individual to tell his or her narrative; that is, anti-foundationalism in this guise becomes the access to the control of one’s own politics” (Woods 1999, 21). One way to afford power to the individual may be by means of voting rights for all in order to provide representation for those who are otherwise marginalized and to account for the diverse individual human experience. Postmodernists do not think that minorities and all individuals are correctly represented by political metanarratives, and therefore, they would support representation for all by means of voting as a way to avoid the miscategorization of individuals into metanarratives. In fact, the feminist movement is an example of this type of resistance to popular culture, which has contributed to the spread of postmodernism (Woods 1999, 170).

===Are there any philosophical or moral traditions that dispute the classification of this right as a fundamental right?===
===What do the major legal theories (positive law, natural law, critical legal studies, etc.) say about this right?===

Natural Law:

Perceptions of voting as a right under natural law theory have evolved over time. In early natural law theory, the right to vote was not explicitly considered a necessary component of the fundamental goods on which rights and law are founded. Notably, suffrage was not an intrinsic element of Aquinas’s or philosopher John Finnis’s seven fundamental goods–“life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical reasonableness, and religion” (Britannica). While Aquinas posited that “the supreme power belongs to the multitude as a whole, or to that one who represents the multitude,” he never emphasized the importance of expressing the power of the multitude through voting, specifically (Shepard 1913, 114). Additionally in the Second Treatise of Government, John Locke finds that, while natural law and reason compel humans beings to create civil governments to protect their property and grant powers to sovereign individuals and institutions as a “common superior on earth to appeal to for relief,” widely-recognized suffrage is not a natural prerequisite for this tendency (Locke 1689, 15).

Over time, however, suffrage has received more consideration as intrinsic to natural law. Walter James Shepard describes this shift as part of the “theory of the early constitutional regime,” which moved beyond feudal interpretations of political representation and brought about the notion “that voting is an abstract right, founded in natural law, a consequence of the social compact, and an incident of popular sovereignty” (Shepard 1913, 108). The American Civil Rights Movement also brought about more explicit connections between the right to vote and natural law theory. Martin Luther King Jr., widely considered to have based his political philosophy on the tenets of natural law, often rhetorically framed the right to vote as part of the “eternal moral issue” of the Civil Rights Movement, stating that “the denial of this sacred right is a tragic betrayal of the highest mandates of our democratic tradition” (King 1957). King’s commentary on de facto denial of African Americans’ right to vote echoes later writings by King that more explicitly outline the natural law tradition: “A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law” (King 1963).

Legal Positivism:

Legal positivist interpretations of suffrage prioritize the systems that define, carry out, and protect suffrage and the voting process. Unlike natural law, the right to vote is not intimately connected or not connected to the pursuit of human goodness. Instead, it is a product of positive norms in a given society, and can be codified as a right as long as society and its legislators view it as something worth protecting. According to legal positivist H.L.A. Hart, the right to vote constitutes a “secondary rule”–a rule that regulates how laws in the conventional sense are “ascertained, introduced, eliminated” and enforced (Hart 1961, 92). Whereas “primary rules” control individual action such as speed limits, environmental regulations, or criminal law, the right to vote as a secondary rule regulates the process by which primary rules are created by incorporating some level of public input on who makes the law. Positivist Jeremy Waldron emphasizes the necessity of governmental and legal systems for suffrage, stating that “one has the right to vote only if one’s vote is counted and given effect in a system of collective decision that determines policy, leadership and authority” (Waldron 1999, 233). While positivists emphasize the importance of systems in the creation and validation of voting rights, voting as a right can also be conferred “as criteria of legal validity” in “conformity with moral principles or substantive values” (Hart 1961, 250). Waldron’s discussion of the inherent connection between individuals and the legal systems that dictate large parts of their lives serves as a positivist articulation of voting as a right: “since it is my duties (among others’) whose performance the state is orchestrating, I have a right to a say in the decision-mechanisms which control their orchestration” (Waldron 1998, 310).

Critical Legal Theory:

Some critical legal theorists maintain critiques against rights-based legal philosophies and methodologies altogether, including voting rights. These critiques include notions that rights-based legal thought “produces a kind of isolated individualism that hinders social solidarity and genuine human connection,” that “the use of rights discourse stunts human imagination and mystifies people about how law really works,” and that “legal rights are in fact indeterminate and incoherent” (Harvard). Drawing on historical precedent, critical legal theorists such as Robert Gordon argue that overreliance on rights-based legal strategy can make modest social gains for individuals, but simultaneously impose a limit on the extent to which individuals can make use of such rights and push back against entrenched power structures. Similarly, Cass Sunstein argues that the right to vote is not meaningfully enforced in the United States due to its strict limitation to the public sector:

“The legal system purports to promote democracy through protecting the right to vote
and the traditional freedom of expression; but those rights do not allow for democracy in the private sector, where critical decisions are also made. By safeguarding rights in the public arena and ignoring the private sphere, the legal system has eroded rather than promoted democracy” (Sunstein 1983, 128).

Under this framework, limiting suffrage to a matter of individual rights imposes unnecessary restrictions on when and where it can be enforced.

Not all critical legal theorists agree with the rejection of rights-based frameworks for suffrage. Critical race theorists such as Kimberle Crenshaw believe that “rights can be defended and reconstructed; the critique of rights neglects the historical potential of rights in the real lives of people of color and women” (Harvard). Framing voting as a right can also empower marginalized groups and mobilize individuals to push back against the existing legal status quo:

“The vast majority are able to sustain a ‘dual consciousness’ – recognizing and capitalizing on the revolutionary potential of legal rights while remaining skeptical of the overall social and political order in which rights are currently embedded” (Harvard). While there is broad consensus in critical legal theory that existing legal systems favor historically dominant hierarchies and do not equally protect all citizens’ ability to vote, there is ongoing debate as to whether framing the issue as a matter of voting “rights” is the best course of action.

==Culture and Politics==
===Is this right interpreted and exercised in different ways in different countries? Focus on particular countries in which the right is interpreted distinctively===
===Is this right exercised in different ways depending on the political governance regime in place (democracy, autocracy, hybrid regime)?===
===Is there general and widespread belief that this right is a fundamental right that should generally be protected (and that exceptions should be rare)?===
For several decades, the right to vote has been widely recognized as fundamental to fair, participatory government by a wide variety of international organizations and individual nations. The most prominent example comes from the United Nations’ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, which recognized that “every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity...to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors” (UN General Assembly 1966). Regional organizations such as the OAS, OSCE, EU, and African Union also hold provisions emphasizing the importance of maintaining equal access to voting among their member nations (University of Minnesota, 2003). In addition to international decrees and declarations identifying the importance of suffrage, international election monitoring and observation bodies exist around the world to protect citizens’ ability to vote and analyze countries’ electoral processes. There is strong global consensus that voting rights ought to be protected and are an essential element of successful representative democracies.

In an American context, the United States Constitution explicitly protects citizens’ right to vote in Section II of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment, Nineteenth Amendment, and Twenty-Fourth Amendment. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its subsequent amendments also describe the right to vote as an “inherent constitutional right” (H.R. 4249, 91st Congress 1970). Additionally, prominent Supreme Court cases concerning voting rights such as, Reynolds v. Sims (1964), Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections (1966), and Kramer v. Union Free School District (1969) convey the fundamental nature of suffrage, pushing back against previous interpretations by the Court in Minor v. Happersett (1875) that “the Constitution...does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one” (Supreme Court of the US 1875) and even older perceptions of voting as a privilege that had to be earned through societal metrics such as property ownership (Behrens 2004, 232). In Reynolds, the Court established that:

"Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.
Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."

Harper concerned the constitutionality of poll taxes, and the Court reasoned that “wealth or fee paying has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned” (Supreme Court of the US 1966). Kramer similarly outlined that “any unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the legitimacy of representative government” (Supreme Court of the US 1969).
Both majority opinions in Reynolds and Harper also relied upon previous rationale established in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) that “though not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege merely conceded by society according to its will, under certain conditions, nevertheless [the right to vote] is regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights” (Supreme Court of the US 1886).

In spite of these general beliefs legal precedent, certain members of society are still excluded from this fundamental right for reasons that are widely debated. Citizenship, for example, is often a requirement for suffrage. However, some countries, including certain local governments in the United States, allow noncitizens to vote in local elections after they have met certain residency requirements (Earnest). Felons are also often restricted from voting. In most countries with restrictions on felon voting, these penalties only take place when individuals are serving their prison sentence. In the United States, however, felon voting policy, like nearly all electoral policy, is a state decision, and half of all states prohibit felons from voting until the completion of parole and probation, including nine states that prohibit it even after parole and probation (ProCon). Restrictive felon voting policies are indicative to some experts that the United States has “failed to give the right to vote its true status as a fundamental right” (Behrens 275).

In addition to the explicit prohibition of certain individuals from voting, unequal access to voting precincts and absentee drop-off locations as well as reduced voting hours and early voting periods also undermine the extent to which voting rights are protected around the world. Beyond restrictions of where citizens can vote, more explicit voter intimidation and election-related violence are employed even in countries that have signed on to international agreements outlining the importance of voting rights. Partisan gerrymandering, which the Supreme Court has defined as federally “nonjusticiable” in Rucho v. Common Cause (2019), also dilutes the impact of certain citizens’ votes, undermining their ability to meaningfully exercise suffrage (Supreme Court of the US 2019).

Additionally, policies implemented to address voter fraud such as voter identification can also limit overall voting access. Critics of voter identification argue that requiring an often-times narrow list of permissible forms of identification puts an undue burden on citizens who are less likely to possess valid identification and constitute a more discrete form of a “poll tax” (Nackenoff). Voter ID cases are often analyzed on a case-by-case basis, as outlined in Crawford v. Marion County (2008), with states’ individual histories of voting discrimination, prevalence of voter fraud–or in many cases “perceptions” of fraud or a lack of “voter confidence”–and evidence indicating deliberate discriminatory intent all playing a role in determining whether or not voter identification satisfies a legitimate government interest (Tokaji).

===Does public polling reveal insights about the right as experienced in different countries?===

''Electoral Rights and Europe''

Being a part of the European Union, a citizen of a European country has electoral power in European, national, regional, and municipal levels, though that can bring confusion as to whether or not a European citizen can participate in all of the elections of a particular EU country. EU citizens can vote for European Parliament and municipal elections in any EU country that they live in, though they cannot vote in elections for national parliament nor in regional elections ('Flash Eurobarometer 485 - European Union Citizenship and Democracy', 2020, p. 3).

According to the Flash Eurobarometer 485 of July 2020, 71% European citizens were aware that a citizen of the EU that lives in their country has the right to vote for European Parliament (p. 5). 53% correctly stated that it is false that EU citizens living in their country can vote for national elections. A similar fifty percent split was found with European citizen’s belief of whether other EU citizens not from their country could vote for municipal and regional elections (p. 5).

This data implies that most Europeans recognize their own and others’ right to vote, and that their voting is done in conjunction with European voters from different countries and cultures. This creates an experience of voting that is decidedly international, both in the power that a European has with their vote and also the effects they feel from the votes of others. Voting power is much more expansive than just their own locality, and is instead affecting a much larger trans-national federation.

Later in the report, it shows that 63% of Europeans believe that a citizen of the US is justified in having the right to vote in the national elections of the country that the foreign citizen resides in (p. 6). The countries with the highest number of citizens who thought it justified was Ireland with 77% and Portugal with 74%. The lowest was Denmark with 40% and Sweden with 35%.

With the countries with more citizens that believe it is justified like Portugal and Ireland, the data implies that the right to vote should be expansive and farther reaching, with less importance placed on nationality and more on where someone lives. Moreover, the citizen’s desire for a wider net of participation implies an experience of voting that is too restricted, and far away from being universal.

With countries on the lower end with citizens that believe it to not be justified like Denmark and Sweden, the data implies that their conception of the right to vote is one that should be kept close with the ethnic and cultural natives of the country. The electoral net is too wide, and there would be a greater benefit if voting access were to be restrained and more controlled. This is further supported by the report later on which states that 49% of Danes and 56% of Swedes (the highest percentage) believe that European citizens should only vote in their country of origin (p. 21).

''Encouraging Others to Vote''

The World Values Survey in their 2020 report asked more than 70,000 citizens from 50 countries about what political activism they would consider taking, particularly whether they would encourage others they know to vote in an election.
The results:
* 22% said they have encouraged others to vote
* 26% said they might encourage others to vote
* 48% said they would never encourage others to vote ('World Values Survey Wave 7', 2017, p. 333).
The countries with the highest percentage of those that have encouraged others were Germany with 64%, the United States with 63%, and New Zealand with 62%. The countries with the highest percentage of those that would never encourage others were Myanmar with 79%, Ethiopia and Kyrgyzstan with 76%, and Jordan with 69% (p. 333).

For the countries like Germany and New Zealand with a high percentage of vote encouragers, the act of voting is likely experienced as an important, effective, and social phenomenon where political accomplishments can be reached if there is enough support. Voting is a statement made about the beliefs a citizen has over the contemporary political process, and pride is taken in its expression and public participation. The right to vote is something citizens should both have and take advantage of.

For the countries like Myanmar and Ethiopia with a high percentage of “never encourage” voters, their experience of voting is likely one where voting is unimportant and ineffective, and as a result is either a private or non-existent affair. Likely, the experience of voting is one of pessimism and disillusionment. The political goals of the public are not taken into account and the act of voting is political theater. On the other hand, it is possible also that voting is actively discouraged in these countries in order to uphold the current status quo, and in that case the right to vote is seen as a threat to established power.

==Conflicts with other Rights==
===Are there other specific fundamental rights that tend to conflict with this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?===
===Are there other specific rights that are critical to the exercise of this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?===
===Is there a perception that this right is above or higher than other fundamental rights, or in general, that it has a particular place in a hierarchy of rights?===
===What specific examples of hierarchies, manifestos, constitutions, or prioritized descriptions of rights cite this right’s high status? Low status? No status at all?===
===How does federalism change, if at all, the exercise or application of this right? What examples of this can one point to?===
==Limitations / Restrictions==
===What are the typical exceptions or limitations placed on this right?===
===Under American jurisprudence, what permissible exceptions exist?===
===Under international human rights laws, what permissible exceptions (often called derogations) exist?===
===Have political theorists or philosophers discussed the permissibility of exceptions to this right?===
===Should this right be limited when limiting it would jeopardize democratic norms?===
===Is this right often perceived as threatening to government authorities?===
===Is this right often curtailed by government authorities for reasons other than those which are generally viewed as permissible?===
===Is this right at times curtailed by private actors?===
===Is this right subject to specific limitations in event of emergency (war, brief natural disaster [weather, earthquake], long-run natural disaster [volcano, fire, disease])? Can such limitations be defined in advance with reference to the disaster in question?===
==Utilitarian / Fairness Assessments==
===Is there a cost attached to protecting and enforcing this right? What kinds of costs are implicated?===
====Short-term economic cost in general====
====Long-term economic cost in general====
====Cost to those least able to economically absorb the cost====
====Cost to perceived democratic legitimacy====
====Cost to consistency or coherence of the law as a whole====
====Cost to the legitimacy or effectiveness of other rights====
====Cost to considerations of social equality====
====Cost to other non-material goods not so far specified====
===What are the financial consequences, if any, of making this right a legally protectable right?===
===Are there any groups that are uniquely disadvantaged by the exercise of this right?===
===Are there any groups that uniquely benefit from the exercise of this right?===
===Are there instances when this fundamental right can lead to unfairness or inequities?===
===Are there objective ways to measure the utilitarian nature of this right?===
===If so, where can one draw the line: when does this right stop being useful or economically viable?===
==Looking Ahead==
===How can we expect this right to change and evolve in the years ahead?===
===How is the future likely to shape the exercise of this right?===
===Will the exercise or protection of this right be affected by technological changes?===
===Under what conditions would this right become irrelevant?===
===Are questions of fairness and utility pertaining to this right likely to change in the years ahead?===
==Policy Recommendations==
===Can the practice or exercise of this right be shaped through executive action?===
===In the US context, are there particular parties with a stake or interest in amending or reconceptualizing this right?===
===In the US context, can this right be altered legislatively, or would it require a constitutional amendment?===
===Is this right best addressed at the national level? The sub-national level? The international level?===
===To what extent is this right shaped primarily by judicial decisions?===
===If this right is best addressed through the amendment process, how should it proceed?===
===If this right were unlimited, what might be the consequences (positive and negative)?===
===If this right were eliminated, what might be the consequences (positive and negative)?===

Source/Privacy Rights

2022-08-03T17:30:33Z

Kbrard: /* Postmodernism */

==History==
===What is the oldest source in any country that mentions this right?===
Most sources say that the first mention of this right is ''The Right to Privacy'' written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis and published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890. Both were Boston attorneys and Brandeis would go on to serve as a United States Supreme Court Justice for 23 years (Louis Brandeis, n.d.). In this essay, they note that the legal scope of rights broadens over time and posit that the right to life has expanded to “the right to be let alone,” which had become an increasingly difficult feat with new technologies (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 193, 195).

Warren and Brandeis (1890) acknowledge that, at the time, there was little-to-no legal protection of this right. They look at defamation law and determine while it alludes to privacy law, there are limitations to privacy protection from this area of law as it only considers a damaged reputation, not instances in which an individual wishes something remained secret (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 197; Bycer, 2014). They also looked at copywriting and publishing law, which only applies to one’s own work (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 199). They determine that the right to privacy can extend beyond these areas of law as the right should be able to wholly prevent the depiction of private life (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 218). In the last part of this essay, they set out limitations to the right of privacy – privileged information remains under defamation law (to allow for the operation of courts), privacy ceases with consent to publish, gossip is not in the realm of privacy law, and intention and truth do not prevent a breach of such right.

However, Warren and Brandeis cite at least two instances that predate ''The Right to Privacy'' which discuss the right to privacy. The earliest is the citing of an 1820 statement from Lord Cottenham, who, in agreement with Lord Eldon, felt that were a king’s illnesses recorded by a doctor and published while that king was still alive, a court would not permit its publishing, as he claimed this circumstance would breach the king’s privacy (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 205; Bycer, 2014). Additionally, they acknowledge that the right to privacy has already been regulated in France since 1868. Section 11 of the 1868 Loi Relative à la Presse (Press Law) says that all periodic writings about a private fact of life are violations punishable by a fine of 500 francs. Pursuit of the violation may only be undertaken by the affected party (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 214, footnote 1). Beyond what Warren & Brandeis cited as earlier mentions, there was also the 1801 Haitian Constitution which provided the home was inviolable from government invasion in Article 63 (Theodore, 2000).

Resources

Bycer, M. (2014). Understanding the 1890 Warren and Brandeis “The Right to Privacy” Article. National Juris University. Retrieved Sept. 10, 2021, from https://nationalparalegal.edu/UnderstandingWarrenBrandeis.aspx
Louis Brandeis. (2020, Nov. 9). Britannica. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.britannica.com/biography/Louis-Brandeis
Theodore, Charmant. (2000). Haitian Constitution of 1801 (English). Louverture Project. http://thelouvertureproject.org/index.php?title=Haitian_Constitution_of_1801_(English)
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right? BUILD IN COLLAPSE EXPAND TOGGLE===
====Afghanistan====
The 1964 Afghan Constitution protected only the right to privacy in the home in Article 28 (Constitute Project, “Afghanistan 1964 Constitution”). Today, Article 38 offers similar protections and Article 37 protects communications (Constitute Project, “Afghanistan 2004 Constitution”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Afghanistan_1964?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Afghanistan_2004?lang=en

====Albania====
Today, privacy is guaranteed in Articles 35 (data), 36 (correspondence), and 37 (home) of the 1998 constitution (Constitute Project, “Albania 1998 rev. 2016”). This appears to be their first protection of privacy rights.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Albania_2016?lang=en

====Algeria====
Today, the 2020 constitution protects the inviolability of the domicile in Article 47 and, in Article 46, private life and private communication (Constitute Project, “Algeria 2020”). Previously, these rights were protected in the 1976 Constitution in Articles 39 and 40 (International Constitutional Law Project, Algeria Constitution”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Algeria_2020?lang=en
https://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ag00000_.html

====Andorra====
Articles 14 and 15 of the first and only Andorran constitution protect privacy in the state. Article 14 protects privacy, honor, and reputation, while Article 15 protects the home and communications (Constitute Project, “Andorra 1993”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Andorra_1993?lang=en

====Angola====
Today, privacy rights are protected in Articles 32 (personal and family life), 33 (home), and 34 (correspondence and communication) of the 2010 constitution.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Angola_2010?lang=en

====Antigua and Barbuda====
In the constitution, Article 3, Section C protects the right to privacy in personal and family life, as well as the home (Constitute Project, “Antigua and Barbuda 1981”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Antigua_and_Barbuda_1981?lang=en

====Argentina====
Articles 18 & 19 of the 1853 constitution protect privacy. Article 18(2) reads, “The residence is inviolable, as are letters and private papers; and a law shall determine in what cases and for what reasons their search and seizure shall be allowed,” while Article 19 reads, “The private actions of men that in no way offend public order or morality, nor injure a third party, are reserved only to God, and are exempt from the authority of the magistrates” (Constitute Project, “Argentina 1832, reinst. 1983, rev. 1994”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Argentina_1994?lang=en

====Armenia====
The 1995 Armenian constitution protects three main privacy rights in Articles 31-33: personal life, home, and communication (Constitute Project, “Armenia 1995 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Armenia_2015?lang=en

====Australia====
Privacy rights are not prescribed in the Constitution of Australia (Australian Human Rights Commission, “How are human rights protected in Australia?”). Beyond the international covenants, such as the ICCPR, privacy was first protected in the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT Human Rights Commission, “Human Rights”).

https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/rights-and-freedoms/how-are-human-rights-protected-australian-law
https://hrc.act.gov.au/humanrights/

====Austria====
According to the Austrian Embassy in Washington, D.C., the ratification of the ECHR by Austria in 1958 gave the treaty constitutional law standing in the state. The ECHR is what protects the right to privacy in Austria.

https://www.austria.org/human-rights-and-the-council-of-europe

====Azerbaijan====
Today, Article 32 of the 1995 constitution protects privacy. It is quite detailed but protects personal privacy, family life, personal information, and correspondence. Article 33 extends privacy rights to the residence (Constitute Project, “Azerbaijan 1995 rev. 2016”). Previously, privacy rights had been protected by the 1977 Soviet Constitution (see below).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Azerbaijan_2016?lang=en

====The Bahamas====
Article 15(c) protects the right to privacy in one’s home. Article 21 extends this right to exist during searches (Constitute Project, “Bahamas (The) 1973”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bahamas_1973?lang=en

====Bahrain====
Articles 25 & 26 of the 2002 constitution protect privacy in the home and all types of communication (Constitute Project, “Bahrain 2002 rev. 2017”). This constitution was the first establishment of privacy rights in Bahrain.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bahrain_2017?lang=en

====Bangladesh====
Article 43 of the constitution grants the right to privacy in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Bangladesh 1972, reinst. 1986, rev. 2014”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bangladesh_2014?lang=en

====Barbados====
Article 11(b) of the constitution grants every person in Barbados privacy of their home. Article 20(1) prevents interference in correspondence (Constitute Project, “Barbados 1966 rev. 2007”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Barbados_2007?lang=en

====Belarus====
Article 28 of the constitution protects private life in Belarus (Constitute Project, “Belarus 1994 rev. 2004”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Belarus_2004?lang=en

====Belgium====
Since 1831, Belgium has had one constitution, only amended 33 times. Article 15 protects one’s privacy in the home. Article 22 protects private life. Article 29 protects private letters (Constitute Project, “Belgium 1831 rev. 2014”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Belgium_2014?lang=en

====Belize====
In its only constitution since its independence, Belize protects privacy rights in Article 3(c). It protects family life, personal privacy, one’s home, and their dignity (Constitute Project, “Belize 1981 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Belize_2011?lang=en

====Benin====
Today, the 1990 constitution protects privacy in the home and of correspondence in Articles 20 and 21, respectively (Constitute Project, “Benin 1990”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Benin_1990?lang=en

====Bhutan====
In 2008, a new constitution was passed, which protected privacy rights in Article 19. Article 19 reads: A person shall not be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence nor to unlawful attacks on the person’s honour and reputation” (Bhutan’s National Council, “The Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan”).

https://www.nationalcouncil.bt/assets/uploads/docs/acts/2017/Constitution_of_Bhutan_2008.pdf

====Bolivia====
Today, privacy rights are protected in Article 21(3). These protections are general, while Article 25 protects more specific privacy rights in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2009”). This document is the 17th constitution since 1826, but other versions in English could not be found, so privacy rights may have a longer history in Bolivia.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009?lang=en

====Bosnia and Herzegovina====
Privacy rights have been protected in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995 with their independence from Yugoslavia. The 1995 constitution protects these rights in Article 3(f). These protections include private and family life, home, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 rev. 2009”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bosnia_Herzegovina_2009?lang=en

====Botswana====
The 1966 constitution of Botswana includes privacy protections of the home in Article 3(c) and Article 9. Article 12, in protecting freedom of expression, also protects correspondence (Constitute Project, “Botswana 1966 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Botswana_2016?lang=en

====Brazil====
In its first constitution, Brazil only claimed the inviolability of private letters in Article 179(XXVII) (WikiSource, “Constitution of the Empire of Brazil”). Since then, privacy rights have expanded, and today personal privacy, the home, and correspondence are protected in Article 5(X-XII) (Constitute Project, “Brazil 1988 rev. 2017”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2017?lang=en
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Empire_of_Brazil

====Brunei====
Brunei lacks any legislation or constitutional provisions for privacy rights. The 1996 United States Department of State Report on Brunei Human Rights even says that law actively allows for intrusions of privacy.

https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/brunei.html

====Bulgaria====
The right to privacy, including family life, private life, honor, dignity, and reputation, is protected in Article 32 of the 1991 constitution (Constitute Project, “Bulgaria 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bulgaria_2015?lang=en

====Burkina Faso====
The 1991 Burkina Faso Constitution protects privacy rights in Article 6. It reads, “The residence, the domicile, private and family life, [and] the secrecy of correspondence of every person, are inviolable. It can only be infringed according to the forms and in the cases specified by the law” (Constitute Project, “Burkina Faso 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Burkina_Faso_2015?lang=en

====Burundi====
The earliest mention of privacy rights in the Burundi Constitution is from the 1998 interim constitution. In this writing, privacy rights are contained in Article 23 and protect privacy, family, home, and correspondence (Constitution Net, “Constitution of Burundi”). Today, they are contained in Article 28 of the 2018 constitution (Constitute Project, “Burundi 2018”).

http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/transitional_national_constitution_and_transitional_constitution_act_1998-2001_0.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Burundi_2018?lang=en

====Cambodia====
The 1993 constitution contains privacy rights in Article 40: “The rights to privacy of residence, and to the confidentiality of correspondence by mail, telegram, fax, telex and telephone, shall be guaranteed” (Office of the Council of the Ministers of Cambodia, “Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia”).

https://pressocm.gov.kh/en/archives/9539

====Cameroon====
In the Preamble of the 1972 constitution, privacy is granted to the home and correspondence in points 5 and 6 (Constitute Project, “Cameroon 1972 rev. 2008”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cameroon_2008?lang=en

====Canada====
The Canadian Constitution has been in force since 1867 and is comprised of a couple of Acts. For privacy purposes, the most important is the Constitution Act of 1982, which contains the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In this section, Article 7 provides the most privacy protection that is seen in the constitution, protecting the right to life, liberty, and security of a person (Constitute Project, “Canada 1867 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Canada_2011?lang=en

====Cape Verde====
Article 33 makes violations of privacy inadmissible in court, while Article 38 grants the right to “personal identity, to civil rights, to a name, honor, and reputation, and to personal and family privacy”. Article 41 extends privacy rights to correspondence, and Article 42 extends it to electronic data privacy (Constitute Project, “Cape Verde 1980 rev. 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cape_Verde_1992?lang=en

====Central African Republic====
In 1994, a new constitution was passed in the Central African Republic. Article 13 granted private communications inviolable and Article 14 did the same for the private home (African Child Forum, “Constitution of the Central African Republic”). Today, private communication is seen in Article 16 and the home is inviolable in Article 19 (Constitute Project, “Central African Republic 2016”).

http://www.africanchildforum.org/clr/Legislation%20Per%20Country/CAR/car_constitution_1995_en.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Central_African_Republic_2016?lang=en

====Chad====
Both the 1996 and 2018 Chad Constitutions protect the right to privacy in Article 17 and the right to privacy in communications in Article 45 and 47, respectively (Constitute Project, “Chad").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chad_2015?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chad_2018?lang=en

====Chile====
The 1925 Chilean Constitution protected the inviolability of the home and correspondence in Article 10 Sections 12 & 13 (Constitute Project, “Chile 1925”). Today, the home is protected in Article 19 Section 5 (Constitute Project, “Chile 1980 rev. 2021”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chile_2021?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chile_1925?lang=en

====China====
In 1975, the Chinese Constitution protected the right to privacy to the person and the home in Chapter III, Article 28 (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 1975, 39). Today, Articles 38-40 protect privacy in China. Article 38 is for personal dignity, 39 for the home, and 40 for correspondence (Constitute Project, “China (People’s Republic of) 1982 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/China_2018?lang=en
https://china.usc.edu/sites/default/files/article/attachments/peoples-republic-of-china-constitution-1975.pdf

====Colombia====
The 1991 Colombian constitution is very explicit in its privacy protections in Article 15. Section 1 grants privacy to people and family life, section 2 is for data privacy, section 3 is for correspondence (Constitute Project, “Colombia 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015?lang=en

====Comoros====
Today, privacy provisions are in Article 26 and Article 27, which grant privacy in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Comoros 2018”). Before this constitution, similar clauses were in the 1996 constitutional preamble, drawn from the United Nations Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man (Constitution Net, “CONSTITUTION of the FEDERAL ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF THE COMOROS”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Comoros_2018?lang=en
http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/Comoros%20Constitution.pdf

====Democratic Republic of the Congo====
The personal right to privacy is granted in Article 31 of the 2005 Constitution, while the home is protected under Article 29 (Constitute Project, “Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 2005 rev. 2011”). Before this, the right to privacy in home and correspondence were granted in the Zaire 1990 constitution (amended from a previous version, though unclear which previous version) in Articles 22 & 23 (World Statesmen, “Complete Text of the Zairian Constitution After the Enactment of Law No. 90-002 of July 5, 1990 Concerning the Modification of Certain Provisions of the Constitution”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_2011?lang=en
https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Zaire1990.pdf

====Republic of the Congo====
The only mention of privacy rights today is that of the home in Article 20 of the 2015 Constitution (Constitute Project, “Congo (Republic of the) 2015”). The same right appeared in the 2001 Constitution in Article 14 (Constitute Project, “Congo (Republic of the) 2001”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Congo_2015?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Congo_2001?lang=en

====Costa Rica====
Today, privacy rights are protected in Articles 23 (the home) and 24 (communications and intimacy) (Constitute Project, “Costa Rica 1949 rev. 2020”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa_Rica_2020?lang=en

====Croatia====
Article 34 of the 1991 constitution protects the home. Article 35 protects personal and familial life, as well as dignity. Article 36 protects correspondence (Constitute Project, “Croatia 1991 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Croatia_2013?lang=en

====Cuba====
The 2019 constitution protects personal and familial privacy in Article 48, the home in Article 49, and correspondence in Article 50 (Constitute Project, “Cuba 2019”). Privacy was not in the previous Cuban constitution of 1976 (Constitute Project, “Cuba 1976 rev. 2002”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2019?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2002?lang=en

====Cyprus====
Article 15 of the 1960 constitution reads: “Every person has the right to respect for his private and family life.” Article 16 expands these protections to the home, as Article 17 expands them to correspondence and communication (Constitute Project, “Cyprus 1960 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cyprus_2013?lang=en

====Czech Republic====
Article 7(1) of the 1993 constitution guarantees the inviolability of persons and private life. Article 10 protects life from intrusion by others, and it also protects data privacy (Constitute Project, “Czech Republic 1993 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Czech_Republic_2013?lang=en

====Denmark====
Today, Article 72 protects the right to privacy in the home, while also preventing the search of private communications (Constitute Project, “Demark 1953”). The general form of the constitution derives from the 1849 Danish Constitution (Danish Parliament, “The Constitutional Act of Denmark”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Denmark_1953?lang=en
https://www.thedanishparliament.dk/en/democracy/the-constitutional-act-of-denmark

====Djibouti====
Today, the right to privacy in the home and communications are protected in the 1992 constitution Articles 12 & 13. Personal life is not protected (Constitute Project, “Djibouti 1992 rev. 2010”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominica_2014?lang=en

====Dominica====
Article 1(c) of the only constitution Dominica has had, written in 1978, protects the right to privacy in the home. Article 7(1) protects privacy during a search (Constitute Project, "Dominica 1978 rev. 2014").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominica_2014?lang=en

====Dominican Republic====
Today, Article 44 protects the right to privacy and personal honor. It reads, “All people have the right to privacy. The respect and non-interference into private and family life, the home, and private correspondence are guaranteed. The right to honor, good name, and one’s own image are recognized. All authorities or individuals who violate them are obligated to compensate or repair them in accordance with the law” (Constitute Project, “Dominican Republic 2015”). The subsections expand on these rights. In previous versions, this was the right to intimacy and personal honor (Constitute Project, “Dominican Republic 2010”). Previous constitutions could not be found in English.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominican_Republic_2015?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominican_Republic_2010?lang=en

====East Timor====
East Timor, or Timor-Leste, protects the right to private life, home, and communication during evidence collection in Article 34, privacy in general in Article 36, and privacy in the home and communication in Article 37 (Constitute Project, “Timor-Leste 2002”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/East_Timor_2002?lang=en

====Ecuador====
Article 11(3) enforces and protects the rights put forth by the constitution and international treaties: “The rights and guarantees set forth in the Constitution and in international human rights instruments shall be directly and immediately enforced by and before any civil, administrative or judicial servant, either by virtue of their office or at the request of the party”. In Chapter 6, Rights to Freedom, Article 66, Sections 11 and 19-22 set out more specific privacy regulations in terms of convictions, correspondence, the home, personal data, and privacy rights (Constitute Project, “Ecuador 2008 rev. 2021). There are 22 previous Ecuadorian constitutions, but English translations could not be found to investigate the presence of privacy rights.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ecuador_2021?lang=en

====Egypt====
The 1923 constitution of Egypt protects personal freedom in Article 4, privacy in the home in Article 8, and correspondence in Article 11 (Constitution Net, “Royal Decree No. 42 of 1923 On Building a Constitutional System for the Egyptian State”). Today, these rights are protected in Articles 57 & 58 (Constitute Project, “Egypt 2014 rev. 2019”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2019?lang=en
http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/1923_-_egyptian_constitution_english_1.pdf

====El Salvador====
Article 2 of the 1983 constitution explicitly protects the “right to honor, personal and family intimacy, and one’s own image.” Article 6 allows for free communication as long as it does not violate the private lives of others. Article 24 protects correspondence (Constitute Project, “El Salvador 1983 rev. 2014”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/El_Salvador_2014?lang=en

====Equatorial Guinea====
Today, Article 13 of the 1991 constitution protects rights and freedoms. In section 1(g), the right to privacy in communications and the home is protected (Constitute Project, “Equatorial Guinea 1991 rev. 2012”). Translations of the 1968, 1973, and 1982 constitutions could not be found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Equatorial_Guinea_2012?lang=en

====Eritrea====
In its history, Eritrea has only had one constitution and it protects the right to privacy in Article 18. Specific privacies are not mentioned but it is an overarching declaration of the protection of the right: “Every person shall have the right to privacy” (Constitute Project, “Eritrea 1997”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Eritrea_1997?lang=en

====Estonia====
The 1920 constitution of Estonia protected personal privacy in Paragraph 8. Paragraph 10 protected the homestead and Paragraph 14 protected communications (Wikisource, “Constitution of the Esthonian Republic (1920)”). Today, privacy rights are guaranteed in Section 26 (Riigi Teataja, “The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia”).

https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/521052015001/consolide
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Esthonian_Republic_(1920)

====Eswatini====
Article 14(1) names and protects fundamental rights, and subsection C reads “protection of the privacy of the home and other property rights of the individual” (Constitute Project, “Eswatini 2005”). Previous iterations of the constitutions from 1967 and 1968 could not be found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Swaziland_2005?lang=en

====Ethiopia====
The 1931 constitution protects correspondence privacy in Article 26 (Ethiopian Legal Brief, “Ethiopian Constitution of 1931”). In Article 25, the home is claimed as private. Today, privacy rights are protected in Article 26 (Constitute Project, “Ethiopia 1994”).

https://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/ethiopian-constitution-of-1931.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ethiopia_1994?lang=en

====Fiji====
The 1970 Fiji constitution, its first after independence from Britain, protected the right to privacy in the home in Article 3(c) (Constitution Net, “Fiji Independence Order 1970 and Constitution of Fiji”). Today, the 2013 constitution expands the right to privacy from the home to include the right to private and family life, privacy in correspondence, and data privacy in Article 24 (Constitute Project, “Fiji 2013”).

http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/1970_constitution.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Fiji_2013?lang=en

====Finland====
Originally, the 1919 Finnish Constitution protected privacy in Section 8 (RefWorld, “Constitution Act of Finland”). Today, Section 10 of the Finnish Constitution protects the right to privacy with similar language. It says, “Everyone's private life, honour and the sanctity of the home are guaranteed. More detailed provisions on the protection of personal data are laid down by an Act. The secrecy of correspondence, telephony and other confidential communications is inviolable” (Constitute Project, “Finland 1999 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Finland_2011?lang=en
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b53418.html

====France====
The right to privacy in France is implied in Article IV of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 26 August 1789. Article IV reads, “Liberty consists of being able to do everything that does not harm anybody else: thus the exercise of the natural rights of every man has no boundaries except those that ensure to other Members of the Society the enjoyment of those same rights” (Hardt, Kiiver, Kristofertisch). The Declaration of the Rights of Man is still in force today due to the Preamble of the 1958 French Constitution.

Sascha Hardt, Phillip Kiiver & Gisela Kristofertisch. (2019). Comparative Constitutional Law Documents. “Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen [Declaration des Driots de L’Homme et du Citoyen] of 26 August 1789” and “Constitution of the V. Republic of 4 October 1958.”

====Gabon====
Article 1 of the constitution lays out fundamental rights granted within the state (Constitute Project, “Gabon 1991 rev. 2011”). Section 5 of Article 1 protects the privacy of correspondence. Section 12 claims the inviolability of the domicile. The current constitution is based on the 1961 constitution, though it was rewritten in 1991.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Gabon_2011?lang=en

====The Gambia====
Article 23 of the 1996 constitution says, “No person shall be subject to interference with the privacy of his or her home, correspondence or communications save as is in accordance with law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety of the economic well-being of the country, for the protection of health or morals, for the prevention of disorder or crime or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Constitute Project, “Gambia (The) 1996 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Gambia_2018?lang=en

====Georgia====
Today, Article 15 in the 1995 constitution of Georgia protects the right to personal privacy, personal space, and privacy of communication. Additionally, Article 9 claims the inviolability of human dignity (Constitute Project, “Georgia 1995 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Georgia_2018?lang=en

====Germany====
German Basic Law, passed in 1949, provides for privacy in a couple of places. Article 1(1) protects an individual’s dignity, and Article 10 protects privacy in correspondence and telecommunications (Hardt, Kiiver, Rotering, & Kristofertisch). Article 13 protects the home.

Sascha Hardt, Phillip Kiiver, Gereon Rotering, & Gisela Kristofertisch. (2019). Comparative Constitutional Law Documents. “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany of 23 May 1949.”

====Ghana====
In the 1992 constitution, still in force today, the right to privacy in the home and correspondence is found in Article 18(2) (Constitute Project, “Ghana 1992 rev. 1996”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ghana_1996?lang=en

====Greece====
In the 1975 constitution, the Greeks protect the right to privacy in Article 9. This article protects the home, private, and family life. Article 9A provides constitutional data privacy protections (Constitute Project, “Greece 1975 rev. 2008”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Greece_2008?lang=en

====Grenada====
The 1973 constitution of Grenada, the country’s first, protected the right to privacy in Article 1(c) (Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, “The Grenada Constitution Order 1973”). Specifically, it protected the home and other property. Today, the 1973 constitution takes on similar language in Article 1(c) (Constitute Project, “Grenada 1973, reinst. 1991, rev. 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Grenada_1992?lang=en
https://www.cpahq.org/media/gq5dtcj5/gre_constitution.pdf

====Guatemala====
There are two provisions for privacy protection in the 1985 Guatemalan Constitution. Article 23 grants privacy in the home (vivienda) and Article 24 protects correspondence and other documents (Constitute Project, “Guatemala 1985 rev. 1993”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Guatemala_1993?lang=en

====Guinea====
The 2010 constitution of Guinea protects private life, correspondence, and the home in Article 12: “The domicile is inviolable. It may be infringed only in the case of grave and imminent peril, to evade [parer] a
common danger or to protect the life of the persons. All other infringement, all search may only be ordered by the judge or by the authority that the law designates and in the forms prescribed by it.
The secrecy of correspondence and of communication is inviolable. Each one has the right to the protection of their private life” (Constitute Project, “Guinea’s Constitution of 2010”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Guinea_2010.pdf

====Guinea-Bissau====
Article 44 of the 1984 constitution grants the right to protection of personal and private life. Article 48 grants privacy in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Guinea-Bissau 1984 rev. 1996”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Guinea_Bissau_1996?lang=en

====Guyana====
In 1966, Guyana gained independence from Britain and, in the same order, passed its constitution. The 1966 constitution provided for protection in the home from others in Article 3(c) (Guyana Parliament, “The Guyana Independence Order 1966”).

http://parliament.gov.gy/new2/documents/bills/21123/statutory_instrument_guyana_independence_order_1966_no_575.pdf

====Haiti====
In 1801, the first constitution of Haiti protected the privacy of the home in Article 63 (Louverture Project, “Constitution of 1801”). Today, Article 49 of the 1987 constitution protect protects communications (Constitute Project, “Haiti 1987 rev. 2012”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Haiti_2012?lang=en
http://thelouvertureproject.org/index.php?title=Haitian_Constitution_of_1801_(English)

====Honduras====
The 1982 constitution provides for privacy protections in Article 76. In this text, one is granted “The right to honor, to personal privacy, to family, and to one's dignity” (Constitute Project, “Hungary 1982 rev. 2013").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Honduras_2013?lang=en

====Hungary====
The 1949 constitution was the first to include privacy rights. In Article 57, personal privacy, as well as privacy in the home and correspondence are protected: “he Hungarian People's Republic guarantees the personal freedom and privileges of the citizens, and respects the secrecy of correspondence and the inviolability of the home” (Princeton University, “CONSTITUTION of the People's Republic of Hungary - Budapest, 20th August 1949”). In the most recent constitution from 2011, these rights are protected in Article VI (Constitute Project, “Hungary 2011 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Hungary_2016?lang=en
https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/hungary/1949%20Hungarian%20constitution.pdf

====Iceland====
Article 71 says, “Everyone shall enjoy freedom from interference with privacy, home, and family life” (Constitute Project, “Iceland 1944 rev. 2013”). This article is in the 1944 constitution, which is largely based on the 1874 constitutional text that preceded it (Icelandic Human Rights Center, “Icelandic Law”).

https://www.humanrights.is/en/laws-conventions/icelandic-law
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Iceland_2013?lang=en

====India====
While not explicitly mentioned in the Indian constitution, the right to privacy has been recognized by the Indian Supreme Court. In 2017, they ruled unanimously that the right to privacy for all people falls under Article 21, which provides the “protection of life and personal liberty” (McCarthy; Mahapatra & Choudhary).

McCarthy, J. (2017, Aug. 24). Indian Supreme Court declares privacy a fundamental right. NPR. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/24/545963181/indian-supreme-court-declares-privacy-a-fundamental-right
Mahapatra, D. & Choudhary, A.A. (2017, Aug. 24). Right to privacy is a fundamental right, it is intrinsic to the right to life: Supreme Court. Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/right-to-privacy-is-a-fundamental-right-supreme-court/articleshow/60203394.cms

====Indonesia====
Article 28G grants the right to privacy. It reads, “Every person shall have the right to protection of his/herself, family, honour, dignity, and property, and shall have the right to feel secure against and receive protection from the threat of fear to do or not do something that is a human right” (Constitute Project, Indonesia 1954 reinst. 1959, rev. 2002”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Indonesia_2002?lang=en

====Iran====
While the constitution of Iran does not protect privacy, it does guarantee protection of the law which conforms with Islamic Law in Article 20 (Constitute Project, “Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1979 rev. 1989”). Islam provides such protections within the Quran (Hayat, M.H., “Privacy and Islam: From the Quran to data protection in Pakistan”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989?lang=en
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13600830701532043?journalCode=cict20#:~:text=Islam%20not%20only%20prohibits%20entering,enter%20in%20one's%20own%20house.&text=We%20now%20come%20to%20rules,family%20circle%20in%20Islamic%20society.

====Iraq====
The 2004 constitution protects the right to personal privacy in Article 17(1) and the right to privacy in the home in Article 17(2) (Constitute Project, “Iraq 2005). Previously, only the home had been protected in the 1925 constitution (United Nations Archives, “Constitution of ‘Iraq (Organic Law)”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005?lang=en
https://biblio-archive.unog.ch/Dateien/CouncilDocs/C-49-1929-VI_EN.pdf

====Republic of Ireland====
Article 40(5) protects the inviolability of the dwelling (Constitute Project, “Ireland 1937 rev. 2017”). This same protection was afforded in Article 7 of the Constitution of the Irish Free State from 1922 (electronic Irish Statute Book, “Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) Act, 1922”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ireland_2019?lang=en
https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1922/act/1/enacted/en/print

====Israel====
Privacy rights in Israel derive from the Basic Law Human Liberty and Dignity of 1992. In this law, Article 7 protects privacy, intimacy, private premises, and confidential communications (Constitute Project, “Israel 1953 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Israel_2013?lang=en

====Italy====
Articles 13-15 grant privacy to people, homes, and correspondence in the Italian Constitution from 1947 (Constitute Project, “Italy 1947 rev. 2020”). Previous constitutions are from 1848 and 1861, but translations were not found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Italy_2020?lang=en

====Ivory Coast====
The only specific privacy right mentioned in the constitution is that in Article 8, which inviolably protects the home (Constitute Project, “Côte d'Ivoire 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/countries/Africa/Cote_d_Ivoire?lang=en

====Jamaica====
Chapter III of the 1962 constitution protects the fundamental rights and freedoms of Jamaicans. In Section 3(j) of Article 13, privacy protections are granted to persons, property, private and family life, and communication (Constitute Project, “Jamaica 1962 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Jamaica_2015?lang=en

====Japan====
Historically, the 1889 constitution of Japan protected the home and correspondence in Articles 25 and 26 (Constitute Project, “Japan’s Constitution of 1889 Historical”). Today, Article 35 protects the home (Constitute Project, "Japan 1946").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Japan_1889.pdf?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Japan_1946?lang=en

====Jordan====
Article 7 of the 1952 constitution says, “1. Personal freedom shall be guaranteed. 2. Every infringement on rights and public freedoms or the inviolability of the private life of Jordanians is a crime punishable by law.” Article 18 protects communications and Article 10 protects the home (Constitute Project, “Jordan 1952 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Jordan_2016?lang=en

====Kazakhstan====
In their first formal constitution, Kazakhstan protected the right to privacy in Article 18. It says, “1. Everyone shall have the right to inviolability of private life, personal or family secrets, protection of honor and dignity. 2. Everyone shall have the right to confidentiality of personal deposits and savings, correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraph, and other messages. Limitation of this right shall be permitted only in the cases and according to the procedure directly established by law. 3. State bodies, public associations, officials, and the mass media must provide every citizen with the possibility to obtain access to documents, decisions and other sources of information concerning his rights and interests” (Constitute Project, “Kazakhstan 1995 rev. 2017”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kazakhstan_2017?lang=en

====Kenya====
In 1963, the Kenyan Constitution protected privacy in Article 14(c) (Kenya Law, “1963 Constitution”). Today, Article 31 of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution gives every person the right to privacy in their person, home, possessions, family life, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Kenya 2010 Constitution”).

http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/1963_Constitution.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kenya_2010?lang=en

====Kiribati====
Article 3 of the 1979 constitution calls for the protection of privacy in the home and Article 9 protects a person from searches (Constitute Project, “Kiribati 1979 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/countries/Oceania/Kiribati?lang=en

====Kuwait====
Kuwait’s 1962 constitution has been reinstated twice, but it does not mention privacy rights generally. It does, however, protect the inviolability of the home in Article 38 (Constitute Project, “Kuwait 1962 reinst. 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kuwait_1992?lang=en

====Kyrgyzstan====
The 2007 constitution, the first to be adopted after independence from the Soviet Union, protected privacy rights in Article 14 (Electoral Knowledge Network, “Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic”). Today, Article 29 protects the rights to privacy in private life, dignity, and correspondence in the 2010 constitution (Constitute Project, “Kyrgyzstan 2010 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kyrgyz_Republic_2016?lang=en
https://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/asia/KG/kyrgyzstan-constitution-1993-2007/view?searchterm=russian

====Laos====
Privacy rights are scarcely protected in Laos. The revised 2015 constitution protects violations of life, body, integrity, and property in Article 42, which has been amended since the implementation of the constitution in 1991 (Constitute Project, “Lao People’s Democratic Republic 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://media.bloomsburyprofessional.com/rep/files/laos-constitution-1947-1949-englishx.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Laos_2015?lang=en

====Latvia====
Article 96 of the 1922 constitution states “Everyone has the right to inviolability of his or her private life, home and correspondence” (Constitute Project, “Latvia 1922, reinst. 1991, rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Latvia_2016?lang=en

====Lebanon====
The constitution provides no protections for general privacy rights. However, Article 14 does protect the inviolability of the home (Constitute Project, “Lebanon 1926 rev. 2004”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Lebanon_2004?lang=en

====Lesotho====
The 1993 constitution of Lesotho sets forth fundamental rights which are granted to each person in Lesotho in Article 4. In Section 1(g) of Article 4, the right to respect for family and private life is protected. In Article 11, this right is expanded upon and clarified (Constitute Project, “Lesotho 1993 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Lesotho_2018?lang=en

====Liberia====
The 1825 and 1847 constitutions of Liberia did not included mention of privacy rights. The first protection of privacy rights was in the 1986 constitution, Article 16. Article 16 states “No person shall be subjected to interference with his privacy of person, family, home or correspondence except by order of a court of competent jurisdiction” (Constitute Project, “Liberia 1986”).

http://crc.gov.lr/doc/CONSTITUTION%20OF%201847%20final.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Liberia_1986?lang=en

====Libya====
The interim constitution of 2011 is the first to grant privacy rights. It does so in Articles 11-13. These articles protect homes, private life, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Libya 2011 rev. 2012”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Libya_2012?lang=en

====Liechtenstein====
The 1862 constitution alludes to privacy rights in the home in Article 12 (Wright, “Constitution of 26 September 1862.”). Today, privacy rights go further under the 1921 constitution, with Article 32 guaranteeing “Personal liberty, the immunity of the home and the inviolability of letters and written matter” (Constitute Project, “Liechtenstein 1921 rev. 2011”).

https://books.google.com/books?id=kXBDAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA375&lpg=PA375&dq=1862+Constitution+of+Liechtenstein+full+text&source=bl&ots=6dAZ5MiCdX&sig=YurO0ujdxMdcKsMLT_DfGdxPCm0&hl=en&sa=X&ei=axZlU-b1KorroATU9oG4Cg#v=onepage&q=priva&f=false
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Liechtenstein_2011?lang=en

====Lithuania====
Articles 22 and 24 grant privacy rights in Lithuania. Article 22 declares the inviolability of the private life, including correspondence and data, and Article 24 protects the home (Constitute Project, “Lithuania 1992 rev. 2019”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lithuania_2019?lang=en

====Luxembourg====
The 1868 constitution, since amended, protects private life in Article 3. In Article 15, it protects the home and in Article 28, correspondence (Constitute Project, “Luxembourg 1868 rev. 2009”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Luxembourg_2009?lang=en

====Madagascar====
Article 13(1) governs privacy rights in Madagascar. It assures each individual “the inviolability of their person, their domicile and of the secrecy of their correspondence” (Constitute Project, “Madagascar 2010”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Madagascar_2010?lang=en

====Malawi====
The 1994 Malawi Constitution protects personal privacy in Article 21. As defined in the article, personal privacy protects possessions, home, and property (Constitute Project, “Malawi 1994 rev. 2017”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malawi_2017?lang=en

====Malaysia====
The constitution is lacking privacy rights protections. The first privacy related writing was the Personal Data Protection Act of 2010. This law came into force in 2013 and is more about data privacy than privacy rights generally.

https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-privacy-data-protection-and-cybersecurity-law-review/malaysia
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malaysia_2007?lang=en

====Maldives====
Article 24 grants the right to privacy in the Maldives. It says: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his private communications. Every person must respect these rights with respect to others” (Constitute Project, “Maldives 2008”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Maldives_2008?lang=en

====Mali====
Article 6 of the 1992 constitution protected the three main privacy rights: the home, correspondence, and the individual (Constitute Project, “Mali 1992”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mali_1992?lang=en

====Malta====
Article 32 of the Maltese Constitution protects the right to private and family life. Article 38 protects the home (Constitute Project, “Malta 1964 rev. 2016”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malta_2016?lang=en

====Marshall Islands====
Section 13 of the Marshall Islands’ constitution protects personal autonomy. It says: “All persons shall be free from unreasonable interference in personal choices that do not injure others and from unreasonable intrusions into their privacy” (Constitute Project, “Marshall Islands 1979 rev. 1995”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Marshall_Islands_1995?lang=en

====Mauritania====
Article 13(4) protects the right to privacy in Mauritania: “The honor and the private life of the citizen, the inviolability of the human person, of his domicile and of his correspondence are guaranteed by the State” (Constitute Project, "Mauritania 1991 rev. 2012").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mauritania_2012?lang=en

====Mauritius====
The sole constitution of Mauritius from 1968 is limited in what it says about privacy rights. It only protects a person and their property from a search in Article 9 (Constitute Project, "Mauritius 1968 rev. 2016").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mauritius_2016?lang=en

====Mexico====
Article 7 of the 1857 constitution prevents writers from writing about people’s private lives (World History Commons, “Federal Constitution of the United Mexican States of 1857”). Today, Article 16 of the 1917 constitution protects the privacy rights and data privacy in Mexico: “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, his/her family, papers, properties or be invaded at home without a written order from a competent authority, duly explaining the legal cause of the proceeding. All people have the right to enjoy protection on his personal data, and to access, correct and cancel such data. All people have the right to oppose the disclosure of his data, according to the law. The law shall establish exceptions to the criteria that rule the handling of data, due to national security reasons, law and order, public security, public health, or protection of third party’s rights” (Constitute Project, “Mexico 1917 rev. 2015”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mexico_2015?lang=en
https://worldhistorycommons.org/federal-constitution-united-mexican-states-1857

====Federated States of Micronesia====
Article IV Section 5 of the constitution of 1978 says “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and other possessions against unreasonable search, seizure, or invasion of privacy may not be violated. A warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized” (Constitute Project, “Micronesia (Federated States of) 1978 rev. 1990”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Micronesia_1990?lang=en

====Moldova====
Today, Articles 28-30 of the 1994 constitution protect privacy rights in Moldova. Article 28 grants privacy in private and family life, Article 29 in the home, and Article 30 in correspondence (Constitute Project, “Moldova 1994 rev. 2016”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Moldova_2016?lang=en

====Monaco====
The 1962 constitution, still in force today, protects the home in Article 21 and the general right to privacy in Article 22. Article 22 calls out private and family life as well as correspondence (Constitute Project, “Monaco 1962 rev 2002”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Monaco_2002?lang=en

====Mongolia====
Article 16(13) of the 1992 constitution protects the right to personal liberty and safety. It says, “The privacy of citizens, their families, confidentiality of correspondence and communication, and the inviolability of home residence shall be protected by law” (Constitute Project, “Mongolia 1992 rev. 2001).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mongolia_2001?lang=en

====Montenegro====
Article 20 of the 1992 constitution says, “physical and psychological integrity of man, his privacy and personal rights are inviolable” (Venice Commission, “Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro”). Today, Article 28 says “The inviolability of the physical and mental integrity of a man, and privacy and individual rights thereof shall be guaranteed” (Constitute Project, “Montenegro 2007 rev. 2013”).

https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2005)096-e
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Montenegro_2013?lang=en

====Morocco====
The 2011 Moroccan constitution was the first to have fundamental rights based on international treaties (Moroccan Government, “Constitution”). This made it the first to guarantee the right to privacy, which was achieved in Article 24 (Moroccan Government, “Constitution”; Constitute Project, “Morocco 2011”). Article 24 protects private life, the home, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Morocco 2011”).

https://www.maroc.ma/en/content/constitution
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Morocco_2011?lang=en

====Mozambique====
The 1975 constitution of Mozambique granted “All citizens … the right to their honor, good name and reputation, as well as the right to privacy and to defend their public image” (RefWorld, “Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique”). This is echoed in Article 41 of the 2004 constitution (Constitute Project, “Mozambique 2004 rev. 2007”).

https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4f40.html
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mozambique_2007?lang=en

====Myanmar====
Article 160 in the 1974 Burmese Constitution grants privacy for home, property, correspondence, and communications (Burma Library, “THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF BURMA (1974)”). Today, these same protections are afforded in Article 357 (Constitute Project, “Myanmar 2008 rev. 2015”).

https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs07/1974Constitution.pdf?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=pmd_uXw1EkLnkyq9T6FqkzA_NO9lvJaIhzdgyzAJ1J1s5Ko-1635431051-0-gqNtZGzNAiWjcnBszQjR
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Myanmar_2015?lang=en

====Namibia====
The 1990 constitution protects the right to privacy in the home and for correspondence in Article 13 (Constitute Project, “Namibia 1990 rev. 2014”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Namibia_2014?lang=en

====Nauru====
The preamble to Part II Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in the 1968 constitution grants everyone the “respect for his private and family life” (Constitute Project, “Nauru 1968 rev. 2015”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nauru_2015?lang=en

====Nepal====
The 1990 constitution was the first to protect privacy as a fundamental right. In Article 22: “Except as provided by law, the privacy of the person, house, property, document, correspondence or information of anyone is inviolable” (Constitution Net, “The Constitution of Nepal 1990”). In the 2015 constitution, the same language is used in Article 28 (Constitute Project, “Nepal 2015 rev. 2016").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nepal_2016?lang=en
https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/1990_constitution_english.pdf

====Kingdom of the Netherlands====
Article 10 of the 1814 Constitution grants privacy rights to persons in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 10(1) states “Everyone has, save for limitations to be provided by or pursuant to statute, the right to respect for his private life.” Article 13 protects private correspondence and Article 12 protects the home (Hardt & Kiiver, 2019, 141).

Sascha Hardt & Phillip Kiiver. Comparative Constitutional Law Documents. “Constitution for the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 24 August 1815.”

====New Zealand====
New Zealand governs privacy rights with the 1993 Privacy Act, which has since been replaced with the 2020 Privacy Act.

https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0028/latest/DLM296639.html

====Nicaragua====
The 1974 constitution “guarantees the inviolability of the home, the dwelling, and of any other private premises of persons” in Article 58 (General Secretariat Organization of American States, Washington D.C., “Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua”). Article 80 protected correspondence. The 1987 constitution broadened privacy rights in Article 26 stating: “Everyone has the right to: 1. Privacy in his/her life and that of his/her family; 2. Respect of his/her honor and reputation; 3. Know about any information which private or public entities may have on record about him/her as well as the right to know why and for what purpose they hold such information; 4. Inviolability of his/her domicile, correspondence and communication of any kind.” (Constitute Project, “Nicaragua 1987 rev. 2014”).

https://books.google.com/books?printsec=frontcover&vid=LCCN77374018#v=snippet&q=inviolable&f=false
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nicaragua_2014?lang=en

====Niger====
The 2010 constitution only protects the domicile of people in terms of privacy rights. This is done in Article 27 (Constitute Project, “Niger 2010 rev. 2017”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Niger_2017?lang=en

====Nigeria====
In 1960, the country’s first constitution protected the private life, home, and correspondence of each person in Article 22 (World Statesmen, “The Constitution of the Federation of Niger”).
Today, the same language is seen in Article 37 of the 1999 constitution (Constitute Project, “Nigeria Constitution 1999 rev. 2011”).

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/nigeria_const1960.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Nigeria_2011?lang=en

====North Korea====
Article 79 of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 1972 constitution grants that citizens and homes are inviolable and that communications are private (Constitute Project, “Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of) 1972 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Peoples_Republic_of_Korea_2016?lang=en

====North Macedonia====
Article 25 of the 1991 constitution states “Each citizen is guaranteed the respect and protection of the privacy of his/her personal and family life and of his/her dignity and repute.” Amendment XIX, altering Article 17, protects communications more heavily (Constitute Project, “North Macedonia 1991 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Macedonia_2011?lang=en

====Norway====
Norway has had one constitution since 1814, though it has been amended many times. Article 102 gives everyone “the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence” (Constitute Project, “Norway 1814 rev. 2016”). However, it appears this was amended sometime after 2004, as the version with amendments through 2004 does not have this language in Article 102 (Constitute Project, “Norway 1814 rev. 2004”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Norway_2016?lang=en
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Norway_2004.pdf

====Oman====
The Oman constitution, written in 1996, only constitutional protects the privacy of homes in Article 27 (Constitute Project, "Oman 1996 rev. 2011").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Oman_2011?lang=en

====Pakistan====
The 1973 constitution, reinstated in 2002, in Article 14 cites the inviolability of man’s dignity and privacy in the home as fundamental (Constitute Project, “Pakistan Constitution reinst. 2002, rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Pakistan_2018?lang=en

====Palau====
Article IV(4) of the 1981 constitution ensures “Every person has the right to be secure in his person, house, papers and effects against entry, search and seizure” (Constitute Project, “Palau 1981 rev. 1992").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Palau_1992?lang=en

====Panama====
Article 28 of the 1904 constitution keeps documents private (University of Michigan, “Constitution of the Republic of Panama”). The 1972 constitution reflects the same tone toward the privacy of documents in Article 29. Article 26 grants the home inviolable, though there is no blanket protection of privacy rights in the 1972 constitution (Constitute Project, “Panama 1972 rev. 2004”).

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112104577715&view=1up&seq=12
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Panama_2004?lang=en

====Papua New Guinea====
Under the basic rights prescribed under Section 5(f), all citizens have the “protection for the privacy of their homes and other property” (Constitute Project, Papua New Guinea 1975 rev. 2016). Additionally, Article 49(1) gives “Every person has a right to reasonable privacy in respect of his private and family life, his communications with other persons and his personal papers and effects, except to the extent that the exercise of that right is regulated or restricted by law that complies with Section 38 (general qualifications on qualified rights).”

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Papua_New_Guinea_2016?lang=en

====Paraguay====
In the 1967 constitution, Article 68 makes the home inviolable, and Article 69 makes communications inviolable, barring investigation (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, “Constitution of the Republic of Paraguay 1967”. Today, according to Article 33 of the Paraguay Constitution, “Personal and family intimacy, as well as the respect of private life, is inviolable. The behavior of persons, that does not affect the public order established by the law or the rights of third parties[,] is exempted from the public authority.” Article 34 inviolably protects the home (Constitute Project, “Paraguay 1992 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Paraguay_2011?lang=en
https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/con00138.pdf

====Peru====
Today, Article 2(7) protects privacy rights in Peru for one’s honor, reputation, personal and family life, voice, and image (Constitute Project, “Peru 1993 rev. 2021”). Similar rights appear to have been listed in Article 2 of the 1979 constitution, but an English translation could not be found.

http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Peru-Constitucion%201979.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Peru_2021?lang=en

====Philippines====
The 1935 Constitution grants “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated” in Article III, Section 1(3) (Official Gazette, “The 1935 Constitution”). Today, similar language is used in Article II, Section 1(2) (Official Gazette, “The 1935 Constitution”).

https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/the-1935-constitution/
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/

====Poland====
The 1921 Polish Constitution grants privacy in the home and communication in articles 100 and 106, respectively (Sejm Parliamentary Library, “Constitution of the Republic of Poland, March 17, 1921”). Today, Article 47 of the 1997 constitution protects the general right to privacy in Poland: “Everyone shall have the right to legal protection of his private and family life, of his honour and good reputation and to make decisions about his personal life.” Articles 49 and 50 extend these protections to communications and the home (Constitute Project, “Poland 1997 rev. 2009”).

http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/kpol/e1921.html
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Poland_2009?lang=en

====Portugal====
Portugal’s first protection of privacy was in the 1976 constitution. Article 26(1) says “Everyone shall possess the right to a personal identity, to the development of their personality, to civil capacity, to citizenship, to a good name and reputation, to their likeness, to speak out, to protect the privacy of their personal and family life, and to legal protection against any form of discrimination.” Article 65 grants privacy in the home (Constitute Project, “Portugal 1976 rev. 2005).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Portugal_2005?lang=en

====Qatar====
From 1972-2003, Qatar was ruled by a temporary constitution. In this document Article 12 granted the sanctity of dwellings (Al Meezan, “The Amended Provisional Constitution of 1972”). Today, Article 37 of the Constitution claims “The sanctity of human privacy shall be inviolable, and therefore interference into privacy of a person, family affairs, home of residence, correspondence, or any other act of interference that may demean or defame a person may not be allowed save as limited by the provisions of the law stipulated therein” (Qatar Government Communications Office, “The Constitution”).

https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/about-qatar/the-constitution/
https://www.almeezan.qa/LawView.aspx?opt&LawID=4360&language=en#Section_14176

====Romania====
Today, Article 26 of the 1991 Romanian Constitution protects personal and family privacy: “(1) The public authorities shall respect and protect the intimate, family and private life” (Constitute Project, “Romania 1991 rev. 2003”). Privacy may have been protected in earlier iterations of the constitution (i.e., 1952, 1965, etc.), but English translations could not be found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Romania_2003?lang=en

====Russia====
In 1906, the Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire were the first to grant Russians “sanctity of the home and property.” This was the first time Russians were granted civil liberties (Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library, “‘Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire’ Approved”).

https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619222

====Rwanda====
The right to privacy in Rwanda is protected by Articles 23 and 34. Article 23 states “The privacy of a person, his or her family, home or correspondence shall not be subjected to interference in a manner inconsistent with the law; the person's honour and dignity shall be respected. A person's home is inviolable. No search or entry into a home shall be carried out without the consent of the owner, except in circumstances and in accordance with procedures determined by the law.” Article 34 states “Private property, whether owned individually or collectively, is inviolable” (Constitute Project, "Rwanda 2003 rev. 2015").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Rwanda_2015?lang=en

====Saint Kitts and Nevis====
Chapter II, Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, of the 1983 constitution entitles everyone to fundamental rights, including “protection for his personal privacy, the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation” (Constitute Project, “Saint Kitts and Nevis 1983”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Kitts_and_Nevis_1983?lang=en

====Saint Lucia====
Chapter I, Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, of the 1978 constitution immediately grants every person in St. Lucia “protection for his family life, his personal privacy, the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation” (Constitute Project, “Saint Lucia 1978”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Lucia_1978?lang=en

====Saint Vincent and the Grenadines====
In the preamble of their only constitution to date, Vincentians are promised safeguards to “the rights of privacy of family life, of property, and the fostering of the pursuit of just economic rewards for labor.” This is reaffirmed in Article 1 with the granting of fundamental rights and freedoms (Constitute Project, “Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1979”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Vincent_and_the_Grenadines_1979?lang=en

====Samoa====
There is no mention of privacy rights in the constitution, which has been updated as recently as 2017 (Constitute Project, “Samoa 1962 rev. 2017”). Section 50(2) of the Telecommunications Act 2005 protects the privacy of telecommunications customers (Samoa). This was the earliest found reference to privacy rights in Samoa.

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Samoa_2017?lang=en
https://www.regulator.gov.ws/images/Act/TELECOMMUNICATIONS_ACT_2005_-_Eng.pdf

====San Marino====
The 1974 Declaration of Citizens' Rights and of the fundamental principles of the San Marinese legal order is the first time privacy rights are alluded to in San Marino. Art. 6 grants civil and political liberties. It does not grant privacy except in communications.

https://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions/country/6/San%20Marino/show

====São Tomé and Príncipe====
Article 24 of the 1975 Constitution, still in effect today, states “Personal identity and the confidentiality of the intimacy of private and family life are inviolable” (Constitute Project, Sao Tome and Principe 1975 rev. 2003). Additionally, Article 25 grants that communications and one’s home are also private (Constitute Project, Sao Tome and Principe 1975 rev. 2003).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Sao_Tome_and_Principe_2003?lang=en

====Saudi Arabia====
The 1992 Saudi Constitution does not explicitly protect privacy but claims privacy in communications and homes in Articles 37 and 40 (Constitute Project, “Saudi Arabia’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2005”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Saudi_Arabia_2013?lang=en

====Senegal====
Senegal does not explicitly protect the right to privacy in its constitution. Article 7 of the 2001 constitution makes the claim to protect human rights but does not call out privacy. Article 13 provides for private correspondence and Article 16 makes the domicile inviolable (Constitute Project, “Senegal 2001 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Senegal_2016?lang=en

====Serbia====
The 2006 Serbian Constitution does not protect the right to privacy outright but allows for privacy in communication and data collection/sharing in Articles 41 and 42 (Constitute Project, “Serbia 2006”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Serbia_2006?lang=en

====Seychelles====
The 1976 Independence Constitution of Seychelles, under Chapter 3, Article 12(c) gives individuals privacy of their home and other property (Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative, “Constitution of Seychelles, 1976”).

https://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/constitution-of-seychelles-1976/

====Sierra Leone====
The 1978 constitution protected the privacy of the home and property under Article 12 (The Laws of Sierra Leone on the Sierra Leone Web, “The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1978”).

http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/1978-12s.pdf

====Singapore====
No part of the constitution mentions a right to privacy (Privacy International, “The Right to Privacy in Singapore”). There are also no specific laws governing privacy within the state.

https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/Singapore_UPR_PI_submission_FINAL.pdf

====Slovakia====
Article 16(1) of the 1992 constitution states “The inviolability of the person and its privacy is guaranteed. It may be limited only in cases laid down by law” (Constitute Project, “Slovakia 1992 rev. 2017). Sections 2 and 3 of Article 19 protect private life and data collection and publication (Constitute Project, “Slovakia 1992 rev. 2017). Article 21 claims the home is inviolable, while Article 22 protects communications (Constitute Project, “Slovakia 1992 rev. 2017).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Slovakia_2017?lang=en

====Slovenia====
Articles 35 and 36 of the constitution speak to the right to privacy in Slovenia. Article 35 says “The inviolability of the physical and mental integrity of every person, his privacy and personality rights shall be guaranteed” (Constitute Project, “Slovenia 1991 rev. 2016”). Article 36 says “Dwellings are inviolable. No one may, without a court order, enter the dwelling or other premises of another person, nor may he search the same, against the will of the resident. Any person whose dwelling or other premises are searched has the right to be present or to have a representative present. Such a search may only be conducted in the presence of two witnesses. Subject to conditions provided by law, an official may enter the dwelling or other premises of another person without a court order, and may in exceptional circumstances conduct a search in the absence of witnesses, where this is absolutely necessary for the direct apprehension of a person who has committed a criminal offence or to protect people or property” (Constitute Project, “Slovenia 1991 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Slovenia_2016?lang=en

====Solomon Islands====
Article 9 of the Solomon Islands Constitution protects the privacy of the home and other property: “Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.” (Constitute Project, “Solomon Islands 1978 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Solomon_Islands_2018?lang=en

====Somalia====
Article 28 of the 1960 Constitution of Somalia grants “respect for the private home” in which "no home or private property of any one (sic) may be entered into or violated, save in the cases mentioned in Paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of Article 25” (World Intellectual Property Organization, “The Constitution”).

https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/so/so002en.pdf

====South Africa====
The 1993 Interim Constitution of South Africa was the first to grant privacy rights. The right to privacy includes “the right not to be subject to searches of his or her person, home or property, the seizure of private possessions or the violation of private communications” (South African Government, “Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993”). Today, the 1996 Constitution offers similar protections in Article 14 (Constitute Project, “South Africa 1996 rev. 2012).

https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-act-200-1993#13%20Privacy
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Africa_2012?lang=en

====South Korea====
Under the first constitution of the Republic of Korea in 1948, Articles 17 and 18 grant the right to privacy. Neither the privacy of a citizen nor communication may be infringed (Constitute Project, “Korea (Republic of) 1948 rev. 1987”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Republic_of_Korea_1987?lang=en

====South Sudan====
Article 22 of the 2011 South Sudan constitution protects the right to privacy: “The privacy of all persons shall be inviolable; no person shall be subjected to interference with his or her private life, family, home or correspondence, save in accordance with the law” (Constitute Project, “South Sudan 2011 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Sudan_2013?lang=en

====Spain====
The 1978 Spanish Constitution was the first to present privacy rights in Spain. Section 19(1) protects “the right to honour, to personal and family privacy and to the own image,” while 19(2) protects the home, and 19(4) explicitly grants data privacy (Constitute Project, “Spain 1978 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Spain_2011?lang=en

====Sri Lanka====
Sri Lanka’s constitution does not protect the right to privacy, though privacy is mentioned briefly in Article 14A(2) (Constitute Project, “Sri Lanka 1978 rev. 2015”). Sri Lanka is also lacking comprehensive privacy legislation, instead opting to write in provisions when regulating other industries (Data Guidance, “Sri Lanka – Data Protection Overview”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Sri_Lanka_2015?lang=en
https://www.dataguidance.com/notes/sri-lanka-data-protection-overview

====Sudan====
Privacy rights first appear in the 1973 Sudanese Constitution. Article 42 states “the private life of citizens is inviolable. The state shall guarantee the freedom and secrecy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communications in accordance with the law.” Article 43 protects dwellings in the same manner (The Democratic Republic of Sudan Gazette, “The Permanent Constitution of Sudan”). Today, these protections are combined into Article 55 of the 2019 Constitution, in which “No one’s privacy may be violated. It is not permissible to interfere in the private or family life of any person in his home or correspondence, except in accordance with the law” (Constitute Project, "Sudan 2019").

https://www.righttononviolence.org/mecf/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Constitution-Sudan-1973-+-amendment-1975.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Sudan_2019?lang=en

====Suriname====
The 1975 Suriname Constitution protected the home and private life in Article 14 (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1983, “Report on the Human Rights Situation in Suriname”). Today, these rights are protected under Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution (Constitute Project, “Suriname 1987 rev 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Surinam_1992?lang=en
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Suriname83eng/chap.1.htm

====Sweden====
Constitutionally, privacy rights were introduced with the 1974 Swedish Constitution. Articles 2 and 6 present the right to privacy, while Article 20 allows the provisions in Article 6 to have some limitations (Constitute Project, “Sweden’s Constitution of 1974 with Amendments through 2012”). Sweden was also the first to introduce data privacy rights with the Data Act in 1973 (GDPRHub, “Data Protection in Sweden”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Sweden_2012.pdf?lang=en
https://gdprhub.eu/Data_Protection_in_Sweden

====Switzerland====
The 1992 Federal Act on Data Protection was the first formal protection of privacy in Switzerland (DLA Piper, “Data protection laws of the world: Switzerland”). This law has since been revised, but since then, the right to privacy was added to the 1999 Swiss Constitution in Article 13 (Constitute Project, “Switzerland 1999 rev. 2014”).

https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?t=law&c=CH
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Switzerland_2014?lang=en

====Syria====
The right to privacy was limited in the 1973 constitution, preventing only the private seizure of private property without judicial ruling (Carnegie Middle East Center, “The Syrian Constitution – 1973-2012”). Today, Articles 36 and 37 of the 2012 Constitution protect privacy rights. Article 36 protects private life and Article 37 protects communications (Constitute Project, “Syrian Arab Republic 2012”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Syria_2012?lang=en
https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/50255?lang=en

====Tajikistan====
Articles 22 and 23 of the 1994 Tajikistan constitution protect the right to privacy. Article 22 makes the home inviolable, and Article 23 forbids “The collection, storage, use, and dissemination of information about private life of a person without his consent” (Constitute Project, “Tajikistan 1994 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Tajikistan_2016?lang=en

====Tanzania====
The 1965 constitution of Tanzania did not explicitly provide for privacy but defaulted “to safeguard the inherent dignity of the individual in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” during the preamble (World Statesmen, “The Interim Constitution of Tanzania”). Today, the 1997 constitution (as amended in 2005) privacy and personal security in Article 16 (Constitute Project, “Tanzania’s Constitution of 1977 with Amendments through 2005”).

http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Tanzania-Constitution-1965.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Tanzania_2005?lang=en

====Thailand====
The earliest mention of privacy is the 1997 constitution of Thailand. While they have had many constitutions since 1932, the earliest translation found was that of the 1997 text. Section 34 protects “A person’s family rights, dignity, reputation or the right of privacy” unless it is beneficial to the public (Ref World, “Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand”).

https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ae6b5b2b.pdf

====Togo====
Articles 27, 28, and 29 in the 1992 Togolese Constitution protect private property, the home, private life, and image, and correspondence. Article 28 is explicit to the right to privacy, while Articles 27 and 29 fit into the privacy penumbras subscribed by the United States (Constitute Project, “Togo’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2007”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Togo_2007?lang=en

====Tonga====
The Tonga constitution was written in 1875. Under Article 16, privacy is granted during searches, except for lawfully granted searches through a warrant (Constitute Project, “Tonga’s Constitution of 1875 with Amendments through 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Tonga_2013.pdf?lang=en

====Trinidad and Tobago====
The 1976 constitution does not explicitly protect the right to privacy. However, Article 4 protects fundamental human rights, such as “the right of the individual to respect for his private and family life” and protection of the law (Constitute Project, “Trinidad and Tobago 1976 rev. 2007").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Trinidad_and_Tobago_2007?lang=en

====Tunisia====
In 1959, the constitution granted the right to privacy in Article 9. At some point between then and 2008, this article was amended to protect personal data, reflecting the changes in privacy rights with new technologies (Constitute Project, “Tunisia 1959 rev. 2008").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2008?lang=en

====Turkey====
The 1924 Turkish Constitution protects personal liberty except for the provision of law under Article 72 (World Statesmen, “The New Constitution of Turkey”). Article 71 protects the inviolability of the home, life, property, and honor. Article 81 allows for private communications.

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Turkeyconstitution1924.pdf

====Turkmenistan====
The 1992 Constitution protects against arbitrary interference of privacy in Article 25 (International Committee on the Red Cross, “Constitution 1992, as of 2008”).

Today, Article 37 of the 2008 constitution grants “the right to private liberty, personal and family secrets and their protection from arbitrary interference in their privacy” while Article 38 prevents the “Collection, storage and dissemination of information about private life of an individual” without consent (Constitute Project, “Turkmenistan's Constitution of 2008 with Amendments through 2016”).

https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/D9E58AFB0C841166C1256FFD0034016C
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkmenistan_2016.pdf?lang=en

====Tuvalu====
The 1996 constitution protects privacy rights under Articles 11(h) and 21 (Constitute Project, “Tuvalu Constitution of 1996”). Article 11(h) reads “Every person is entitled…to the following fundamental freedoms: […] (h) protection for the privacy of his home and other property” (Constitute Project, “Tuvalu Constitution of 1996”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tuvalu_1986.pdf?lang=en

====Uganda====
Article 17(c) of the 1962 constitution provides privacy rights protections in Uganda (World Statesmen, “Uganda Constitutional Instruments”). It protects “the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation” as a fundamental right. Today, the 1995 Constitution grants these protections in Article 27 (Constitute Project, “Uganda’s Constitution of 1995 with Amendments through 2017").

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Uganda-const-1962.pdf
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Uganda_2017.pdf?lang=en

====Ukraine====
Articles 30, 31, and 32 of the 1996 Constitution grant the right to privacy (Constitute Project, “Ukraine’s Constitution of 1996 with Amendments through 2016”). Article 30 gives privacy in the home, Article 31 allows privacy protections to communications, and Article 32 prevents interference into personal and family life (Constitute Project, “Ukraine’s Constitution of 1996 with Amendments through 2016”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ukraine_2016.pdf?lang=en

====United Arab Emirates====
The 1971 constitution protects privacy in communications in Articles 31 and Article 36 protects one’s home (Constitute Project, “United Arab Emirates 1971, rev. 2009").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/United_Arab_Emirates_2009?lang=en

====United Kingdom====
The United Kingdom 1988 Human Rights Act entrenched the ECHR into United Kingdom law (Liberty, “The Human Rights Act”). It protects one’s privacy from unnecessary intrusion, among other rights. Additionally, in ‘’The Right to Privacy’’ Warren and Brandeis cite Lord Cottenham in 1820 who, in agreement with Lord Eldon, felt that were a king’s illnesses recorded by a doctor and published while that king was still alive, a court would not permit its publishing, as he claimed this circumstance would breach the king’s privacy (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 205; Bycer, 2014).

https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/your-rights/the-human-rights-act/
Bycer, M. (2014). Understanding the 1890 Warren and Brandeis “The Right to Privacy” Article. National Juris University. Retrieved Sept. 10, 2021, from https://nationalparalegal.edu/UnderstandingWarrenBrandeis.aspx
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

====United States====
The first mention of this right is ‘’The Right to Privacy’’ written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis and published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890. Constitutionally, it was first found in the 1965 Supreme Court case ‘’Griswold v. Connecticut’’ (Privacy, n.d.).

Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

====Uruguay====
The 1966 constitution was the first translated into English to mention privacy rights. It is protected in Articles 10, 11, and 28. Article 10 grants individuals’ privacy, Article 11 makes the home private, and Article 28 protects communications (Constitute Project, "Uruguay 1966, reinst. 1985, rev. 2004").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Uruguay_2004?lang=en

====Uzbekistan====
Article 27 of the 1992 Constitution protects privacy and the inviolability of the home, requiring a prescription by law to allow a search of the home (Constitute Project, “Uzbekistan's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2011”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Uzbekistan_2011.pdf?lang=en

====Vanuatu====
Article 5(1)(j) in the 1980 Vanuatu Constitution protects privacy in the home and property (Constitute Project, “Vanuatu’s Constitution of 1980 with Amendments through 2013”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Vanuatu_2013.pdf?lang=en

====Venezuela====
Privacy is first alluded to in the Venezuelan Declaration of Independence and Constitution of 1812 in Art. 177, which grants privacy in the home from soldiers (Rice University, "Venezuelan Declaration of Independence and Constitution").
Today, privacy is strictly protected in Venezuela, going beyond the call of the ICCPR’s call in Article 17 under constitutional Articles 48 and 60 (Privacy International, “The Right to Privacy in Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of): Stakeholder Report, Universal Periodic Review,” 4).

https://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/venezuela_upr2016.pdf
https://scholarship.rice.edu/jsp/xml/1911/9253/1/aa00032.tei.html

====Vietnam====
The 1992 Vietnam Constitution was the first since its independence that recognized the “inviolability of personal privacy” in Article 21 (Constitute Project, “Viet Nam’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2013”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Socialist_Republic_of_Vietnam_2013.pdf?lang=en
https://constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-vietnam

====Yemen====
There are no explicit protections of privacy in Yemen, though Article 20 does not allow for private confiscation without legal judgment (Constitute Project, “Yemen 1991: Rev. 2015”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Yemen_2015?lang=en
https://giswatch.org/en/country-report/communications-surveillance/yemen

====Zambia====
Privacy was protected in the first constitution of Zambia in 1964 in Chapter 3, Articles 13(c) and 19 (World Statesmen, “Laws of Zambia: The Constitution”).
Today, Article 11(d) and 17 of the 1991 Zambian Constitution protect the right to privacy (Constitute Project, “Zambia’s Constitution of 1991 with Amendments Through 2016”).

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Constitution-Zambia1964.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Zambia_2016.pdf?lang=en

====Zimbabwe====

The 2013 Zimbabwe Constitution grants “[e]very person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have: (a) their home, premises or property entered without their permission; (b) their person, home, premises or property searched; (c) their possessions seized; (d) the privacy of their communications infringed; or (e) their health condition disclosed” in Section 57 (Privacy International, “The Right to Privacy in Zimbabwe: Stakeholder Report, Universal Periodic Review,” 4). Before this, the 2007 Interception of Communications Act allowed for public information to be intercepted by authorities, something that has not been rectified since the implementation of the new constitution.

https://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/zimbabwe_upr2016.pdf

===Is there another noteworthy written source from the past that mentions this right?===
The right to privacy has diverged in many ways since its most notable first mention in ''The Right to Privacy'' by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. What started in 1890 as the idea of protection against gossip about oneself and the ability to enjoy life uninterrupted has evolved into various international and national conventions and laws.

The right to privacy was first enshrined at a supranational level before it was established in individual states (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 26). The right’s first appearance in legal documentation was in the United Nation’s (UN) 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR). Article 12 of the UDHR (1948) states “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” The UHDR is not a treaty, so the right was not yet entrenched and more of a suggestion for states to incorporate into their laws and practices.

Two years later, the Council of Europe passed the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) which has similar tones in Article 8, though with an exception for national security in Article 8 (2) but is legally binding (1950). Article 8 of the ECHR specifically protects one’s family life, personal life, correspondence, and home (Roagna, 2021, 9). Worldwide, the right to privacy became codified in 1966 with the passage of the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), in which Article 17 has almost identical language to the UDHR’s Article 12. In subsequent UN treaties, this right to privacy was explicitly granted to children and migrants as well (Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, Art. 16; International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990, Art. 14).

'''Complying with the ICCPR''': In the United States, the right to privacy was not originally codified but established through a variety of Supreme Court cases beginning in the 1960s (Privacy, n.d.). In 1965, the Court ruled on Griswold v. Connecticut. The majority opinion written by Justice Douglas claims that the express personal freedoms named in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments create an implied “zone of privacy” (Privacy, n.d.). Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, referenced in later Supreme Court privacy cases, claims privacy zones derive from the Fourteenth Amendment (Privacy, n.d.). Later, legislation was passed regulating specific sectors, beginning in 1974 with the Family Educations Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), which protects student data, and the Privacy Act which regulates the use of data by federal agencies (History of privacy timeline, 2021).

The European Court of Human Rights has refined the implementation of ECHR Article 8 through case law (Roagna, 2021, 7). In deciding these cases, the Court must decide if the complaint is related to Article 8 and, if so, if the right has been interfered with outside of the exceptions laid out in Article 8 (2) (Roagna, 2021, 11). For this reason, there is no clear-cut definition as to which national laws may conflict with Article 8 (Roagna, 2021, 12). The Court has provided protections for ‘quasi-familial’ relationships, relationships that may develop later (i.e., one has the right to adopt), the development of personality, photographs, and data collection, ruling these areas are part of private and/or family life (Roagna, 2021, 10-19). The Court has also provided lengthy protections to family life with a broad definition of family which evolves with European customs (Roagna, 2021, 27). The protection of a home has also been interpreted broadly, requiring continuous ties to a location, mostly due to the French translation of “home” to “domicile” (Roagna, 2021, 30-31). The Court rules for high protection of means of communication as it can be easily breached (Roagna, 2021, 32). This protection includes information gathered from monitored internet use and remains in places no matter the content of the message (Roagna, 2021, 32).

'''The Digital Era''': Since these international conventions have become effective and enforceable, there has been a lot of technological change and little change in these agreements (Human right to privacy, n.d.). The UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) noted in General Comment 16, adopted regarding ICCPR’s Article 17 in 1988, that the legislation in many states was not enough to ensure the “protection against both unlawful and arbitrary interference,” and that data collection “must be regulated by law” (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 27; UN Human Rights Committee, 1994, para. 2 & 10). In essence, this comment was requesting states enact more protective privacy law legislation, and, specifically, data regulation law, as the right to privacy evolved to be dominated by electronic data (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 27).

There have been two approaches to this call for better data privacy regulation: general regulation and regulation by sector. The European Union has taken the general regulation approach with the passage of the 1995 European Data Protection Directive and the 2016 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR affects people and companies worldwide, requiring that data collected is truly needed, accurate, processed safely, and that all of this is done in a clear, legal, and transparent way (Krishnamurthy, 2020; Wolford, n.d.). The United States has chosen to regulate privacy data by sector, beginning with FERPA in 1974 (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29; History of privacy timeline, 2021). This approach has led to some strict laws preventing unauthorized access to personal information in some areas regulated by specific legislation (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29). In areas without specific legislation, however, Americans take great liberties while collecting data (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29). Put in combination with the lacking legislation preventing interference or data attacks, some question how compliant the United States is with Article 17 of the ICCPR (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29). However, as of 2020, 29% of states are still drafting or have yet to draft such legislation (UN Committee on Trade and Development).

'''Privacy in Former Sovereign States'''

It is worth noting that some states have always had some privacy rights since they gained independence because their previous constitution and laws contained such provisions. This is the case with states that were formerly in the Soviet Union. The 1977 Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which was then implemented in nearly identical form in the various republics as their own constitution, protected “the privacy of citizens, and of their correspondence, telephone conversations, and telegraphic communications” in Article 56 (USSR, 1982, 35). Additionally, Czechoslovakia protected privacy rights of the person, home, and correspondence in Article 30 & 31 in the 1960 constitution (Czechoslovakia, 1964, 233).

Resources

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://rm.coe.int/1680a2353d
Convention on the Rights of the Child. United Nations (UN) General Assembly (UNGA). Nov. 20, 1989. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx
Czechoslovakia. (1964). Constitution of Czechoslovakia July 11, 1960. Orbis: Prague. From https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Czechoslovakia-Const1960.pdf
History of privacy timeline. (2021). The University of Michigan. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://safecomputing.umich.edu/privacy/history-of-privacy-timeline
Human right to privacy in the digital age, The. (n.d.). American Civil Liberties Union. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.aclu.org/other/human-right-privacy-digital-age
International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. UNGA. Dec. 18, 1990. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cmw.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. UNGA. Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
Krishnamurthy, V. (2020, Jan. 6). A tale of two privacy laws: The GDPR and the International Right to Privacy. AJIL Unbound 114, 26-30. doi:10.1017/aju.2019.79
Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
Roagna, I. (2012). Council of Europe human rights handbook: Protecting the right to respect for private and family life under the European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. https://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/Roagna2012_EN.pdf
UN Committee on Trade and Development. (2020). Data Protection and Privacy Legislation Worldwide. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://unctad.org/page/data-protection-and-privacy-legislation-worldwide
UN Human Rights Committee. (1994). General Comment 16. Thirty-third session. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 1 Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://undocs.org/HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
USSR. (1982). Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist States: Adopted at the Seventh (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Ninth Convocation, on October 7, 1977. Novosti Press Publishing House: Moscow. From https://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/constitution/1977/constitution-ussr-1977.pdf
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

===Is the identification of this right associated with a particular era in history, political regime, or political leader?===
===What specific events or ideas contributed to its identification as a fundamental right?===
===When was it generally accepted as a fundamental, legally-protectable right?===
===What historical forces or events, if any, contributed to a widespread belief in its importance? ===
==Legal Codification==
===Is this right protected in the Constitutions of most countries today?===
===Is it contained in the US Constitution?===
The right to privacy is not explicitly contained in the United States Constitution.

References

Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy

===Has it been interpreted as being implicit in the US Constitution?===
In the United States, the right to privacy was not originally codified but established through Supreme Court cases around the 1960s (Privacy, n.d.). Prior to this time, the Court recognized in ''Snyder v. Massachusetts'' (1934) that some concepts of fairness are fundamental, but not expressed. In 1965, the Court heard and decided ''Griswold v. Connecticut''. In the majority opinion, Justice William Douglas argues that the Court had previously ruled on cases in which rights were not explicit in the Bill of Rights, but the rights were justifiable to the Court through the First and Fourteenth Amendments (''Griswold v. Connecticut'', 1965, par. 11). Later in the opinion of the court, he states that in other cases, such as ''Boyd v. United States'' (1886), ''Mapp v. Ohio'' (1961), and ''Poe v. Ullman'' (1961), the court used the ‘penumbras’ of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to make decisions on implicit liberties (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, pars. 14-15). Combined, these penumbras create what the Griswold v. Connecticut majority opinion calls “zones of privacy” (Privacy, n.d.). In a concurring ''Griswold'' opinion, Justice Arthur Goldberg argues that while liberties extend beyond the Bill of Rights, he, Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Justice William Brennan feel that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not include “all of the first eight amendments” (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, par. 21). However, in a different concurring opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan found “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands […] on its own bottom” (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, par. 53; Privacy, n.d.). Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion became the predominant argument used in later privacy cases (Privacy, n.d.).

In 1967, the Supreme Court decided the case of ''Katz v. United States'' (Katz v. US, n.d.). Katz, located in Los Angeles, had been using a public phone booth to inform bettors in Boston and Miami, and in an effort to convict him, federal agents tapped the phone booth (Katz v. US, n.d.). A lower court allowed this evidence to be admitted, but Katz claimed it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment (Katz v. US, n.d.). The Supreme Court sided 7-1 with Katz and establishes that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places” (Katz v. United States, 1967). In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan established the Expectation for Privacy Test (Katz v. US, n.d.; Expectation of Privacy, n.d.). This test is two-fold – the individual must have an expectation for privacy which is rooted in law and society finds that expectation for privacy to be reasonable – and has been used as a basis for privacy since (Expectation of Privacy, n.d.).

After these two cases, the Supreme Court has continued to extend the right to privacy, notably so in three landmark cases: ''Eisenstadt v. Baird'' (1971), ''Roe v. Wade'' (1972), and ''Lawrence v. Texas'' (2003) through the use of the Fourteenth Amendment and Justice Harlan’s concurring ''Griswold'' opinion (Privacy, n.d.). ''Eisenstadt'' extended the use of contraceptives beyond married couples to individuals (Privacy, n.d.). ''Roe'' extended the right to privacy to the women’s right to have an abortion (Privacy, n.d.). ''Lawrence v. Texas''' overturned ''Bowers v. Hardwick'' (1986) and extended privacy to private conduct (Privacy, n.d.).

References

Expectation of Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 13, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/expectation_of_privacy
''Griswold v. Connecticut'', 381 U.S. 479 (1965). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479
Katz v. United States. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved September 13, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/35
''Katz v. United States'', 389 U.S. 347 (1967). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/389/347
Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
''Snyder v. Massachusetts'', 291 U.S. 97 (1934). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/291/97

===Are there any exceptions in American law to this right?===
Most recent US legislation regarding the right to privacy concerns the collection, retention, and transfer of personal data. Under the Department of Justice, the Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties (OPCL) enforces privacy laws, recommends privacy policies (including exceptions), and responds to data breaches (Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties, n.d.).

'''Freedom of Information Act 1966 (as amended 2016)'''

In 1966, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This act granted anyone the ability to request access to federal agency records but not the records of private companies. However, nine exemptions and three exclusions may prevent access to these records (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). The exclusions are narrow and related to law enforcement and ongoing intelligence investigations and are unaffected by FOIA (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). The exemptions authorize government agencies to withhold information from those requesting it (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). The nine exemptions prevent the sharing of information if it is classified for national security, part of internal rules or practices, prohibited through other laws (such as the Privacy Act, see below), a trade secret, legally protected, a medical file, law enforcement records, regarding bank supervision, or locational information (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). FOIA was most recently updated with the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, which increased transparency and altered procedures (OIP Summary of the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, 2016).

'''Privacy Act 1974'''

The Privacy Act of 1974 was an effort to balance the “governments’ need to maintain information” and the “rights of individuals to be protected against unwarranted invasions of their privacy” (Walls, n.d.; Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, n.d.). It prevents agencies from disclosing records to any person or agency unless it falls into one of the twelve approved guidelines (Walls, n.d.; Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, n.d.). The most used reasons which allow for disclosure are subsections 1, 2, and 3 of 5 US Code § 552a(b) (Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition, 2021). Subsection One allows for the disclosure of information between agencies on a need-to-know basis. Subsection Two allows the FOIA to overrule the Privacy Act with regards to when to disclose information. Subsection Three allows for disclosure to another party if their use is similar to the use for which the data was originally collected. This third exception is quite broad, which causes controversy (Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition, 2021). Other exceptions include use for public record (used for the Census or National Archive data), or requests by law enforcement or the court system. In addition to putting forth information disclosure guidelines, this act requires agencies to keep accurate records of how, where, and why they sent information if they had sent information (Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, n.d.).

'''Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 1999'''

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) was passed to regulate the transfer of consumers’ “nonpublic personal information” by financial institutions (FDIC, 2021). At its core, the law says financial institutions cannot pass along personal data to third parties unless the customer is put on notice, given the opportunity to opt out, and they do not opt out (FDIC, 2021). Exceptions to this rule appear in Sections 13-15 (FDIC, 2021, VIII-1.3). Section 13 permits the transfer of some personal data to a third party if they are performing services on behalf of the financial institution, but they must be contractually bound to not do anything else with the data (FDIC, 2021, VIII-1.3). Section 14 allows the bank to disclose information as needed to perform banking functions initiated by the customer, while Section 15 extends that disclosure to normal financial institution acts, such as fraud detection (FDIC, 2021, VIII-1.3). Of these exceptions, only Section 13 requires the customer to be notified that their information is being shared (FDIC, 2021).

'''USA PATRIOT Act 2001 & USA Freedom Act 2015'''

Enacted less than two months after the 9/11 attacks, the PATRIOT Act was passed with the intention of increasing homeland security by allowing surveillance techniques used in local crime to be used to fight terrorism (Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.; USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.). Most importantly, this law allowed for the sharing of information between law enforcement agencies at various levels without notice (Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.). This law wasn’t the most protective of civil rights and liberties and to rectify that President Obama signed the USA Freedom Act in 2015, ending government collection of metadata (Patriot Act, n.d.; Fact sheet, 2015).

Resources

Fact sheet: Implementation of the USA Freedom Act of 2015. (2015, Nov. 27). Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.intelligence.gov/index.php/ic-on-the-record-database/results/787-fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-usa-freedom-act-of-2015
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). (2021, April). FDIC Consumer Compliance Examination Manual: VIII-1.1 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Author. https://www.fdic.gov/resources/supervision-and-examinations/consumer-compliance-examination-manual/index.html
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. (1966).
Freedom of Information Act, The. (n.d.). Department of State. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://foia.state.gov/learn/foia.aspx
Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act. (n.d.) Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm
Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties. (n.d.). Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/opcl
OIP Summary of the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016. (2016, Aug. 17). Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/oip/oip-summary-foia-improvement-act-2016
Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition. (2021, Feb. 16). Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/opcl/overview-privacy-act-1974-2020-edition/disclosures-third-parties
Patriot Act. (n.d.) History.com. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/patriot-act
Privacy Act of 1974. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. (n.d.). Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1279#vf4tzl
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). (1974).
USA PATRIOT Act. (n.d.). Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1281
Walls, T. (n.d.). FOIA v. Privacy Act: A comparison chart. IAPP. https://iapp.org/resources/article/foia-v-privacy-act-a-comparison-chart/

===Is this right enshrined in international and regional human rights treaties?===
==Philosophical Origins==
===What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?===
====Buddhism====
====Platonism====
====Aristotelian thought====
====Ancient Chinese Philosophy====
====Stoicism====
====Early Indian Philosophy====
====Miscellaneous Hellenistic Schools (epicureans, academics, skeptics, etc.)====
====Roman Legal and Political Thought====
====Early Christianity====
====Thomism and medieval Christianity====
====Medieval Islamic Thought====
====Medieval Judaism====
====Early Modern Rationalism====
====Absolute Idealism====
====Reformation Christianity====
====Hobbesian Thought====
The right to privacy is a right that not many think of when they think of their natural rights. Specifically, most forget about this right and what it entitles when it comes to their basic political involvement and contribution to society. Although it is not always explicitly stated, multiple philosophers have had their fair share of commentary on the right to privacy and what this right should look like within their form of government and civil society. Thomas Hobbes, author of The Leviathan, writes about the absolute power the monarch should have over the citizenry, offering commentary on the specific right to privacy within his version of society. Even though, Hobbes outlines some sort of privacy within the state of nature, Hobbes claims that there is no right to privacy on the premise that entering the social contract forfeits certain aspects of privacy in order to contribute to the public conscience and the laws made by the government.

Hobbes makes the argument that within the state of nature there is this sense of privacy that allows the people to make judgements and decisions for themselves in the name of self-preservation. Hobbes specifically noted that, “That every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions.” This is true in the condition of meer Nature, where there are no Civill Lawes; and also under Civill Government, in such cases as are not determined by the Law” (Hobbes 1651, 277). Hobbes makes the point that without a government system there is a form of privacy that allows individuals the ability to pass judgement as they please because they are within a state of war where individuals must fight for their own self-preservation. Hobbes then claims that as soon as one enters the social contract in which the people consent to being governed that the privacy is altered because the government is responsible for the preservation of the people. Hobbes hopes that with the emphasis on religion within the conscience, people outside the government can make just decisions for the better of the commonwealth. To Hobbes, once entering the social contract every citizen is responsible for the common good which is only molded when the government can see into the lives of the people and make their decisions for the betterment of society. The state of nature for Hobbes is one of war in which people must be private in order to protect themselves from others and defend their own interests, but since the government will be involved to help protect such people, there is no need for privacy anymore and therefore the government needs to be involved in the people’s lives. Furthermore, Hobbes added to this argument claiming that, “The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing anything, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto” (Hobbes 1651, 106). Hobbes’ depiction of the state of nature justifies the reasons why one must be private as it relates to the protection of his life and his pursuits that will in turn ensure his right to life and liberty. As his arguments progress, he will make the argument that the state should be involved in the lives of the people because the government is the greatest representation of the people and their desire for self-preservation. He depicts this point to show that within the state of nature, there are some aspects of life that are necessary for the survival of the individual and then why consenting to the social contract means giving up some of these liberties to the government in exchange for the preservation that people naturally seek in life. To Hobbes, the state of nature is a place individuals need privacy in order to protect themselves from the dangers of those around them, hence why once people enter the social contract, they sacrifice their rights to such privacy as there is no longer a need for it since the government is protecting individual interests.

Despite his version of the state of nature calling for some sort of privacy based on self-preservation, once the citizenry has consented to being governed, the sphere of privacy is absent to a certain extent to put the needs of the public first. For example, Hobbes noted that, “For a mans Conscience, and his Judgement is the same thing; and as the Judgement, so also the Conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is subject to no Civill Law, sinneth in all he does against his Conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a Common-wealth; because the Law is the publique Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private Consciences, which are but private opinions, the Common-wealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the Soveraign Power, farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes” (Hobbes 1651, 278). As Hobbes progresses in his argument, he makes the point that the government is to reflect the private sentiments of the people and therefore whatever conscience and thoughts they have, it must already be public since the government is to represent those thoughts and sentiments. However, Hobbes also makes the case that if there are other private sentiments within the public that are not made known, a toxic environment is formed around the privacy of thoughts because the government is unaware of the judgements being made and is therefore not a part of the absolute power over the people. It is for that reason that Hobbes believes that within the social contract there is no aspect of privacy because he believes that the government is the greatest absolute in society and needs to be absolute in order to preserve the people. Hobbes also notes that once entering into the social contract, all people have left is their conscience and judgements because all other private goods are given to the government to control and to protect. Hobbes would also make the point that if the people fail to follow the public conscience which Hobbes calls the law, then there would be a sort of anarchy in which power is no longer consolidated within the government as people rule their lives as they please ignoring the laws in place and possibly violating the rights of the people around them. In addition, Hobbes wrote that, “A private man has alwaies the liberty, (because thought is free,) to beleeve, or not beleeve in his heart, those acts that have been given out for Miracles, according as he shall see, what benefit can accrew by mens belief, to those that pretend, or countenance them, and thereby conjecture, whether they be Miracles, or Lies. But when it comes to confession of that faith, the Private Reason must submit to the Publique; that is to say, to Gods Lieutenant. But who is this Lieutenant of God, and Head of the Church, shall be considered in its proper place thereafter” (Hobbes 1651, 387). Even on matters such as religion, there is no sphere of privacy according to Hobbes because it is the responsibility of the government to care for the people and cater to the liberties of the people. Any time Hobbes discussed the state of religion, the government had some stake in allowing the employment of teachers and ministers according to the standard of the government and what they should and should not allow. The matter of religion to Hobbes was a private matter until entering the social contract in which the government owns the interests of the people including their interests on religion and the matter of salvation. Hobbes further depicts a society in which the government has access to the lives of the people and their interests as a means of protecting such assets and values. Hobbes sees the lack of privacy within the government and the people as a means of preserving the people and their values as they go through society making their own decisions. It is this private conscience that the people have access to, but that Hobbes claims is the least important compared to the public, government conscience.

Hobbes does create some sort of private sphere within the silence of the laws and within the home life that the father rules over the family and the servants that does create a minuscule space for privacy. Specifically, Hobbes notes that, “Private Bodies Regular, and Lawfull, are those that are constituted without Letters, or other written Authority, saving the Lawes common to all other Subjects. And because they be united in one Person Representative, they are held for Regular; such as are all Families, in which the Father, or Master ordereth the whole Family. For he obligeth his Children, and Servants, as farre as the Law permitteth, though not further, because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions, which the Law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during the time they are under domestique government, they are subject to their Fathers, and Masters, as to their immediate Soveraigns. For the Father, and Master being before the Institution of Common-wealth, absolute Soveraigns in their own Families, they lose afterward no more of their Authority, than the Law of the Common-wealth taketh from them. Private Bodies Regular, but Unlawfull, are those that unite themselves into one person Representative, without any publique Authority at all; such as are the Corporations of Beggars, Theeves and Gipsies, the better to order their trade of begging, and stealing; and the Corporations of men, that by Authority from any forraign Person, unite themselves in anothers Dominion, for easier propagation of Doctrines, and for making a party, against the Power of the Common-wealth" (Hobbes 1651, 199). Hobbes then goes on with his argument to explain how the sphere of privacy that may exist within society is within the home and within the family. However, this does not mean that individuals within the home are not subject to the laws that are considered the public conscience. Above all, it is this sphere of the public conscience which the government develops the laws that should not and cannot be ignored by the public even within the private sphere. What should be mentioned as well is Hobbes’ sense of freedom within the silence of the laws which may allow the individual to interpret the laws as they see fit and act based on their own judgement of the laws. Alongside this sentiment however is still the lingering opinion that the absolute government has the utmost and complete control over the people and the people must therefore follow this opinion. Hobbes even notes above that the father might be the head of the household and the reigning authority, but in the end, even the father must follow the wishes of the commonwealth and adhere to the laws put in place by the magistrate and the government. Carrying on the same sentiments, Hobbes wrote that, “...though he be carefull in his politique Person to procure the common interest; yet he is more, or no lesse carefull to procure the private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the publique interest chance to crosse the private, he preferrs the private: for the Passions of men, are commonly more potent than their Reason. From whence it follows, that where the publique and private interest are most closely united, there is the publique most advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy, or Aristocracy, the publique prosperity conferres not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a Civill warre” (Hobbes 1651, 157). Hobbes describes the fact that people enjoy the private sphere more than the public and therefore, one would think that the existence of a private sphere is incredibly important. However, Hobbes further explains that within the privacy of thought there is a sense of selfishness that prevents people from making decisions in the best interest of the commonwealth and therefore, there should be no sphere that would allow people to adhere to their selfish policies. Hobbes further describes what would happen if the government were to take this selfish stance in which they would no longer do their job of preserving the population despite that being their only true duty. Furthermore, Hobbes connects the quality of the government to the quality of the public since according to him, the state of the government reflects the level of preservation that the citizenry endures. He uses this point to further the case of using a monarchy rather than a democracy or oligarchy because of the inability of a large body to make quick decisions on behalf of the public interest.

Thomas Hobbes was an absolutist to the fullest extent. When it came to writing about government, he believed that the more consolidated the power was in the hands of the leviathan, the better off the population was going to be for making the best decisions for the people they ruled over. This meant, however, sacrificing certain rights to the government to preserve the citizenry to the best of their ability. Specifically, the right to privacy to Hobbes should not exist on the basis that the government needs to be involved in the lives of the people in order to figure out the public conscience and to make their decisions accordingly. By consenting to the government, the government has absolute power and control over the people and the decisions they decide to make and therefore, the government has direct access to the wishes and the lives of the people. The right to privacy to Hobbes is an interesting debate since his views on rights in the first place seem irregular due to the absolute power, he believes that the government has over the people and the way that there is no explicit right to rebel against abusive governments. The right to privacy is a topic to which there is no one answer, yet Hobbes tries to remedy with the solution that proposes the abolition of such a right in order to cater to the needs of the public.

Bibliography

Hobbes, Thomas. The Leviathan. New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, INC. London: J.M. Dent and Sons Limited, 1950.

====Lockean Thought/English Empiricism====
The issue of the right to privacy within the United States is a relatively new phenomenon following the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut in which the right to privacy was clearly established by the Supreme Court. However, it might be suggested that its origins and foundations can be traced back to the late 1600s when John Locke introduced the private sphere when it came to the conversation of religious tolerance. John Locke wrote “Letter Concerning Toleration” in 1689 that describes the way in which the right to privacy originates from the idea that the people can and should be separate from the government in certain aspects. Locke introduces the idea of a private sphere or the right to privacy when he discusses issues like religion since its discussion creates more problems preventing society from working efficiently.

Locke recognizes that there are very divisive issues that prevent people from working together effectively within society. Specifically referring to spreading religious beliefs, he wrote that “If by these means the offenders will not be reclaimed, and the erroneous convinced, there remains nothing further to be done but that such stubborn and obstinate persons, who give no ground to hope for their reformation, should be cast out and separated from the society” (Locke 1689, 30). Locke claims that the divisions within the public sphere over religion can be remedied by the complete separation of such matters from the state since religion is its own society. Religion dividing society is evident throughout history as nations and their people fought wars over their competing religious values and beliefs. For Locke the separation between the two and separating the state from religion was a way to avoid conflict within a nation and come to the general agreement that not everyone is going to agree on the matter of religion. However, Locke challenges his own idea of religious tolerance by saying that all religions except Atheists, Unitarians, and Catholics deserve tolerance because these groups prioritize religious law rather than political law. Locke recognizes the fact that a lot of the political issues revolve around religion and to focus on the commonwealth, matters of religion need to be subjected to the individual rather than being a concern of the state. Furthermore, upon the creation of the private sphere “...it will be urged still that civil assemblies are open and free for anyone to enter into, whereas religious conventicles are more private and thereby give opportunity to clandestine machinations” (Locke 1689, 51). Locke develops the idea that all religions must be tolerated within the government in the best interest of the commonwealth, leaving the political conversation open for political conversation as to how the government should be run. If the state sphere should interfere with the individual sphere, Locke claims that greater problems would arise as the government wields a seemingly tyrannical power. Locke proposes this idea of the private sphere in order to avoid problems within the political sphere, but alongside this proposal, he builds the foundation for a right to privacy that is valued so much today. The rest of his arguments include the point that there is a realm of privacy in which the individual makes decisions that they believe will best benefit them.

It was from Locke’s separation between the state and the individual that the right to privacy came to life off the premise that there is a place within society where the government should not be involved in the matters of the people. Locke continues for the advocation of a private sphere by claiming that, “In private domestic affairs, in the management of estates, in the conservation of bodily health, every man may consider what suits his own convenience and follow what course he likes best” (Locke 1689, 34). Throughout his letter of toleration, and through the rest of his theory, he is critical of government intervention in the affairs of the people and emphasizes this private sphere as a place to escape government intervention. This sort of foundation and sentiment expressed by Locke gave the people the perspective that the state is going to act within their own self-interest which might mean being involved in the actions of the people. Locke again remedies this problem with the private sphere as a space where the government cannot get involved in the choices of the individual when it comes to their lives. Specifically, Locke subtly turns the conversation slightly away from religion and into the idea of affairs, property, and health in general as a part of the private sphere that the government should not be a part of. To the rest of society, the government has always been involved in the lives of the people, so to have this idea proposed that people can and should be independent of government intervention changed the way the people saw the government and the power they had over the lives of the people. In addition, Locke then claims that when the magistrate makes laws, “...a private person is to abstain from the action that he judges unlawful, and he is to undergo the punishment which it is not unlawful for him to bear” (Locke 1689, 48). Locke paints a picture that the people can make decisions about the laws within this private realm that adds another dimension to the idea that the people have more power within their private space than they thought. Historically, the governments were involved in all affairs of the people, leaving them little room for voluntary actions that they wanted to pursue for themselves, and Locke’s sentiments provides them the space to become free thinkers outside of the government. Although his writings are in specific reference to religion being in the private sphere, the later sentiments expand to other areas of life that would be affected had religion been placed within the private sphere. This allows the people to believe that other aspects of their life that have been controlled by the government can enter the private sphere where the government will not have any control over the efforts of the people themselves. This created a life where the people had private lives, where the government was not involved in the lives of the people and where the people made decisions for themselves. As people saw the potential for the private sphere, the right to privacy became more prevalent as a boundary between the state and the people developed, despite the boundary between the public and the private being unclear sometimes. Although this line is imprecise, Locke’s notion of the private sphere when it comes to politics introduces the idea of the line in the first place and introduces a new level of understanding about the relationship between the people and the government.

Locke created the idea of the private sphere based on the premise that doing so might help prevent a lot of the conflict that had been around during the time that created the bad relationship between the state and the people. However, by proposing this idea he shines light on the paradox on the relationship between rights in general and the government. It is the duty of the government to act within the interest of the people by providing them access to their rights regardless of what they are, but at the same time the government also wants to act within their self-interest to maintain law and order within society and therefore might see rights as an obstacle to their end goal. Furthermore, Locke writes about this topic in a time period where the legal framework looks incredibly different from what is present today and therefore writes from the perspective that religion causes these huge wars within nations and between major parties. All these factors contribute to the idea that the right to privacy has existed throughout history and throughout theory as criticism of government is an ongoing conversation that has many different perspectives and points of view. Locke’s writings about creating a private sphere for religion only reflect the sentiments known today as the right to privacy that has changed the way that people have viewed the relationship between the people and the government.

Bibliography

Locke, John. 1983. “A Letter Concerning Toleration”, edited by James H. Tully. Hackett Publishing Company Inc.

====Physiocrats====
====Scottish Enlightenment====
====Modern Capitalism====
====Rousseau's Thought====
====Kantianism====
Even though Kant does describe privacy in very vague descriptions, Kant’s idea of the right to privacy is severely limited by the importance of the public sphere and the goals and laws set in place by the government and the public

Kant’s idea of the private sphere stems from his emphasis on the moral relationships within the public that create a sense of wellbeing for society and the people there to allow everyone to pursue their own interests. In his essay titled “Perpetual Peace” Kant wrote that, “For in their external relations, they have already approached what the idea of right prescribes, although the reason for this is certainly not their internal moral attitudes. In the same way, we cannot expect their moral attitudes to produce a good political constitution; on the contrary, it is only through the latter that the people can be expected to attain a good level of moral culture. Thus, that mechanism of nature by which selfish inclinations are naturally opposed to one another in their external relations can be used by reason to facilitate the attainment of its own end, the reign of established right. Internal and external peace are thereby furthered and assured, so far as it lies within the power of the state itself to do so. We may therefore say that nature irresistibly wishes that right should eventually gain the upper hand” (Kant 1795, 113). Kant’s emphasis is on the peace of the community and the ways in which community control their own personal morality to maintain the community and avoid the problems that are likely to arise. Due to this, it might be reasonable to assume that Kant would say that the individuals' morals are private since they must sacrifice their ideals for the public standard set by the community, leaving the private realm the only space in which individuals can subscribe to their own ideas of the good life. Specifically, Kant would say that whatever passions people have should be subjected to the private sphere to maintain a certain level of peace and stability within society. Kant even adds that maintaining a private or “internal” sphere for selfish interests helps benefit both the public and the private sphere so that there is balance in both spheres and the people maintain the peace. For Kant, the relationship between the public and the private is dependent on the morals people hold to maintain a standard within the community and prolong a state of establishment, which requires creating some sort of separation between the two spheres. However, it should be noted that Kant places an emphasis on the public to suggest that its importance prevails above the importance of matters within the private sphere. Furthermore, Kant said that “ we cannot simply conclude by a reverse process that all maxims which can be made public are therefore also just, because the person who has decisive supremacy has no need to conceal his maxims. The condition which must be fulfilled before any kind of international right is possible is that a lawful state must already be in existence. For without this, there can be no public right, and any right which can be conceived of outside it, i.e., in a state of nature, will be merely a private right. Now we have already seen above that a federative association of states whose sole intention is to eliminate war is the only lawfol arrangement which can be reconciled with their freedom” (Kant 1795, 129). The idea of the “internal” is continued in his analysis of the state of nature in which there is only matters of the private sphere. However, when theorists reference the state of nature, they usually provide some remedy because they believe that the state of nature is imperfect and needs to be fixed for the betterment of society. Therefore, it might be reasonable to assume that Kant believes that this state of privacy needed to be fixed by creating a society in which people needed to create more public relations and establish a state that revolves around the public sphere and the interests for the public. This is not to say that he wants to get rid of the idea of privacy altogether, but it further shows his preference for the public sphere rather than the private sphere. When it comes to the government and the private sphere, Kant emphasizes the use of government as public actors acting for the public rather than public actors acting within their own private interests. He believed that the officials of the government are merely public figures that adhere to the morals established by society and because of this again, like most of society, they leave their private reasonings within the public sphere especially when making decisions for the people.

Kant does paint some pictures of privacy within the realm of private property, but his idea of private property does not come without exceptions and limits when it comes to the boundaries between the private, the public, and the government. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant said that “this supreme ownership is only an idea of the civil union, designed to represent through concepts of right the need to unite the private property of all members of the people under a universal public owner; for this makes it possible to define particular ownership by means of the necessary formal principle of distribution (division of the land), rather than by principles of aggregation (which proceeds empirically from the parts to the whole). The principles of right require that the supreme proprietor should not possess any land as private property (otherwise he would become a private person), for all land belongs exclusively to the people it also has a well-authenticated objective reality which can easily be demonstrated from particular instances as they arise” (Kant 1797, 147). The reiteration of a private sphere for Kant is reimagined in the form of private property. For Kant, private property is the space in which individuals can live out their personal, private morals they had to leave behind to maintain public moral standards and public peace. The realm of private property is the space in which the government cannot interfere with the people and for Kant something the government cannot and should not acquire for themselves. If the government were to obtain their own private property, the government would become private individuals no longer invested in the public morals or the public peace they are to represent and enforce. It should be noted that Kant’s version of government is a federation of civil societies, reemphasizing the lack of power the government should have. Therefore, it is logical for Kant to believe that the government should not even own property since their role is minimized within the civil society in which the people and the public control most of the affairs. Kant’s decentralized government reinstates the idea that the higher ups within society should not be allowed to interfere with the lives of the people, leaving matters of civil society to the people based upon public morals rather than private interests. This creates a third power within society, namely the civil society that reigns over the government and the private individual as that is where all matters take place and are negotiated among the individuals of society rather than another power. In addition, Kant noted “A third kind of right is necessary for the preservation of the state-the right of inspection (ius inspectionis). This requires that no association which could influence the public welfare of society (publicum), such as an association of political or religious illuminati, may be kept secret; at the request of the police, it must not refuse to disclose its constitution. But only in cases of emergency may the police search anyone's private residence, and in each case, they must be authorised to do so by a higher authority” (Kant 1797, 149). Although the government is not as important as civil society as discussed before, it does not mean that Kant believes that it should not have any duties to protect the public peace and the public morals. For this reason, Kant grants the government some powers to protect such interests like the right to inspect or enter private realms. Although this seems contradictory of his ideas discussed earlier, it must be noted that Kant believed that individuals must not interfere with one another and have the liberty to act within their own selfish interests. To maintain this standard, Kant tasked the government with creating laws that would create a sense of freedom in which the individual has the right to do as they please until their actions interfere with others' right to freedom. This therefore is the reasoning behind allowing the government to intrude in the private homes of the individual when there is a reasonable assumption that doing so would benefit the community and its aim for peace. Again, this establishes a boundary between the public and the private realms, implying that the people have this implicit limited right to privacy, but the concept of privacy is subject to the strives towards public peace and individual liberty. Kant’s main emphasis is the peace of society and is willing to put the needs of society above the interests of the private individual to achieve his main objectives of peace and liberty.

The lines between the private, the public, and the government are further blurred in his discussion of rights and the public and government punishment for going against the morals set forward by civil society. Again, in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant said that “The real definition would run thus: “Right in a thing is a right to the private use of a thing, of which I am in possession — original or derivative — in common with all others.” For this is the one condition under which it is alone possible that I can exclude every others possessor from the private use of the thing (jus contra quemlibet hujus rei possessorem). For, except by presupposing such a common collective possession, it cannot be conceived how, when I am not in actual possession of a thing, I could be injured or wronged by others who are in possession of it and use it” (Kant 1797, 49). Kant’s main emphasis is the liberty one must do as they please without limiting the liberty those around him have as well. For that reason, Kant defines “right” or liberty above as a private matter because it is his to do whatever he wants with it. It is his and no one else to determine what an individual does or thinks so long as it does not interfere with the liberty of the people around him. This is a broad interpretation of privacy especially since Kant emphasizes the needs and the wishes of the public above the individual which contradicts the very idea of the individual having the right to do as he pleases. Other than private property, every human has the private possession of this right without interference from anyone else around him. However, Kant makes it known that there are limitations to these rights in the form of adhering to the public standards of morality and upholding the peace of civil society. It is in these instances that the idea of privacy is questioned and limited because it directly contradicts the actions and the intentions of the public and the government. Besides this private right Kant describes, he wrote that, “The right of administering punishment is the right of the sovereign as the supreme power to inflict pain upon a subject on account of a crime committed by him. The head of the state cannot therefore be punished; but his supremacy may be withdrawn from him. Any transgression of the public law which makes him who commits it incapable of being a citizen, constitutes a crime, either simply as a private crime (crimen), or also as a public crime (crimen publicum). Private crimes are dealt with by a civil court; public crimes by a criminal court. Embezzlement or speculation of money or goods entrusted in trade, fraud in purchase or sale, if done before the eyes of the party who suffers, are private crimes. On the other hand, coining false money or forging bills of exchange, theft, robbery, etc., are public crimes, because the commonwealth, and not merely some particular individual, is endangered thereby. Such crimes may be divided into those of a base character (indolis abjectae) and those of a violent character (indolis violentiae). Judicial or juridical punishment (poena forensis) is to be distinguished from natural punishment (poena naturalis), in which crime as vice punishes itself, and does not as such come within the cognizance of the legislator” (Kant 1797, 104-105). Within the discussion of the right to privacy in relation to civil society, Kant discusses the ways in which the government are allowed and permitted to interact with the community. He thus concludes that when it comes to the concept of punishment, when the crime is committed in which there are no victims, the civil society will decide a punishment and in the cases in which more than one individual is involved, the state will decide a punishment. This again subjects the individual to another power, namely civil society, in which the individual not only sacrifices his own morals to, but also determines the standards for society and punishments as they see fit. This distinction between the public and the government creates another relationship between what is considered public to society and what is considered public to the government. Kant’s ideas suggest that the individual may be private from the government, but the individual cannot be private from the public in which they report to. Individuals can keep their morals private from the public, but in the end, the interests and the actions of the individual are public and subject to judgement from civil society. Compared to the relationship between the government and the people, the relationship between civil society and the private individual shows that the public is more important since it is invested in the life of the individual and since the individual is expected to subject itself to the morals established by the public.

Kant’s emphasis on the public sphere and the clear difference between the public, the government, and the private sector reinstate the point that although the right to privacy is stated and valued to keep the government out of personal affairs, there are exceptions to this rule crucial for restoring justice within society.

Bibliography

Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysics of Morals. Edited by Mary Gregor. Cambridge University Press. 1996.

Kant, Immanuel. Kant Political Writings. Edited by Hans Reiss. Cambridge University Press. 1970.

====German Idealism====
====Benthamite Utilitarianism====
====Millian Utilitarianism====
When it comes to the rights and liberties bestowed upon an individual, there are some that seem inherent according to society’s standards like the freedom of speech and religion, especially since some of these values are rooted in texts that have helped found the country. However, as time has progressed, there are new issues that expand the public’s definition of rights and liberties and gives them a new vision as to what they may or may not have a right to. One of these rights is the right to privacy, a right in which there are various opinions, all of which are relatively new, yet there is a hindrance of commentary on these issues. John Stuart Mill has written various pieces including but not limited to On Liberty and The Subjection of Women in which he writes about the rights people inherently have and the values that people should have within society. Although it could be assumed that Mill creates a private realm in which individuals pursue their higher faculties away from society, Mill’s view of privacy is extremely limited and whatever private realm there might be is subjected to teaching morals and values.

Based off an initial reading of Mill, it might be assumed that a private sphere might exist in order to develop higher faculties away from the public. For example, Mill notes that, “A person whose desires and impulses are his own—are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture—is said to have a character...Their thinking is done for them by men much like themselves, addressing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of the moment, through the newspapers” (Mill 1859, 67). From here the reader reasonably infers that Mill would advocate for individuals to remove themselves from the public in order to reach their higher faculties since if one is not in the public sphere, the conclusion is that they are in the private sphere. However, as Mill goes on to describe his argument, he uses various examples to explain his philosophy and how the issue of the private and public spheres should be addressed. In the end, he turns to uses his own harm principle to argue that the state and the government should intervene in instances where the decisions one makes affect the prospects and the lives of the people around them. Due to this belief, he argues that the private sphere is severely limited by the government’s interest to protect the people from other’s personal desires. Furthermore, Mill notes that “That, this being supposed, they cannot be acting wrongly in endeavoring to exclude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested, of instigators who cannot possibly be impartial—who have a direct personal interest on one side, and that side the one which the State believes to be wrong, and who confessedly promote it for personal objects only” (Mill 1859, 110). Alongside this argument, Mill describes several examples where government intervention is allowed when the decisions of the individual interfere with the lives and the decisions of other people. With that being said, there can be no existence of a private sphere for the government needs to protect individuals from the impulses they have that in Mill’s philosophy warrant punishment by the government. The problem with the discussion of Mill and the private sphere is that he does not make any explicit claim about the right to privacy because of the necessity of government intervention from his point of view.

Mill further describes this limited aspect of privacy in which the government is allowed to intervene so long as there is reason to intervene for the good of the rest of the population. For example, Mill writes that “The State, while it respects the liberty of each in what specially regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others” (Mill 1859, 116). This statement alone, despite not referring to the topic at hand, states clearly where he would stand on the issue of the right to privacy. One might claim that there could still be a private sphere especially since Mill does not dismiss the idea all together, but what is important to mention is that the state cannot intervene in matters of right and wrong without letting the individual be somewhat public. He names another example in which he claims “If the government would make up its mind to require for every child a good education, it might save itself the trouble of providing one. It might leave to parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased, and content itself with helping to pay the school fees of the poorer class of children, and defraying the entire school expenses of those who have no one else to pay for them” (Mill 1859, 116-117). In these matters, Mill claims that the government can control and regulate the way that children pursue their higher faculties through education since it is their liberty and goal to reach these faculties for the betterment of their character and overall well-being. Mill maintains this point of view that every individual has the right to live their best life, which he believes is attainable so long as people make decisions for themselves only and the state makes decisions to make sure that others cannot infringe on the lives of others. He recognized the ways that people’s individual private actions could injure one another, despite operating within this realm of personal liberty. He saw the way that life needed regulation based on the harm principle which allowed the government to intervene on private matters and push for a stronger public sphere to share ideas. Mill by no means wanted the government to control every aspect of the life of the individual, he wanted to merely hold the individual accountable for the way their decisions affected those around them.

Mill continues within his other works to paint a picture as to what he wants society to look like and describes the ways in which having a private or domestic sphere can create a form of the right to privacy. Within The Subjection of Women Mill notes that, “As regards the relations of private life it may be said generally, that their influence is, on the whole, encouraging to the softer virtues, discouraging to the sterner: though the statement must be taken with all the modifications dependent on individual character”(Mill 1861, 565-566). Mill’s main emphasis is on the morally correct and doing the necessary things in order to achieve this moral good, especially since he believes that the society around him is declining due to the lack of morality and tendency for people to avoid pursuing their higher faculties. Since women are subjected to the household and are not given a role within the public sphere, it could be argued that women then are responsible for what would have been the private sphere since the home is their responsibility to maintain. It could be asserted that there is a private sphere in which the women or those at home are responsible for the moral development of the children and those living within the home. Within his writing about the home, the government plays no role in dictating how the morals are taught, therefore alluding to this right to privacy based on the premise that the home is a private space in which the government cannot intervene. In addition, Mill adds that “There is no country of Europe in which the ablest men have not frequently experienced, and keenly appreciated, the value of the advice and help of clever and experienced women of the world, in the attainment both of private and of public objects; and there are important matters of public administration to which few men are equally competent with such women; among others, the detailed control of expenditure” (Mill 1861, 580). Here, Mill describes the full capacity of women within the public sphere and particularly within the government but understands that the standards that society have during his time leave no space for women publicly. He uses this line to reference the power and influence that women already have over the private sphere despite society’s perception of women. However, it should be noted that acting within their realm of liberty, they had this explicit right to privacy that allowed them to hold themselves accountable, therefore keeping the government out of their private lives. Therefore, Mill could take on the belief that if a private sphere should exist to develop and teach morals to children who then enter the public sphere and hopefully act within their best interests to pursue their higher faculties without intervening in the lives of others.

What might be something to keep in mind about Mill and his idea of the right to privacy is the sense of Victorian morality that he writes about and his overall response to rights of any kind. He writes both works from the Victorian moral point of view which in turn is reflected in the way that he believes that society should be run and would agree about the way that life would be instructed upon these morals. It is this sense of morality that would go against most things that one might believe is not the concern of the public and Mill would want to spread his single version of morality because everyone should be morally upright according to the same standard. Despite this observation, Mill would also claim that holding oneself accountable is necessary to maintain this moral standard because individuals do not and should not depend on one another. Other than the right to privacy, his perspective on rights aligns with those of earlier philosophers so long as they fall within the utilitarian model and therefore benefit most of the people. However, this creates somewhat of a dilemma since any action or inaction could be seen to benefit the majority. The government could infringe on the inherent rights one has and claim that it be for the betterment of society that they control religion, speech, and property despite these being protected by many other philosophers. In that sense, it is hard to define from the Mill point of view what people do and do not have the right to within their system of government. The right to privacy from Mill’s perspective is one that is hard to define and comes with various limitations that allow the government to intrude on the lives of the people.

Bibliography

Mill, John Stuart. “On Liberty.” In John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Essays, edited by John Gray. Oxford World’s Classics, 1991.

Mill, John Stuart. “The Subjection of Women.” In John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Essays, edited by John Gray. Oxford World’s Classics, 1991.

====Current Utilitarianism====
====Transcendentalism====
====Marxism====
====Early Sociology====
====Pragmatism====
====Weberian Thought====
====Process Philosophy====
====Social Darwinism====
====British Idealism (19th cen.)====
====Continental Philosophy/Frankfurt School====
====Behaviorism====
====Feminist Thought====
Various feminist theorists have often been forgotten because of their role as women and the fact that society sees their input as invalid because of the long history of their treatment. However, despite the oppression and the push to exclude them from political conversations, women have entered the conversation claiming that the true problem in life is patriarchy. Their commentary surrounds the involvement of men within the government and how the male-dominated government suppresses women. They can generally agree on most political discussions like the right to privacy, but that is not to say that it does not come without variation as all political theory usually does. The consensus among the feminists is that the private realm maintains the oppression of women and propose the elimination of the private realm to remedy the problem at hand, despite some thoughts on the return to the private realm once the problem has been solved socially first.

Most feminist political commentary and theory is centered around the critique of the relationship between the private and the public spheres that inherently treats women as less than compared to their male counterpart. In her political commentary Sexual Personae, Camille Paglia noted that “He has no personal life. He completely identifies private with public interest. Hence, he is unstoppable. Such men can be political geniuses or monsters” (Paglia 1990, 214). In fact, Bell Hooks would go as far to claim that men are told to dominate the private sphere despite giving women the belief that the home and the private realm will be theirs to dominate and to rule over (Hooks 1984, 120). Paglia and Hooks both demonstrate the point that the feminists paint a picture where the power of the public outweigh the power of the private and since women are taught that the private will be their realm, they are inherently less important compared to their male counterparts. Paglia also details something important in the fact that the men of society can either help or hurt women because of the power they possess in the public and the private, yet most feminists would argue that they choose to abuse women within their spheres because of the way that Hooks says that they are encouraged to dominate women any way that they can. These sentiments reflect the critiques of the relationship between the private and public spheres that dominates the arguments made by feminists on the matter of the right to privacy and hence why some are skeptical about maintain that right. Susan Moller Okin’s work Justice, Gender, and Family noted that, “If there were a clear sphere from which the state refrained from intruding, that sphere would have to be defined, and its definition would be a political issue. But in fact, the state has not just "kept out of family life. In innumerable ways, the state determines and enforces the terms of marriage” (Okin 1989, 129). To Okin, the dichotomy between the private and the public realms is central to her argument for the elimination of the private sphere because of the lack of justice maintained within this sphere. Okin uses this to further the point that there is no separation because of the state’s involvement in issues like women’s bodies and marriage that make the separation unrealistic since within the minds of men, the two are automatically linked without any clear distinctions. The feminists use examples of abortion and marriage to further prove that the lines between the state and the home are blurred and often nonexistent because the state makes decisions without consulting women or even acknowledging the boundary that should be there. Okin even claims that the boundary is artificial and only created based off the different principles that the men have on these matters. However, she highlights the lack of justice for women due to the difference in principles in men that allow them to abuse their women and belittle them from reaching their full potential within society.

Some theorists see the role of the traditional woman with her duties and her obligations to the family as invasive and a problem when it comes to the right to privacy for a woman. Written in 1903, Charlotte Perkins Gilman makes the claim that, “The mother—poor invaded soul—finds even the bathroom door no bar to hammering little hands. From parlour to kitchen, from cellar to garret, she is at the mercy of children, servants, tradesmen, and callers. So chased and trodden is she that the very idea of privacy is lost to her mind; she never had any, she doesn't know what it is, and she cannot understand why her husband should wish to have any "reserves," any place or time, any thought or feeling, with which she may not make free” (Gilman 1903, 36). Gilman makes the assertion that the role women have taken on within the home means that there is no such privacy for the woman whatsoever. It is because she has other obligations as a mother, as a wife, as a caregiver that something is always expected from her and that her needs are irrelevant because she “rules” the home. She claims that there is also no possibility for individual privacy because there is no specific space for just the individual unless they are living alone. However, within the family, the individual is crowded by those around, and as stated before the role of the woman is to serve everyone and everything according to the standards set by the man. She adds that if the individual was truly private, there would be no scrutiny or judgement because the individual is truly private about their thoughts and their feelings, but this concept of privacy is only applicable to the man who rules the home and is always free to express themselves within the home. It is the woman who is continuously repressed in and out of the home and is in constant contact with the other women and servants of the neighborhood with whom they share and continuously violate the idea of privacy. In Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach by Martha Nussbaum, Nussbaum noted that, “It goes without saying that in poor families where five or six people share a single room, there is no such thing as the privacy of the individual in the middle-class American sense – although poor people will frequently seek solitude for the purpose of defecation, walking considerable distances from their dwellings” (Nussbaum 2000, 259). Nussbaum and Gilman both illustrate the life of the woman in which she is subjected to the needs of the family and expected to run the household without being given the respect that should come with the role. She continues the argument by claiming that individuals have the right to privacy within their decisional liberties, but for women and in general the home limits the space where the individual can carry out their liberties simply because the lack of space. Nussbaum decides to remedy this by claiming that the state should be allowed to intervene so long as they do so to protect only the privacy the individual has in the form of decisional liberties the individual holds. Even though she speaks in broader terms about the individual, she emphasizes the fact, as Gilman points out, that the role of the women is far more extensive than that of the man within the home and therefore, her privacy is severely more limited than that of the man within the home. In the process of the state protecting the liberties of the individual, Nussbaum would claim that the needs of the woman need to be acknowledged and enforced in order to maintain her decisional liberties.

Alongside the critique of the public and private spheres mentioned above, theorists propose a reconstruction of the public and private life that would eventually liberate women from the abuse and violence they face. In her book, A Vindication of the Rights of Women with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects by Mary Wollstonecraft, she noted that “To render women truly useful members of society, I argue that they should be led, by having their understandings cultivated on a large scale, to acquire a rational affection for their country, founded on knowledge, because it is obvious that we are little interested about what we do not understand. And to render this general knowledge of due importance, I have endeavoured to shew that private duties are never properly fulfilled unless the understanding enlarges the heart; and that public virtue is only an aggregate of private” (Wollstonecraft 1792, 291). Part of the larger and general feminist argument for privacy is the reconstruction of the private and public realms so that there could possibly be the existence of the private sphere once the problems are addressed. For Wollstonecraft, part of the progression of women is to form the new public sphere around the education of the women in order to maintain the public happiness. Wollstonecraft claims that the means of some private virtue is the same as the public happiness since whatever happens within the private is brought out into the public. For that reason, Wollstonecraft argues that the public and the private are utterly the same since the state already tries to solve the problems that take place within the private space of the home. However, within the home, she notes that the role of the woman is to please the man and because of this she is denied her public and civil duties which again can be rectified by educating women and men about the opinions and the manner which society enforces. The Feminine Mystique by Betty Friedan noted that, “Their determination betrays women’s underestimated human strength and their urgent need to use it. But only the strongest, after nearly twenty years of the feminine mystique, can move on by themselves. For this is not just the private problem of each individual woman. There are implications of the feminine mystique that must be faced on a national scale” (Friedan 1963, 350-351). Friedan wanted to remedy the inequalities that she saw within the private life, by demolishing the line between the public and the private by exposing the inequalities that the women faced within the private life. In order to reform and reconstruct life to benefit women, her solution was to promote education and find something beyond the self to identify with. Her idea that was if women were able to reimagine themselves, they would be able to overcome the problems and show society the way that women should be treated. Freidan’s concept of the private however was aligned with Gilman and Nussbaum in that the duties of the woman prevent actual privacy, so she proposed another separate space away from the family in which the woman can achieve a sense of privacy. In order to reimagine themselves within the public, Friedan proposed private and public education like Wollstonecraft proposed, and suggested challenging the images of women proposed by the media. When it came to the media specifically, she wanted women to reimagine themselves using their own private image to facilitate what their version of what a woman looked like. Feminists in general proposed their own version of reconstructing the public to change the way women were viewed which usually involved exposing their problems to the public, completely ignoring the idea of the private individual.

Despite the constant call for the barrier between the public and the private to be broken, there are some claims to a right to privacy made by the feminists. Catherine MacKinnon noted this in her work Toward a Feminist Theory of the State when she claimed that “The law of privacy treats the private sphere as a sphere of personal freedom. For men, it is. For women, the private is the distinctive sphere of intimate violation and abuse, neither free nor particularly personal. Men's realm of private freedom is women's realm of collective subordination.” (MacKinnon 1989, 168). Most feminist theorists agree to some sort of concept of the private and what that might look like. Most feminists were skeptical of the private because of all the abuse that took place within this sphere, hence why they wanted the government to intervene in the matters of the private. However, as MacKinnon pointed out, the private provided personal freedom that the public could not provide, hence why it was important to revisit the private sphere once the woman was reimagined and re-envisioned for the better. MacKinnon acknowledged the fact that there were legal protections about privacy for women since there were these protections for men but based on examples surrounding abortion and marriage concluded that even though it was legally available for women, it was not enforced. Specifically, the government rulings on issues like Roe v. Wade gave women the private right to choose, but she recognized that the fact that the government had a say on this matter, was an invasion of the privacy of the women to choose. Even the discussion of whether the government would fund abortions became a matter of government involvement on a woman’s decision to choose. After her discussion of this matter, she established that the right to privacy was necessary and continuously violated by the government in order to maintain control over women. Carole Pateman extends this argument within her work The Sexual Contract when she notes that, “Shultz states that there is a strong argument that private contract should not override the criminal law but, she writes, 'the idea of enforceable private agreements concerning violent sexual conduct is less offensive than a state declaration that violent sexual conduct is automatically acceptable in marriage.' Such a response begs the question about limitations to and alternatives to contract” (Pateman 1988, 185). Pateman specifically notes that the relationship between the government and the people on matters of private and public is something that is important for the safety of women and for the natural liberties for the individual. She notes that what calls the sexual contract is something women are subjected to where their abuse accumulates at home and sometimes within the public. She called for government intervention on matters of legally maintaining women’s liberties and for intervention when men within the private life continuously abused women. Pateman noted that the line between the public and the private was indefinite and used the system of marriage as an example of how the government was involved. She claimed that because the government had to keep records of marriage contracts between private individuals, marriage could be considered public, despite the specific agreements within the marriage contract is a private matter talked and agreed upon by the different parties. She still notes in the end that the government had some obligation within the private lives to reform the treatment of women and the inequalities that women face within the home, an attitude shared by most of the feminist theorists.

The consensus among the feminists is that the private sphere is where women are subjects of abuse and inequalities that need to be exposed out in the public in order to help women overcome the view that men have of them. To these theorists' women face the same treatment within the public sphere as the patriarchy and the government make decisions on their behalf and subject them to the private life where they are expected to take care of the family. The primary role of the woman centers around the idea of the family and the way that the woman is supposed to take care of the family depriving her of her own privacy. Jean Bethke Elshtain adds an interesting perspective to this notion and considers that as women are liberated by their actions, the structure of the family will fall apart. She adds that the family dynamic is also changing as there are more single parent households or same-sex households that change the way the family has been thought of (Elshtain 1981, 323). This is an interesting notion as the thought of the private sphere changes for these women and the way that women are taking more charge within the world continuously challenging the private abuse at the hands of the man. The notion of the right to privacy is something constantly changing as situations change but should be broken down to expose the flaws within the system that negatively affect women.

Bibliography

Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought - Second Edition. NED-New edition, 2. Princeton University Press, 1981. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv131bvkg.

Friedan, Betty. The Feminine Mystique. Dell Publishing Company INC. 1973

Gilman, Charlotte Perkins. The Home. New York Charlton Company. 1910

Hooks, Bell. 1984. Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center. South End Press

Mackinnon, Catherine A. 1989. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Harvard University Press

Nussbaum, Martha C. 2000. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge University Press

Okin, Susan Moller. 1989. Justice, Gender, and the Family. Basic Books Inc.

Paglia, Camille. “Shakespeare and Dionysus: As You Like It and Antony and Cleopatra.” In Sexual Personae, 194–229. Yale University Press, 1990. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1bh4bwb.12.

Pateman, Carole. The Sexual Contract. Stanford University Press, 1988.

Wollstonecraft, Mary. 1792. A Vindication of the Rights of Women with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects. Cambridge University Press

====Postmodernism====
Postmodernists believe that society’s expectations and norms of society are merely products of the capitalistic marketplace and the aesthetics that are formed around them rather than looking at the historical foundations of popular culture. These theorists typically are very skeptical of these norms because of the problems they have caused within society and believe that a simple solution can fix all problems, as most modernists propose. Therefore, postmodernists simply describe the standard for privacy that society currently holds and do not propose any true remedies to the problems they might have with the notion of privacy. Specifically, Jean-Francios Lyotard, Frederic Jameson, and Michael J. Shapiro all describe the aesthetics of privacy that society currently accepts and identifies how unrealistic privacy is within the capitalistic marketplace. They remain skeptical about how private individuals can be private in the modern world by creating marketplaces that are designed to invade the private sphere to pursue their capitalistic interests. Postmodernists like Lyotard, Jameson, and Shapiro claim that the idea of privacy does not truly exist due to the monopolization of personal information by corporations and used to maintain power; therefore, the existence of a private realm is unnecessary.

Postmodernists take the position that privacy within society might not exist due to the monopolization of information by corporations to pursue their interests. For example, in the book Inhuman by Jean-Francios Lyotard, the author notes that “Through innovation, the will affirms its hegemony over time. It thus conforms to the metaphysics of capital, which is a technology of time. The innovation 'works'. The question mark of the Is it happening?' stops. With the occurrence, the will is defeated. The avant-gardist task remains that of undoing the presumption of the mind with respect to time. The sublime feeling is the name of this privation” (Lyotard 1988, 107). Lyotard’s observation proves that with the existence of information, whether it be private or public, corporations have been able to monopolize such information and use it to their advantage. Privatizing all information solidifies the power dynamic between those in power and those who feed into their power since such information is used to pursue their interests. Lyotard would also argue that there might not be such an idea of private information in general since general information is already public, and anyone or company can have access to this information to again use it for themselves. Due to this, he challenges the idea of the private realm even existing because of the way that information is easily accessible. However, Lyotard might also point out that the only privacy that exists within society is the privacy of the corporations that take all public entities and claim them and privatize them. He points out that culturally significant objects are also privatized by corporations, who then profit off of the nation’s sp. Lyotard would conclude that privacy only exists for the corporations who use the personal information around them to turn profits for themselves and their interests. Furthering this sentiment, Frederic Jameson wrote

“The definitive answer will come, of course, with the conception of a "logic of naturalism" that informs the other half of his title. For the moment there remains the nagging feeling that all this does come down to the "self" after all, and that the desperate or passional fantasies of productionism, romance, slavery, masochism, the gold standard, and hoarding or spending are all somehow attempts to square the circle and come to terms with the antinomy of the self as private property. This is nowhere affirmed as such, yet the theoretical or interpretive void in the endless chain of homologies somehow draws the reading mind toward what we may call the existential (if not the psychoanalytic) solution: the ontological priority of explanations in terms of the self over all the other levels. This is, in general, the fate of philosophies without "content" (in the Hegelian sense of the word), and in particular of philosophies that seek to exclude content as such: a kind of Lacanian "foreclusion" in which content is reintroduced back from the outside in the form of some compensatory and generally psychoanalytic bottom line (as in Tel Quel and some places in Derrida), the materials of the "self" proving more serviceable in the completion of a formalist system than the materials of history or the social” (Jameson 1997, 198-199).

Like Lyotard, Jameson is skeptical of the private condition of the individual and whether it is a true institution within society or there for the aesthetic that society has created behind it. Unlike Lyotard, Jameson would say that the idea of the private is created for the formation of the “self”, prioritized and valued because of society’s significance. Jameson claims that the concept of the “self” is not as important as people have made it out to be, and so it feeds back into the aesthetic of society rather than having any real significance. Jameson also claims that this sense of privacy stems from the media that pushes it forward to accommodate corporations pursuing their own interests. This sense of self is further broken down by society in which people are categorized and assigned labels that again have no meaning and disregard any sense of privacy and self that society values so deeply. Jameson would also claim that the increase in media technology makes any sense of privacy difficult to achieve and maintain because people can share their information across multiple platforms and therefore share that information with the corporations around them.

Postmodernists, like all theorists, tend to describe what is in society and by, doing so, challenge the view of the world that most people hold without questioning the norms and possible solutions to the problem described. When applying postmodernity to political theory, Michael Shapiro noted that

“One can, in short, render boundaries innocuous by speaking unproblematically about "public" and "private" spheres, the "work place," "recreational space," and so on. What is left of the political process in this model is primarily a policing function that consists in the prevention of intrusions from one institutional setting to another. Clearly, there is a significant operation of power and authority in the production of those domains whose inviolability Walzer seeks to preserve. His version of the liberal discourse depoliticizes modernity's contemporary ground plan and serves as a legitimation rhetoric. It distributes discursive assets to those who control the flow of goods, commitments, and, in general, all valued outcomes” (Shapiro 1992, 94).

Part of addressing the issue of privacy again realizes the state of society, which Shapiro argues is this state of maintaining whatever power an individual may have or be able to own. To add to this notion, Shapiro would say that society already blurs the private and public boundaries to pursue their social actions and agenda. He concludes that there cannot just be two distinct realms that people can adhere to, especially because he claims that there is no end to history in which this is possible. He continues this argument with the claim that even if there were space for this sort of dichotomy, it would not matter because of the ability society should have to extract the political tendencies from each realm rather than regulating them. Shapiro adds to the sentiments of Lyotard and Jameson in that all three recognize the power dynamic that any aspect of privacy adds to society. Shapiro adds that this privacy aspect solidifies the power dynamics that again allow the rich to get richer and others to remain in their place. This causes postmodernists to try and reimagine the private sphere in order to dismantle and restore the power relations between the people and the corporations that have monopolies on privatized information. In addition, Jameson wrote that “We have touched briefly on property relations in the postmodern in a previous chapter; suffice it to say now that in itself, private property remains that dusty and drearily old-fashioned thing whose truth one used to glimpse when traveling in the older nation states and observing, with Mr. Bloom's "grey horror" that sears the flesh, the hoariest antique forms of British commerce or French family firms (Dickens remaining the most precious imperishable afterimage of the juridical exfoliation of these entities, unimaginable crystalline growths like some cancerous Antarctica)” (Jameson 1997, 320-321). Essentially, Jameson proposes that society does away with the notion of private property because it reinstates the aesthetics and the history that have created the present problems. However, Jameson’s answer to privacy is quite complicated because in other works, he explains that the government needs to protect the individual’s privacy from monopolies. It must be noted that postmodernists do not usually favor a solution in general because they believe that society is more complicated than any solution can fix the problems at hand. Therefore, Jameson and the others reflect on the realities of privacy and the state of society without any solid remedy to the problems they propose. However, there seems to be some consensus that the notion of privacy should be abandoned or dismissed until society can remedy the problems already present in society. For Jameson, it seems to be the case that the private life is something he believes is worth preserving, but he understands that the condition of the private life is diminishing and might not be realistic to maintain. For example, Jameson holds that the media is the reason for an individual’s lack of privacy since the media advertises products using private personal information corporations know will appeal to the consumer. Jameson’s assertion that there can be no sphere of privacy comes from the sentiment that society is based on the capitalistic marketplace in which corporations try to make as much money as possible and obtain as much information about the population as possible.

The key to understanding the postmodernist perspective is the realization that this skeptical view prevents any theorist from developing a solution to the problems they describe. They have read and concluded that modernists believe they can solve all the world’s problems with their theories without looking at the implications or analyzing the world on a different level that questions the popular culture norms that dictate all decisions individuals make. For that reason, they propose no definitive solutions because they do not see the point in making decisions when the aesthetics and the norms of society have already been so deeply rooted in society. Therefore, making definitive decisions about things such as privacy is only there to describe the current state in which they exist, if they even exist. In the matter of the private realm, postmodernists would conclude that the existence of a private sphere does not exist based on the premise that the capitalistic society will monopolize private information for its benefit.

Bibliography

Jameson, Frederic. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Duke University Press Durham. 1997.

Lyotard, Jean-Francios. The Inhuman Reflections of Time. Stanford University Press. 1991.

Shapiro, Michael J. Reading the Postmodern Polity: Political Theory as Textual Practice. NED-New edition. University of Minnesota Press, 1992. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttsg7v.

===Are there any philosophical or moral traditions that dispute the classification of this right as a fundamental right?===
===What do the major legal theories (positive law, natural law, critical legal studies, etc.) say about this right?===
'''Positive Law'''

Positive law theory asks if the actions the government actor took would have been unlawful for a nongovernment actor to do in that jurisdiction (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1830, 1831). In other words, what does the written law allow? For instance, the model holds something to be a search if the government uses special legal powers to gain access to information (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1832). This model constrains the ability possessed by police to gain information from private parties while creating a predictable conception of privacy (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1856). Its use in the United States aims to add clarity to privacy expectations that is not had in the ''Katz'' test (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1869). Positive law theory was used in ''California v. Ciraolo'' and ''Florida v. Riley'' (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1867).

'''Natural Law'''

Locke is one of the primary natural law theorists. In his ''Two Treatises on Government: Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government'' (Essay Two) he discusses some of these rights which implicitly concern privacy in the State of Nature. In Chapter II: Of the State of Nature, he recognizes in section 6 that the laws of nature prevent “harm[ing] another in his life, health, liberty or possessions” (Locke, 1832, 107). All of these categories can be linked to laws today which protect privacy: mainly constitutional law in various countries, but also, for instance, the United States Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (1996).

'''Critical Legal Studies'''

Critical Legal Theorists believe law becomes intertwined with social issues causing each judge to have a somewhat different judgement in each case (Dworkin, 1977, 117). These differing torts and constitutional interpretations create varying implications in jurisdictions based on the weight precedents are given (Dworkin, 1977, 118). Dworkin recognizes that with this connection to social facts, the judiciary plays a bigger role in society (Waldron. 1999, 211). For instance, some judges may find a connection between the directly provided for protection of the right to liberty and implied right to privacy, while others may not (Dworkin, 1977, 117). Roberto Unger supports this example, writing in his essay ‘’Critical Legal Studies Movement’’ that some rights give individuals “a zone of unchecked discretionary action that others … may not invade,” reminiscent of Warren & Brandeis’s original claim to the right to privacy (Unger, 1983, 599).

'''Legal Positivism'''

Legal Positivism claims law depends on social facts, but the existence of law is not dependent on its merits or morals (Sevel & Leiter, 2010). H. L. A. Hart, a famed positivist, claimed that “law should be bound by limits and respect citizen’s privacy” (van der Sloot, 1). Moreover, the state could not and should not regulate private conduct unless there was harm (van der Sloot, 1). Robert Burt claims Hart essentially follows Louis Brandeis’s “right to be let alone” (Burt, 2004, 14).

'''Legal Realism'''

Legal Realism is reading laws “in the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question” (Macauley, 2005, 371). As such, legal realism expects the law to be constantly changing based on social conditions (Hall, 2005, 452). Calo claims privacy law exemplifies legal realism because of all of the exceptions, shifts with technology, and meanings dependent on other values and rights (Calo, 2019, 34). Despite privacy law’s beginnings being rooted in legal realism, he recognizes that privacy scholars have not expressly used this legal theory (Calo, 2019, 34, 40, 48).

'''United States Constitutional Theorists'''

One would think defining the appearance of privacy rights in the United States Constitution to be easy, especially given the language of ‘penumbras’ used in ''Griswold v. Connecticut'' rather than citing one specific clause constitutional (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, pars. 14-15). However, Scott Gerber demonstrated in his work ''Privacy and Constitutional Theory'' that all six of the constitutional theories of interpretation he presented can be used to find privacy rights in the Constitution (Gerber, 2000; Baker, 2004).

Originalists: In his writing, Gerber (2000) posits that if an originalist interpreter wants to find privacy rights in the constitution, they can (167). Generally, those who do find privacy rights in the Constitution cite the Ninth Amendment (Gerber, 2000, 171). This is what Justice Arthur Goldberg cited in his ''Griswold'' concurrence and has been cited as such since James Madison wrote the amendment (Gerber, 2000, 171, 172).

Living Constitutionalists (US): Living constitutionalists allow for precedents to be called upon. It can be argued this is what was done in ''Griswold v. CT'' and other substantive due process decisions on privacy, such as ''Boyd v. US'' in 1886 (Gerber, 2000, 178). In the ''Griswold'' majority opinion, Justice William Douglas argued that the Supreme Court had previously ruled on cases in which rights were not explicit in the Bill of Rights, but the rights were justifiable to the Court through the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965, par. 11).

Resources

Baker, T.E. (2004). Constitutional theory in a nutshell. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 13(1), 57-123. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1245&context=wmborj
Baude, W. & Stern, J.Y. (2016, May). The positive law model of the Fourth Amendment. Harvard Law Review 129(7), 1821-1889. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44072348
Burt, R. (2004). Moral offenses and same sex relations: Revisiting the Hart-Devlin Debate. Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series. https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/711/
Calo, R. (2019). Privacy Law’s Indeterminacy. Theoretical Inquiries in Law 20(1), 33-52. https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2019-0001
Dworkin, R. (1977). Taking rights seriously. Harvard University Press.
Gerber, S. (2000). Privacy and constitutional theory. Social Philosophy and Policy 17(2), 165-185. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500002156
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479
Hall, E.L. (Ed.). (2005). The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
Locke, J. (2008). Concerning the true original extent and end of civil government. In R. Hay (Ed.), The Works of John Locke: In 10 volumes (Vol. V). Cosimo Classics.
Macaulay, S. (2005). The new versus od legal realism: “Things ain’t what they used to be.” Wisconsin Law Review 2005(2), 365-403. From https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_8/tg2md/new_versus.pdf
Sevel, M. & Leiter, B. (2010). Legal Positivism. Oxford Bibliographies. https://doi.org/10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0065
van der Sloot, B. (2017). Privacy as secondary rule, or the intrinsic limits of legal orders in the age of Big Data. In M. Dehmer and F. Emmert-Streib (Eds.), Frontiers in Data Science. CRC Press. https://bartvandersloot.com/onewebmedia/Privacy%20as%20secondary%20rule.pdf
Unger, R.M. (1983, Jan.). The Critical Legal Studies Movement. Harvard Law Review 96(3), 561-675. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1341032
Waldron, J. (1999) Law and Disagreement. Oxford University Press.

==Culture and Politics==
===Is this right interpreted and exercised in different ways in different countries? Focus on particular countries in which the right is interpreted distinctively===
The right to privacy has been interpreted in various ways. The EU has strict legislation regarding data privacy and the Council of Europe has outlined in Article 8(1) of the ECHR (1950) the right to privacy in the four spheres of family life, private life, communication, and the home (Wolford, n.d.). On the other hand, the United States has outlined protections from government interference in the private sphere in the Bill of Rights, has comparatively less (& less encompassing) legislation on the issue, and has relied on the courts to protect people from private entities and in the home (U.S. Constitution; 1787, Amendment 4; Privacy, n.d.). These differences result in a more consistent application of privacy rights in Europe compared to the United States.

In the home, Europeans have had a safe, private space since 1950 (ECHR, 1950, Art. 8(1)). In the United States, this right wasn’t concrete until long after the Supreme Court began ruling on the privacy cases in the mid-1960s (Privacy, n.d.). However, it remains that Americans have a higher expectation of privacy in the home than in a public area (Electronic Surveillance, n.d.). In an extreme example of lack of privacy in the home, Albanians working for the Soviet government did not own anything in their homes – the state owned it all (Lubonja, 2001, 239).

Exceptions to privacy at home include police entering with and, in some cases, without a warrant. New Zealand also utilizes court-issued warrants to prevent officials from entering the home, but if officials are actively preventing a crime, enforcing a law, making an arrest, or aiding in an emergency, they do not need a warrant (Community Law, n.d.). Within the European Union, this warrant can come from a court within any part of the EU’s jurisdiction. The European Evidence Warrant (EEW) allows a warrant issued to gather evidence to be valid across the EU and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) applies this principle to the arrest of criminals taking exploiting the open borders within the EU (European evidence warrant, 2006; European arrest warrant, n.d.). EEWs can also be used to get cell phone records (The European evidence warrant, 2006). In the United States, a customer can ask for those records to be turned over to authorities or authorities can use a subpoena (FCC 2019).

The Prüm Convention demonstrates another aspect of inter-European collaboration in crime-solving efforts, leading to interesting implications for data privacy. Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Luxembourg, and Spain all signed this treaty, to which other nations can opt-in, in an effort to increase cross-border security (Prüm Convetion, 2005). At the roots, it allows the parties to ask each other for help solving crimes by sharing data from each nation’s crime database (Walsch, 2008, 86). By not creating an international crime database, each nation is required to ask other nations for the needed data (Walsch, 2008, 86). This method allows the shared data to be governed by each nation’s specific data privacy laws, but it lands in an unregulated grey area after the data transfer (Walsch, 2008, 85). Differences in privacy law become clear when looking at what personal data is collected from people. Some states collect DNA in all criminal cases, others only when the person has been in prison for over two years, and others do not collect DNA at all (Walsch, 2008, 86). In the context of solving international crime, these differences mean some states tend to be more helpful than others.

Resources

Community Law. (n.d.). Entry powers: When the police can come into your home. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://communitylaw.org.nz/community-law-manual/chapter-31-police-powers/entry-powers-when-the-police-can-come-into-your-home/entry-without-a-warrant-to-prevent-or-investigate-crimes/
Electronic Surveillance. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 20, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/electronic_surveillance
European arrest warrant. (n.d.). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/cross-border-cases/judicial-cooperation/types-judicial-cooperation/european-arrest-warrant_en
European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
European evidence warrant. (2006, June 1). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_06_168
European evidence warrant, The: The acquisition and admissibility of foreign evidence. (n.d.). Academy of European Law. Retrieved Sept. 20, 2021, from https://www.era.int/cgi-bin/cms?_SID=d241949ae554074b1e14fd12b7f05d3f5d1e38df00162723613600&_sprache=en&_bereich=artikel&_aktion=detail&idartikel=121538
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). (2019, Dec. 30). Protecting your privacy: Phone and cable records. https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/protecting-your-privacy
Lubonja, F. (2001). Privacy in a totalitarian regime. Social Research 68(1), 237-254. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40971449
Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
Prüm Convention. AT-BE-DE-ES-FR-LU-NL. May 27, 2005. 10900/05. https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/sites/default/files/docs/body/prumtr.pdf
U.S. Constitution. Amendment IV. https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript
Walsch, C. (2008, Nov. 9). Europeanization and democracy: Negotiating the Prum Treaty and the Schengen III Agreement. Politicka Misao, XVL(5), 81-90.
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

===Is this right exercised in different ways depending on the political governance regime in place (democracy, autocracy, hybrid regime)?===
Rhoda Howard and Jack Donnelly (1986) put forth six regime types: liberal, minimal, traditionalist, communist, corporatist (authoritarian), and developmental. When comparing regime type to the ‘valuation of privacy,’ liberal regimes are ranked highly, and minimal regimes are ranked very highly (Howard & Donnelly, 1986, 814). The other regime types, all communitarian regimes rather than individualistic, were ranked low or very low regarding privacy (Howard & Donnelly, 1986, 814). At their cores, communitarian regimes do not have privacy because it can be argued, as Howard and Donnelly (1986, 211) do, that the allowance of freedoms may lead to self-destruction. Thus, privacy is ignored (Howard & Donnelly, 1986, 211). Fatos Lubonja agrees with this sentiment, writing that privacy did not exist in Albania under the totalitarian regime, and cites his experience in Albanian prisons as an example (Lubonja, 2001). He also admitted to self-censorship in the private diaries which originally got him arrested, supposing many others had censored themselves in the same way (Lubonja, 2001, 247).

Resources

Howard, R.E., & Donnelly, J. (1986, Sept.) Human dignity, human rights, and political regimes. The American Political Science Review 80(3), 801-817. https://doi.org/10.2307/1960539
Lubonja, F. (2001). Privacy in a totalitarian regime. Social Research 68(1), 237-254. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40971449

===Is there general and widespread belief that this right is a fundamental right that should generally be protected (and that exceptions should be rare)?===
The right to privacy is expressed in many places: Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996), Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) (2009), and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (1950). Nationally, this right has been cited in the 1988 Brazil Constitution and United States case law (derived from the US Constitution). In India, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in 2017 that the right to privacy for all people falls under Article 21, which provides the “protection of life and personal liberty” (McCarthy, 2017; Mahaprata & Choudhary, 2017). However, many exceptions to privacy are also listed alongside the right to privacy in these supreme documents, despite the belief in its inviolability.

Article 8(2) of the ECHR provides that privacy interference can only occur in instances “of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Article 7 of the CRFEU can be breached by a search or arrest warrant issued by any EU state (European arrest warrant, n.d.; European evidence warrant, 2006). In Article 5 Sections X-XII, the Brazilian Constitution outlines the right to privacy in areas related to private life, the home, and correspondence. These sections also clearly outline exceptions; Section XI recognizes that officials can enter a home “in cases of flagrante delicto, disaster or rescue, or, during the day, with a court order,” and Section XII allows criminal proceedings to methodically breach this privacy. In the United States, privacy zones – derived from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments in ''Griswold v. Connecticut'' (1965) in conjunction with the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment – have extended privacy to Americans in various ways (Privacy, n.d.). Again, a court-issued search or arrest warrant may breach this right to privacy, especially in the home.

'''Data Privacy'''

The US has very little data privacy due to a lack of legislation and regard. Most data regulation is due to compliance with the 2018 implementation of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, which applies to any company collecting any data on European citizens or companies with a large number of customers based in Europe (Wolford, n.d.). On the other hand, the Brazilian Supreme Court extended these Article 5 protections to data privacy in 2020 (Bioni & Monteiro, 2020). Additionally, New Zealand’s Information Privacy Principles (IPP) in Article 22 of the Privacy Act 2020 protect data collection, but also provides some exceptions in IPP 11 and 12.

'''Relationships'''

In 2018, the Indian Supreme Court declared part of Section 377 unconstitutional against Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution (Rai, 2018). This ruling allowed those in LGBT relationships privacy in the home, but again, this privacy was not granted in public spaces (Rai, 2018). Similarly, the right to a private relationship went through the courts in the United States. First, it was granted to interracial couples in 1967 through ''Loving v. Virginia'' (1967) and then to same-sex couples through ''Obergefell v. Hodges'' in 2015. In Brazil, relationships are protected under Article 5(X), which states “personal intimacy, private life, honor and reputation are inviolable, guaranteeing the right to compensation for pecuniary or moral damages resulting from the violation thereof” (Brazil Constitution, 1988).

'''Communication'''

Private communication is protected under Article 5(XII) of the Brazilian Constitution (1988). In the United States, the right to private communication became convoluted with the 2001 USA PATRIOT ACT, which authorized the interception and disclosure of communication under certain circumstances.

Resources

Bioni, B.R. & Monteiro, R.L. (2020, June 9). A landmark ruling in Brazil: Paving the way for considering data protections as an autonomous fundamental right. Future of Privacy Forum. https://fpf.org/blog/a-landmark-ruling-in-brazil-paving-the-way-for-considering-data-protection-as-an-autonomous-fundamental-right/
Brazil Constitution. (1988). https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2017.pdf?lang=en
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Dec. 1, 2009. https://fra.europa.eu/en/eu-charter
Constitution of India. (1950). https://legislative.gov.in/constitution-of-india
European arrest warrant. (n.d.). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/cross-border-cases/judicial-cooperation/types-judicial-cooperation/european-arrest-warrant_en
European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
European evidence warrant. (2006, June 1). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_06_168

===Does public polling reveal insights about the right as experienced in different countries?===
'''Worldwide'''

A 2018 Deloitte survey has revealed that the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is having a positive international impact on the perception of data collection and storage even just six months after its implementation (Deloitte, 2018, 4). The GDPR has had a worldwide effect on privacy laws as it requires all companies which collect data on EU citizens to comply with the law, regardless of the location of their headquarters (Wolford, n.d.). At the most basic level, respondents felt companies have begun to care more about data protection (Deloitte, 2018, 6). Additionally, over 3 out of 4 respondents were aware of their rights under this law and some had already used this knowledge to alter what data companies were collecting about them (Deloitte, 2018, 13, 14, 19). On the other hand, 19% of those polled felt that organizations did not care about privacy (Deloitte, 2018, 6) and only 51% felt the law had put them in control of the personal data that companies have access to (Deloitte, 2018, 18).

'''European Union'''

In a 2019 European Union (including North Macedonia) study conducted a year after the implementation of the GDPR, the European Commission concurred with Deloitte in that the GDPR had made people more aware of their rights (Vandystadt & Voin, 2019). However, only 20% of these respondents knew which authority was responsible for protecting privacy rights (Vandystadt & Voin, 2019; Awareness of the general data protection regulation, 2019).

'''United States'''

In 2002, a Harris Poll found that 63% of respondents found the privacy legislation in place to be inadequate (EPIC, 2021). In 2019, 75% of those surveyed felt the government should regulate companies and their use of personal data (Auxier, 2020). In 2020, 79% of the population wanted national privacy legislation enacted (Auxier, 2020). It is clear that over time, Americans have become more concerned about the use of their personal data, especially in the private sector (Auxier et al., 2019; Auxier, 2020). Despite this fact, the United States has still not enacted sweeping privacy legislation at a national level. At the state level, California was the first state to enact privacy legislation in 2018, and at least nineteen other states have followed suit with the hope that it will signal the federal government to propose some sort of national privacy legislation for ease of compliance (Sabin, 2021). However, Americans seem to be fine with either approach, with polls showing around 70% find their state government to be responsible for this issue and the same percent find the federal government to be responsible (Sabin, 2021).

'''New Zealand'''

In 2012, the New Zealand Privacy Commissioner published a privacy study completed by UMR Research. This study found that 90% of people wanted the government to protect their data and be told by companies how their data was being used (Privacy Commissioner, 2012, 9). Interestingly, only 66% were concerned about the presence of their personal data online (Privacy Commissioner, 2012, 12). However, 88% of respondents wanted businesses to be punished if they were using data incorrectly, and 97% wanted the Privacy Commissioner to be able to reprimand companies if they were breaching the then enforceable 1993 Privacy Act (Privacy Commissioner, 2012, 23, 10). Since this study was published, the 1993 Privacy Act has been updated. Now, if an investigation reveals a breach of duty or misconduct, Article 96 of the Privacy Act 2020 requires the Commissioner to refer the matter to authorities, reflecting some of the public’s wants revealed in the 2012 poll.

'''British Columbia'''

In 2020, Canadian non-profit, Freedom of Information and Privacy Association or FIPA, worked with Ipsos and polled British Columbians surrounding their attitudes regarding privacy law. About half of them were unsure if the current laws were protective enough or admitted they thought current privacy laws were lacking (FIPA, 2020). When asked about the transparency of Canadian companies, 50% felt companies were not open about their data practices and 75% felt that Canadian companies may send their data to non-Canadian companies (FIPA, 2020). However, one-third of respondents from the same study knew British Columbian privacy law and its protections and three-quarters would like a public education initiative to teach these protections (FIPA, 2020).

Resources

Auxier, B. (2020, May 4). How Americans see digital privacy issues amid the COVID-19 outbreak. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/04/how-americans-see-digital-privacy-issues-amid-the-covid-19-outbreak/
Auxier, B., Rainie, L., Anderson, M., Perrin, A., Kumar, M., & Turner, E. (2019, Nov. 15). Americans and privacy: Concerned, confused, and feeling lack of control over their personal information. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/
Awareness of the general data protection regulation – one year on. (2019). European Commission. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2222
Deloitte. (2018). A new era for privacy: GDPR six months on. https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/risk/deloitte-uk-risk-gdpr-six-months-on.pdf
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). (2021). Public opinion on privacy. https://epic.org/privacy/survey/
FIPA. (2020, June 4). British Columbians want action on privacy protection: Polling results. https://fipa.bc.ca/2020-privacy-poll/
Privacy Act 2020, 2020 No. 31, (2021). https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2020/0031/latest/LMS23223.html
Privacy Commissioner. (2012, Apr.). UMR omnibus results. https://www.privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Surveys/Privacy-Commission-UMR-Omni-Results-Apr-2012.pdf
Sabin, S. (2021, Apr. 27). States are moving on privacy bills. Morning Consult. https://morningconsult.com/2021/04/27/state-privacy-congress-priority-poll/
Vandystadt, N., & Voin, M. (2019, July 24). GDPR shows results, but work needs to continue. European Commission. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/api/deliverable/download/file?deliverableId=69715
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

==Conflicts with other Rights==
===Are there other specific fundamental rights that tend to conflict with this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?===
As Warren & Brandeis suggest in ''The Right to Privacy'' (1890), the right to privacy directly conflicts with freedom of the press and speech. They wanted to protect people from writings beyond what defamation and publishing law covered. However, by proposing privacy protections that extended beyond these laws, they were inherently limiting what could be published. While this limitation was intentional, it was sure to be contentious as the First Amendment had been in place and protected for nearly 100 years and privacy rights were not prominent in any part of the world before this time. The First Amendment reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (US Constitution, 1787, Amd. 1).

The United States Supreme Court Cases offer plenty of examples of press and privacy rights conflicting, as “the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of the right to privacy” (''Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc.'', 1971). In some cases, privacy prevails, in others, the First Amendment. One of the cases was ''New York Times Company v. United States'' (1971) in which the ''New York Times'' published the Pentagon Papers but the Nixon administration argued that those should be kept private for national security concerns. In a 6-3 decision, the Court claimed that these were not to be considered private or secure and that the freedom of the press prevailed (NYT v. US, n.d.). Also in 1971, the Court ordered Branzburg to reveal his sources to a grand jury, despite the sources explicitly asking to not be revealed in ''Bransburg v. Hayes''. Had secrecy been maintained, the press would have more rights than individuals during the grand jury (Branzburg v. Hayes, n.d.). Additionally, other cases such as ''Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn'' (1975) and ''Florida Star v. BJF'' (1989) held that freedom of the press overtakes privacy rights when the information is lawfully and publicly available. ''Cohen v. Cowles Media Company'' (1991) granted privacy to press informants if they had been promised confidentiality with promissory estoppel because the principle applies generally not just to the press (Cohen v. Cowles Media Company, n.d.). The contrast of ''Branzburg'' and ''Cohen'' shows how interpretive and circumstantial privacy rights are, while ''NYT v. NASA'' (1991) reveals that privacy rights are dependent on the media used to publish the information. In this instance, the US District Court for the District of Columbia allowed for transcripts of the Challenger astronauts’ last words to be published by the ''Times'', but not the voice recordings (Mills, 2008, 36).

Privacy rights also conflict with the right to information. The government recognized this right with the Freedom of Information Act in 1966 (FOIA). This act granted anyone the ability to request access to federal agency records but not the records of private companies. The goal of having public records is to keep the government accountable, but this risks people’s privacy based on the nature of the information agencies collect (Mills, 2008, 50). However, nine exemptions and three exclusions in FOIA limit access to these records. The exclusions are narrow and related to law enforcement and ongoing intelligence investigations and are unaffected by FOIA. The exemptions authorize government agencies to withhold information from those requesting it (Freedom of Information Act, n.d). Luckily, the exceptions and exemptions and the Privacy Act of 1974 considered the right of privacy and aimed to prevent the collision of these rights (Mills, 2008, 51).

Privacy is also put aside when considering public security and health (Mills, 2008, 227). In the United States, this lack of priority became clear with the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and PATRIOT Act of 2001, which both expanded the ability of the FBI to have access to information on individuals that may or may not be a threat to the nation’s security. Many courts have upheld acts that place public security over personal privacy rights. To use an example less severe than terrorism, such is the case with the release of sex offenders (Mills, 2008, 224). While it hurts one’s reputation to have their name released in connection with this crime, it protects the greater community and their neighbors by alerting them.

Resources

Branzburg v. Hayes. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 12, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-85
Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc, 4 Cal. 3d 529 (CA Sup. Ct. 1971). https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/4/529.html
Cohen v. Cowles Media Company. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 12, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-634
Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-938
Florida Star v. B. J. F. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-329
Freedom of Information Act, The. (n.d.). Department of State. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://foia.state.gov/learn/foia.aspx
Mills, J.L. (2008). Privacy: The lost right. Oxford University Press.
New York Times Company v. United States. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 12, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1970/1873
U.S. Constitution. (1787). https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Are there other specific rights that are critical to the exercise of this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?===
“Privacy claims began gradually to be made independently of the trespass rules essential to property rights” (Heffernan, 2016, 102). The connection between these rights was recognized early on by Hixon (“the right to privacy…carried at least an implied right of property”) from Warren & Brandeis’s 1890 writing and by New York Court of Appeals judge John C. Grey (Hixon, 1987, 39). These rights are protected and exercised jointly in many constitutions and states, likely as privacy rights’ origins are rooted in property rights (Heffernan, 2016, 113). For instance, in Grenada Article 1(c) of the 1973 constitution protects both privacy and property (Constitute Project, Grenada 1973, reinst. 1991, rev. 1992). Without the right to privacy, property rights would be lessened as it would only grant the right to ownership and, barring other protections, leave the property vulnerable to searches that may expose private information. When exercised in conjunction with property rights, privacy protections expand. This is explicit in the constitution of Saint Kitts and Nevis, which, in granting privacy rights, also prevents the deprivation of property without compensation (Constitute Project, Saint Kitts and Nevis 1983).

The right to privacy also convenes with the right to be forgotten in some states. This right is “the right of a past individual to be forgotten by people in the present” (Gadja, 2018, 205). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in 2014 that the right to privacy granted in Europe extended to past economic troubles and that this lack of privacy that caused the lawsuit was harming his ability to move past these troubles (Gadja, 2018, abstract). This ruling allowed the past troubles to be forgotten. Since this ruling in 2014, the United States courts have also alluded to the right to be forgotten as a sect of privacy rights, despite many believing at the time “this right [would not] cross the Atlantic” because of the First Amendment and others believing this right was present before the conventional right to privacy (Gadja, 2018, 206). While the US Supreme Court has not ruled on this right, lower courts have, as the California Supreme Court did in ''Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association'' in 1971. ''Briscoe'' opined that while the reports of previous crimes were newsworthy, the “identification of the actor in reports of long past crimes usually serve[d] little independent public purpose” other than curiosity given the rehabilitation that had taken place (''Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association'', 1971). The plaintiff was allowed to have his past forgotten and the press was not allowed to take this right away, in this instance (Gadja, 2018, 212). However, this right is not internationally recognized, as other states such as Brazil have not supported this right (Library of Congress, 2021).

The right to be forgotten and property combine to create the right to one’s name and likeness which is especially important for those in the public eye (Mills, 2008, 220). It is accepted that people have a right to profit off of their own image, much like they have the right to profit off of their inventions or intellectual property (Mills, 2-008, 217-218). This right became clear in court cases soon after the 1890 publication of the Warren & Brandeis article, beginning with ''Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.'' in 1902 (Hixon, 1987, 39). Beyond this, of course, are other sects of privacy law that remain pivotal in the protection of privacy rights as it is known today.

Resources

Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc, 4 Cal. 3d 529 (CA Sup. Ct. 1971). https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/4/529.html
Constitute Project. (2021). Grenda 1973, reinstated 1991, revised 1992. https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Grenada_1992?lang=en
Constitute Project. (2021). Saint Kitts and Nevis 1983. https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Kitts_and_Nevis_1983?lang=en
Gadja, A. (2018). Privacy, press, and the right to be forgotten in the United States. Washington Law Review 93(1), 201-264. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3144077
Heffernan, W.C. (2016). Privacy and the American Constitution: New rights through interpretation of an old text. Palgrave Macmillan.
Hixon, R.F. (1987). Privacy in a public society: Human rights in conflict. Oxford University Press.
Library of Congress. (2021, Mar. 15). Brazil: Federal supreme court decides right to be forgotten is not supported by constitution. https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2021-03-15/brazil-federal-supreme-court-decides-right-to-be-forgotten-is-not-supported-by-constitution/
U.S. Constitution. (1787). https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript

===Is there a perception that this right is above or higher than other fundamental rights, or in general, that it has a particular place in a hierarchy of rights?===
Joseph Wronka posits that the UDHR has tiers of rights, arranged by article. Article 1, human dignity, is the first and foremost right. Articles 2-21, which includes the right to privacy in Article 12, are civil and political rights, protecting people from their government. The right to speech, press, religion, and vote are also protected in these articles (Wronka, 1994; UDHR 1948). Below these rights were the positive rights in which a government should provide “to ensure an existence worthy of human dignity” and solidarity rights (Wronka, 1994). So, there is some recognition of a hierarchy between fundamental rights, but nothing has been written on the hierarchy among rights of the same tier.

In practice, however, privacy seems to be overshadowed by other rights. On one hand, privacy rights can overtake rights such as the freedoms of speech and press. On the other hand, these rights have stifled privacy rights in many instances. Hixon suggests that privacy rights prevail in cases of information gathering but press and speech rights prevail during and after publishing (Hixon, 1987, 178). Mills suggests this difference in protection is due to the publication medium and the perceived benefit to the public (Mills, 2008, 36, 117).

In the United States, some scholars have noted that “free-speech and free-press rights almost always trump information privacy rights,” suggesting there is a hierarchy within fundamental rights in at least one nation (Mills, 2008, 108). Hixon referred to privacy as “at best a correlative right,” and “sociological notion,” while Milles calls it a “precondition” (Hixon, 1987, 44, 45; Mills, 2008, 116). Press freedoms only require a “newsworthy” and “public interest” standard to be upheld, while privacy rights have had to be fought for continuously in courts. In this fight, the inadequacy of American privacy law has shown through, stemming from the lack of explicit protection in the Constitution (Hixon, 1987, 76). Public figures continuously have information published about them, protected under free speech, leaving them vulnerable to the news cycles (Hixon, 1987, 133).

Resources

Hixon, R.F. (1987). Privacy in a public society: Human rights in conflict. Oxford University Press.
Mills, J.L. (2008). Privacy: The lost right. Oxford University Press.
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
Wronka, J. (1994). Human rights and social policy in the United States: An educational agenda for the 21st Century. Journal of Moral Education 23(3). https://doi.org/10.1080/0305724940230304

===What specific examples of hierarchies, manifestos, constitutions, or prioritized descriptions of rights cite this right’s high status? Low status? No status at all?===
The right to privacy is listed in many international treaties – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990), and Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). The consistency with which it is held as a fundamental right certainly suggests it’s high status. The consistency with which it is present in many national constitutions confirms this suggestion (see “What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right” above).

Resources

Convention on the Rights of the Child. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Nov. 20, 1989. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx
European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. UNGA. Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. UNGA. Dec. 18, 1990. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cmw.pdf
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

===How does federalism change, if at all, the exercise or application of this right? What examples of this can one point to?===
With federalism, there is often one state that leads the rest – in terms of privacy legislation, California leads the United States, and the German state Hessen led Germany and the European Union (Mills, 2008, 167; Petkova, 2016, 5, 4). Though the EU is not properly a federalist entity, federalism encouraged and promoted privacy as a fundamental right. Privacy rights began in Hessen, became federal law after German parliamentary action, and eventually became supranational as the EU passed encompassing privacy legislation in 1995 (Petkova, 2016, 4). Later iterations of the 1995 law led to the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation which has provisions that help regulate information privacy outside of EU borders, including in the United States.

In the United States, federalism clarifies and further protects the right to privacy. This is important because the federal right is still based on Supreme Court opinions rather than explicit constitutional provisions or legislation. This lack of explicit language allows states to “provide leadership in the privacy area because of the constitutional options available” and drive for change (Mills, 2008, 162; Petkova, 2017, 24). As of 2008, ten states in the US (Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington) explicitly protect privacy in their constitutions (Mills, 2008, Appendix II). At least twenty states have passed privacy legislation (with some overlap between the ten with constitutional provisions, namely California). State privacy legislation focuses on data privacy, improving security measures for storing personal information, notifying individuals of security breaches, and enabling security alerts and/or freezes on credit reports (Mills, 2008, 167). Most states hoped their passage would signal the federal government to pass privacy legislation (Sabin, 2021). Schwartz acknowledges that this legislation would be possible under the Commerce Clause, though the effects would depend on the text (2009, 922). Some scholars are wary of federal legislation as states have created a successful legal landscape based on experimentation and consequence, and federal legislation could disrupt the balance, create uncertainty, and be hard to amend (Bellia, 2009; Schwartz, 2009, 922-931).

Federalism results in the lack of consistent privacy laws and rights. For instance, in Germany, every company needs to have a data protection officer. In the EU, the GDPR only requires public companies and certain private companies to have this position, while allowing all other private companies to opt-in to having this role (Petkova, 2017, 20). These different laws can alter privacy protection outcomes based on the jurisdiction in which the incident took place, especially if the rights are challenged in courts. This was the case in Florida’s ''Rolling v. State''. Six college students were brutally murdered in Gainesville, Florida and their families hoped to prevent the press from releasing the photos of their bodies. Mills, who was asked to consult on the case, knew this would be a complex legal question as the Florida laws technically allowed for these records to be open to ensure police accountability, but he also knew the families would suffer severe harm were these photos to appear publicly. The Florida Supreme Court decided that the laws in place allowed for a compromise: the photos could be made available to the public by the records custodian upon a reasonable request provided there were restrictions on the copying and removal of the photos. Mills acknowledges that had the situation been occurred in another jurisdiction, the result would not have been the same and the photos likely would have been published (Mills, 2008, 247-251).

Resources

Bellia, P.L. (2009). Federalization of Information Privacy Law. Yale Law Journal 118(5), 868-900. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40389431
Mills, J.L. (2008). Privacy: The lost right. Oxford University Press.
Petkova, B. (2016). The Safeguards of Privacy Federalism. Lewis & Clark Law Review 20(2). https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Petkova%20The%20Safeguards%20of%20Privacy%20Federalsim_0.pdf
Petkova, B. (2017). Domesticating the “foreign” in making transatlantic data privacy law. International Journal of Constitutional Law 15(4), 1135-1156). https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Petkova%20Domesticating%20the%20Foreign%20in%20Making.pdf
Sabin, S. (2021, Apr. 27). States are moving on privacy bills. Morning Consult. https://morningconsult.com/2021/04/27/state-privacy-congress-priority-poll/
Schwartz, P.M. (2009). Preemption and privacy. Yale Law Journal 118(5). https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5155&context=ylj

==Limitations / Restrictions==
===What are the typical exceptions or limitations placed on this right?===
Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) presents exceptions to the right to privacy. Privacy is granted “except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (1950). The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996) allow for reasonable, non-arbitrary searches. These exceptions allow privacy to be breached with a court-issued warrant. Most exceptions stem from these documents and it should be noted that the United Nations extended the right to privacy to online spheres (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2013, I§5). Additionally, the European Union implemented the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which prevents the sharing of personal data with outside sources (Wolford, n.d.). The GDPR applies to any companies operating in or with the EU causing it to have international implications (Wolford, n.d.).

Resources

European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2014, June 30). The right to privacy in the digital age. A/HRC/27/37. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf
United States Constitution. 1787. https://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

===Under American jurisprudence, what permissible exceptions exist?===
The Fourth Amendment states “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (1791). While this amendment protects the right to privacy from the government, it also brings forth exceptions: reasonable search and seizure as well as infringements allowed by court-issued warrants seeking specific items or people. Other amendments used to extend privacy by the Supreme Court, namely the First, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth, do not have notable exceptions regarding privacy.

'''Limitations of Reasonability'''

Defining what constitutes a reasonable search has proven to be difficult. In ''Katz v. United States'' (1967) the Supreme Court ruled the Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places” and created the Katz test to determine where it is reasonable to expect privacy from law enforcement and a warrant is needed (''Katz v. United States'', 1967). This test examines whether the information was meant to be kept private and if it had been disclosed (Hu, 2018, 129). Prior to the ''Katz'' test, the court used the trespass test, a common-law approach to the Fourth Amendment in which physical intrusion can violate the Fourth Amendment. Fifty years after ''Katz'', the Court again relied on the trespass test in ''United States v. Jones'' (Hu, 2018, 130; ''United States v. Jones'', 2012). In doing so, the court claimed while the ''Katz'' test extended the right to privacy to people, it did not revoke the traditional common-law protections (''United States v. Jones'', 2012). Hu, citing Justices Sotomayor and Alito, feels that the Katz test ends before cyber-surveillance begins and recognizes the need for change (Hu, 2018, 139, 141).

In analyzing Fourth Amendment Supreme Court rulings, Orin Kerr found that four general models have been used to decide privacy cases (2017, 524). These models vary in scale (micro or macro) and normativity (normative or descriptive) and consider one of the following: how public the information is, what information was found, the actions that were taken, or whether or not government conduct should be regulated (Kerr, 2017, 506, 524). Kerr claims the last of these considerations was the basis for the ''Katz'' ruling (2017, 519). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has used all four of these models to both protect and deny privacy and has not provided clear guidance as to what is a reasonable search (Ker, 2017, 507, 508). Kerr concludes by suggesting there is no one size fits all test or model because of the importance of case facts (2017, 525). As such, Kerr would rather see many definitive models so that the limitations of reasonability are clear and contextualized for future court decisions at all levels (2017, 542).

'''Privacy Violations by a Non-Government Entity'''

The Supreme Court has rarely ruled on notable cases in which the privacy offender was not a government entity. However, in ''Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union'' (1937) the Court ruled that Senn could not invoke his privacy in work against the right to publicity of the union’s picketing (Richards, 1334). In the opinion of the Court, Justice Brandeis held that because it was a commercial dispute and affected the competition for customers, the right to privacy was not applicable (Richards, 1334). He also protected counter-speech in this opinion (Richards, 1334).

Resources

Hu, M. (2018). Cybersurveillance intrusions and an evolving Katz privacy test. American Criminal Law Review 55(1), 127-152. https://www.law.georgetown.edu/american-criminal-law-review/in-print/volume-55-issue-1-winter-2018/cybersurveillance-intrusions-and-an-evolving-katz-privacy-test/
''Katz v. United States'', 389 U.S. 347 (1967). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/389/347
Kerr, O. (2007). Four models of Fourth Amendment protection. Stanford Law Review 60(2), 503-552. http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2010/04/Kerr.pdf
Richards N.M. (2010, Oct.). The puzzle of Brandeis, privacy, and speech. Vanderbilt Law Review 63(5) 1293-1352. https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol63/iss5/3/
United States Constitution. 1787. https://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm
''United States v. Jones'', 565 U.S. 400 (2012). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/10-1259

===Under international human rights laws, what permissible exceptions (often called derogations) exist?===
Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) presents exceptions to the right to privacy – “except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (1950). The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948, Art. 12) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996, Art. 17) only prevent arbitrary and unlawful searches, allowing for reasonable searches.

Resources

European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

===Have political theorists or philosophers discussed the permissibility of exceptions to this right?===
'''Hobbes'''

Thomas Hobbes grappled with varying different situations of privacy. In ''Leviathan'', it was mostly concerning places in which privacy and the public overlap. Generally, the public and commonwealth rights overtake those of an individual, especially in times of war, but there are some exceptions (Hobbes, 1651/1965, 130). For instance, one had the right to protect themselves with their private strength without being a threat to the commonwealth (Hobbes, 1651/1965, 138). Additionally, men could own private property and goods without interference from the Church of England and hold their own beliefs, as long as they didn’t go against the Church (Hobbes, 1651/1965, 250, 345).

In ''De Cive'' (On the Citizen), Hobbes presents an interesting dilemma – once the people form a state, the people no longer exist and instead become subjects (Hobbes, 1642/1651, 39-40). He suggests this leaves the ruler of the state with no responsibility to the subjects, able to harm them as there is no direct contract between the ruler and subjects (Hobbes, 1642/1651, 40). Without obligation, there is certainly little to prevent the ruler from imposing on subjects and revoking their privacy.

'''Locke'''

In 1689, John Locke discussed privacy in his ''Letters on Toleration''. In this essay, Locke discusses privacy in relation to the Church of England. Generally, there is no privacy from the Magistrate in matters relating to the Church, however, in some instances, privacy is afforded to private matters (Locke, 1689/2010, 43, 46). For instance, Locke claims that one may take care of one’s health without much interference at all and prevents people from telling others what to believe in unless they are a clergyman (Locke, 1689/2010, 46. 129). Additionally, if one perceives an order by a magistrate to be unlawful, they can abstain from that law, and the magistrate cannot use their private judgment to impose laws but must refer back to God’s laws (Locke, 1689/2010, 58-59).

'''Kant'''

Immanuel Kant talks a lot about Enlightenment and the formation of states. Inherently, in the creation of these states, some rights are taken away to “[harmonize] with the freedom on everyone else” (Kant, 1970, 47, 55, 73). However, these rights that are given up usually have specific limitations (Kant, 1970, 45). The government in these societies could prevent some actions but, much like Warren & Brandeis later, felt that free-thinking and reasoning were of utmost importance in developing new ideas, and suggested they be protected (Kant, 1970, 59). However, Kant also suggests limiting the right to reason because it can still “expand to its fullest” while it is limited (Kant, 1970, 59).

In Warren & Brandeis’s terms of “the right to be let alone,” Kant, in his ''Theory and Practice'', instead proposes the right to coercion, meaning all who are a part of the state are held to the same standard (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 193; Kant, 1970, 75). This coercion is imposed uniformly on all subjects, but not the ruler (Kant, 1970, 75). As long as one was conforming to the laws, there was no reason to interrupt their actions, but once conformity was broken, there was a chance to impose and alter someone’s actions (Kant, 1970, 80). Kant recognizes that Hobbes feels differently, writing directly against Hobbes’ views as put forth in De Cive, in that the ruler has no obligations to the people and may treat them how he wishes – implying no right to be let alone (Kant, 1970, 84; Hobbes, 1651, 40).

'''Sieyes'''

In his essay titled ''Views of the Executive Means Available to the Representatives of France in 1789'', Emmanuel Sieyes claims rights are inherent to a person. However, in ''What is the Third Estate'', Sieyes claims that states may use the rights it was granted by the constitution and positive law to preserve the nation and community (Sieyes, 1788/2003, 136). In terms of privacy, these statements seem to imply that privacy may sometimes be taken away from some in the interests of the public. It is important to note, though, that these impositions may not go beyond the scope of the constitution in place (Sieyes, 1788/2003, 137).

'''Mill'''

John Stuart Mill, an English thinker, recognizes that English laws tended to interfere with privacy (Mill, 1859/2011, 15). However, Mill felt that separating church and state (“spiritual and temporal authority”) prevented more interferences of law within private life, somewhat facilitating what Warren & Brandeis would later call “the right to be let alone” (Mill, 1859/2011, 24; Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 193).

Resources

Hobbes, T. (1651). De cive (T. Hobbes, Trans.). UK Public Library. (Original work published 1642). http://www.public-library.uk/ebooks/27/57.pdf
Hobbes, T. (1965). Leviathan. Liberty Fund. (Original work published 1651). http://files.libertyfund.org/files/869/0161_Bk.pdf
Kant, I. (1970). Kant: Political writings (R.S. Reiss, Ed., 2003 ed.). Cambridge University Press.
Locke, J. (2010). A letter concerning toleration and other writings (M. Goldie, Ed.). Liberty Fund. (Original work published 1689). http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2375/Locke_1560_EBk_v6.0.pdf
Mill, J.S. (2011). On liberty. Project Gutenberg. (Original work published in 1859). https://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm#Page_1
Sieyes, E. (2003). Political writings (M. Sonenscher, Ed.). Hackett Publishing Company. (Original work published in 1788).
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Should this right be limited when limiting it would jeopardize democratic norms?===
Like many rights, privacy is not absolute (Siddiky, 2011, 224). It conflicts with and is compromised in the presence of other fundamental rights and democratic norms.

'''Speech'''

The right to privacy notably conflicts with the First Amendment’s right to free speech. In some cases, the right to privacy becomes limited and less protected, but, in others, it remains protected. This protective line between speech and privacy is thin. For instance, speech protections extend to allow employers, including the government in its capacity as an employer, to be able to restrict the speech of employees in certain matters (Volokh, 2000, 1095). However, in ''Connick v. Meyers'' (1983), the United States Supreme Court decided that, while working for the government, matters of public concern are protected and private while intraoffice grievances are not (Connick v. Meyers, n.d.; Volokh, 2000, 1095).

As Warren & Brandeis suggested in ''The Right to Privacy'' in 1890, the right to privacy conflicts with the First Amendment rights. In their writings about what is now known as ‘tort privacy’ (different from ‘constitutional privacy’), they advocate for the prevention of disclosures of private affairs to the public (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 195). This distinction is still maintained today, allowing for the publishing of ‘newsworthy’ stories about public figures (Volokh, 2000, 1088; Richards, 2010, 1307). However, the courts have not defined what constitutes newsworthy and have even left the definition to juries (Volokh, 2000, 1089).

Privacy has also been limited by the Supreme Court, despite being the institution that created the protection of the right. In ''Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union'' (1937), Senn had chosen to not join the labor union and the union members began picketing around him, beginning a labor dispute and causing Senn to call for his right to privacy (Richards, 2010, 1332-1333). In this case, Justice Brandeis wrote in the opinion’s footnote, Senn was not able to invoke his right to privacy against the union’s right to publicity (Richards, 2010, 1334). In essence, in the commercial sphere between competitors, the right to privacy became inapplicable in the interest of consumers (Richards, 2010, 1334).

On the other hand, privacy has remained protected in other instances. In ''Cohen v. Cowles Media'', the Supreme Court ruled that people can contract away their right to speech (Volokh, 2000, 1057). Volokh (2000) posits this privacy extends to implied contracts, especially in professions in which privacy can be reasonably expected. Thus, the federal laws requiring confidentiality have simply allowed for repercussions to be implemented, rather than creating a new area in privacy rights (1058). In publishing, the actions of private people are protected (Richards, 2010, 1307; Volokh, 2000, 1055). Volokh (2000) posits this protection extends beyond actions to embarrassing photos or stories which exhibit a lack of dignity (1094). Generally, this protection is expressed as the public concern test, in which privacy is granted to a party as long as the public is not affected (Volokh, 2000, 1097). This general protection of the right to privacy is consistent with Richards’ (2010) conclusion from Brandeis’ writings: that privacy protections allow for new ideas to be formed through development in private conversations (1347).

'''Right to Public Trial'''

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution directly conflicts with the implicit right to privacy by granting the right to a public trial. It is argued that the use of this court structure allows for the expression of public concern and prevents corruption while increasing public confidence in the system (Siddiky, 2011, 229).

Despite the right to a public trial, the juvenile justice system was created to protect the identity of minors who committed crimes in the hopes that this protection will allow them to become contributing members to society without the judgment of a criminal past (Siddiky, 2011, 207, 241). Even with this intention, there are exceptions to this privacy. First and foremost, juveniles’ privacy has previously been limited in favor of granting other constitutional rights, including 14th Amendment due process (Siddiky, 2011, 213, 227). Privacy may also be removed if they are charged as an adult, which requires meeting varying statutory criteria depending on the jurisdiction (Siddiky, 2011, 214). Additionally, there has been some movement surrounding the reform of juvenile courts which may remove their anonymity because of perceived coddling and the high recidivism rates among teens, potentially suggesting the need for different consequences (Siddiky, 2011, 215, 217).

Outside of juvenile courts, privacy is compromised more often for the sake of public trials. Something, though, the right to privacy prevails as a judge allows a party in a suit to file anonymously (Rastgoufard, 2003, 1009). These exceptions are rare and are not entrenched in the Federal Rule of Civil Procedures, but the United States Supreme Court has allowed anonymous suits to be decided (Rastgoufard, 2003, 1023). Most notably, anonymity was granted in Roe v. Wade in which ‘Jane Roe’ was allowed to remain anonymous as pregnancy was considered to be a very private matter. Juries have also been allowed to be anonymous (Rastgoufard, 2003, 1009).

'''Property Rights'''

The right to be left alone seems like it would go hand in hand with property rights. Your property, your privacy. However, it is easy to learn who owns a piece of real estate through public records (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 355). While this has benefits mostly related to the ease of buying or selling real estate, there are few-to-no processes in place to confirm the validity of deed filings or liens, especially in the United States (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 359). However, many involved in the industry have interests in limiting privacy in this area for their professional ease (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 374). In Europe, the only people that can file these records are notaries, but the US does not offer similar protections (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 372). These infringements on the right to privacy have become more accessible with digitized records, though this is not limited to this industry (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 375). Additionally, it is probably possible to buy a house anonymously, though there is limited academic literature on how.

'''Political Preferences'''

While one has the right to cast a vote in private and not tell anyone who they voted for, that doesn’t stop people from figuring out one’s political tendencies. With party alignment shrinking, the importance of micro-targeting has grown in campaigns. As such, political parties and candidates have gathered information on voters to determine who is a supporter, who could be persuaded, and who is not likely to be a supporter (Bennett, 2015, 372). At first, parties and candidates begin by looking at state and local party registration lists (Bennett, 2015, 372). From there, they use a variety of factors, such as social media, letters to elected officials, and campaign donations, to determine issues of importance to each voter (Bennett, 372, 2015, 378). While most of this is already public information or has been willingly put out on the internet by individuals, it is not being used in the intended way, and some of the information gathered is private (Bennett, 2015, 372; 11 CFR § 102.17(c)(4)). As such, this approach is illegal in Europe, though it has become prominent in other western nations beyond the United States, such as Canada (Bennett, 2015, 373).

Resources

11 FCR § 102.17(c)(4). (2021). https://www.fec.gov/regulations/102-17/2021-annual-102#102-17-c-4
Bennett, C.J. (2015). Trends in voter surveillance in western societies: Privacy intrusions and democratic implications. Surveillance & Society 13(3/4), 370-384. https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v13i3/4.5373
Connick v. Myers. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved September 28, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1251
Rastgoufard, B. (2003). Pay attention to that green curtain: Anonymity in the courts. Case Western Reserve Law Review 53(4), 1009-1040. https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1512&context=caselrev
Richards N.M. (2010, Oct.). The puzzle of Brandeis, privacy, and speech. Vanderbilt Law Review 63(5) 1293-1352. https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol63/iss5/3/
Roscoe, E. & Szypszak, C. (2017, Summer). Privacy and public real estates records: Preserving legacy system reliability against modern threats. The Urban Lawyer 49(3), 355-391. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44648036
Siddiky, L. (2011). Keeping the court room doors closed so the doors of opportunity can remain open: An argument for maintaining privacy in the juvenile justice system. Howard Law Journal 55(205), 204-246.
Volokh, E. (2000, May). Freedom of speech and information privacy: The troubling implications of a right to stop people from speaking about you. Stanford Law Review 52(5), 1049-1124. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1229510
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Is this right often perceived as threatening to government authorities?===
The Fourth Amendment has rarely been fully realized in its long history. While the Fourth Amendment guarantees privacy in search and seizure, the states originally did not want it to apply to their procedures and noted that it had yet to be applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1260). As such, lots of cases came forward to the Supreme Court, and the Exclusionary Rule was established (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). The Exclusionary Rule prevents trials from using improperly collected evidence, but it does not fully apply the Fourth Amendment and prevent searches (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). The rule has gone through a couple of iterations based on the amendments from which it is derived by the Court. It was originally established in ''Boyd v. US'' (1886), based in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, then evolved with ''Weeks v. US'' (1914), which claimed derivation from the Fifth Amendment but appeared to be based in the Fourth. Its current state results from ''Mapp v. Ohio'' (1961) when the Court held that the Fourth Amendment was an essential feature of privacy and decided that the standards of evidence collection should be consistent between federal and state jurisdictions (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1262). However, authorities can collect whatever evidence they wish and are not held to a legal standard unless they wish to have permissible evidence in the likely-upcoming judicial proceedings (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). Additionally, there are currently many cases that have developed in which a warrant is not needed, causing even Congress, via the Government Publishing Office, to admit there has been an expansion of power given to authorities (US GPO, 1992, 1208-1209). Beyond this expansion, it is known that authorities who perform acts that are not permitted by law are rarely reprimanded, especially with search and seizure and the ability to use the “good faith” defense (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1258). These facts prevent the right to privacy from being perceived as threatening to government authorities.

Resources

Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: Exclusionary Rule. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 9, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-4/enforcing-the-fourth-amendment-the-exclusionary-rule
US Government Publishing Office (US GPO). (1992, June 29). Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure (S. Doc. 103-6). https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CONAN-1992/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-5/summary

===Is this right often curtailed by government authorities for reasons other than those which are generally viewed as permissible?===

While the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is in place to protect people’s privacy, a fact continuously recognized by the Supreme Court, it continues to leave people vulnerable to the decisions of authorities due to a lack of clarity and accountability provided by the courts (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). The Fourth Amendment is explicit in that it prevents unreasonable search and seizure (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). However, it is hard to determine what is reasonable and the Supreme Court has claimed that the reasonableness of a search is situationally dependent (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1202). Various rules and exceptions to the right to privacy have been established.

Under the Exclusionary Rule, lots of searches are carried out which are later found to be unconstitutional by a court, at which point there is little that can be done to rectify the violation of privacy rights (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). These instances are not permissible exceptions, but rather instances in which it becomes clear after the fact that privacy was violated (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted in ways that cause the government’s regulatory interests to be placed over an individual’s interests (US GPO, 1992, 1204). These interpretations have created exceptions, creating situationally specific instances in which privacy is not necessarily protected. For instance, during the execution of a search warrant, if it does not include a search clause for those occupying the location, they may not be searched, but they can be detained (US GPO, 1992, 1227). For whatever reason, the courts have viewed detainment as less intrusive than a search, so it has become allowed, though it has been debated if it is a reasonable and permissible exception without a warrant (US GPO, 1992, 1227). This debate starts with the Court’s opinions in ''Terry v. Ohio'' (1968) and ''United States v. Mendenhall''(1980) that state seizure is either restraining liberty or the belief that one is not at liberty to leave (US GPO, 1992, 1231). The ''Terry'' decision was important in other ways as well, creating another standard for search and seizure without a warrant and probable cause - authorities may stop and frisk individuals if there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (US GPO, 1992, 1230). Recently, this standard has been applied less restrictively and more often, creating some tension between the right to privacy and public safety (GPO, 1992, 1231).

Exceptions don’t just result from court rulings. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 permitted information sharing between law enforcement agencies without notice, leading many to believe more privacy violations were occurring (Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.). However, some scholars argue while privacy is more elusive under the presence of this law, privacy is not hindered as most of us remain unconcerned about the information that may or may not be collected about us resulting in little or no behavioral change (Rubel, 2007, 148-149). At the same time, however, “lack of privacy bears upon how we act,” as does the knowledge that others may have access to our information, so the right becomes less protected under the PATRIOT Act (Rubel, 2007, 142, 153).

Resources

Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: Exclusionary Rule. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 9, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-4/enforcing-the-fourth-amendment-the-exclusionary-rule
Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act. (n.d.) Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm
Rubel, A. (2007, Mar.). Privacy and the USA Patriot Act: Rights, the value of rights, and autonomy. Law and Philosophy 26(2), 119-159. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-005-5970-x
US Government Publishing Office (US GPO). (1992, June 29). Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure (S. Doc. 103-6). https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CONAN-1992/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-5/summary
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001). https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/3162

===Is this right at times curtailed by private actors?===
'''Privacy Torts'''

Privacy violations under tort law was how Warren & Brandeis originally developed the right in 1890 (Citron, 2010, 1805). These violations, usually unwanted intrusions or disclosures can result from negligent or intentional actions and result in civil lawsuits rather than questions of constitutional legality (Citron, 2010, 1806; Tort, n.d.). Violations are hard to define as they change with technology (the original call for privacy was in relation to the ‘instant photograph’), which creates more and more opportunities for violations (Citron, 2010, 1809; Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 195). However, the law changes slower than technology creating some disconnect in legal remedies for new technology (Citron, 2010, 1810).

'''Constitutional Privacy'''

Constitutions only protect people from government actors and international covenants only affect the laws and regulations which governments put in place (Hudson, 2018; Dunn, 2009). Even so, most allowances of government invasions of privacy in the United States have evolved because the government mimicked the actions of private actors, placing private conduct at the baseline of privacy expectations (Kamin, 2004, 101, 115).

At a basic level, once information is willingly given to someone other than oneself, the courts have continuously ruled that there is no longer the expectation for privacy. This holds true with information that is given to both private companies and individuals (Kamin, 2004, 101). The ''Katz'' decision somewhat demonstrates this curtailment of privacy by creating the plain view doctrine. If something is in plain view, even in a private space, it is not private (Kamin, 2004, 104). This decision extrapolates on the theory that as long as someone else may reasonably have that information, it is an unprotected area under the Fourth Amendment (Kamin, 2004, 104). So, by letting someone into one’s home or publishing information online, one is inherently limiting their Fourth Amendment protections. As such, authorities can ask private companies to perform searches or subpoena these actors rather than those they are investigating, depending on the company’s privacy policies (Kamin, 2004, 102, 137).

In ''United States v. Jacobsen'' (1984) privacy protections were tested when officials were able to open a package that FedEx had damaged and opened for insurance purposes (Kamin, 2004, 99, ''United States v. Jacobsen'', 1984). Upon its opening, FedEx employees suspected the package contained cocaine (Kamin, 2004, 99; United States v. Jacobsen, n.d.). Had federal officials gotten to it first, it would not have been able to be searched, even if it was damaged, but the information provided by FedEx from the private search was enough to imply the plain view doctrine thus permitting a warrantless search by the DEA (Kamin, 2004, 100; United States v. Jacobsen, n.d.; ''US v. Jacobsen'', 1984). The Supreme Court upheld the granting of the search and subsequent arrest warrant which was obtained because the DEA confirmed the contents were cocaine based on the ‘tip’ from private actors (United States v. Jacobsen, n.d.). The Court said that “[w]hether those invasions were accidental or deliberate, and whether they were reasonable or unreasonable, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of their private character” (''US v. Jacobsen'', 1984). Kamin (2004) goes as far as to say that “[t]he fact that the private actor did something the government would not have been permitted to do simply did not covert the subsequent, otherwise reasonable, police conduct into a search that implicated the Fourth Amendment” (100-101). That is to say, after the package was opened due to the damage by a non-governmental party, privacy could no longer be expected, despite that it is reasonable to expect privacy during shipping (Kamin, 2004, 100).

Resources

Citron, D.K. (2010, Dec. 1). Mainstreaming Privacy Torts. California Law Review 98(6). https://www.jstor.org/stable/25799956
Dunn, C. (2009, Apr. 28). Applying the Constitution to private actors (New York Law Journal). NYCLU ACLU of New York. https://www.nyclu.org/en/publications/column-applying-constitution-private-actors-new-york-law-journal
Hudson, D.L. (2018, Oct. 20). In the age of social media, expand the reach of the First Amendment. Human Rights Magazine 43(4), n.p. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/the-ongoing-challenge-to-define-free-speech/in-the-age-of-socia-media-first-amendment/
Kamin, S. (2004, Dec. 1). The private is public: The relevance of private actors in defining the Fourth Amendment. Boston College Law Review 46(1), 83-147. https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2293&context=bclr
Tort. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 15, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tort
United States v. Jacobsen. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1167
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 US 109 (1984). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/466/109
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Is this right subject to specific limitations in event of emergency (war, brief natural disaster [weather, earthquake], long-run natural disaster [volcano, fire, disease])? Can such limitations be defined in advance with reference to the disaster in question?===
Privacy protections are typically limited in times of emergency, but the type of emergency seems to dictate its limitations.

'''Natural Disasters'''

A Wilson Center report from 2013 outlines various times in which natural disasters have elicited temporary easing of privacy rules to aid in searching for missing persons. The first examples were from Australia after the 2002 Bali earthquake and the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami. During the Bali earthquake, many governmental agencies had to spend time creating their own missing persons reports (Reidenberg, Gellman, Debelak, Elewa, & Liu, 2013, 12). This was recognized as a waste of resources in light of the disaster and the importance of timeliness (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 12). The 2004 tsunamis renewed this sentiment (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 12). In response to these impeded disaster responses, Australia passed Part VIA to the Australian Privacy Act in 2006 (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13). Part VIA allows for sharing of otherwise protected information through a government emergency declaration if “(1) the entity reasonably believes that the individual may be involved in the disaster; and (2) the collection, use or disclosure of personal information is for a permitted purpose related to the disaster” (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13, 14). It also has stipulations on how long these special provisions can be in place and works for events both in and out of Australian borders while specifically preventing disclosure to media outlets (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13-14)
.
Despite New Zealand’s comprehensive privacy laws, similar actions were taken in New Zealand after the 2011 Christchurch earthquake. There were stipulations in the Privacy Act to permit the sharing of information in some circumstances, it was unclear if they directly applied to natural disaster emergencies (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 15). This lack of clarity was impeding rescue efforts and the Privacy Commissioner, who is granted some discretion through the Privacy Act, took steps to allow temporary authorization of information sharing concerning the emergency at hand (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 16). Incidentally, many realized that this liberation of privacy issues reassured a variety of sectors’ information sharing in their emergency response (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 17). These reassurances caused the Privacy Commissioner to propose and pass the Civil Defence National Emergencies (Information Sharing) Code in 2013, allowing for these different privacy stipulations to be counted on during emergency planning (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 19).

The United States notoriously lacks privacy law. However, there is regulation in the medical field – Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1966 (HIPAA). HIPAA was somewhat suspended after Hurricane Katrina in light of nine of the eleven New Orleans hospitals incapacitated and people fleeing to surrounding states to receive medical attention (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 19-21). It prioritized providing treatment over payment and aided in locating missing persons by publishing facility directories (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 21). This privacy law alteration was less comprehensive than those in New Zealand and Australia after natural disasters, but it shows that the response regarding privacy exceptions is dependent on need.

All of these disasters culminated in the creation of the Missing Persons Community of Interest (MPCI), in which non-government actors collaborated to create standardized missing persons databases after disasters (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 25). At the time the report was written, there were five interlocking systems to record who was missing and try to connect these people with worried family (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 27). These systems were used multiple times from 2006 to 2012 when this report was written (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 27). The systems all have varying balances of access and privacy and, interestingly, one of these services is run by the International Committee of the Red Cross out of Geneva, Switzerland and is explicitly exempt from the Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 29, 35). Additionally, in 2011, the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners on Data Protection and Major Natural Disasters asked countries to review their privacy laws to make sure they were flexible in the event of a major natural disaster (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 73).

'''Disease'''

Rothstein (2020) suggests the following be considered when creating policy exceptions and interventions to health information during disease outbreaks: (1) necessity and effectiveness, (2) proportionality and minimal infringement, (3) purpose limitations, and (4) justice (1374). Policies that become altered during the outbreak should remain monitored for continued justification of the alteration and should discontinue at the end of the outbreak (Rothstein, 2020, 1375).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Canada realized the conflict between the creation of a public health database and data privacy law. Data privacy laws vary by province (some have legislation, others default to federal law), sector (public and private), and profession (i.e., healthcare data is strictly regulated) (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 454-455). Generally, data cannot be shared between provinces, though this is debated based on local and federal laws, nor used for purposes other than for which it was collected (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 455). However, all these limits can be loosened during public health emergencies. There are legislative carve-outs for combating health risks, and during COVID-19 the Privacy Commissioner allowed officials to forgo consent from each individual, a privilege that is repealed after the emergency (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 455).

'''War'''

McDonald (2020) describes privacy as a social good and notes there is a trade-off between privacy and national security, claiming these rights are dependent on context (380). As such, these privacy limitations can be toward individuals or society, but they usually come to light ex parte (McDonald, 2020, 385, 380). However, it is unclear who dictates when this trade-off between privacy and security begins, ends, or how invasive it is as war surveillance is largely unregulated; there is no law of war regarding privacy (McDonald, 2020, 385, 386). It seems feasible violations can be committed by both one’s own country and the opposition. By one’s own country in the sense that they don’t want traitors, resulting in actions similar to how the United States placed Japanese Americans into internment camps during WWI or passed the Sedition Act of 1798 (Share America, 2015). Alternatively, the opposition can somewhat feasibly be expected to also survey those they are at war against, especially when attacking and trying to avoid civilian injury (McDonald, 2020, 381). Enemies may also invade privacy through espionage and intelligence which isn’t necessarily legal under international law though it is not limited to wartime (Pun, 2017, 360-361, 364; McDonald, 2020, 384).

Resources

Bernier, A. & Knoppers, B.M. (2020, June 26). Pandemics, privacy, and public health research. Canadian Journal of Public Health 111(4), 454-457. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7318908/pdf/41997_2020_Article_368.pdf
McDonald, J. (2020). Information, privacy, and just war theory. Ethics & International Affairs 34(3), 379-400. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679420000477
Pun, D. (2017, Summer). Rethinking espionage in the Modern Era. Chicago Journal of International Law 18(1), 353-391. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol18/iss1/10/
Quinton, A. (1988, Autumn). Plagues and morality. Social Research: An International Quarterly 55(3), 451-462. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40970516
Reidenberg, J.R., Gellman, R., Debelak, J., Elewa, A., & Liu, N. (2013). Privacy and missing persons after natural disasters. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Commons Lab. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/privacy-and-missing-persons-after-natural-disasters
Rothstein, M.A. (2020, Aug. 12). Public health and privacy in the pandemic. American Journal of Public Health 110(9), 1374-1375. https://www.doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2020.305849
Share America. (2015, Apr. 6). Civil liberties in wartime. United States Department of State. Retrieved October 18, 2021, https://share.america.gov/civil-liberties-wartime/

==Utilitarian / Fairness Assessments==
===Is there a cost attached to protecting and enforcing this right? What kinds of costs are implicated?===
====Short-term economic cost in general====
====Long-term economic cost in general====
====Cost to those least able to economically absorb the cost====
====Cost to perceived democratic legitimacy====
====Cost to consistency or coherence of the law as a whole====
====Cost to the legitimacy or effectiveness of other rights====
====Cost to considerations of social equality====
====Cost to other non-material goods not so far specified====
===What are the financial consequences, if any, of making this right a legally protectable right?===
===Are there any groups that are uniquely disadvantaged by the exercise of this right?===
===Are there any groups that uniquely benefit from the exercise of this right?===
===Are there instances when this fundamental right can lead to unfairness or inequities?===
===Are there objective ways to measure the utilitarian nature of this right?===
===If so, where can one draw the line: when does this right stop being useful or economically viable?===
==Looking Ahead==
===How can we expect this right to change and evolve in the years ahead?===
===How is the future likely to shape the exercise of this right?===
===Will the exercise or protection of this right be affected by technological changes?===
===Under what conditions would this right become irrelevant?===
===Are questions of fairness and utility pertaining to this right likely to change in the years ahead?===
==Policy Recommendations==
===Can the practice or exercise of this right be shaped through executive action?===
===In the US context, are there particular parties with a stake or interest in amending or reconceptualizing this right?===
===In the US context, can this right be altered legislatively, or would it require a constitutional amendment?===
===Is this right best addressed at the national level? The sub-national level? The international level?===
===To what extent is this right shaped primarily by judicial decisions?===
===If this right is best addressed through the amendment process, how should it proceed?===
===If this right were unlimited, what might be the consequences (positive and negative)?===
===If this right were eliminated, what might be the consequences (positive and negative)?===

Source/Privacy Rights

2022-08-03T17:28:31Z

Kbrard: /* Kantianism */

==History==
===What is the oldest source in any country that mentions this right?===
Most sources say that the first mention of this right is ''The Right to Privacy'' written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis and published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890. Both were Boston attorneys and Brandeis would go on to serve as a United States Supreme Court Justice for 23 years (Louis Brandeis, n.d.). In this essay, they note that the legal scope of rights broadens over time and posit that the right to life has expanded to “the right to be let alone,” which had become an increasingly difficult feat with new technologies (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 193, 195).

Warren and Brandeis (1890) acknowledge that, at the time, there was little-to-no legal protection of this right. They look at defamation law and determine while it alludes to privacy law, there are limitations to privacy protection from this area of law as it only considers a damaged reputation, not instances in which an individual wishes something remained secret (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 197; Bycer, 2014). They also looked at copywriting and publishing law, which only applies to one’s own work (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 199). They determine that the right to privacy can extend beyond these areas of law as the right should be able to wholly prevent the depiction of private life (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 218). In the last part of this essay, they set out limitations to the right of privacy – privileged information remains under defamation law (to allow for the operation of courts), privacy ceases with consent to publish, gossip is not in the realm of privacy law, and intention and truth do not prevent a breach of such right.

However, Warren and Brandeis cite at least two instances that predate ''The Right to Privacy'' which discuss the right to privacy. The earliest is the citing of an 1820 statement from Lord Cottenham, who, in agreement with Lord Eldon, felt that were a king’s illnesses recorded by a doctor and published while that king was still alive, a court would not permit its publishing, as he claimed this circumstance would breach the king’s privacy (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 205; Bycer, 2014). Additionally, they acknowledge that the right to privacy has already been regulated in France since 1868. Section 11 of the 1868 Loi Relative à la Presse (Press Law) says that all periodic writings about a private fact of life are violations punishable by a fine of 500 francs. Pursuit of the violation may only be undertaken by the affected party (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 214, footnote 1). Beyond what Warren & Brandeis cited as earlier mentions, there was also the 1801 Haitian Constitution which provided the home was inviolable from government invasion in Article 63 (Theodore, 2000).

Resources

Bycer, M. (2014). Understanding the 1890 Warren and Brandeis “The Right to Privacy” Article. National Juris University. Retrieved Sept. 10, 2021, from https://nationalparalegal.edu/UnderstandingWarrenBrandeis.aspx
Louis Brandeis. (2020, Nov. 9). Britannica. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.britannica.com/biography/Louis-Brandeis
Theodore, Charmant. (2000). Haitian Constitution of 1801 (English). Louverture Project. http://thelouvertureproject.org/index.php?title=Haitian_Constitution_of_1801_(English)
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right? BUILD IN COLLAPSE EXPAND TOGGLE===
====Afghanistan====
The 1964 Afghan Constitution protected only the right to privacy in the home in Article 28 (Constitute Project, “Afghanistan 1964 Constitution”). Today, Article 38 offers similar protections and Article 37 protects communications (Constitute Project, “Afghanistan 2004 Constitution”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Afghanistan_1964?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Afghanistan_2004?lang=en

====Albania====
Today, privacy is guaranteed in Articles 35 (data), 36 (correspondence), and 37 (home) of the 1998 constitution (Constitute Project, “Albania 1998 rev. 2016”). This appears to be their first protection of privacy rights.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Albania_2016?lang=en

====Algeria====
Today, the 2020 constitution protects the inviolability of the domicile in Article 47 and, in Article 46, private life and private communication (Constitute Project, “Algeria 2020”). Previously, these rights were protected in the 1976 Constitution in Articles 39 and 40 (International Constitutional Law Project, Algeria Constitution”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Algeria_2020?lang=en
https://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ag00000_.html

====Andorra====
Articles 14 and 15 of the first and only Andorran constitution protect privacy in the state. Article 14 protects privacy, honor, and reputation, while Article 15 protects the home and communications (Constitute Project, “Andorra 1993”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Andorra_1993?lang=en

====Angola====
Today, privacy rights are protected in Articles 32 (personal and family life), 33 (home), and 34 (correspondence and communication) of the 2010 constitution.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Angola_2010?lang=en

====Antigua and Barbuda====
In the constitution, Article 3, Section C protects the right to privacy in personal and family life, as well as the home (Constitute Project, “Antigua and Barbuda 1981”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Antigua_and_Barbuda_1981?lang=en

====Argentina====
Articles 18 & 19 of the 1853 constitution protect privacy. Article 18(2) reads, “The residence is inviolable, as are letters and private papers; and a law shall determine in what cases and for what reasons their search and seizure shall be allowed,” while Article 19 reads, “The private actions of men that in no way offend public order or morality, nor injure a third party, are reserved only to God, and are exempt from the authority of the magistrates” (Constitute Project, “Argentina 1832, reinst. 1983, rev. 1994”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Argentina_1994?lang=en

====Armenia====
The 1995 Armenian constitution protects three main privacy rights in Articles 31-33: personal life, home, and communication (Constitute Project, “Armenia 1995 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Armenia_2015?lang=en

====Australia====
Privacy rights are not prescribed in the Constitution of Australia (Australian Human Rights Commission, “How are human rights protected in Australia?”). Beyond the international covenants, such as the ICCPR, privacy was first protected in the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT Human Rights Commission, “Human Rights”).

https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/rights-and-freedoms/how-are-human-rights-protected-australian-law
https://hrc.act.gov.au/humanrights/

====Austria====
According to the Austrian Embassy in Washington, D.C., the ratification of the ECHR by Austria in 1958 gave the treaty constitutional law standing in the state. The ECHR is what protects the right to privacy in Austria.

https://www.austria.org/human-rights-and-the-council-of-europe

====Azerbaijan====
Today, Article 32 of the 1995 constitution protects privacy. It is quite detailed but protects personal privacy, family life, personal information, and correspondence. Article 33 extends privacy rights to the residence (Constitute Project, “Azerbaijan 1995 rev. 2016”). Previously, privacy rights had been protected by the 1977 Soviet Constitution (see below).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Azerbaijan_2016?lang=en

====The Bahamas====
Article 15(c) protects the right to privacy in one’s home. Article 21 extends this right to exist during searches (Constitute Project, “Bahamas (The) 1973”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bahamas_1973?lang=en

====Bahrain====
Articles 25 & 26 of the 2002 constitution protect privacy in the home and all types of communication (Constitute Project, “Bahrain 2002 rev. 2017”). This constitution was the first establishment of privacy rights in Bahrain.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bahrain_2017?lang=en

====Bangladesh====
Article 43 of the constitution grants the right to privacy in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Bangladesh 1972, reinst. 1986, rev. 2014”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bangladesh_2014?lang=en

====Barbados====
Article 11(b) of the constitution grants every person in Barbados privacy of their home. Article 20(1) prevents interference in correspondence (Constitute Project, “Barbados 1966 rev. 2007”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Barbados_2007?lang=en

====Belarus====
Article 28 of the constitution protects private life in Belarus (Constitute Project, “Belarus 1994 rev. 2004”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Belarus_2004?lang=en

====Belgium====
Since 1831, Belgium has had one constitution, only amended 33 times. Article 15 protects one’s privacy in the home. Article 22 protects private life. Article 29 protects private letters (Constitute Project, “Belgium 1831 rev. 2014”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Belgium_2014?lang=en

====Belize====
In its only constitution since its independence, Belize protects privacy rights in Article 3(c). It protects family life, personal privacy, one’s home, and their dignity (Constitute Project, “Belize 1981 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Belize_2011?lang=en

====Benin====
Today, the 1990 constitution protects privacy in the home and of correspondence in Articles 20 and 21, respectively (Constitute Project, “Benin 1990”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Benin_1990?lang=en

====Bhutan====
In 2008, a new constitution was passed, which protected privacy rights in Article 19. Article 19 reads: A person shall not be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence nor to unlawful attacks on the person’s honour and reputation” (Bhutan’s National Council, “The Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan”).

https://www.nationalcouncil.bt/assets/uploads/docs/acts/2017/Constitution_of_Bhutan_2008.pdf

====Bolivia====
Today, privacy rights are protected in Article 21(3). These protections are general, while Article 25 protects more specific privacy rights in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2009”). This document is the 17th constitution since 1826, but other versions in English could not be found, so privacy rights may have a longer history in Bolivia.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009?lang=en

====Bosnia and Herzegovina====
Privacy rights have been protected in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995 with their independence from Yugoslavia. The 1995 constitution protects these rights in Article 3(f). These protections include private and family life, home, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 rev. 2009”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bosnia_Herzegovina_2009?lang=en

====Botswana====
The 1966 constitution of Botswana includes privacy protections of the home in Article 3(c) and Article 9. Article 12, in protecting freedom of expression, also protects correspondence (Constitute Project, “Botswana 1966 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Botswana_2016?lang=en

====Brazil====
In its first constitution, Brazil only claimed the inviolability of private letters in Article 179(XXVII) (WikiSource, “Constitution of the Empire of Brazil”). Since then, privacy rights have expanded, and today personal privacy, the home, and correspondence are protected in Article 5(X-XII) (Constitute Project, “Brazil 1988 rev. 2017”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2017?lang=en
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Empire_of_Brazil

====Brunei====
Brunei lacks any legislation or constitutional provisions for privacy rights. The 1996 United States Department of State Report on Brunei Human Rights even says that law actively allows for intrusions of privacy.

https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/brunei.html

====Bulgaria====
The right to privacy, including family life, private life, honor, dignity, and reputation, is protected in Article 32 of the 1991 constitution (Constitute Project, “Bulgaria 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bulgaria_2015?lang=en

====Burkina Faso====
The 1991 Burkina Faso Constitution protects privacy rights in Article 6. It reads, “The residence, the domicile, private and family life, [and] the secrecy of correspondence of every person, are inviolable. It can only be infringed according to the forms and in the cases specified by the law” (Constitute Project, “Burkina Faso 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Burkina_Faso_2015?lang=en

====Burundi====
The earliest mention of privacy rights in the Burundi Constitution is from the 1998 interim constitution. In this writing, privacy rights are contained in Article 23 and protect privacy, family, home, and correspondence (Constitution Net, “Constitution of Burundi”). Today, they are contained in Article 28 of the 2018 constitution (Constitute Project, “Burundi 2018”).

http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/transitional_national_constitution_and_transitional_constitution_act_1998-2001_0.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Burundi_2018?lang=en

====Cambodia====
The 1993 constitution contains privacy rights in Article 40: “The rights to privacy of residence, and to the confidentiality of correspondence by mail, telegram, fax, telex and telephone, shall be guaranteed” (Office of the Council of the Ministers of Cambodia, “Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia”).

https://pressocm.gov.kh/en/archives/9539

====Cameroon====
In the Preamble of the 1972 constitution, privacy is granted to the home and correspondence in points 5 and 6 (Constitute Project, “Cameroon 1972 rev. 2008”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cameroon_2008?lang=en

====Canada====
The Canadian Constitution has been in force since 1867 and is comprised of a couple of Acts. For privacy purposes, the most important is the Constitution Act of 1982, which contains the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In this section, Article 7 provides the most privacy protection that is seen in the constitution, protecting the right to life, liberty, and security of a person (Constitute Project, “Canada 1867 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Canada_2011?lang=en

====Cape Verde====
Article 33 makes violations of privacy inadmissible in court, while Article 38 grants the right to “personal identity, to civil rights, to a name, honor, and reputation, and to personal and family privacy”. Article 41 extends privacy rights to correspondence, and Article 42 extends it to electronic data privacy (Constitute Project, “Cape Verde 1980 rev. 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cape_Verde_1992?lang=en

====Central African Republic====
In 1994, a new constitution was passed in the Central African Republic. Article 13 granted private communications inviolable and Article 14 did the same for the private home (African Child Forum, “Constitution of the Central African Republic”). Today, private communication is seen in Article 16 and the home is inviolable in Article 19 (Constitute Project, “Central African Republic 2016”).

http://www.africanchildforum.org/clr/Legislation%20Per%20Country/CAR/car_constitution_1995_en.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Central_African_Republic_2016?lang=en

====Chad====
Both the 1996 and 2018 Chad Constitutions protect the right to privacy in Article 17 and the right to privacy in communications in Article 45 and 47, respectively (Constitute Project, “Chad").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chad_2015?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chad_2018?lang=en

====Chile====
The 1925 Chilean Constitution protected the inviolability of the home and correspondence in Article 10 Sections 12 & 13 (Constitute Project, “Chile 1925”). Today, the home is protected in Article 19 Section 5 (Constitute Project, “Chile 1980 rev. 2021”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chile_2021?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chile_1925?lang=en

====China====
In 1975, the Chinese Constitution protected the right to privacy to the person and the home in Chapter III, Article 28 (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 1975, 39). Today, Articles 38-40 protect privacy in China. Article 38 is for personal dignity, 39 for the home, and 40 for correspondence (Constitute Project, “China (People’s Republic of) 1982 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/China_2018?lang=en
https://china.usc.edu/sites/default/files/article/attachments/peoples-republic-of-china-constitution-1975.pdf

====Colombia====
The 1991 Colombian constitution is very explicit in its privacy protections in Article 15. Section 1 grants privacy to people and family life, section 2 is for data privacy, section 3 is for correspondence (Constitute Project, “Colombia 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015?lang=en

====Comoros====
Today, privacy provisions are in Article 26 and Article 27, which grant privacy in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Comoros 2018”). Before this constitution, similar clauses were in the 1996 constitutional preamble, drawn from the United Nations Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man (Constitution Net, “CONSTITUTION of the FEDERAL ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF THE COMOROS”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Comoros_2018?lang=en
http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/Comoros%20Constitution.pdf

====Democratic Republic of the Congo====
The personal right to privacy is granted in Article 31 of the 2005 Constitution, while the home is protected under Article 29 (Constitute Project, “Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 2005 rev. 2011”). Before this, the right to privacy in home and correspondence were granted in the Zaire 1990 constitution (amended from a previous version, though unclear which previous version) in Articles 22 & 23 (World Statesmen, “Complete Text of the Zairian Constitution After the Enactment of Law No. 90-002 of July 5, 1990 Concerning the Modification of Certain Provisions of the Constitution”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_2011?lang=en
https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Zaire1990.pdf

====Republic of the Congo====
The only mention of privacy rights today is that of the home in Article 20 of the 2015 Constitution (Constitute Project, “Congo (Republic of the) 2015”). The same right appeared in the 2001 Constitution in Article 14 (Constitute Project, “Congo (Republic of the) 2001”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Congo_2015?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Congo_2001?lang=en

====Costa Rica====
Today, privacy rights are protected in Articles 23 (the home) and 24 (communications and intimacy) (Constitute Project, “Costa Rica 1949 rev. 2020”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa_Rica_2020?lang=en

====Croatia====
Article 34 of the 1991 constitution protects the home. Article 35 protects personal and familial life, as well as dignity. Article 36 protects correspondence (Constitute Project, “Croatia 1991 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Croatia_2013?lang=en

====Cuba====
The 2019 constitution protects personal and familial privacy in Article 48, the home in Article 49, and correspondence in Article 50 (Constitute Project, “Cuba 2019”). Privacy was not in the previous Cuban constitution of 1976 (Constitute Project, “Cuba 1976 rev. 2002”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2019?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2002?lang=en

====Cyprus====
Article 15 of the 1960 constitution reads: “Every person has the right to respect for his private and family life.” Article 16 expands these protections to the home, as Article 17 expands them to correspondence and communication (Constitute Project, “Cyprus 1960 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cyprus_2013?lang=en

====Czech Republic====
Article 7(1) of the 1993 constitution guarantees the inviolability of persons and private life. Article 10 protects life from intrusion by others, and it also protects data privacy (Constitute Project, “Czech Republic 1993 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Czech_Republic_2013?lang=en

====Denmark====
Today, Article 72 protects the right to privacy in the home, while also preventing the search of private communications (Constitute Project, “Demark 1953”). The general form of the constitution derives from the 1849 Danish Constitution (Danish Parliament, “The Constitutional Act of Denmark”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Denmark_1953?lang=en
https://www.thedanishparliament.dk/en/democracy/the-constitutional-act-of-denmark

====Djibouti====
Today, the right to privacy in the home and communications are protected in the 1992 constitution Articles 12 & 13. Personal life is not protected (Constitute Project, “Djibouti 1992 rev. 2010”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominica_2014?lang=en

====Dominica====
Article 1(c) of the only constitution Dominica has had, written in 1978, protects the right to privacy in the home. Article 7(1) protects privacy during a search (Constitute Project, "Dominica 1978 rev. 2014").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominica_2014?lang=en

====Dominican Republic====
Today, Article 44 protects the right to privacy and personal honor. It reads, “All people have the right to privacy. The respect and non-interference into private and family life, the home, and private correspondence are guaranteed. The right to honor, good name, and one’s own image are recognized. All authorities or individuals who violate them are obligated to compensate or repair them in accordance with the law” (Constitute Project, “Dominican Republic 2015”). The subsections expand on these rights. In previous versions, this was the right to intimacy and personal honor (Constitute Project, “Dominican Republic 2010”). Previous constitutions could not be found in English.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominican_Republic_2015?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominican_Republic_2010?lang=en

====East Timor====
East Timor, or Timor-Leste, protects the right to private life, home, and communication during evidence collection in Article 34, privacy in general in Article 36, and privacy in the home and communication in Article 37 (Constitute Project, “Timor-Leste 2002”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/East_Timor_2002?lang=en

====Ecuador====
Article 11(3) enforces and protects the rights put forth by the constitution and international treaties: “The rights and guarantees set forth in the Constitution and in international human rights instruments shall be directly and immediately enforced by and before any civil, administrative or judicial servant, either by virtue of their office or at the request of the party”. In Chapter 6, Rights to Freedom, Article 66, Sections 11 and 19-22 set out more specific privacy regulations in terms of convictions, correspondence, the home, personal data, and privacy rights (Constitute Project, “Ecuador 2008 rev. 2021). There are 22 previous Ecuadorian constitutions, but English translations could not be found to investigate the presence of privacy rights.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ecuador_2021?lang=en

====Egypt====
The 1923 constitution of Egypt protects personal freedom in Article 4, privacy in the home in Article 8, and correspondence in Article 11 (Constitution Net, “Royal Decree No. 42 of 1923 On Building a Constitutional System for the Egyptian State”). Today, these rights are protected in Articles 57 & 58 (Constitute Project, “Egypt 2014 rev. 2019”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2019?lang=en
http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/1923_-_egyptian_constitution_english_1.pdf

====El Salvador====
Article 2 of the 1983 constitution explicitly protects the “right to honor, personal and family intimacy, and one’s own image.” Article 6 allows for free communication as long as it does not violate the private lives of others. Article 24 protects correspondence (Constitute Project, “El Salvador 1983 rev. 2014”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/El_Salvador_2014?lang=en

====Equatorial Guinea====
Today, Article 13 of the 1991 constitution protects rights and freedoms. In section 1(g), the right to privacy in communications and the home is protected (Constitute Project, “Equatorial Guinea 1991 rev. 2012”). Translations of the 1968, 1973, and 1982 constitutions could not be found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Equatorial_Guinea_2012?lang=en

====Eritrea====
In its history, Eritrea has only had one constitution and it protects the right to privacy in Article 18. Specific privacies are not mentioned but it is an overarching declaration of the protection of the right: “Every person shall have the right to privacy” (Constitute Project, “Eritrea 1997”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Eritrea_1997?lang=en

====Estonia====
The 1920 constitution of Estonia protected personal privacy in Paragraph 8. Paragraph 10 protected the homestead and Paragraph 14 protected communications (Wikisource, “Constitution of the Esthonian Republic (1920)”). Today, privacy rights are guaranteed in Section 26 (Riigi Teataja, “The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia”).

https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/521052015001/consolide
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Esthonian_Republic_(1920)

====Eswatini====
Article 14(1) names and protects fundamental rights, and subsection C reads “protection of the privacy of the home and other property rights of the individual” (Constitute Project, “Eswatini 2005”). Previous iterations of the constitutions from 1967 and 1968 could not be found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Swaziland_2005?lang=en

====Ethiopia====
The 1931 constitution protects correspondence privacy in Article 26 (Ethiopian Legal Brief, “Ethiopian Constitution of 1931”). In Article 25, the home is claimed as private. Today, privacy rights are protected in Article 26 (Constitute Project, “Ethiopia 1994”).

https://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/ethiopian-constitution-of-1931.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ethiopia_1994?lang=en

====Fiji====
The 1970 Fiji constitution, its first after independence from Britain, protected the right to privacy in the home in Article 3(c) (Constitution Net, “Fiji Independence Order 1970 and Constitution of Fiji”). Today, the 2013 constitution expands the right to privacy from the home to include the right to private and family life, privacy in correspondence, and data privacy in Article 24 (Constitute Project, “Fiji 2013”).

http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/1970_constitution.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Fiji_2013?lang=en

====Finland====
Originally, the 1919 Finnish Constitution protected privacy in Section 8 (RefWorld, “Constitution Act of Finland”). Today, Section 10 of the Finnish Constitution protects the right to privacy with similar language. It says, “Everyone's private life, honour and the sanctity of the home are guaranteed. More detailed provisions on the protection of personal data are laid down by an Act. The secrecy of correspondence, telephony and other confidential communications is inviolable” (Constitute Project, “Finland 1999 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Finland_2011?lang=en
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b53418.html

====France====
The right to privacy in France is implied in Article IV of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 26 August 1789. Article IV reads, “Liberty consists of being able to do everything that does not harm anybody else: thus the exercise of the natural rights of every man has no boundaries except those that ensure to other Members of the Society the enjoyment of those same rights” (Hardt, Kiiver, Kristofertisch). The Declaration of the Rights of Man is still in force today due to the Preamble of the 1958 French Constitution.

Sascha Hardt, Phillip Kiiver & Gisela Kristofertisch. (2019). Comparative Constitutional Law Documents. “Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen [Declaration des Driots de L’Homme et du Citoyen] of 26 August 1789” and “Constitution of the V. Republic of 4 October 1958.”

====Gabon====
Article 1 of the constitution lays out fundamental rights granted within the state (Constitute Project, “Gabon 1991 rev. 2011”). Section 5 of Article 1 protects the privacy of correspondence. Section 12 claims the inviolability of the domicile. The current constitution is based on the 1961 constitution, though it was rewritten in 1991.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Gabon_2011?lang=en

====The Gambia====
Article 23 of the 1996 constitution says, “No person shall be subject to interference with the privacy of his or her home, correspondence or communications save as is in accordance with law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety of the economic well-being of the country, for the protection of health or morals, for the prevention of disorder or crime or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Constitute Project, “Gambia (The) 1996 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Gambia_2018?lang=en

====Georgia====
Today, Article 15 in the 1995 constitution of Georgia protects the right to personal privacy, personal space, and privacy of communication. Additionally, Article 9 claims the inviolability of human dignity (Constitute Project, “Georgia 1995 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Georgia_2018?lang=en

====Germany====
German Basic Law, passed in 1949, provides for privacy in a couple of places. Article 1(1) protects an individual’s dignity, and Article 10 protects privacy in correspondence and telecommunications (Hardt, Kiiver, Rotering, & Kristofertisch). Article 13 protects the home.

Sascha Hardt, Phillip Kiiver, Gereon Rotering, & Gisela Kristofertisch. (2019). Comparative Constitutional Law Documents. “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany of 23 May 1949.”

====Ghana====
In the 1992 constitution, still in force today, the right to privacy in the home and correspondence is found in Article 18(2) (Constitute Project, “Ghana 1992 rev. 1996”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ghana_1996?lang=en

====Greece====
In the 1975 constitution, the Greeks protect the right to privacy in Article 9. This article protects the home, private, and family life. Article 9A provides constitutional data privacy protections (Constitute Project, “Greece 1975 rev. 2008”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Greece_2008?lang=en

====Grenada====
The 1973 constitution of Grenada, the country’s first, protected the right to privacy in Article 1(c) (Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, “The Grenada Constitution Order 1973”). Specifically, it protected the home and other property. Today, the 1973 constitution takes on similar language in Article 1(c) (Constitute Project, “Grenada 1973, reinst. 1991, rev. 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Grenada_1992?lang=en
https://www.cpahq.org/media/gq5dtcj5/gre_constitution.pdf

====Guatemala====
There are two provisions for privacy protection in the 1985 Guatemalan Constitution. Article 23 grants privacy in the home (vivienda) and Article 24 protects correspondence and other documents (Constitute Project, “Guatemala 1985 rev. 1993”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Guatemala_1993?lang=en

====Guinea====
The 2010 constitution of Guinea protects private life, correspondence, and the home in Article 12: “The domicile is inviolable. It may be infringed only in the case of grave and imminent peril, to evade [parer] a
common danger or to protect the life of the persons. All other infringement, all search may only be ordered by the judge or by the authority that the law designates and in the forms prescribed by it.
The secrecy of correspondence and of communication is inviolable. Each one has the right to the protection of their private life” (Constitute Project, “Guinea’s Constitution of 2010”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Guinea_2010.pdf

====Guinea-Bissau====
Article 44 of the 1984 constitution grants the right to protection of personal and private life. Article 48 grants privacy in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Guinea-Bissau 1984 rev. 1996”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Guinea_Bissau_1996?lang=en

====Guyana====
In 1966, Guyana gained independence from Britain and, in the same order, passed its constitution. The 1966 constitution provided for protection in the home from others in Article 3(c) (Guyana Parliament, “The Guyana Independence Order 1966”).

http://parliament.gov.gy/new2/documents/bills/21123/statutory_instrument_guyana_independence_order_1966_no_575.pdf

====Haiti====
In 1801, the first constitution of Haiti protected the privacy of the home in Article 63 (Louverture Project, “Constitution of 1801”). Today, Article 49 of the 1987 constitution protect protects communications (Constitute Project, “Haiti 1987 rev. 2012”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Haiti_2012?lang=en
http://thelouvertureproject.org/index.php?title=Haitian_Constitution_of_1801_(English)

====Honduras====
The 1982 constitution provides for privacy protections in Article 76. In this text, one is granted “The right to honor, to personal privacy, to family, and to one's dignity” (Constitute Project, “Hungary 1982 rev. 2013").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Honduras_2013?lang=en

====Hungary====
The 1949 constitution was the first to include privacy rights. In Article 57, personal privacy, as well as privacy in the home and correspondence are protected: “he Hungarian People's Republic guarantees the personal freedom and privileges of the citizens, and respects the secrecy of correspondence and the inviolability of the home” (Princeton University, “CONSTITUTION of the People's Republic of Hungary - Budapest, 20th August 1949”). In the most recent constitution from 2011, these rights are protected in Article VI (Constitute Project, “Hungary 2011 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Hungary_2016?lang=en
https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/hungary/1949%20Hungarian%20constitution.pdf

====Iceland====
Article 71 says, “Everyone shall enjoy freedom from interference with privacy, home, and family life” (Constitute Project, “Iceland 1944 rev. 2013”). This article is in the 1944 constitution, which is largely based on the 1874 constitutional text that preceded it (Icelandic Human Rights Center, “Icelandic Law”).

https://www.humanrights.is/en/laws-conventions/icelandic-law
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Iceland_2013?lang=en

====India====
While not explicitly mentioned in the Indian constitution, the right to privacy has been recognized by the Indian Supreme Court. In 2017, they ruled unanimously that the right to privacy for all people falls under Article 21, which provides the “protection of life and personal liberty” (McCarthy; Mahapatra & Choudhary).

McCarthy, J. (2017, Aug. 24). Indian Supreme Court declares privacy a fundamental right. NPR. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/24/545963181/indian-supreme-court-declares-privacy-a-fundamental-right
Mahapatra, D. & Choudhary, A.A. (2017, Aug. 24). Right to privacy is a fundamental right, it is intrinsic to the right to life: Supreme Court. Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/right-to-privacy-is-a-fundamental-right-supreme-court/articleshow/60203394.cms

====Indonesia====
Article 28G grants the right to privacy. It reads, “Every person shall have the right to protection of his/herself, family, honour, dignity, and property, and shall have the right to feel secure against and receive protection from the threat of fear to do or not do something that is a human right” (Constitute Project, Indonesia 1954 reinst. 1959, rev. 2002”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Indonesia_2002?lang=en

====Iran====
While the constitution of Iran does not protect privacy, it does guarantee protection of the law which conforms with Islamic Law in Article 20 (Constitute Project, “Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1979 rev. 1989”). Islam provides such protections within the Quran (Hayat, M.H., “Privacy and Islam: From the Quran to data protection in Pakistan”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989?lang=en
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13600830701532043?journalCode=cict20#:~:text=Islam%20not%20only%20prohibits%20entering,enter%20in%20one's%20own%20house.&text=We%20now%20come%20to%20rules,family%20circle%20in%20Islamic%20society.

====Iraq====
The 2004 constitution protects the right to personal privacy in Article 17(1) and the right to privacy in the home in Article 17(2) (Constitute Project, “Iraq 2005). Previously, only the home had been protected in the 1925 constitution (United Nations Archives, “Constitution of ‘Iraq (Organic Law)”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005?lang=en
https://biblio-archive.unog.ch/Dateien/CouncilDocs/C-49-1929-VI_EN.pdf

====Republic of Ireland====
Article 40(5) protects the inviolability of the dwelling (Constitute Project, “Ireland 1937 rev. 2017”). This same protection was afforded in Article 7 of the Constitution of the Irish Free State from 1922 (electronic Irish Statute Book, “Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) Act, 1922”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ireland_2019?lang=en
https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1922/act/1/enacted/en/print

====Israel====
Privacy rights in Israel derive from the Basic Law Human Liberty and Dignity of 1992. In this law, Article 7 protects privacy, intimacy, private premises, and confidential communications (Constitute Project, “Israel 1953 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Israel_2013?lang=en

====Italy====
Articles 13-15 grant privacy to people, homes, and correspondence in the Italian Constitution from 1947 (Constitute Project, “Italy 1947 rev. 2020”). Previous constitutions are from 1848 and 1861, but translations were not found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Italy_2020?lang=en

====Ivory Coast====
The only specific privacy right mentioned in the constitution is that in Article 8, which inviolably protects the home (Constitute Project, “Côte d'Ivoire 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/countries/Africa/Cote_d_Ivoire?lang=en

====Jamaica====
Chapter III of the 1962 constitution protects the fundamental rights and freedoms of Jamaicans. In Section 3(j) of Article 13, privacy protections are granted to persons, property, private and family life, and communication (Constitute Project, “Jamaica 1962 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Jamaica_2015?lang=en

====Japan====
Historically, the 1889 constitution of Japan protected the home and correspondence in Articles 25 and 26 (Constitute Project, “Japan’s Constitution of 1889 Historical”). Today, Article 35 protects the home (Constitute Project, "Japan 1946").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Japan_1889.pdf?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Japan_1946?lang=en

====Jordan====
Article 7 of the 1952 constitution says, “1. Personal freedom shall be guaranteed. 2. Every infringement on rights and public freedoms or the inviolability of the private life of Jordanians is a crime punishable by law.” Article 18 protects communications and Article 10 protects the home (Constitute Project, “Jordan 1952 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Jordan_2016?lang=en

====Kazakhstan====
In their first formal constitution, Kazakhstan protected the right to privacy in Article 18. It says, “1. Everyone shall have the right to inviolability of private life, personal or family secrets, protection of honor and dignity. 2. Everyone shall have the right to confidentiality of personal deposits and savings, correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraph, and other messages. Limitation of this right shall be permitted only in the cases and according to the procedure directly established by law. 3. State bodies, public associations, officials, and the mass media must provide every citizen with the possibility to obtain access to documents, decisions and other sources of information concerning his rights and interests” (Constitute Project, “Kazakhstan 1995 rev. 2017”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kazakhstan_2017?lang=en

====Kenya====
In 1963, the Kenyan Constitution protected privacy in Article 14(c) (Kenya Law, “1963 Constitution”). Today, Article 31 of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution gives every person the right to privacy in their person, home, possessions, family life, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Kenya 2010 Constitution”).

http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/1963_Constitution.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kenya_2010?lang=en

====Kiribati====
Article 3 of the 1979 constitution calls for the protection of privacy in the home and Article 9 protects a person from searches (Constitute Project, “Kiribati 1979 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/countries/Oceania/Kiribati?lang=en

====Kuwait====
Kuwait’s 1962 constitution has been reinstated twice, but it does not mention privacy rights generally. It does, however, protect the inviolability of the home in Article 38 (Constitute Project, “Kuwait 1962 reinst. 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kuwait_1992?lang=en

====Kyrgyzstan====
The 2007 constitution, the first to be adopted after independence from the Soviet Union, protected privacy rights in Article 14 (Electoral Knowledge Network, “Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic”). Today, Article 29 protects the rights to privacy in private life, dignity, and correspondence in the 2010 constitution (Constitute Project, “Kyrgyzstan 2010 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kyrgyz_Republic_2016?lang=en
https://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/asia/KG/kyrgyzstan-constitution-1993-2007/view?searchterm=russian

====Laos====
Privacy rights are scarcely protected in Laos. The revised 2015 constitution protects violations of life, body, integrity, and property in Article 42, which has been amended since the implementation of the constitution in 1991 (Constitute Project, “Lao People’s Democratic Republic 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://media.bloomsburyprofessional.com/rep/files/laos-constitution-1947-1949-englishx.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Laos_2015?lang=en

====Latvia====
Article 96 of the 1922 constitution states “Everyone has the right to inviolability of his or her private life, home and correspondence” (Constitute Project, “Latvia 1922, reinst. 1991, rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Latvia_2016?lang=en

====Lebanon====
The constitution provides no protections for general privacy rights. However, Article 14 does protect the inviolability of the home (Constitute Project, “Lebanon 1926 rev. 2004”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Lebanon_2004?lang=en

====Lesotho====
The 1993 constitution of Lesotho sets forth fundamental rights which are granted to each person in Lesotho in Article 4. In Section 1(g) of Article 4, the right to respect for family and private life is protected. In Article 11, this right is expanded upon and clarified (Constitute Project, “Lesotho 1993 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Lesotho_2018?lang=en

====Liberia====
The 1825 and 1847 constitutions of Liberia did not included mention of privacy rights. The first protection of privacy rights was in the 1986 constitution, Article 16. Article 16 states “No person shall be subjected to interference with his privacy of person, family, home or correspondence except by order of a court of competent jurisdiction” (Constitute Project, “Liberia 1986”).

http://crc.gov.lr/doc/CONSTITUTION%20OF%201847%20final.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Liberia_1986?lang=en

====Libya====
The interim constitution of 2011 is the first to grant privacy rights. It does so in Articles 11-13. These articles protect homes, private life, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Libya 2011 rev. 2012”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Libya_2012?lang=en

====Liechtenstein====
The 1862 constitution alludes to privacy rights in the home in Article 12 (Wright, “Constitution of 26 September 1862.”). Today, privacy rights go further under the 1921 constitution, with Article 32 guaranteeing “Personal liberty, the immunity of the home and the inviolability of letters and written matter” (Constitute Project, “Liechtenstein 1921 rev. 2011”).

https://books.google.com/books?id=kXBDAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA375&lpg=PA375&dq=1862+Constitution+of+Liechtenstein+full+text&source=bl&ots=6dAZ5MiCdX&sig=YurO0ujdxMdcKsMLT_DfGdxPCm0&hl=en&sa=X&ei=axZlU-b1KorroATU9oG4Cg#v=onepage&q=priva&f=false
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Liechtenstein_2011?lang=en

====Lithuania====
Articles 22 and 24 grant privacy rights in Lithuania. Article 22 declares the inviolability of the private life, including correspondence and data, and Article 24 protects the home (Constitute Project, “Lithuania 1992 rev. 2019”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lithuania_2019?lang=en

====Luxembourg====
The 1868 constitution, since amended, protects private life in Article 3. In Article 15, it protects the home and in Article 28, correspondence (Constitute Project, “Luxembourg 1868 rev. 2009”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Luxembourg_2009?lang=en

====Madagascar====
Article 13(1) governs privacy rights in Madagascar. It assures each individual “the inviolability of their person, their domicile and of the secrecy of their correspondence” (Constitute Project, “Madagascar 2010”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Madagascar_2010?lang=en

====Malawi====
The 1994 Malawi Constitution protects personal privacy in Article 21. As defined in the article, personal privacy protects possessions, home, and property (Constitute Project, “Malawi 1994 rev. 2017”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malawi_2017?lang=en

====Malaysia====
The constitution is lacking privacy rights protections. The first privacy related writing was the Personal Data Protection Act of 2010. This law came into force in 2013 and is more about data privacy than privacy rights generally.

https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-privacy-data-protection-and-cybersecurity-law-review/malaysia
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malaysia_2007?lang=en

====Maldives====
Article 24 grants the right to privacy in the Maldives. It says: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his private communications. Every person must respect these rights with respect to others” (Constitute Project, “Maldives 2008”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Maldives_2008?lang=en

====Mali====
Article 6 of the 1992 constitution protected the three main privacy rights: the home, correspondence, and the individual (Constitute Project, “Mali 1992”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mali_1992?lang=en

====Malta====
Article 32 of the Maltese Constitution protects the right to private and family life. Article 38 protects the home (Constitute Project, “Malta 1964 rev. 2016”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malta_2016?lang=en

====Marshall Islands====
Section 13 of the Marshall Islands’ constitution protects personal autonomy. It says: “All persons shall be free from unreasonable interference in personal choices that do not injure others and from unreasonable intrusions into their privacy” (Constitute Project, “Marshall Islands 1979 rev. 1995”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Marshall_Islands_1995?lang=en

====Mauritania====
Article 13(4) protects the right to privacy in Mauritania: “The honor and the private life of the citizen, the inviolability of the human person, of his domicile and of his correspondence are guaranteed by the State” (Constitute Project, "Mauritania 1991 rev. 2012").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mauritania_2012?lang=en

====Mauritius====
The sole constitution of Mauritius from 1968 is limited in what it says about privacy rights. It only protects a person and their property from a search in Article 9 (Constitute Project, "Mauritius 1968 rev. 2016").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mauritius_2016?lang=en

====Mexico====
Article 7 of the 1857 constitution prevents writers from writing about people’s private lives (World History Commons, “Federal Constitution of the United Mexican States of 1857”). Today, Article 16 of the 1917 constitution protects the privacy rights and data privacy in Mexico: “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, his/her family, papers, properties or be invaded at home without a written order from a competent authority, duly explaining the legal cause of the proceeding. All people have the right to enjoy protection on his personal data, and to access, correct and cancel such data. All people have the right to oppose the disclosure of his data, according to the law. The law shall establish exceptions to the criteria that rule the handling of data, due to national security reasons, law and order, public security, public health, or protection of third party’s rights” (Constitute Project, “Mexico 1917 rev. 2015”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mexico_2015?lang=en
https://worldhistorycommons.org/federal-constitution-united-mexican-states-1857

====Federated States of Micronesia====
Article IV Section 5 of the constitution of 1978 says “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and other possessions against unreasonable search, seizure, or invasion of privacy may not be violated. A warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized” (Constitute Project, “Micronesia (Federated States of) 1978 rev. 1990”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Micronesia_1990?lang=en

====Moldova====
Today, Articles 28-30 of the 1994 constitution protect privacy rights in Moldova. Article 28 grants privacy in private and family life, Article 29 in the home, and Article 30 in correspondence (Constitute Project, “Moldova 1994 rev. 2016”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Moldova_2016?lang=en

====Monaco====
The 1962 constitution, still in force today, protects the home in Article 21 and the general right to privacy in Article 22. Article 22 calls out private and family life as well as correspondence (Constitute Project, “Monaco 1962 rev 2002”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Monaco_2002?lang=en

====Mongolia====
Article 16(13) of the 1992 constitution protects the right to personal liberty and safety. It says, “The privacy of citizens, their families, confidentiality of correspondence and communication, and the inviolability of home residence shall be protected by law” (Constitute Project, “Mongolia 1992 rev. 2001).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mongolia_2001?lang=en

====Montenegro====
Article 20 of the 1992 constitution says, “physical and psychological integrity of man, his privacy and personal rights are inviolable” (Venice Commission, “Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro”). Today, Article 28 says “The inviolability of the physical and mental integrity of a man, and privacy and individual rights thereof shall be guaranteed” (Constitute Project, “Montenegro 2007 rev. 2013”).

https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2005)096-e
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Montenegro_2013?lang=en

====Morocco====
The 2011 Moroccan constitution was the first to have fundamental rights based on international treaties (Moroccan Government, “Constitution”). This made it the first to guarantee the right to privacy, which was achieved in Article 24 (Moroccan Government, “Constitution”; Constitute Project, “Morocco 2011”). Article 24 protects private life, the home, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Morocco 2011”).

https://www.maroc.ma/en/content/constitution
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Morocco_2011?lang=en

====Mozambique====
The 1975 constitution of Mozambique granted “All citizens … the right to their honor, good name and reputation, as well as the right to privacy and to defend their public image” (RefWorld, “Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique”). This is echoed in Article 41 of the 2004 constitution (Constitute Project, “Mozambique 2004 rev. 2007”).

https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4f40.html
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mozambique_2007?lang=en

====Myanmar====
Article 160 in the 1974 Burmese Constitution grants privacy for home, property, correspondence, and communications (Burma Library, “THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF BURMA (1974)”). Today, these same protections are afforded in Article 357 (Constitute Project, “Myanmar 2008 rev. 2015”).

https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs07/1974Constitution.pdf?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=pmd_uXw1EkLnkyq9T6FqkzA_NO9lvJaIhzdgyzAJ1J1s5Ko-1635431051-0-gqNtZGzNAiWjcnBszQjR
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Myanmar_2015?lang=en

====Namibia====
The 1990 constitution protects the right to privacy in the home and for correspondence in Article 13 (Constitute Project, “Namibia 1990 rev. 2014”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Namibia_2014?lang=en

====Nauru====
The preamble to Part II Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in the 1968 constitution grants everyone the “respect for his private and family life” (Constitute Project, “Nauru 1968 rev. 2015”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nauru_2015?lang=en

====Nepal====
The 1990 constitution was the first to protect privacy as a fundamental right. In Article 22: “Except as provided by law, the privacy of the person, house, property, document, correspondence or information of anyone is inviolable” (Constitution Net, “The Constitution of Nepal 1990”). In the 2015 constitution, the same language is used in Article 28 (Constitute Project, “Nepal 2015 rev. 2016").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nepal_2016?lang=en
https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/1990_constitution_english.pdf

====Kingdom of the Netherlands====
Article 10 of the 1814 Constitution grants privacy rights to persons in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 10(1) states “Everyone has, save for limitations to be provided by or pursuant to statute, the right to respect for his private life.” Article 13 protects private correspondence and Article 12 protects the home (Hardt & Kiiver, 2019, 141).

Sascha Hardt & Phillip Kiiver. Comparative Constitutional Law Documents. “Constitution for the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 24 August 1815.”

====New Zealand====
New Zealand governs privacy rights with the 1993 Privacy Act, which has since been replaced with the 2020 Privacy Act.

https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0028/latest/DLM296639.html

====Nicaragua====
The 1974 constitution “guarantees the inviolability of the home, the dwelling, and of any other private premises of persons” in Article 58 (General Secretariat Organization of American States, Washington D.C., “Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua”). Article 80 protected correspondence. The 1987 constitution broadened privacy rights in Article 26 stating: “Everyone has the right to: 1. Privacy in his/her life and that of his/her family; 2. Respect of his/her honor and reputation; 3. Know about any information which private or public entities may have on record about him/her as well as the right to know why and for what purpose they hold such information; 4. Inviolability of his/her domicile, correspondence and communication of any kind.” (Constitute Project, “Nicaragua 1987 rev. 2014”).

https://books.google.com/books?printsec=frontcover&vid=LCCN77374018#v=snippet&q=inviolable&f=false
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nicaragua_2014?lang=en

====Niger====
The 2010 constitution only protects the domicile of people in terms of privacy rights. This is done in Article 27 (Constitute Project, “Niger 2010 rev. 2017”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Niger_2017?lang=en

====Nigeria====
In 1960, the country’s first constitution protected the private life, home, and correspondence of each person in Article 22 (World Statesmen, “The Constitution of the Federation of Niger”).
Today, the same language is seen in Article 37 of the 1999 constitution (Constitute Project, “Nigeria Constitution 1999 rev. 2011”).

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/nigeria_const1960.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Nigeria_2011?lang=en

====North Korea====
Article 79 of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 1972 constitution grants that citizens and homes are inviolable and that communications are private (Constitute Project, “Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of) 1972 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Peoples_Republic_of_Korea_2016?lang=en

====North Macedonia====
Article 25 of the 1991 constitution states “Each citizen is guaranteed the respect and protection of the privacy of his/her personal and family life and of his/her dignity and repute.” Amendment XIX, altering Article 17, protects communications more heavily (Constitute Project, “North Macedonia 1991 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Macedonia_2011?lang=en

====Norway====
Norway has had one constitution since 1814, though it has been amended many times. Article 102 gives everyone “the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence” (Constitute Project, “Norway 1814 rev. 2016”). However, it appears this was amended sometime after 2004, as the version with amendments through 2004 does not have this language in Article 102 (Constitute Project, “Norway 1814 rev. 2004”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Norway_2016?lang=en
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Norway_2004.pdf

====Oman====
The Oman constitution, written in 1996, only constitutional protects the privacy of homes in Article 27 (Constitute Project, "Oman 1996 rev. 2011").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Oman_2011?lang=en

====Pakistan====
The 1973 constitution, reinstated in 2002, in Article 14 cites the inviolability of man’s dignity and privacy in the home as fundamental (Constitute Project, “Pakistan Constitution reinst. 2002, rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Pakistan_2018?lang=en

====Palau====
Article IV(4) of the 1981 constitution ensures “Every person has the right to be secure in his person, house, papers and effects against entry, search and seizure” (Constitute Project, “Palau 1981 rev. 1992").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Palau_1992?lang=en

====Panama====
Article 28 of the 1904 constitution keeps documents private (University of Michigan, “Constitution of the Republic of Panama”). The 1972 constitution reflects the same tone toward the privacy of documents in Article 29. Article 26 grants the home inviolable, though there is no blanket protection of privacy rights in the 1972 constitution (Constitute Project, “Panama 1972 rev. 2004”).

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112104577715&view=1up&seq=12
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Panama_2004?lang=en

====Papua New Guinea====
Under the basic rights prescribed under Section 5(f), all citizens have the “protection for the privacy of their homes and other property” (Constitute Project, Papua New Guinea 1975 rev. 2016). Additionally, Article 49(1) gives “Every person has a right to reasonable privacy in respect of his private and family life, his communications with other persons and his personal papers and effects, except to the extent that the exercise of that right is regulated or restricted by law that complies with Section 38 (general qualifications on qualified rights).”

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Papua_New_Guinea_2016?lang=en

====Paraguay====
In the 1967 constitution, Article 68 makes the home inviolable, and Article 69 makes communications inviolable, barring investigation (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, “Constitution of the Republic of Paraguay 1967”. Today, according to Article 33 of the Paraguay Constitution, “Personal and family intimacy, as well as the respect of private life, is inviolable. The behavior of persons, that does not affect the public order established by the law or the rights of third parties[,] is exempted from the public authority.” Article 34 inviolably protects the home (Constitute Project, “Paraguay 1992 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Paraguay_2011?lang=en
https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/con00138.pdf

====Peru====
Today, Article 2(7) protects privacy rights in Peru for one’s honor, reputation, personal and family life, voice, and image (Constitute Project, “Peru 1993 rev. 2021”). Similar rights appear to have been listed in Article 2 of the 1979 constitution, but an English translation could not be found.

http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Peru-Constitucion%201979.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Peru_2021?lang=en

====Philippines====
The 1935 Constitution grants “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated” in Article III, Section 1(3) (Official Gazette, “The 1935 Constitution”). Today, similar language is used in Article II, Section 1(2) (Official Gazette, “The 1935 Constitution”).

https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/the-1935-constitution/
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/

====Poland====
The 1921 Polish Constitution grants privacy in the home and communication in articles 100 and 106, respectively (Sejm Parliamentary Library, “Constitution of the Republic of Poland, March 17, 1921”). Today, Article 47 of the 1997 constitution protects the general right to privacy in Poland: “Everyone shall have the right to legal protection of his private and family life, of his honour and good reputation and to make decisions about his personal life.” Articles 49 and 50 extend these protections to communications and the home (Constitute Project, “Poland 1997 rev. 2009”).

http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/kpol/e1921.html
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Poland_2009?lang=en

====Portugal====
Portugal’s first protection of privacy was in the 1976 constitution. Article 26(1) says “Everyone shall possess the right to a personal identity, to the development of their personality, to civil capacity, to citizenship, to a good name and reputation, to their likeness, to speak out, to protect the privacy of their personal and family life, and to legal protection against any form of discrimination.” Article 65 grants privacy in the home (Constitute Project, “Portugal 1976 rev. 2005).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Portugal_2005?lang=en

====Qatar====
From 1972-2003, Qatar was ruled by a temporary constitution. In this document Article 12 granted the sanctity of dwellings (Al Meezan, “The Amended Provisional Constitution of 1972”). Today, Article 37 of the Constitution claims “The sanctity of human privacy shall be inviolable, and therefore interference into privacy of a person, family affairs, home of residence, correspondence, or any other act of interference that may demean or defame a person may not be allowed save as limited by the provisions of the law stipulated therein” (Qatar Government Communications Office, “The Constitution”).

https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/about-qatar/the-constitution/
https://www.almeezan.qa/LawView.aspx?opt&LawID=4360&language=en#Section_14176

====Romania====
Today, Article 26 of the 1991 Romanian Constitution protects personal and family privacy: “(1) The public authorities shall respect and protect the intimate, family and private life” (Constitute Project, “Romania 1991 rev. 2003”). Privacy may have been protected in earlier iterations of the constitution (i.e., 1952, 1965, etc.), but English translations could not be found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Romania_2003?lang=en

====Russia====
In 1906, the Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire were the first to grant Russians “sanctity of the home and property.” This was the first time Russians were granted civil liberties (Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library, “‘Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire’ Approved”).

https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619222

====Rwanda====
The right to privacy in Rwanda is protected by Articles 23 and 34. Article 23 states “The privacy of a person, his or her family, home or correspondence shall not be subjected to interference in a manner inconsistent with the law; the person's honour and dignity shall be respected. A person's home is inviolable. No search or entry into a home shall be carried out without the consent of the owner, except in circumstances and in accordance with procedures determined by the law.” Article 34 states “Private property, whether owned individually or collectively, is inviolable” (Constitute Project, "Rwanda 2003 rev. 2015").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Rwanda_2015?lang=en

====Saint Kitts and Nevis====
Chapter II, Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, of the 1983 constitution entitles everyone to fundamental rights, including “protection for his personal privacy, the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation” (Constitute Project, “Saint Kitts and Nevis 1983”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Kitts_and_Nevis_1983?lang=en

====Saint Lucia====
Chapter I, Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, of the 1978 constitution immediately grants every person in St. Lucia “protection for his family life, his personal privacy, the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation” (Constitute Project, “Saint Lucia 1978”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Lucia_1978?lang=en

====Saint Vincent and the Grenadines====
In the preamble of their only constitution to date, Vincentians are promised safeguards to “the rights of privacy of family life, of property, and the fostering of the pursuit of just economic rewards for labor.” This is reaffirmed in Article 1 with the granting of fundamental rights and freedoms (Constitute Project, “Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1979”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Vincent_and_the_Grenadines_1979?lang=en

====Samoa====
There is no mention of privacy rights in the constitution, which has been updated as recently as 2017 (Constitute Project, “Samoa 1962 rev. 2017”). Section 50(2) of the Telecommunications Act 2005 protects the privacy of telecommunications customers (Samoa). This was the earliest found reference to privacy rights in Samoa.

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Samoa_2017?lang=en
https://www.regulator.gov.ws/images/Act/TELECOMMUNICATIONS_ACT_2005_-_Eng.pdf

====San Marino====
The 1974 Declaration of Citizens' Rights and of the fundamental principles of the San Marinese legal order is the first time privacy rights are alluded to in San Marino. Art. 6 grants civil and political liberties. It does not grant privacy except in communications.

https://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions/country/6/San%20Marino/show

====São Tomé and Príncipe====
Article 24 of the 1975 Constitution, still in effect today, states “Personal identity and the confidentiality of the intimacy of private and family life are inviolable” (Constitute Project, Sao Tome and Principe 1975 rev. 2003). Additionally, Article 25 grants that communications and one’s home are also private (Constitute Project, Sao Tome and Principe 1975 rev. 2003).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Sao_Tome_and_Principe_2003?lang=en

====Saudi Arabia====
The 1992 Saudi Constitution does not explicitly protect privacy but claims privacy in communications and homes in Articles 37 and 40 (Constitute Project, “Saudi Arabia’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2005”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Saudi_Arabia_2013?lang=en

====Senegal====
Senegal does not explicitly protect the right to privacy in its constitution. Article 7 of the 2001 constitution makes the claim to protect human rights but does not call out privacy. Article 13 provides for private correspondence and Article 16 makes the domicile inviolable (Constitute Project, “Senegal 2001 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Senegal_2016?lang=en

====Serbia====
The 2006 Serbian Constitution does not protect the right to privacy outright but allows for privacy in communication and data collection/sharing in Articles 41 and 42 (Constitute Project, “Serbia 2006”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Serbia_2006?lang=en

====Seychelles====
The 1976 Independence Constitution of Seychelles, under Chapter 3, Article 12(c) gives individuals privacy of their home and other property (Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative, “Constitution of Seychelles, 1976”).

https://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/constitution-of-seychelles-1976/

====Sierra Leone====
The 1978 constitution protected the privacy of the home and property under Article 12 (The Laws of Sierra Leone on the Sierra Leone Web, “The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1978”).

http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/1978-12s.pdf

====Singapore====
No part of the constitution mentions a right to privacy (Privacy International, “The Right to Privacy in Singapore”). There are also no specific laws governing privacy within the state.

https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/Singapore_UPR_PI_submission_FINAL.pdf

====Slovakia====
Article 16(1) of the 1992 constitution states “The inviolability of the person and its privacy is guaranteed. It may be limited only in cases laid down by law” (Constitute Project, “Slovakia 1992 rev. 2017). Sections 2 and 3 of Article 19 protect private life and data collection and publication (Constitute Project, “Slovakia 1992 rev. 2017). Article 21 claims the home is inviolable, while Article 22 protects communications (Constitute Project, “Slovakia 1992 rev. 2017).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Slovakia_2017?lang=en

====Slovenia====
Articles 35 and 36 of the constitution speak to the right to privacy in Slovenia. Article 35 says “The inviolability of the physical and mental integrity of every person, his privacy and personality rights shall be guaranteed” (Constitute Project, “Slovenia 1991 rev. 2016”). Article 36 says “Dwellings are inviolable. No one may, without a court order, enter the dwelling or other premises of another person, nor may he search the same, against the will of the resident. Any person whose dwelling or other premises are searched has the right to be present or to have a representative present. Such a search may only be conducted in the presence of two witnesses. Subject to conditions provided by law, an official may enter the dwelling or other premises of another person without a court order, and may in exceptional circumstances conduct a search in the absence of witnesses, where this is absolutely necessary for the direct apprehension of a person who has committed a criminal offence or to protect people or property” (Constitute Project, “Slovenia 1991 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Slovenia_2016?lang=en

====Solomon Islands====
Article 9 of the Solomon Islands Constitution protects the privacy of the home and other property: “Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.” (Constitute Project, “Solomon Islands 1978 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Solomon_Islands_2018?lang=en

====Somalia====
Article 28 of the 1960 Constitution of Somalia grants “respect for the private home” in which "no home or private property of any one (sic) may be entered into or violated, save in the cases mentioned in Paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of Article 25” (World Intellectual Property Organization, “The Constitution”).

https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/so/so002en.pdf

====South Africa====
The 1993 Interim Constitution of South Africa was the first to grant privacy rights. The right to privacy includes “the right not to be subject to searches of his or her person, home or property, the seizure of private possessions or the violation of private communications” (South African Government, “Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993”). Today, the 1996 Constitution offers similar protections in Article 14 (Constitute Project, “South Africa 1996 rev. 2012).

https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-act-200-1993#13%20Privacy
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Africa_2012?lang=en

====South Korea====
Under the first constitution of the Republic of Korea in 1948, Articles 17 and 18 grant the right to privacy. Neither the privacy of a citizen nor communication may be infringed (Constitute Project, “Korea (Republic of) 1948 rev. 1987”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Republic_of_Korea_1987?lang=en

====South Sudan====
Article 22 of the 2011 South Sudan constitution protects the right to privacy: “The privacy of all persons shall be inviolable; no person shall be subjected to interference with his or her private life, family, home or correspondence, save in accordance with the law” (Constitute Project, “South Sudan 2011 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Sudan_2013?lang=en

====Spain====
The 1978 Spanish Constitution was the first to present privacy rights in Spain. Section 19(1) protects “the right to honour, to personal and family privacy and to the own image,” while 19(2) protects the home, and 19(4) explicitly grants data privacy (Constitute Project, “Spain 1978 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Spain_2011?lang=en

====Sri Lanka====
Sri Lanka’s constitution does not protect the right to privacy, though privacy is mentioned briefly in Article 14A(2) (Constitute Project, “Sri Lanka 1978 rev. 2015”). Sri Lanka is also lacking comprehensive privacy legislation, instead opting to write in provisions when regulating other industries (Data Guidance, “Sri Lanka – Data Protection Overview”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Sri_Lanka_2015?lang=en
https://www.dataguidance.com/notes/sri-lanka-data-protection-overview

====Sudan====
Privacy rights first appear in the 1973 Sudanese Constitution. Article 42 states “the private life of citizens is inviolable. The state shall guarantee the freedom and secrecy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communications in accordance with the law.” Article 43 protects dwellings in the same manner (The Democratic Republic of Sudan Gazette, “The Permanent Constitution of Sudan”). Today, these protections are combined into Article 55 of the 2019 Constitution, in which “No one’s privacy may be violated. It is not permissible to interfere in the private or family life of any person in his home or correspondence, except in accordance with the law” (Constitute Project, "Sudan 2019").

https://www.righttononviolence.org/mecf/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Constitution-Sudan-1973-+-amendment-1975.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Sudan_2019?lang=en

====Suriname====
The 1975 Suriname Constitution protected the home and private life in Article 14 (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1983, “Report on the Human Rights Situation in Suriname”). Today, these rights are protected under Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution (Constitute Project, “Suriname 1987 rev 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Surinam_1992?lang=en
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Suriname83eng/chap.1.htm

====Sweden====
Constitutionally, privacy rights were introduced with the 1974 Swedish Constitution. Articles 2 and 6 present the right to privacy, while Article 20 allows the provisions in Article 6 to have some limitations (Constitute Project, “Sweden’s Constitution of 1974 with Amendments through 2012”). Sweden was also the first to introduce data privacy rights with the Data Act in 1973 (GDPRHub, “Data Protection in Sweden”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Sweden_2012.pdf?lang=en
https://gdprhub.eu/Data_Protection_in_Sweden

====Switzerland====
The 1992 Federal Act on Data Protection was the first formal protection of privacy in Switzerland (DLA Piper, “Data protection laws of the world: Switzerland”). This law has since been revised, but since then, the right to privacy was added to the 1999 Swiss Constitution in Article 13 (Constitute Project, “Switzerland 1999 rev. 2014”).

https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?t=law&c=CH
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Switzerland_2014?lang=en

====Syria====
The right to privacy was limited in the 1973 constitution, preventing only the private seizure of private property without judicial ruling (Carnegie Middle East Center, “The Syrian Constitution – 1973-2012”). Today, Articles 36 and 37 of the 2012 Constitution protect privacy rights. Article 36 protects private life and Article 37 protects communications (Constitute Project, “Syrian Arab Republic 2012”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Syria_2012?lang=en
https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/50255?lang=en

====Tajikistan====
Articles 22 and 23 of the 1994 Tajikistan constitution protect the right to privacy. Article 22 makes the home inviolable, and Article 23 forbids “The collection, storage, use, and dissemination of information about private life of a person without his consent” (Constitute Project, “Tajikistan 1994 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Tajikistan_2016?lang=en

====Tanzania====
The 1965 constitution of Tanzania did not explicitly provide for privacy but defaulted “to safeguard the inherent dignity of the individual in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” during the preamble (World Statesmen, “The Interim Constitution of Tanzania”). Today, the 1997 constitution (as amended in 2005) privacy and personal security in Article 16 (Constitute Project, “Tanzania’s Constitution of 1977 with Amendments through 2005”).

http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Tanzania-Constitution-1965.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Tanzania_2005?lang=en

====Thailand====
The earliest mention of privacy is the 1997 constitution of Thailand. While they have had many constitutions since 1932, the earliest translation found was that of the 1997 text. Section 34 protects “A person’s family rights, dignity, reputation or the right of privacy” unless it is beneficial to the public (Ref World, “Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand”).

https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ae6b5b2b.pdf

====Togo====
Articles 27, 28, and 29 in the 1992 Togolese Constitution protect private property, the home, private life, and image, and correspondence. Article 28 is explicit to the right to privacy, while Articles 27 and 29 fit into the privacy penumbras subscribed by the United States (Constitute Project, “Togo’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2007”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Togo_2007?lang=en

====Tonga====
The Tonga constitution was written in 1875. Under Article 16, privacy is granted during searches, except for lawfully granted searches through a warrant (Constitute Project, “Tonga’s Constitution of 1875 with Amendments through 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Tonga_2013.pdf?lang=en

====Trinidad and Tobago====
The 1976 constitution does not explicitly protect the right to privacy. However, Article 4 protects fundamental human rights, such as “the right of the individual to respect for his private and family life” and protection of the law (Constitute Project, “Trinidad and Tobago 1976 rev. 2007").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Trinidad_and_Tobago_2007?lang=en

====Tunisia====
In 1959, the constitution granted the right to privacy in Article 9. At some point between then and 2008, this article was amended to protect personal data, reflecting the changes in privacy rights with new technologies (Constitute Project, “Tunisia 1959 rev. 2008").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2008?lang=en

====Turkey====
The 1924 Turkish Constitution protects personal liberty except for the provision of law under Article 72 (World Statesmen, “The New Constitution of Turkey”). Article 71 protects the inviolability of the home, life, property, and honor. Article 81 allows for private communications.

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Turkeyconstitution1924.pdf

====Turkmenistan====
The 1992 Constitution protects against arbitrary interference of privacy in Article 25 (International Committee on the Red Cross, “Constitution 1992, as of 2008”).

Today, Article 37 of the 2008 constitution grants “the right to private liberty, personal and family secrets and their protection from arbitrary interference in their privacy” while Article 38 prevents the “Collection, storage and dissemination of information about private life of an individual” without consent (Constitute Project, “Turkmenistan's Constitution of 2008 with Amendments through 2016”).

https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/D9E58AFB0C841166C1256FFD0034016C
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkmenistan_2016.pdf?lang=en

====Tuvalu====
The 1996 constitution protects privacy rights under Articles 11(h) and 21 (Constitute Project, “Tuvalu Constitution of 1996”). Article 11(h) reads “Every person is entitled…to the following fundamental freedoms: […] (h) protection for the privacy of his home and other property” (Constitute Project, “Tuvalu Constitution of 1996”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tuvalu_1986.pdf?lang=en

====Uganda====
Article 17(c) of the 1962 constitution provides privacy rights protections in Uganda (World Statesmen, “Uganda Constitutional Instruments”). It protects “the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation” as a fundamental right. Today, the 1995 Constitution grants these protections in Article 27 (Constitute Project, “Uganda’s Constitution of 1995 with Amendments through 2017").

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Uganda-const-1962.pdf
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Uganda_2017.pdf?lang=en

====Ukraine====
Articles 30, 31, and 32 of the 1996 Constitution grant the right to privacy (Constitute Project, “Ukraine’s Constitution of 1996 with Amendments through 2016”). Article 30 gives privacy in the home, Article 31 allows privacy protections to communications, and Article 32 prevents interference into personal and family life (Constitute Project, “Ukraine’s Constitution of 1996 with Amendments through 2016”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ukraine_2016.pdf?lang=en

====United Arab Emirates====
The 1971 constitution protects privacy in communications in Articles 31 and Article 36 protects one’s home (Constitute Project, “United Arab Emirates 1971, rev. 2009").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/United_Arab_Emirates_2009?lang=en

====United Kingdom====
The United Kingdom 1988 Human Rights Act entrenched the ECHR into United Kingdom law (Liberty, “The Human Rights Act”). It protects one’s privacy from unnecessary intrusion, among other rights. Additionally, in ‘’The Right to Privacy’’ Warren and Brandeis cite Lord Cottenham in 1820 who, in agreement with Lord Eldon, felt that were a king’s illnesses recorded by a doctor and published while that king was still alive, a court would not permit its publishing, as he claimed this circumstance would breach the king’s privacy (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 205; Bycer, 2014).

https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/your-rights/the-human-rights-act/
Bycer, M. (2014). Understanding the 1890 Warren and Brandeis “The Right to Privacy” Article. National Juris University. Retrieved Sept. 10, 2021, from https://nationalparalegal.edu/UnderstandingWarrenBrandeis.aspx
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

====United States====
The first mention of this right is ‘’The Right to Privacy’’ written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis and published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890. Constitutionally, it was first found in the 1965 Supreme Court case ‘’Griswold v. Connecticut’’ (Privacy, n.d.).

Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

====Uruguay====
The 1966 constitution was the first translated into English to mention privacy rights. It is protected in Articles 10, 11, and 28. Article 10 grants individuals’ privacy, Article 11 makes the home private, and Article 28 protects communications (Constitute Project, "Uruguay 1966, reinst. 1985, rev. 2004").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Uruguay_2004?lang=en

====Uzbekistan====
Article 27 of the 1992 Constitution protects privacy and the inviolability of the home, requiring a prescription by law to allow a search of the home (Constitute Project, “Uzbekistan's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2011”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Uzbekistan_2011.pdf?lang=en

====Vanuatu====
Article 5(1)(j) in the 1980 Vanuatu Constitution protects privacy in the home and property (Constitute Project, “Vanuatu’s Constitution of 1980 with Amendments through 2013”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Vanuatu_2013.pdf?lang=en

====Venezuela====
Privacy is first alluded to in the Venezuelan Declaration of Independence and Constitution of 1812 in Art. 177, which grants privacy in the home from soldiers (Rice University, "Venezuelan Declaration of Independence and Constitution").
Today, privacy is strictly protected in Venezuela, going beyond the call of the ICCPR’s call in Article 17 under constitutional Articles 48 and 60 (Privacy International, “The Right to Privacy in Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of): Stakeholder Report, Universal Periodic Review,” 4).

https://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/venezuela_upr2016.pdf
https://scholarship.rice.edu/jsp/xml/1911/9253/1/aa00032.tei.html

====Vietnam====
The 1992 Vietnam Constitution was the first since its independence that recognized the “inviolability of personal privacy” in Article 21 (Constitute Project, “Viet Nam’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2013”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Socialist_Republic_of_Vietnam_2013.pdf?lang=en
https://constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-vietnam

====Yemen====
There are no explicit protections of privacy in Yemen, though Article 20 does not allow for private confiscation without legal judgment (Constitute Project, “Yemen 1991: Rev. 2015”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Yemen_2015?lang=en
https://giswatch.org/en/country-report/communications-surveillance/yemen

====Zambia====
Privacy was protected in the first constitution of Zambia in 1964 in Chapter 3, Articles 13(c) and 19 (World Statesmen, “Laws of Zambia: The Constitution”).
Today, Article 11(d) and 17 of the 1991 Zambian Constitution protect the right to privacy (Constitute Project, “Zambia’s Constitution of 1991 with Amendments Through 2016”).

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Constitution-Zambia1964.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Zambia_2016.pdf?lang=en

====Zimbabwe====

The 2013 Zimbabwe Constitution grants “[e]very person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have: (a) their home, premises or property entered without their permission; (b) their person, home, premises or property searched; (c) their possessions seized; (d) the privacy of their communications infringed; or (e) their health condition disclosed” in Section 57 (Privacy International, “The Right to Privacy in Zimbabwe: Stakeholder Report, Universal Periodic Review,” 4). Before this, the 2007 Interception of Communications Act allowed for public information to be intercepted by authorities, something that has not been rectified since the implementation of the new constitution.

https://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/zimbabwe_upr2016.pdf

===Is there another noteworthy written source from the past that mentions this right?===
The right to privacy has diverged in many ways since its most notable first mention in ''The Right to Privacy'' by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. What started in 1890 as the idea of protection against gossip about oneself and the ability to enjoy life uninterrupted has evolved into various international and national conventions and laws.

The right to privacy was first enshrined at a supranational level before it was established in individual states (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 26). The right’s first appearance in legal documentation was in the United Nation’s (UN) 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR). Article 12 of the UDHR (1948) states “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” The UHDR is not a treaty, so the right was not yet entrenched and more of a suggestion for states to incorporate into their laws and practices.

Two years later, the Council of Europe passed the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) which has similar tones in Article 8, though with an exception for national security in Article 8 (2) but is legally binding (1950). Article 8 of the ECHR specifically protects one’s family life, personal life, correspondence, and home (Roagna, 2021, 9). Worldwide, the right to privacy became codified in 1966 with the passage of the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), in which Article 17 has almost identical language to the UDHR’s Article 12. In subsequent UN treaties, this right to privacy was explicitly granted to children and migrants as well (Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, Art. 16; International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990, Art. 14).

'''Complying with the ICCPR''': In the United States, the right to privacy was not originally codified but established through a variety of Supreme Court cases beginning in the 1960s (Privacy, n.d.). In 1965, the Court ruled on Griswold v. Connecticut. The majority opinion written by Justice Douglas claims that the express personal freedoms named in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments create an implied “zone of privacy” (Privacy, n.d.). Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, referenced in later Supreme Court privacy cases, claims privacy zones derive from the Fourteenth Amendment (Privacy, n.d.). Later, legislation was passed regulating specific sectors, beginning in 1974 with the Family Educations Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), which protects student data, and the Privacy Act which regulates the use of data by federal agencies (History of privacy timeline, 2021).

The European Court of Human Rights has refined the implementation of ECHR Article 8 through case law (Roagna, 2021, 7). In deciding these cases, the Court must decide if the complaint is related to Article 8 and, if so, if the right has been interfered with outside of the exceptions laid out in Article 8 (2) (Roagna, 2021, 11). For this reason, there is no clear-cut definition as to which national laws may conflict with Article 8 (Roagna, 2021, 12). The Court has provided protections for ‘quasi-familial’ relationships, relationships that may develop later (i.e., one has the right to adopt), the development of personality, photographs, and data collection, ruling these areas are part of private and/or family life (Roagna, 2021, 10-19). The Court has also provided lengthy protections to family life with a broad definition of family which evolves with European customs (Roagna, 2021, 27). The protection of a home has also been interpreted broadly, requiring continuous ties to a location, mostly due to the French translation of “home” to “domicile” (Roagna, 2021, 30-31). The Court rules for high protection of means of communication as it can be easily breached (Roagna, 2021, 32). This protection includes information gathered from monitored internet use and remains in places no matter the content of the message (Roagna, 2021, 32).

'''The Digital Era''': Since these international conventions have become effective and enforceable, there has been a lot of technological change and little change in these agreements (Human right to privacy, n.d.). The UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) noted in General Comment 16, adopted regarding ICCPR’s Article 17 in 1988, that the legislation in many states was not enough to ensure the “protection against both unlawful and arbitrary interference,” and that data collection “must be regulated by law” (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 27; UN Human Rights Committee, 1994, para. 2 & 10). In essence, this comment was requesting states enact more protective privacy law legislation, and, specifically, data regulation law, as the right to privacy evolved to be dominated by electronic data (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 27).

There have been two approaches to this call for better data privacy regulation: general regulation and regulation by sector. The European Union has taken the general regulation approach with the passage of the 1995 European Data Protection Directive and the 2016 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR affects people and companies worldwide, requiring that data collected is truly needed, accurate, processed safely, and that all of this is done in a clear, legal, and transparent way (Krishnamurthy, 2020; Wolford, n.d.). The United States has chosen to regulate privacy data by sector, beginning with FERPA in 1974 (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29; History of privacy timeline, 2021). This approach has led to some strict laws preventing unauthorized access to personal information in some areas regulated by specific legislation (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29). In areas without specific legislation, however, Americans take great liberties while collecting data (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29). Put in combination with the lacking legislation preventing interference or data attacks, some question how compliant the United States is with Article 17 of the ICCPR (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29). However, as of 2020, 29% of states are still drafting or have yet to draft such legislation (UN Committee on Trade and Development).

'''Privacy in Former Sovereign States'''

It is worth noting that some states have always had some privacy rights since they gained independence because their previous constitution and laws contained such provisions. This is the case with states that were formerly in the Soviet Union. The 1977 Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which was then implemented in nearly identical form in the various republics as their own constitution, protected “the privacy of citizens, and of their correspondence, telephone conversations, and telegraphic communications” in Article 56 (USSR, 1982, 35). Additionally, Czechoslovakia protected privacy rights of the person, home, and correspondence in Article 30 & 31 in the 1960 constitution (Czechoslovakia, 1964, 233).

Resources

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://rm.coe.int/1680a2353d
Convention on the Rights of the Child. United Nations (UN) General Assembly (UNGA). Nov. 20, 1989. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx
Czechoslovakia. (1964). Constitution of Czechoslovakia July 11, 1960. Orbis: Prague. From https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Czechoslovakia-Const1960.pdf
History of privacy timeline. (2021). The University of Michigan. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://safecomputing.umich.edu/privacy/history-of-privacy-timeline
Human right to privacy in the digital age, The. (n.d.). American Civil Liberties Union. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.aclu.org/other/human-right-privacy-digital-age
International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. UNGA. Dec. 18, 1990. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cmw.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. UNGA. Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
Krishnamurthy, V. (2020, Jan. 6). A tale of two privacy laws: The GDPR and the International Right to Privacy. AJIL Unbound 114, 26-30. doi:10.1017/aju.2019.79
Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
Roagna, I. (2012). Council of Europe human rights handbook: Protecting the right to respect for private and family life under the European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. https://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/Roagna2012_EN.pdf
UN Committee on Trade and Development. (2020). Data Protection and Privacy Legislation Worldwide. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://unctad.org/page/data-protection-and-privacy-legislation-worldwide
UN Human Rights Committee. (1994). General Comment 16. Thirty-third session. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 1 Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://undocs.org/HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
USSR. (1982). Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist States: Adopted at the Seventh (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Ninth Convocation, on October 7, 1977. Novosti Press Publishing House: Moscow. From https://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/constitution/1977/constitution-ussr-1977.pdf
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

===Is the identification of this right associated with a particular era in history, political regime, or political leader?===
===What specific events or ideas contributed to its identification as a fundamental right?===
===When was it generally accepted as a fundamental, legally-protectable right?===
===What historical forces or events, if any, contributed to a widespread belief in its importance? ===
==Legal Codification==
===Is this right protected in the Constitutions of most countries today?===
===Is it contained in the US Constitution?===
The right to privacy is not explicitly contained in the United States Constitution.

References

Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy

===Has it been interpreted as being implicit in the US Constitution?===
In the United States, the right to privacy was not originally codified but established through Supreme Court cases around the 1960s (Privacy, n.d.). Prior to this time, the Court recognized in ''Snyder v. Massachusetts'' (1934) that some concepts of fairness are fundamental, but not expressed. In 1965, the Court heard and decided ''Griswold v. Connecticut''. In the majority opinion, Justice William Douglas argues that the Court had previously ruled on cases in which rights were not explicit in the Bill of Rights, but the rights were justifiable to the Court through the First and Fourteenth Amendments (''Griswold v. Connecticut'', 1965, par. 11). Later in the opinion of the court, he states that in other cases, such as ''Boyd v. United States'' (1886), ''Mapp v. Ohio'' (1961), and ''Poe v. Ullman'' (1961), the court used the ‘penumbras’ of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to make decisions on implicit liberties (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, pars. 14-15). Combined, these penumbras create what the Griswold v. Connecticut majority opinion calls “zones of privacy” (Privacy, n.d.). In a concurring ''Griswold'' opinion, Justice Arthur Goldberg argues that while liberties extend beyond the Bill of Rights, he, Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Justice William Brennan feel that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not include “all of the first eight amendments” (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, par. 21). However, in a different concurring opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan found “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands […] on its own bottom” (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, par. 53; Privacy, n.d.). Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion became the predominant argument used in later privacy cases (Privacy, n.d.).

In 1967, the Supreme Court decided the case of ''Katz v. United States'' (Katz v. US, n.d.). Katz, located in Los Angeles, had been using a public phone booth to inform bettors in Boston and Miami, and in an effort to convict him, federal agents tapped the phone booth (Katz v. US, n.d.). A lower court allowed this evidence to be admitted, but Katz claimed it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment (Katz v. US, n.d.). The Supreme Court sided 7-1 with Katz and establishes that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places” (Katz v. United States, 1967). In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan established the Expectation for Privacy Test (Katz v. US, n.d.; Expectation of Privacy, n.d.). This test is two-fold – the individual must have an expectation for privacy which is rooted in law and society finds that expectation for privacy to be reasonable – and has been used as a basis for privacy since (Expectation of Privacy, n.d.).

After these two cases, the Supreme Court has continued to extend the right to privacy, notably so in three landmark cases: ''Eisenstadt v. Baird'' (1971), ''Roe v. Wade'' (1972), and ''Lawrence v. Texas'' (2003) through the use of the Fourteenth Amendment and Justice Harlan’s concurring ''Griswold'' opinion (Privacy, n.d.). ''Eisenstadt'' extended the use of contraceptives beyond married couples to individuals (Privacy, n.d.). ''Roe'' extended the right to privacy to the women’s right to have an abortion (Privacy, n.d.). ''Lawrence v. Texas''' overturned ''Bowers v. Hardwick'' (1986) and extended privacy to private conduct (Privacy, n.d.).

References

Expectation of Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 13, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/expectation_of_privacy
''Griswold v. Connecticut'', 381 U.S. 479 (1965). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479
Katz v. United States. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved September 13, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/35
''Katz v. United States'', 389 U.S. 347 (1967). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/389/347
Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
''Snyder v. Massachusetts'', 291 U.S. 97 (1934). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/291/97

===Are there any exceptions in American law to this right?===
Most recent US legislation regarding the right to privacy concerns the collection, retention, and transfer of personal data. Under the Department of Justice, the Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties (OPCL) enforces privacy laws, recommends privacy policies (including exceptions), and responds to data breaches (Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties, n.d.).

'''Freedom of Information Act 1966 (as amended 2016)'''

In 1966, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This act granted anyone the ability to request access to federal agency records but not the records of private companies. However, nine exemptions and three exclusions may prevent access to these records (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). The exclusions are narrow and related to law enforcement and ongoing intelligence investigations and are unaffected by FOIA (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). The exemptions authorize government agencies to withhold information from those requesting it (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). The nine exemptions prevent the sharing of information if it is classified for national security, part of internal rules or practices, prohibited through other laws (such as the Privacy Act, see below), a trade secret, legally protected, a medical file, law enforcement records, regarding bank supervision, or locational information (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). FOIA was most recently updated with the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, which increased transparency and altered procedures (OIP Summary of the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, 2016).

'''Privacy Act 1974'''

The Privacy Act of 1974 was an effort to balance the “governments’ need to maintain information” and the “rights of individuals to be protected against unwarranted invasions of their privacy” (Walls, n.d.; Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, n.d.). It prevents agencies from disclosing records to any person or agency unless it falls into one of the twelve approved guidelines (Walls, n.d.; Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, n.d.). The most used reasons which allow for disclosure are subsections 1, 2, and 3 of 5 US Code § 552a(b) (Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition, 2021). Subsection One allows for the disclosure of information between agencies on a need-to-know basis. Subsection Two allows the FOIA to overrule the Privacy Act with regards to when to disclose information. Subsection Three allows for disclosure to another party if their use is similar to the use for which the data was originally collected. This third exception is quite broad, which causes controversy (Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition, 2021). Other exceptions include use for public record (used for the Census or National Archive data), or requests by law enforcement or the court system. In addition to putting forth information disclosure guidelines, this act requires agencies to keep accurate records of how, where, and why they sent information if they had sent information (Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, n.d.).

'''Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 1999'''

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) was passed to regulate the transfer of consumers’ “nonpublic personal information” by financial institutions (FDIC, 2021). At its core, the law says financial institutions cannot pass along personal data to third parties unless the customer is put on notice, given the opportunity to opt out, and they do not opt out (FDIC, 2021). Exceptions to this rule appear in Sections 13-15 (FDIC, 2021, VIII-1.3). Section 13 permits the transfer of some personal data to a third party if they are performing services on behalf of the financial institution, but they must be contractually bound to not do anything else with the data (FDIC, 2021, VIII-1.3). Section 14 allows the bank to disclose information as needed to perform banking functions initiated by the customer, while Section 15 extends that disclosure to normal financial institution acts, such as fraud detection (FDIC, 2021, VIII-1.3). Of these exceptions, only Section 13 requires the customer to be notified that their information is being shared (FDIC, 2021).

'''USA PATRIOT Act 2001 & USA Freedom Act 2015'''

Enacted less than two months after the 9/11 attacks, the PATRIOT Act was passed with the intention of increasing homeland security by allowing surveillance techniques used in local crime to be used to fight terrorism (Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.; USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.). Most importantly, this law allowed for the sharing of information between law enforcement agencies at various levels without notice (Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.). This law wasn’t the most protective of civil rights and liberties and to rectify that President Obama signed the USA Freedom Act in 2015, ending government collection of metadata (Patriot Act, n.d.; Fact sheet, 2015).

Resources

Fact sheet: Implementation of the USA Freedom Act of 2015. (2015, Nov. 27). Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.intelligence.gov/index.php/ic-on-the-record-database/results/787-fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-usa-freedom-act-of-2015
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). (2021, April). FDIC Consumer Compliance Examination Manual: VIII-1.1 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Author. https://www.fdic.gov/resources/supervision-and-examinations/consumer-compliance-examination-manual/index.html
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. (1966).
Freedom of Information Act, The. (n.d.). Department of State. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://foia.state.gov/learn/foia.aspx
Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act. (n.d.) Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm
Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties. (n.d.). Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/opcl
OIP Summary of the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016. (2016, Aug. 17). Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/oip/oip-summary-foia-improvement-act-2016
Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition. (2021, Feb. 16). Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/opcl/overview-privacy-act-1974-2020-edition/disclosures-third-parties
Patriot Act. (n.d.) History.com. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/patriot-act
Privacy Act of 1974. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. (n.d.). Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1279#vf4tzl
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). (1974).
USA PATRIOT Act. (n.d.). Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1281
Walls, T. (n.d.). FOIA v. Privacy Act: A comparison chart. IAPP. https://iapp.org/resources/article/foia-v-privacy-act-a-comparison-chart/

===Is this right enshrined in international and regional human rights treaties?===
==Philosophical Origins==
===What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?===
====Buddhism====
====Platonism====
====Aristotelian thought====
====Ancient Chinese Philosophy====
====Stoicism====
====Early Indian Philosophy====
====Miscellaneous Hellenistic Schools (epicureans, academics, skeptics, etc.)====
====Roman Legal and Political Thought====
====Early Christianity====
====Thomism and medieval Christianity====
====Medieval Islamic Thought====
====Medieval Judaism====
====Early Modern Rationalism====
====Absolute Idealism====
====Reformation Christianity====
====Hobbesian Thought====
The right to privacy is a right that not many think of when they think of their natural rights. Specifically, most forget about this right and what it entitles when it comes to their basic political involvement and contribution to society. Although it is not always explicitly stated, multiple philosophers have had their fair share of commentary on the right to privacy and what this right should look like within their form of government and civil society. Thomas Hobbes, author of The Leviathan, writes about the absolute power the monarch should have over the citizenry, offering commentary on the specific right to privacy within his version of society. Even though, Hobbes outlines some sort of privacy within the state of nature, Hobbes claims that there is no right to privacy on the premise that entering the social contract forfeits certain aspects of privacy in order to contribute to the public conscience and the laws made by the government.

Hobbes makes the argument that within the state of nature there is this sense of privacy that allows the people to make judgements and decisions for themselves in the name of self-preservation. Hobbes specifically noted that, “That every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions.” This is true in the condition of meer Nature, where there are no Civill Lawes; and also under Civill Government, in such cases as are not determined by the Law” (Hobbes 1651, 277). Hobbes makes the point that without a government system there is a form of privacy that allows individuals the ability to pass judgement as they please because they are within a state of war where individuals must fight for their own self-preservation. Hobbes then claims that as soon as one enters the social contract in which the people consent to being governed that the privacy is altered because the government is responsible for the preservation of the people. Hobbes hopes that with the emphasis on religion within the conscience, people outside the government can make just decisions for the better of the commonwealth. To Hobbes, once entering the social contract every citizen is responsible for the common good which is only molded when the government can see into the lives of the people and make their decisions for the betterment of society. The state of nature for Hobbes is one of war in which people must be private in order to protect themselves from others and defend their own interests, but since the government will be involved to help protect such people, there is no need for privacy anymore and therefore the government needs to be involved in the people’s lives. Furthermore, Hobbes added to this argument claiming that, “The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing anything, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto” (Hobbes 1651, 106). Hobbes’ depiction of the state of nature justifies the reasons why one must be private as it relates to the protection of his life and his pursuits that will in turn ensure his right to life and liberty. As his arguments progress, he will make the argument that the state should be involved in the lives of the people because the government is the greatest representation of the people and their desire for self-preservation. He depicts this point to show that within the state of nature, there are some aspects of life that are necessary for the survival of the individual and then why consenting to the social contract means giving up some of these liberties to the government in exchange for the preservation that people naturally seek in life. To Hobbes, the state of nature is a place individuals need privacy in order to protect themselves from the dangers of those around them, hence why once people enter the social contract, they sacrifice their rights to such privacy as there is no longer a need for it since the government is protecting individual interests.

Despite his version of the state of nature calling for some sort of privacy based on self-preservation, once the citizenry has consented to being governed, the sphere of privacy is absent to a certain extent to put the needs of the public first. For example, Hobbes noted that, “For a mans Conscience, and his Judgement is the same thing; and as the Judgement, so also the Conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is subject to no Civill Law, sinneth in all he does against his Conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a Common-wealth; because the Law is the publique Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private Consciences, which are but private opinions, the Common-wealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the Soveraign Power, farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes” (Hobbes 1651, 278). As Hobbes progresses in his argument, he makes the point that the government is to reflect the private sentiments of the people and therefore whatever conscience and thoughts they have, it must already be public since the government is to represent those thoughts and sentiments. However, Hobbes also makes the case that if there are other private sentiments within the public that are not made known, a toxic environment is formed around the privacy of thoughts because the government is unaware of the judgements being made and is therefore not a part of the absolute power over the people. It is for that reason that Hobbes believes that within the social contract there is no aspect of privacy because he believes that the government is the greatest absolute in society and needs to be absolute in order to preserve the people. Hobbes also notes that once entering into the social contract, all people have left is their conscience and judgements because all other private goods are given to the government to control and to protect. Hobbes would also make the point that if the people fail to follow the public conscience which Hobbes calls the law, then there would be a sort of anarchy in which power is no longer consolidated within the government as people rule their lives as they please ignoring the laws in place and possibly violating the rights of the people around them. In addition, Hobbes wrote that, “A private man has alwaies the liberty, (because thought is free,) to beleeve, or not beleeve in his heart, those acts that have been given out for Miracles, according as he shall see, what benefit can accrew by mens belief, to those that pretend, or countenance them, and thereby conjecture, whether they be Miracles, or Lies. But when it comes to confession of that faith, the Private Reason must submit to the Publique; that is to say, to Gods Lieutenant. But who is this Lieutenant of God, and Head of the Church, shall be considered in its proper place thereafter” (Hobbes 1651, 387). Even on matters such as religion, there is no sphere of privacy according to Hobbes because it is the responsibility of the government to care for the people and cater to the liberties of the people. Any time Hobbes discussed the state of religion, the government had some stake in allowing the employment of teachers and ministers according to the standard of the government and what they should and should not allow. The matter of religion to Hobbes was a private matter until entering the social contract in which the government owns the interests of the people including their interests on religion and the matter of salvation. Hobbes further depicts a society in which the government has access to the lives of the people and their interests as a means of protecting such assets and values. Hobbes sees the lack of privacy within the government and the people as a means of preserving the people and their values as they go through society making their own decisions. It is this private conscience that the people have access to, but that Hobbes claims is the least important compared to the public, government conscience.

Hobbes does create some sort of private sphere within the silence of the laws and within the home life that the father rules over the family and the servants that does create a minuscule space for privacy. Specifically, Hobbes notes that, “Private Bodies Regular, and Lawfull, are those that are constituted without Letters, or other written Authority, saving the Lawes common to all other Subjects. And because they be united in one Person Representative, they are held for Regular; such as are all Families, in which the Father, or Master ordereth the whole Family. For he obligeth his Children, and Servants, as farre as the Law permitteth, though not further, because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions, which the Law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during the time they are under domestique government, they are subject to their Fathers, and Masters, as to their immediate Soveraigns. For the Father, and Master being before the Institution of Common-wealth, absolute Soveraigns in their own Families, they lose afterward no more of their Authority, than the Law of the Common-wealth taketh from them. Private Bodies Regular, but Unlawfull, are those that unite themselves into one person Representative, without any publique Authority at all; such as are the Corporations of Beggars, Theeves and Gipsies, the better to order their trade of begging, and stealing; and the Corporations of men, that by Authority from any forraign Person, unite themselves in anothers Dominion, for easier propagation of Doctrines, and for making a party, against the Power of the Common-wealth" (Hobbes 1651, 199). Hobbes then goes on with his argument to explain how the sphere of privacy that may exist within society is within the home and within the family. However, this does not mean that individuals within the home are not subject to the laws that are considered the public conscience. Above all, it is this sphere of the public conscience which the government develops the laws that should not and cannot be ignored by the public even within the private sphere. What should be mentioned as well is Hobbes’ sense of freedom within the silence of the laws which may allow the individual to interpret the laws as they see fit and act based on their own judgement of the laws. Alongside this sentiment however is still the lingering opinion that the absolute government has the utmost and complete control over the people and the people must therefore follow this opinion. Hobbes even notes above that the father might be the head of the household and the reigning authority, but in the end, even the father must follow the wishes of the commonwealth and adhere to the laws put in place by the magistrate and the government. Carrying on the same sentiments, Hobbes wrote that, “...though he be carefull in his politique Person to procure the common interest; yet he is more, or no lesse carefull to procure the private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the publique interest chance to crosse the private, he preferrs the private: for the Passions of men, are commonly more potent than their Reason. From whence it follows, that where the publique and private interest are most closely united, there is the publique most advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy, or Aristocracy, the publique prosperity conferres not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a Civill warre” (Hobbes 1651, 157). Hobbes describes the fact that people enjoy the private sphere more than the public and therefore, one would think that the existence of a private sphere is incredibly important. However, Hobbes further explains that within the privacy of thought there is a sense of selfishness that prevents people from making decisions in the best interest of the commonwealth and therefore, there should be no sphere that would allow people to adhere to their selfish policies. Hobbes further describes what would happen if the government were to take this selfish stance in which they would no longer do their job of preserving the population despite that being their only true duty. Furthermore, Hobbes connects the quality of the government to the quality of the public since according to him, the state of the government reflects the level of preservation that the citizenry endures. He uses this point to further the case of using a monarchy rather than a democracy or oligarchy because of the inability of a large body to make quick decisions on behalf of the public interest.

Thomas Hobbes was an absolutist to the fullest extent. When it came to writing about government, he believed that the more consolidated the power was in the hands of the leviathan, the better off the population was going to be for making the best decisions for the people they ruled over. This meant, however, sacrificing certain rights to the government to preserve the citizenry to the best of their ability. Specifically, the right to privacy to Hobbes should not exist on the basis that the government needs to be involved in the lives of the people in order to figure out the public conscience and to make their decisions accordingly. By consenting to the government, the government has absolute power and control over the people and the decisions they decide to make and therefore, the government has direct access to the wishes and the lives of the people. The right to privacy to Hobbes is an interesting debate since his views on rights in the first place seem irregular due to the absolute power, he believes that the government has over the people and the way that there is no explicit right to rebel against abusive governments. The right to privacy is a topic to which there is no one answer, yet Hobbes tries to remedy with the solution that proposes the abolition of such a right in order to cater to the needs of the public.

Bibliography

Hobbes, Thomas. The Leviathan. New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, INC. London: J.M. Dent and Sons Limited, 1950.

====Lockean Thought/English Empiricism====
The issue of the right to privacy within the United States is a relatively new phenomenon following the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut in which the right to privacy was clearly established by the Supreme Court. However, it might be suggested that its origins and foundations can be traced back to the late 1600s when John Locke introduced the private sphere when it came to the conversation of religious tolerance. John Locke wrote “Letter Concerning Toleration” in 1689 that describes the way in which the right to privacy originates from the idea that the people can and should be separate from the government in certain aspects. Locke introduces the idea of a private sphere or the right to privacy when he discusses issues like religion since its discussion creates more problems preventing society from working efficiently.

Locke recognizes that there are very divisive issues that prevent people from working together effectively within society. Specifically referring to spreading religious beliefs, he wrote that “If by these means the offenders will not be reclaimed, and the erroneous convinced, there remains nothing further to be done but that such stubborn and obstinate persons, who give no ground to hope for their reformation, should be cast out and separated from the society” (Locke 1689, 30). Locke claims that the divisions within the public sphere over religion can be remedied by the complete separation of such matters from the state since religion is its own society. Religion dividing society is evident throughout history as nations and their people fought wars over their competing religious values and beliefs. For Locke the separation between the two and separating the state from religion was a way to avoid conflict within a nation and come to the general agreement that not everyone is going to agree on the matter of religion. However, Locke challenges his own idea of religious tolerance by saying that all religions except Atheists, Unitarians, and Catholics deserve tolerance because these groups prioritize religious law rather than political law. Locke recognizes the fact that a lot of the political issues revolve around religion and to focus on the commonwealth, matters of religion need to be subjected to the individual rather than being a concern of the state. Furthermore, upon the creation of the private sphere “...it will be urged still that civil assemblies are open and free for anyone to enter into, whereas religious conventicles are more private and thereby give opportunity to clandestine machinations” (Locke 1689, 51). Locke develops the idea that all religions must be tolerated within the government in the best interest of the commonwealth, leaving the political conversation open for political conversation as to how the government should be run. If the state sphere should interfere with the individual sphere, Locke claims that greater problems would arise as the government wields a seemingly tyrannical power. Locke proposes this idea of the private sphere in order to avoid problems within the political sphere, but alongside this proposal, he builds the foundation for a right to privacy that is valued so much today. The rest of his arguments include the point that there is a realm of privacy in which the individual makes decisions that they believe will best benefit them.

It was from Locke’s separation between the state and the individual that the right to privacy came to life off the premise that there is a place within society where the government should not be involved in the matters of the people. Locke continues for the advocation of a private sphere by claiming that, “In private domestic affairs, in the management of estates, in the conservation of bodily health, every man may consider what suits his own convenience and follow what course he likes best” (Locke 1689, 34). Throughout his letter of toleration, and through the rest of his theory, he is critical of government intervention in the affairs of the people and emphasizes this private sphere as a place to escape government intervention. This sort of foundation and sentiment expressed by Locke gave the people the perspective that the state is going to act within their own self-interest which might mean being involved in the actions of the people. Locke again remedies this problem with the private sphere as a space where the government cannot get involved in the choices of the individual when it comes to their lives. Specifically, Locke subtly turns the conversation slightly away from religion and into the idea of affairs, property, and health in general as a part of the private sphere that the government should not be a part of. To the rest of society, the government has always been involved in the lives of the people, so to have this idea proposed that people can and should be independent of government intervention changed the way the people saw the government and the power they had over the lives of the people. In addition, Locke then claims that when the magistrate makes laws, “...a private person is to abstain from the action that he judges unlawful, and he is to undergo the punishment which it is not unlawful for him to bear” (Locke 1689, 48). Locke paints a picture that the people can make decisions about the laws within this private realm that adds another dimension to the idea that the people have more power within their private space than they thought. Historically, the governments were involved in all affairs of the people, leaving them little room for voluntary actions that they wanted to pursue for themselves, and Locke’s sentiments provides them the space to become free thinkers outside of the government. Although his writings are in specific reference to religion being in the private sphere, the later sentiments expand to other areas of life that would be affected had religion been placed within the private sphere. This allows the people to believe that other aspects of their life that have been controlled by the government can enter the private sphere where the government will not have any control over the efforts of the people themselves. This created a life where the people had private lives, where the government was not involved in the lives of the people and where the people made decisions for themselves. As people saw the potential for the private sphere, the right to privacy became more prevalent as a boundary between the state and the people developed, despite the boundary between the public and the private being unclear sometimes. Although this line is imprecise, Locke’s notion of the private sphere when it comes to politics introduces the idea of the line in the first place and introduces a new level of understanding about the relationship between the people and the government.

Locke created the idea of the private sphere based on the premise that doing so might help prevent a lot of the conflict that had been around during the time that created the bad relationship between the state and the people. However, by proposing this idea he shines light on the paradox on the relationship between rights in general and the government. It is the duty of the government to act within the interest of the people by providing them access to their rights regardless of what they are, but at the same time the government also wants to act within their self-interest to maintain law and order within society and therefore might see rights as an obstacle to their end goal. Furthermore, Locke writes about this topic in a time period where the legal framework looks incredibly different from what is present today and therefore writes from the perspective that religion causes these huge wars within nations and between major parties. All these factors contribute to the idea that the right to privacy has existed throughout history and throughout theory as criticism of government is an ongoing conversation that has many different perspectives and points of view. Locke’s writings about creating a private sphere for religion only reflect the sentiments known today as the right to privacy that has changed the way that people have viewed the relationship between the people and the government.

Bibliography

Locke, John. 1983. “A Letter Concerning Toleration”, edited by James H. Tully. Hackett Publishing Company Inc.

====Physiocrats====
====Scottish Enlightenment====
====Modern Capitalism====
====Rousseau's Thought====
====Kantianism====
Even though Kant does describe privacy in very vague descriptions, Kant’s idea of the right to privacy is severely limited by the importance of the public sphere and the goals and laws set in place by the government and the public

Kant’s idea of the private sphere stems from his emphasis on the moral relationships within the public that create a sense of wellbeing for society and the people there to allow everyone to pursue their own interests. In his essay titled “Perpetual Peace” Kant wrote that, “For in their external relations, they have already approached what the idea of right prescribes, although the reason for this is certainly not their internal moral attitudes. In the same way, we cannot expect their moral attitudes to produce a good political constitution; on the contrary, it is only through the latter that the people can be expected to attain a good level of moral culture. Thus, that mechanism of nature by which selfish inclinations are naturally opposed to one another in their external relations can be used by reason to facilitate the attainment of its own end, the reign of established right. Internal and external peace are thereby furthered and assured, so far as it lies within the power of the state itself to do so. We may therefore say that nature irresistibly wishes that right should eventually gain the upper hand” (Kant 1795, 113). Kant’s emphasis is on the peace of the community and the ways in which community control their own personal morality to maintain the community and avoid the problems that are likely to arise. Due to this, it might be reasonable to assume that Kant would say that the individuals' morals are private since they must sacrifice their ideals for the public standard set by the community, leaving the private realm the only space in which individuals can subscribe to their own ideas of the good life. Specifically, Kant would say that whatever passions people have should be subjected to the private sphere to maintain a certain level of peace and stability within society. Kant even adds that maintaining a private or “internal” sphere for selfish interests helps benefit both the public and the private sphere so that there is balance in both spheres and the people maintain the peace. For Kant, the relationship between the public and the private is dependent on the morals people hold to maintain a standard within the community and prolong a state of establishment, which requires creating some sort of separation between the two spheres. However, it should be noted that Kant places an emphasis on the public to suggest that its importance prevails above the importance of matters within the private sphere. Furthermore, Kant said that “ we cannot simply conclude by a reverse process that all maxims which can be made public are therefore also just, because the person who has decisive supremacy has no need to conceal his maxims. The condition which must be fulfilled before any kind of international right is possible is that a lawful state must already be in existence. For without this, there can be no public right, and any right which can be conceived of outside it, i.e., in a state of nature, will be merely a private right. Now we have already seen above that a federative association of states whose sole intention is to eliminate war is the only lawfol arrangement which can be reconciled with their freedom” (Kant 1795, 129). The idea of the “internal” is continued in his analysis of the state of nature in which there is only matters of the private sphere. However, when theorists reference the state of nature, they usually provide some remedy because they believe that the state of nature is imperfect and needs to be fixed for the betterment of society. Therefore, it might be reasonable to assume that Kant believes that this state of privacy needed to be fixed by creating a society in which people needed to create more public relations and establish a state that revolves around the public sphere and the interests for the public. This is not to say that he wants to get rid of the idea of privacy altogether, but it further shows his preference for the public sphere rather than the private sphere. When it comes to the government and the private sphere, Kant emphasizes the use of government as public actors acting for the public rather than public actors acting within their own private interests. He believed that the officials of the government are merely public figures that adhere to the morals established by society and because of this again, like most of society, they leave their private reasonings within the public sphere especially when making decisions for the people.

Kant does paint some pictures of privacy within the realm of private property, but his idea of private property does not come without exceptions and limits when it comes to the boundaries between the private, the public, and the government. In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant said that “this supreme ownership is only an idea of the civil union, designed to represent through concepts of right the need to unite the private property of all members of the people under a universal public owner; for this makes it possible to define particular ownership by means of the necessary formal principle of distribution (division of the land), rather than by principles of aggregation (which proceeds empirically from the parts to the whole). The principles of right require that the supreme proprietor should not possess any land as private property (otherwise he would become a private person), for all land belongs exclusively to the people it also has a well-authenticated objective reality which can easily be demonstrated from particular instances as they arise” (Kant 1797, 147). The reiteration of a private sphere for Kant is reimagined in the form of private property. For Kant, private property is the space in which individuals can live out their personal, private morals they had to leave behind to maintain public moral standards and public peace. The realm of private property is the space in which the government cannot interfere with the people and for Kant something the government cannot and should not acquire for themselves. If the government were to obtain their own private property, the government would become private individuals no longer invested in the public morals or the public peace they are to represent and enforce. It should be noted that Kant’s version of government is a federation of civil societies, reemphasizing the lack of power the government should have. Therefore, it is logical for Kant to believe that the government should not even own property since their role is minimized within the civil society in which the people and the public control most of the affairs. Kant’s decentralized government reinstates the idea that the higher ups within society should not be allowed to interfere with the lives of the people, leaving matters of civil society to the people based upon public morals rather than private interests. This creates a third power within society, namely the civil society that reigns over the government and the private individual as that is where all matters take place and are negotiated among the individuals of society rather than another power. In addition, Kant noted “A third kind of right is necessary for the preservation of the state-the right of inspection (ius inspectionis). This requires that no association which could influence the public welfare of society (publicum), such as an association of political or religious illuminati, may be kept secret; at the request of the police, it must not refuse to disclose its constitution. But only in cases of emergency may the police search anyone's private residence, and in each case, they must be authorised to do so by a higher authority” (Kant 1797, 149). Although the government is not as important as civil society as discussed before, it does not mean that Kant believes that it should not have any duties to protect the public peace and the public morals. For this reason, Kant grants the government some powers to protect such interests like the right to inspect or enter private realms. Although this seems contradictory of his ideas discussed earlier, it must be noted that Kant believed that individuals must not interfere with one another and have the liberty to act within their own selfish interests. To maintain this standard, Kant tasked the government with creating laws that would create a sense of freedom in which the individual has the right to do as they please until their actions interfere with others' right to freedom. This therefore is the reasoning behind allowing the government to intrude in the private homes of the individual when there is a reasonable assumption that doing so would benefit the community and its aim for peace. Again, this establishes a boundary between the public and the private realms, implying that the people have this implicit limited right to privacy, but the concept of privacy is subject to the strives towards public peace and individual liberty. Kant’s main emphasis is the peace of society and is willing to put the needs of society above the interests of the private individual to achieve his main objectives of peace and liberty.

The lines between the private, the public, and the government are further blurred in his discussion of rights and the public and government punishment for going against the morals set forward by civil society. Again, in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant said that “The real definition would run thus: “Right in a thing is a right to the private use of a thing, of which I am in possession — original or derivative — in common with all others.” For this is the one condition under which it is alone possible that I can exclude every others possessor from the private use of the thing (jus contra quemlibet hujus rei possessorem). For, except by presupposing such a common collective possession, it cannot be conceived how, when I am not in actual possession of a thing, I could be injured or wronged by others who are in possession of it and use it” (Kant 1797, 49). Kant’s main emphasis is the liberty one must do as they please without limiting the liberty those around him have as well. For that reason, Kant defines “right” or liberty above as a private matter because it is his to do whatever he wants with it. It is his and no one else to determine what an individual does or thinks so long as it does not interfere with the liberty of the people around him. This is a broad interpretation of privacy especially since Kant emphasizes the needs and the wishes of the public above the individual which contradicts the very idea of the individual having the right to do as he pleases. Other than private property, every human has the private possession of this right without interference from anyone else around him. However, Kant makes it known that there are limitations to these rights in the form of adhering to the public standards of morality and upholding the peace of civil society. It is in these instances that the idea of privacy is questioned and limited because it directly contradicts the actions and the intentions of the public and the government. Besides this private right Kant describes, he wrote that, “The right of administering punishment is the right of the sovereign as the supreme power to inflict pain upon a subject on account of a crime committed by him. The head of the state cannot therefore be punished; but his supremacy may be withdrawn from him. Any transgression of the public law which makes him who commits it incapable of being a citizen, constitutes a crime, either simply as a private crime (crimen), or also as a public crime (crimen publicum). Private crimes are dealt with by a civil court; public crimes by a criminal court. Embezzlement or speculation of money or goods entrusted in trade, fraud in purchase or sale, if done before the eyes of the party who suffers, are private crimes. On the other hand, coining false money or forging bills of exchange, theft, robbery, etc., are public crimes, because the commonwealth, and not merely some particular individual, is endangered thereby. Such crimes may be divided into those of a base character (indolis abjectae) and those of a violent character (indolis violentiae). Judicial or juridical punishment (poena forensis) is to be distinguished from natural punishment (poena naturalis), in which crime as vice punishes itself, and does not as such come within the cognizance of the legislator” (Kant 1797, 104-105). Within the discussion of the right to privacy in relation to civil society, Kant discusses the ways in which the government are allowed and permitted to interact with the community. He thus concludes that when it comes to the concept of punishment, when the crime is committed in which there are no victims, the civil society will decide a punishment and in the cases in which more than one individual is involved, the state will decide a punishment. This again subjects the individual to another power, namely civil society, in which the individual not only sacrifices his own morals to, but also determines the standards for society and punishments as they see fit. This distinction between the public and the government creates another relationship between what is considered public to society and what is considered public to the government. Kant’s ideas suggest that the individual may be private from the government, but the individual cannot be private from the public in which they report to. Individuals can keep their morals private from the public, but in the end, the interests and the actions of the individual are public and subject to judgement from civil society. Compared to the relationship between the government and the people, the relationship between civil society and the private individual shows that the public is more important since it is invested in the life of the individual and since the individual is expected to subject itself to the morals established by the public.

Kant’s emphasis on the public sphere and the clear difference between the public, the government, and the private sector reinstate the point that although the right to privacy is stated and valued to keep the government out of personal affairs, there are exceptions to this rule crucial for restoring justice within society.

Bibliography

Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysics of Morals. Edited by Mary Gregor. Cambridge University Press. 1996.

Kant, Immanuel. Kant Political Writings. Edited by Hans Reiss. Cambridge University Press. 1970.

====German Idealism====
====Benthamite Utilitarianism====
====Millian Utilitarianism====
When it comes to the rights and liberties bestowed upon an individual, there are some that seem inherent according to society’s standards like the freedom of speech and religion, especially since some of these values are rooted in texts that have helped found the country. However, as time has progressed, there are new issues that expand the public’s definition of rights and liberties and gives them a new vision as to what they may or may not have a right to. One of these rights is the right to privacy, a right in which there are various opinions, all of which are relatively new, yet there is a hindrance of commentary on these issues. John Stuart Mill has written various pieces including but not limited to On Liberty and The Subjection of Women in which he writes about the rights people inherently have and the values that people should have within society. Although it could be assumed that Mill creates a private realm in which individuals pursue their higher faculties away from society, Mill’s view of privacy is extremely limited and whatever private realm there might be is subjected to teaching morals and values.

Based off an initial reading of Mill, it might be assumed that a private sphere might exist in order to develop higher faculties away from the public. For example, Mill notes that, “A person whose desires and impulses are his own—are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture—is said to have a character...Their thinking is done for them by men much like themselves, addressing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of the moment, through the newspapers” (Mill 1859, 67). From here the reader reasonably infers that Mill would advocate for individuals to remove themselves from the public in order to reach their higher faculties since if one is not in the public sphere, the conclusion is that they are in the private sphere. However, as Mill goes on to describe his argument, he uses various examples to explain his philosophy and how the issue of the private and public spheres should be addressed. In the end, he turns to uses his own harm principle to argue that the state and the government should intervene in instances where the decisions one makes affect the prospects and the lives of the people around them. Due to this belief, he argues that the private sphere is severely limited by the government’s interest to protect the people from other’s personal desires. Furthermore, Mill notes that “That, this being supposed, they cannot be acting wrongly in endeavoring to exclude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested, of instigators who cannot possibly be impartial—who have a direct personal interest on one side, and that side the one which the State believes to be wrong, and who confessedly promote it for personal objects only” (Mill 1859, 110). Alongside this argument, Mill describes several examples where government intervention is allowed when the decisions of the individual interfere with the lives and the decisions of other people. With that being said, there can be no existence of a private sphere for the government needs to protect individuals from the impulses they have that in Mill’s philosophy warrant punishment by the government. The problem with the discussion of Mill and the private sphere is that he does not make any explicit claim about the right to privacy because of the necessity of government intervention from his point of view.

Mill further describes this limited aspect of privacy in which the government is allowed to intervene so long as there is reason to intervene for the good of the rest of the population. For example, Mill writes that “The State, while it respects the liberty of each in what specially regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others” (Mill 1859, 116). This statement alone, despite not referring to the topic at hand, states clearly where he would stand on the issue of the right to privacy. One might claim that there could still be a private sphere especially since Mill does not dismiss the idea all together, but what is important to mention is that the state cannot intervene in matters of right and wrong without letting the individual be somewhat public. He names another example in which he claims “If the government would make up its mind to require for every child a good education, it might save itself the trouble of providing one. It might leave to parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased, and content itself with helping to pay the school fees of the poorer class of children, and defraying the entire school expenses of those who have no one else to pay for them” (Mill 1859, 116-117). In these matters, Mill claims that the government can control and regulate the way that children pursue their higher faculties through education since it is their liberty and goal to reach these faculties for the betterment of their character and overall well-being. Mill maintains this point of view that every individual has the right to live their best life, which he believes is attainable so long as people make decisions for themselves only and the state makes decisions to make sure that others cannot infringe on the lives of others. He recognized the ways that people’s individual private actions could injure one another, despite operating within this realm of personal liberty. He saw the way that life needed regulation based on the harm principle which allowed the government to intervene on private matters and push for a stronger public sphere to share ideas. Mill by no means wanted the government to control every aspect of the life of the individual, he wanted to merely hold the individual accountable for the way their decisions affected those around them.

Mill continues within his other works to paint a picture as to what he wants society to look like and describes the ways in which having a private or domestic sphere can create a form of the right to privacy. Within The Subjection of Women Mill notes that, “As regards the relations of private life it may be said generally, that their influence is, on the whole, encouraging to the softer virtues, discouraging to the sterner: though the statement must be taken with all the modifications dependent on individual character”(Mill 1861, 565-566). Mill’s main emphasis is on the morally correct and doing the necessary things in order to achieve this moral good, especially since he believes that the society around him is declining due to the lack of morality and tendency for people to avoid pursuing their higher faculties. Since women are subjected to the household and are not given a role within the public sphere, it could be argued that women then are responsible for what would have been the private sphere since the home is their responsibility to maintain. It could be asserted that there is a private sphere in which the women or those at home are responsible for the moral development of the children and those living within the home. Within his writing about the home, the government plays no role in dictating how the morals are taught, therefore alluding to this right to privacy based on the premise that the home is a private space in which the government cannot intervene. In addition, Mill adds that “There is no country of Europe in which the ablest men have not frequently experienced, and keenly appreciated, the value of the advice and help of clever and experienced women of the world, in the attainment both of private and of public objects; and there are important matters of public administration to which few men are equally competent with such women; among others, the detailed control of expenditure” (Mill 1861, 580). Here, Mill describes the full capacity of women within the public sphere and particularly within the government but understands that the standards that society have during his time leave no space for women publicly. He uses this line to reference the power and influence that women already have over the private sphere despite society’s perception of women. However, it should be noted that acting within their realm of liberty, they had this explicit right to privacy that allowed them to hold themselves accountable, therefore keeping the government out of their private lives. Therefore, Mill could take on the belief that if a private sphere should exist to develop and teach morals to children who then enter the public sphere and hopefully act within their best interests to pursue their higher faculties without intervening in the lives of others.

What might be something to keep in mind about Mill and his idea of the right to privacy is the sense of Victorian morality that he writes about and his overall response to rights of any kind. He writes both works from the Victorian moral point of view which in turn is reflected in the way that he believes that society should be run and would agree about the way that life would be instructed upon these morals. It is this sense of morality that would go against most things that one might believe is not the concern of the public and Mill would want to spread his single version of morality because everyone should be morally upright according to the same standard. Despite this observation, Mill would also claim that holding oneself accountable is necessary to maintain this moral standard because individuals do not and should not depend on one another. Other than the right to privacy, his perspective on rights aligns with those of earlier philosophers so long as they fall within the utilitarian model and therefore benefit most of the people. However, this creates somewhat of a dilemma since any action or inaction could be seen to benefit the majority. The government could infringe on the inherent rights one has and claim that it be for the betterment of society that they control religion, speech, and property despite these being protected by many other philosophers. In that sense, it is hard to define from the Mill point of view what people do and do not have the right to within their system of government. The right to privacy from Mill’s perspective is one that is hard to define and comes with various limitations that allow the government to intrude on the lives of the people.

Bibliography

Mill, John Stuart. “On Liberty.” In John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Essays, edited by John Gray. Oxford World’s Classics, 1991.

Mill, John Stuart. “The Subjection of Women.” In John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Essays, edited by John Gray. Oxford World’s Classics, 1991.

====Current Utilitarianism====
====Transcendentalism====
====Marxism====
====Early Sociology====
====Pragmatism====
====Weberian Thought====
====Process Philosophy====
====Social Darwinism====
====British Idealism (19th cen.)====
====Continental Philosophy/Frankfurt School====
====Behaviorism====
====Feminist Thought====
Various feminist theorists have often been forgotten because of their role as women and the fact that society sees their input as invalid because of the long history of their treatment. However, despite the oppression and the push to exclude them from political conversations, women have entered the conversation claiming that the true problem in life is patriarchy. Their commentary surrounds the involvement of men within the government and how the male-dominated government suppresses women. They can generally agree on most political discussions like the right to privacy, but that is not to say that it does not come without variation as all political theory usually does. The consensus among the feminists is that the private realm maintains the oppression of women and propose the elimination of the private realm to remedy the problem at hand, despite some thoughts on the return to the private realm once the problem has been solved socially first.

Most feminist political commentary and theory is centered around the critique of the relationship between the private and the public spheres that inherently treats women as less than compared to their male counterpart. In her political commentary Sexual Personae, Camille Paglia noted that “He has no personal life. He completely identifies private with public interest. Hence, he is unstoppable. Such men can be political geniuses or monsters” (Paglia 1990, 214). In fact, Bell Hooks would go as far to claim that men are told to dominate the private sphere despite giving women the belief that the home and the private realm will be theirs to dominate and to rule over (Hooks 1984, 120). Paglia and Hooks both demonstrate the point that the feminists paint a picture where the power of the public outweigh the power of the private and since women are taught that the private will be their realm, they are inherently less important compared to their male counterparts. Paglia also details something important in the fact that the men of society can either help or hurt women because of the power they possess in the public and the private, yet most feminists would argue that they choose to abuse women within their spheres because of the way that Hooks says that they are encouraged to dominate women any way that they can. These sentiments reflect the critiques of the relationship between the private and public spheres that dominates the arguments made by feminists on the matter of the right to privacy and hence why some are skeptical about maintain that right. Susan Moller Okin’s work Justice, Gender, and Family noted that, “If there were a clear sphere from which the state refrained from intruding, that sphere would have to be defined, and its definition would be a political issue. But in fact, the state has not just "kept out of family life. In innumerable ways, the state determines and enforces the terms of marriage” (Okin 1989, 129). To Okin, the dichotomy between the private and the public realms is central to her argument for the elimination of the private sphere because of the lack of justice maintained within this sphere. Okin uses this to further the point that there is no separation because of the state’s involvement in issues like women’s bodies and marriage that make the separation unrealistic since within the minds of men, the two are automatically linked without any clear distinctions. The feminists use examples of abortion and marriage to further prove that the lines between the state and the home are blurred and often nonexistent because the state makes decisions without consulting women or even acknowledging the boundary that should be there. Okin even claims that the boundary is artificial and only created based off the different principles that the men have on these matters. However, she highlights the lack of justice for women due to the difference in principles in men that allow them to abuse their women and belittle them from reaching their full potential within society.

Some theorists see the role of the traditional woman with her duties and her obligations to the family as invasive and a problem when it comes to the right to privacy for a woman. Written in 1903, Charlotte Perkins Gilman makes the claim that, “The mother—poor invaded soul—finds even the bathroom door no bar to hammering little hands. From parlour to kitchen, from cellar to garret, she is at the mercy of children, servants, tradesmen, and callers. So chased and trodden is she that the very idea of privacy is lost to her mind; she never had any, she doesn't know what it is, and she cannot understand why her husband should wish to have any "reserves," any place or time, any thought or feeling, with which she may not make free” (Gilman 1903, 36). Gilman makes the assertion that the role women have taken on within the home means that there is no such privacy for the woman whatsoever. It is because she has other obligations as a mother, as a wife, as a caregiver that something is always expected from her and that her needs are irrelevant because she “rules” the home. She claims that there is also no possibility for individual privacy because there is no specific space for just the individual unless they are living alone. However, within the family, the individual is crowded by those around, and as stated before the role of the woman is to serve everyone and everything according to the standards set by the man. She adds that if the individual was truly private, there would be no scrutiny or judgement because the individual is truly private about their thoughts and their feelings, but this concept of privacy is only applicable to the man who rules the home and is always free to express themselves within the home. It is the woman who is continuously repressed in and out of the home and is in constant contact with the other women and servants of the neighborhood with whom they share and continuously violate the idea of privacy. In Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach by Martha Nussbaum, Nussbaum noted that, “It goes without saying that in poor families where five or six people share a single room, there is no such thing as the privacy of the individual in the middle-class American sense – although poor people will frequently seek solitude for the purpose of defecation, walking considerable distances from their dwellings” (Nussbaum 2000, 259). Nussbaum and Gilman both illustrate the life of the woman in which she is subjected to the needs of the family and expected to run the household without being given the respect that should come with the role. She continues the argument by claiming that individuals have the right to privacy within their decisional liberties, but for women and in general the home limits the space where the individual can carry out their liberties simply because the lack of space. Nussbaum decides to remedy this by claiming that the state should be allowed to intervene so long as they do so to protect only the privacy the individual has in the form of decisional liberties the individual holds. Even though she speaks in broader terms about the individual, she emphasizes the fact, as Gilman points out, that the role of the women is far more extensive than that of the man within the home and therefore, her privacy is severely more limited than that of the man within the home. In the process of the state protecting the liberties of the individual, Nussbaum would claim that the needs of the woman need to be acknowledged and enforced in order to maintain her decisional liberties.

Alongside the critique of the public and private spheres mentioned above, theorists propose a reconstruction of the public and private life that would eventually liberate women from the abuse and violence they face. In her book, A Vindication of the Rights of Women with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects by Mary Wollstonecraft, she noted that “To render women truly useful members of society, I argue that they should be led, by having their understandings cultivated on a large scale, to acquire a rational affection for their country, founded on knowledge, because it is obvious that we are little interested about what we do not understand. And to render this general knowledge of due importance, I have endeavoured to shew that private duties are never properly fulfilled unless the understanding enlarges the heart; and that public virtue is only an aggregate of private” (Wollstonecraft 1792, 291). Part of the larger and general feminist argument for privacy is the reconstruction of the private and public realms so that there could possibly be the existence of the private sphere once the problems are addressed. For Wollstonecraft, part of the progression of women is to form the new public sphere around the education of the women in order to maintain the public happiness. Wollstonecraft claims that the means of some private virtue is the same as the public happiness since whatever happens within the private is brought out into the public. For that reason, Wollstonecraft argues that the public and the private are utterly the same since the state already tries to solve the problems that take place within the private space of the home. However, within the home, she notes that the role of the woman is to please the man and because of this she is denied her public and civil duties which again can be rectified by educating women and men about the opinions and the manner which society enforces. The Feminine Mystique by Betty Friedan noted that, “Their determination betrays women’s underestimated human strength and their urgent need to use it. But only the strongest, after nearly twenty years of the feminine mystique, can move on by themselves. For this is not just the private problem of each individual woman. There are implications of the feminine mystique that must be faced on a national scale” (Friedan 1963, 350-351). Friedan wanted to remedy the inequalities that she saw within the private life, by demolishing the line between the public and the private by exposing the inequalities that the women faced within the private life. In order to reform and reconstruct life to benefit women, her solution was to promote education and find something beyond the self to identify with. Her idea that was if women were able to reimagine themselves, they would be able to overcome the problems and show society the way that women should be treated. Freidan’s concept of the private however was aligned with Gilman and Nussbaum in that the duties of the woman prevent actual privacy, so she proposed another separate space away from the family in which the woman can achieve a sense of privacy. In order to reimagine themselves within the public, Friedan proposed private and public education like Wollstonecraft proposed, and suggested challenging the images of women proposed by the media. When it came to the media specifically, she wanted women to reimagine themselves using their own private image to facilitate what their version of what a woman looked like. Feminists in general proposed their own version of reconstructing the public to change the way women were viewed which usually involved exposing their problems to the public, completely ignoring the idea of the private individual.

Despite the constant call for the barrier between the public and the private to be broken, there are some claims to a right to privacy made by the feminists. Catherine MacKinnon noted this in her work Toward a Feminist Theory of the State when she claimed that “The law of privacy treats the private sphere as a sphere of personal freedom. For men, it is. For women, the private is the distinctive sphere of intimate violation and abuse, neither free nor particularly personal. Men's realm of private freedom is women's realm of collective subordination.” (MacKinnon 1989, 168). Most feminist theorists agree to some sort of concept of the private and what that might look like. Most feminists were skeptical of the private because of all the abuse that took place within this sphere, hence why they wanted the government to intervene in the matters of the private. However, as MacKinnon pointed out, the private provided personal freedom that the public could not provide, hence why it was important to revisit the private sphere once the woman was reimagined and re-envisioned for the better. MacKinnon acknowledged the fact that there were legal protections about privacy for women since there were these protections for men but based on examples surrounding abortion and marriage concluded that even though it was legally available for women, it was not enforced. Specifically, the government rulings on issues like Roe v. Wade gave women the private right to choose, but she recognized that the fact that the government had a say on this matter, was an invasion of the privacy of the women to choose. Even the discussion of whether the government would fund abortions became a matter of government involvement on a woman’s decision to choose. After her discussion of this matter, she established that the right to privacy was necessary and continuously violated by the government in order to maintain control over women. Carole Pateman extends this argument within her work The Sexual Contract when she notes that, “Shultz states that there is a strong argument that private contract should not override the criminal law but, she writes, 'the idea of enforceable private agreements concerning violent sexual conduct is less offensive than a state declaration that violent sexual conduct is automatically acceptable in marriage.' Such a response begs the question about limitations to and alternatives to contract” (Pateman 1988, 185). Pateman specifically notes that the relationship between the government and the people on matters of private and public is something that is important for the safety of women and for the natural liberties for the individual. She notes that what calls the sexual contract is something women are subjected to where their abuse accumulates at home and sometimes within the public. She called for government intervention on matters of legally maintaining women’s liberties and for intervention when men within the private life continuously abused women. Pateman noted that the line between the public and the private was indefinite and used the system of marriage as an example of how the government was involved. She claimed that because the government had to keep records of marriage contracts between private individuals, marriage could be considered public, despite the specific agreements within the marriage contract is a private matter talked and agreed upon by the different parties. She still notes in the end that the government had some obligation within the private lives to reform the treatment of women and the inequalities that women face within the home, an attitude shared by most of the feminist theorists.

The consensus among the feminists is that the private sphere is where women are subjects of abuse and inequalities that need to be exposed out in the public in order to help women overcome the view that men have of them. To these theorists' women face the same treatment within the public sphere as the patriarchy and the government make decisions on their behalf and subject them to the private life where they are expected to take care of the family. The primary role of the woman centers around the idea of the family and the way that the woman is supposed to take care of the family depriving her of her own privacy. Jean Bethke Elshtain adds an interesting perspective to this notion and considers that as women are liberated by their actions, the structure of the family will fall apart. She adds that the family dynamic is also changing as there are more single parent households or same-sex households that change the way the family has been thought of (Elshtain 1981, 323). This is an interesting notion as the thought of the private sphere changes for these women and the way that women are taking more charge within the world continuously challenging the private abuse at the hands of the man. The notion of the right to privacy is something constantly changing as situations change but should be broken down to expose the flaws within the system that negatively affect women.

Bibliography

Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought - Second Edition. NED-New edition, 2. Princeton University Press, 1981. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv131bvkg.

Friedan, Betty. The Feminine Mystique. Dell Publishing Company INC. 1973

Gilman, Charlotte Perkins. The Home. New York Charlton Company. 1910

Hooks, Bell. 1984. Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center. South End Press

Mackinnon, Catherine A. 1989. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Harvard University Press

Nussbaum, Martha C. 2000. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge University Press

Okin, Susan Moller. 1989. Justice, Gender, and the Family. Basic Books Inc.

Paglia, Camille. “Shakespeare and Dionysus: As You Like It and Antony and Cleopatra.” In Sexual Personae, 194–229. Yale University Press, 1990. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1bh4bwb.12.

Pateman, Carole. The Sexual Contract. Stanford University Press, 1988.

Wollstonecraft, Mary. 1792. A Vindication of the Rights of Women with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects. Cambridge University Press

====Postmodernism====
===Are there any philosophical or moral traditions that dispute the classification of this right as a fundamental right?===
===What do the major legal theories (positive law, natural law, critical legal studies, etc.) say about this right?===
'''Positive Law'''

Positive law theory asks if the actions the government actor took would have been unlawful for a nongovernment actor to do in that jurisdiction (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1830, 1831). In other words, what does the written law allow? For instance, the model holds something to be a search if the government uses special legal powers to gain access to information (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1832). This model constrains the ability possessed by police to gain information from private parties while creating a predictable conception of privacy (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1856). Its use in the United States aims to add clarity to privacy expectations that is not had in the ''Katz'' test (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1869). Positive law theory was used in ''California v. Ciraolo'' and ''Florida v. Riley'' (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1867).

'''Natural Law'''

Locke is one of the primary natural law theorists. In his ''Two Treatises on Government: Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government'' (Essay Two) he discusses some of these rights which implicitly concern privacy in the State of Nature. In Chapter II: Of the State of Nature, he recognizes in section 6 that the laws of nature prevent “harm[ing] another in his life, health, liberty or possessions” (Locke, 1832, 107). All of these categories can be linked to laws today which protect privacy: mainly constitutional law in various countries, but also, for instance, the United States Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (1996).

'''Critical Legal Studies'''

Critical Legal Theorists believe law becomes intertwined with social issues causing each judge to have a somewhat different judgement in each case (Dworkin, 1977, 117). These differing torts and constitutional interpretations create varying implications in jurisdictions based on the weight precedents are given (Dworkin, 1977, 118). Dworkin recognizes that with this connection to social facts, the judiciary plays a bigger role in society (Waldron. 1999, 211). For instance, some judges may find a connection between the directly provided for protection of the right to liberty and implied right to privacy, while others may not (Dworkin, 1977, 117). Roberto Unger supports this example, writing in his essay ‘’Critical Legal Studies Movement’’ that some rights give individuals “a zone of unchecked discretionary action that others … may not invade,” reminiscent of Warren & Brandeis’s original claim to the right to privacy (Unger, 1983, 599).

'''Legal Positivism'''

Legal Positivism claims law depends on social facts, but the existence of law is not dependent on its merits or morals (Sevel & Leiter, 2010). H. L. A. Hart, a famed positivist, claimed that “law should be bound by limits and respect citizen’s privacy” (van der Sloot, 1). Moreover, the state could not and should not regulate private conduct unless there was harm (van der Sloot, 1). Robert Burt claims Hart essentially follows Louis Brandeis’s “right to be let alone” (Burt, 2004, 14).

'''Legal Realism'''

Legal Realism is reading laws “in the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question” (Macauley, 2005, 371). As such, legal realism expects the law to be constantly changing based on social conditions (Hall, 2005, 452). Calo claims privacy law exemplifies legal realism because of all of the exceptions, shifts with technology, and meanings dependent on other values and rights (Calo, 2019, 34). Despite privacy law’s beginnings being rooted in legal realism, he recognizes that privacy scholars have not expressly used this legal theory (Calo, 2019, 34, 40, 48).

'''United States Constitutional Theorists'''

One would think defining the appearance of privacy rights in the United States Constitution to be easy, especially given the language of ‘penumbras’ used in ''Griswold v. Connecticut'' rather than citing one specific clause constitutional (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, pars. 14-15). However, Scott Gerber demonstrated in his work ''Privacy and Constitutional Theory'' that all six of the constitutional theories of interpretation he presented can be used to find privacy rights in the Constitution (Gerber, 2000; Baker, 2004).

Originalists: In his writing, Gerber (2000) posits that if an originalist interpreter wants to find privacy rights in the constitution, they can (167). Generally, those who do find privacy rights in the Constitution cite the Ninth Amendment (Gerber, 2000, 171). This is what Justice Arthur Goldberg cited in his ''Griswold'' concurrence and has been cited as such since James Madison wrote the amendment (Gerber, 2000, 171, 172).

Living Constitutionalists (US): Living constitutionalists allow for precedents to be called upon. It can be argued this is what was done in ''Griswold v. CT'' and other substantive due process decisions on privacy, such as ''Boyd v. US'' in 1886 (Gerber, 2000, 178). In the ''Griswold'' majority opinion, Justice William Douglas argued that the Supreme Court had previously ruled on cases in which rights were not explicit in the Bill of Rights, but the rights were justifiable to the Court through the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965, par. 11).

Resources

Baker, T.E. (2004). Constitutional theory in a nutshell. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 13(1), 57-123. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1245&context=wmborj
Baude, W. & Stern, J.Y. (2016, May). The positive law model of the Fourth Amendment. Harvard Law Review 129(7), 1821-1889. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44072348
Burt, R. (2004). Moral offenses and same sex relations: Revisiting the Hart-Devlin Debate. Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series. https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/711/
Calo, R. (2019). Privacy Law’s Indeterminacy. Theoretical Inquiries in Law 20(1), 33-52. https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2019-0001
Dworkin, R. (1977). Taking rights seriously. Harvard University Press.
Gerber, S. (2000). Privacy and constitutional theory. Social Philosophy and Policy 17(2), 165-185. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500002156
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479
Hall, E.L. (Ed.). (2005). The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
Locke, J. (2008). Concerning the true original extent and end of civil government. In R. Hay (Ed.), The Works of John Locke: In 10 volumes (Vol. V). Cosimo Classics.
Macaulay, S. (2005). The new versus od legal realism: “Things ain’t what they used to be.” Wisconsin Law Review 2005(2), 365-403. From https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_8/tg2md/new_versus.pdf
Sevel, M. & Leiter, B. (2010). Legal Positivism. Oxford Bibliographies. https://doi.org/10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0065
van der Sloot, B. (2017). Privacy as secondary rule, or the intrinsic limits of legal orders in the age of Big Data. In M. Dehmer and F. Emmert-Streib (Eds.), Frontiers in Data Science. CRC Press. https://bartvandersloot.com/onewebmedia/Privacy%20as%20secondary%20rule.pdf
Unger, R.M. (1983, Jan.). The Critical Legal Studies Movement. Harvard Law Review 96(3), 561-675. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1341032
Waldron, J. (1999) Law and Disagreement. Oxford University Press.

==Culture and Politics==
===Is this right interpreted and exercised in different ways in different countries? Focus on particular countries in which the right is interpreted distinctively===
The right to privacy has been interpreted in various ways. The EU has strict legislation regarding data privacy and the Council of Europe has outlined in Article 8(1) of the ECHR (1950) the right to privacy in the four spheres of family life, private life, communication, and the home (Wolford, n.d.). On the other hand, the United States has outlined protections from government interference in the private sphere in the Bill of Rights, has comparatively less (& less encompassing) legislation on the issue, and has relied on the courts to protect people from private entities and in the home (U.S. Constitution; 1787, Amendment 4; Privacy, n.d.). These differences result in a more consistent application of privacy rights in Europe compared to the United States.

In the home, Europeans have had a safe, private space since 1950 (ECHR, 1950, Art. 8(1)). In the United States, this right wasn’t concrete until long after the Supreme Court began ruling on the privacy cases in the mid-1960s (Privacy, n.d.). However, it remains that Americans have a higher expectation of privacy in the home than in a public area (Electronic Surveillance, n.d.). In an extreme example of lack of privacy in the home, Albanians working for the Soviet government did not own anything in their homes – the state owned it all (Lubonja, 2001, 239).

Exceptions to privacy at home include police entering with and, in some cases, without a warrant. New Zealand also utilizes court-issued warrants to prevent officials from entering the home, but if officials are actively preventing a crime, enforcing a law, making an arrest, or aiding in an emergency, they do not need a warrant (Community Law, n.d.). Within the European Union, this warrant can come from a court within any part of the EU’s jurisdiction. The European Evidence Warrant (EEW) allows a warrant issued to gather evidence to be valid across the EU and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) applies this principle to the arrest of criminals taking exploiting the open borders within the EU (European evidence warrant, 2006; European arrest warrant, n.d.). EEWs can also be used to get cell phone records (The European evidence warrant, 2006). In the United States, a customer can ask for those records to be turned over to authorities or authorities can use a subpoena (FCC 2019).

The Prüm Convention demonstrates another aspect of inter-European collaboration in crime-solving efforts, leading to interesting implications for data privacy. Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Luxembourg, and Spain all signed this treaty, to which other nations can opt-in, in an effort to increase cross-border security (Prüm Convetion, 2005). At the roots, it allows the parties to ask each other for help solving crimes by sharing data from each nation’s crime database (Walsch, 2008, 86). By not creating an international crime database, each nation is required to ask other nations for the needed data (Walsch, 2008, 86). This method allows the shared data to be governed by each nation’s specific data privacy laws, but it lands in an unregulated grey area after the data transfer (Walsch, 2008, 85). Differences in privacy law become clear when looking at what personal data is collected from people. Some states collect DNA in all criminal cases, others only when the person has been in prison for over two years, and others do not collect DNA at all (Walsch, 2008, 86). In the context of solving international crime, these differences mean some states tend to be more helpful than others.

Resources

Community Law. (n.d.). Entry powers: When the police can come into your home. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://communitylaw.org.nz/community-law-manual/chapter-31-police-powers/entry-powers-when-the-police-can-come-into-your-home/entry-without-a-warrant-to-prevent-or-investigate-crimes/
Electronic Surveillance. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 20, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/electronic_surveillance
European arrest warrant. (n.d.). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/cross-border-cases/judicial-cooperation/types-judicial-cooperation/european-arrest-warrant_en
European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
European evidence warrant. (2006, June 1). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_06_168
European evidence warrant, The: The acquisition and admissibility of foreign evidence. (n.d.). Academy of European Law. Retrieved Sept. 20, 2021, from https://www.era.int/cgi-bin/cms?_SID=d241949ae554074b1e14fd12b7f05d3f5d1e38df00162723613600&_sprache=en&_bereich=artikel&_aktion=detail&idartikel=121538
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). (2019, Dec. 30). Protecting your privacy: Phone and cable records. https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/protecting-your-privacy
Lubonja, F. (2001). Privacy in a totalitarian regime. Social Research 68(1), 237-254. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40971449
Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
Prüm Convention. AT-BE-DE-ES-FR-LU-NL. May 27, 2005. 10900/05. https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/sites/default/files/docs/body/prumtr.pdf
U.S. Constitution. Amendment IV. https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript
Walsch, C. (2008, Nov. 9). Europeanization and democracy: Negotiating the Prum Treaty and the Schengen III Agreement. Politicka Misao, XVL(5), 81-90.
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

===Is this right exercised in different ways depending on the political governance regime in place (democracy, autocracy, hybrid regime)?===
Rhoda Howard and Jack Donnelly (1986) put forth six regime types: liberal, minimal, traditionalist, communist, corporatist (authoritarian), and developmental. When comparing regime type to the ‘valuation of privacy,’ liberal regimes are ranked highly, and minimal regimes are ranked very highly (Howard & Donnelly, 1986, 814). The other regime types, all communitarian regimes rather than individualistic, were ranked low or very low regarding privacy (Howard & Donnelly, 1986, 814). At their cores, communitarian regimes do not have privacy because it can be argued, as Howard and Donnelly (1986, 211) do, that the allowance of freedoms may lead to self-destruction. Thus, privacy is ignored (Howard & Donnelly, 1986, 211). Fatos Lubonja agrees with this sentiment, writing that privacy did not exist in Albania under the totalitarian regime, and cites his experience in Albanian prisons as an example (Lubonja, 2001). He also admitted to self-censorship in the private diaries which originally got him arrested, supposing many others had censored themselves in the same way (Lubonja, 2001, 247).

Resources

Howard, R.E., & Donnelly, J. (1986, Sept.) Human dignity, human rights, and political regimes. The American Political Science Review 80(3), 801-817. https://doi.org/10.2307/1960539
Lubonja, F. (2001). Privacy in a totalitarian regime. Social Research 68(1), 237-254. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40971449

===Is there general and widespread belief that this right is a fundamental right that should generally be protected (and that exceptions should be rare)?===
The right to privacy is expressed in many places: Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996), Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) (2009), and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (1950). Nationally, this right has been cited in the 1988 Brazil Constitution and United States case law (derived from the US Constitution). In India, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in 2017 that the right to privacy for all people falls under Article 21, which provides the “protection of life and personal liberty” (McCarthy, 2017; Mahaprata & Choudhary, 2017). However, many exceptions to privacy are also listed alongside the right to privacy in these supreme documents, despite the belief in its inviolability.

Article 8(2) of the ECHR provides that privacy interference can only occur in instances “of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Article 7 of the CRFEU can be breached by a search or arrest warrant issued by any EU state (European arrest warrant, n.d.; European evidence warrant, 2006). In Article 5 Sections X-XII, the Brazilian Constitution outlines the right to privacy in areas related to private life, the home, and correspondence. These sections also clearly outline exceptions; Section XI recognizes that officials can enter a home “in cases of flagrante delicto, disaster or rescue, or, during the day, with a court order,” and Section XII allows criminal proceedings to methodically breach this privacy. In the United States, privacy zones – derived from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments in ''Griswold v. Connecticut'' (1965) in conjunction with the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment – have extended privacy to Americans in various ways (Privacy, n.d.). Again, a court-issued search or arrest warrant may breach this right to privacy, especially in the home.

'''Data Privacy'''

The US has very little data privacy due to a lack of legislation and regard. Most data regulation is due to compliance with the 2018 implementation of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, which applies to any company collecting any data on European citizens or companies with a large number of customers based in Europe (Wolford, n.d.). On the other hand, the Brazilian Supreme Court extended these Article 5 protections to data privacy in 2020 (Bioni & Monteiro, 2020). Additionally, New Zealand’s Information Privacy Principles (IPP) in Article 22 of the Privacy Act 2020 protect data collection, but also provides some exceptions in IPP 11 and 12.

'''Relationships'''

In 2018, the Indian Supreme Court declared part of Section 377 unconstitutional against Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution (Rai, 2018). This ruling allowed those in LGBT relationships privacy in the home, but again, this privacy was not granted in public spaces (Rai, 2018). Similarly, the right to a private relationship went through the courts in the United States. First, it was granted to interracial couples in 1967 through ''Loving v. Virginia'' (1967) and then to same-sex couples through ''Obergefell v. Hodges'' in 2015. In Brazil, relationships are protected under Article 5(X), which states “personal intimacy, private life, honor and reputation are inviolable, guaranteeing the right to compensation for pecuniary or moral damages resulting from the violation thereof” (Brazil Constitution, 1988).

'''Communication'''

Private communication is protected under Article 5(XII) of the Brazilian Constitution (1988). In the United States, the right to private communication became convoluted with the 2001 USA PATRIOT ACT, which authorized the interception and disclosure of communication under certain circumstances.

Resources

Bioni, B.R. & Monteiro, R.L. (2020, June 9). A landmark ruling in Brazil: Paving the way for considering data protections as an autonomous fundamental right. Future of Privacy Forum. https://fpf.org/blog/a-landmark-ruling-in-brazil-paving-the-way-for-considering-data-protection-as-an-autonomous-fundamental-right/
Brazil Constitution. (1988). https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2017.pdf?lang=en
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Dec. 1, 2009. https://fra.europa.eu/en/eu-charter
Constitution of India. (1950). https://legislative.gov.in/constitution-of-india
European arrest warrant. (n.d.). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/cross-border-cases/judicial-cooperation/types-judicial-cooperation/european-arrest-warrant_en
European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
European evidence warrant. (2006, June 1). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_06_168

===Does public polling reveal insights about the right as experienced in different countries?===
'''Worldwide'''

A 2018 Deloitte survey has revealed that the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is having a positive international impact on the perception of data collection and storage even just six months after its implementation (Deloitte, 2018, 4). The GDPR has had a worldwide effect on privacy laws as it requires all companies which collect data on EU citizens to comply with the law, regardless of the location of their headquarters (Wolford, n.d.). At the most basic level, respondents felt companies have begun to care more about data protection (Deloitte, 2018, 6). Additionally, over 3 out of 4 respondents were aware of their rights under this law and some had already used this knowledge to alter what data companies were collecting about them (Deloitte, 2018, 13, 14, 19). On the other hand, 19% of those polled felt that organizations did not care about privacy (Deloitte, 2018, 6) and only 51% felt the law had put them in control of the personal data that companies have access to (Deloitte, 2018, 18).

'''European Union'''

In a 2019 European Union (including North Macedonia) study conducted a year after the implementation of the GDPR, the European Commission concurred with Deloitte in that the GDPR had made people more aware of their rights (Vandystadt & Voin, 2019). However, only 20% of these respondents knew which authority was responsible for protecting privacy rights (Vandystadt & Voin, 2019; Awareness of the general data protection regulation, 2019).

'''United States'''

In 2002, a Harris Poll found that 63% of respondents found the privacy legislation in place to be inadequate (EPIC, 2021). In 2019, 75% of those surveyed felt the government should regulate companies and their use of personal data (Auxier, 2020). In 2020, 79% of the population wanted national privacy legislation enacted (Auxier, 2020). It is clear that over time, Americans have become more concerned about the use of their personal data, especially in the private sector (Auxier et al., 2019; Auxier, 2020). Despite this fact, the United States has still not enacted sweeping privacy legislation at a national level. At the state level, California was the first state to enact privacy legislation in 2018, and at least nineteen other states have followed suit with the hope that it will signal the federal government to propose some sort of national privacy legislation for ease of compliance (Sabin, 2021). However, Americans seem to be fine with either approach, with polls showing around 70% find their state government to be responsible for this issue and the same percent find the federal government to be responsible (Sabin, 2021).

'''New Zealand'''

In 2012, the New Zealand Privacy Commissioner published a privacy study completed by UMR Research. This study found that 90% of people wanted the government to protect their data and be told by companies how their data was being used (Privacy Commissioner, 2012, 9). Interestingly, only 66% were concerned about the presence of their personal data online (Privacy Commissioner, 2012, 12). However, 88% of respondents wanted businesses to be punished if they were using data incorrectly, and 97% wanted the Privacy Commissioner to be able to reprimand companies if they were breaching the then enforceable 1993 Privacy Act (Privacy Commissioner, 2012, 23, 10). Since this study was published, the 1993 Privacy Act has been updated. Now, if an investigation reveals a breach of duty or misconduct, Article 96 of the Privacy Act 2020 requires the Commissioner to refer the matter to authorities, reflecting some of the public’s wants revealed in the 2012 poll.

'''British Columbia'''

In 2020, Canadian non-profit, Freedom of Information and Privacy Association or FIPA, worked with Ipsos and polled British Columbians surrounding their attitudes regarding privacy law. About half of them were unsure if the current laws were protective enough or admitted they thought current privacy laws were lacking (FIPA, 2020). When asked about the transparency of Canadian companies, 50% felt companies were not open about their data practices and 75% felt that Canadian companies may send their data to non-Canadian companies (FIPA, 2020). However, one-third of respondents from the same study knew British Columbian privacy law and its protections and three-quarters would like a public education initiative to teach these protections (FIPA, 2020).

Resources

Auxier, B. (2020, May 4). How Americans see digital privacy issues amid the COVID-19 outbreak. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/04/how-americans-see-digital-privacy-issues-amid-the-covid-19-outbreak/
Auxier, B., Rainie, L., Anderson, M., Perrin, A., Kumar, M., & Turner, E. (2019, Nov. 15). Americans and privacy: Concerned, confused, and feeling lack of control over their personal information. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/
Awareness of the general data protection regulation – one year on. (2019). European Commission. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2222
Deloitte. (2018). A new era for privacy: GDPR six months on. https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/risk/deloitte-uk-risk-gdpr-six-months-on.pdf
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). (2021). Public opinion on privacy. https://epic.org/privacy/survey/
FIPA. (2020, June 4). British Columbians want action on privacy protection: Polling results. https://fipa.bc.ca/2020-privacy-poll/
Privacy Act 2020, 2020 No. 31, (2021). https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2020/0031/latest/LMS23223.html
Privacy Commissioner. (2012, Apr.). UMR omnibus results. https://www.privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Surveys/Privacy-Commission-UMR-Omni-Results-Apr-2012.pdf
Sabin, S. (2021, Apr. 27). States are moving on privacy bills. Morning Consult. https://morningconsult.com/2021/04/27/state-privacy-congress-priority-poll/
Vandystadt, N., & Voin, M. (2019, July 24). GDPR shows results, but work needs to continue. European Commission. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/api/deliverable/download/file?deliverableId=69715
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

==Conflicts with other Rights==
===Are there other specific fundamental rights that tend to conflict with this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?===
As Warren & Brandeis suggest in ''The Right to Privacy'' (1890), the right to privacy directly conflicts with freedom of the press and speech. They wanted to protect people from writings beyond what defamation and publishing law covered. However, by proposing privacy protections that extended beyond these laws, they were inherently limiting what could be published. While this limitation was intentional, it was sure to be contentious as the First Amendment had been in place and protected for nearly 100 years and privacy rights were not prominent in any part of the world before this time. The First Amendment reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (US Constitution, 1787, Amd. 1).

The United States Supreme Court Cases offer plenty of examples of press and privacy rights conflicting, as “the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of the right to privacy” (''Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc.'', 1971). In some cases, privacy prevails, in others, the First Amendment. One of the cases was ''New York Times Company v. United States'' (1971) in which the ''New York Times'' published the Pentagon Papers but the Nixon administration argued that those should be kept private for national security concerns. In a 6-3 decision, the Court claimed that these were not to be considered private or secure and that the freedom of the press prevailed (NYT v. US, n.d.). Also in 1971, the Court ordered Branzburg to reveal his sources to a grand jury, despite the sources explicitly asking to not be revealed in ''Bransburg v. Hayes''. Had secrecy been maintained, the press would have more rights than individuals during the grand jury (Branzburg v. Hayes, n.d.). Additionally, other cases such as ''Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn'' (1975) and ''Florida Star v. BJF'' (1989) held that freedom of the press overtakes privacy rights when the information is lawfully and publicly available. ''Cohen v. Cowles Media Company'' (1991) granted privacy to press informants if they had been promised confidentiality with promissory estoppel because the principle applies generally not just to the press (Cohen v. Cowles Media Company, n.d.). The contrast of ''Branzburg'' and ''Cohen'' shows how interpretive and circumstantial privacy rights are, while ''NYT v. NASA'' (1991) reveals that privacy rights are dependent on the media used to publish the information. In this instance, the US District Court for the District of Columbia allowed for transcripts of the Challenger astronauts’ last words to be published by the ''Times'', but not the voice recordings (Mills, 2008, 36).

Privacy rights also conflict with the right to information. The government recognized this right with the Freedom of Information Act in 1966 (FOIA). This act granted anyone the ability to request access to federal agency records but not the records of private companies. The goal of having public records is to keep the government accountable, but this risks people’s privacy based on the nature of the information agencies collect (Mills, 2008, 50). However, nine exemptions and three exclusions in FOIA limit access to these records. The exclusions are narrow and related to law enforcement and ongoing intelligence investigations and are unaffected by FOIA. The exemptions authorize government agencies to withhold information from those requesting it (Freedom of Information Act, n.d). Luckily, the exceptions and exemptions and the Privacy Act of 1974 considered the right of privacy and aimed to prevent the collision of these rights (Mills, 2008, 51).

Privacy is also put aside when considering public security and health (Mills, 2008, 227). In the United States, this lack of priority became clear with the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and PATRIOT Act of 2001, which both expanded the ability of the FBI to have access to information on individuals that may or may not be a threat to the nation’s security. Many courts have upheld acts that place public security over personal privacy rights. To use an example less severe than terrorism, such is the case with the release of sex offenders (Mills, 2008, 224). While it hurts one’s reputation to have their name released in connection with this crime, it protects the greater community and their neighbors by alerting them.

Resources

Branzburg v. Hayes. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 12, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-85
Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc, 4 Cal. 3d 529 (CA Sup. Ct. 1971). https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/4/529.html
Cohen v. Cowles Media Company. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 12, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-634
Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-938
Florida Star v. B. J. F. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-329
Freedom of Information Act, The. (n.d.). Department of State. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://foia.state.gov/learn/foia.aspx
Mills, J.L. (2008). Privacy: The lost right. Oxford University Press.
New York Times Company v. United States. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 12, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1970/1873
U.S. Constitution. (1787). https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Are there other specific rights that are critical to the exercise of this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?===
“Privacy claims began gradually to be made independently of the trespass rules essential to property rights” (Heffernan, 2016, 102). The connection between these rights was recognized early on by Hixon (“the right to privacy…carried at least an implied right of property”) from Warren & Brandeis’s 1890 writing and by New York Court of Appeals judge John C. Grey (Hixon, 1987, 39). These rights are protected and exercised jointly in many constitutions and states, likely as privacy rights’ origins are rooted in property rights (Heffernan, 2016, 113). For instance, in Grenada Article 1(c) of the 1973 constitution protects both privacy and property (Constitute Project, Grenada 1973, reinst. 1991, rev. 1992). Without the right to privacy, property rights would be lessened as it would only grant the right to ownership and, barring other protections, leave the property vulnerable to searches that may expose private information. When exercised in conjunction with property rights, privacy protections expand. This is explicit in the constitution of Saint Kitts and Nevis, which, in granting privacy rights, also prevents the deprivation of property without compensation (Constitute Project, Saint Kitts and Nevis 1983).

The right to privacy also convenes with the right to be forgotten in some states. This right is “the right of a past individual to be forgotten by people in the present” (Gadja, 2018, 205). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in 2014 that the right to privacy granted in Europe extended to past economic troubles and that this lack of privacy that caused the lawsuit was harming his ability to move past these troubles (Gadja, 2018, abstract). This ruling allowed the past troubles to be forgotten. Since this ruling in 2014, the United States courts have also alluded to the right to be forgotten as a sect of privacy rights, despite many believing at the time “this right [would not] cross the Atlantic” because of the First Amendment and others believing this right was present before the conventional right to privacy (Gadja, 2018, 206). While the US Supreme Court has not ruled on this right, lower courts have, as the California Supreme Court did in ''Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association'' in 1971. ''Briscoe'' opined that while the reports of previous crimes were newsworthy, the “identification of the actor in reports of long past crimes usually serve[d] little independent public purpose” other than curiosity given the rehabilitation that had taken place (''Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association'', 1971). The plaintiff was allowed to have his past forgotten and the press was not allowed to take this right away, in this instance (Gadja, 2018, 212). However, this right is not internationally recognized, as other states such as Brazil have not supported this right (Library of Congress, 2021).

The right to be forgotten and property combine to create the right to one’s name and likeness which is especially important for those in the public eye (Mills, 2008, 220). It is accepted that people have a right to profit off of their own image, much like they have the right to profit off of their inventions or intellectual property (Mills, 2-008, 217-218). This right became clear in court cases soon after the 1890 publication of the Warren & Brandeis article, beginning with ''Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.'' in 1902 (Hixon, 1987, 39). Beyond this, of course, are other sects of privacy law that remain pivotal in the protection of privacy rights as it is known today.

Resources

Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc, 4 Cal. 3d 529 (CA Sup. Ct. 1971). https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/4/529.html
Constitute Project. (2021). Grenda 1973, reinstated 1991, revised 1992. https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Grenada_1992?lang=en
Constitute Project. (2021). Saint Kitts and Nevis 1983. https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Kitts_and_Nevis_1983?lang=en
Gadja, A. (2018). Privacy, press, and the right to be forgotten in the United States. Washington Law Review 93(1), 201-264. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3144077
Heffernan, W.C. (2016). Privacy and the American Constitution: New rights through interpretation of an old text. Palgrave Macmillan.
Hixon, R.F. (1987). Privacy in a public society: Human rights in conflict. Oxford University Press.
Library of Congress. (2021, Mar. 15). Brazil: Federal supreme court decides right to be forgotten is not supported by constitution. https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2021-03-15/brazil-federal-supreme-court-decides-right-to-be-forgotten-is-not-supported-by-constitution/
U.S. Constitution. (1787). https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript

===Is there a perception that this right is above or higher than other fundamental rights, or in general, that it has a particular place in a hierarchy of rights?===
Joseph Wronka posits that the UDHR has tiers of rights, arranged by article. Article 1, human dignity, is the first and foremost right. Articles 2-21, which includes the right to privacy in Article 12, are civil and political rights, protecting people from their government. The right to speech, press, religion, and vote are also protected in these articles (Wronka, 1994; UDHR 1948). Below these rights were the positive rights in which a government should provide “to ensure an existence worthy of human dignity” and solidarity rights (Wronka, 1994). So, there is some recognition of a hierarchy between fundamental rights, but nothing has been written on the hierarchy among rights of the same tier.

In practice, however, privacy seems to be overshadowed by other rights. On one hand, privacy rights can overtake rights such as the freedoms of speech and press. On the other hand, these rights have stifled privacy rights in many instances. Hixon suggests that privacy rights prevail in cases of information gathering but press and speech rights prevail during and after publishing (Hixon, 1987, 178). Mills suggests this difference in protection is due to the publication medium and the perceived benefit to the public (Mills, 2008, 36, 117).

In the United States, some scholars have noted that “free-speech and free-press rights almost always trump information privacy rights,” suggesting there is a hierarchy within fundamental rights in at least one nation (Mills, 2008, 108). Hixon referred to privacy as “at best a correlative right,” and “sociological notion,” while Milles calls it a “precondition” (Hixon, 1987, 44, 45; Mills, 2008, 116). Press freedoms only require a “newsworthy” and “public interest” standard to be upheld, while privacy rights have had to be fought for continuously in courts. In this fight, the inadequacy of American privacy law has shown through, stemming from the lack of explicit protection in the Constitution (Hixon, 1987, 76). Public figures continuously have information published about them, protected under free speech, leaving them vulnerable to the news cycles (Hixon, 1987, 133).

Resources

Hixon, R.F. (1987). Privacy in a public society: Human rights in conflict. Oxford University Press.
Mills, J.L. (2008). Privacy: The lost right. Oxford University Press.
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
Wronka, J. (1994). Human rights and social policy in the United States: An educational agenda for the 21st Century. Journal of Moral Education 23(3). https://doi.org/10.1080/0305724940230304

===What specific examples of hierarchies, manifestos, constitutions, or prioritized descriptions of rights cite this right’s high status? Low status? No status at all?===
The right to privacy is listed in many international treaties – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990), and Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). The consistency with which it is held as a fundamental right certainly suggests it’s high status. The consistency with which it is present in many national constitutions confirms this suggestion (see “What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right” above).

Resources

Convention on the Rights of the Child. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Nov. 20, 1989. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx
European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. UNGA. Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. UNGA. Dec. 18, 1990. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cmw.pdf
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

===How does federalism change, if at all, the exercise or application of this right? What examples of this can one point to?===
With federalism, there is often one state that leads the rest – in terms of privacy legislation, California leads the United States, and the German state Hessen led Germany and the European Union (Mills, 2008, 167; Petkova, 2016, 5, 4). Though the EU is not properly a federalist entity, federalism encouraged and promoted privacy as a fundamental right. Privacy rights began in Hessen, became federal law after German parliamentary action, and eventually became supranational as the EU passed encompassing privacy legislation in 1995 (Petkova, 2016, 4). Later iterations of the 1995 law led to the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation which has provisions that help regulate information privacy outside of EU borders, including in the United States.

In the United States, federalism clarifies and further protects the right to privacy. This is important because the federal right is still based on Supreme Court opinions rather than explicit constitutional provisions or legislation. This lack of explicit language allows states to “provide leadership in the privacy area because of the constitutional options available” and drive for change (Mills, 2008, 162; Petkova, 2017, 24). As of 2008, ten states in the US (Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington) explicitly protect privacy in their constitutions (Mills, 2008, Appendix II). At least twenty states have passed privacy legislation (with some overlap between the ten with constitutional provisions, namely California). State privacy legislation focuses on data privacy, improving security measures for storing personal information, notifying individuals of security breaches, and enabling security alerts and/or freezes on credit reports (Mills, 2008, 167). Most states hoped their passage would signal the federal government to pass privacy legislation (Sabin, 2021). Schwartz acknowledges that this legislation would be possible under the Commerce Clause, though the effects would depend on the text (2009, 922). Some scholars are wary of federal legislation as states have created a successful legal landscape based on experimentation and consequence, and federal legislation could disrupt the balance, create uncertainty, and be hard to amend (Bellia, 2009; Schwartz, 2009, 922-931).

Federalism results in the lack of consistent privacy laws and rights. For instance, in Germany, every company needs to have a data protection officer. In the EU, the GDPR only requires public companies and certain private companies to have this position, while allowing all other private companies to opt-in to having this role (Petkova, 2017, 20). These different laws can alter privacy protection outcomes based on the jurisdiction in which the incident took place, especially if the rights are challenged in courts. This was the case in Florida’s ''Rolling v. State''. Six college students were brutally murdered in Gainesville, Florida and their families hoped to prevent the press from releasing the photos of their bodies. Mills, who was asked to consult on the case, knew this would be a complex legal question as the Florida laws technically allowed for these records to be open to ensure police accountability, but he also knew the families would suffer severe harm were these photos to appear publicly. The Florida Supreme Court decided that the laws in place allowed for a compromise: the photos could be made available to the public by the records custodian upon a reasonable request provided there were restrictions on the copying and removal of the photos. Mills acknowledges that had the situation been occurred in another jurisdiction, the result would not have been the same and the photos likely would have been published (Mills, 2008, 247-251).

Resources

Bellia, P.L. (2009). Federalization of Information Privacy Law. Yale Law Journal 118(5), 868-900. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40389431
Mills, J.L. (2008). Privacy: The lost right. Oxford University Press.
Petkova, B. (2016). The Safeguards of Privacy Federalism. Lewis & Clark Law Review 20(2). https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Petkova%20The%20Safeguards%20of%20Privacy%20Federalsim_0.pdf
Petkova, B. (2017). Domesticating the “foreign” in making transatlantic data privacy law. International Journal of Constitutional Law 15(4), 1135-1156). https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Petkova%20Domesticating%20the%20Foreign%20in%20Making.pdf
Sabin, S. (2021, Apr. 27). States are moving on privacy bills. Morning Consult. https://morningconsult.com/2021/04/27/state-privacy-congress-priority-poll/
Schwartz, P.M. (2009). Preemption and privacy. Yale Law Journal 118(5). https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5155&context=ylj

==Limitations / Restrictions==
===What are the typical exceptions or limitations placed on this right?===
Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) presents exceptions to the right to privacy. Privacy is granted “except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (1950). The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996) allow for reasonable, non-arbitrary searches. These exceptions allow privacy to be breached with a court-issued warrant. Most exceptions stem from these documents and it should be noted that the United Nations extended the right to privacy to online spheres (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2013, I§5). Additionally, the European Union implemented the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which prevents the sharing of personal data with outside sources (Wolford, n.d.). The GDPR applies to any companies operating in or with the EU causing it to have international implications (Wolford, n.d.).

Resources

European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2014, June 30). The right to privacy in the digital age. A/HRC/27/37. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf
United States Constitution. 1787. https://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

===Under American jurisprudence, what permissible exceptions exist?===
The Fourth Amendment states “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (1791). While this amendment protects the right to privacy from the government, it also brings forth exceptions: reasonable search and seizure as well as infringements allowed by court-issued warrants seeking specific items or people. Other amendments used to extend privacy by the Supreme Court, namely the First, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth, do not have notable exceptions regarding privacy.

'''Limitations of Reasonability'''

Defining what constitutes a reasonable search has proven to be difficult. In ''Katz v. United States'' (1967) the Supreme Court ruled the Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places” and created the Katz test to determine where it is reasonable to expect privacy from law enforcement and a warrant is needed (''Katz v. United States'', 1967). This test examines whether the information was meant to be kept private and if it had been disclosed (Hu, 2018, 129). Prior to the ''Katz'' test, the court used the trespass test, a common-law approach to the Fourth Amendment in which physical intrusion can violate the Fourth Amendment. Fifty years after ''Katz'', the Court again relied on the trespass test in ''United States v. Jones'' (Hu, 2018, 130; ''United States v. Jones'', 2012). In doing so, the court claimed while the ''Katz'' test extended the right to privacy to people, it did not revoke the traditional common-law protections (''United States v. Jones'', 2012). Hu, citing Justices Sotomayor and Alito, feels that the Katz test ends before cyber-surveillance begins and recognizes the need for change (Hu, 2018, 139, 141).

In analyzing Fourth Amendment Supreme Court rulings, Orin Kerr found that four general models have been used to decide privacy cases (2017, 524). These models vary in scale (micro or macro) and normativity (normative or descriptive) and consider one of the following: how public the information is, what information was found, the actions that were taken, or whether or not government conduct should be regulated (Kerr, 2017, 506, 524). Kerr claims the last of these considerations was the basis for the ''Katz'' ruling (2017, 519). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has used all four of these models to both protect and deny privacy and has not provided clear guidance as to what is a reasonable search (Ker, 2017, 507, 508). Kerr concludes by suggesting there is no one size fits all test or model because of the importance of case facts (2017, 525). As such, Kerr would rather see many definitive models so that the limitations of reasonability are clear and contextualized for future court decisions at all levels (2017, 542).

'''Privacy Violations by a Non-Government Entity'''

The Supreme Court has rarely ruled on notable cases in which the privacy offender was not a government entity. However, in ''Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union'' (1937) the Court ruled that Senn could not invoke his privacy in work against the right to publicity of the union’s picketing (Richards, 1334). In the opinion of the Court, Justice Brandeis held that because it was a commercial dispute and affected the competition for customers, the right to privacy was not applicable (Richards, 1334). He also protected counter-speech in this opinion (Richards, 1334).

Resources

Hu, M. (2018). Cybersurveillance intrusions and an evolving Katz privacy test. American Criminal Law Review 55(1), 127-152. https://www.law.georgetown.edu/american-criminal-law-review/in-print/volume-55-issue-1-winter-2018/cybersurveillance-intrusions-and-an-evolving-katz-privacy-test/
''Katz v. United States'', 389 U.S. 347 (1967). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/389/347
Kerr, O. (2007). Four models of Fourth Amendment protection. Stanford Law Review 60(2), 503-552. http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2010/04/Kerr.pdf
Richards N.M. (2010, Oct.). The puzzle of Brandeis, privacy, and speech. Vanderbilt Law Review 63(5) 1293-1352. https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol63/iss5/3/
United States Constitution. 1787. https://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm
''United States v. Jones'', 565 U.S. 400 (2012). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/10-1259

===Under international human rights laws, what permissible exceptions (often called derogations) exist?===
Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) presents exceptions to the right to privacy – “except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (1950). The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948, Art. 12) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996, Art. 17) only prevent arbitrary and unlawful searches, allowing for reasonable searches.

Resources

European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

===Have political theorists or philosophers discussed the permissibility of exceptions to this right?===
'''Hobbes'''

Thomas Hobbes grappled with varying different situations of privacy. In ''Leviathan'', it was mostly concerning places in which privacy and the public overlap. Generally, the public and commonwealth rights overtake those of an individual, especially in times of war, but there are some exceptions (Hobbes, 1651/1965, 130). For instance, one had the right to protect themselves with their private strength without being a threat to the commonwealth (Hobbes, 1651/1965, 138). Additionally, men could own private property and goods without interference from the Church of England and hold their own beliefs, as long as they didn’t go against the Church (Hobbes, 1651/1965, 250, 345).

In ''De Cive'' (On the Citizen), Hobbes presents an interesting dilemma – once the people form a state, the people no longer exist and instead become subjects (Hobbes, 1642/1651, 39-40). He suggests this leaves the ruler of the state with no responsibility to the subjects, able to harm them as there is no direct contract between the ruler and subjects (Hobbes, 1642/1651, 40). Without obligation, there is certainly little to prevent the ruler from imposing on subjects and revoking their privacy.

'''Locke'''

In 1689, John Locke discussed privacy in his ''Letters on Toleration''. In this essay, Locke discusses privacy in relation to the Church of England. Generally, there is no privacy from the Magistrate in matters relating to the Church, however, in some instances, privacy is afforded to private matters (Locke, 1689/2010, 43, 46). For instance, Locke claims that one may take care of one’s health without much interference at all and prevents people from telling others what to believe in unless they are a clergyman (Locke, 1689/2010, 46. 129). Additionally, if one perceives an order by a magistrate to be unlawful, they can abstain from that law, and the magistrate cannot use their private judgment to impose laws but must refer back to God’s laws (Locke, 1689/2010, 58-59).

'''Kant'''

Immanuel Kant talks a lot about Enlightenment and the formation of states. Inherently, in the creation of these states, some rights are taken away to “[harmonize] with the freedom on everyone else” (Kant, 1970, 47, 55, 73). However, these rights that are given up usually have specific limitations (Kant, 1970, 45). The government in these societies could prevent some actions but, much like Warren & Brandeis later, felt that free-thinking and reasoning were of utmost importance in developing new ideas, and suggested they be protected (Kant, 1970, 59). However, Kant also suggests limiting the right to reason because it can still “expand to its fullest” while it is limited (Kant, 1970, 59).

In Warren & Brandeis’s terms of “the right to be let alone,” Kant, in his ''Theory and Practice'', instead proposes the right to coercion, meaning all who are a part of the state are held to the same standard (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 193; Kant, 1970, 75). This coercion is imposed uniformly on all subjects, but not the ruler (Kant, 1970, 75). As long as one was conforming to the laws, there was no reason to interrupt their actions, but once conformity was broken, there was a chance to impose and alter someone’s actions (Kant, 1970, 80). Kant recognizes that Hobbes feels differently, writing directly against Hobbes’ views as put forth in De Cive, in that the ruler has no obligations to the people and may treat them how he wishes – implying no right to be let alone (Kant, 1970, 84; Hobbes, 1651, 40).

'''Sieyes'''

In his essay titled ''Views of the Executive Means Available to the Representatives of France in 1789'', Emmanuel Sieyes claims rights are inherent to a person. However, in ''What is the Third Estate'', Sieyes claims that states may use the rights it was granted by the constitution and positive law to preserve the nation and community (Sieyes, 1788/2003, 136). In terms of privacy, these statements seem to imply that privacy may sometimes be taken away from some in the interests of the public. It is important to note, though, that these impositions may not go beyond the scope of the constitution in place (Sieyes, 1788/2003, 137).

'''Mill'''

John Stuart Mill, an English thinker, recognizes that English laws tended to interfere with privacy (Mill, 1859/2011, 15). However, Mill felt that separating church and state (“spiritual and temporal authority”) prevented more interferences of law within private life, somewhat facilitating what Warren & Brandeis would later call “the right to be let alone” (Mill, 1859/2011, 24; Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 193).

Resources

Hobbes, T. (1651). De cive (T. Hobbes, Trans.). UK Public Library. (Original work published 1642). http://www.public-library.uk/ebooks/27/57.pdf
Hobbes, T. (1965). Leviathan. Liberty Fund. (Original work published 1651). http://files.libertyfund.org/files/869/0161_Bk.pdf
Kant, I. (1970). Kant: Political writings (R.S. Reiss, Ed., 2003 ed.). Cambridge University Press.
Locke, J. (2010). A letter concerning toleration and other writings (M. Goldie, Ed.). Liberty Fund. (Original work published 1689). http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2375/Locke_1560_EBk_v6.0.pdf
Mill, J.S. (2011). On liberty. Project Gutenberg. (Original work published in 1859). https://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm#Page_1
Sieyes, E. (2003). Political writings (M. Sonenscher, Ed.). Hackett Publishing Company. (Original work published in 1788).
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Should this right be limited when limiting it would jeopardize democratic norms?===
Like many rights, privacy is not absolute (Siddiky, 2011, 224). It conflicts with and is compromised in the presence of other fundamental rights and democratic norms.

'''Speech'''

The right to privacy notably conflicts with the First Amendment’s right to free speech. In some cases, the right to privacy becomes limited and less protected, but, in others, it remains protected. This protective line between speech and privacy is thin. For instance, speech protections extend to allow employers, including the government in its capacity as an employer, to be able to restrict the speech of employees in certain matters (Volokh, 2000, 1095). However, in ''Connick v. Meyers'' (1983), the United States Supreme Court decided that, while working for the government, matters of public concern are protected and private while intraoffice grievances are not (Connick v. Meyers, n.d.; Volokh, 2000, 1095).

As Warren & Brandeis suggested in ''The Right to Privacy'' in 1890, the right to privacy conflicts with the First Amendment rights. In their writings about what is now known as ‘tort privacy’ (different from ‘constitutional privacy’), they advocate for the prevention of disclosures of private affairs to the public (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 195). This distinction is still maintained today, allowing for the publishing of ‘newsworthy’ stories about public figures (Volokh, 2000, 1088; Richards, 2010, 1307). However, the courts have not defined what constitutes newsworthy and have even left the definition to juries (Volokh, 2000, 1089).

Privacy has also been limited by the Supreme Court, despite being the institution that created the protection of the right. In ''Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union'' (1937), Senn had chosen to not join the labor union and the union members began picketing around him, beginning a labor dispute and causing Senn to call for his right to privacy (Richards, 2010, 1332-1333). In this case, Justice Brandeis wrote in the opinion’s footnote, Senn was not able to invoke his right to privacy against the union’s right to publicity (Richards, 2010, 1334). In essence, in the commercial sphere between competitors, the right to privacy became inapplicable in the interest of consumers (Richards, 2010, 1334).

On the other hand, privacy has remained protected in other instances. In ''Cohen v. Cowles Media'', the Supreme Court ruled that people can contract away their right to speech (Volokh, 2000, 1057). Volokh (2000) posits this privacy extends to implied contracts, especially in professions in which privacy can be reasonably expected. Thus, the federal laws requiring confidentiality have simply allowed for repercussions to be implemented, rather than creating a new area in privacy rights (1058). In publishing, the actions of private people are protected (Richards, 2010, 1307; Volokh, 2000, 1055). Volokh (2000) posits this protection extends beyond actions to embarrassing photos or stories which exhibit a lack of dignity (1094). Generally, this protection is expressed as the public concern test, in which privacy is granted to a party as long as the public is not affected (Volokh, 2000, 1097). This general protection of the right to privacy is consistent with Richards’ (2010) conclusion from Brandeis’ writings: that privacy protections allow for new ideas to be formed through development in private conversations (1347).

'''Right to Public Trial'''

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution directly conflicts with the implicit right to privacy by granting the right to a public trial. It is argued that the use of this court structure allows for the expression of public concern and prevents corruption while increasing public confidence in the system (Siddiky, 2011, 229).

Despite the right to a public trial, the juvenile justice system was created to protect the identity of minors who committed crimes in the hopes that this protection will allow them to become contributing members to society without the judgment of a criminal past (Siddiky, 2011, 207, 241). Even with this intention, there are exceptions to this privacy. First and foremost, juveniles’ privacy has previously been limited in favor of granting other constitutional rights, including 14th Amendment due process (Siddiky, 2011, 213, 227). Privacy may also be removed if they are charged as an adult, which requires meeting varying statutory criteria depending on the jurisdiction (Siddiky, 2011, 214). Additionally, there has been some movement surrounding the reform of juvenile courts which may remove their anonymity because of perceived coddling and the high recidivism rates among teens, potentially suggesting the need for different consequences (Siddiky, 2011, 215, 217).

Outside of juvenile courts, privacy is compromised more often for the sake of public trials. Something, though, the right to privacy prevails as a judge allows a party in a suit to file anonymously (Rastgoufard, 2003, 1009). These exceptions are rare and are not entrenched in the Federal Rule of Civil Procedures, but the United States Supreme Court has allowed anonymous suits to be decided (Rastgoufard, 2003, 1023). Most notably, anonymity was granted in Roe v. Wade in which ‘Jane Roe’ was allowed to remain anonymous as pregnancy was considered to be a very private matter. Juries have also been allowed to be anonymous (Rastgoufard, 2003, 1009).

'''Property Rights'''

The right to be left alone seems like it would go hand in hand with property rights. Your property, your privacy. However, it is easy to learn who owns a piece of real estate through public records (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 355). While this has benefits mostly related to the ease of buying or selling real estate, there are few-to-no processes in place to confirm the validity of deed filings or liens, especially in the United States (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 359). However, many involved in the industry have interests in limiting privacy in this area for their professional ease (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 374). In Europe, the only people that can file these records are notaries, but the US does not offer similar protections (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 372). These infringements on the right to privacy have become more accessible with digitized records, though this is not limited to this industry (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 375). Additionally, it is probably possible to buy a house anonymously, though there is limited academic literature on how.

'''Political Preferences'''

While one has the right to cast a vote in private and not tell anyone who they voted for, that doesn’t stop people from figuring out one’s political tendencies. With party alignment shrinking, the importance of micro-targeting has grown in campaigns. As such, political parties and candidates have gathered information on voters to determine who is a supporter, who could be persuaded, and who is not likely to be a supporter (Bennett, 2015, 372). At first, parties and candidates begin by looking at state and local party registration lists (Bennett, 2015, 372). From there, they use a variety of factors, such as social media, letters to elected officials, and campaign donations, to determine issues of importance to each voter (Bennett, 372, 2015, 378). While most of this is already public information or has been willingly put out on the internet by individuals, it is not being used in the intended way, and some of the information gathered is private (Bennett, 2015, 372; 11 CFR § 102.17(c)(4)). As such, this approach is illegal in Europe, though it has become prominent in other western nations beyond the United States, such as Canada (Bennett, 2015, 373).

Resources

11 FCR § 102.17(c)(4). (2021). https://www.fec.gov/regulations/102-17/2021-annual-102#102-17-c-4
Bennett, C.J. (2015). Trends in voter surveillance in western societies: Privacy intrusions and democratic implications. Surveillance & Society 13(3/4), 370-384. https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v13i3/4.5373
Connick v. Myers. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved September 28, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1251
Rastgoufard, B. (2003). Pay attention to that green curtain: Anonymity in the courts. Case Western Reserve Law Review 53(4), 1009-1040. https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1512&context=caselrev
Richards N.M. (2010, Oct.). The puzzle of Brandeis, privacy, and speech. Vanderbilt Law Review 63(5) 1293-1352. https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol63/iss5/3/
Roscoe, E. & Szypszak, C. (2017, Summer). Privacy and public real estates records: Preserving legacy system reliability against modern threats. The Urban Lawyer 49(3), 355-391. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44648036
Siddiky, L. (2011). Keeping the court room doors closed so the doors of opportunity can remain open: An argument for maintaining privacy in the juvenile justice system. Howard Law Journal 55(205), 204-246.
Volokh, E. (2000, May). Freedom of speech and information privacy: The troubling implications of a right to stop people from speaking about you. Stanford Law Review 52(5), 1049-1124. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1229510
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Is this right often perceived as threatening to government authorities?===
The Fourth Amendment has rarely been fully realized in its long history. While the Fourth Amendment guarantees privacy in search and seizure, the states originally did not want it to apply to their procedures and noted that it had yet to be applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1260). As such, lots of cases came forward to the Supreme Court, and the Exclusionary Rule was established (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). The Exclusionary Rule prevents trials from using improperly collected evidence, but it does not fully apply the Fourth Amendment and prevent searches (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). The rule has gone through a couple of iterations based on the amendments from which it is derived by the Court. It was originally established in ''Boyd v. US'' (1886), based in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, then evolved with ''Weeks v. US'' (1914), which claimed derivation from the Fifth Amendment but appeared to be based in the Fourth. Its current state results from ''Mapp v. Ohio'' (1961) when the Court held that the Fourth Amendment was an essential feature of privacy and decided that the standards of evidence collection should be consistent between federal and state jurisdictions (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1262). However, authorities can collect whatever evidence they wish and are not held to a legal standard unless they wish to have permissible evidence in the likely-upcoming judicial proceedings (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). Additionally, there are currently many cases that have developed in which a warrant is not needed, causing even Congress, via the Government Publishing Office, to admit there has been an expansion of power given to authorities (US GPO, 1992, 1208-1209). Beyond this expansion, it is known that authorities who perform acts that are not permitted by law are rarely reprimanded, especially with search and seizure and the ability to use the “good faith” defense (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1258). These facts prevent the right to privacy from being perceived as threatening to government authorities.

Resources

Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: Exclusionary Rule. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 9, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-4/enforcing-the-fourth-amendment-the-exclusionary-rule
US Government Publishing Office (US GPO). (1992, June 29). Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure (S. Doc. 103-6). https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CONAN-1992/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-5/summary

===Is this right often curtailed by government authorities for reasons other than those which are generally viewed as permissible?===

While the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is in place to protect people’s privacy, a fact continuously recognized by the Supreme Court, it continues to leave people vulnerable to the decisions of authorities due to a lack of clarity and accountability provided by the courts (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). The Fourth Amendment is explicit in that it prevents unreasonable search and seizure (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). However, it is hard to determine what is reasonable and the Supreme Court has claimed that the reasonableness of a search is situationally dependent (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1202). Various rules and exceptions to the right to privacy have been established.

Under the Exclusionary Rule, lots of searches are carried out which are later found to be unconstitutional by a court, at which point there is little that can be done to rectify the violation of privacy rights (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). These instances are not permissible exceptions, but rather instances in which it becomes clear after the fact that privacy was violated (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted in ways that cause the government’s regulatory interests to be placed over an individual’s interests (US GPO, 1992, 1204). These interpretations have created exceptions, creating situationally specific instances in which privacy is not necessarily protected. For instance, during the execution of a search warrant, if it does not include a search clause for those occupying the location, they may not be searched, but they can be detained (US GPO, 1992, 1227). For whatever reason, the courts have viewed detainment as less intrusive than a search, so it has become allowed, though it has been debated if it is a reasonable and permissible exception without a warrant (US GPO, 1992, 1227). This debate starts with the Court’s opinions in ''Terry v. Ohio'' (1968) and ''United States v. Mendenhall''(1980) that state seizure is either restraining liberty or the belief that one is not at liberty to leave (US GPO, 1992, 1231). The ''Terry'' decision was important in other ways as well, creating another standard for search and seizure without a warrant and probable cause - authorities may stop and frisk individuals if there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (US GPO, 1992, 1230). Recently, this standard has been applied less restrictively and more often, creating some tension between the right to privacy and public safety (GPO, 1992, 1231).

Exceptions don’t just result from court rulings. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 permitted information sharing between law enforcement agencies without notice, leading many to believe more privacy violations were occurring (Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.). However, some scholars argue while privacy is more elusive under the presence of this law, privacy is not hindered as most of us remain unconcerned about the information that may or may not be collected about us resulting in little or no behavioral change (Rubel, 2007, 148-149). At the same time, however, “lack of privacy bears upon how we act,” as does the knowledge that others may have access to our information, so the right becomes less protected under the PATRIOT Act (Rubel, 2007, 142, 153).

Resources

Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: Exclusionary Rule. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 9, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-4/enforcing-the-fourth-amendment-the-exclusionary-rule
Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act. (n.d.) Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm
Rubel, A. (2007, Mar.). Privacy and the USA Patriot Act: Rights, the value of rights, and autonomy. Law and Philosophy 26(2), 119-159. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-005-5970-x
US Government Publishing Office (US GPO). (1992, June 29). Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure (S. Doc. 103-6). https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CONAN-1992/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-5/summary
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001). https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/3162

===Is this right at times curtailed by private actors?===
'''Privacy Torts'''

Privacy violations under tort law was how Warren & Brandeis originally developed the right in 1890 (Citron, 2010, 1805). These violations, usually unwanted intrusions or disclosures can result from negligent or intentional actions and result in civil lawsuits rather than questions of constitutional legality (Citron, 2010, 1806; Tort, n.d.). Violations are hard to define as they change with technology (the original call for privacy was in relation to the ‘instant photograph’), which creates more and more opportunities for violations (Citron, 2010, 1809; Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 195). However, the law changes slower than technology creating some disconnect in legal remedies for new technology (Citron, 2010, 1810).

'''Constitutional Privacy'''

Constitutions only protect people from government actors and international covenants only affect the laws and regulations which governments put in place (Hudson, 2018; Dunn, 2009). Even so, most allowances of government invasions of privacy in the United States have evolved because the government mimicked the actions of private actors, placing private conduct at the baseline of privacy expectations (Kamin, 2004, 101, 115).

At a basic level, once information is willingly given to someone other than oneself, the courts have continuously ruled that there is no longer the expectation for privacy. This holds true with information that is given to both private companies and individuals (Kamin, 2004, 101). The ''Katz'' decision somewhat demonstrates this curtailment of privacy by creating the plain view doctrine. If something is in plain view, even in a private space, it is not private (Kamin, 2004, 104). This decision extrapolates on the theory that as long as someone else may reasonably have that information, it is an unprotected area under the Fourth Amendment (Kamin, 2004, 104). So, by letting someone into one’s home or publishing information online, one is inherently limiting their Fourth Amendment protections. As such, authorities can ask private companies to perform searches or subpoena these actors rather than those they are investigating, depending on the company’s privacy policies (Kamin, 2004, 102, 137).

In ''United States v. Jacobsen'' (1984) privacy protections were tested when officials were able to open a package that FedEx had damaged and opened for insurance purposes (Kamin, 2004, 99, ''United States v. Jacobsen'', 1984). Upon its opening, FedEx employees suspected the package contained cocaine (Kamin, 2004, 99; United States v. Jacobsen, n.d.). Had federal officials gotten to it first, it would not have been able to be searched, even if it was damaged, but the information provided by FedEx from the private search was enough to imply the plain view doctrine thus permitting a warrantless search by the DEA (Kamin, 2004, 100; United States v. Jacobsen, n.d.; ''US v. Jacobsen'', 1984). The Supreme Court upheld the granting of the search and subsequent arrest warrant which was obtained because the DEA confirmed the contents were cocaine based on the ‘tip’ from private actors (United States v. Jacobsen, n.d.). The Court said that “[w]hether those invasions were accidental or deliberate, and whether they were reasonable or unreasonable, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of their private character” (''US v. Jacobsen'', 1984). Kamin (2004) goes as far as to say that “[t]he fact that the private actor did something the government would not have been permitted to do simply did not covert the subsequent, otherwise reasonable, police conduct into a search that implicated the Fourth Amendment” (100-101). That is to say, after the package was opened due to the damage by a non-governmental party, privacy could no longer be expected, despite that it is reasonable to expect privacy during shipping (Kamin, 2004, 100).

Resources

Citron, D.K. (2010, Dec. 1). Mainstreaming Privacy Torts. California Law Review 98(6). https://www.jstor.org/stable/25799956
Dunn, C. (2009, Apr. 28). Applying the Constitution to private actors (New York Law Journal). NYCLU ACLU of New York. https://www.nyclu.org/en/publications/column-applying-constitution-private-actors-new-york-law-journal
Hudson, D.L. (2018, Oct. 20). In the age of social media, expand the reach of the First Amendment. Human Rights Magazine 43(4), n.p. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/the-ongoing-challenge-to-define-free-speech/in-the-age-of-socia-media-first-amendment/
Kamin, S. (2004, Dec. 1). The private is public: The relevance of private actors in defining the Fourth Amendment. Boston College Law Review 46(1), 83-147. https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2293&context=bclr
Tort. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 15, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tort
United States v. Jacobsen. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1167
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 US 109 (1984). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/466/109
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Is this right subject to specific limitations in event of emergency (war, brief natural disaster [weather, earthquake], long-run natural disaster [volcano, fire, disease])? Can such limitations be defined in advance with reference to the disaster in question?===
Privacy protections are typically limited in times of emergency, but the type of emergency seems to dictate its limitations.

'''Natural Disasters'''

A Wilson Center report from 2013 outlines various times in which natural disasters have elicited temporary easing of privacy rules to aid in searching for missing persons. The first examples were from Australia after the 2002 Bali earthquake and the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami. During the Bali earthquake, many governmental agencies had to spend time creating their own missing persons reports (Reidenberg, Gellman, Debelak, Elewa, & Liu, 2013, 12). This was recognized as a waste of resources in light of the disaster and the importance of timeliness (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 12). The 2004 tsunamis renewed this sentiment (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 12). In response to these impeded disaster responses, Australia passed Part VIA to the Australian Privacy Act in 2006 (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13). Part VIA allows for sharing of otherwise protected information through a government emergency declaration if “(1) the entity reasonably believes that the individual may be involved in the disaster; and (2) the collection, use or disclosure of personal information is for a permitted purpose related to the disaster” (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13, 14). It also has stipulations on how long these special provisions can be in place and works for events both in and out of Australian borders while specifically preventing disclosure to media outlets (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13-14)
.
Despite New Zealand’s comprehensive privacy laws, similar actions were taken in New Zealand after the 2011 Christchurch earthquake. There were stipulations in the Privacy Act to permit the sharing of information in some circumstances, it was unclear if they directly applied to natural disaster emergencies (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 15). This lack of clarity was impeding rescue efforts and the Privacy Commissioner, who is granted some discretion through the Privacy Act, took steps to allow temporary authorization of information sharing concerning the emergency at hand (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 16). Incidentally, many realized that this liberation of privacy issues reassured a variety of sectors’ information sharing in their emergency response (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 17). These reassurances caused the Privacy Commissioner to propose and pass the Civil Defence National Emergencies (Information Sharing) Code in 2013, allowing for these different privacy stipulations to be counted on during emergency planning (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 19).

The United States notoriously lacks privacy law. However, there is regulation in the medical field – Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1966 (HIPAA). HIPAA was somewhat suspended after Hurricane Katrina in light of nine of the eleven New Orleans hospitals incapacitated and people fleeing to surrounding states to receive medical attention (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 19-21). It prioritized providing treatment over payment and aided in locating missing persons by publishing facility directories (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 21). This privacy law alteration was less comprehensive than those in New Zealand and Australia after natural disasters, but it shows that the response regarding privacy exceptions is dependent on need.

All of these disasters culminated in the creation of the Missing Persons Community of Interest (MPCI), in which non-government actors collaborated to create standardized missing persons databases after disasters (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 25). At the time the report was written, there were five interlocking systems to record who was missing and try to connect these people with worried family (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 27). These systems were used multiple times from 2006 to 2012 when this report was written (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 27). The systems all have varying balances of access and privacy and, interestingly, one of these services is run by the International Committee of the Red Cross out of Geneva, Switzerland and is explicitly exempt from the Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 29, 35). Additionally, in 2011, the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners on Data Protection and Major Natural Disasters asked countries to review their privacy laws to make sure they were flexible in the event of a major natural disaster (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 73).

'''Disease'''

Rothstein (2020) suggests the following be considered when creating policy exceptions and interventions to health information during disease outbreaks: (1) necessity and effectiveness, (2) proportionality and minimal infringement, (3) purpose limitations, and (4) justice (1374). Policies that become altered during the outbreak should remain monitored for continued justification of the alteration and should discontinue at the end of the outbreak (Rothstein, 2020, 1375).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Canada realized the conflict between the creation of a public health database and data privacy law. Data privacy laws vary by province (some have legislation, others default to federal law), sector (public and private), and profession (i.e., healthcare data is strictly regulated) (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 454-455). Generally, data cannot be shared between provinces, though this is debated based on local and federal laws, nor used for purposes other than for which it was collected (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 455). However, all these limits can be loosened during public health emergencies. There are legislative carve-outs for combating health risks, and during COVID-19 the Privacy Commissioner allowed officials to forgo consent from each individual, a privilege that is repealed after the emergency (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 455).

'''War'''

McDonald (2020) describes privacy as a social good and notes there is a trade-off between privacy and national security, claiming these rights are dependent on context (380). As such, these privacy limitations can be toward individuals or society, but they usually come to light ex parte (McDonald, 2020, 385, 380). However, it is unclear who dictates when this trade-off between privacy and security begins, ends, or how invasive it is as war surveillance is largely unregulated; there is no law of war regarding privacy (McDonald, 2020, 385, 386). It seems feasible violations can be committed by both one’s own country and the opposition. By one’s own country in the sense that they don’t want traitors, resulting in actions similar to how the United States placed Japanese Americans into internment camps during WWI or passed the Sedition Act of 1798 (Share America, 2015). Alternatively, the opposition can somewhat feasibly be expected to also survey those they are at war against, especially when attacking and trying to avoid civilian injury (McDonald, 2020, 381). Enemies may also invade privacy through espionage and intelligence which isn’t necessarily legal under international law though it is not limited to wartime (Pun, 2017, 360-361, 364; McDonald, 2020, 384).

Resources

Bernier, A. & Knoppers, B.M. (2020, June 26). Pandemics, privacy, and public health research. Canadian Journal of Public Health 111(4), 454-457. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7318908/pdf/41997_2020_Article_368.pdf
McDonald, J. (2020). Information, privacy, and just war theory. Ethics & International Affairs 34(3), 379-400. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679420000477
Pun, D. (2017, Summer). Rethinking espionage in the Modern Era. Chicago Journal of International Law 18(1), 353-391. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol18/iss1/10/
Quinton, A. (1988, Autumn). Plagues and morality. Social Research: An International Quarterly 55(3), 451-462. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40970516
Reidenberg, J.R., Gellman, R., Debelak, J., Elewa, A., & Liu, N. (2013). Privacy and missing persons after natural disasters. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Commons Lab. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/privacy-and-missing-persons-after-natural-disasters
Rothstein, M.A. (2020, Aug. 12). Public health and privacy in the pandemic. American Journal of Public Health 110(9), 1374-1375. https://www.doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2020.305849
Share America. (2015, Apr. 6). Civil liberties in wartime. United States Department of State. Retrieved October 18, 2021, https://share.america.gov/civil-liberties-wartime/

==Utilitarian / Fairness Assessments==
===Is there a cost attached to protecting and enforcing this right? What kinds of costs are implicated?===
====Short-term economic cost in general====
====Long-term economic cost in general====
====Cost to those least able to economically absorb the cost====
====Cost to perceived democratic legitimacy====
====Cost to consistency or coherence of the law as a whole====
====Cost to the legitimacy or effectiveness of other rights====
====Cost to considerations of social equality====
====Cost to other non-material goods not so far specified====
===What are the financial consequences, if any, of making this right a legally protectable right?===
===Are there any groups that are uniquely disadvantaged by the exercise of this right?===
===Are there any groups that uniquely benefit from the exercise of this right?===
===Are there instances when this fundamental right can lead to unfairness or inequities?===
===Are there objective ways to measure the utilitarian nature of this right?===
===If so, where can one draw the line: when does this right stop being useful or economically viable?===
==Looking Ahead==
===How can we expect this right to change and evolve in the years ahead?===
===How is the future likely to shape the exercise of this right?===
===Will the exercise or protection of this right be affected by technological changes?===
===Under what conditions would this right become irrelevant?===
===Are questions of fairness and utility pertaining to this right likely to change in the years ahead?===
==Policy Recommendations==
===Can the practice or exercise of this right be shaped through executive action?===
===In the US context, are there particular parties with a stake or interest in amending or reconceptualizing this right?===
===In the US context, can this right be altered legislatively, or would it require a constitutional amendment?===
===Is this right best addressed at the national level? The sub-national level? The international level?===
===To what extent is this right shaped primarily by judicial decisions?===
===If this right is best addressed through the amendment process, how should it proceed?===
===If this right were unlimited, what might be the consequences (positive and negative)?===
===If this right were eliminated, what might be the consequences (positive and negative)?===

Source/Privacy Rights

2022-08-03T17:26:23Z

Kbrard: /* Hobbesian Thought */

==History==
===What is the oldest source in any country that mentions this right?===
Most sources say that the first mention of this right is ''The Right to Privacy'' written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis and published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890. Both were Boston attorneys and Brandeis would go on to serve as a United States Supreme Court Justice for 23 years (Louis Brandeis, n.d.). In this essay, they note that the legal scope of rights broadens over time and posit that the right to life has expanded to “the right to be let alone,” which had become an increasingly difficult feat with new technologies (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 193, 195).

Warren and Brandeis (1890) acknowledge that, at the time, there was little-to-no legal protection of this right. They look at defamation law and determine while it alludes to privacy law, there are limitations to privacy protection from this area of law as it only considers a damaged reputation, not instances in which an individual wishes something remained secret (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 197; Bycer, 2014). They also looked at copywriting and publishing law, which only applies to one’s own work (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 199). They determine that the right to privacy can extend beyond these areas of law as the right should be able to wholly prevent the depiction of private life (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 218). In the last part of this essay, they set out limitations to the right of privacy – privileged information remains under defamation law (to allow for the operation of courts), privacy ceases with consent to publish, gossip is not in the realm of privacy law, and intention and truth do not prevent a breach of such right.

However, Warren and Brandeis cite at least two instances that predate ''The Right to Privacy'' which discuss the right to privacy. The earliest is the citing of an 1820 statement from Lord Cottenham, who, in agreement with Lord Eldon, felt that were a king’s illnesses recorded by a doctor and published while that king was still alive, a court would not permit its publishing, as he claimed this circumstance would breach the king’s privacy (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 205; Bycer, 2014). Additionally, they acknowledge that the right to privacy has already been regulated in France since 1868. Section 11 of the 1868 Loi Relative à la Presse (Press Law) says that all periodic writings about a private fact of life are violations punishable by a fine of 500 francs. Pursuit of the violation may only be undertaken by the affected party (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 214, footnote 1). Beyond what Warren & Brandeis cited as earlier mentions, there was also the 1801 Haitian Constitution which provided the home was inviolable from government invasion in Article 63 (Theodore, 2000).

Resources

Bycer, M. (2014). Understanding the 1890 Warren and Brandeis “The Right to Privacy” Article. National Juris University. Retrieved Sept. 10, 2021, from https://nationalparalegal.edu/UnderstandingWarrenBrandeis.aspx
Louis Brandeis. (2020, Nov. 9). Britannica. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.britannica.com/biography/Louis-Brandeis
Theodore, Charmant. (2000). Haitian Constitution of 1801 (English). Louverture Project. http://thelouvertureproject.org/index.php?title=Haitian_Constitution_of_1801_(English)
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right? BUILD IN COLLAPSE EXPAND TOGGLE===
====Afghanistan====
The 1964 Afghan Constitution protected only the right to privacy in the home in Article 28 (Constitute Project, “Afghanistan 1964 Constitution”). Today, Article 38 offers similar protections and Article 37 protects communications (Constitute Project, “Afghanistan 2004 Constitution”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Afghanistan_1964?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Afghanistan_2004?lang=en

====Albania====
Today, privacy is guaranteed in Articles 35 (data), 36 (correspondence), and 37 (home) of the 1998 constitution (Constitute Project, “Albania 1998 rev. 2016”). This appears to be their first protection of privacy rights.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Albania_2016?lang=en

====Algeria====
Today, the 2020 constitution protects the inviolability of the domicile in Article 47 and, in Article 46, private life and private communication (Constitute Project, “Algeria 2020”). Previously, these rights were protected in the 1976 Constitution in Articles 39 and 40 (International Constitutional Law Project, Algeria Constitution”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Algeria_2020?lang=en
https://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ag00000_.html

====Andorra====
Articles 14 and 15 of the first and only Andorran constitution protect privacy in the state. Article 14 protects privacy, honor, and reputation, while Article 15 protects the home and communications (Constitute Project, “Andorra 1993”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Andorra_1993?lang=en

====Angola====
Today, privacy rights are protected in Articles 32 (personal and family life), 33 (home), and 34 (correspondence and communication) of the 2010 constitution.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Angola_2010?lang=en

====Antigua and Barbuda====
In the constitution, Article 3, Section C protects the right to privacy in personal and family life, as well as the home (Constitute Project, “Antigua and Barbuda 1981”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Antigua_and_Barbuda_1981?lang=en

====Argentina====
Articles 18 & 19 of the 1853 constitution protect privacy. Article 18(2) reads, “The residence is inviolable, as are letters and private papers; and a law shall determine in what cases and for what reasons their search and seizure shall be allowed,” while Article 19 reads, “The private actions of men that in no way offend public order or morality, nor injure a third party, are reserved only to God, and are exempt from the authority of the magistrates” (Constitute Project, “Argentina 1832, reinst. 1983, rev. 1994”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Argentina_1994?lang=en

====Armenia====
The 1995 Armenian constitution protects three main privacy rights in Articles 31-33: personal life, home, and communication (Constitute Project, “Armenia 1995 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Armenia_2015?lang=en

====Australia====
Privacy rights are not prescribed in the Constitution of Australia (Australian Human Rights Commission, “How are human rights protected in Australia?”). Beyond the international covenants, such as the ICCPR, privacy was first protected in the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT Human Rights Commission, “Human Rights”).

https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/rights-and-freedoms/how-are-human-rights-protected-australian-law
https://hrc.act.gov.au/humanrights/

====Austria====
According to the Austrian Embassy in Washington, D.C., the ratification of the ECHR by Austria in 1958 gave the treaty constitutional law standing in the state. The ECHR is what protects the right to privacy in Austria.

https://www.austria.org/human-rights-and-the-council-of-europe

====Azerbaijan====
Today, Article 32 of the 1995 constitution protects privacy. It is quite detailed but protects personal privacy, family life, personal information, and correspondence. Article 33 extends privacy rights to the residence (Constitute Project, “Azerbaijan 1995 rev. 2016”). Previously, privacy rights had been protected by the 1977 Soviet Constitution (see below).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Azerbaijan_2016?lang=en

====The Bahamas====
Article 15(c) protects the right to privacy in one’s home. Article 21 extends this right to exist during searches (Constitute Project, “Bahamas (The) 1973”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bahamas_1973?lang=en

====Bahrain====
Articles 25 & 26 of the 2002 constitution protect privacy in the home and all types of communication (Constitute Project, “Bahrain 2002 rev. 2017”). This constitution was the first establishment of privacy rights in Bahrain.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bahrain_2017?lang=en

====Bangladesh====
Article 43 of the constitution grants the right to privacy in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Bangladesh 1972, reinst. 1986, rev. 2014”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bangladesh_2014?lang=en

====Barbados====
Article 11(b) of the constitution grants every person in Barbados privacy of their home. Article 20(1) prevents interference in correspondence (Constitute Project, “Barbados 1966 rev. 2007”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Barbados_2007?lang=en

====Belarus====
Article 28 of the constitution protects private life in Belarus (Constitute Project, “Belarus 1994 rev. 2004”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Belarus_2004?lang=en

====Belgium====
Since 1831, Belgium has had one constitution, only amended 33 times. Article 15 protects one’s privacy in the home. Article 22 protects private life. Article 29 protects private letters (Constitute Project, “Belgium 1831 rev. 2014”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Belgium_2014?lang=en

====Belize====
In its only constitution since its independence, Belize protects privacy rights in Article 3(c). It protects family life, personal privacy, one’s home, and their dignity (Constitute Project, “Belize 1981 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Belize_2011?lang=en

====Benin====
Today, the 1990 constitution protects privacy in the home and of correspondence in Articles 20 and 21, respectively (Constitute Project, “Benin 1990”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Benin_1990?lang=en

====Bhutan====
In 2008, a new constitution was passed, which protected privacy rights in Article 19. Article 19 reads: A person shall not be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence nor to unlawful attacks on the person’s honour and reputation” (Bhutan’s National Council, “The Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan”).

https://www.nationalcouncil.bt/assets/uploads/docs/acts/2017/Constitution_of_Bhutan_2008.pdf

====Bolivia====
Today, privacy rights are protected in Article 21(3). These protections are general, while Article 25 protects more specific privacy rights in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2009”). This document is the 17th constitution since 1826, but other versions in English could not be found, so privacy rights may have a longer history in Bolivia.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009?lang=en

====Bosnia and Herzegovina====
Privacy rights have been protected in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995 with their independence from Yugoslavia. The 1995 constitution protects these rights in Article 3(f). These protections include private and family life, home, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 rev. 2009”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bosnia_Herzegovina_2009?lang=en

====Botswana====
The 1966 constitution of Botswana includes privacy protections of the home in Article 3(c) and Article 9. Article 12, in protecting freedom of expression, also protects correspondence (Constitute Project, “Botswana 1966 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Botswana_2016?lang=en

====Brazil====
In its first constitution, Brazil only claimed the inviolability of private letters in Article 179(XXVII) (WikiSource, “Constitution of the Empire of Brazil”). Since then, privacy rights have expanded, and today personal privacy, the home, and correspondence are protected in Article 5(X-XII) (Constitute Project, “Brazil 1988 rev. 2017”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2017?lang=en
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Empire_of_Brazil

====Brunei====
Brunei lacks any legislation or constitutional provisions for privacy rights. The 1996 United States Department of State Report on Brunei Human Rights even says that law actively allows for intrusions of privacy.

https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/brunei.html

====Bulgaria====
The right to privacy, including family life, private life, honor, dignity, and reputation, is protected in Article 32 of the 1991 constitution (Constitute Project, “Bulgaria 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bulgaria_2015?lang=en

====Burkina Faso====
The 1991 Burkina Faso Constitution protects privacy rights in Article 6. It reads, “The residence, the domicile, private and family life, [and] the secrecy of correspondence of every person, are inviolable. It can only be infringed according to the forms and in the cases specified by the law” (Constitute Project, “Burkina Faso 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Burkina_Faso_2015?lang=en

====Burundi====
The earliest mention of privacy rights in the Burundi Constitution is from the 1998 interim constitution. In this writing, privacy rights are contained in Article 23 and protect privacy, family, home, and correspondence (Constitution Net, “Constitution of Burundi”). Today, they are contained in Article 28 of the 2018 constitution (Constitute Project, “Burundi 2018”).

http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/transitional_national_constitution_and_transitional_constitution_act_1998-2001_0.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Burundi_2018?lang=en

====Cambodia====
The 1993 constitution contains privacy rights in Article 40: “The rights to privacy of residence, and to the confidentiality of correspondence by mail, telegram, fax, telex and telephone, shall be guaranteed” (Office of the Council of the Ministers of Cambodia, “Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia”).

https://pressocm.gov.kh/en/archives/9539

====Cameroon====
In the Preamble of the 1972 constitution, privacy is granted to the home and correspondence in points 5 and 6 (Constitute Project, “Cameroon 1972 rev. 2008”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cameroon_2008?lang=en

====Canada====
The Canadian Constitution has been in force since 1867 and is comprised of a couple of Acts. For privacy purposes, the most important is the Constitution Act of 1982, which contains the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In this section, Article 7 provides the most privacy protection that is seen in the constitution, protecting the right to life, liberty, and security of a person (Constitute Project, “Canada 1867 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Canada_2011?lang=en

====Cape Verde====
Article 33 makes violations of privacy inadmissible in court, while Article 38 grants the right to “personal identity, to civil rights, to a name, honor, and reputation, and to personal and family privacy”. Article 41 extends privacy rights to correspondence, and Article 42 extends it to electronic data privacy (Constitute Project, “Cape Verde 1980 rev. 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cape_Verde_1992?lang=en

====Central African Republic====
In 1994, a new constitution was passed in the Central African Republic. Article 13 granted private communications inviolable and Article 14 did the same for the private home (African Child Forum, “Constitution of the Central African Republic”). Today, private communication is seen in Article 16 and the home is inviolable in Article 19 (Constitute Project, “Central African Republic 2016”).

http://www.africanchildforum.org/clr/Legislation%20Per%20Country/CAR/car_constitution_1995_en.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Central_African_Republic_2016?lang=en

====Chad====
Both the 1996 and 2018 Chad Constitutions protect the right to privacy in Article 17 and the right to privacy in communications in Article 45 and 47, respectively (Constitute Project, “Chad").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chad_2015?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chad_2018?lang=en

====Chile====
The 1925 Chilean Constitution protected the inviolability of the home and correspondence in Article 10 Sections 12 & 13 (Constitute Project, “Chile 1925”). Today, the home is protected in Article 19 Section 5 (Constitute Project, “Chile 1980 rev. 2021”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chile_2021?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chile_1925?lang=en

====China====
In 1975, the Chinese Constitution protected the right to privacy to the person and the home in Chapter III, Article 28 (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 1975, 39). Today, Articles 38-40 protect privacy in China. Article 38 is for personal dignity, 39 for the home, and 40 for correspondence (Constitute Project, “China (People’s Republic of) 1982 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/China_2018?lang=en
https://china.usc.edu/sites/default/files/article/attachments/peoples-republic-of-china-constitution-1975.pdf

====Colombia====
The 1991 Colombian constitution is very explicit in its privacy protections in Article 15. Section 1 grants privacy to people and family life, section 2 is for data privacy, section 3 is for correspondence (Constitute Project, “Colombia 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015?lang=en

====Comoros====
Today, privacy provisions are in Article 26 and Article 27, which grant privacy in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Comoros 2018”). Before this constitution, similar clauses were in the 1996 constitutional preamble, drawn from the United Nations Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man (Constitution Net, “CONSTITUTION of the FEDERAL ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF THE COMOROS”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Comoros_2018?lang=en
http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/Comoros%20Constitution.pdf

====Democratic Republic of the Congo====
The personal right to privacy is granted in Article 31 of the 2005 Constitution, while the home is protected under Article 29 (Constitute Project, “Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 2005 rev. 2011”). Before this, the right to privacy in home and correspondence were granted in the Zaire 1990 constitution (amended from a previous version, though unclear which previous version) in Articles 22 & 23 (World Statesmen, “Complete Text of the Zairian Constitution After the Enactment of Law No. 90-002 of July 5, 1990 Concerning the Modification of Certain Provisions of the Constitution”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_2011?lang=en
https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Zaire1990.pdf

====Republic of the Congo====
The only mention of privacy rights today is that of the home in Article 20 of the 2015 Constitution (Constitute Project, “Congo (Republic of the) 2015”). The same right appeared in the 2001 Constitution in Article 14 (Constitute Project, “Congo (Republic of the) 2001”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Congo_2015?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Congo_2001?lang=en

====Costa Rica====
Today, privacy rights are protected in Articles 23 (the home) and 24 (communications and intimacy) (Constitute Project, “Costa Rica 1949 rev. 2020”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa_Rica_2020?lang=en

====Croatia====
Article 34 of the 1991 constitution protects the home. Article 35 protects personal and familial life, as well as dignity. Article 36 protects correspondence (Constitute Project, “Croatia 1991 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Croatia_2013?lang=en

====Cuba====
The 2019 constitution protects personal and familial privacy in Article 48, the home in Article 49, and correspondence in Article 50 (Constitute Project, “Cuba 2019”). Privacy was not in the previous Cuban constitution of 1976 (Constitute Project, “Cuba 1976 rev. 2002”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2019?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2002?lang=en

====Cyprus====
Article 15 of the 1960 constitution reads: “Every person has the right to respect for his private and family life.” Article 16 expands these protections to the home, as Article 17 expands them to correspondence and communication (Constitute Project, “Cyprus 1960 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cyprus_2013?lang=en

====Czech Republic====
Article 7(1) of the 1993 constitution guarantees the inviolability of persons and private life. Article 10 protects life from intrusion by others, and it also protects data privacy (Constitute Project, “Czech Republic 1993 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Czech_Republic_2013?lang=en

====Denmark====
Today, Article 72 protects the right to privacy in the home, while also preventing the search of private communications (Constitute Project, “Demark 1953”). The general form of the constitution derives from the 1849 Danish Constitution (Danish Parliament, “The Constitutional Act of Denmark”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Denmark_1953?lang=en
https://www.thedanishparliament.dk/en/democracy/the-constitutional-act-of-denmark

====Djibouti====
Today, the right to privacy in the home and communications are protected in the 1992 constitution Articles 12 & 13. Personal life is not protected (Constitute Project, “Djibouti 1992 rev. 2010”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominica_2014?lang=en

====Dominica====
Article 1(c) of the only constitution Dominica has had, written in 1978, protects the right to privacy in the home. Article 7(1) protects privacy during a search (Constitute Project, "Dominica 1978 rev. 2014").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominica_2014?lang=en

====Dominican Republic====
Today, Article 44 protects the right to privacy and personal honor. It reads, “All people have the right to privacy. The respect and non-interference into private and family life, the home, and private correspondence are guaranteed. The right to honor, good name, and one’s own image are recognized. All authorities or individuals who violate them are obligated to compensate or repair them in accordance with the law” (Constitute Project, “Dominican Republic 2015”). The subsections expand on these rights. In previous versions, this was the right to intimacy and personal honor (Constitute Project, “Dominican Republic 2010”). Previous constitutions could not be found in English.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominican_Republic_2015?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominican_Republic_2010?lang=en

====East Timor====
East Timor, or Timor-Leste, protects the right to private life, home, and communication during evidence collection in Article 34, privacy in general in Article 36, and privacy in the home and communication in Article 37 (Constitute Project, “Timor-Leste 2002”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/East_Timor_2002?lang=en

====Ecuador====
Article 11(3) enforces and protects the rights put forth by the constitution and international treaties: “The rights and guarantees set forth in the Constitution and in international human rights instruments shall be directly and immediately enforced by and before any civil, administrative or judicial servant, either by virtue of their office or at the request of the party”. In Chapter 6, Rights to Freedom, Article 66, Sections 11 and 19-22 set out more specific privacy regulations in terms of convictions, correspondence, the home, personal data, and privacy rights (Constitute Project, “Ecuador 2008 rev. 2021). There are 22 previous Ecuadorian constitutions, but English translations could not be found to investigate the presence of privacy rights.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ecuador_2021?lang=en

====Egypt====
The 1923 constitution of Egypt protects personal freedom in Article 4, privacy in the home in Article 8, and correspondence in Article 11 (Constitution Net, “Royal Decree No. 42 of 1923 On Building a Constitutional System for the Egyptian State”). Today, these rights are protected in Articles 57 & 58 (Constitute Project, “Egypt 2014 rev. 2019”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2019?lang=en
http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/1923_-_egyptian_constitution_english_1.pdf

====El Salvador====
Article 2 of the 1983 constitution explicitly protects the “right to honor, personal and family intimacy, and one’s own image.” Article 6 allows for free communication as long as it does not violate the private lives of others. Article 24 protects correspondence (Constitute Project, “El Salvador 1983 rev. 2014”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/El_Salvador_2014?lang=en

====Equatorial Guinea====
Today, Article 13 of the 1991 constitution protects rights and freedoms. In section 1(g), the right to privacy in communications and the home is protected (Constitute Project, “Equatorial Guinea 1991 rev. 2012”). Translations of the 1968, 1973, and 1982 constitutions could not be found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Equatorial_Guinea_2012?lang=en

====Eritrea====
In its history, Eritrea has only had one constitution and it protects the right to privacy in Article 18. Specific privacies are not mentioned but it is an overarching declaration of the protection of the right: “Every person shall have the right to privacy” (Constitute Project, “Eritrea 1997”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Eritrea_1997?lang=en

====Estonia====
The 1920 constitution of Estonia protected personal privacy in Paragraph 8. Paragraph 10 protected the homestead and Paragraph 14 protected communications (Wikisource, “Constitution of the Esthonian Republic (1920)”). Today, privacy rights are guaranteed in Section 26 (Riigi Teataja, “The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia”).

https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/521052015001/consolide
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Esthonian_Republic_(1920)

====Eswatini====
Article 14(1) names and protects fundamental rights, and subsection C reads “protection of the privacy of the home and other property rights of the individual” (Constitute Project, “Eswatini 2005”). Previous iterations of the constitutions from 1967 and 1968 could not be found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Swaziland_2005?lang=en

====Ethiopia====
The 1931 constitution protects correspondence privacy in Article 26 (Ethiopian Legal Brief, “Ethiopian Constitution of 1931”). In Article 25, the home is claimed as private. Today, privacy rights are protected in Article 26 (Constitute Project, “Ethiopia 1994”).

https://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/ethiopian-constitution-of-1931.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ethiopia_1994?lang=en

====Fiji====
The 1970 Fiji constitution, its first after independence from Britain, protected the right to privacy in the home in Article 3(c) (Constitution Net, “Fiji Independence Order 1970 and Constitution of Fiji”). Today, the 2013 constitution expands the right to privacy from the home to include the right to private and family life, privacy in correspondence, and data privacy in Article 24 (Constitute Project, “Fiji 2013”).

http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/1970_constitution.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Fiji_2013?lang=en

====Finland====
Originally, the 1919 Finnish Constitution protected privacy in Section 8 (RefWorld, “Constitution Act of Finland”). Today, Section 10 of the Finnish Constitution protects the right to privacy with similar language. It says, “Everyone's private life, honour and the sanctity of the home are guaranteed. More detailed provisions on the protection of personal data are laid down by an Act. The secrecy of correspondence, telephony and other confidential communications is inviolable” (Constitute Project, “Finland 1999 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Finland_2011?lang=en
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b53418.html

====France====
The right to privacy in France is implied in Article IV of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 26 August 1789. Article IV reads, “Liberty consists of being able to do everything that does not harm anybody else: thus the exercise of the natural rights of every man has no boundaries except those that ensure to other Members of the Society the enjoyment of those same rights” (Hardt, Kiiver, Kristofertisch). The Declaration of the Rights of Man is still in force today due to the Preamble of the 1958 French Constitution.

Sascha Hardt, Phillip Kiiver & Gisela Kristofertisch. (2019). Comparative Constitutional Law Documents. “Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen [Declaration des Driots de L’Homme et du Citoyen] of 26 August 1789” and “Constitution of the V. Republic of 4 October 1958.”

====Gabon====
Article 1 of the constitution lays out fundamental rights granted within the state (Constitute Project, “Gabon 1991 rev. 2011”). Section 5 of Article 1 protects the privacy of correspondence. Section 12 claims the inviolability of the domicile. The current constitution is based on the 1961 constitution, though it was rewritten in 1991.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Gabon_2011?lang=en

====The Gambia====
Article 23 of the 1996 constitution says, “No person shall be subject to interference with the privacy of his or her home, correspondence or communications save as is in accordance with law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety of the economic well-being of the country, for the protection of health or morals, for the prevention of disorder or crime or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Constitute Project, “Gambia (The) 1996 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Gambia_2018?lang=en

====Georgia====
Today, Article 15 in the 1995 constitution of Georgia protects the right to personal privacy, personal space, and privacy of communication. Additionally, Article 9 claims the inviolability of human dignity (Constitute Project, “Georgia 1995 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Georgia_2018?lang=en

====Germany====
German Basic Law, passed in 1949, provides for privacy in a couple of places. Article 1(1) protects an individual’s dignity, and Article 10 protects privacy in correspondence and telecommunications (Hardt, Kiiver, Rotering, & Kristofertisch). Article 13 protects the home.

Sascha Hardt, Phillip Kiiver, Gereon Rotering, & Gisela Kristofertisch. (2019). Comparative Constitutional Law Documents. “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany of 23 May 1949.”

====Ghana====
In the 1992 constitution, still in force today, the right to privacy in the home and correspondence is found in Article 18(2) (Constitute Project, “Ghana 1992 rev. 1996”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ghana_1996?lang=en

====Greece====
In the 1975 constitution, the Greeks protect the right to privacy in Article 9. This article protects the home, private, and family life. Article 9A provides constitutional data privacy protections (Constitute Project, “Greece 1975 rev. 2008”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Greece_2008?lang=en

====Grenada====
The 1973 constitution of Grenada, the country’s first, protected the right to privacy in Article 1(c) (Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, “The Grenada Constitution Order 1973”). Specifically, it protected the home and other property. Today, the 1973 constitution takes on similar language in Article 1(c) (Constitute Project, “Grenada 1973, reinst. 1991, rev. 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Grenada_1992?lang=en
https://www.cpahq.org/media/gq5dtcj5/gre_constitution.pdf

====Guatemala====
There are two provisions for privacy protection in the 1985 Guatemalan Constitution. Article 23 grants privacy in the home (vivienda) and Article 24 protects correspondence and other documents (Constitute Project, “Guatemala 1985 rev. 1993”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Guatemala_1993?lang=en

====Guinea====
The 2010 constitution of Guinea protects private life, correspondence, and the home in Article 12: “The domicile is inviolable. It may be infringed only in the case of grave and imminent peril, to evade [parer] a
common danger or to protect the life of the persons. All other infringement, all search may only be ordered by the judge or by the authority that the law designates and in the forms prescribed by it.
The secrecy of correspondence and of communication is inviolable. Each one has the right to the protection of their private life” (Constitute Project, “Guinea’s Constitution of 2010”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Guinea_2010.pdf

====Guinea-Bissau====
Article 44 of the 1984 constitution grants the right to protection of personal and private life. Article 48 grants privacy in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Guinea-Bissau 1984 rev. 1996”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Guinea_Bissau_1996?lang=en

====Guyana====
In 1966, Guyana gained independence from Britain and, in the same order, passed its constitution. The 1966 constitution provided for protection in the home from others in Article 3(c) (Guyana Parliament, “The Guyana Independence Order 1966”).

http://parliament.gov.gy/new2/documents/bills/21123/statutory_instrument_guyana_independence_order_1966_no_575.pdf

====Haiti====
In 1801, the first constitution of Haiti protected the privacy of the home in Article 63 (Louverture Project, “Constitution of 1801”). Today, Article 49 of the 1987 constitution protect protects communications (Constitute Project, “Haiti 1987 rev. 2012”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Haiti_2012?lang=en
http://thelouvertureproject.org/index.php?title=Haitian_Constitution_of_1801_(English)

====Honduras====
The 1982 constitution provides for privacy protections in Article 76. In this text, one is granted “The right to honor, to personal privacy, to family, and to one's dignity” (Constitute Project, “Hungary 1982 rev. 2013").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Honduras_2013?lang=en

====Hungary====
The 1949 constitution was the first to include privacy rights. In Article 57, personal privacy, as well as privacy in the home and correspondence are protected: “he Hungarian People's Republic guarantees the personal freedom and privileges of the citizens, and respects the secrecy of correspondence and the inviolability of the home” (Princeton University, “CONSTITUTION of the People's Republic of Hungary - Budapest, 20th August 1949”). In the most recent constitution from 2011, these rights are protected in Article VI (Constitute Project, “Hungary 2011 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Hungary_2016?lang=en
https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/hungary/1949%20Hungarian%20constitution.pdf

====Iceland====
Article 71 says, “Everyone shall enjoy freedom from interference with privacy, home, and family life” (Constitute Project, “Iceland 1944 rev. 2013”). This article is in the 1944 constitution, which is largely based on the 1874 constitutional text that preceded it (Icelandic Human Rights Center, “Icelandic Law”).

https://www.humanrights.is/en/laws-conventions/icelandic-law
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Iceland_2013?lang=en

====India====
While not explicitly mentioned in the Indian constitution, the right to privacy has been recognized by the Indian Supreme Court. In 2017, they ruled unanimously that the right to privacy for all people falls under Article 21, which provides the “protection of life and personal liberty” (McCarthy; Mahapatra & Choudhary).

McCarthy, J. (2017, Aug. 24). Indian Supreme Court declares privacy a fundamental right. NPR. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/24/545963181/indian-supreme-court-declares-privacy-a-fundamental-right
Mahapatra, D. & Choudhary, A.A. (2017, Aug. 24). Right to privacy is a fundamental right, it is intrinsic to the right to life: Supreme Court. Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/right-to-privacy-is-a-fundamental-right-supreme-court/articleshow/60203394.cms

====Indonesia====
Article 28G grants the right to privacy. It reads, “Every person shall have the right to protection of his/herself, family, honour, dignity, and property, and shall have the right to feel secure against and receive protection from the threat of fear to do or not do something that is a human right” (Constitute Project, Indonesia 1954 reinst. 1959, rev. 2002”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Indonesia_2002?lang=en

====Iran====
While the constitution of Iran does not protect privacy, it does guarantee protection of the law which conforms with Islamic Law in Article 20 (Constitute Project, “Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1979 rev. 1989”). Islam provides such protections within the Quran (Hayat, M.H., “Privacy and Islam: From the Quran to data protection in Pakistan”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989?lang=en
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13600830701532043?journalCode=cict20#:~:text=Islam%20not%20only%20prohibits%20entering,enter%20in%20one's%20own%20house.&text=We%20now%20come%20to%20rules,family%20circle%20in%20Islamic%20society.

====Iraq====
The 2004 constitution protects the right to personal privacy in Article 17(1) and the right to privacy in the home in Article 17(2) (Constitute Project, “Iraq 2005). Previously, only the home had been protected in the 1925 constitution (United Nations Archives, “Constitution of ‘Iraq (Organic Law)”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005?lang=en
https://biblio-archive.unog.ch/Dateien/CouncilDocs/C-49-1929-VI_EN.pdf

====Republic of Ireland====
Article 40(5) protects the inviolability of the dwelling (Constitute Project, “Ireland 1937 rev. 2017”). This same protection was afforded in Article 7 of the Constitution of the Irish Free State from 1922 (electronic Irish Statute Book, “Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) Act, 1922”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ireland_2019?lang=en
https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1922/act/1/enacted/en/print

====Israel====
Privacy rights in Israel derive from the Basic Law Human Liberty and Dignity of 1992. In this law, Article 7 protects privacy, intimacy, private premises, and confidential communications (Constitute Project, “Israel 1953 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Israel_2013?lang=en

====Italy====
Articles 13-15 grant privacy to people, homes, and correspondence in the Italian Constitution from 1947 (Constitute Project, “Italy 1947 rev. 2020”). Previous constitutions are from 1848 and 1861, but translations were not found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Italy_2020?lang=en

====Ivory Coast====
The only specific privacy right mentioned in the constitution is that in Article 8, which inviolably protects the home (Constitute Project, “Côte d'Ivoire 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/countries/Africa/Cote_d_Ivoire?lang=en

====Jamaica====
Chapter III of the 1962 constitution protects the fundamental rights and freedoms of Jamaicans. In Section 3(j) of Article 13, privacy protections are granted to persons, property, private and family life, and communication (Constitute Project, “Jamaica 1962 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Jamaica_2015?lang=en

====Japan====
Historically, the 1889 constitution of Japan protected the home and correspondence in Articles 25 and 26 (Constitute Project, “Japan’s Constitution of 1889 Historical”). Today, Article 35 protects the home (Constitute Project, "Japan 1946").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Japan_1889.pdf?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Japan_1946?lang=en

====Jordan====
Article 7 of the 1952 constitution says, “1. Personal freedom shall be guaranteed. 2. Every infringement on rights and public freedoms or the inviolability of the private life of Jordanians is a crime punishable by law.” Article 18 protects communications and Article 10 protects the home (Constitute Project, “Jordan 1952 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Jordan_2016?lang=en

====Kazakhstan====
In their first formal constitution, Kazakhstan protected the right to privacy in Article 18. It says, “1. Everyone shall have the right to inviolability of private life, personal or family secrets, protection of honor and dignity. 2. Everyone shall have the right to confidentiality of personal deposits and savings, correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraph, and other messages. Limitation of this right shall be permitted only in the cases and according to the procedure directly established by law. 3. State bodies, public associations, officials, and the mass media must provide every citizen with the possibility to obtain access to documents, decisions and other sources of information concerning his rights and interests” (Constitute Project, “Kazakhstan 1995 rev. 2017”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kazakhstan_2017?lang=en

====Kenya====
In 1963, the Kenyan Constitution protected privacy in Article 14(c) (Kenya Law, “1963 Constitution”). Today, Article 31 of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution gives every person the right to privacy in their person, home, possessions, family life, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Kenya 2010 Constitution”).

http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/1963_Constitution.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kenya_2010?lang=en

====Kiribati====
Article 3 of the 1979 constitution calls for the protection of privacy in the home and Article 9 protects a person from searches (Constitute Project, “Kiribati 1979 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/countries/Oceania/Kiribati?lang=en

====Kuwait====
Kuwait’s 1962 constitution has been reinstated twice, but it does not mention privacy rights generally. It does, however, protect the inviolability of the home in Article 38 (Constitute Project, “Kuwait 1962 reinst. 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kuwait_1992?lang=en

====Kyrgyzstan====
The 2007 constitution, the first to be adopted after independence from the Soviet Union, protected privacy rights in Article 14 (Electoral Knowledge Network, “Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic”). Today, Article 29 protects the rights to privacy in private life, dignity, and correspondence in the 2010 constitution (Constitute Project, “Kyrgyzstan 2010 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kyrgyz_Republic_2016?lang=en
https://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/asia/KG/kyrgyzstan-constitution-1993-2007/view?searchterm=russian

====Laos====
Privacy rights are scarcely protected in Laos. The revised 2015 constitution protects violations of life, body, integrity, and property in Article 42, which has been amended since the implementation of the constitution in 1991 (Constitute Project, “Lao People’s Democratic Republic 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://media.bloomsburyprofessional.com/rep/files/laos-constitution-1947-1949-englishx.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Laos_2015?lang=en

====Latvia====
Article 96 of the 1922 constitution states “Everyone has the right to inviolability of his or her private life, home and correspondence” (Constitute Project, “Latvia 1922, reinst. 1991, rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Latvia_2016?lang=en

====Lebanon====
The constitution provides no protections for general privacy rights. However, Article 14 does protect the inviolability of the home (Constitute Project, “Lebanon 1926 rev. 2004”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Lebanon_2004?lang=en

====Lesotho====
The 1993 constitution of Lesotho sets forth fundamental rights which are granted to each person in Lesotho in Article 4. In Section 1(g) of Article 4, the right to respect for family and private life is protected. In Article 11, this right is expanded upon and clarified (Constitute Project, “Lesotho 1993 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Lesotho_2018?lang=en

====Liberia====
The 1825 and 1847 constitutions of Liberia did not included mention of privacy rights. The first protection of privacy rights was in the 1986 constitution, Article 16. Article 16 states “No person shall be subjected to interference with his privacy of person, family, home or correspondence except by order of a court of competent jurisdiction” (Constitute Project, “Liberia 1986”).

http://crc.gov.lr/doc/CONSTITUTION%20OF%201847%20final.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Liberia_1986?lang=en

====Libya====
The interim constitution of 2011 is the first to grant privacy rights. It does so in Articles 11-13. These articles protect homes, private life, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Libya 2011 rev. 2012”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Libya_2012?lang=en

====Liechtenstein====
The 1862 constitution alludes to privacy rights in the home in Article 12 (Wright, “Constitution of 26 September 1862.”). Today, privacy rights go further under the 1921 constitution, with Article 32 guaranteeing “Personal liberty, the immunity of the home and the inviolability of letters and written matter” (Constitute Project, “Liechtenstein 1921 rev. 2011”).

https://books.google.com/books?id=kXBDAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA375&lpg=PA375&dq=1862+Constitution+of+Liechtenstein+full+text&source=bl&ots=6dAZ5MiCdX&sig=YurO0ujdxMdcKsMLT_DfGdxPCm0&hl=en&sa=X&ei=axZlU-b1KorroATU9oG4Cg#v=onepage&q=priva&f=false
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Liechtenstein_2011?lang=en

====Lithuania====
Articles 22 and 24 grant privacy rights in Lithuania. Article 22 declares the inviolability of the private life, including correspondence and data, and Article 24 protects the home (Constitute Project, “Lithuania 1992 rev. 2019”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lithuania_2019?lang=en

====Luxembourg====
The 1868 constitution, since amended, protects private life in Article 3. In Article 15, it protects the home and in Article 28, correspondence (Constitute Project, “Luxembourg 1868 rev. 2009”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Luxembourg_2009?lang=en

====Madagascar====
Article 13(1) governs privacy rights in Madagascar. It assures each individual “the inviolability of their person, their domicile and of the secrecy of their correspondence” (Constitute Project, “Madagascar 2010”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Madagascar_2010?lang=en

====Malawi====
The 1994 Malawi Constitution protects personal privacy in Article 21. As defined in the article, personal privacy protects possessions, home, and property (Constitute Project, “Malawi 1994 rev. 2017”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malawi_2017?lang=en

====Malaysia====
The constitution is lacking privacy rights protections. The first privacy related writing was the Personal Data Protection Act of 2010. This law came into force in 2013 and is more about data privacy than privacy rights generally.

https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-privacy-data-protection-and-cybersecurity-law-review/malaysia
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malaysia_2007?lang=en

====Maldives====
Article 24 grants the right to privacy in the Maldives. It says: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his private communications. Every person must respect these rights with respect to others” (Constitute Project, “Maldives 2008”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Maldives_2008?lang=en

====Mali====
Article 6 of the 1992 constitution protected the three main privacy rights: the home, correspondence, and the individual (Constitute Project, “Mali 1992”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mali_1992?lang=en

====Malta====
Article 32 of the Maltese Constitution protects the right to private and family life. Article 38 protects the home (Constitute Project, “Malta 1964 rev. 2016”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malta_2016?lang=en

====Marshall Islands====
Section 13 of the Marshall Islands’ constitution protects personal autonomy. It says: “All persons shall be free from unreasonable interference in personal choices that do not injure others and from unreasonable intrusions into their privacy” (Constitute Project, “Marshall Islands 1979 rev. 1995”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Marshall_Islands_1995?lang=en

====Mauritania====
Article 13(4) protects the right to privacy in Mauritania: “The honor and the private life of the citizen, the inviolability of the human person, of his domicile and of his correspondence are guaranteed by the State” (Constitute Project, "Mauritania 1991 rev. 2012").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mauritania_2012?lang=en

====Mauritius====
The sole constitution of Mauritius from 1968 is limited in what it says about privacy rights. It only protects a person and their property from a search in Article 9 (Constitute Project, "Mauritius 1968 rev. 2016").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mauritius_2016?lang=en

====Mexico====
Article 7 of the 1857 constitution prevents writers from writing about people’s private lives (World History Commons, “Federal Constitution of the United Mexican States of 1857”). Today, Article 16 of the 1917 constitution protects the privacy rights and data privacy in Mexico: “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, his/her family, papers, properties or be invaded at home without a written order from a competent authority, duly explaining the legal cause of the proceeding. All people have the right to enjoy protection on his personal data, and to access, correct and cancel such data. All people have the right to oppose the disclosure of his data, according to the law. The law shall establish exceptions to the criteria that rule the handling of data, due to national security reasons, law and order, public security, public health, or protection of third party’s rights” (Constitute Project, “Mexico 1917 rev. 2015”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mexico_2015?lang=en
https://worldhistorycommons.org/federal-constitution-united-mexican-states-1857

====Federated States of Micronesia====
Article IV Section 5 of the constitution of 1978 says “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and other possessions against unreasonable search, seizure, or invasion of privacy may not be violated. A warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized” (Constitute Project, “Micronesia (Federated States of) 1978 rev. 1990”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Micronesia_1990?lang=en

====Moldova====
Today, Articles 28-30 of the 1994 constitution protect privacy rights in Moldova. Article 28 grants privacy in private and family life, Article 29 in the home, and Article 30 in correspondence (Constitute Project, “Moldova 1994 rev. 2016”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Moldova_2016?lang=en

====Monaco====
The 1962 constitution, still in force today, protects the home in Article 21 and the general right to privacy in Article 22. Article 22 calls out private and family life as well as correspondence (Constitute Project, “Monaco 1962 rev 2002”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Monaco_2002?lang=en

====Mongolia====
Article 16(13) of the 1992 constitution protects the right to personal liberty and safety. It says, “The privacy of citizens, their families, confidentiality of correspondence and communication, and the inviolability of home residence shall be protected by law” (Constitute Project, “Mongolia 1992 rev. 2001).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mongolia_2001?lang=en

====Montenegro====
Article 20 of the 1992 constitution says, “physical and psychological integrity of man, his privacy and personal rights are inviolable” (Venice Commission, “Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro”). Today, Article 28 says “The inviolability of the physical and mental integrity of a man, and privacy and individual rights thereof shall be guaranteed” (Constitute Project, “Montenegro 2007 rev. 2013”).

https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2005)096-e
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Montenegro_2013?lang=en

====Morocco====
The 2011 Moroccan constitution was the first to have fundamental rights based on international treaties (Moroccan Government, “Constitution”). This made it the first to guarantee the right to privacy, which was achieved in Article 24 (Moroccan Government, “Constitution”; Constitute Project, “Morocco 2011”). Article 24 protects private life, the home, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Morocco 2011”).

https://www.maroc.ma/en/content/constitution
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Morocco_2011?lang=en

====Mozambique====
The 1975 constitution of Mozambique granted “All citizens … the right to their honor, good name and reputation, as well as the right to privacy and to defend their public image” (RefWorld, “Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique”). This is echoed in Article 41 of the 2004 constitution (Constitute Project, “Mozambique 2004 rev. 2007”).

https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4f40.html
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mozambique_2007?lang=en

====Myanmar====
Article 160 in the 1974 Burmese Constitution grants privacy for home, property, correspondence, and communications (Burma Library, “THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF BURMA (1974)”). Today, these same protections are afforded in Article 357 (Constitute Project, “Myanmar 2008 rev. 2015”).

https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs07/1974Constitution.pdf?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=pmd_uXw1EkLnkyq9T6FqkzA_NO9lvJaIhzdgyzAJ1J1s5Ko-1635431051-0-gqNtZGzNAiWjcnBszQjR
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Myanmar_2015?lang=en

====Namibia====
The 1990 constitution protects the right to privacy in the home and for correspondence in Article 13 (Constitute Project, “Namibia 1990 rev. 2014”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Namibia_2014?lang=en

====Nauru====
The preamble to Part II Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in the 1968 constitution grants everyone the “respect for his private and family life” (Constitute Project, “Nauru 1968 rev. 2015”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nauru_2015?lang=en

====Nepal====
The 1990 constitution was the first to protect privacy as a fundamental right. In Article 22: “Except as provided by law, the privacy of the person, house, property, document, correspondence or information of anyone is inviolable” (Constitution Net, “The Constitution of Nepal 1990”). In the 2015 constitution, the same language is used in Article 28 (Constitute Project, “Nepal 2015 rev. 2016").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nepal_2016?lang=en
https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/1990_constitution_english.pdf

====Kingdom of the Netherlands====
Article 10 of the 1814 Constitution grants privacy rights to persons in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 10(1) states “Everyone has, save for limitations to be provided by or pursuant to statute, the right to respect for his private life.” Article 13 protects private correspondence and Article 12 protects the home (Hardt & Kiiver, 2019, 141).

Sascha Hardt & Phillip Kiiver. Comparative Constitutional Law Documents. “Constitution for the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 24 August 1815.”

====New Zealand====
New Zealand governs privacy rights with the 1993 Privacy Act, which has since been replaced with the 2020 Privacy Act.

https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0028/latest/DLM296639.html

====Nicaragua====
The 1974 constitution “guarantees the inviolability of the home, the dwelling, and of any other private premises of persons” in Article 58 (General Secretariat Organization of American States, Washington D.C., “Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua”). Article 80 protected correspondence. The 1987 constitution broadened privacy rights in Article 26 stating: “Everyone has the right to: 1. Privacy in his/her life and that of his/her family; 2. Respect of his/her honor and reputation; 3. Know about any information which private or public entities may have on record about him/her as well as the right to know why and for what purpose they hold such information; 4. Inviolability of his/her domicile, correspondence and communication of any kind.” (Constitute Project, “Nicaragua 1987 rev. 2014”).

https://books.google.com/books?printsec=frontcover&vid=LCCN77374018#v=snippet&q=inviolable&f=false
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nicaragua_2014?lang=en

====Niger====
The 2010 constitution only protects the domicile of people in terms of privacy rights. This is done in Article 27 (Constitute Project, “Niger 2010 rev. 2017”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Niger_2017?lang=en

====Nigeria====
In 1960, the country’s first constitution protected the private life, home, and correspondence of each person in Article 22 (World Statesmen, “The Constitution of the Federation of Niger”).
Today, the same language is seen in Article 37 of the 1999 constitution (Constitute Project, “Nigeria Constitution 1999 rev. 2011”).

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/nigeria_const1960.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Nigeria_2011?lang=en

====North Korea====
Article 79 of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 1972 constitution grants that citizens and homes are inviolable and that communications are private (Constitute Project, “Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of) 1972 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Peoples_Republic_of_Korea_2016?lang=en

====North Macedonia====
Article 25 of the 1991 constitution states “Each citizen is guaranteed the respect and protection of the privacy of his/her personal and family life and of his/her dignity and repute.” Amendment XIX, altering Article 17, protects communications more heavily (Constitute Project, “North Macedonia 1991 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Macedonia_2011?lang=en

====Norway====
Norway has had one constitution since 1814, though it has been amended many times. Article 102 gives everyone “the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence” (Constitute Project, “Norway 1814 rev. 2016”). However, it appears this was amended sometime after 2004, as the version with amendments through 2004 does not have this language in Article 102 (Constitute Project, “Norway 1814 rev. 2004”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Norway_2016?lang=en
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Norway_2004.pdf

====Oman====
The Oman constitution, written in 1996, only constitutional protects the privacy of homes in Article 27 (Constitute Project, "Oman 1996 rev. 2011").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Oman_2011?lang=en

====Pakistan====
The 1973 constitution, reinstated in 2002, in Article 14 cites the inviolability of man’s dignity and privacy in the home as fundamental (Constitute Project, “Pakistan Constitution reinst. 2002, rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Pakistan_2018?lang=en

====Palau====
Article IV(4) of the 1981 constitution ensures “Every person has the right to be secure in his person, house, papers and effects against entry, search and seizure” (Constitute Project, “Palau 1981 rev. 1992").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Palau_1992?lang=en

====Panama====
Article 28 of the 1904 constitution keeps documents private (University of Michigan, “Constitution of the Republic of Panama”). The 1972 constitution reflects the same tone toward the privacy of documents in Article 29. Article 26 grants the home inviolable, though there is no blanket protection of privacy rights in the 1972 constitution (Constitute Project, “Panama 1972 rev. 2004”).

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112104577715&view=1up&seq=12
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Panama_2004?lang=en

====Papua New Guinea====
Under the basic rights prescribed under Section 5(f), all citizens have the “protection for the privacy of their homes and other property” (Constitute Project, Papua New Guinea 1975 rev. 2016). Additionally, Article 49(1) gives “Every person has a right to reasonable privacy in respect of his private and family life, his communications with other persons and his personal papers and effects, except to the extent that the exercise of that right is regulated or restricted by law that complies with Section 38 (general qualifications on qualified rights).”

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Papua_New_Guinea_2016?lang=en

====Paraguay====
In the 1967 constitution, Article 68 makes the home inviolable, and Article 69 makes communications inviolable, barring investigation (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, “Constitution of the Republic of Paraguay 1967”. Today, according to Article 33 of the Paraguay Constitution, “Personal and family intimacy, as well as the respect of private life, is inviolable. The behavior of persons, that does not affect the public order established by the law or the rights of third parties[,] is exempted from the public authority.” Article 34 inviolably protects the home (Constitute Project, “Paraguay 1992 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Paraguay_2011?lang=en
https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/con00138.pdf

====Peru====
Today, Article 2(7) protects privacy rights in Peru for one’s honor, reputation, personal and family life, voice, and image (Constitute Project, “Peru 1993 rev. 2021”). Similar rights appear to have been listed in Article 2 of the 1979 constitution, but an English translation could not be found.

http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Peru-Constitucion%201979.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Peru_2021?lang=en

====Philippines====
The 1935 Constitution grants “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated” in Article III, Section 1(3) (Official Gazette, “The 1935 Constitution”). Today, similar language is used in Article II, Section 1(2) (Official Gazette, “The 1935 Constitution”).

https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/the-1935-constitution/
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/

====Poland====
The 1921 Polish Constitution grants privacy in the home and communication in articles 100 and 106, respectively (Sejm Parliamentary Library, “Constitution of the Republic of Poland, March 17, 1921”). Today, Article 47 of the 1997 constitution protects the general right to privacy in Poland: “Everyone shall have the right to legal protection of his private and family life, of his honour and good reputation and to make decisions about his personal life.” Articles 49 and 50 extend these protections to communications and the home (Constitute Project, “Poland 1997 rev. 2009”).

http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/kpol/e1921.html
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Poland_2009?lang=en

====Portugal====
Portugal’s first protection of privacy was in the 1976 constitution. Article 26(1) says “Everyone shall possess the right to a personal identity, to the development of their personality, to civil capacity, to citizenship, to a good name and reputation, to their likeness, to speak out, to protect the privacy of their personal and family life, and to legal protection against any form of discrimination.” Article 65 grants privacy in the home (Constitute Project, “Portugal 1976 rev. 2005).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Portugal_2005?lang=en

====Qatar====
From 1972-2003, Qatar was ruled by a temporary constitution. In this document Article 12 granted the sanctity of dwellings (Al Meezan, “The Amended Provisional Constitution of 1972”). Today, Article 37 of the Constitution claims “The sanctity of human privacy shall be inviolable, and therefore interference into privacy of a person, family affairs, home of residence, correspondence, or any other act of interference that may demean or defame a person may not be allowed save as limited by the provisions of the law stipulated therein” (Qatar Government Communications Office, “The Constitution”).

https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/about-qatar/the-constitution/
https://www.almeezan.qa/LawView.aspx?opt&LawID=4360&language=en#Section_14176

====Romania====
Today, Article 26 of the 1991 Romanian Constitution protects personal and family privacy: “(1) The public authorities shall respect and protect the intimate, family and private life” (Constitute Project, “Romania 1991 rev. 2003”). Privacy may have been protected in earlier iterations of the constitution (i.e., 1952, 1965, etc.), but English translations could not be found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Romania_2003?lang=en

====Russia====
In 1906, the Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire were the first to grant Russians “sanctity of the home and property.” This was the first time Russians were granted civil liberties (Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library, “‘Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire’ Approved”).

https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619222

====Rwanda====
The right to privacy in Rwanda is protected by Articles 23 and 34. Article 23 states “The privacy of a person, his or her family, home or correspondence shall not be subjected to interference in a manner inconsistent with the law; the person's honour and dignity shall be respected. A person's home is inviolable. No search or entry into a home shall be carried out without the consent of the owner, except in circumstances and in accordance with procedures determined by the law.” Article 34 states “Private property, whether owned individually or collectively, is inviolable” (Constitute Project, "Rwanda 2003 rev. 2015").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Rwanda_2015?lang=en

====Saint Kitts and Nevis====
Chapter II, Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, of the 1983 constitution entitles everyone to fundamental rights, including “protection for his personal privacy, the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation” (Constitute Project, “Saint Kitts and Nevis 1983”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Kitts_and_Nevis_1983?lang=en

====Saint Lucia====
Chapter I, Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, of the 1978 constitution immediately grants every person in St. Lucia “protection for his family life, his personal privacy, the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation” (Constitute Project, “Saint Lucia 1978”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Lucia_1978?lang=en

====Saint Vincent and the Grenadines====
In the preamble of their only constitution to date, Vincentians are promised safeguards to “the rights of privacy of family life, of property, and the fostering of the pursuit of just economic rewards for labor.” This is reaffirmed in Article 1 with the granting of fundamental rights and freedoms (Constitute Project, “Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1979”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Vincent_and_the_Grenadines_1979?lang=en

====Samoa====
There is no mention of privacy rights in the constitution, which has been updated as recently as 2017 (Constitute Project, “Samoa 1962 rev. 2017”). Section 50(2) of the Telecommunications Act 2005 protects the privacy of telecommunications customers (Samoa). This was the earliest found reference to privacy rights in Samoa.

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Samoa_2017?lang=en
https://www.regulator.gov.ws/images/Act/TELECOMMUNICATIONS_ACT_2005_-_Eng.pdf

====San Marino====
The 1974 Declaration of Citizens' Rights and of the fundamental principles of the San Marinese legal order is the first time privacy rights are alluded to in San Marino. Art. 6 grants civil and political liberties. It does not grant privacy except in communications.

https://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions/country/6/San%20Marino/show

====São Tomé and Príncipe====
Article 24 of the 1975 Constitution, still in effect today, states “Personal identity and the confidentiality of the intimacy of private and family life are inviolable” (Constitute Project, Sao Tome and Principe 1975 rev. 2003). Additionally, Article 25 grants that communications and one’s home are also private (Constitute Project, Sao Tome and Principe 1975 rev. 2003).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Sao_Tome_and_Principe_2003?lang=en

====Saudi Arabia====
The 1992 Saudi Constitution does not explicitly protect privacy but claims privacy in communications and homes in Articles 37 and 40 (Constitute Project, “Saudi Arabia’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2005”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Saudi_Arabia_2013?lang=en

====Senegal====
Senegal does not explicitly protect the right to privacy in its constitution. Article 7 of the 2001 constitution makes the claim to protect human rights but does not call out privacy. Article 13 provides for private correspondence and Article 16 makes the domicile inviolable (Constitute Project, “Senegal 2001 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Senegal_2016?lang=en

====Serbia====
The 2006 Serbian Constitution does not protect the right to privacy outright but allows for privacy in communication and data collection/sharing in Articles 41 and 42 (Constitute Project, “Serbia 2006”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Serbia_2006?lang=en

====Seychelles====
The 1976 Independence Constitution of Seychelles, under Chapter 3, Article 12(c) gives individuals privacy of their home and other property (Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative, “Constitution of Seychelles, 1976”).

https://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/constitution-of-seychelles-1976/

====Sierra Leone====
The 1978 constitution protected the privacy of the home and property under Article 12 (The Laws of Sierra Leone on the Sierra Leone Web, “The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1978”).

http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/1978-12s.pdf

====Singapore====
No part of the constitution mentions a right to privacy (Privacy International, “The Right to Privacy in Singapore”). There are also no specific laws governing privacy within the state.

https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/Singapore_UPR_PI_submission_FINAL.pdf

====Slovakia====
Article 16(1) of the 1992 constitution states “The inviolability of the person and its privacy is guaranteed. It may be limited only in cases laid down by law” (Constitute Project, “Slovakia 1992 rev. 2017). Sections 2 and 3 of Article 19 protect private life and data collection and publication (Constitute Project, “Slovakia 1992 rev. 2017). Article 21 claims the home is inviolable, while Article 22 protects communications (Constitute Project, “Slovakia 1992 rev. 2017).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Slovakia_2017?lang=en

====Slovenia====
Articles 35 and 36 of the constitution speak to the right to privacy in Slovenia. Article 35 says “The inviolability of the physical and mental integrity of every person, his privacy and personality rights shall be guaranteed” (Constitute Project, “Slovenia 1991 rev. 2016”). Article 36 says “Dwellings are inviolable. No one may, without a court order, enter the dwelling or other premises of another person, nor may he search the same, against the will of the resident. Any person whose dwelling or other premises are searched has the right to be present or to have a representative present. Such a search may only be conducted in the presence of two witnesses. Subject to conditions provided by law, an official may enter the dwelling or other premises of another person without a court order, and may in exceptional circumstances conduct a search in the absence of witnesses, where this is absolutely necessary for the direct apprehension of a person who has committed a criminal offence or to protect people or property” (Constitute Project, “Slovenia 1991 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Slovenia_2016?lang=en

====Solomon Islands====
Article 9 of the Solomon Islands Constitution protects the privacy of the home and other property: “Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.” (Constitute Project, “Solomon Islands 1978 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Solomon_Islands_2018?lang=en

====Somalia====
Article 28 of the 1960 Constitution of Somalia grants “respect for the private home” in which "no home or private property of any one (sic) may be entered into or violated, save in the cases mentioned in Paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of Article 25” (World Intellectual Property Organization, “The Constitution”).

https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/so/so002en.pdf

====South Africa====
The 1993 Interim Constitution of South Africa was the first to grant privacy rights. The right to privacy includes “the right not to be subject to searches of his or her person, home or property, the seizure of private possessions or the violation of private communications” (South African Government, “Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993”). Today, the 1996 Constitution offers similar protections in Article 14 (Constitute Project, “South Africa 1996 rev. 2012).

https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-act-200-1993#13%20Privacy
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Africa_2012?lang=en

====South Korea====
Under the first constitution of the Republic of Korea in 1948, Articles 17 and 18 grant the right to privacy. Neither the privacy of a citizen nor communication may be infringed (Constitute Project, “Korea (Republic of) 1948 rev. 1987”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Republic_of_Korea_1987?lang=en

====South Sudan====
Article 22 of the 2011 South Sudan constitution protects the right to privacy: “The privacy of all persons shall be inviolable; no person shall be subjected to interference with his or her private life, family, home or correspondence, save in accordance with the law” (Constitute Project, “South Sudan 2011 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Sudan_2013?lang=en

====Spain====
The 1978 Spanish Constitution was the first to present privacy rights in Spain. Section 19(1) protects “the right to honour, to personal and family privacy and to the own image,” while 19(2) protects the home, and 19(4) explicitly grants data privacy (Constitute Project, “Spain 1978 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Spain_2011?lang=en

====Sri Lanka====
Sri Lanka’s constitution does not protect the right to privacy, though privacy is mentioned briefly in Article 14A(2) (Constitute Project, “Sri Lanka 1978 rev. 2015”). Sri Lanka is also lacking comprehensive privacy legislation, instead opting to write in provisions when regulating other industries (Data Guidance, “Sri Lanka – Data Protection Overview”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Sri_Lanka_2015?lang=en
https://www.dataguidance.com/notes/sri-lanka-data-protection-overview

====Sudan====
Privacy rights first appear in the 1973 Sudanese Constitution. Article 42 states “the private life of citizens is inviolable. The state shall guarantee the freedom and secrecy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communications in accordance with the law.” Article 43 protects dwellings in the same manner (The Democratic Republic of Sudan Gazette, “The Permanent Constitution of Sudan”). Today, these protections are combined into Article 55 of the 2019 Constitution, in which “No one’s privacy may be violated. It is not permissible to interfere in the private or family life of any person in his home or correspondence, except in accordance with the law” (Constitute Project, "Sudan 2019").

https://www.righttononviolence.org/mecf/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Constitution-Sudan-1973-+-amendment-1975.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Sudan_2019?lang=en

====Suriname====
The 1975 Suriname Constitution protected the home and private life in Article 14 (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1983, “Report on the Human Rights Situation in Suriname”). Today, these rights are protected under Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution (Constitute Project, “Suriname 1987 rev 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Surinam_1992?lang=en
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Suriname83eng/chap.1.htm

====Sweden====
Constitutionally, privacy rights were introduced with the 1974 Swedish Constitution. Articles 2 and 6 present the right to privacy, while Article 20 allows the provisions in Article 6 to have some limitations (Constitute Project, “Sweden’s Constitution of 1974 with Amendments through 2012”). Sweden was also the first to introduce data privacy rights with the Data Act in 1973 (GDPRHub, “Data Protection in Sweden”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Sweden_2012.pdf?lang=en
https://gdprhub.eu/Data_Protection_in_Sweden

====Switzerland====
The 1992 Federal Act on Data Protection was the first formal protection of privacy in Switzerland (DLA Piper, “Data protection laws of the world: Switzerland”). This law has since been revised, but since then, the right to privacy was added to the 1999 Swiss Constitution in Article 13 (Constitute Project, “Switzerland 1999 rev. 2014”).

https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?t=law&c=CH
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Switzerland_2014?lang=en

====Syria====
The right to privacy was limited in the 1973 constitution, preventing only the private seizure of private property without judicial ruling (Carnegie Middle East Center, “The Syrian Constitution – 1973-2012”). Today, Articles 36 and 37 of the 2012 Constitution protect privacy rights. Article 36 protects private life and Article 37 protects communications (Constitute Project, “Syrian Arab Republic 2012”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Syria_2012?lang=en
https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/50255?lang=en

====Tajikistan====
Articles 22 and 23 of the 1994 Tajikistan constitution protect the right to privacy. Article 22 makes the home inviolable, and Article 23 forbids “The collection, storage, use, and dissemination of information about private life of a person without his consent” (Constitute Project, “Tajikistan 1994 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Tajikistan_2016?lang=en

====Tanzania====
The 1965 constitution of Tanzania did not explicitly provide for privacy but defaulted “to safeguard the inherent dignity of the individual in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” during the preamble (World Statesmen, “The Interim Constitution of Tanzania”). Today, the 1997 constitution (as amended in 2005) privacy and personal security in Article 16 (Constitute Project, “Tanzania’s Constitution of 1977 with Amendments through 2005”).

http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Tanzania-Constitution-1965.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Tanzania_2005?lang=en

====Thailand====
The earliest mention of privacy is the 1997 constitution of Thailand. While they have had many constitutions since 1932, the earliest translation found was that of the 1997 text. Section 34 protects “A person’s family rights, dignity, reputation or the right of privacy” unless it is beneficial to the public (Ref World, “Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand”).

https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ae6b5b2b.pdf

====Togo====
Articles 27, 28, and 29 in the 1992 Togolese Constitution protect private property, the home, private life, and image, and correspondence. Article 28 is explicit to the right to privacy, while Articles 27 and 29 fit into the privacy penumbras subscribed by the United States (Constitute Project, “Togo’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2007”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Togo_2007?lang=en

====Tonga====
The Tonga constitution was written in 1875. Under Article 16, privacy is granted during searches, except for lawfully granted searches through a warrant (Constitute Project, “Tonga’s Constitution of 1875 with Amendments through 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Tonga_2013.pdf?lang=en

====Trinidad and Tobago====
The 1976 constitution does not explicitly protect the right to privacy. However, Article 4 protects fundamental human rights, such as “the right of the individual to respect for his private and family life” and protection of the law (Constitute Project, “Trinidad and Tobago 1976 rev. 2007").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Trinidad_and_Tobago_2007?lang=en

====Tunisia====
In 1959, the constitution granted the right to privacy in Article 9. At some point between then and 2008, this article was amended to protect personal data, reflecting the changes in privacy rights with new technologies (Constitute Project, “Tunisia 1959 rev. 2008").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2008?lang=en

====Turkey====
The 1924 Turkish Constitution protects personal liberty except for the provision of law under Article 72 (World Statesmen, “The New Constitution of Turkey”). Article 71 protects the inviolability of the home, life, property, and honor. Article 81 allows for private communications.

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Turkeyconstitution1924.pdf

====Turkmenistan====
The 1992 Constitution protects against arbitrary interference of privacy in Article 25 (International Committee on the Red Cross, “Constitution 1992, as of 2008”).

Today, Article 37 of the 2008 constitution grants “the right to private liberty, personal and family secrets and their protection from arbitrary interference in their privacy” while Article 38 prevents the “Collection, storage and dissemination of information about private life of an individual” without consent (Constitute Project, “Turkmenistan's Constitution of 2008 with Amendments through 2016”).

https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/D9E58AFB0C841166C1256FFD0034016C
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkmenistan_2016.pdf?lang=en

====Tuvalu====
The 1996 constitution protects privacy rights under Articles 11(h) and 21 (Constitute Project, “Tuvalu Constitution of 1996”). Article 11(h) reads “Every person is entitled…to the following fundamental freedoms: […] (h) protection for the privacy of his home and other property” (Constitute Project, “Tuvalu Constitution of 1996”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tuvalu_1986.pdf?lang=en

====Uganda====
Article 17(c) of the 1962 constitution provides privacy rights protections in Uganda (World Statesmen, “Uganda Constitutional Instruments”). It protects “the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation” as a fundamental right. Today, the 1995 Constitution grants these protections in Article 27 (Constitute Project, “Uganda’s Constitution of 1995 with Amendments through 2017").

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Uganda-const-1962.pdf
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Uganda_2017.pdf?lang=en

====Ukraine====
Articles 30, 31, and 32 of the 1996 Constitution grant the right to privacy (Constitute Project, “Ukraine’s Constitution of 1996 with Amendments through 2016”). Article 30 gives privacy in the home, Article 31 allows privacy protections to communications, and Article 32 prevents interference into personal and family life (Constitute Project, “Ukraine’s Constitution of 1996 with Amendments through 2016”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ukraine_2016.pdf?lang=en

====United Arab Emirates====
The 1971 constitution protects privacy in communications in Articles 31 and Article 36 protects one’s home (Constitute Project, “United Arab Emirates 1971, rev. 2009").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/United_Arab_Emirates_2009?lang=en

====United Kingdom====
The United Kingdom 1988 Human Rights Act entrenched the ECHR into United Kingdom law (Liberty, “The Human Rights Act”). It protects one’s privacy from unnecessary intrusion, among other rights. Additionally, in ‘’The Right to Privacy’’ Warren and Brandeis cite Lord Cottenham in 1820 who, in agreement with Lord Eldon, felt that were a king’s illnesses recorded by a doctor and published while that king was still alive, a court would not permit its publishing, as he claimed this circumstance would breach the king’s privacy (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 205; Bycer, 2014).

https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/your-rights/the-human-rights-act/
Bycer, M. (2014). Understanding the 1890 Warren and Brandeis “The Right to Privacy” Article. National Juris University. Retrieved Sept. 10, 2021, from https://nationalparalegal.edu/UnderstandingWarrenBrandeis.aspx
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

====United States====
The first mention of this right is ‘’The Right to Privacy’’ written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis and published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890. Constitutionally, it was first found in the 1965 Supreme Court case ‘’Griswold v. Connecticut’’ (Privacy, n.d.).

Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

====Uruguay====
The 1966 constitution was the first translated into English to mention privacy rights. It is protected in Articles 10, 11, and 28. Article 10 grants individuals’ privacy, Article 11 makes the home private, and Article 28 protects communications (Constitute Project, "Uruguay 1966, reinst. 1985, rev. 2004").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Uruguay_2004?lang=en

====Uzbekistan====
Article 27 of the 1992 Constitution protects privacy and the inviolability of the home, requiring a prescription by law to allow a search of the home (Constitute Project, “Uzbekistan's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2011”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Uzbekistan_2011.pdf?lang=en

====Vanuatu====
Article 5(1)(j) in the 1980 Vanuatu Constitution protects privacy in the home and property (Constitute Project, “Vanuatu’s Constitution of 1980 with Amendments through 2013”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Vanuatu_2013.pdf?lang=en

====Venezuela====
Privacy is first alluded to in the Venezuelan Declaration of Independence and Constitution of 1812 in Art. 177, which grants privacy in the home from soldiers (Rice University, "Venezuelan Declaration of Independence and Constitution").
Today, privacy is strictly protected in Venezuela, going beyond the call of the ICCPR’s call in Article 17 under constitutional Articles 48 and 60 (Privacy International, “The Right to Privacy in Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of): Stakeholder Report, Universal Periodic Review,” 4).

https://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/venezuela_upr2016.pdf
https://scholarship.rice.edu/jsp/xml/1911/9253/1/aa00032.tei.html

====Vietnam====
The 1992 Vietnam Constitution was the first since its independence that recognized the “inviolability of personal privacy” in Article 21 (Constitute Project, “Viet Nam’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2013”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Socialist_Republic_of_Vietnam_2013.pdf?lang=en
https://constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-vietnam

====Yemen====
There are no explicit protections of privacy in Yemen, though Article 20 does not allow for private confiscation without legal judgment (Constitute Project, “Yemen 1991: Rev. 2015”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Yemen_2015?lang=en
https://giswatch.org/en/country-report/communications-surveillance/yemen

====Zambia====
Privacy was protected in the first constitution of Zambia in 1964 in Chapter 3, Articles 13(c) and 19 (World Statesmen, “Laws of Zambia: The Constitution”).
Today, Article 11(d) and 17 of the 1991 Zambian Constitution protect the right to privacy (Constitute Project, “Zambia’s Constitution of 1991 with Amendments Through 2016”).

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Constitution-Zambia1964.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Zambia_2016.pdf?lang=en

====Zimbabwe====

The 2013 Zimbabwe Constitution grants “[e]very person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have: (a) their home, premises or property entered without their permission; (b) their person, home, premises or property searched; (c) their possessions seized; (d) the privacy of their communications infringed; or (e) their health condition disclosed” in Section 57 (Privacy International, “The Right to Privacy in Zimbabwe: Stakeholder Report, Universal Periodic Review,” 4). Before this, the 2007 Interception of Communications Act allowed for public information to be intercepted by authorities, something that has not been rectified since the implementation of the new constitution.

https://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/zimbabwe_upr2016.pdf

===Is there another noteworthy written source from the past that mentions this right?===
The right to privacy has diverged in many ways since its most notable first mention in ''The Right to Privacy'' by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. What started in 1890 as the idea of protection against gossip about oneself and the ability to enjoy life uninterrupted has evolved into various international and national conventions and laws.

The right to privacy was first enshrined at a supranational level before it was established in individual states (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 26). The right’s first appearance in legal documentation was in the United Nation’s (UN) 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR). Article 12 of the UDHR (1948) states “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” The UHDR is not a treaty, so the right was not yet entrenched and more of a suggestion for states to incorporate into their laws and practices.

Two years later, the Council of Europe passed the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) which has similar tones in Article 8, though with an exception for national security in Article 8 (2) but is legally binding (1950). Article 8 of the ECHR specifically protects one’s family life, personal life, correspondence, and home (Roagna, 2021, 9). Worldwide, the right to privacy became codified in 1966 with the passage of the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), in which Article 17 has almost identical language to the UDHR’s Article 12. In subsequent UN treaties, this right to privacy was explicitly granted to children and migrants as well (Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, Art. 16; International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990, Art. 14).

'''Complying with the ICCPR''': In the United States, the right to privacy was not originally codified but established through a variety of Supreme Court cases beginning in the 1960s (Privacy, n.d.). In 1965, the Court ruled on Griswold v. Connecticut. The majority opinion written by Justice Douglas claims that the express personal freedoms named in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments create an implied “zone of privacy” (Privacy, n.d.). Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, referenced in later Supreme Court privacy cases, claims privacy zones derive from the Fourteenth Amendment (Privacy, n.d.). Later, legislation was passed regulating specific sectors, beginning in 1974 with the Family Educations Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), which protects student data, and the Privacy Act which regulates the use of data by federal agencies (History of privacy timeline, 2021).

The European Court of Human Rights has refined the implementation of ECHR Article 8 through case law (Roagna, 2021, 7). In deciding these cases, the Court must decide if the complaint is related to Article 8 and, if so, if the right has been interfered with outside of the exceptions laid out in Article 8 (2) (Roagna, 2021, 11). For this reason, there is no clear-cut definition as to which national laws may conflict with Article 8 (Roagna, 2021, 12). The Court has provided protections for ‘quasi-familial’ relationships, relationships that may develop later (i.e., one has the right to adopt), the development of personality, photographs, and data collection, ruling these areas are part of private and/or family life (Roagna, 2021, 10-19). The Court has also provided lengthy protections to family life with a broad definition of family which evolves with European customs (Roagna, 2021, 27). The protection of a home has also been interpreted broadly, requiring continuous ties to a location, mostly due to the French translation of “home” to “domicile” (Roagna, 2021, 30-31). The Court rules for high protection of means of communication as it can be easily breached (Roagna, 2021, 32). This protection includes information gathered from monitored internet use and remains in places no matter the content of the message (Roagna, 2021, 32).

'''The Digital Era''': Since these international conventions have become effective and enforceable, there has been a lot of technological change and little change in these agreements (Human right to privacy, n.d.). The UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) noted in General Comment 16, adopted regarding ICCPR’s Article 17 in 1988, that the legislation in many states was not enough to ensure the “protection against both unlawful and arbitrary interference,” and that data collection “must be regulated by law” (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 27; UN Human Rights Committee, 1994, para. 2 & 10). In essence, this comment was requesting states enact more protective privacy law legislation, and, specifically, data regulation law, as the right to privacy evolved to be dominated by electronic data (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 27).

There have been two approaches to this call for better data privacy regulation: general regulation and regulation by sector. The European Union has taken the general regulation approach with the passage of the 1995 European Data Protection Directive and the 2016 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR affects people and companies worldwide, requiring that data collected is truly needed, accurate, processed safely, and that all of this is done in a clear, legal, and transparent way (Krishnamurthy, 2020; Wolford, n.d.). The United States has chosen to regulate privacy data by sector, beginning with FERPA in 1974 (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29; History of privacy timeline, 2021). This approach has led to some strict laws preventing unauthorized access to personal information in some areas regulated by specific legislation (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29). In areas without specific legislation, however, Americans take great liberties while collecting data (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29). Put in combination with the lacking legislation preventing interference or data attacks, some question how compliant the United States is with Article 17 of the ICCPR (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29). However, as of 2020, 29% of states are still drafting or have yet to draft such legislation (UN Committee on Trade and Development).

'''Privacy in Former Sovereign States'''

It is worth noting that some states have always had some privacy rights since they gained independence because their previous constitution and laws contained such provisions. This is the case with states that were formerly in the Soviet Union. The 1977 Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which was then implemented in nearly identical form in the various republics as their own constitution, protected “the privacy of citizens, and of their correspondence, telephone conversations, and telegraphic communications” in Article 56 (USSR, 1982, 35). Additionally, Czechoslovakia protected privacy rights of the person, home, and correspondence in Article 30 & 31 in the 1960 constitution (Czechoslovakia, 1964, 233).

Resources

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://rm.coe.int/1680a2353d
Convention on the Rights of the Child. United Nations (UN) General Assembly (UNGA). Nov. 20, 1989. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx
Czechoslovakia. (1964). Constitution of Czechoslovakia July 11, 1960. Orbis: Prague. From https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Czechoslovakia-Const1960.pdf
History of privacy timeline. (2021). The University of Michigan. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://safecomputing.umich.edu/privacy/history-of-privacy-timeline
Human right to privacy in the digital age, The. (n.d.). American Civil Liberties Union. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.aclu.org/other/human-right-privacy-digital-age
International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. UNGA. Dec. 18, 1990. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cmw.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. UNGA. Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
Krishnamurthy, V. (2020, Jan. 6). A tale of two privacy laws: The GDPR and the International Right to Privacy. AJIL Unbound 114, 26-30. doi:10.1017/aju.2019.79
Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
Roagna, I. (2012). Council of Europe human rights handbook: Protecting the right to respect for private and family life under the European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. https://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/Roagna2012_EN.pdf
UN Committee on Trade and Development. (2020). Data Protection and Privacy Legislation Worldwide. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://unctad.org/page/data-protection-and-privacy-legislation-worldwide
UN Human Rights Committee. (1994). General Comment 16. Thirty-third session. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 1 Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://undocs.org/HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
USSR. (1982). Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist States: Adopted at the Seventh (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Ninth Convocation, on October 7, 1977. Novosti Press Publishing House: Moscow. From https://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/constitution/1977/constitution-ussr-1977.pdf
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

===Is the identification of this right associated with a particular era in history, political regime, or political leader?===
===What specific events or ideas contributed to its identification as a fundamental right?===
===When was it generally accepted as a fundamental, legally-protectable right?===
===What historical forces or events, if any, contributed to a widespread belief in its importance? ===
==Legal Codification==
===Is this right protected in the Constitutions of most countries today?===
===Is it contained in the US Constitution?===
The right to privacy is not explicitly contained in the United States Constitution.

References

Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy

===Has it been interpreted as being implicit in the US Constitution?===
In the United States, the right to privacy was not originally codified but established through Supreme Court cases around the 1960s (Privacy, n.d.). Prior to this time, the Court recognized in ''Snyder v. Massachusetts'' (1934) that some concepts of fairness are fundamental, but not expressed. In 1965, the Court heard and decided ''Griswold v. Connecticut''. In the majority opinion, Justice William Douglas argues that the Court had previously ruled on cases in which rights were not explicit in the Bill of Rights, but the rights were justifiable to the Court through the First and Fourteenth Amendments (''Griswold v. Connecticut'', 1965, par. 11). Later in the opinion of the court, he states that in other cases, such as ''Boyd v. United States'' (1886), ''Mapp v. Ohio'' (1961), and ''Poe v. Ullman'' (1961), the court used the ‘penumbras’ of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to make decisions on implicit liberties (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, pars. 14-15). Combined, these penumbras create what the Griswold v. Connecticut majority opinion calls “zones of privacy” (Privacy, n.d.). In a concurring ''Griswold'' opinion, Justice Arthur Goldberg argues that while liberties extend beyond the Bill of Rights, he, Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Justice William Brennan feel that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not include “all of the first eight amendments” (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, par. 21). However, in a different concurring opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan found “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands […] on its own bottom” (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, par. 53; Privacy, n.d.). Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion became the predominant argument used in later privacy cases (Privacy, n.d.).

In 1967, the Supreme Court decided the case of ''Katz v. United States'' (Katz v. US, n.d.). Katz, located in Los Angeles, had been using a public phone booth to inform bettors in Boston and Miami, and in an effort to convict him, federal agents tapped the phone booth (Katz v. US, n.d.). A lower court allowed this evidence to be admitted, but Katz claimed it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment (Katz v. US, n.d.). The Supreme Court sided 7-1 with Katz and establishes that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places” (Katz v. United States, 1967). In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan established the Expectation for Privacy Test (Katz v. US, n.d.; Expectation of Privacy, n.d.). This test is two-fold – the individual must have an expectation for privacy which is rooted in law and society finds that expectation for privacy to be reasonable – and has been used as a basis for privacy since (Expectation of Privacy, n.d.).

After these two cases, the Supreme Court has continued to extend the right to privacy, notably so in three landmark cases: ''Eisenstadt v. Baird'' (1971), ''Roe v. Wade'' (1972), and ''Lawrence v. Texas'' (2003) through the use of the Fourteenth Amendment and Justice Harlan’s concurring ''Griswold'' opinion (Privacy, n.d.). ''Eisenstadt'' extended the use of contraceptives beyond married couples to individuals (Privacy, n.d.). ''Roe'' extended the right to privacy to the women’s right to have an abortion (Privacy, n.d.). ''Lawrence v. Texas''' overturned ''Bowers v. Hardwick'' (1986) and extended privacy to private conduct (Privacy, n.d.).

References

Expectation of Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 13, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/expectation_of_privacy
''Griswold v. Connecticut'', 381 U.S. 479 (1965). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479
Katz v. United States. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved September 13, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/35
''Katz v. United States'', 389 U.S. 347 (1967). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/389/347
Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
''Snyder v. Massachusetts'', 291 U.S. 97 (1934). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/291/97

===Are there any exceptions in American law to this right?===
Most recent US legislation regarding the right to privacy concerns the collection, retention, and transfer of personal data. Under the Department of Justice, the Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties (OPCL) enforces privacy laws, recommends privacy policies (including exceptions), and responds to data breaches (Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties, n.d.).

'''Freedom of Information Act 1966 (as amended 2016)'''

In 1966, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This act granted anyone the ability to request access to federal agency records but not the records of private companies. However, nine exemptions and three exclusions may prevent access to these records (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). The exclusions are narrow and related to law enforcement and ongoing intelligence investigations and are unaffected by FOIA (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). The exemptions authorize government agencies to withhold information from those requesting it (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). The nine exemptions prevent the sharing of information if it is classified for national security, part of internal rules or practices, prohibited through other laws (such as the Privacy Act, see below), a trade secret, legally protected, a medical file, law enforcement records, regarding bank supervision, or locational information (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). FOIA was most recently updated with the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, which increased transparency and altered procedures (OIP Summary of the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, 2016).

'''Privacy Act 1974'''

The Privacy Act of 1974 was an effort to balance the “governments’ need to maintain information” and the “rights of individuals to be protected against unwarranted invasions of their privacy” (Walls, n.d.; Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, n.d.). It prevents agencies from disclosing records to any person or agency unless it falls into one of the twelve approved guidelines (Walls, n.d.; Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, n.d.). The most used reasons which allow for disclosure are subsections 1, 2, and 3 of 5 US Code § 552a(b) (Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition, 2021). Subsection One allows for the disclosure of information between agencies on a need-to-know basis. Subsection Two allows the FOIA to overrule the Privacy Act with regards to when to disclose information. Subsection Three allows for disclosure to another party if their use is similar to the use for which the data was originally collected. This third exception is quite broad, which causes controversy (Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition, 2021). Other exceptions include use for public record (used for the Census or National Archive data), or requests by law enforcement or the court system. In addition to putting forth information disclosure guidelines, this act requires agencies to keep accurate records of how, where, and why they sent information if they had sent information (Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, n.d.).

'''Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 1999'''

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) was passed to regulate the transfer of consumers’ “nonpublic personal information” by financial institutions (FDIC, 2021). At its core, the law says financial institutions cannot pass along personal data to third parties unless the customer is put on notice, given the opportunity to opt out, and they do not opt out (FDIC, 2021). Exceptions to this rule appear in Sections 13-15 (FDIC, 2021, VIII-1.3). Section 13 permits the transfer of some personal data to a third party if they are performing services on behalf of the financial institution, but they must be contractually bound to not do anything else with the data (FDIC, 2021, VIII-1.3). Section 14 allows the bank to disclose information as needed to perform banking functions initiated by the customer, while Section 15 extends that disclosure to normal financial institution acts, such as fraud detection (FDIC, 2021, VIII-1.3). Of these exceptions, only Section 13 requires the customer to be notified that their information is being shared (FDIC, 2021).

'''USA PATRIOT Act 2001 & USA Freedom Act 2015'''

Enacted less than two months after the 9/11 attacks, the PATRIOT Act was passed with the intention of increasing homeland security by allowing surveillance techniques used in local crime to be used to fight terrorism (Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.; USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.). Most importantly, this law allowed for the sharing of information between law enforcement agencies at various levels without notice (Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.). This law wasn’t the most protective of civil rights and liberties and to rectify that President Obama signed the USA Freedom Act in 2015, ending government collection of metadata (Patriot Act, n.d.; Fact sheet, 2015).

Resources

Fact sheet: Implementation of the USA Freedom Act of 2015. (2015, Nov. 27). Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.intelligence.gov/index.php/ic-on-the-record-database/results/787-fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-usa-freedom-act-of-2015
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). (2021, April). FDIC Consumer Compliance Examination Manual: VIII-1.1 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Author. https://www.fdic.gov/resources/supervision-and-examinations/consumer-compliance-examination-manual/index.html
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. (1966).
Freedom of Information Act, The. (n.d.). Department of State. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://foia.state.gov/learn/foia.aspx
Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act. (n.d.) Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm
Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties. (n.d.). Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/opcl
OIP Summary of the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016. (2016, Aug. 17). Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/oip/oip-summary-foia-improvement-act-2016
Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition. (2021, Feb. 16). Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/opcl/overview-privacy-act-1974-2020-edition/disclosures-third-parties
Patriot Act. (n.d.) History.com. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/patriot-act
Privacy Act of 1974. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. (n.d.). Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1279#vf4tzl
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). (1974).
USA PATRIOT Act. (n.d.). Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1281
Walls, T. (n.d.). FOIA v. Privacy Act: A comparison chart. IAPP. https://iapp.org/resources/article/foia-v-privacy-act-a-comparison-chart/

===Is this right enshrined in international and regional human rights treaties?===
==Philosophical Origins==
===What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?===
====Buddhism====
====Platonism====
====Aristotelian thought====
====Ancient Chinese Philosophy====
====Stoicism====
====Early Indian Philosophy====
====Miscellaneous Hellenistic Schools (epicureans, academics, skeptics, etc.)====
====Roman Legal and Political Thought====
====Early Christianity====
====Thomism and medieval Christianity====
====Medieval Islamic Thought====
====Medieval Judaism====
====Early Modern Rationalism====
====Absolute Idealism====
====Reformation Christianity====
====Hobbesian Thought====
The right to privacy is a right that not many think of when they think of their natural rights. Specifically, most forget about this right and what it entitles when it comes to their basic political involvement and contribution to society. Although it is not always explicitly stated, multiple philosophers have had their fair share of commentary on the right to privacy and what this right should look like within their form of government and civil society. Thomas Hobbes, author of The Leviathan, writes about the absolute power the monarch should have over the citizenry, offering commentary on the specific right to privacy within his version of society. Even though, Hobbes outlines some sort of privacy within the state of nature, Hobbes claims that there is no right to privacy on the premise that entering the social contract forfeits certain aspects of privacy in order to contribute to the public conscience and the laws made by the government.

Hobbes makes the argument that within the state of nature there is this sense of privacy that allows the people to make judgements and decisions for themselves in the name of self-preservation. Hobbes specifically noted that, “That every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions.” This is true in the condition of meer Nature, where there are no Civill Lawes; and also under Civill Government, in such cases as are not determined by the Law” (Hobbes 1651, 277). Hobbes makes the point that without a government system there is a form of privacy that allows individuals the ability to pass judgement as they please because they are within a state of war where individuals must fight for their own self-preservation. Hobbes then claims that as soon as one enters the social contract in which the people consent to being governed that the privacy is altered because the government is responsible for the preservation of the people. Hobbes hopes that with the emphasis on religion within the conscience, people outside the government can make just decisions for the better of the commonwealth. To Hobbes, once entering the social contract every citizen is responsible for the common good which is only molded when the government can see into the lives of the people and make their decisions for the betterment of society. The state of nature for Hobbes is one of war in which people must be private in order to protect themselves from others and defend their own interests, but since the government will be involved to help protect such people, there is no need for privacy anymore and therefore the government needs to be involved in the people’s lives. Furthermore, Hobbes added to this argument claiming that, “The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently, of doing anything, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto” (Hobbes 1651, 106). Hobbes’ depiction of the state of nature justifies the reasons why one must be private as it relates to the protection of his life and his pursuits that will in turn ensure his right to life and liberty. As his arguments progress, he will make the argument that the state should be involved in the lives of the people because the government is the greatest representation of the people and their desire for self-preservation. He depicts this point to show that within the state of nature, there are some aspects of life that are necessary for the survival of the individual and then why consenting to the social contract means giving up some of these liberties to the government in exchange for the preservation that people naturally seek in life. To Hobbes, the state of nature is a place individuals need privacy in order to protect themselves from the dangers of those around them, hence why once people enter the social contract, they sacrifice their rights to such privacy as there is no longer a need for it since the government is protecting individual interests.

Despite his version of the state of nature calling for some sort of privacy based on self-preservation, once the citizenry has consented to being governed, the sphere of privacy is absent to a certain extent to put the needs of the public first. For example, Hobbes noted that, “For a mans Conscience, and his Judgement is the same thing; and as the Judgement, so also the Conscience may be erroneous. Therefore, though he that is subject to no Civill Law, sinneth in all he does against his Conscience, because he has no other rule to follow but his own reason; yet it is not so with him that lives in a Common-wealth; because the Law is the publique Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided. Otherwise in such diversity, as there is of private Consciences, which are but private opinions, the Common-wealth must needs be distracted, and no man dare to obey the Soveraign Power, farther than it shall seem good in his own eyes” (Hobbes 1651, 278). As Hobbes progresses in his argument, he makes the point that the government is to reflect the private sentiments of the people and therefore whatever conscience and thoughts they have, it must already be public since the government is to represent those thoughts and sentiments. However, Hobbes also makes the case that if there are other private sentiments within the public that are not made known, a toxic environment is formed around the privacy of thoughts because the government is unaware of the judgements being made and is therefore not a part of the absolute power over the people. It is for that reason that Hobbes believes that within the social contract there is no aspect of privacy because he believes that the government is the greatest absolute in society and needs to be absolute in order to preserve the people. Hobbes also notes that once entering into the social contract, all people have left is their conscience and judgements because all other private goods are given to the government to control and to protect. Hobbes would also make the point that if the people fail to follow the public conscience which Hobbes calls the law, then there would be a sort of anarchy in which power is no longer consolidated within the government as people rule their lives as they please ignoring the laws in place and possibly violating the rights of the people around them. In addition, Hobbes wrote that, “A private man has alwaies the liberty, (because thought is free,) to beleeve, or not beleeve in his heart, those acts that have been given out for Miracles, according as he shall see, what benefit can accrew by mens belief, to those that pretend, or countenance them, and thereby conjecture, whether they be Miracles, or Lies. But when it comes to confession of that faith, the Private Reason must submit to the Publique; that is to say, to Gods Lieutenant. But who is this Lieutenant of God, and Head of the Church, shall be considered in its proper place thereafter” (Hobbes 1651, 387). Even on matters such as religion, there is no sphere of privacy according to Hobbes because it is the responsibility of the government to care for the people and cater to the liberties of the people. Any time Hobbes discussed the state of religion, the government had some stake in allowing the employment of teachers and ministers according to the standard of the government and what they should and should not allow. The matter of religion to Hobbes was a private matter until entering the social contract in which the government owns the interests of the people including their interests on religion and the matter of salvation. Hobbes further depicts a society in which the government has access to the lives of the people and their interests as a means of protecting such assets and values. Hobbes sees the lack of privacy within the government and the people as a means of preserving the people and their values as they go through society making their own decisions. It is this private conscience that the people have access to, but that Hobbes claims is the least important compared to the public, government conscience.

Hobbes does create some sort of private sphere within the silence of the laws and within the home life that the father rules over the family and the servants that does create a minuscule space for privacy. Specifically, Hobbes notes that, “Private Bodies Regular, and Lawfull, are those that are constituted without Letters, or other written Authority, saving the Lawes common to all other Subjects. And because they be united in one Person Representative, they are held for Regular; such as are all Families, in which the Father, or Master ordereth the whole Family. For he obligeth his Children, and Servants, as farre as the Law permitteth, though not further, because none of them are bound to obedience in those actions, which the Law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions, during the time they are under domestique government, they are subject to their Fathers, and Masters, as to their immediate Soveraigns. For the Father, and Master being before the Institution of Common-wealth, absolute Soveraigns in their own Families, they lose afterward no more of their Authority, than the Law of the Common-wealth taketh from them. Private Bodies Regular, but Unlawfull, are those that unite themselves into one person Representative, without any publique Authority at all; such as are the Corporations of Beggars, Theeves and Gipsies, the better to order their trade of begging, and stealing; and the Corporations of men, that by Authority from any forraign Person, unite themselves in anothers Dominion, for easier propagation of Doctrines, and for making a party, against the Power of the Common-wealth" (Hobbes 1651, 199). Hobbes then goes on with his argument to explain how the sphere of privacy that may exist within society is within the home and within the family. However, this does not mean that individuals within the home are not subject to the laws that are considered the public conscience. Above all, it is this sphere of the public conscience which the government develops the laws that should not and cannot be ignored by the public even within the private sphere. What should be mentioned as well is Hobbes’ sense of freedom within the silence of the laws which may allow the individual to interpret the laws as they see fit and act based on their own judgement of the laws. Alongside this sentiment however is still the lingering opinion that the absolute government has the utmost and complete control over the people and the people must therefore follow this opinion. Hobbes even notes above that the father might be the head of the household and the reigning authority, but in the end, even the father must follow the wishes of the commonwealth and adhere to the laws put in place by the magistrate and the government. Carrying on the same sentiments, Hobbes wrote that, “...though he be carefull in his politique Person to procure the common interest; yet he is more, or no lesse carefull to procure the private good of himselfe, his family, kindred and friends; and for the most part, if the publique interest chance to crosse the private, he preferrs the private: for the Passions of men, are commonly more potent than their Reason. From whence it follows, that where the publique and private interest are most closely united, there is the publique most advanced. Now in Monarchy, the private interest is the same with the publique. The riches, power, and honour of a Monarch arise onely from the riches, strength and reputation of his Subjects. For no King can be rich, nor glorious, nor secure; whose Subjects are either poore, or contemptible, or too weak through want, or dissention, to maintain a war against their enemies: Whereas in a Democracy, or Aristocracy, the publique prosperity conferres not so much to the private fortune of one that is corrupt, or ambitious, as doth many times a perfidious advice, a treacherous action, or a Civill warre” (Hobbes 1651, 157). Hobbes describes the fact that people enjoy the private sphere more than the public and therefore, one would think that the existence of a private sphere is incredibly important. However, Hobbes further explains that within the privacy of thought there is a sense of selfishness that prevents people from making decisions in the best interest of the commonwealth and therefore, there should be no sphere that would allow people to adhere to their selfish policies. Hobbes further describes what would happen if the government were to take this selfish stance in which they would no longer do their job of preserving the population despite that being their only true duty. Furthermore, Hobbes connects the quality of the government to the quality of the public since according to him, the state of the government reflects the level of preservation that the citizenry endures. He uses this point to further the case of using a monarchy rather than a democracy or oligarchy because of the inability of a large body to make quick decisions on behalf of the public interest.

Thomas Hobbes was an absolutist to the fullest extent. When it came to writing about government, he believed that the more consolidated the power was in the hands of the leviathan, the better off the population was going to be for making the best decisions for the people they ruled over. This meant, however, sacrificing certain rights to the government to preserve the citizenry to the best of their ability. Specifically, the right to privacy to Hobbes should not exist on the basis that the government needs to be involved in the lives of the people in order to figure out the public conscience and to make their decisions accordingly. By consenting to the government, the government has absolute power and control over the people and the decisions they decide to make and therefore, the government has direct access to the wishes and the lives of the people. The right to privacy to Hobbes is an interesting debate since his views on rights in the first place seem irregular due to the absolute power, he believes that the government has over the people and the way that there is no explicit right to rebel against abusive governments. The right to privacy is a topic to which there is no one answer, yet Hobbes tries to remedy with the solution that proposes the abolition of such a right in order to cater to the needs of the public.

Bibliography

Hobbes, Thomas. The Leviathan. New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, INC. London: J.M. Dent and Sons Limited, 1950.

====Lockean Thought/English Empiricism====
The issue of the right to privacy within the United States is a relatively new phenomenon following the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut in which the right to privacy was clearly established by the Supreme Court. However, it might be suggested that its origins and foundations can be traced back to the late 1600s when John Locke introduced the private sphere when it came to the conversation of religious tolerance. John Locke wrote “Letter Concerning Toleration” in 1689 that describes the way in which the right to privacy originates from the idea that the people can and should be separate from the government in certain aspects. Locke introduces the idea of a private sphere or the right to privacy when he discusses issues like religion since its discussion creates more problems preventing society from working efficiently.

Locke recognizes that there are very divisive issues that prevent people from working together effectively within society. Specifically referring to spreading religious beliefs, he wrote that “If by these means the offenders will not be reclaimed, and the erroneous convinced, there remains nothing further to be done but that such stubborn and obstinate persons, who give no ground to hope for their reformation, should be cast out and separated from the society” (Locke 1689, 30). Locke claims that the divisions within the public sphere over religion can be remedied by the complete separation of such matters from the state since religion is its own society. Religion dividing society is evident throughout history as nations and their people fought wars over their competing religious values and beliefs. For Locke the separation between the two and separating the state from religion was a way to avoid conflict within a nation and come to the general agreement that not everyone is going to agree on the matter of religion. However, Locke challenges his own idea of religious tolerance by saying that all religions except Atheists, Unitarians, and Catholics deserve tolerance because these groups prioritize religious law rather than political law. Locke recognizes the fact that a lot of the political issues revolve around religion and to focus on the commonwealth, matters of religion need to be subjected to the individual rather than being a concern of the state. Furthermore, upon the creation of the private sphere “...it will be urged still that civil assemblies are open and free for anyone to enter into, whereas religious conventicles are more private and thereby give opportunity to clandestine machinations” (Locke 1689, 51). Locke develops the idea that all religions must be tolerated within the government in the best interest of the commonwealth, leaving the political conversation open for political conversation as to how the government should be run. If the state sphere should interfere with the individual sphere, Locke claims that greater problems would arise as the government wields a seemingly tyrannical power. Locke proposes this idea of the private sphere in order to avoid problems within the political sphere, but alongside this proposal, he builds the foundation for a right to privacy that is valued so much today. The rest of his arguments include the point that there is a realm of privacy in which the individual makes decisions that they believe will best benefit them.

It was from Locke’s separation between the state and the individual that the right to privacy came to life off the premise that there is a place within society where the government should not be involved in the matters of the people. Locke continues for the advocation of a private sphere by claiming that, “In private domestic affairs, in the management of estates, in the conservation of bodily health, every man may consider what suits his own convenience and follow what course he likes best” (Locke 1689, 34). Throughout his letter of toleration, and through the rest of his theory, he is critical of government intervention in the affairs of the people and emphasizes this private sphere as a place to escape government intervention. This sort of foundation and sentiment expressed by Locke gave the people the perspective that the state is going to act within their own self-interest which might mean being involved in the actions of the people. Locke again remedies this problem with the private sphere as a space where the government cannot get involved in the choices of the individual when it comes to their lives. Specifically, Locke subtly turns the conversation slightly away from religion and into the idea of affairs, property, and health in general as a part of the private sphere that the government should not be a part of. To the rest of society, the government has always been involved in the lives of the people, so to have this idea proposed that people can and should be independent of government intervention changed the way the people saw the government and the power they had over the lives of the people. In addition, Locke then claims that when the magistrate makes laws, “...a private person is to abstain from the action that he judges unlawful, and he is to undergo the punishment which it is not unlawful for him to bear” (Locke 1689, 48). Locke paints a picture that the people can make decisions about the laws within this private realm that adds another dimension to the idea that the people have more power within their private space than they thought. Historically, the governments were involved in all affairs of the people, leaving them little room for voluntary actions that they wanted to pursue for themselves, and Locke’s sentiments provides them the space to become free thinkers outside of the government. Although his writings are in specific reference to religion being in the private sphere, the later sentiments expand to other areas of life that would be affected had religion been placed within the private sphere. This allows the people to believe that other aspects of their life that have been controlled by the government can enter the private sphere where the government will not have any control over the efforts of the people themselves. This created a life where the people had private lives, where the government was not involved in the lives of the people and where the people made decisions for themselves. As people saw the potential for the private sphere, the right to privacy became more prevalent as a boundary between the state and the people developed, despite the boundary between the public and the private being unclear sometimes. Although this line is imprecise, Locke’s notion of the private sphere when it comes to politics introduces the idea of the line in the first place and introduces a new level of understanding about the relationship between the people and the government.

Locke created the idea of the private sphere based on the premise that doing so might help prevent a lot of the conflict that had been around during the time that created the bad relationship between the state and the people. However, by proposing this idea he shines light on the paradox on the relationship between rights in general and the government. It is the duty of the government to act within the interest of the people by providing them access to their rights regardless of what they are, but at the same time the government also wants to act within their self-interest to maintain law and order within society and therefore might see rights as an obstacle to their end goal. Furthermore, Locke writes about this topic in a time period where the legal framework looks incredibly different from what is present today and therefore writes from the perspective that religion causes these huge wars within nations and between major parties. All these factors contribute to the idea that the right to privacy has existed throughout history and throughout theory as criticism of government is an ongoing conversation that has many different perspectives and points of view. Locke’s writings about creating a private sphere for religion only reflect the sentiments known today as the right to privacy that has changed the way that people have viewed the relationship between the people and the government.

Bibliography

Locke, John. 1983. “A Letter Concerning Toleration”, edited by James H. Tully. Hackett Publishing Company Inc.

====Physiocrats====
====Scottish Enlightenment====
====Modern Capitalism====
====Rousseau's Thought====
====Kantianism====
====German Idealism====
====Benthamite Utilitarianism====
====Millian Utilitarianism====
When it comes to the rights and liberties bestowed upon an individual, there are some that seem inherent according to society’s standards like the freedom of speech and religion, especially since some of these values are rooted in texts that have helped found the country. However, as time has progressed, there are new issues that expand the public’s definition of rights and liberties and gives them a new vision as to what they may or may not have a right to. One of these rights is the right to privacy, a right in which there are various opinions, all of which are relatively new, yet there is a hindrance of commentary on these issues. John Stuart Mill has written various pieces including but not limited to On Liberty and The Subjection of Women in which he writes about the rights people inherently have and the values that people should have within society. Although it could be assumed that Mill creates a private realm in which individuals pursue their higher faculties away from society, Mill’s view of privacy is extremely limited and whatever private realm there might be is subjected to teaching morals and values.

Based off an initial reading of Mill, it might be assumed that a private sphere might exist in order to develop higher faculties away from the public. For example, Mill notes that, “A person whose desires and impulses are his own—are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture—is said to have a character...Their thinking is done for them by men much like themselves, addressing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of the moment, through the newspapers” (Mill 1859, 67). From here the reader reasonably infers that Mill would advocate for individuals to remove themselves from the public in order to reach their higher faculties since if one is not in the public sphere, the conclusion is that they are in the private sphere. However, as Mill goes on to describe his argument, he uses various examples to explain his philosophy and how the issue of the private and public spheres should be addressed. In the end, he turns to uses his own harm principle to argue that the state and the government should intervene in instances where the decisions one makes affect the prospects and the lives of the people around them. Due to this belief, he argues that the private sphere is severely limited by the government’s interest to protect the people from other’s personal desires. Furthermore, Mill notes that “That, this being supposed, they cannot be acting wrongly in endeavoring to exclude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested, of instigators who cannot possibly be impartial—who have a direct personal interest on one side, and that side the one which the State believes to be wrong, and who confessedly promote it for personal objects only” (Mill 1859, 110). Alongside this argument, Mill describes several examples where government intervention is allowed when the decisions of the individual interfere with the lives and the decisions of other people. With that being said, there can be no existence of a private sphere for the government needs to protect individuals from the impulses they have that in Mill’s philosophy warrant punishment by the government. The problem with the discussion of Mill and the private sphere is that he does not make any explicit claim about the right to privacy because of the necessity of government intervention from his point of view.

Mill further describes this limited aspect of privacy in which the government is allowed to intervene so long as there is reason to intervene for the good of the rest of the population. For example, Mill writes that “The State, while it respects the liberty of each in what specially regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others” (Mill 1859, 116). This statement alone, despite not referring to the topic at hand, states clearly where he would stand on the issue of the right to privacy. One might claim that there could still be a private sphere especially since Mill does not dismiss the idea all together, but what is important to mention is that the state cannot intervene in matters of right and wrong without letting the individual be somewhat public. He names another example in which he claims “If the government would make up its mind to require for every child a good education, it might save itself the trouble of providing one. It might leave to parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased, and content itself with helping to pay the school fees of the poorer class of children, and defraying the entire school expenses of those who have no one else to pay for them” (Mill 1859, 116-117). In these matters, Mill claims that the government can control and regulate the way that children pursue their higher faculties through education since it is their liberty and goal to reach these faculties for the betterment of their character and overall well-being. Mill maintains this point of view that every individual has the right to live their best life, which he believes is attainable so long as people make decisions for themselves only and the state makes decisions to make sure that others cannot infringe on the lives of others. He recognized the ways that people’s individual private actions could injure one another, despite operating within this realm of personal liberty. He saw the way that life needed regulation based on the harm principle which allowed the government to intervene on private matters and push for a stronger public sphere to share ideas. Mill by no means wanted the government to control every aspect of the life of the individual, he wanted to merely hold the individual accountable for the way their decisions affected those around them.

Mill continues within his other works to paint a picture as to what he wants society to look like and describes the ways in which having a private or domestic sphere can create a form of the right to privacy. Within The Subjection of Women Mill notes that, “As regards the relations of private life it may be said generally, that their influence is, on the whole, encouraging to the softer virtues, discouraging to the sterner: though the statement must be taken with all the modifications dependent on individual character”(Mill 1861, 565-566). Mill’s main emphasis is on the morally correct and doing the necessary things in order to achieve this moral good, especially since he believes that the society around him is declining due to the lack of morality and tendency for people to avoid pursuing their higher faculties. Since women are subjected to the household and are not given a role within the public sphere, it could be argued that women then are responsible for what would have been the private sphere since the home is their responsibility to maintain. It could be asserted that there is a private sphere in which the women or those at home are responsible for the moral development of the children and those living within the home. Within his writing about the home, the government plays no role in dictating how the morals are taught, therefore alluding to this right to privacy based on the premise that the home is a private space in which the government cannot intervene. In addition, Mill adds that “There is no country of Europe in which the ablest men have not frequently experienced, and keenly appreciated, the value of the advice and help of clever and experienced women of the world, in the attainment both of private and of public objects; and there are important matters of public administration to which few men are equally competent with such women; among others, the detailed control of expenditure” (Mill 1861, 580). Here, Mill describes the full capacity of women within the public sphere and particularly within the government but understands that the standards that society have during his time leave no space for women publicly. He uses this line to reference the power and influence that women already have over the private sphere despite society’s perception of women. However, it should be noted that acting within their realm of liberty, they had this explicit right to privacy that allowed them to hold themselves accountable, therefore keeping the government out of their private lives. Therefore, Mill could take on the belief that if a private sphere should exist to develop and teach morals to children who then enter the public sphere and hopefully act within their best interests to pursue their higher faculties without intervening in the lives of others.

What might be something to keep in mind about Mill and his idea of the right to privacy is the sense of Victorian morality that he writes about and his overall response to rights of any kind. He writes both works from the Victorian moral point of view which in turn is reflected in the way that he believes that society should be run and would agree about the way that life would be instructed upon these morals. It is this sense of morality that would go against most things that one might believe is not the concern of the public and Mill would want to spread his single version of morality because everyone should be morally upright according to the same standard. Despite this observation, Mill would also claim that holding oneself accountable is necessary to maintain this moral standard because individuals do not and should not depend on one another. Other than the right to privacy, his perspective on rights aligns with those of earlier philosophers so long as they fall within the utilitarian model and therefore benefit most of the people. However, this creates somewhat of a dilemma since any action or inaction could be seen to benefit the majority. The government could infringe on the inherent rights one has and claim that it be for the betterment of society that they control religion, speech, and property despite these being protected by many other philosophers. In that sense, it is hard to define from the Mill point of view what people do and do not have the right to within their system of government. The right to privacy from Mill’s perspective is one that is hard to define and comes with various limitations that allow the government to intrude on the lives of the people.

Bibliography

Mill, John Stuart. “On Liberty.” In John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Essays, edited by John Gray. Oxford World’s Classics, 1991.

Mill, John Stuart. “The Subjection of Women.” In John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Essays, edited by John Gray. Oxford World’s Classics, 1991.

====Current Utilitarianism====
====Transcendentalism====
====Marxism====
====Early Sociology====
====Pragmatism====
====Weberian Thought====
====Process Philosophy====
====Social Darwinism====
====British Idealism (19th cen.)====
====Continental Philosophy/Frankfurt School====
====Behaviorism====
====Feminist Thought====
Various feminist theorists have often been forgotten because of their role as women and the fact that society sees their input as invalid because of the long history of their treatment. However, despite the oppression and the push to exclude them from political conversations, women have entered the conversation claiming that the true problem in life is patriarchy. Their commentary surrounds the involvement of men within the government and how the male-dominated government suppresses women. They can generally agree on most political discussions like the right to privacy, but that is not to say that it does not come without variation as all political theory usually does. The consensus among the feminists is that the private realm maintains the oppression of women and propose the elimination of the private realm to remedy the problem at hand, despite some thoughts on the return to the private realm once the problem has been solved socially first.

Most feminist political commentary and theory is centered around the critique of the relationship between the private and the public spheres that inherently treats women as less than compared to their male counterpart. In her political commentary Sexual Personae, Camille Paglia noted that “He has no personal life. He completely identifies private with public interest. Hence, he is unstoppable. Such men can be political geniuses or monsters” (Paglia 1990, 214). In fact, Bell Hooks would go as far to claim that men are told to dominate the private sphere despite giving women the belief that the home and the private realm will be theirs to dominate and to rule over (Hooks 1984, 120). Paglia and Hooks both demonstrate the point that the feminists paint a picture where the power of the public outweigh the power of the private and since women are taught that the private will be their realm, they are inherently less important compared to their male counterparts. Paglia also details something important in the fact that the men of society can either help or hurt women because of the power they possess in the public and the private, yet most feminists would argue that they choose to abuse women within their spheres because of the way that Hooks says that they are encouraged to dominate women any way that they can. These sentiments reflect the critiques of the relationship between the private and public spheres that dominates the arguments made by feminists on the matter of the right to privacy and hence why some are skeptical about maintain that right. Susan Moller Okin’s work Justice, Gender, and Family noted that, “If there were a clear sphere from which the state refrained from intruding, that sphere would have to be defined, and its definition would be a political issue. But in fact, the state has not just "kept out of family life. In innumerable ways, the state determines and enforces the terms of marriage” (Okin 1989, 129). To Okin, the dichotomy between the private and the public realms is central to her argument for the elimination of the private sphere because of the lack of justice maintained within this sphere. Okin uses this to further the point that there is no separation because of the state’s involvement in issues like women’s bodies and marriage that make the separation unrealistic since within the minds of men, the two are automatically linked without any clear distinctions. The feminists use examples of abortion and marriage to further prove that the lines between the state and the home are blurred and often nonexistent because the state makes decisions without consulting women or even acknowledging the boundary that should be there. Okin even claims that the boundary is artificial and only created based off the different principles that the men have on these matters. However, she highlights the lack of justice for women due to the difference in principles in men that allow them to abuse their women and belittle them from reaching their full potential within society.

Some theorists see the role of the traditional woman with her duties and her obligations to the family as invasive and a problem when it comes to the right to privacy for a woman. Written in 1903, Charlotte Perkins Gilman makes the claim that, “The mother—poor invaded soul—finds even the bathroom door no bar to hammering little hands. From parlour to kitchen, from cellar to garret, she is at the mercy of children, servants, tradesmen, and callers. So chased and trodden is she that the very idea of privacy is lost to her mind; she never had any, she doesn't know what it is, and she cannot understand why her husband should wish to have any "reserves," any place or time, any thought or feeling, with which she may not make free” (Gilman 1903, 36). Gilman makes the assertion that the role women have taken on within the home means that there is no such privacy for the woman whatsoever. It is because she has other obligations as a mother, as a wife, as a caregiver that something is always expected from her and that her needs are irrelevant because she “rules” the home. She claims that there is also no possibility for individual privacy because there is no specific space for just the individual unless they are living alone. However, within the family, the individual is crowded by those around, and as stated before the role of the woman is to serve everyone and everything according to the standards set by the man. She adds that if the individual was truly private, there would be no scrutiny or judgement because the individual is truly private about their thoughts and their feelings, but this concept of privacy is only applicable to the man who rules the home and is always free to express themselves within the home. It is the woman who is continuously repressed in and out of the home and is in constant contact with the other women and servants of the neighborhood with whom they share and continuously violate the idea of privacy. In Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach by Martha Nussbaum, Nussbaum noted that, “It goes without saying that in poor families where five or six people share a single room, there is no such thing as the privacy of the individual in the middle-class American sense – although poor people will frequently seek solitude for the purpose of defecation, walking considerable distances from their dwellings” (Nussbaum 2000, 259). Nussbaum and Gilman both illustrate the life of the woman in which she is subjected to the needs of the family and expected to run the household without being given the respect that should come with the role. She continues the argument by claiming that individuals have the right to privacy within their decisional liberties, but for women and in general the home limits the space where the individual can carry out their liberties simply because the lack of space. Nussbaum decides to remedy this by claiming that the state should be allowed to intervene so long as they do so to protect only the privacy the individual has in the form of decisional liberties the individual holds. Even though she speaks in broader terms about the individual, she emphasizes the fact, as Gilman points out, that the role of the women is far more extensive than that of the man within the home and therefore, her privacy is severely more limited than that of the man within the home. In the process of the state protecting the liberties of the individual, Nussbaum would claim that the needs of the woman need to be acknowledged and enforced in order to maintain her decisional liberties.

Alongside the critique of the public and private spheres mentioned above, theorists propose a reconstruction of the public and private life that would eventually liberate women from the abuse and violence they face. In her book, A Vindication of the Rights of Women with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects by Mary Wollstonecraft, she noted that “To render women truly useful members of society, I argue that they should be led, by having their understandings cultivated on a large scale, to acquire a rational affection for their country, founded on knowledge, because it is obvious that we are little interested about what we do not understand. And to render this general knowledge of due importance, I have endeavoured to shew that private duties are never properly fulfilled unless the understanding enlarges the heart; and that public virtue is only an aggregate of private” (Wollstonecraft 1792, 291). Part of the larger and general feminist argument for privacy is the reconstruction of the private and public realms so that there could possibly be the existence of the private sphere once the problems are addressed. For Wollstonecraft, part of the progression of women is to form the new public sphere around the education of the women in order to maintain the public happiness. Wollstonecraft claims that the means of some private virtue is the same as the public happiness since whatever happens within the private is brought out into the public. For that reason, Wollstonecraft argues that the public and the private are utterly the same since the state already tries to solve the problems that take place within the private space of the home. However, within the home, she notes that the role of the woman is to please the man and because of this she is denied her public and civil duties which again can be rectified by educating women and men about the opinions and the manner which society enforces. The Feminine Mystique by Betty Friedan noted that, “Their determination betrays women’s underestimated human strength and their urgent need to use it. But only the strongest, after nearly twenty years of the feminine mystique, can move on by themselves. For this is not just the private problem of each individual woman. There are implications of the feminine mystique that must be faced on a national scale” (Friedan 1963, 350-351). Friedan wanted to remedy the inequalities that she saw within the private life, by demolishing the line between the public and the private by exposing the inequalities that the women faced within the private life. In order to reform and reconstruct life to benefit women, her solution was to promote education and find something beyond the self to identify with. Her idea that was if women were able to reimagine themselves, they would be able to overcome the problems and show society the way that women should be treated. Freidan’s concept of the private however was aligned with Gilman and Nussbaum in that the duties of the woman prevent actual privacy, so she proposed another separate space away from the family in which the woman can achieve a sense of privacy. In order to reimagine themselves within the public, Friedan proposed private and public education like Wollstonecraft proposed, and suggested challenging the images of women proposed by the media. When it came to the media specifically, she wanted women to reimagine themselves using their own private image to facilitate what their version of what a woman looked like. Feminists in general proposed their own version of reconstructing the public to change the way women were viewed which usually involved exposing their problems to the public, completely ignoring the idea of the private individual.

Despite the constant call for the barrier between the public and the private to be broken, there are some claims to a right to privacy made by the feminists. Catherine MacKinnon noted this in her work Toward a Feminist Theory of the State when she claimed that “The law of privacy treats the private sphere as a sphere of personal freedom. For men, it is. For women, the private is the distinctive sphere of intimate violation and abuse, neither free nor particularly personal. Men's realm of private freedom is women's realm of collective subordination.” (MacKinnon 1989, 168). Most feminist theorists agree to some sort of concept of the private and what that might look like. Most feminists were skeptical of the private because of all the abuse that took place within this sphere, hence why they wanted the government to intervene in the matters of the private. However, as MacKinnon pointed out, the private provided personal freedom that the public could not provide, hence why it was important to revisit the private sphere once the woman was reimagined and re-envisioned for the better. MacKinnon acknowledged the fact that there were legal protections about privacy for women since there were these protections for men but based on examples surrounding abortion and marriage concluded that even though it was legally available for women, it was not enforced. Specifically, the government rulings on issues like Roe v. Wade gave women the private right to choose, but she recognized that the fact that the government had a say on this matter, was an invasion of the privacy of the women to choose. Even the discussion of whether the government would fund abortions became a matter of government involvement on a woman’s decision to choose. After her discussion of this matter, she established that the right to privacy was necessary and continuously violated by the government in order to maintain control over women. Carole Pateman extends this argument within her work The Sexual Contract when she notes that, “Shultz states that there is a strong argument that private contract should not override the criminal law but, she writes, 'the idea of enforceable private agreements concerning violent sexual conduct is less offensive than a state declaration that violent sexual conduct is automatically acceptable in marriage.' Such a response begs the question about limitations to and alternatives to contract” (Pateman 1988, 185). Pateman specifically notes that the relationship between the government and the people on matters of private and public is something that is important for the safety of women and for the natural liberties for the individual. She notes that what calls the sexual contract is something women are subjected to where their abuse accumulates at home and sometimes within the public. She called for government intervention on matters of legally maintaining women’s liberties and for intervention when men within the private life continuously abused women. Pateman noted that the line between the public and the private was indefinite and used the system of marriage as an example of how the government was involved. She claimed that because the government had to keep records of marriage contracts between private individuals, marriage could be considered public, despite the specific agreements within the marriage contract is a private matter talked and agreed upon by the different parties. She still notes in the end that the government had some obligation within the private lives to reform the treatment of women and the inequalities that women face within the home, an attitude shared by most of the feminist theorists.

The consensus among the feminists is that the private sphere is where women are subjects of abuse and inequalities that need to be exposed out in the public in order to help women overcome the view that men have of them. To these theorists' women face the same treatment within the public sphere as the patriarchy and the government make decisions on their behalf and subject them to the private life where they are expected to take care of the family. The primary role of the woman centers around the idea of the family and the way that the woman is supposed to take care of the family depriving her of her own privacy. Jean Bethke Elshtain adds an interesting perspective to this notion and considers that as women are liberated by their actions, the structure of the family will fall apart. She adds that the family dynamic is also changing as there are more single parent households or same-sex households that change the way the family has been thought of (Elshtain 1981, 323). This is an interesting notion as the thought of the private sphere changes for these women and the way that women are taking more charge within the world continuously challenging the private abuse at the hands of the man. The notion of the right to privacy is something constantly changing as situations change but should be broken down to expose the flaws within the system that negatively affect women.

Bibliography

Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought - Second Edition. NED-New edition, 2. Princeton University Press, 1981. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv131bvkg.

Friedan, Betty. The Feminine Mystique. Dell Publishing Company INC. 1973

Gilman, Charlotte Perkins. The Home. New York Charlton Company. 1910

Hooks, Bell. 1984. Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center. South End Press

Mackinnon, Catherine A. 1989. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Harvard University Press

Nussbaum, Martha C. 2000. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge University Press

Okin, Susan Moller. 1989. Justice, Gender, and the Family. Basic Books Inc.

Paglia, Camille. “Shakespeare and Dionysus: As You Like It and Antony and Cleopatra.” In Sexual Personae, 194–229. Yale University Press, 1990. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1bh4bwb.12.

Pateman, Carole. The Sexual Contract. Stanford University Press, 1988.

Wollstonecraft, Mary. 1792. A Vindication of the Rights of Women with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects. Cambridge University Press

====Postmodernism====
===Are there any philosophical or moral traditions that dispute the classification of this right as a fundamental right?===
===What do the major legal theories (positive law, natural law, critical legal studies, etc.) say about this right?===
'''Positive Law'''

Positive law theory asks if the actions the government actor took would have been unlawful for a nongovernment actor to do in that jurisdiction (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1830, 1831). In other words, what does the written law allow? For instance, the model holds something to be a search if the government uses special legal powers to gain access to information (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1832). This model constrains the ability possessed by police to gain information from private parties while creating a predictable conception of privacy (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1856). Its use in the United States aims to add clarity to privacy expectations that is not had in the ''Katz'' test (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1869). Positive law theory was used in ''California v. Ciraolo'' and ''Florida v. Riley'' (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1867).

'''Natural Law'''

Locke is one of the primary natural law theorists. In his ''Two Treatises on Government: Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government'' (Essay Two) he discusses some of these rights which implicitly concern privacy in the State of Nature. In Chapter II: Of the State of Nature, he recognizes in section 6 that the laws of nature prevent “harm[ing] another in his life, health, liberty or possessions” (Locke, 1832, 107). All of these categories can be linked to laws today which protect privacy: mainly constitutional law in various countries, but also, for instance, the United States Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (1996).

'''Critical Legal Studies'''

Critical Legal Theorists believe law becomes intertwined with social issues causing each judge to have a somewhat different judgement in each case (Dworkin, 1977, 117). These differing torts and constitutional interpretations create varying implications in jurisdictions based on the weight precedents are given (Dworkin, 1977, 118). Dworkin recognizes that with this connection to social facts, the judiciary plays a bigger role in society (Waldron. 1999, 211). For instance, some judges may find a connection between the directly provided for protection of the right to liberty and implied right to privacy, while others may not (Dworkin, 1977, 117). Roberto Unger supports this example, writing in his essay ‘’Critical Legal Studies Movement’’ that some rights give individuals “a zone of unchecked discretionary action that others … may not invade,” reminiscent of Warren & Brandeis’s original claim to the right to privacy (Unger, 1983, 599).

'''Legal Positivism'''

Legal Positivism claims law depends on social facts, but the existence of law is not dependent on its merits or morals (Sevel & Leiter, 2010). H. L. A. Hart, a famed positivist, claimed that “law should be bound by limits and respect citizen’s privacy” (van der Sloot, 1). Moreover, the state could not and should not regulate private conduct unless there was harm (van der Sloot, 1). Robert Burt claims Hart essentially follows Louis Brandeis’s “right to be let alone” (Burt, 2004, 14).

'''Legal Realism'''

Legal Realism is reading laws “in the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question” (Macauley, 2005, 371). As such, legal realism expects the law to be constantly changing based on social conditions (Hall, 2005, 452). Calo claims privacy law exemplifies legal realism because of all of the exceptions, shifts with technology, and meanings dependent on other values and rights (Calo, 2019, 34). Despite privacy law’s beginnings being rooted in legal realism, he recognizes that privacy scholars have not expressly used this legal theory (Calo, 2019, 34, 40, 48).

'''United States Constitutional Theorists'''

One would think defining the appearance of privacy rights in the United States Constitution to be easy, especially given the language of ‘penumbras’ used in ''Griswold v. Connecticut'' rather than citing one specific clause constitutional (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, pars. 14-15). However, Scott Gerber demonstrated in his work ''Privacy and Constitutional Theory'' that all six of the constitutional theories of interpretation he presented can be used to find privacy rights in the Constitution (Gerber, 2000; Baker, 2004).

Originalists: In his writing, Gerber (2000) posits that if an originalist interpreter wants to find privacy rights in the constitution, they can (167). Generally, those who do find privacy rights in the Constitution cite the Ninth Amendment (Gerber, 2000, 171). This is what Justice Arthur Goldberg cited in his ''Griswold'' concurrence and has been cited as such since James Madison wrote the amendment (Gerber, 2000, 171, 172).

Living Constitutionalists (US): Living constitutionalists allow for precedents to be called upon. It can be argued this is what was done in ''Griswold v. CT'' and other substantive due process decisions on privacy, such as ''Boyd v. US'' in 1886 (Gerber, 2000, 178). In the ''Griswold'' majority opinion, Justice William Douglas argued that the Supreme Court had previously ruled on cases in which rights were not explicit in the Bill of Rights, but the rights were justifiable to the Court through the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965, par. 11).

Resources

Baker, T.E. (2004). Constitutional theory in a nutshell. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 13(1), 57-123. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1245&context=wmborj
Baude, W. & Stern, J.Y. (2016, May). The positive law model of the Fourth Amendment. Harvard Law Review 129(7), 1821-1889. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44072348
Burt, R. (2004). Moral offenses and same sex relations: Revisiting the Hart-Devlin Debate. Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series. https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/711/
Calo, R. (2019). Privacy Law’s Indeterminacy. Theoretical Inquiries in Law 20(1), 33-52. https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2019-0001
Dworkin, R. (1977). Taking rights seriously. Harvard University Press.
Gerber, S. (2000). Privacy and constitutional theory. Social Philosophy and Policy 17(2), 165-185. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500002156
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479
Hall, E.L. (Ed.). (2005). The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
Locke, J. (2008). Concerning the true original extent and end of civil government. In R. Hay (Ed.), The Works of John Locke: In 10 volumes (Vol. V). Cosimo Classics.
Macaulay, S. (2005). The new versus od legal realism: “Things ain’t what they used to be.” Wisconsin Law Review 2005(2), 365-403. From https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_8/tg2md/new_versus.pdf
Sevel, M. & Leiter, B. (2010). Legal Positivism. Oxford Bibliographies. https://doi.org/10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0065
van der Sloot, B. (2017). Privacy as secondary rule, or the intrinsic limits of legal orders in the age of Big Data. In M. Dehmer and F. Emmert-Streib (Eds.), Frontiers in Data Science. CRC Press. https://bartvandersloot.com/onewebmedia/Privacy%20as%20secondary%20rule.pdf
Unger, R.M. (1983, Jan.). The Critical Legal Studies Movement. Harvard Law Review 96(3), 561-675. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1341032
Waldron, J. (1999) Law and Disagreement. Oxford University Press.

==Culture and Politics==
===Is this right interpreted and exercised in different ways in different countries? Focus on particular countries in which the right is interpreted distinctively===
The right to privacy has been interpreted in various ways. The EU has strict legislation regarding data privacy and the Council of Europe has outlined in Article 8(1) of the ECHR (1950) the right to privacy in the four spheres of family life, private life, communication, and the home (Wolford, n.d.). On the other hand, the United States has outlined protections from government interference in the private sphere in the Bill of Rights, has comparatively less (& less encompassing) legislation on the issue, and has relied on the courts to protect people from private entities and in the home (U.S. Constitution; 1787, Amendment 4; Privacy, n.d.). These differences result in a more consistent application of privacy rights in Europe compared to the United States.

In the home, Europeans have had a safe, private space since 1950 (ECHR, 1950, Art. 8(1)). In the United States, this right wasn’t concrete until long after the Supreme Court began ruling on the privacy cases in the mid-1960s (Privacy, n.d.). However, it remains that Americans have a higher expectation of privacy in the home than in a public area (Electronic Surveillance, n.d.). In an extreme example of lack of privacy in the home, Albanians working for the Soviet government did not own anything in their homes – the state owned it all (Lubonja, 2001, 239).

Exceptions to privacy at home include police entering with and, in some cases, without a warrant. New Zealand also utilizes court-issued warrants to prevent officials from entering the home, but if officials are actively preventing a crime, enforcing a law, making an arrest, or aiding in an emergency, they do not need a warrant (Community Law, n.d.). Within the European Union, this warrant can come from a court within any part of the EU’s jurisdiction. The European Evidence Warrant (EEW) allows a warrant issued to gather evidence to be valid across the EU and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) applies this principle to the arrest of criminals taking exploiting the open borders within the EU (European evidence warrant, 2006; European arrest warrant, n.d.). EEWs can also be used to get cell phone records (The European evidence warrant, 2006). In the United States, a customer can ask for those records to be turned over to authorities or authorities can use a subpoena (FCC 2019).

The Prüm Convention demonstrates another aspect of inter-European collaboration in crime-solving efforts, leading to interesting implications for data privacy. Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Luxembourg, and Spain all signed this treaty, to which other nations can opt-in, in an effort to increase cross-border security (Prüm Convetion, 2005). At the roots, it allows the parties to ask each other for help solving crimes by sharing data from each nation’s crime database (Walsch, 2008, 86). By not creating an international crime database, each nation is required to ask other nations for the needed data (Walsch, 2008, 86). This method allows the shared data to be governed by each nation’s specific data privacy laws, but it lands in an unregulated grey area after the data transfer (Walsch, 2008, 85). Differences in privacy law become clear when looking at what personal data is collected from people. Some states collect DNA in all criminal cases, others only when the person has been in prison for over two years, and others do not collect DNA at all (Walsch, 2008, 86). In the context of solving international crime, these differences mean some states tend to be more helpful than others.

Resources

Community Law. (n.d.). Entry powers: When the police can come into your home. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://communitylaw.org.nz/community-law-manual/chapter-31-police-powers/entry-powers-when-the-police-can-come-into-your-home/entry-without-a-warrant-to-prevent-or-investigate-crimes/
Electronic Surveillance. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 20, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/electronic_surveillance
European arrest warrant. (n.d.). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/cross-border-cases/judicial-cooperation/types-judicial-cooperation/european-arrest-warrant_en
European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
European evidence warrant. (2006, June 1). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_06_168
European evidence warrant, The: The acquisition and admissibility of foreign evidence. (n.d.). Academy of European Law. Retrieved Sept. 20, 2021, from https://www.era.int/cgi-bin/cms?_SID=d241949ae554074b1e14fd12b7f05d3f5d1e38df00162723613600&_sprache=en&_bereich=artikel&_aktion=detail&idartikel=121538
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). (2019, Dec. 30). Protecting your privacy: Phone and cable records. https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/protecting-your-privacy
Lubonja, F. (2001). Privacy in a totalitarian regime. Social Research 68(1), 237-254. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40971449
Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
Prüm Convention. AT-BE-DE-ES-FR-LU-NL. May 27, 2005. 10900/05. https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/sites/default/files/docs/body/prumtr.pdf
U.S. Constitution. Amendment IV. https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript
Walsch, C. (2008, Nov. 9). Europeanization and democracy: Negotiating the Prum Treaty and the Schengen III Agreement. Politicka Misao, XVL(5), 81-90.
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

===Is this right exercised in different ways depending on the political governance regime in place (democracy, autocracy, hybrid regime)?===
Rhoda Howard and Jack Donnelly (1986) put forth six regime types: liberal, minimal, traditionalist, communist, corporatist (authoritarian), and developmental. When comparing regime type to the ‘valuation of privacy,’ liberal regimes are ranked highly, and minimal regimes are ranked very highly (Howard & Donnelly, 1986, 814). The other regime types, all communitarian regimes rather than individualistic, were ranked low or very low regarding privacy (Howard & Donnelly, 1986, 814). At their cores, communitarian regimes do not have privacy because it can be argued, as Howard and Donnelly (1986, 211) do, that the allowance of freedoms may lead to self-destruction. Thus, privacy is ignored (Howard & Donnelly, 1986, 211). Fatos Lubonja agrees with this sentiment, writing that privacy did not exist in Albania under the totalitarian regime, and cites his experience in Albanian prisons as an example (Lubonja, 2001). He also admitted to self-censorship in the private diaries which originally got him arrested, supposing many others had censored themselves in the same way (Lubonja, 2001, 247).

Resources

Howard, R.E., & Donnelly, J. (1986, Sept.) Human dignity, human rights, and political regimes. The American Political Science Review 80(3), 801-817. https://doi.org/10.2307/1960539
Lubonja, F. (2001). Privacy in a totalitarian regime. Social Research 68(1), 237-254. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40971449

===Is there general and widespread belief that this right is a fundamental right that should generally be protected (and that exceptions should be rare)?===
The right to privacy is expressed in many places: Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996), Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) (2009), and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (1950). Nationally, this right has been cited in the 1988 Brazil Constitution and United States case law (derived from the US Constitution). In India, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in 2017 that the right to privacy for all people falls under Article 21, which provides the “protection of life and personal liberty” (McCarthy, 2017; Mahaprata & Choudhary, 2017). However, many exceptions to privacy are also listed alongside the right to privacy in these supreme documents, despite the belief in its inviolability.

Article 8(2) of the ECHR provides that privacy interference can only occur in instances “of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Article 7 of the CRFEU can be breached by a search or arrest warrant issued by any EU state (European arrest warrant, n.d.; European evidence warrant, 2006). In Article 5 Sections X-XII, the Brazilian Constitution outlines the right to privacy in areas related to private life, the home, and correspondence. These sections also clearly outline exceptions; Section XI recognizes that officials can enter a home “in cases of flagrante delicto, disaster or rescue, or, during the day, with a court order,” and Section XII allows criminal proceedings to methodically breach this privacy. In the United States, privacy zones – derived from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments in ''Griswold v. Connecticut'' (1965) in conjunction with the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment – have extended privacy to Americans in various ways (Privacy, n.d.). Again, a court-issued search or arrest warrant may breach this right to privacy, especially in the home.

'''Data Privacy'''

The US has very little data privacy due to a lack of legislation and regard. Most data regulation is due to compliance with the 2018 implementation of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, which applies to any company collecting any data on European citizens or companies with a large number of customers based in Europe (Wolford, n.d.). On the other hand, the Brazilian Supreme Court extended these Article 5 protections to data privacy in 2020 (Bioni & Monteiro, 2020). Additionally, New Zealand’s Information Privacy Principles (IPP) in Article 22 of the Privacy Act 2020 protect data collection, but also provides some exceptions in IPP 11 and 12.

'''Relationships'''

In 2018, the Indian Supreme Court declared part of Section 377 unconstitutional against Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution (Rai, 2018). This ruling allowed those in LGBT relationships privacy in the home, but again, this privacy was not granted in public spaces (Rai, 2018). Similarly, the right to a private relationship went through the courts in the United States. First, it was granted to interracial couples in 1967 through ''Loving v. Virginia'' (1967) and then to same-sex couples through ''Obergefell v. Hodges'' in 2015. In Brazil, relationships are protected under Article 5(X), which states “personal intimacy, private life, honor and reputation are inviolable, guaranteeing the right to compensation for pecuniary or moral damages resulting from the violation thereof” (Brazil Constitution, 1988).

'''Communication'''

Private communication is protected under Article 5(XII) of the Brazilian Constitution (1988). In the United States, the right to private communication became convoluted with the 2001 USA PATRIOT ACT, which authorized the interception and disclosure of communication under certain circumstances.

Resources

Bioni, B.R. & Monteiro, R.L. (2020, June 9). A landmark ruling in Brazil: Paving the way for considering data protections as an autonomous fundamental right. Future of Privacy Forum. https://fpf.org/blog/a-landmark-ruling-in-brazil-paving-the-way-for-considering-data-protection-as-an-autonomous-fundamental-right/
Brazil Constitution. (1988). https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2017.pdf?lang=en
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Dec. 1, 2009. https://fra.europa.eu/en/eu-charter
Constitution of India. (1950). https://legislative.gov.in/constitution-of-india
European arrest warrant. (n.d.). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/cross-border-cases/judicial-cooperation/types-judicial-cooperation/european-arrest-warrant_en
European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
European evidence warrant. (2006, June 1). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_06_168

===Does public polling reveal insights about the right as experienced in different countries?===
'''Worldwide'''

A 2018 Deloitte survey has revealed that the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is having a positive international impact on the perception of data collection and storage even just six months after its implementation (Deloitte, 2018, 4). The GDPR has had a worldwide effect on privacy laws as it requires all companies which collect data on EU citizens to comply with the law, regardless of the location of their headquarters (Wolford, n.d.). At the most basic level, respondents felt companies have begun to care more about data protection (Deloitte, 2018, 6). Additionally, over 3 out of 4 respondents were aware of their rights under this law and some had already used this knowledge to alter what data companies were collecting about them (Deloitte, 2018, 13, 14, 19). On the other hand, 19% of those polled felt that organizations did not care about privacy (Deloitte, 2018, 6) and only 51% felt the law had put them in control of the personal data that companies have access to (Deloitte, 2018, 18).

'''European Union'''

In a 2019 European Union (including North Macedonia) study conducted a year after the implementation of the GDPR, the European Commission concurred with Deloitte in that the GDPR had made people more aware of their rights (Vandystadt & Voin, 2019). However, only 20% of these respondents knew which authority was responsible for protecting privacy rights (Vandystadt & Voin, 2019; Awareness of the general data protection regulation, 2019).

'''United States'''

In 2002, a Harris Poll found that 63% of respondents found the privacy legislation in place to be inadequate (EPIC, 2021). In 2019, 75% of those surveyed felt the government should regulate companies and their use of personal data (Auxier, 2020). In 2020, 79% of the population wanted national privacy legislation enacted (Auxier, 2020). It is clear that over time, Americans have become more concerned about the use of their personal data, especially in the private sector (Auxier et al., 2019; Auxier, 2020). Despite this fact, the United States has still not enacted sweeping privacy legislation at a national level. At the state level, California was the first state to enact privacy legislation in 2018, and at least nineteen other states have followed suit with the hope that it will signal the federal government to propose some sort of national privacy legislation for ease of compliance (Sabin, 2021). However, Americans seem to be fine with either approach, with polls showing around 70% find their state government to be responsible for this issue and the same percent find the federal government to be responsible (Sabin, 2021).

'''New Zealand'''

In 2012, the New Zealand Privacy Commissioner published a privacy study completed by UMR Research. This study found that 90% of people wanted the government to protect their data and be told by companies how their data was being used (Privacy Commissioner, 2012, 9). Interestingly, only 66% were concerned about the presence of their personal data online (Privacy Commissioner, 2012, 12). However, 88% of respondents wanted businesses to be punished if they were using data incorrectly, and 97% wanted the Privacy Commissioner to be able to reprimand companies if they were breaching the then enforceable 1993 Privacy Act (Privacy Commissioner, 2012, 23, 10). Since this study was published, the 1993 Privacy Act has been updated. Now, if an investigation reveals a breach of duty or misconduct, Article 96 of the Privacy Act 2020 requires the Commissioner to refer the matter to authorities, reflecting some of the public’s wants revealed in the 2012 poll.

'''British Columbia'''

In 2020, Canadian non-profit, Freedom of Information and Privacy Association or FIPA, worked with Ipsos and polled British Columbians surrounding their attitudes regarding privacy law. About half of them were unsure if the current laws were protective enough or admitted they thought current privacy laws were lacking (FIPA, 2020). When asked about the transparency of Canadian companies, 50% felt companies were not open about their data practices and 75% felt that Canadian companies may send their data to non-Canadian companies (FIPA, 2020). However, one-third of respondents from the same study knew British Columbian privacy law and its protections and three-quarters would like a public education initiative to teach these protections (FIPA, 2020).

Resources

Auxier, B. (2020, May 4). How Americans see digital privacy issues amid the COVID-19 outbreak. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/04/how-americans-see-digital-privacy-issues-amid-the-covid-19-outbreak/
Auxier, B., Rainie, L., Anderson, M., Perrin, A., Kumar, M., & Turner, E. (2019, Nov. 15). Americans and privacy: Concerned, confused, and feeling lack of control over their personal information. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/
Awareness of the general data protection regulation – one year on. (2019). European Commission. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2222
Deloitte. (2018). A new era for privacy: GDPR six months on. https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/risk/deloitte-uk-risk-gdpr-six-months-on.pdf
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). (2021). Public opinion on privacy. https://epic.org/privacy/survey/
FIPA. (2020, June 4). British Columbians want action on privacy protection: Polling results. https://fipa.bc.ca/2020-privacy-poll/
Privacy Act 2020, 2020 No. 31, (2021). https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2020/0031/latest/LMS23223.html
Privacy Commissioner. (2012, Apr.). UMR omnibus results. https://www.privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Surveys/Privacy-Commission-UMR-Omni-Results-Apr-2012.pdf
Sabin, S. (2021, Apr. 27). States are moving on privacy bills. Morning Consult. https://morningconsult.com/2021/04/27/state-privacy-congress-priority-poll/
Vandystadt, N., & Voin, M. (2019, July 24). GDPR shows results, but work needs to continue. European Commission. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/api/deliverable/download/file?deliverableId=69715
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

==Conflicts with other Rights==
===Are there other specific fundamental rights that tend to conflict with this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?===
As Warren & Brandeis suggest in ''The Right to Privacy'' (1890), the right to privacy directly conflicts with freedom of the press and speech. They wanted to protect people from writings beyond what defamation and publishing law covered. However, by proposing privacy protections that extended beyond these laws, they were inherently limiting what could be published. While this limitation was intentional, it was sure to be contentious as the First Amendment had been in place and protected for nearly 100 years and privacy rights were not prominent in any part of the world before this time. The First Amendment reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (US Constitution, 1787, Amd. 1).

The United States Supreme Court Cases offer plenty of examples of press and privacy rights conflicting, as “the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of the right to privacy” (''Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc.'', 1971). In some cases, privacy prevails, in others, the First Amendment. One of the cases was ''New York Times Company v. United States'' (1971) in which the ''New York Times'' published the Pentagon Papers but the Nixon administration argued that those should be kept private for national security concerns. In a 6-3 decision, the Court claimed that these were not to be considered private or secure and that the freedom of the press prevailed (NYT v. US, n.d.). Also in 1971, the Court ordered Branzburg to reveal his sources to a grand jury, despite the sources explicitly asking to not be revealed in ''Bransburg v. Hayes''. Had secrecy been maintained, the press would have more rights than individuals during the grand jury (Branzburg v. Hayes, n.d.). Additionally, other cases such as ''Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn'' (1975) and ''Florida Star v. BJF'' (1989) held that freedom of the press overtakes privacy rights when the information is lawfully and publicly available. ''Cohen v. Cowles Media Company'' (1991) granted privacy to press informants if they had been promised confidentiality with promissory estoppel because the principle applies generally not just to the press (Cohen v. Cowles Media Company, n.d.). The contrast of ''Branzburg'' and ''Cohen'' shows how interpretive and circumstantial privacy rights are, while ''NYT v. NASA'' (1991) reveals that privacy rights are dependent on the media used to publish the information. In this instance, the US District Court for the District of Columbia allowed for transcripts of the Challenger astronauts’ last words to be published by the ''Times'', but not the voice recordings (Mills, 2008, 36).

Privacy rights also conflict with the right to information. The government recognized this right with the Freedom of Information Act in 1966 (FOIA). This act granted anyone the ability to request access to federal agency records but not the records of private companies. The goal of having public records is to keep the government accountable, but this risks people’s privacy based on the nature of the information agencies collect (Mills, 2008, 50). However, nine exemptions and three exclusions in FOIA limit access to these records. The exclusions are narrow and related to law enforcement and ongoing intelligence investigations and are unaffected by FOIA. The exemptions authorize government agencies to withhold information from those requesting it (Freedom of Information Act, n.d). Luckily, the exceptions and exemptions and the Privacy Act of 1974 considered the right of privacy and aimed to prevent the collision of these rights (Mills, 2008, 51).

Privacy is also put aside when considering public security and health (Mills, 2008, 227). In the United States, this lack of priority became clear with the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and PATRIOT Act of 2001, which both expanded the ability of the FBI to have access to information on individuals that may or may not be a threat to the nation’s security. Many courts have upheld acts that place public security over personal privacy rights. To use an example less severe than terrorism, such is the case with the release of sex offenders (Mills, 2008, 224). While it hurts one’s reputation to have their name released in connection with this crime, it protects the greater community and their neighbors by alerting them.

Resources

Branzburg v. Hayes. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 12, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-85
Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc, 4 Cal. 3d 529 (CA Sup. Ct. 1971). https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/4/529.html
Cohen v. Cowles Media Company. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 12, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-634
Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-938
Florida Star v. B. J. F. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-329
Freedom of Information Act, The. (n.d.). Department of State. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://foia.state.gov/learn/foia.aspx
Mills, J.L. (2008). Privacy: The lost right. Oxford University Press.
New York Times Company v. United States. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 12, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1970/1873
U.S. Constitution. (1787). https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Are there other specific rights that are critical to the exercise of this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?===
“Privacy claims began gradually to be made independently of the trespass rules essential to property rights” (Heffernan, 2016, 102). The connection between these rights was recognized early on by Hixon (“the right to privacy…carried at least an implied right of property”) from Warren & Brandeis’s 1890 writing and by New York Court of Appeals judge John C. Grey (Hixon, 1987, 39). These rights are protected and exercised jointly in many constitutions and states, likely as privacy rights’ origins are rooted in property rights (Heffernan, 2016, 113). For instance, in Grenada Article 1(c) of the 1973 constitution protects both privacy and property (Constitute Project, Grenada 1973, reinst. 1991, rev. 1992). Without the right to privacy, property rights would be lessened as it would only grant the right to ownership and, barring other protections, leave the property vulnerable to searches that may expose private information. When exercised in conjunction with property rights, privacy protections expand. This is explicit in the constitution of Saint Kitts and Nevis, which, in granting privacy rights, also prevents the deprivation of property without compensation (Constitute Project, Saint Kitts and Nevis 1983).

The right to privacy also convenes with the right to be forgotten in some states. This right is “the right of a past individual to be forgotten by people in the present” (Gadja, 2018, 205). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in 2014 that the right to privacy granted in Europe extended to past economic troubles and that this lack of privacy that caused the lawsuit was harming his ability to move past these troubles (Gadja, 2018, abstract). This ruling allowed the past troubles to be forgotten. Since this ruling in 2014, the United States courts have also alluded to the right to be forgotten as a sect of privacy rights, despite many believing at the time “this right [would not] cross the Atlantic” because of the First Amendment and others believing this right was present before the conventional right to privacy (Gadja, 2018, 206). While the US Supreme Court has not ruled on this right, lower courts have, as the California Supreme Court did in ''Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association'' in 1971. ''Briscoe'' opined that while the reports of previous crimes were newsworthy, the “identification of the actor in reports of long past crimes usually serve[d] little independent public purpose” other than curiosity given the rehabilitation that had taken place (''Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association'', 1971). The plaintiff was allowed to have his past forgotten and the press was not allowed to take this right away, in this instance (Gadja, 2018, 212). However, this right is not internationally recognized, as other states such as Brazil have not supported this right (Library of Congress, 2021).

The right to be forgotten and property combine to create the right to one’s name and likeness which is especially important for those in the public eye (Mills, 2008, 220). It is accepted that people have a right to profit off of their own image, much like they have the right to profit off of their inventions or intellectual property (Mills, 2-008, 217-218). This right became clear in court cases soon after the 1890 publication of the Warren & Brandeis article, beginning with ''Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.'' in 1902 (Hixon, 1987, 39). Beyond this, of course, are other sects of privacy law that remain pivotal in the protection of privacy rights as it is known today.

Resources

Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc, 4 Cal. 3d 529 (CA Sup. Ct. 1971). https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/4/529.html
Constitute Project. (2021). Grenda 1973, reinstated 1991, revised 1992. https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Grenada_1992?lang=en
Constitute Project. (2021). Saint Kitts and Nevis 1983. https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Kitts_and_Nevis_1983?lang=en
Gadja, A. (2018). Privacy, press, and the right to be forgotten in the United States. Washington Law Review 93(1), 201-264. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3144077
Heffernan, W.C. (2016). Privacy and the American Constitution: New rights through interpretation of an old text. Palgrave Macmillan.
Hixon, R.F. (1987). Privacy in a public society: Human rights in conflict. Oxford University Press.
Library of Congress. (2021, Mar. 15). Brazil: Federal supreme court decides right to be forgotten is not supported by constitution. https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2021-03-15/brazil-federal-supreme-court-decides-right-to-be-forgotten-is-not-supported-by-constitution/
U.S. Constitution. (1787). https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript

===Is there a perception that this right is above or higher than other fundamental rights, or in general, that it has a particular place in a hierarchy of rights?===
Joseph Wronka posits that the UDHR has tiers of rights, arranged by article. Article 1, human dignity, is the first and foremost right. Articles 2-21, which includes the right to privacy in Article 12, are civil and political rights, protecting people from their government. The right to speech, press, religion, and vote are also protected in these articles (Wronka, 1994; UDHR 1948). Below these rights were the positive rights in which a government should provide “to ensure an existence worthy of human dignity” and solidarity rights (Wronka, 1994). So, there is some recognition of a hierarchy between fundamental rights, but nothing has been written on the hierarchy among rights of the same tier.

In practice, however, privacy seems to be overshadowed by other rights. On one hand, privacy rights can overtake rights such as the freedoms of speech and press. On the other hand, these rights have stifled privacy rights in many instances. Hixon suggests that privacy rights prevail in cases of information gathering but press and speech rights prevail during and after publishing (Hixon, 1987, 178). Mills suggests this difference in protection is due to the publication medium and the perceived benefit to the public (Mills, 2008, 36, 117).

In the United States, some scholars have noted that “free-speech and free-press rights almost always trump information privacy rights,” suggesting there is a hierarchy within fundamental rights in at least one nation (Mills, 2008, 108). Hixon referred to privacy as “at best a correlative right,” and “sociological notion,” while Milles calls it a “precondition” (Hixon, 1987, 44, 45; Mills, 2008, 116). Press freedoms only require a “newsworthy” and “public interest” standard to be upheld, while privacy rights have had to be fought for continuously in courts. In this fight, the inadequacy of American privacy law has shown through, stemming from the lack of explicit protection in the Constitution (Hixon, 1987, 76). Public figures continuously have information published about them, protected under free speech, leaving them vulnerable to the news cycles (Hixon, 1987, 133).

Resources

Hixon, R.F. (1987). Privacy in a public society: Human rights in conflict. Oxford University Press.
Mills, J.L. (2008). Privacy: The lost right. Oxford University Press.
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
Wronka, J. (1994). Human rights and social policy in the United States: An educational agenda for the 21st Century. Journal of Moral Education 23(3). https://doi.org/10.1080/0305724940230304

===What specific examples of hierarchies, manifestos, constitutions, or prioritized descriptions of rights cite this right’s high status? Low status? No status at all?===
The right to privacy is listed in many international treaties – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990), and Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). The consistency with which it is held as a fundamental right certainly suggests it’s high status. The consistency with which it is present in many national constitutions confirms this suggestion (see “What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right” above).

Resources

Convention on the Rights of the Child. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Nov. 20, 1989. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx
European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. UNGA. Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. UNGA. Dec. 18, 1990. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cmw.pdf
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

===How does federalism change, if at all, the exercise or application of this right? What examples of this can one point to?===
With federalism, there is often one state that leads the rest – in terms of privacy legislation, California leads the United States, and the German state Hessen led Germany and the European Union (Mills, 2008, 167; Petkova, 2016, 5, 4). Though the EU is not properly a federalist entity, federalism encouraged and promoted privacy as a fundamental right. Privacy rights began in Hessen, became federal law after German parliamentary action, and eventually became supranational as the EU passed encompassing privacy legislation in 1995 (Petkova, 2016, 4). Later iterations of the 1995 law led to the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation which has provisions that help regulate information privacy outside of EU borders, including in the United States.

In the United States, federalism clarifies and further protects the right to privacy. This is important because the federal right is still based on Supreme Court opinions rather than explicit constitutional provisions or legislation. This lack of explicit language allows states to “provide leadership in the privacy area because of the constitutional options available” and drive for change (Mills, 2008, 162; Petkova, 2017, 24). As of 2008, ten states in the US (Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington) explicitly protect privacy in their constitutions (Mills, 2008, Appendix II). At least twenty states have passed privacy legislation (with some overlap between the ten with constitutional provisions, namely California). State privacy legislation focuses on data privacy, improving security measures for storing personal information, notifying individuals of security breaches, and enabling security alerts and/or freezes on credit reports (Mills, 2008, 167). Most states hoped their passage would signal the federal government to pass privacy legislation (Sabin, 2021). Schwartz acknowledges that this legislation would be possible under the Commerce Clause, though the effects would depend on the text (2009, 922). Some scholars are wary of federal legislation as states have created a successful legal landscape based on experimentation and consequence, and federal legislation could disrupt the balance, create uncertainty, and be hard to amend (Bellia, 2009; Schwartz, 2009, 922-931).

Federalism results in the lack of consistent privacy laws and rights. For instance, in Germany, every company needs to have a data protection officer. In the EU, the GDPR only requires public companies and certain private companies to have this position, while allowing all other private companies to opt-in to having this role (Petkova, 2017, 20). These different laws can alter privacy protection outcomes based on the jurisdiction in which the incident took place, especially if the rights are challenged in courts. This was the case in Florida’s ''Rolling v. State''. Six college students were brutally murdered in Gainesville, Florida and their families hoped to prevent the press from releasing the photos of their bodies. Mills, who was asked to consult on the case, knew this would be a complex legal question as the Florida laws technically allowed for these records to be open to ensure police accountability, but he also knew the families would suffer severe harm were these photos to appear publicly. The Florida Supreme Court decided that the laws in place allowed for a compromise: the photos could be made available to the public by the records custodian upon a reasonable request provided there were restrictions on the copying and removal of the photos. Mills acknowledges that had the situation been occurred in another jurisdiction, the result would not have been the same and the photos likely would have been published (Mills, 2008, 247-251).

Resources

Bellia, P.L. (2009). Federalization of Information Privacy Law. Yale Law Journal 118(5), 868-900. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40389431
Mills, J.L. (2008). Privacy: The lost right. Oxford University Press.
Petkova, B. (2016). The Safeguards of Privacy Federalism. Lewis & Clark Law Review 20(2). https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Petkova%20The%20Safeguards%20of%20Privacy%20Federalsim_0.pdf
Petkova, B. (2017). Domesticating the “foreign” in making transatlantic data privacy law. International Journal of Constitutional Law 15(4), 1135-1156). https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Petkova%20Domesticating%20the%20Foreign%20in%20Making.pdf
Sabin, S. (2021, Apr. 27). States are moving on privacy bills. Morning Consult. https://morningconsult.com/2021/04/27/state-privacy-congress-priority-poll/
Schwartz, P.M. (2009). Preemption and privacy. Yale Law Journal 118(5). https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5155&context=ylj

==Limitations / Restrictions==
===What are the typical exceptions or limitations placed on this right?===
Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) presents exceptions to the right to privacy. Privacy is granted “except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (1950). The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996) allow for reasonable, non-arbitrary searches. These exceptions allow privacy to be breached with a court-issued warrant. Most exceptions stem from these documents and it should be noted that the United Nations extended the right to privacy to online spheres (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2013, I§5). Additionally, the European Union implemented the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which prevents the sharing of personal data with outside sources (Wolford, n.d.). The GDPR applies to any companies operating in or with the EU causing it to have international implications (Wolford, n.d.).

Resources

European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2014, June 30). The right to privacy in the digital age. A/HRC/27/37. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf
United States Constitution. 1787. https://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

===Under American jurisprudence, what permissible exceptions exist?===
The Fourth Amendment states “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (1791). While this amendment protects the right to privacy from the government, it also brings forth exceptions: reasonable search and seizure as well as infringements allowed by court-issued warrants seeking specific items or people. Other amendments used to extend privacy by the Supreme Court, namely the First, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth, do not have notable exceptions regarding privacy.

'''Limitations of Reasonability'''

Defining what constitutes a reasonable search has proven to be difficult. In ''Katz v. United States'' (1967) the Supreme Court ruled the Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places” and created the Katz test to determine where it is reasonable to expect privacy from law enforcement and a warrant is needed (''Katz v. United States'', 1967). This test examines whether the information was meant to be kept private and if it had been disclosed (Hu, 2018, 129). Prior to the ''Katz'' test, the court used the trespass test, a common-law approach to the Fourth Amendment in which physical intrusion can violate the Fourth Amendment. Fifty years after ''Katz'', the Court again relied on the trespass test in ''United States v. Jones'' (Hu, 2018, 130; ''United States v. Jones'', 2012). In doing so, the court claimed while the ''Katz'' test extended the right to privacy to people, it did not revoke the traditional common-law protections (''United States v. Jones'', 2012). Hu, citing Justices Sotomayor and Alito, feels that the Katz test ends before cyber-surveillance begins and recognizes the need for change (Hu, 2018, 139, 141).

In analyzing Fourth Amendment Supreme Court rulings, Orin Kerr found that four general models have been used to decide privacy cases (2017, 524). These models vary in scale (micro or macro) and normativity (normative or descriptive) and consider one of the following: how public the information is, what information was found, the actions that were taken, or whether or not government conduct should be regulated (Kerr, 2017, 506, 524). Kerr claims the last of these considerations was the basis for the ''Katz'' ruling (2017, 519). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has used all four of these models to both protect and deny privacy and has not provided clear guidance as to what is a reasonable search (Ker, 2017, 507, 508). Kerr concludes by suggesting there is no one size fits all test or model because of the importance of case facts (2017, 525). As such, Kerr would rather see many definitive models so that the limitations of reasonability are clear and contextualized for future court decisions at all levels (2017, 542).

'''Privacy Violations by a Non-Government Entity'''

The Supreme Court has rarely ruled on notable cases in which the privacy offender was not a government entity. However, in ''Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union'' (1937) the Court ruled that Senn could not invoke his privacy in work against the right to publicity of the union’s picketing (Richards, 1334). In the opinion of the Court, Justice Brandeis held that because it was a commercial dispute and affected the competition for customers, the right to privacy was not applicable (Richards, 1334). He also protected counter-speech in this opinion (Richards, 1334).

Resources

Hu, M. (2018). Cybersurveillance intrusions and an evolving Katz privacy test. American Criminal Law Review 55(1), 127-152. https://www.law.georgetown.edu/american-criminal-law-review/in-print/volume-55-issue-1-winter-2018/cybersurveillance-intrusions-and-an-evolving-katz-privacy-test/
''Katz v. United States'', 389 U.S. 347 (1967). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/389/347
Kerr, O. (2007). Four models of Fourth Amendment protection. Stanford Law Review 60(2), 503-552. http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2010/04/Kerr.pdf
Richards N.M. (2010, Oct.). The puzzle of Brandeis, privacy, and speech. Vanderbilt Law Review 63(5) 1293-1352. https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol63/iss5/3/
United States Constitution. 1787. https://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm
''United States v. Jones'', 565 U.S. 400 (2012). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/10-1259

===Under international human rights laws, what permissible exceptions (often called derogations) exist?===
Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) presents exceptions to the right to privacy – “except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (1950). The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948, Art. 12) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996, Art. 17) only prevent arbitrary and unlawful searches, allowing for reasonable searches.

Resources

European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

===Have political theorists or philosophers discussed the permissibility of exceptions to this right?===
'''Hobbes'''

Thomas Hobbes grappled with varying different situations of privacy. In ''Leviathan'', it was mostly concerning places in which privacy and the public overlap. Generally, the public and commonwealth rights overtake those of an individual, especially in times of war, but there are some exceptions (Hobbes, 1651/1965, 130). For instance, one had the right to protect themselves with their private strength without being a threat to the commonwealth (Hobbes, 1651/1965, 138). Additionally, men could own private property and goods without interference from the Church of England and hold their own beliefs, as long as they didn’t go against the Church (Hobbes, 1651/1965, 250, 345).

In ''De Cive'' (On the Citizen), Hobbes presents an interesting dilemma – once the people form a state, the people no longer exist and instead become subjects (Hobbes, 1642/1651, 39-40). He suggests this leaves the ruler of the state with no responsibility to the subjects, able to harm them as there is no direct contract between the ruler and subjects (Hobbes, 1642/1651, 40). Without obligation, there is certainly little to prevent the ruler from imposing on subjects and revoking their privacy.

'''Locke'''

In 1689, John Locke discussed privacy in his ''Letters on Toleration''. In this essay, Locke discusses privacy in relation to the Church of England. Generally, there is no privacy from the Magistrate in matters relating to the Church, however, in some instances, privacy is afforded to private matters (Locke, 1689/2010, 43, 46). For instance, Locke claims that one may take care of one’s health without much interference at all and prevents people from telling others what to believe in unless they are a clergyman (Locke, 1689/2010, 46. 129). Additionally, if one perceives an order by a magistrate to be unlawful, they can abstain from that law, and the magistrate cannot use their private judgment to impose laws but must refer back to God’s laws (Locke, 1689/2010, 58-59).

'''Kant'''

Immanuel Kant talks a lot about Enlightenment and the formation of states. Inherently, in the creation of these states, some rights are taken away to “[harmonize] with the freedom on everyone else” (Kant, 1970, 47, 55, 73). However, these rights that are given up usually have specific limitations (Kant, 1970, 45). The government in these societies could prevent some actions but, much like Warren & Brandeis later, felt that free-thinking and reasoning were of utmost importance in developing new ideas, and suggested they be protected (Kant, 1970, 59). However, Kant also suggests limiting the right to reason because it can still “expand to its fullest” while it is limited (Kant, 1970, 59).

In Warren & Brandeis’s terms of “the right to be let alone,” Kant, in his ''Theory and Practice'', instead proposes the right to coercion, meaning all who are a part of the state are held to the same standard (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 193; Kant, 1970, 75). This coercion is imposed uniformly on all subjects, but not the ruler (Kant, 1970, 75). As long as one was conforming to the laws, there was no reason to interrupt their actions, but once conformity was broken, there was a chance to impose and alter someone’s actions (Kant, 1970, 80). Kant recognizes that Hobbes feels differently, writing directly against Hobbes’ views as put forth in De Cive, in that the ruler has no obligations to the people and may treat them how he wishes – implying no right to be let alone (Kant, 1970, 84; Hobbes, 1651, 40).

'''Sieyes'''

In his essay titled ''Views of the Executive Means Available to the Representatives of France in 1789'', Emmanuel Sieyes claims rights are inherent to a person. However, in ''What is the Third Estate'', Sieyes claims that states may use the rights it was granted by the constitution and positive law to preserve the nation and community (Sieyes, 1788/2003, 136). In terms of privacy, these statements seem to imply that privacy may sometimes be taken away from some in the interests of the public. It is important to note, though, that these impositions may not go beyond the scope of the constitution in place (Sieyes, 1788/2003, 137).

'''Mill'''

John Stuart Mill, an English thinker, recognizes that English laws tended to interfere with privacy (Mill, 1859/2011, 15). However, Mill felt that separating church and state (“spiritual and temporal authority”) prevented more interferences of law within private life, somewhat facilitating what Warren & Brandeis would later call “the right to be let alone” (Mill, 1859/2011, 24; Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 193).

Resources

Hobbes, T. (1651). De cive (T. Hobbes, Trans.). UK Public Library. (Original work published 1642). http://www.public-library.uk/ebooks/27/57.pdf
Hobbes, T. (1965). Leviathan. Liberty Fund. (Original work published 1651). http://files.libertyfund.org/files/869/0161_Bk.pdf
Kant, I. (1970). Kant: Political writings (R.S. Reiss, Ed., 2003 ed.). Cambridge University Press.
Locke, J. (2010). A letter concerning toleration and other writings (M. Goldie, Ed.). Liberty Fund. (Original work published 1689). http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2375/Locke_1560_EBk_v6.0.pdf
Mill, J.S. (2011). On liberty. Project Gutenberg. (Original work published in 1859). https://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm#Page_1
Sieyes, E. (2003). Political writings (M. Sonenscher, Ed.). Hackett Publishing Company. (Original work published in 1788).
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Should this right be limited when limiting it would jeopardize democratic norms?===
Like many rights, privacy is not absolute (Siddiky, 2011, 224). It conflicts with and is compromised in the presence of other fundamental rights and democratic norms.

'''Speech'''

The right to privacy notably conflicts with the First Amendment’s right to free speech. In some cases, the right to privacy becomes limited and less protected, but, in others, it remains protected. This protective line between speech and privacy is thin. For instance, speech protections extend to allow employers, including the government in its capacity as an employer, to be able to restrict the speech of employees in certain matters (Volokh, 2000, 1095). However, in ''Connick v. Meyers'' (1983), the United States Supreme Court decided that, while working for the government, matters of public concern are protected and private while intraoffice grievances are not (Connick v. Meyers, n.d.; Volokh, 2000, 1095).

As Warren & Brandeis suggested in ''The Right to Privacy'' in 1890, the right to privacy conflicts with the First Amendment rights. In their writings about what is now known as ‘tort privacy’ (different from ‘constitutional privacy’), they advocate for the prevention of disclosures of private affairs to the public (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 195). This distinction is still maintained today, allowing for the publishing of ‘newsworthy’ stories about public figures (Volokh, 2000, 1088; Richards, 2010, 1307). However, the courts have not defined what constitutes newsworthy and have even left the definition to juries (Volokh, 2000, 1089).

Privacy has also been limited by the Supreme Court, despite being the institution that created the protection of the right. In ''Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union'' (1937), Senn had chosen to not join the labor union and the union members began picketing around him, beginning a labor dispute and causing Senn to call for his right to privacy (Richards, 2010, 1332-1333). In this case, Justice Brandeis wrote in the opinion’s footnote, Senn was not able to invoke his right to privacy against the union’s right to publicity (Richards, 2010, 1334). In essence, in the commercial sphere between competitors, the right to privacy became inapplicable in the interest of consumers (Richards, 2010, 1334).

On the other hand, privacy has remained protected in other instances. In ''Cohen v. Cowles Media'', the Supreme Court ruled that people can contract away their right to speech (Volokh, 2000, 1057). Volokh (2000) posits this privacy extends to implied contracts, especially in professions in which privacy can be reasonably expected. Thus, the federal laws requiring confidentiality have simply allowed for repercussions to be implemented, rather than creating a new area in privacy rights (1058). In publishing, the actions of private people are protected (Richards, 2010, 1307; Volokh, 2000, 1055). Volokh (2000) posits this protection extends beyond actions to embarrassing photos or stories which exhibit a lack of dignity (1094). Generally, this protection is expressed as the public concern test, in which privacy is granted to a party as long as the public is not affected (Volokh, 2000, 1097). This general protection of the right to privacy is consistent with Richards’ (2010) conclusion from Brandeis’ writings: that privacy protections allow for new ideas to be formed through development in private conversations (1347).

'''Right to Public Trial'''

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution directly conflicts with the implicit right to privacy by granting the right to a public trial. It is argued that the use of this court structure allows for the expression of public concern and prevents corruption while increasing public confidence in the system (Siddiky, 2011, 229).

Despite the right to a public trial, the juvenile justice system was created to protect the identity of minors who committed crimes in the hopes that this protection will allow them to become contributing members to society without the judgment of a criminal past (Siddiky, 2011, 207, 241). Even with this intention, there are exceptions to this privacy. First and foremost, juveniles’ privacy has previously been limited in favor of granting other constitutional rights, including 14th Amendment due process (Siddiky, 2011, 213, 227). Privacy may also be removed if they are charged as an adult, which requires meeting varying statutory criteria depending on the jurisdiction (Siddiky, 2011, 214). Additionally, there has been some movement surrounding the reform of juvenile courts which may remove their anonymity because of perceived coddling and the high recidivism rates among teens, potentially suggesting the need for different consequences (Siddiky, 2011, 215, 217).

Outside of juvenile courts, privacy is compromised more often for the sake of public trials. Something, though, the right to privacy prevails as a judge allows a party in a suit to file anonymously (Rastgoufard, 2003, 1009). These exceptions are rare and are not entrenched in the Federal Rule of Civil Procedures, but the United States Supreme Court has allowed anonymous suits to be decided (Rastgoufard, 2003, 1023). Most notably, anonymity was granted in Roe v. Wade in which ‘Jane Roe’ was allowed to remain anonymous as pregnancy was considered to be a very private matter. Juries have also been allowed to be anonymous (Rastgoufard, 2003, 1009).

'''Property Rights'''

The right to be left alone seems like it would go hand in hand with property rights. Your property, your privacy. However, it is easy to learn who owns a piece of real estate through public records (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 355). While this has benefits mostly related to the ease of buying or selling real estate, there are few-to-no processes in place to confirm the validity of deed filings or liens, especially in the United States (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 359). However, many involved in the industry have interests in limiting privacy in this area for their professional ease (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 374). In Europe, the only people that can file these records are notaries, but the US does not offer similar protections (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 372). These infringements on the right to privacy have become more accessible with digitized records, though this is not limited to this industry (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 375). Additionally, it is probably possible to buy a house anonymously, though there is limited academic literature on how.

'''Political Preferences'''

While one has the right to cast a vote in private and not tell anyone who they voted for, that doesn’t stop people from figuring out one’s political tendencies. With party alignment shrinking, the importance of micro-targeting has grown in campaigns. As such, political parties and candidates have gathered information on voters to determine who is a supporter, who could be persuaded, and who is not likely to be a supporter (Bennett, 2015, 372). At first, parties and candidates begin by looking at state and local party registration lists (Bennett, 2015, 372). From there, they use a variety of factors, such as social media, letters to elected officials, and campaign donations, to determine issues of importance to each voter (Bennett, 372, 2015, 378). While most of this is already public information or has been willingly put out on the internet by individuals, it is not being used in the intended way, and some of the information gathered is private (Bennett, 2015, 372; 11 CFR § 102.17(c)(4)). As such, this approach is illegal in Europe, though it has become prominent in other western nations beyond the United States, such as Canada (Bennett, 2015, 373).

Resources

11 FCR § 102.17(c)(4). (2021). https://www.fec.gov/regulations/102-17/2021-annual-102#102-17-c-4
Bennett, C.J. (2015). Trends in voter surveillance in western societies: Privacy intrusions and democratic implications. Surveillance & Society 13(3/4), 370-384. https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v13i3/4.5373
Connick v. Myers. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved September 28, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1251
Rastgoufard, B. (2003). Pay attention to that green curtain: Anonymity in the courts. Case Western Reserve Law Review 53(4), 1009-1040. https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1512&context=caselrev
Richards N.M. (2010, Oct.). The puzzle of Brandeis, privacy, and speech. Vanderbilt Law Review 63(5) 1293-1352. https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol63/iss5/3/
Roscoe, E. & Szypszak, C. (2017, Summer). Privacy and public real estates records: Preserving legacy system reliability against modern threats. The Urban Lawyer 49(3), 355-391. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44648036
Siddiky, L. (2011). Keeping the court room doors closed so the doors of opportunity can remain open: An argument for maintaining privacy in the juvenile justice system. Howard Law Journal 55(205), 204-246.
Volokh, E. (2000, May). Freedom of speech and information privacy: The troubling implications of a right to stop people from speaking about you. Stanford Law Review 52(5), 1049-1124. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1229510
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Is this right often perceived as threatening to government authorities?===
The Fourth Amendment has rarely been fully realized in its long history. While the Fourth Amendment guarantees privacy in search and seizure, the states originally did not want it to apply to their procedures and noted that it had yet to be applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1260). As such, lots of cases came forward to the Supreme Court, and the Exclusionary Rule was established (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). The Exclusionary Rule prevents trials from using improperly collected evidence, but it does not fully apply the Fourth Amendment and prevent searches (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). The rule has gone through a couple of iterations based on the amendments from which it is derived by the Court. It was originally established in ''Boyd v. US'' (1886), based in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, then evolved with ''Weeks v. US'' (1914), which claimed derivation from the Fifth Amendment but appeared to be based in the Fourth. Its current state results from ''Mapp v. Ohio'' (1961) when the Court held that the Fourth Amendment was an essential feature of privacy and decided that the standards of evidence collection should be consistent between federal and state jurisdictions (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1262). However, authorities can collect whatever evidence they wish and are not held to a legal standard unless they wish to have permissible evidence in the likely-upcoming judicial proceedings (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). Additionally, there are currently many cases that have developed in which a warrant is not needed, causing even Congress, via the Government Publishing Office, to admit there has been an expansion of power given to authorities (US GPO, 1992, 1208-1209). Beyond this expansion, it is known that authorities who perform acts that are not permitted by law are rarely reprimanded, especially with search and seizure and the ability to use the “good faith” defense (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1258). These facts prevent the right to privacy from being perceived as threatening to government authorities.

Resources

Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: Exclusionary Rule. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 9, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-4/enforcing-the-fourth-amendment-the-exclusionary-rule
US Government Publishing Office (US GPO). (1992, June 29). Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure (S. Doc. 103-6). https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CONAN-1992/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-5/summary

===Is this right often curtailed by government authorities for reasons other than those which are generally viewed as permissible?===

While the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is in place to protect people’s privacy, a fact continuously recognized by the Supreme Court, it continues to leave people vulnerable to the decisions of authorities due to a lack of clarity and accountability provided by the courts (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). The Fourth Amendment is explicit in that it prevents unreasonable search and seizure (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). However, it is hard to determine what is reasonable and the Supreme Court has claimed that the reasonableness of a search is situationally dependent (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1202). Various rules and exceptions to the right to privacy have been established.

Under the Exclusionary Rule, lots of searches are carried out which are later found to be unconstitutional by a court, at which point there is little that can be done to rectify the violation of privacy rights (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). These instances are not permissible exceptions, but rather instances in which it becomes clear after the fact that privacy was violated (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted in ways that cause the government’s regulatory interests to be placed over an individual’s interests (US GPO, 1992, 1204). These interpretations have created exceptions, creating situationally specific instances in which privacy is not necessarily protected. For instance, during the execution of a search warrant, if it does not include a search clause for those occupying the location, they may not be searched, but they can be detained (US GPO, 1992, 1227). For whatever reason, the courts have viewed detainment as less intrusive than a search, so it has become allowed, though it has been debated if it is a reasonable and permissible exception without a warrant (US GPO, 1992, 1227). This debate starts with the Court’s opinions in ''Terry v. Ohio'' (1968) and ''United States v. Mendenhall''(1980) that state seizure is either restraining liberty or the belief that one is not at liberty to leave (US GPO, 1992, 1231). The ''Terry'' decision was important in other ways as well, creating another standard for search and seizure without a warrant and probable cause - authorities may stop and frisk individuals if there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (US GPO, 1992, 1230). Recently, this standard has been applied less restrictively and more often, creating some tension between the right to privacy and public safety (GPO, 1992, 1231).

Exceptions don’t just result from court rulings. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 permitted information sharing between law enforcement agencies without notice, leading many to believe more privacy violations were occurring (Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.). However, some scholars argue while privacy is more elusive under the presence of this law, privacy is not hindered as most of us remain unconcerned about the information that may or may not be collected about us resulting in little or no behavioral change (Rubel, 2007, 148-149). At the same time, however, “lack of privacy bears upon how we act,” as does the knowledge that others may have access to our information, so the right becomes less protected under the PATRIOT Act (Rubel, 2007, 142, 153).

Resources

Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: Exclusionary Rule. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 9, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-4/enforcing-the-fourth-amendment-the-exclusionary-rule
Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act. (n.d.) Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm
Rubel, A. (2007, Mar.). Privacy and the USA Patriot Act: Rights, the value of rights, and autonomy. Law and Philosophy 26(2), 119-159. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-005-5970-x
US Government Publishing Office (US GPO). (1992, June 29). Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure (S. Doc. 103-6). https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CONAN-1992/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-5/summary
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001). https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/3162

===Is this right at times curtailed by private actors?===
'''Privacy Torts'''

Privacy violations under tort law was how Warren & Brandeis originally developed the right in 1890 (Citron, 2010, 1805). These violations, usually unwanted intrusions or disclosures can result from negligent or intentional actions and result in civil lawsuits rather than questions of constitutional legality (Citron, 2010, 1806; Tort, n.d.). Violations are hard to define as they change with technology (the original call for privacy was in relation to the ‘instant photograph’), which creates more and more opportunities for violations (Citron, 2010, 1809; Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 195). However, the law changes slower than technology creating some disconnect in legal remedies for new technology (Citron, 2010, 1810).

'''Constitutional Privacy'''

Constitutions only protect people from government actors and international covenants only affect the laws and regulations which governments put in place (Hudson, 2018; Dunn, 2009). Even so, most allowances of government invasions of privacy in the United States have evolved because the government mimicked the actions of private actors, placing private conduct at the baseline of privacy expectations (Kamin, 2004, 101, 115).

At a basic level, once information is willingly given to someone other than oneself, the courts have continuously ruled that there is no longer the expectation for privacy. This holds true with information that is given to both private companies and individuals (Kamin, 2004, 101). The ''Katz'' decision somewhat demonstrates this curtailment of privacy by creating the plain view doctrine. If something is in plain view, even in a private space, it is not private (Kamin, 2004, 104). This decision extrapolates on the theory that as long as someone else may reasonably have that information, it is an unprotected area under the Fourth Amendment (Kamin, 2004, 104). So, by letting someone into one’s home or publishing information online, one is inherently limiting their Fourth Amendment protections. As such, authorities can ask private companies to perform searches or subpoena these actors rather than those they are investigating, depending on the company’s privacy policies (Kamin, 2004, 102, 137).

In ''United States v. Jacobsen'' (1984) privacy protections were tested when officials were able to open a package that FedEx had damaged and opened for insurance purposes (Kamin, 2004, 99, ''United States v. Jacobsen'', 1984). Upon its opening, FedEx employees suspected the package contained cocaine (Kamin, 2004, 99; United States v. Jacobsen, n.d.). Had federal officials gotten to it first, it would not have been able to be searched, even if it was damaged, but the information provided by FedEx from the private search was enough to imply the plain view doctrine thus permitting a warrantless search by the DEA (Kamin, 2004, 100; United States v. Jacobsen, n.d.; ''US v. Jacobsen'', 1984). The Supreme Court upheld the granting of the search and subsequent arrest warrant which was obtained because the DEA confirmed the contents were cocaine based on the ‘tip’ from private actors (United States v. Jacobsen, n.d.). The Court said that “[w]hether those invasions were accidental or deliberate, and whether they were reasonable or unreasonable, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of their private character” (''US v. Jacobsen'', 1984). Kamin (2004) goes as far as to say that “[t]he fact that the private actor did something the government would not have been permitted to do simply did not covert the subsequent, otherwise reasonable, police conduct into a search that implicated the Fourth Amendment” (100-101). That is to say, after the package was opened due to the damage by a non-governmental party, privacy could no longer be expected, despite that it is reasonable to expect privacy during shipping (Kamin, 2004, 100).

Resources

Citron, D.K. (2010, Dec. 1). Mainstreaming Privacy Torts. California Law Review 98(6). https://www.jstor.org/stable/25799956
Dunn, C. (2009, Apr. 28). Applying the Constitution to private actors (New York Law Journal). NYCLU ACLU of New York. https://www.nyclu.org/en/publications/column-applying-constitution-private-actors-new-york-law-journal
Hudson, D.L. (2018, Oct. 20). In the age of social media, expand the reach of the First Amendment. Human Rights Magazine 43(4), n.p. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/the-ongoing-challenge-to-define-free-speech/in-the-age-of-socia-media-first-amendment/
Kamin, S. (2004, Dec. 1). The private is public: The relevance of private actors in defining the Fourth Amendment. Boston College Law Review 46(1), 83-147. https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2293&context=bclr
Tort. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 15, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tort
United States v. Jacobsen. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1167
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 US 109 (1984). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/466/109
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Is this right subject to specific limitations in event of emergency (war, brief natural disaster [weather, earthquake], long-run natural disaster [volcano, fire, disease])? Can such limitations be defined in advance with reference to the disaster in question?===
Privacy protections are typically limited in times of emergency, but the type of emergency seems to dictate its limitations.

'''Natural Disasters'''

A Wilson Center report from 2013 outlines various times in which natural disasters have elicited temporary easing of privacy rules to aid in searching for missing persons. The first examples were from Australia after the 2002 Bali earthquake and the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami. During the Bali earthquake, many governmental agencies had to spend time creating their own missing persons reports (Reidenberg, Gellman, Debelak, Elewa, & Liu, 2013, 12). This was recognized as a waste of resources in light of the disaster and the importance of timeliness (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 12). The 2004 tsunamis renewed this sentiment (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 12). In response to these impeded disaster responses, Australia passed Part VIA to the Australian Privacy Act in 2006 (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13). Part VIA allows for sharing of otherwise protected information through a government emergency declaration if “(1) the entity reasonably believes that the individual may be involved in the disaster; and (2) the collection, use or disclosure of personal information is for a permitted purpose related to the disaster” (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13, 14). It also has stipulations on how long these special provisions can be in place and works for events both in and out of Australian borders while specifically preventing disclosure to media outlets (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13-14)
.
Despite New Zealand’s comprehensive privacy laws, similar actions were taken in New Zealand after the 2011 Christchurch earthquake. There were stipulations in the Privacy Act to permit the sharing of information in some circumstances, it was unclear if they directly applied to natural disaster emergencies (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 15). This lack of clarity was impeding rescue efforts and the Privacy Commissioner, who is granted some discretion through the Privacy Act, took steps to allow temporary authorization of information sharing concerning the emergency at hand (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 16). Incidentally, many realized that this liberation of privacy issues reassured a variety of sectors’ information sharing in their emergency response (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 17). These reassurances caused the Privacy Commissioner to propose and pass the Civil Defence National Emergencies (Information Sharing) Code in 2013, allowing for these different privacy stipulations to be counted on during emergency planning (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 19).

The United States notoriously lacks privacy law. However, there is regulation in the medical field – Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1966 (HIPAA). HIPAA was somewhat suspended after Hurricane Katrina in light of nine of the eleven New Orleans hospitals incapacitated and people fleeing to surrounding states to receive medical attention (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 19-21). It prioritized providing treatment over payment and aided in locating missing persons by publishing facility directories (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 21). This privacy law alteration was less comprehensive than those in New Zealand and Australia after natural disasters, but it shows that the response regarding privacy exceptions is dependent on need.

All of these disasters culminated in the creation of the Missing Persons Community of Interest (MPCI), in which non-government actors collaborated to create standardized missing persons databases after disasters (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 25). At the time the report was written, there were five interlocking systems to record who was missing and try to connect these people with worried family (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 27). These systems were used multiple times from 2006 to 2012 when this report was written (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 27). The systems all have varying balances of access and privacy and, interestingly, one of these services is run by the International Committee of the Red Cross out of Geneva, Switzerland and is explicitly exempt from the Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 29, 35). Additionally, in 2011, the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners on Data Protection and Major Natural Disasters asked countries to review their privacy laws to make sure they were flexible in the event of a major natural disaster (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 73).

'''Disease'''

Rothstein (2020) suggests the following be considered when creating policy exceptions and interventions to health information during disease outbreaks: (1) necessity and effectiveness, (2) proportionality and minimal infringement, (3) purpose limitations, and (4) justice (1374). Policies that become altered during the outbreak should remain monitored for continued justification of the alteration and should discontinue at the end of the outbreak (Rothstein, 2020, 1375).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Canada realized the conflict between the creation of a public health database and data privacy law. Data privacy laws vary by province (some have legislation, others default to federal law), sector (public and private), and profession (i.e., healthcare data is strictly regulated) (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 454-455). Generally, data cannot be shared between provinces, though this is debated based on local and federal laws, nor used for purposes other than for which it was collected (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 455). However, all these limits can be loosened during public health emergencies. There are legislative carve-outs for combating health risks, and during COVID-19 the Privacy Commissioner allowed officials to forgo consent from each individual, a privilege that is repealed after the emergency (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 455).

'''War'''

McDonald (2020) describes privacy as a social good and notes there is a trade-off between privacy and national security, claiming these rights are dependent on context (380). As such, these privacy limitations can be toward individuals or society, but they usually come to light ex parte (McDonald, 2020, 385, 380). However, it is unclear who dictates when this trade-off between privacy and security begins, ends, or how invasive it is as war surveillance is largely unregulated; there is no law of war regarding privacy (McDonald, 2020, 385, 386). It seems feasible violations can be committed by both one’s own country and the opposition. By one’s own country in the sense that they don’t want traitors, resulting in actions similar to how the United States placed Japanese Americans into internment camps during WWI or passed the Sedition Act of 1798 (Share America, 2015). Alternatively, the opposition can somewhat feasibly be expected to also survey those they are at war against, especially when attacking and trying to avoid civilian injury (McDonald, 2020, 381). Enemies may also invade privacy through espionage and intelligence which isn’t necessarily legal under international law though it is not limited to wartime (Pun, 2017, 360-361, 364; McDonald, 2020, 384).

Resources

Bernier, A. & Knoppers, B.M. (2020, June 26). Pandemics, privacy, and public health research. Canadian Journal of Public Health 111(4), 454-457. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7318908/pdf/41997_2020_Article_368.pdf
McDonald, J. (2020). Information, privacy, and just war theory. Ethics & International Affairs 34(3), 379-400. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679420000477
Pun, D. (2017, Summer). Rethinking espionage in the Modern Era. Chicago Journal of International Law 18(1), 353-391. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol18/iss1/10/
Quinton, A. (1988, Autumn). Plagues and morality. Social Research: An International Quarterly 55(3), 451-462. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40970516
Reidenberg, J.R., Gellman, R., Debelak, J., Elewa, A., & Liu, N. (2013). Privacy and missing persons after natural disasters. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Commons Lab. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/privacy-and-missing-persons-after-natural-disasters
Rothstein, M.A. (2020, Aug. 12). Public health and privacy in the pandemic. American Journal of Public Health 110(9), 1374-1375. https://www.doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2020.305849
Share America. (2015, Apr. 6). Civil liberties in wartime. United States Department of State. Retrieved October 18, 2021, https://share.america.gov/civil-liberties-wartime/

==Utilitarian / Fairness Assessments==
===Is there a cost attached to protecting and enforcing this right? What kinds of costs are implicated?===
====Short-term economic cost in general====
====Long-term economic cost in general====
====Cost to those least able to economically absorb the cost====
====Cost to perceived democratic legitimacy====
====Cost to consistency or coherence of the law as a whole====
====Cost to the legitimacy or effectiveness of other rights====
====Cost to considerations of social equality====
====Cost to other non-material goods not so far specified====
===What are the financial consequences, if any, of making this right a legally protectable right?===
===Are there any groups that are uniquely disadvantaged by the exercise of this right?===
===Are there any groups that uniquely benefit from the exercise of this right?===
===Are there instances when this fundamental right can lead to unfairness or inequities?===
===Are there objective ways to measure the utilitarian nature of this right?===
===If so, where can one draw the line: when does this right stop being useful or economically viable?===
==Looking Ahead==
===How can we expect this right to change and evolve in the years ahead?===
===How is the future likely to shape the exercise of this right?===
===Will the exercise or protection of this right be affected by technological changes?===
===Under what conditions would this right become irrelevant?===
===Are questions of fairness and utility pertaining to this right likely to change in the years ahead?===
==Policy Recommendations==
===Can the practice or exercise of this right be shaped through executive action?===
===In the US context, are there particular parties with a stake or interest in amending or reconceptualizing this right?===
===In the US context, can this right be altered legislatively, or would it require a constitutional amendment?===
===Is this right best addressed at the national level? The sub-national level? The international level?===
===To what extent is this right shaped primarily by judicial decisions?===
===If this right is best addressed through the amendment process, how should it proceed?===
===If this right were unlimited, what might be the consequences (positive and negative)?===
===If this right were eliminated, what might be the consequences (positive and negative)?===

Source/Privacy Rights

2022-08-03T17:24:25Z

Kbrard: /* Feminist Thought */

==History==
===What is the oldest source in any country that mentions this right?===
Most sources say that the first mention of this right is ''The Right to Privacy'' written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis and published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890. Both were Boston attorneys and Brandeis would go on to serve as a United States Supreme Court Justice for 23 years (Louis Brandeis, n.d.). In this essay, they note that the legal scope of rights broadens over time and posit that the right to life has expanded to “the right to be let alone,” which had become an increasingly difficult feat with new technologies (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 193, 195).

Warren and Brandeis (1890) acknowledge that, at the time, there was little-to-no legal protection of this right. They look at defamation law and determine while it alludes to privacy law, there are limitations to privacy protection from this area of law as it only considers a damaged reputation, not instances in which an individual wishes something remained secret (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 197; Bycer, 2014). They also looked at copywriting and publishing law, which only applies to one’s own work (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 199). They determine that the right to privacy can extend beyond these areas of law as the right should be able to wholly prevent the depiction of private life (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 218). In the last part of this essay, they set out limitations to the right of privacy – privileged information remains under defamation law (to allow for the operation of courts), privacy ceases with consent to publish, gossip is not in the realm of privacy law, and intention and truth do not prevent a breach of such right.

However, Warren and Brandeis cite at least two instances that predate ''The Right to Privacy'' which discuss the right to privacy. The earliest is the citing of an 1820 statement from Lord Cottenham, who, in agreement with Lord Eldon, felt that were a king’s illnesses recorded by a doctor and published while that king was still alive, a court would not permit its publishing, as he claimed this circumstance would breach the king’s privacy (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 205; Bycer, 2014). Additionally, they acknowledge that the right to privacy has already been regulated in France since 1868. Section 11 of the 1868 Loi Relative à la Presse (Press Law) says that all periodic writings about a private fact of life are violations punishable by a fine of 500 francs. Pursuit of the violation may only be undertaken by the affected party (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 214, footnote 1). Beyond what Warren & Brandeis cited as earlier mentions, there was also the 1801 Haitian Constitution which provided the home was inviolable from government invasion in Article 63 (Theodore, 2000).

Resources

Bycer, M. (2014). Understanding the 1890 Warren and Brandeis “The Right to Privacy” Article. National Juris University. Retrieved Sept. 10, 2021, from https://nationalparalegal.edu/UnderstandingWarrenBrandeis.aspx
Louis Brandeis. (2020, Nov. 9). Britannica. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.britannica.com/biography/Louis-Brandeis
Theodore, Charmant. (2000). Haitian Constitution of 1801 (English). Louverture Project. http://thelouvertureproject.org/index.php?title=Haitian_Constitution_of_1801_(English)
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right? BUILD IN COLLAPSE EXPAND TOGGLE===
====Afghanistan====
The 1964 Afghan Constitution protected only the right to privacy in the home in Article 28 (Constitute Project, “Afghanistan 1964 Constitution”). Today, Article 38 offers similar protections and Article 37 protects communications (Constitute Project, “Afghanistan 2004 Constitution”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Afghanistan_1964?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Afghanistan_2004?lang=en

====Albania====
Today, privacy is guaranteed in Articles 35 (data), 36 (correspondence), and 37 (home) of the 1998 constitution (Constitute Project, “Albania 1998 rev. 2016”). This appears to be their first protection of privacy rights.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Albania_2016?lang=en

====Algeria====
Today, the 2020 constitution protects the inviolability of the domicile in Article 47 and, in Article 46, private life and private communication (Constitute Project, “Algeria 2020”). Previously, these rights were protected in the 1976 Constitution in Articles 39 and 40 (International Constitutional Law Project, Algeria Constitution”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Algeria_2020?lang=en
https://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ag00000_.html

====Andorra====
Articles 14 and 15 of the first and only Andorran constitution protect privacy in the state. Article 14 protects privacy, honor, and reputation, while Article 15 protects the home and communications (Constitute Project, “Andorra 1993”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Andorra_1993?lang=en

====Angola====
Today, privacy rights are protected in Articles 32 (personal and family life), 33 (home), and 34 (correspondence and communication) of the 2010 constitution.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Angola_2010?lang=en

====Antigua and Barbuda====
In the constitution, Article 3, Section C protects the right to privacy in personal and family life, as well as the home (Constitute Project, “Antigua and Barbuda 1981”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Antigua_and_Barbuda_1981?lang=en

====Argentina====
Articles 18 & 19 of the 1853 constitution protect privacy. Article 18(2) reads, “The residence is inviolable, as are letters and private papers; and a law shall determine in what cases and for what reasons their search and seizure shall be allowed,” while Article 19 reads, “The private actions of men that in no way offend public order or morality, nor injure a third party, are reserved only to God, and are exempt from the authority of the magistrates” (Constitute Project, “Argentina 1832, reinst. 1983, rev. 1994”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Argentina_1994?lang=en

====Armenia====
The 1995 Armenian constitution protects three main privacy rights in Articles 31-33: personal life, home, and communication (Constitute Project, “Armenia 1995 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Armenia_2015?lang=en

====Australia====
Privacy rights are not prescribed in the Constitution of Australia (Australian Human Rights Commission, “How are human rights protected in Australia?”). Beyond the international covenants, such as the ICCPR, privacy was first protected in the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT Human Rights Commission, “Human Rights”).

https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/rights-and-freedoms/how-are-human-rights-protected-australian-law
https://hrc.act.gov.au/humanrights/

====Austria====
According to the Austrian Embassy in Washington, D.C., the ratification of the ECHR by Austria in 1958 gave the treaty constitutional law standing in the state. The ECHR is what protects the right to privacy in Austria.

https://www.austria.org/human-rights-and-the-council-of-europe

====Azerbaijan====
Today, Article 32 of the 1995 constitution protects privacy. It is quite detailed but protects personal privacy, family life, personal information, and correspondence. Article 33 extends privacy rights to the residence (Constitute Project, “Azerbaijan 1995 rev. 2016”). Previously, privacy rights had been protected by the 1977 Soviet Constitution (see below).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Azerbaijan_2016?lang=en

====The Bahamas====
Article 15(c) protects the right to privacy in one’s home. Article 21 extends this right to exist during searches (Constitute Project, “Bahamas (The) 1973”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bahamas_1973?lang=en

====Bahrain====
Articles 25 & 26 of the 2002 constitution protect privacy in the home and all types of communication (Constitute Project, “Bahrain 2002 rev. 2017”). This constitution was the first establishment of privacy rights in Bahrain.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bahrain_2017?lang=en

====Bangladesh====
Article 43 of the constitution grants the right to privacy in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Bangladesh 1972, reinst. 1986, rev. 2014”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bangladesh_2014?lang=en

====Barbados====
Article 11(b) of the constitution grants every person in Barbados privacy of their home. Article 20(1) prevents interference in correspondence (Constitute Project, “Barbados 1966 rev. 2007”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Barbados_2007?lang=en

====Belarus====
Article 28 of the constitution protects private life in Belarus (Constitute Project, “Belarus 1994 rev. 2004”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Belarus_2004?lang=en

====Belgium====
Since 1831, Belgium has had one constitution, only amended 33 times. Article 15 protects one’s privacy in the home. Article 22 protects private life. Article 29 protects private letters (Constitute Project, “Belgium 1831 rev. 2014”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Belgium_2014?lang=en

====Belize====
In its only constitution since its independence, Belize protects privacy rights in Article 3(c). It protects family life, personal privacy, one’s home, and their dignity (Constitute Project, “Belize 1981 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Belize_2011?lang=en

====Benin====
Today, the 1990 constitution protects privacy in the home and of correspondence in Articles 20 and 21, respectively (Constitute Project, “Benin 1990”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Benin_1990?lang=en

====Bhutan====
In 2008, a new constitution was passed, which protected privacy rights in Article 19. Article 19 reads: A person shall not be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence nor to unlawful attacks on the person’s honour and reputation” (Bhutan’s National Council, “The Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan”).

https://www.nationalcouncil.bt/assets/uploads/docs/acts/2017/Constitution_of_Bhutan_2008.pdf

====Bolivia====
Today, privacy rights are protected in Article 21(3). These protections are general, while Article 25 protects more specific privacy rights in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2009”). This document is the 17th constitution since 1826, but other versions in English could not be found, so privacy rights may have a longer history in Bolivia.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009?lang=en

====Bosnia and Herzegovina====
Privacy rights have been protected in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995 with their independence from Yugoslavia. The 1995 constitution protects these rights in Article 3(f). These protections include private and family life, home, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 rev. 2009”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bosnia_Herzegovina_2009?lang=en

====Botswana====
The 1966 constitution of Botswana includes privacy protections of the home in Article 3(c) and Article 9. Article 12, in protecting freedom of expression, also protects correspondence (Constitute Project, “Botswana 1966 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Botswana_2016?lang=en

====Brazil====
In its first constitution, Brazil only claimed the inviolability of private letters in Article 179(XXVII) (WikiSource, “Constitution of the Empire of Brazil”). Since then, privacy rights have expanded, and today personal privacy, the home, and correspondence are protected in Article 5(X-XII) (Constitute Project, “Brazil 1988 rev. 2017”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2017?lang=en
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Empire_of_Brazil

====Brunei====
Brunei lacks any legislation or constitutional provisions for privacy rights. The 1996 United States Department of State Report on Brunei Human Rights even says that law actively allows for intrusions of privacy.

https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/brunei.html

====Bulgaria====
The right to privacy, including family life, private life, honor, dignity, and reputation, is protected in Article 32 of the 1991 constitution (Constitute Project, “Bulgaria 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bulgaria_2015?lang=en

====Burkina Faso====
The 1991 Burkina Faso Constitution protects privacy rights in Article 6. It reads, “The residence, the domicile, private and family life, [and] the secrecy of correspondence of every person, are inviolable. It can only be infringed according to the forms and in the cases specified by the law” (Constitute Project, “Burkina Faso 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Burkina_Faso_2015?lang=en

====Burundi====
The earliest mention of privacy rights in the Burundi Constitution is from the 1998 interim constitution. In this writing, privacy rights are contained in Article 23 and protect privacy, family, home, and correspondence (Constitution Net, “Constitution of Burundi”). Today, they are contained in Article 28 of the 2018 constitution (Constitute Project, “Burundi 2018”).

http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/transitional_national_constitution_and_transitional_constitution_act_1998-2001_0.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Burundi_2018?lang=en

====Cambodia====
The 1993 constitution contains privacy rights in Article 40: “The rights to privacy of residence, and to the confidentiality of correspondence by mail, telegram, fax, telex and telephone, shall be guaranteed” (Office of the Council of the Ministers of Cambodia, “Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia”).

https://pressocm.gov.kh/en/archives/9539

====Cameroon====
In the Preamble of the 1972 constitution, privacy is granted to the home and correspondence in points 5 and 6 (Constitute Project, “Cameroon 1972 rev. 2008”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cameroon_2008?lang=en

====Canada====
The Canadian Constitution has been in force since 1867 and is comprised of a couple of Acts. For privacy purposes, the most important is the Constitution Act of 1982, which contains the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In this section, Article 7 provides the most privacy protection that is seen in the constitution, protecting the right to life, liberty, and security of a person (Constitute Project, “Canada 1867 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Canada_2011?lang=en

====Cape Verde====
Article 33 makes violations of privacy inadmissible in court, while Article 38 grants the right to “personal identity, to civil rights, to a name, honor, and reputation, and to personal and family privacy”. Article 41 extends privacy rights to correspondence, and Article 42 extends it to electronic data privacy (Constitute Project, “Cape Verde 1980 rev. 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cape_Verde_1992?lang=en

====Central African Republic====
In 1994, a new constitution was passed in the Central African Republic. Article 13 granted private communications inviolable and Article 14 did the same for the private home (African Child Forum, “Constitution of the Central African Republic”). Today, private communication is seen in Article 16 and the home is inviolable in Article 19 (Constitute Project, “Central African Republic 2016”).

http://www.africanchildforum.org/clr/Legislation%20Per%20Country/CAR/car_constitution_1995_en.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Central_African_Republic_2016?lang=en

====Chad====
Both the 1996 and 2018 Chad Constitutions protect the right to privacy in Article 17 and the right to privacy in communications in Article 45 and 47, respectively (Constitute Project, “Chad").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chad_2015?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chad_2018?lang=en

====Chile====
The 1925 Chilean Constitution protected the inviolability of the home and correspondence in Article 10 Sections 12 & 13 (Constitute Project, “Chile 1925”). Today, the home is protected in Article 19 Section 5 (Constitute Project, “Chile 1980 rev. 2021”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chile_2021?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chile_1925?lang=en

====China====
In 1975, the Chinese Constitution protected the right to privacy to the person and the home in Chapter III, Article 28 (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 1975, 39). Today, Articles 38-40 protect privacy in China. Article 38 is for personal dignity, 39 for the home, and 40 for correspondence (Constitute Project, “China (People’s Republic of) 1982 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/China_2018?lang=en
https://china.usc.edu/sites/default/files/article/attachments/peoples-republic-of-china-constitution-1975.pdf

====Colombia====
The 1991 Colombian constitution is very explicit in its privacy protections in Article 15. Section 1 grants privacy to people and family life, section 2 is for data privacy, section 3 is for correspondence (Constitute Project, “Colombia 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015?lang=en

====Comoros====
Today, privacy provisions are in Article 26 and Article 27, which grant privacy in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Comoros 2018”). Before this constitution, similar clauses were in the 1996 constitutional preamble, drawn from the United Nations Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man (Constitution Net, “CONSTITUTION of the FEDERAL ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF THE COMOROS”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Comoros_2018?lang=en
http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/Comoros%20Constitution.pdf

====Democratic Republic of the Congo====
The personal right to privacy is granted in Article 31 of the 2005 Constitution, while the home is protected under Article 29 (Constitute Project, “Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 2005 rev. 2011”). Before this, the right to privacy in home and correspondence were granted in the Zaire 1990 constitution (amended from a previous version, though unclear which previous version) in Articles 22 & 23 (World Statesmen, “Complete Text of the Zairian Constitution After the Enactment of Law No. 90-002 of July 5, 1990 Concerning the Modification of Certain Provisions of the Constitution”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_2011?lang=en
https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Zaire1990.pdf

====Republic of the Congo====
The only mention of privacy rights today is that of the home in Article 20 of the 2015 Constitution (Constitute Project, “Congo (Republic of the) 2015”). The same right appeared in the 2001 Constitution in Article 14 (Constitute Project, “Congo (Republic of the) 2001”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Congo_2015?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Congo_2001?lang=en

====Costa Rica====
Today, privacy rights are protected in Articles 23 (the home) and 24 (communications and intimacy) (Constitute Project, “Costa Rica 1949 rev. 2020”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa_Rica_2020?lang=en

====Croatia====
Article 34 of the 1991 constitution protects the home. Article 35 protects personal and familial life, as well as dignity. Article 36 protects correspondence (Constitute Project, “Croatia 1991 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Croatia_2013?lang=en

====Cuba====
The 2019 constitution protects personal and familial privacy in Article 48, the home in Article 49, and correspondence in Article 50 (Constitute Project, “Cuba 2019”). Privacy was not in the previous Cuban constitution of 1976 (Constitute Project, “Cuba 1976 rev. 2002”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2019?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2002?lang=en

====Cyprus====
Article 15 of the 1960 constitution reads: “Every person has the right to respect for his private and family life.” Article 16 expands these protections to the home, as Article 17 expands them to correspondence and communication (Constitute Project, “Cyprus 1960 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cyprus_2013?lang=en

====Czech Republic====
Article 7(1) of the 1993 constitution guarantees the inviolability of persons and private life. Article 10 protects life from intrusion by others, and it also protects data privacy (Constitute Project, “Czech Republic 1993 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Czech_Republic_2013?lang=en

====Denmark====
Today, Article 72 protects the right to privacy in the home, while also preventing the search of private communications (Constitute Project, “Demark 1953”). The general form of the constitution derives from the 1849 Danish Constitution (Danish Parliament, “The Constitutional Act of Denmark”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Denmark_1953?lang=en
https://www.thedanishparliament.dk/en/democracy/the-constitutional-act-of-denmark

====Djibouti====
Today, the right to privacy in the home and communications are protected in the 1992 constitution Articles 12 & 13. Personal life is not protected (Constitute Project, “Djibouti 1992 rev. 2010”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominica_2014?lang=en

====Dominica====
Article 1(c) of the only constitution Dominica has had, written in 1978, protects the right to privacy in the home. Article 7(1) protects privacy during a search (Constitute Project, "Dominica 1978 rev. 2014").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominica_2014?lang=en

====Dominican Republic====
Today, Article 44 protects the right to privacy and personal honor. It reads, “All people have the right to privacy. The respect and non-interference into private and family life, the home, and private correspondence are guaranteed. The right to honor, good name, and one’s own image are recognized. All authorities or individuals who violate them are obligated to compensate or repair them in accordance with the law” (Constitute Project, “Dominican Republic 2015”). The subsections expand on these rights. In previous versions, this was the right to intimacy and personal honor (Constitute Project, “Dominican Republic 2010”). Previous constitutions could not be found in English.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominican_Republic_2015?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominican_Republic_2010?lang=en

====East Timor====
East Timor, or Timor-Leste, protects the right to private life, home, and communication during evidence collection in Article 34, privacy in general in Article 36, and privacy in the home and communication in Article 37 (Constitute Project, “Timor-Leste 2002”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/East_Timor_2002?lang=en

====Ecuador====
Article 11(3) enforces and protects the rights put forth by the constitution and international treaties: “The rights and guarantees set forth in the Constitution and in international human rights instruments shall be directly and immediately enforced by and before any civil, administrative or judicial servant, either by virtue of their office or at the request of the party”. In Chapter 6, Rights to Freedom, Article 66, Sections 11 and 19-22 set out more specific privacy regulations in terms of convictions, correspondence, the home, personal data, and privacy rights (Constitute Project, “Ecuador 2008 rev. 2021). There are 22 previous Ecuadorian constitutions, but English translations could not be found to investigate the presence of privacy rights.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ecuador_2021?lang=en

====Egypt====
The 1923 constitution of Egypt protects personal freedom in Article 4, privacy in the home in Article 8, and correspondence in Article 11 (Constitution Net, “Royal Decree No. 42 of 1923 On Building a Constitutional System for the Egyptian State”). Today, these rights are protected in Articles 57 & 58 (Constitute Project, “Egypt 2014 rev. 2019”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2019?lang=en
http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/1923_-_egyptian_constitution_english_1.pdf

====El Salvador====
Article 2 of the 1983 constitution explicitly protects the “right to honor, personal and family intimacy, and one’s own image.” Article 6 allows for free communication as long as it does not violate the private lives of others. Article 24 protects correspondence (Constitute Project, “El Salvador 1983 rev. 2014”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/El_Salvador_2014?lang=en

====Equatorial Guinea====
Today, Article 13 of the 1991 constitution protects rights and freedoms. In section 1(g), the right to privacy in communications and the home is protected (Constitute Project, “Equatorial Guinea 1991 rev. 2012”). Translations of the 1968, 1973, and 1982 constitutions could not be found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Equatorial_Guinea_2012?lang=en

====Eritrea====
In its history, Eritrea has only had one constitution and it protects the right to privacy in Article 18. Specific privacies are not mentioned but it is an overarching declaration of the protection of the right: “Every person shall have the right to privacy” (Constitute Project, “Eritrea 1997”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Eritrea_1997?lang=en

====Estonia====
The 1920 constitution of Estonia protected personal privacy in Paragraph 8. Paragraph 10 protected the homestead and Paragraph 14 protected communications (Wikisource, “Constitution of the Esthonian Republic (1920)”). Today, privacy rights are guaranteed in Section 26 (Riigi Teataja, “The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia”).

https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/521052015001/consolide
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Esthonian_Republic_(1920)

====Eswatini====
Article 14(1) names and protects fundamental rights, and subsection C reads “protection of the privacy of the home and other property rights of the individual” (Constitute Project, “Eswatini 2005”). Previous iterations of the constitutions from 1967 and 1968 could not be found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Swaziland_2005?lang=en

====Ethiopia====
The 1931 constitution protects correspondence privacy in Article 26 (Ethiopian Legal Brief, “Ethiopian Constitution of 1931”). In Article 25, the home is claimed as private. Today, privacy rights are protected in Article 26 (Constitute Project, “Ethiopia 1994”).

https://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/ethiopian-constitution-of-1931.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ethiopia_1994?lang=en

====Fiji====
The 1970 Fiji constitution, its first after independence from Britain, protected the right to privacy in the home in Article 3(c) (Constitution Net, “Fiji Independence Order 1970 and Constitution of Fiji”). Today, the 2013 constitution expands the right to privacy from the home to include the right to private and family life, privacy in correspondence, and data privacy in Article 24 (Constitute Project, “Fiji 2013”).

http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/1970_constitution.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Fiji_2013?lang=en

====Finland====
Originally, the 1919 Finnish Constitution protected privacy in Section 8 (RefWorld, “Constitution Act of Finland”). Today, Section 10 of the Finnish Constitution protects the right to privacy with similar language. It says, “Everyone's private life, honour and the sanctity of the home are guaranteed. More detailed provisions on the protection of personal data are laid down by an Act. The secrecy of correspondence, telephony and other confidential communications is inviolable” (Constitute Project, “Finland 1999 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Finland_2011?lang=en
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b53418.html

====France====
The right to privacy in France is implied in Article IV of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 26 August 1789. Article IV reads, “Liberty consists of being able to do everything that does not harm anybody else: thus the exercise of the natural rights of every man has no boundaries except those that ensure to other Members of the Society the enjoyment of those same rights” (Hardt, Kiiver, Kristofertisch). The Declaration of the Rights of Man is still in force today due to the Preamble of the 1958 French Constitution.

Sascha Hardt, Phillip Kiiver & Gisela Kristofertisch. (2019). Comparative Constitutional Law Documents. “Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen [Declaration des Driots de L’Homme et du Citoyen] of 26 August 1789” and “Constitution of the V. Republic of 4 October 1958.”

====Gabon====
Article 1 of the constitution lays out fundamental rights granted within the state (Constitute Project, “Gabon 1991 rev. 2011”). Section 5 of Article 1 protects the privacy of correspondence. Section 12 claims the inviolability of the domicile. The current constitution is based on the 1961 constitution, though it was rewritten in 1991.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Gabon_2011?lang=en

====The Gambia====
Article 23 of the 1996 constitution says, “No person shall be subject to interference with the privacy of his or her home, correspondence or communications save as is in accordance with law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety of the economic well-being of the country, for the protection of health or morals, for the prevention of disorder or crime or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Constitute Project, “Gambia (The) 1996 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Gambia_2018?lang=en

====Georgia====
Today, Article 15 in the 1995 constitution of Georgia protects the right to personal privacy, personal space, and privacy of communication. Additionally, Article 9 claims the inviolability of human dignity (Constitute Project, “Georgia 1995 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Georgia_2018?lang=en

====Germany====
German Basic Law, passed in 1949, provides for privacy in a couple of places. Article 1(1) protects an individual’s dignity, and Article 10 protects privacy in correspondence and telecommunications (Hardt, Kiiver, Rotering, & Kristofertisch). Article 13 protects the home.

Sascha Hardt, Phillip Kiiver, Gereon Rotering, & Gisela Kristofertisch. (2019). Comparative Constitutional Law Documents. “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany of 23 May 1949.”

====Ghana====
In the 1992 constitution, still in force today, the right to privacy in the home and correspondence is found in Article 18(2) (Constitute Project, “Ghana 1992 rev. 1996”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ghana_1996?lang=en

====Greece====
In the 1975 constitution, the Greeks protect the right to privacy in Article 9. This article protects the home, private, and family life. Article 9A provides constitutional data privacy protections (Constitute Project, “Greece 1975 rev. 2008”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Greece_2008?lang=en

====Grenada====
The 1973 constitution of Grenada, the country’s first, protected the right to privacy in Article 1(c) (Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, “The Grenada Constitution Order 1973”). Specifically, it protected the home and other property. Today, the 1973 constitution takes on similar language in Article 1(c) (Constitute Project, “Grenada 1973, reinst. 1991, rev. 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Grenada_1992?lang=en
https://www.cpahq.org/media/gq5dtcj5/gre_constitution.pdf

====Guatemala====
There are two provisions for privacy protection in the 1985 Guatemalan Constitution. Article 23 grants privacy in the home (vivienda) and Article 24 protects correspondence and other documents (Constitute Project, “Guatemala 1985 rev. 1993”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Guatemala_1993?lang=en

====Guinea====
The 2010 constitution of Guinea protects private life, correspondence, and the home in Article 12: “The domicile is inviolable. It may be infringed only in the case of grave and imminent peril, to evade [parer] a
common danger or to protect the life of the persons. All other infringement, all search may only be ordered by the judge or by the authority that the law designates and in the forms prescribed by it.
The secrecy of correspondence and of communication is inviolable. Each one has the right to the protection of their private life” (Constitute Project, “Guinea’s Constitution of 2010”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Guinea_2010.pdf

====Guinea-Bissau====
Article 44 of the 1984 constitution grants the right to protection of personal and private life. Article 48 grants privacy in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Guinea-Bissau 1984 rev. 1996”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Guinea_Bissau_1996?lang=en

====Guyana====
In 1966, Guyana gained independence from Britain and, in the same order, passed its constitution. The 1966 constitution provided for protection in the home from others in Article 3(c) (Guyana Parliament, “The Guyana Independence Order 1966”).

http://parliament.gov.gy/new2/documents/bills/21123/statutory_instrument_guyana_independence_order_1966_no_575.pdf

====Haiti====
In 1801, the first constitution of Haiti protected the privacy of the home in Article 63 (Louverture Project, “Constitution of 1801”). Today, Article 49 of the 1987 constitution protect protects communications (Constitute Project, “Haiti 1987 rev. 2012”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Haiti_2012?lang=en
http://thelouvertureproject.org/index.php?title=Haitian_Constitution_of_1801_(English)

====Honduras====
The 1982 constitution provides for privacy protections in Article 76. In this text, one is granted “The right to honor, to personal privacy, to family, and to one's dignity” (Constitute Project, “Hungary 1982 rev. 2013").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Honduras_2013?lang=en

====Hungary====
The 1949 constitution was the first to include privacy rights. In Article 57, personal privacy, as well as privacy in the home and correspondence are protected: “he Hungarian People's Republic guarantees the personal freedom and privileges of the citizens, and respects the secrecy of correspondence and the inviolability of the home” (Princeton University, “CONSTITUTION of the People's Republic of Hungary - Budapest, 20th August 1949”). In the most recent constitution from 2011, these rights are protected in Article VI (Constitute Project, “Hungary 2011 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Hungary_2016?lang=en
https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/hungary/1949%20Hungarian%20constitution.pdf

====Iceland====
Article 71 says, “Everyone shall enjoy freedom from interference with privacy, home, and family life” (Constitute Project, “Iceland 1944 rev. 2013”). This article is in the 1944 constitution, which is largely based on the 1874 constitutional text that preceded it (Icelandic Human Rights Center, “Icelandic Law”).

https://www.humanrights.is/en/laws-conventions/icelandic-law
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Iceland_2013?lang=en

====India====
While not explicitly mentioned in the Indian constitution, the right to privacy has been recognized by the Indian Supreme Court. In 2017, they ruled unanimously that the right to privacy for all people falls under Article 21, which provides the “protection of life and personal liberty” (McCarthy; Mahapatra & Choudhary).

McCarthy, J. (2017, Aug. 24). Indian Supreme Court declares privacy a fundamental right. NPR. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/24/545963181/indian-supreme-court-declares-privacy-a-fundamental-right
Mahapatra, D. & Choudhary, A.A. (2017, Aug. 24). Right to privacy is a fundamental right, it is intrinsic to the right to life: Supreme Court. Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/right-to-privacy-is-a-fundamental-right-supreme-court/articleshow/60203394.cms

====Indonesia====
Article 28G grants the right to privacy. It reads, “Every person shall have the right to protection of his/herself, family, honour, dignity, and property, and shall have the right to feel secure against and receive protection from the threat of fear to do or not do something that is a human right” (Constitute Project, Indonesia 1954 reinst. 1959, rev. 2002”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Indonesia_2002?lang=en

====Iran====
While the constitution of Iran does not protect privacy, it does guarantee protection of the law which conforms with Islamic Law in Article 20 (Constitute Project, “Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1979 rev. 1989”). Islam provides such protections within the Quran (Hayat, M.H., “Privacy and Islam: From the Quran to data protection in Pakistan”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989?lang=en
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13600830701532043?journalCode=cict20#:~:text=Islam%20not%20only%20prohibits%20entering,enter%20in%20one's%20own%20house.&text=We%20now%20come%20to%20rules,family%20circle%20in%20Islamic%20society.

====Iraq====
The 2004 constitution protects the right to personal privacy in Article 17(1) and the right to privacy in the home in Article 17(2) (Constitute Project, “Iraq 2005). Previously, only the home had been protected in the 1925 constitution (United Nations Archives, “Constitution of ‘Iraq (Organic Law)”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005?lang=en
https://biblio-archive.unog.ch/Dateien/CouncilDocs/C-49-1929-VI_EN.pdf

====Republic of Ireland====
Article 40(5) protects the inviolability of the dwelling (Constitute Project, “Ireland 1937 rev. 2017”). This same protection was afforded in Article 7 of the Constitution of the Irish Free State from 1922 (electronic Irish Statute Book, “Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) Act, 1922”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ireland_2019?lang=en
https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1922/act/1/enacted/en/print

====Israel====
Privacy rights in Israel derive from the Basic Law Human Liberty and Dignity of 1992. In this law, Article 7 protects privacy, intimacy, private premises, and confidential communications (Constitute Project, “Israel 1953 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Israel_2013?lang=en

====Italy====
Articles 13-15 grant privacy to people, homes, and correspondence in the Italian Constitution from 1947 (Constitute Project, “Italy 1947 rev. 2020”). Previous constitutions are from 1848 and 1861, but translations were not found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Italy_2020?lang=en

====Ivory Coast====
The only specific privacy right mentioned in the constitution is that in Article 8, which inviolably protects the home (Constitute Project, “Côte d'Ivoire 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/countries/Africa/Cote_d_Ivoire?lang=en

====Jamaica====
Chapter III of the 1962 constitution protects the fundamental rights and freedoms of Jamaicans. In Section 3(j) of Article 13, privacy protections are granted to persons, property, private and family life, and communication (Constitute Project, “Jamaica 1962 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Jamaica_2015?lang=en

====Japan====
Historically, the 1889 constitution of Japan protected the home and correspondence in Articles 25 and 26 (Constitute Project, “Japan’s Constitution of 1889 Historical”). Today, Article 35 protects the home (Constitute Project, "Japan 1946").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Japan_1889.pdf?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Japan_1946?lang=en

====Jordan====
Article 7 of the 1952 constitution says, “1. Personal freedom shall be guaranteed. 2. Every infringement on rights and public freedoms or the inviolability of the private life of Jordanians is a crime punishable by law.” Article 18 protects communications and Article 10 protects the home (Constitute Project, “Jordan 1952 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Jordan_2016?lang=en

====Kazakhstan====
In their first formal constitution, Kazakhstan protected the right to privacy in Article 18. It says, “1. Everyone shall have the right to inviolability of private life, personal or family secrets, protection of honor and dignity. 2. Everyone shall have the right to confidentiality of personal deposits and savings, correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraph, and other messages. Limitation of this right shall be permitted only in the cases and according to the procedure directly established by law. 3. State bodies, public associations, officials, and the mass media must provide every citizen with the possibility to obtain access to documents, decisions and other sources of information concerning his rights and interests” (Constitute Project, “Kazakhstan 1995 rev. 2017”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kazakhstan_2017?lang=en

====Kenya====
In 1963, the Kenyan Constitution protected privacy in Article 14(c) (Kenya Law, “1963 Constitution”). Today, Article 31 of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution gives every person the right to privacy in their person, home, possessions, family life, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Kenya 2010 Constitution”).

http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/1963_Constitution.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kenya_2010?lang=en

====Kiribati====
Article 3 of the 1979 constitution calls for the protection of privacy in the home and Article 9 protects a person from searches (Constitute Project, “Kiribati 1979 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/countries/Oceania/Kiribati?lang=en

====Kuwait====
Kuwait’s 1962 constitution has been reinstated twice, but it does not mention privacy rights generally. It does, however, protect the inviolability of the home in Article 38 (Constitute Project, “Kuwait 1962 reinst. 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kuwait_1992?lang=en

====Kyrgyzstan====
The 2007 constitution, the first to be adopted after independence from the Soviet Union, protected privacy rights in Article 14 (Electoral Knowledge Network, “Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic”). Today, Article 29 protects the rights to privacy in private life, dignity, and correspondence in the 2010 constitution (Constitute Project, “Kyrgyzstan 2010 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kyrgyz_Republic_2016?lang=en
https://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/asia/KG/kyrgyzstan-constitution-1993-2007/view?searchterm=russian

====Laos====
Privacy rights are scarcely protected in Laos. The revised 2015 constitution protects violations of life, body, integrity, and property in Article 42, which has been amended since the implementation of the constitution in 1991 (Constitute Project, “Lao People’s Democratic Republic 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://media.bloomsburyprofessional.com/rep/files/laos-constitution-1947-1949-englishx.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Laos_2015?lang=en

====Latvia====
Article 96 of the 1922 constitution states “Everyone has the right to inviolability of his or her private life, home and correspondence” (Constitute Project, “Latvia 1922, reinst. 1991, rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Latvia_2016?lang=en

====Lebanon====
The constitution provides no protections for general privacy rights. However, Article 14 does protect the inviolability of the home (Constitute Project, “Lebanon 1926 rev. 2004”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Lebanon_2004?lang=en

====Lesotho====
The 1993 constitution of Lesotho sets forth fundamental rights which are granted to each person in Lesotho in Article 4. In Section 1(g) of Article 4, the right to respect for family and private life is protected. In Article 11, this right is expanded upon and clarified (Constitute Project, “Lesotho 1993 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Lesotho_2018?lang=en

====Liberia====
The 1825 and 1847 constitutions of Liberia did not included mention of privacy rights. The first protection of privacy rights was in the 1986 constitution, Article 16. Article 16 states “No person shall be subjected to interference with his privacy of person, family, home or correspondence except by order of a court of competent jurisdiction” (Constitute Project, “Liberia 1986”).

http://crc.gov.lr/doc/CONSTITUTION%20OF%201847%20final.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Liberia_1986?lang=en

====Libya====
The interim constitution of 2011 is the first to grant privacy rights. It does so in Articles 11-13. These articles protect homes, private life, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Libya 2011 rev. 2012”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Libya_2012?lang=en

====Liechtenstein====
The 1862 constitution alludes to privacy rights in the home in Article 12 (Wright, “Constitution of 26 September 1862.”). Today, privacy rights go further under the 1921 constitution, with Article 32 guaranteeing “Personal liberty, the immunity of the home and the inviolability of letters and written matter” (Constitute Project, “Liechtenstein 1921 rev. 2011”).

https://books.google.com/books?id=kXBDAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA375&lpg=PA375&dq=1862+Constitution+of+Liechtenstein+full+text&source=bl&ots=6dAZ5MiCdX&sig=YurO0ujdxMdcKsMLT_DfGdxPCm0&hl=en&sa=X&ei=axZlU-b1KorroATU9oG4Cg#v=onepage&q=priva&f=false
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Liechtenstein_2011?lang=en

====Lithuania====
Articles 22 and 24 grant privacy rights in Lithuania. Article 22 declares the inviolability of the private life, including correspondence and data, and Article 24 protects the home (Constitute Project, “Lithuania 1992 rev. 2019”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lithuania_2019?lang=en

====Luxembourg====
The 1868 constitution, since amended, protects private life in Article 3. In Article 15, it protects the home and in Article 28, correspondence (Constitute Project, “Luxembourg 1868 rev. 2009”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Luxembourg_2009?lang=en

====Madagascar====
Article 13(1) governs privacy rights in Madagascar. It assures each individual “the inviolability of their person, their domicile and of the secrecy of their correspondence” (Constitute Project, “Madagascar 2010”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Madagascar_2010?lang=en

====Malawi====
The 1994 Malawi Constitution protects personal privacy in Article 21. As defined in the article, personal privacy protects possessions, home, and property (Constitute Project, “Malawi 1994 rev. 2017”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malawi_2017?lang=en

====Malaysia====
The constitution is lacking privacy rights protections. The first privacy related writing was the Personal Data Protection Act of 2010. This law came into force in 2013 and is more about data privacy than privacy rights generally.

https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-privacy-data-protection-and-cybersecurity-law-review/malaysia
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malaysia_2007?lang=en

====Maldives====
Article 24 grants the right to privacy in the Maldives. It says: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his private communications. Every person must respect these rights with respect to others” (Constitute Project, “Maldives 2008”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Maldives_2008?lang=en

====Mali====
Article 6 of the 1992 constitution protected the three main privacy rights: the home, correspondence, and the individual (Constitute Project, “Mali 1992”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mali_1992?lang=en

====Malta====
Article 32 of the Maltese Constitution protects the right to private and family life. Article 38 protects the home (Constitute Project, “Malta 1964 rev. 2016”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malta_2016?lang=en

====Marshall Islands====
Section 13 of the Marshall Islands’ constitution protects personal autonomy. It says: “All persons shall be free from unreasonable interference in personal choices that do not injure others and from unreasonable intrusions into their privacy” (Constitute Project, “Marshall Islands 1979 rev. 1995”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Marshall_Islands_1995?lang=en

====Mauritania====
Article 13(4) protects the right to privacy in Mauritania: “The honor and the private life of the citizen, the inviolability of the human person, of his domicile and of his correspondence are guaranteed by the State” (Constitute Project, "Mauritania 1991 rev. 2012").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mauritania_2012?lang=en

====Mauritius====
The sole constitution of Mauritius from 1968 is limited in what it says about privacy rights. It only protects a person and their property from a search in Article 9 (Constitute Project, "Mauritius 1968 rev. 2016").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mauritius_2016?lang=en

====Mexico====
Article 7 of the 1857 constitution prevents writers from writing about people’s private lives (World History Commons, “Federal Constitution of the United Mexican States of 1857”). Today, Article 16 of the 1917 constitution protects the privacy rights and data privacy in Mexico: “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, his/her family, papers, properties or be invaded at home without a written order from a competent authority, duly explaining the legal cause of the proceeding. All people have the right to enjoy protection on his personal data, and to access, correct and cancel such data. All people have the right to oppose the disclosure of his data, according to the law. The law shall establish exceptions to the criteria that rule the handling of data, due to national security reasons, law and order, public security, public health, or protection of third party’s rights” (Constitute Project, “Mexico 1917 rev. 2015”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mexico_2015?lang=en
https://worldhistorycommons.org/federal-constitution-united-mexican-states-1857

====Federated States of Micronesia====
Article IV Section 5 of the constitution of 1978 says “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and other possessions against unreasonable search, seizure, or invasion of privacy may not be violated. A warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized” (Constitute Project, “Micronesia (Federated States of) 1978 rev. 1990”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Micronesia_1990?lang=en

====Moldova====
Today, Articles 28-30 of the 1994 constitution protect privacy rights in Moldova. Article 28 grants privacy in private and family life, Article 29 in the home, and Article 30 in correspondence (Constitute Project, “Moldova 1994 rev. 2016”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Moldova_2016?lang=en

====Monaco====
The 1962 constitution, still in force today, protects the home in Article 21 and the general right to privacy in Article 22. Article 22 calls out private and family life as well as correspondence (Constitute Project, “Monaco 1962 rev 2002”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Monaco_2002?lang=en

====Mongolia====
Article 16(13) of the 1992 constitution protects the right to personal liberty and safety. It says, “The privacy of citizens, their families, confidentiality of correspondence and communication, and the inviolability of home residence shall be protected by law” (Constitute Project, “Mongolia 1992 rev. 2001).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mongolia_2001?lang=en

====Montenegro====
Article 20 of the 1992 constitution says, “physical and psychological integrity of man, his privacy and personal rights are inviolable” (Venice Commission, “Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro”). Today, Article 28 says “The inviolability of the physical and mental integrity of a man, and privacy and individual rights thereof shall be guaranteed” (Constitute Project, “Montenegro 2007 rev. 2013”).

https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2005)096-e
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Montenegro_2013?lang=en

====Morocco====
The 2011 Moroccan constitution was the first to have fundamental rights based on international treaties (Moroccan Government, “Constitution”). This made it the first to guarantee the right to privacy, which was achieved in Article 24 (Moroccan Government, “Constitution”; Constitute Project, “Morocco 2011”). Article 24 protects private life, the home, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Morocco 2011”).

https://www.maroc.ma/en/content/constitution
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Morocco_2011?lang=en

====Mozambique====
The 1975 constitution of Mozambique granted “All citizens … the right to their honor, good name and reputation, as well as the right to privacy and to defend their public image” (RefWorld, “Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique”). This is echoed in Article 41 of the 2004 constitution (Constitute Project, “Mozambique 2004 rev. 2007”).

https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4f40.html
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mozambique_2007?lang=en

====Myanmar====
Article 160 in the 1974 Burmese Constitution grants privacy for home, property, correspondence, and communications (Burma Library, “THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF BURMA (1974)”). Today, these same protections are afforded in Article 357 (Constitute Project, “Myanmar 2008 rev. 2015”).

https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs07/1974Constitution.pdf?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=pmd_uXw1EkLnkyq9T6FqkzA_NO9lvJaIhzdgyzAJ1J1s5Ko-1635431051-0-gqNtZGzNAiWjcnBszQjR
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Myanmar_2015?lang=en

====Namibia====
The 1990 constitution protects the right to privacy in the home and for correspondence in Article 13 (Constitute Project, “Namibia 1990 rev. 2014”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Namibia_2014?lang=en

====Nauru====
The preamble to Part II Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in the 1968 constitution grants everyone the “respect for his private and family life” (Constitute Project, “Nauru 1968 rev. 2015”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nauru_2015?lang=en

====Nepal====
The 1990 constitution was the first to protect privacy as a fundamental right. In Article 22: “Except as provided by law, the privacy of the person, house, property, document, correspondence or information of anyone is inviolable” (Constitution Net, “The Constitution of Nepal 1990”). In the 2015 constitution, the same language is used in Article 28 (Constitute Project, “Nepal 2015 rev. 2016").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nepal_2016?lang=en
https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/1990_constitution_english.pdf

====Kingdom of the Netherlands====
Article 10 of the 1814 Constitution grants privacy rights to persons in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 10(1) states “Everyone has, save for limitations to be provided by or pursuant to statute, the right to respect for his private life.” Article 13 protects private correspondence and Article 12 protects the home (Hardt & Kiiver, 2019, 141).

Sascha Hardt & Phillip Kiiver. Comparative Constitutional Law Documents. “Constitution for the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 24 August 1815.”

====New Zealand====
New Zealand governs privacy rights with the 1993 Privacy Act, which has since been replaced with the 2020 Privacy Act.

https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0028/latest/DLM296639.html

====Nicaragua====
The 1974 constitution “guarantees the inviolability of the home, the dwelling, and of any other private premises of persons” in Article 58 (General Secretariat Organization of American States, Washington D.C., “Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua”). Article 80 protected correspondence. The 1987 constitution broadened privacy rights in Article 26 stating: “Everyone has the right to: 1. Privacy in his/her life and that of his/her family; 2. Respect of his/her honor and reputation; 3. Know about any information which private or public entities may have on record about him/her as well as the right to know why and for what purpose they hold such information; 4. Inviolability of his/her domicile, correspondence and communication of any kind.” (Constitute Project, “Nicaragua 1987 rev. 2014”).

https://books.google.com/books?printsec=frontcover&vid=LCCN77374018#v=snippet&q=inviolable&f=false
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nicaragua_2014?lang=en

====Niger====
The 2010 constitution only protects the domicile of people in terms of privacy rights. This is done in Article 27 (Constitute Project, “Niger 2010 rev. 2017”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Niger_2017?lang=en

====Nigeria====
In 1960, the country’s first constitution protected the private life, home, and correspondence of each person in Article 22 (World Statesmen, “The Constitution of the Federation of Niger”).
Today, the same language is seen in Article 37 of the 1999 constitution (Constitute Project, “Nigeria Constitution 1999 rev. 2011”).

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/nigeria_const1960.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Nigeria_2011?lang=en

====North Korea====
Article 79 of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 1972 constitution grants that citizens and homes are inviolable and that communications are private (Constitute Project, “Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of) 1972 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Peoples_Republic_of_Korea_2016?lang=en

====North Macedonia====
Article 25 of the 1991 constitution states “Each citizen is guaranteed the respect and protection of the privacy of his/her personal and family life and of his/her dignity and repute.” Amendment XIX, altering Article 17, protects communications more heavily (Constitute Project, “North Macedonia 1991 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Macedonia_2011?lang=en

====Norway====
Norway has had one constitution since 1814, though it has been amended many times. Article 102 gives everyone “the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence” (Constitute Project, “Norway 1814 rev. 2016”). However, it appears this was amended sometime after 2004, as the version with amendments through 2004 does not have this language in Article 102 (Constitute Project, “Norway 1814 rev. 2004”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Norway_2016?lang=en
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Norway_2004.pdf

====Oman====
The Oman constitution, written in 1996, only constitutional protects the privacy of homes in Article 27 (Constitute Project, "Oman 1996 rev. 2011").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Oman_2011?lang=en

====Pakistan====
The 1973 constitution, reinstated in 2002, in Article 14 cites the inviolability of man’s dignity and privacy in the home as fundamental (Constitute Project, “Pakistan Constitution reinst. 2002, rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Pakistan_2018?lang=en

====Palau====
Article IV(4) of the 1981 constitution ensures “Every person has the right to be secure in his person, house, papers and effects against entry, search and seizure” (Constitute Project, “Palau 1981 rev. 1992").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Palau_1992?lang=en

====Panama====
Article 28 of the 1904 constitution keeps documents private (University of Michigan, “Constitution of the Republic of Panama”). The 1972 constitution reflects the same tone toward the privacy of documents in Article 29. Article 26 grants the home inviolable, though there is no blanket protection of privacy rights in the 1972 constitution (Constitute Project, “Panama 1972 rev. 2004”).

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112104577715&view=1up&seq=12
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Panama_2004?lang=en

====Papua New Guinea====
Under the basic rights prescribed under Section 5(f), all citizens have the “protection for the privacy of their homes and other property” (Constitute Project, Papua New Guinea 1975 rev. 2016). Additionally, Article 49(1) gives “Every person has a right to reasonable privacy in respect of his private and family life, his communications with other persons and his personal papers and effects, except to the extent that the exercise of that right is regulated or restricted by law that complies with Section 38 (general qualifications on qualified rights).”

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Papua_New_Guinea_2016?lang=en

====Paraguay====
In the 1967 constitution, Article 68 makes the home inviolable, and Article 69 makes communications inviolable, barring investigation (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, “Constitution of the Republic of Paraguay 1967”. Today, according to Article 33 of the Paraguay Constitution, “Personal and family intimacy, as well as the respect of private life, is inviolable. The behavior of persons, that does not affect the public order established by the law or the rights of third parties[,] is exempted from the public authority.” Article 34 inviolably protects the home (Constitute Project, “Paraguay 1992 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Paraguay_2011?lang=en
https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/con00138.pdf

====Peru====
Today, Article 2(7) protects privacy rights in Peru for one’s honor, reputation, personal and family life, voice, and image (Constitute Project, “Peru 1993 rev. 2021”). Similar rights appear to have been listed in Article 2 of the 1979 constitution, but an English translation could not be found.

http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Peru-Constitucion%201979.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Peru_2021?lang=en

====Philippines====
The 1935 Constitution grants “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated” in Article III, Section 1(3) (Official Gazette, “The 1935 Constitution”). Today, similar language is used in Article II, Section 1(2) (Official Gazette, “The 1935 Constitution”).

https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/the-1935-constitution/
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/

====Poland====
The 1921 Polish Constitution grants privacy in the home and communication in articles 100 and 106, respectively (Sejm Parliamentary Library, “Constitution of the Republic of Poland, March 17, 1921”). Today, Article 47 of the 1997 constitution protects the general right to privacy in Poland: “Everyone shall have the right to legal protection of his private and family life, of his honour and good reputation and to make decisions about his personal life.” Articles 49 and 50 extend these protections to communications and the home (Constitute Project, “Poland 1997 rev. 2009”).

http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/kpol/e1921.html
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Poland_2009?lang=en

====Portugal====
Portugal’s first protection of privacy was in the 1976 constitution. Article 26(1) says “Everyone shall possess the right to a personal identity, to the development of their personality, to civil capacity, to citizenship, to a good name and reputation, to their likeness, to speak out, to protect the privacy of their personal and family life, and to legal protection against any form of discrimination.” Article 65 grants privacy in the home (Constitute Project, “Portugal 1976 rev. 2005).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Portugal_2005?lang=en

====Qatar====
From 1972-2003, Qatar was ruled by a temporary constitution. In this document Article 12 granted the sanctity of dwellings (Al Meezan, “The Amended Provisional Constitution of 1972”). Today, Article 37 of the Constitution claims “The sanctity of human privacy shall be inviolable, and therefore interference into privacy of a person, family affairs, home of residence, correspondence, or any other act of interference that may demean or defame a person may not be allowed save as limited by the provisions of the law stipulated therein” (Qatar Government Communications Office, “The Constitution”).

https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/about-qatar/the-constitution/
https://www.almeezan.qa/LawView.aspx?opt&LawID=4360&language=en#Section_14176

====Romania====
Today, Article 26 of the 1991 Romanian Constitution protects personal and family privacy: “(1) The public authorities shall respect and protect the intimate, family and private life” (Constitute Project, “Romania 1991 rev. 2003”). Privacy may have been protected in earlier iterations of the constitution (i.e., 1952, 1965, etc.), but English translations could not be found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Romania_2003?lang=en

====Russia====
In 1906, the Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire were the first to grant Russians “sanctity of the home and property.” This was the first time Russians were granted civil liberties (Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library, “‘Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire’ Approved”).

https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619222

====Rwanda====
The right to privacy in Rwanda is protected by Articles 23 and 34. Article 23 states “The privacy of a person, his or her family, home or correspondence shall not be subjected to interference in a manner inconsistent with the law; the person's honour and dignity shall be respected. A person's home is inviolable. No search or entry into a home shall be carried out without the consent of the owner, except in circumstances and in accordance with procedures determined by the law.” Article 34 states “Private property, whether owned individually or collectively, is inviolable” (Constitute Project, "Rwanda 2003 rev. 2015").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Rwanda_2015?lang=en

====Saint Kitts and Nevis====
Chapter II, Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, of the 1983 constitution entitles everyone to fundamental rights, including “protection for his personal privacy, the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation” (Constitute Project, “Saint Kitts and Nevis 1983”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Kitts_and_Nevis_1983?lang=en

====Saint Lucia====
Chapter I, Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, of the 1978 constitution immediately grants every person in St. Lucia “protection for his family life, his personal privacy, the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation” (Constitute Project, “Saint Lucia 1978”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Lucia_1978?lang=en

====Saint Vincent and the Grenadines====
In the preamble of their only constitution to date, Vincentians are promised safeguards to “the rights of privacy of family life, of property, and the fostering of the pursuit of just economic rewards for labor.” This is reaffirmed in Article 1 with the granting of fundamental rights and freedoms (Constitute Project, “Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1979”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Vincent_and_the_Grenadines_1979?lang=en

====Samoa====
There is no mention of privacy rights in the constitution, which has been updated as recently as 2017 (Constitute Project, “Samoa 1962 rev. 2017”). Section 50(2) of the Telecommunications Act 2005 protects the privacy of telecommunications customers (Samoa). This was the earliest found reference to privacy rights in Samoa.

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Samoa_2017?lang=en
https://www.regulator.gov.ws/images/Act/TELECOMMUNICATIONS_ACT_2005_-_Eng.pdf

====San Marino====
The 1974 Declaration of Citizens' Rights and of the fundamental principles of the San Marinese legal order is the first time privacy rights are alluded to in San Marino. Art. 6 grants civil and political liberties. It does not grant privacy except in communications.

https://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions/country/6/San%20Marino/show

====São Tomé and Príncipe====
Article 24 of the 1975 Constitution, still in effect today, states “Personal identity and the confidentiality of the intimacy of private and family life are inviolable” (Constitute Project, Sao Tome and Principe 1975 rev. 2003). Additionally, Article 25 grants that communications and one’s home are also private (Constitute Project, Sao Tome and Principe 1975 rev. 2003).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Sao_Tome_and_Principe_2003?lang=en

====Saudi Arabia====
The 1992 Saudi Constitution does not explicitly protect privacy but claims privacy in communications and homes in Articles 37 and 40 (Constitute Project, “Saudi Arabia’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2005”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Saudi_Arabia_2013?lang=en

====Senegal====
Senegal does not explicitly protect the right to privacy in its constitution. Article 7 of the 2001 constitution makes the claim to protect human rights but does not call out privacy. Article 13 provides for private correspondence and Article 16 makes the domicile inviolable (Constitute Project, “Senegal 2001 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Senegal_2016?lang=en

====Serbia====
The 2006 Serbian Constitution does not protect the right to privacy outright but allows for privacy in communication and data collection/sharing in Articles 41 and 42 (Constitute Project, “Serbia 2006”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Serbia_2006?lang=en

====Seychelles====
The 1976 Independence Constitution of Seychelles, under Chapter 3, Article 12(c) gives individuals privacy of their home and other property (Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative, “Constitution of Seychelles, 1976”).

https://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/constitution-of-seychelles-1976/

====Sierra Leone====
The 1978 constitution protected the privacy of the home and property under Article 12 (The Laws of Sierra Leone on the Sierra Leone Web, “The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1978”).

http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/1978-12s.pdf

====Singapore====
No part of the constitution mentions a right to privacy (Privacy International, “The Right to Privacy in Singapore”). There are also no specific laws governing privacy within the state.

https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/Singapore_UPR_PI_submission_FINAL.pdf

====Slovakia====
Article 16(1) of the 1992 constitution states “The inviolability of the person and its privacy is guaranteed. It may be limited only in cases laid down by law” (Constitute Project, “Slovakia 1992 rev. 2017). Sections 2 and 3 of Article 19 protect private life and data collection and publication (Constitute Project, “Slovakia 1992 rev. 2017). Article 21 claims the home is inviolable, while Article 22 protects communications (Constitute Project, “Slovakia 1992 rev. 2017).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Slovakia_2017?lang=en

====Slovenia====
Articles 35 and 36 of the constitution speak to the right to privacy in Slovenia. Article 35 says “The inviolability of the physical and mental integrity of every person, his privacy and personality rights shall be guaranteed” (Constitute Project, “Slovenia 1991 rev. 2016”). Article 36 says “Dwellings are inviolable. No one may, without a court order, enter the dwelling or other premises of another person, nor may he search the same, against the will of the resident. Any person whose dwelling or other premises are searched has the right to be present or to have a representative present. Such a search may only be conducted in the presence of two witnesses. Subject to conditions provided by law, an official may enter the dwelling or other premises of another person without a court order, and may in exceptional circumstances conduct a search in the absence of witnesses, where this is absolutely necessary for the direct apprehension of a person who has committed a criminal offence or to protect people or property” (Constitute Project, “Slovenia 1991 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Slovenia_2016?lang=en

====Solomon Islands====
Article 9 of the Solomon Islands Constitution protects the privacy of the home and other property: “Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.” (Constitute Project, “Solomon Islands 1978 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Solomon_Islands_2018?lang=en

====Somalia====
Article 28 of the 1960 Constitution of Somalia grants “respect for the private home” in which "no home or private property of any one (sic) may be entered into or violated, save in the cases mentioned in Paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of Article 25” (World Intellectual Property Organization, “The Constitution”).

https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/so/so002en.pdf

====South Africa====
The 1993 Interim Constitution of South Africa was the first to grant privacy rights. The right to privacy includes “the right not to be subject to searches of his or her person, home or property, the seizure of private possessions or the violation of private communications” (South African Government, “Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993”). Today, the 1996 Constitution offers similar protections in Article 14 (Constitute Project, “South Africa 1996 rev. 2012).

https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-act-200-1993#13%20Privacy
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Africa_2012?lang=en

====South Korea====
Under the first constitution of the Republic of Korea in 1948, Articles 17 and 18 grant the right to privacy. Neither the privacy of a citizen nor communication may be infringed (Constitute Project, “Korea (Republic of) 1948 rev. 1987”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Republic_of_Korea_1987?lang=en

====South Sudan====
Article 22 of the 2011 South Sudan constitution protects the right to privacy: “The privacy of all persons shall be inviolable; no person shall be subjected to interference with his or her private life, family, home or correspondence, save in accordance with the law” (Constitute Project, “South Sudan 2011 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Sudan_2013?lang=en

====Spain====
The 1978 Spanish Constitution was the first to present privacy rights in Spain. Section 19(1) protects “the right to honour, to personal and family privacy and to the own image,” while 19(2) protects the home, and 19(4) explicitly grants data privacy (Constitute Project, “Spain 1978 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Spain_2011?lang=en

====Sri Lanka====
Sri Lanka’s constitution does not protect the right to privacy, though privacy is mentioned briefly in Article 14A(2) (Constitute Project, “Sri Lanka 1978 rev. 2015”). Sri Lanka is also lacking comprehensive privacy legislation, instead opting to write in provisions when regulating other industries (Data Guidance, “Sri Lanka – Data Protection Overview”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Sri_Lanka_2015?lang=en
https://www.dataguidance.com/notes/sri-lanka-data-protection-overview

====Sudan====
Privacy rights first appear in the 1973 Sudanese Constitution. Article 42 states “the private life of citizens is inviolable. The state shall guarantee the freedom and secrecy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communications in accordance with the law.” Article 43 protects dwellings in the same manner (The Democratic Republic of Sudan Gazette, “The Permanent Constitution of Sudan”). Today, these protections are combined into Article 55 of the 2019 Constitution, in which “No one’s privacy may be violated. It is not permissible to interfere in the private or family life of any person in his home or correspondence, except in accordance with the law” (Constitute Project, "Sudan 2019").

https://www.righttononviolence.org/mecf/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Constitution-Sudan-1973-+-amendment-1975.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Sudan_2019?lang=en

====Suriname====
The 1975 Suriname Constitution protected the home and private life in Article 14 (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1983, “Report on the Human Rights Situation in Suriname”). Today, these rights are protected under Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution (Constitute Project, “Suriname 1987 rev 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Surinam_1992?lang=en
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Suriname83eng/chap.1.htm

====Sweden====
Constitutionally, privacy rights were introduced with the 1974 Swedish Constitution. Articles 2 and 6 present the right to privacy, while Article 20 allows the provisions in Article 6 to have some limitations (Constitute Project, “Sweden’s Constitution of 1974 with Amendments through 2012”). Sweden was also the first to introduce data privacy rights with the Data Act in 1973 (GDPRHub, “Data Protection in Sweden”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Sweden_2012.pdf?lang=en
https://gdprhub.eu/Data_Protection_in_Sweden

====Switzerland====
The 1992 Federal Act on Data Protection was the first formal protection of privacy in Switzerland (DLA Piper, “Data protection laws of the world: Switzerland”). This law has since been revised, but since then, the right to privacy was added to the 1999 Swiss Constitution in Article 13 (Constitute Project, “Switzerland 1999 rev. 2014”).

https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?t=law&c=CH
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Switzerland_2014?lang=en

====Syria====
The right to privacy was limited in the 1973 constitution, preventing only the private seizure of private property without judicial ruling (Carnegie Middle East Center, “The Syrian Constitution – 1973-2012”). Today, Articles 36 and 37 of the 2012 Constitution protect privacy rights. Article 36 protects private life and Article 37 protects communications (Constitute Project, “Syrian Arab Republic 2012”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Syria_2012?lang=en
https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/50255?lang=en

====Tajikistan====
Articles 22 and 23 of the 1994 Tajikistan constitution protect the right to privacy. Article 22 makes the home inviolable, and Article 23 forbids “The collection, storage, use, and dissemination of information about private life of a person without his consent” (Constitute Project, “Tajikistan 1994 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Tajikistan_2016?lang=en

====Tanzania====
The 1965 constitution of Tanzania did not explicitly provide for privacy but defaulted “to safeguard the inherent dignity of the individual in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” during the preamble (World Statesmen, “The Interim Constitution of Tanzania”). Today, the 1997 constitution (as amended in 2005) privacy and personal security in Article 16 (Constitute Project, “Tanzania’s Constitution of 1977 with Amendments through 2005”).

http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Tanzania-Constitution-1965.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Tanzania_2005?lang=en

====Thailand====
The earliest mention of privacy is the 1997 constitution of Thailand. While they have had many constitutions since 1932, the earliest translation found was that of the 1997 text. Section 34 protects “A person’s family rights, dignity, reputation or the right of privacy” unless it is beneficial to the public (Ref World, “Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand”).

https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ae6b5b2b.pdf

====Togo====
Articles 27, 28, and 29 in the 1992 Togolese Constitution protect private property, the home, private life, and image, and correspondence. Article 28 is explicit to the right to privacy, while Articles 27 and 29 fit into the privacy penumbras subscribed by the United States (Constitute Project, “Togo’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2007”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Togo_2007?lang=en

====Tonga====
The Tonga constitution was written in 1875. Under Article 16, privacy is granted during searches, except for lawfully granted searches through a warrant (Constitute Project, “Tonga’s Constitution of 1875 with Amendments through 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Tonga_2013.pdf?lang=en

====Trinidad and Tobago====
The 1976 constitution does not explicitly protect the right to privacy. However, Article 4 protects fundamental human rights, such as “the right of the individual to respect for his private and family life” and protection of the law (Constitute Project, “Trinidad and Tobago 1976 rev. 2007").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Trinidad_and_Tobago_2007?lang=en

====Tunisia====
In 1959, the constitution granted the right to privacy in Article 9. At some point between then and 2008, this article was amended to protect personal data, reflecting the changes in privacy rights with new technologies (Constitute Project, “Tunisia 1959 rev. 2008").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2008?lang=en

====Turkey====
The 1924 Turkish Constitution protects personal liberty except for the provision of law under Article 72 (World Statesmen, “The New Constitution of Turkey”). Article 71 protects the inviolability of the home, life, property, and honor. Article 81 allows for private communications.

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Turkeyconstitution1924.pdf

====Turkmenistan====
The 1992 Constitution protects against arbitrary interference of privacy in Article 25 (International Committee on the Red Cross, “Constitution 1992, as of 2008”).

Today, Article 37 of the 2008 constitution grants “the right to private liberty, personal and family secrets and their protection from arbitrary interference in their privacy” while Article 38 prevents the “Collection, storage and dissemination of information about private life of an individual” without consent (Constitute Project, “Turkmenistan's Constitution of 2008 with Amendments through 2016”).

https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/D9E58AFB0C841166C1256FFD0034016C
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkmenistan_2016.pdf?lang=en

====Tuvalu====
The 1996 constitution protects privacy rights under Articles 11(h) and 21 (Constitute Project, “Tuvalu Constitution of 1996”). Article 11(h) reads “Every person is entitled…to the following fundamental freedoms: […] (h) protection for the privacy of his home and other property” (Constitute Project, “Tuvalu Constitution of 1996”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tuvalu_1986.pdf?lang=en

====Uganda====
Article 17(c) of the 1962 constitution provides privacy rights protections in Uganda (World Statesmen, “Uganda Constitutional Instruments”). It protects “the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation” as a fundamental right. Today, the 1995 Constitution grants these protections in Article 27 (Constitute Project, “Uganda’s Constitution of 1995 with Amendments through 2017").

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Uganda-const-1962.pdf
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Uganda_2017.pdf?lang=en

====Ukraine====
Articles 30, 31, and 32 of the 1996 Constitution grant the right to privacy (Constitute Project, “Ukraine’s Constitution of 1996 with Amendments through 2016”). Article 30 gives privacy in the home, Article 31 allows privacy protections to communications, and Article 32 prevents interference into personal and family life (Constitute Project, “Ukraine’s Constitution of 1996 with Amendments through 2016”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ukraine_2016.pdf?lang=en

====United Arab Emirates====
The 1971 constitution protects privacy in communications in Articles 31 and Article 36 protects one’s home (Constitute Project, “United Arab Emirates 1971, rev. 2009").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/United_Arab_Emirates_2009?lang=en

====United Kingdom====
The United Kingdom 1988 Human Rights Act entrenched the ECHR into United Kingdom law (Liberty, “The Human Rights Act”). It protects one’s privacy from unnecessary intrusion, among other rights. Additionally, in ‘’The Right to Privacy’’ Warren and Brandeis cite Lord Cottenham in 1820 who, in agreement with Lord Eldon, felt that were a king’s illnesses recorded by a doctor and published while that king was still alive, a court would not permit its publishing, as he claimed this circumstance would breach the king’s privacy (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 205; Bycer, 2014).

https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/your-rights/the-human-rights-act/
Bycer, M. (2014). Understanding the 1890 Warren and Brandeis “The Right to Privacy” Article. National Juris University. Retrieved Sept. 10, 2021, from https://nationalparalegal.edu/UnderstandingWarrenBrandeis.aspx
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

====United States====
The first mention of this right is ‘’The Right to Privacy’’ written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis and published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890. Constitutionally, it was first found in the 1965 Supreme Court case ‘’Griswold v. Connecticut’’ (Privacy, n.d.).

Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

====Uruguay====
The 1966 constitution was the first translated into English to mention privacy rights. It is protected in Articles 10, 11, and 28. Article 10 grants individuals’ privacy, Article 11 makes the home private, and Article 28 protects communications (Constitute Project, "Uruguay 1966, reinst. 1985, rev. 2004").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Uruguay_2004?lang=en

====Uzbekistan====
Article 27 of the 1992 Constitution protects privacy and the inviolability of the home, requiring a prescription by law to allow a search of the home (Constitute Project, “Uzbekistan's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2011”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Uzbekistan_2011.pdf?lang=en

====Vanuatu====
Article 5(1)(j) in the 1980 Vanuatu Constitution protects privacy in the home and property (Constitute Project, “Vanuatu’s Constitution of 1980 with Amendments through 2013”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Vanuatu_2013.pdf?lang=en

====Venezuela====
Privacy is first alluded to in the Venezuelan Declaration of Independence and Constitution of 1812 in Art. 177, which grants privacy in the home from soldiers (Rice University, "Venezuelan Declaration of Independence and Constitution").
Today, privacy is strictly protected in Venezuela, going beyond the call of the ICCPR’s call in Article 17 under constitutional Articles 48 and 60 (Privacy International, “The Right to Privacy in Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of): Stakeholder Report, Universal Periodic Review,” 4).

https://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/venezuela_upr2016.pdf
https://scholarship.rice.edu/jsp/xml/1911/9253/1/aa00032.tei.html

====Vietnam====
The 1992 Vietnam Constitution was the first since its independence that recognized the “inviolability of personal privacy” in Article 21 (Constitute Project, “Viet Nam’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2013”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Socialist_Republic_of_Vietnam_2013.pdf?lang=en
https://constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-vietnam

====Yemen====
There are no explicit protections of privacy in Yemen, though Article 20 does not allow for private confiscation without legal judgment (Constitute Project, “Yemen 1991: Rev. 2015”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Yemen_2015?lang=en
https://giswatch.org/en/country-report/communications-surveillance/yemen

====Zambia====
Privacy was protected in the first constitution of Zambia in 1964 in Chapter 3, Articles 13(c) and 19 (World Statesmen, “Laws of Zambia: The Constitution”).
Today, Article 11(d) and 17 of the 1991 Zambian Constitution protect the right to privacy (Constitute Project, “Zambia’s Constitution of 1991 with Amendments Through 2016”).

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Constitution-Zambia1964.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Zambia_2016.pdf?lang=en

====Zimbabwe====

The 2013 Zimbabwe Constitution grants “[e]very person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have: (a) their home, premises or property entered without their permission; (b) their person, home, premises or property searched; (c) their possessions seized; (d) the privacy of their communications infringed; or (e) their health condition disclosed” in Section 57 (Privacy International, “The Right to Privacy in Zimbabwe: Stakeholder Report, Universal Periodic Review,” 4). Before this, the 2007 Interception of Communications Act allowed for public information to be intercepted by authorities, something that has not been rectified since the implementation of the new constitution.

https://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/zimbabwe_upr2016.pdf

===Is there another noteworthy written source from the past that mentions this right?===
The right to privacy has diverged in many ways since its most notable first mention in ''The Right to Privacy'' by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. What started in 1890 as the idea of protection against gossip about oneself and the ability to enjoy life uninterrupted has evolved into various international and national conventions and laws.

The right to privacy was first enshrined at a supranational level before it was established in individual states (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 26). The right’s first appearance in legal documentation was in the United Nation’s (UN) 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR). Article 12 of the UDHR (1948) states “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” The UHDR is not a treaty, so the right was not yet entrenched and more of a suggestion for states to incorporate into their laws and practices.

Two years later, the Council of Europe passed the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) which has similar tones in Article 8, though with an exception for national security in Article 8 (2) but is legally binding (1950). Article 8 of the ECHR specifically protects one’s family life, personal life, correspondence, and home (Roagna, 2021, 9). Worldwide, the right to privacy became codified in 1966 with the passage of the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), in which Article 17 has almost identical language to the UDHR’s Article 12. In subsequent UN treaties, this right to privacy was explicitly granted to children and migrants as well (Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, Art. 16; International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990, Art. 14).

'''Complying with the ICCPR''': In the United States, the right to privacy was not originally codified but established through a variety of Supreme Court cases beginning in the 1960s (Privacy, n.d.). In 1965, the Court ruled on Griswold v. Connecticut. The majority opinion written by Justice Douglas claims that the express personal freedoms named in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments create an implied “zone of privacy” (Privacy, n.d.). Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, referenced in later Supreme Court privacy cases, claims privacy zones derive from the Fourteenth Amendment (Privacy, n.d.). Later, legislation was passed regulating specific sectors, beginning in 1974 with the Family Educations Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), which protects student data, and the Privacy Act which regulates the use of data by federal agencies (History of privacy timeline, 2021).

The European Court of Human Rights has refined the implementation of ECHR Article 8 through case law (Roagna, 2021, 7). In deciding these cases, the Court must decide if the complaint is related to Article 8 and, if so, if the right has been interfered with outside of the exceptions laid out in Article 8 (2) (Roagna, 2021, 11). For this reason, there is no clear-cut definition as to which national laws may conflict with Article 8 (Roagna, 2021, 12). The Court has provided protections for ‘quasi-familial’ relationships, relationships that may develop later (i.e., one has the right to adopt), the development of personality, photographs, and data collection, ruling these areas are part of private and/or family life (Roagna, 2021, 10-19). The Court has also provided lengthy protections to family life with a broad definition of family which evolves with European customs (Roagna, 2021, 27). The protection of a home has also been interpreted broadly, requiring continuous ties to a location, mostly due to the French translation of “home” to “domicile” (Roagna, 2021, 30-31). The Court rules for high protection of means of communication as it can be easily breached (Roagna, 2021, 32). This protection includes information gathered from monitored internet use and remains in places no matter the content of the message (Roagna, 2021, 32).

'''The Digital Era''': Since these international conventions have become effective and enforceable, there has been a lot of technological change and little change in these agreements (Human right to privacy, n.d.). The UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) noted in General Comment 16, adopted regarding ICCPR’s Article 17 in 1988, that the legislation in many states was not enough to ensure the “protection against both unlawful and arbitrary interference,” and that data collection “must be regulated by law” (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 27; UN Human Rights Committee, 1994, para. 2 & 10). In essence, this comment was requesting states enact more protective privacy law legislation, and, specifically, data regulation law, as the right to privacy evolved to be dominated by electronic data (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 27).

There have been two approaches to this call for better data privacy regulation: general regulation and regulation by sector. The European Union has taken the general regulation approach with the passage of the 1995 European Data Protection Directive and the 2016 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR affects people and companies worldwide, requiring that data collected is truly needed, accurate, processed safely, and that all of this is done in a clear, legal, and transparent way (Krishnamurthy, 2020; Wolford, n.d.). The United States has chosen to regulate privacy data by sector, beginning with FERPA in 1974 (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29; History of privacy timeline, 2021). This approach has led to some strict laws preventing unauthorized access to personal information in some areas regulated by specific legislation (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29). In areas without specific legislation, however, Americans take great liberties while collecting data (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29). Put in combination with the lacking legislation preventing interference or data attacks, some question how compliant the United States is with Article 17 of the ICCPR (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29). However, as of 2020, 29% of states are still drafting or have yet to draft such legislation (UN Committee on Trade and Development).

'''Privacy in Former Sovereign States'''

It is worth noting that some states have always had some privacy rights since they gained independence because their previous constitution and laws contained such provisions. This is the case with states that were formerly in the Soviet Union. The 1977 Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which was then implemented in nearly identical form in the various republics as their own constitution, protected “the privacy of citizens, and of their correspondence, telephone conversations, and telegraphic communications” in Article 56 (USSR, 1982, 35). Additionally, Czechoslovakia protected privacy rights of the person, home, and correspondence in Article 30 & 31 in the 1960 constitution (Czechoslovakia, 1964, 233).

Resources

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://rm.coe.int/1680a2353d
Convention on the Rights of the Child. United Nations (UN) General Assembly (UNGA). Nov. 20, 1989. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx
Czechoslovakia. (1964). Constitution of Czechoslovakia July 11, 1960. Orbis: Prague. From https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Czechoslovakia-Const1960.pdf
History of privacy timeline. (2021). The University of Michigan. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://safecomputing.umich.edu/privacy/history-of-privacy-timeline
Human right to privacy in the digital age, The. (n.d.). American Civil Liberties Union. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.aclu.org/other/human-right-privacy-digital-age
International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. UNGA. Dec. 18, 1990. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cmw.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. UNGA. Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
Krishnamurthy, V. (2020, Jan. 6). A tale of two privacy laws: The GDPR and the International Right to Privacy. AJIL Unbound 114, 26-30. doi:10.1017/aju.2019.79
Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
Roagna, I. (2012). Council of Europe human rights handbook: Protecting the right to respect for private and family life under the European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. https://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/Roagna2012_EN.pdf
UN Committee on Trade and Development. (2020). Data Protection and Privacy Legislation Worldwide. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://unctad.org/page/data-protection-and-privacy-legislation-worldwide
UN Human Rights Committee. (1994). General Comment 16. Thirty-third session. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 1 Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://undocs.org/HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
USSR. (1982). Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist States: Adopted at the Seventh (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Ninth Convocation, on October 7, 1977. Novosti Press Publishing House: Moscow. From https://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/constitution/1977/constitution-ussr-1977.pdf
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

===Is the identification of this right associated with a particular era in history, political regime, or political leader?===
===What specific events or ideas contributed to its identification as a fundamental right?===
===When was it generally accepted as a fundamental, legally-protectable right?===
===What historical forces or events, if any, contributed to a widespread belief in its importance? ===
==Legal Codification==
===Is this right protected in the Constitutions of most countries today?===
===Is it contained in the US Constitution?===
The right to privacy is not explicitly contained in the United States Constitution.

References

Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy

===Has it been interpreted as being implicit in the US Constitution?===
In the United States, the right to privacy was not originally codified but established through Supreme Court cases around the 1960s (Privacy, n.d.). Prior to this time, the Court recognized in ''Snyder v. Massachusetts'' (1934) that some concepts of fairness are fundamental, but not expressed. In 1965, the Court heard and decided ''Griswold v. Connecticut''. In the majority opinion, Justice William Douglas argues that the Court had previously ruled on cases in which rights were not explicit in the Bill of Rights, but the rights were justifiable to the Court through the First and Fourteenth Amendments (''Griswold v. Connecticut'', 1965, par. 11). Later in the opinion of the court, he states that in other cases, such as ''Boyd v. United States'' (1886), ''Mapp v. Ohio'' (1961), and ''Poe v. Ullman'' (1961), the court used the ‘penumbras’ of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to make decisions on implicit liberties (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, pars. 14-15). Combined, these penumbras create what the Griswold v. Connecticut majority opinion calls “zones of privacy” (Privacy, n.d.). In a concurring ''Griswold'' opinion, Justice Arthur Goldberg argues that while liberties extend beyond the Bill of Rights, he, Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Justice William Brennan feel that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not include “all of the first eight amendments” (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, par. 21). However, in a different concurring opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan found “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands […] on its own bottom” (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, par. 53; Privacy, n.d.). Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion became the predominant argument used in later privacy cases (Privacy, n.d.).

In 1967, the Supreme Court decided the case of ''Katz v. United States'' (Katz v. US, n.d.). Katz, located in Los Angeles, had been using a public phone booth to inform bettors in Boston and Miami, and in an effort to convict him, federal agents tapped the phone booth (Katz v. US, n.d.). A lower court allowed this evidence to be admitted, but Katz claimed it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment (Katz v. US, n.d.). The Supreme Court sided 7-1 with Katz and establishes that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places” (Katz v. United States, 1967). In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan established the Expectation for Privacy Test (Katz v. US, n.d.; Expectation of Privacy, n.d.). This test is two-fold – the individual must have an expectation for privacy which is rooted in law and society finds that expectation for privacy to be reasonable – and has been used as a basis for privacy since (Expectation of Privacy, n.d.).

After these two cases, the Supreme Court has continued to extend the right to privacy, notably so in three landmark cases: ''Eisenstadt v. Baird'' (1971), ''Roe v. Wade'' (1972), and ''Lawrence v. Texas'' (2003) through the use of the Fourteenth Amendment and Justice Harlan’s concurring ''Griswold'' opinion (Privacy, n.d.). ''Eisenstadt'' extended the use of contraceptives beyond married couples to individuals (Privacy, n.d.). ''Roe'' extended the right to privacy to the women’s right to have an abortion (Privacy, n.d.). ''Lawrence v. Texas''' overturned ''Bowers v. Hardwick'' (1986) and extended privacy to private conduct (Privacy, n.d.).

References

Expectation of Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 13, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/expectation_of_privacy
''Griswold v. Connecticut'', 381 U.S. 479 (1965). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479
Katz v. United States. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved September 13, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/35
''Katz v. United States'', 389 U.S. 347 (1967). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/389/347
Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
''Snyder v. Massachusetts'', 291 U.S. 97 (1934). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/291/97

===Are there any exceptions in American law to this right?===
Most recent US legislation regarding the right to privacy concerns the collection, retention, and transfer of personal data. Under the Department of Justice, the Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties (OPCL) enforces privacy laws, recommends privacy policies (including exceptions), and responds to data breaches (Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties, n.d.).

'''Freedom of Information Act 1966 (as amended 2016)'''

In 1966, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This act granted anyone the ability to request access to federal agency records but not the records of private companies. However, nine exemptions and three exclusions may prevent access to these records (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). The exclusions are narrow and related to law enforcement and ongoing intelligence investigations and are unaffected by FOIA (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). The exemptions authorize government agencies to withhold information from those requesting it (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). The nine exemptions prevent the sharing of information if it is classified for national security, part of internal rules or practices, prohibited through other laws (such as the Privacy Act, see below), a trade secret, legally protected, a medical file, law enforcement records, regarding bank supervision, or locational information (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). FOIA was most recently updated with the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, which increased transparency and altered procedures (OIP Summary of the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, 2016).

'''Privacy Act 1974'''

The Privacy Act of 1974 was an effort to balance the “governments’ need to maintain information” and the “rights of individuals to be protected against unwarranted invasions of their privacy” (Walls, n.d.; Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, n.d.). It prevents agencies from disclosing records to any person or agency unless it falls into one of the twelve approved guidelines (Walls, n.d.; Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, n.d.). The most used reasons which allow for disclosure are subsections 1, 2, and 3 of 5 US Code § 552a(b) (Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition, 2021). Subsection One allows for the disclosure of information between agencies on a need-to-know basis. Subsection Two allows the FOIA to overrule the Privacy Act with regards to when to disclose information. Subsection Three allows for disclosure to another party if their use is similar to the use for which the data was originally collected. This third exception is quite broad, which causes controversy (Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition, 2021). Other exceptions include use for public record (used for the Census or National Archive data), or requests by law enforcement or the court system. In addition to putting forth information disclosure guidelines, this act requires agencies to keep accurate records of how, where, and why they sent information if they had sent information (Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, n.d.).

'''Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 1999'''

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) was passed to regulate the transfer of consumers’ “nonpublic personal information” by financial institutions (FDIC, 2021). At its core, the law says financial institutions cannot pass along personal data to third parties unless the customer is put on notice, given the opportunity to opt out, and they do not opt out (FDIC, 2021). Exceptions to this rule appear in Sections 13-15 (FDIC, 2021, VIII-1.3). Section 13 permits the transfer of some personal data to a third party if they are performing services on behalf of the financial institution, but they must be contractually bound to not do anything else with the data (FDIC, 2021, VIII-1.3). Section 14 allows the bank to disclose information as needed to perform banking functions initiated by the customer, while Section 15 extends that disclosure to normal financial institution acts, such as fraud detection (FDIC, 2021, VIII-1.3). Of these exceptions, only Section 13 requires the customer to be notified that their information is being shared (FDIC, 2021).

'''USA PATRIOT Act 2001 & USA Freedom Act 2015'''

Enacted less than two months after the 9/11 attacks, the PATRIOT Act was passed with the intention of increasing homeland security by allowing surveillance techniques used in local crime to be used to fight terrorism (Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.; USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.). Most importantly, this law allowed for the sharing of information between law enforcement agencies at various levels without notice (Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.). This law wasn’t the most protective of civil rights and liberties and to rectify that President Obama signed the USA Freedom Act in 2015, ending government collection of metadata (Patriot Act, n.d.; Fact sheet, 2015).

Resources

Fact sheet: Implementation of the USA Freedom Act of 2015. (2015, Nov. 27). Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.intelligence.gov/index.php/ic-on-the-record-database/results/787-fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-usa-freedom-act-of-2015
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). (2021, April). FDIC Consumer Compliance Examination Manual: VIII-1.1 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Author. https://www.fdic.gov/resources/supervision-and-examinations/consumer-compliance-examination-manual/index.html
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. (1966).
Freedom of Information Act, The. (n.d.). Department of State. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://foia.state.gov/learn/foia.aspx
Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act. (n.d.) Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm
Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties. (n.d.). Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/opcl
OIP Summary of the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016. (2016, Aug. 17). Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/oip/oip-summary-foia-improvement-act-2016
Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition. (2021, Feb. 16). Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/opcl/overview-privacy-act-1974-2020-edition/disclosures-third-parties
Patriot Act. (n.d.) History.com. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/patriot-act
Privacy Act of 1974. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. (n.d.). Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1279#vf4tzl
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). (1974).
USA PATRIOT Act. (n.d.). Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1281
Walls, T. (n.d.). FOIA v. Privacy Act: A comparison chart. IAPP. https://iapp.org/resources/article/foia-v-privacy-act-a-comparison-chart/

===Is this right enshrined in international and regional human rights treaties?===
==Philosophical Origins==
===What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?===
====Buddhism====
====Platonism====
====Aristotelian thought====
====Ancient Chinese Philosophy====
====Stoicism====
====Early Indian Philosophy====
====Miscellaneous Hellenistic Schools (epicureans, academics, skeptics, etc.)====
====Roman Legal and Political Thought====
====Early Christianity====
====Thomism and medieval Christianity====
====Medieval Islamic Thought====
====Medieval Judaism====
====Early Modern Rationalism====
====Absolute Idealism====
====Reformation Christianity====
====Hobbesian Thought====
====Lockean Thought/English Empiricism====
The issue of the right to privacy within the United States is a relatively new phenomenon following the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut in which the right to privacy was clearly established by the Supreme Court. However, it might be suggested that its origins and foundations can be traced back to the late 1600s when John Locke introduced the private sphere when it came to the conversation of religious tolerance. John Locke wrote “Letter Concerning Toleration” in 1689 that describes the way in which the right to privacy originates from the idea that the people can and should be separate from the government in certain aspects. Locke introduces the idea of a private sphere or the right to privacy when he discusses issues like religion since its discussion creates more problems preventing society from working efficiently.

Locke recognizes that there are very divisive issues that prevent people from working together effectively within society. Specifically referring to spreading religious beliefs, he wrote that “If by these means the offenders will not be reclaimed, and the erroneous convinced, there remains nothing further to be done but that such stubborn and obstinate persons, who give no ground to hope for their reformation, should be cast out and separated from the society” (Locke 1689, 30). Locke claims that the divisions within the public sphere over religion can be remedied by the complete separation of such matters from the state since religion is its own society. Religion dividing society is evident throughout history as nations and their people fought wars over their competing religious values and beliefs. For Locke the separation between the two and separating the state from religion was a way to avoid conflict within a nation and come to the general agreement that not everyone is going to agree on the matter of religion. However, Locke challenges his own idea of religious tolerance by saying that all religions except Atheists, Unitarians, and Catholics deserve tolerance because these groups prioritize religious law rather than political law. Locke recognizes the fact that a lot of the political issues revolve around religion and to focus on the commonwealth, matters of religion need to be subjected to the individual rather than being a concern of the state. Furthermore, upon the creation of the private sphere “...it will be urged still that civil assemblies are open and free for anyone to enter into, whereas religious conventicles are more private and thereby give opportunity to clandestine machinations” (Locke 1689, 51). Locke develops the idea that all religions must be tolerated within the government in the best interest of the commonwealth, leaving the political conversation open for political conversation as to how the government should be run. If the state sphere should interfere with the individual sphere, Locke claims that greater problems would arise as the government wields a seemingly tyrannical power. Locke proposes this idea of the private sphere in order to avoid problems within the political sphere, but alongside this proposal, he builds the foundation for a right to privacy that is valued so much today. The rest of his arguments include the point that there is a realm of privacy in which the individual makes decisions that they believe will best benefit them.

It was from Locke’s separation between the state and the individual that the right to privacy came to life off the premise that there is a place within society where the government should not be involved in the matters of the people. Locke continues for the advocation of a private sphere by claiming that, “In private domestic affairs, in the management of estates, in the conservation of bodily health, every man may consider what suits his own convenience and follow what course he likes best” (Locke 1689, 34). Throughout his letter of toleration, and through the rest of his theory, he is critical of government intervention in the affairs of the people and emphasizes this private sphere as a place to escape government intervention. This sort of foundation and sentiment expressed by Locke gave the people the perspective that the state is going to act within their own self-interest which might mean being involved in the actions of the people. Locke again remedies this problem with the private sphere as a space where the government cannot get involved in the choices of the individual when it comes to their lives. Specifically, Locke subtly turns the conversation slightly away from religion and into the idea of affairs, property, and health in general as a part of the private sphere that the government should not be a part of. To the rest of society, the government has always been involved in the lives of the people, so to have this idea proposed that people can and should be independent of government intervention changed the way the people saw the government and the power they had over the lives of the people. In addition, Locke then claims that when the magistrate makes laws, “...a private person is to abstain from the action that he judges unlawful, and he is to undergo the punishment which it is not unlawful for him to bear” (Locke 1689, 48). Locke paints a picture that the people can make decisions about the laws within this private realm that adds another dimension to the idea that the people have more power within their private space than they thought. Historically, the governments were involved in all affairs of the people, leaving them little room for voluntary actions that they wanted to pursue for themselves, and Locke’s sentiments provides them the space to become free thinkers outside of the government. Although his writings are in specific reference to religion being in the private sphere, the later sentiments expand to other areas of life that would be affected had religion been placed within the private sphere. This allows the people to believe that other aspects of their life that have been controlled by the government can enter the private sphere where the government will not have any control over the efforts of the people themselves. This created a life where the people had private lives, where the government was not involved in the lives of the people and where the people made decisions for themselves. As people saw the potential for the private sphere, the right to privacy became more prevalent as a boundary between the state and the people developed, despite the boundary between the public and the private being unclear sometimes. Although this line is imprecise, Locke’s notion of the private sphere when it comes to politics introduces the idea of the line in the first place and introduces a new level of understanding about the relationship between the people and the government.

Locke created the idea of the private sphere based on the premise that doing so might help prevent a lot of the conflict that had been around during the time that created the bad relationship between the state and the people. However, by proposing this idea he shines light on the paradox on the relationship between rights in general and the government. It is the duty of the government to act within the interest of the people by providing them access to their rights regardless of what they are, but at the same time the government also wants to act within their self-interest to maintain law and order within society and therefore might see rights as an obstacle to their end goal. Furthermore, Locke writes about this topic in a time period where the legal framework looks incredibly different from what is present today and therefore writes from the perspective that religion causes these huge wars within nations and between major parties. All these factors contribute to the idea that the right to privacy has existed throughout history and throughout theory as criticism of government is an ongoing conversation that has many different perspectives and points of view. Locke’s writings about creating a private sphere for religion only reflect the sentiments known today as the right to privacy that has changed the way that people have viewed the relationship between the people and the government.

Bibliography

Locke, John. 1983. “A Letter Concerning Toleration”, edited by James H. Tully. Hackett Publishing Company Inc.

====Physiocrats====
====Scottish Enlightenment====
====Modern Capitalism====
====Rousseau's Thought====
====Kantianism====
====German Idealism====
====Benthamite Utilitarianism====
====Millian Utilitarianism====
When it comes to the rights and liberties bestowed upon an individual, there are some that seem inherent according to society’s standards like the freedom of speech and religion, especially since some of these values are rooted in texts that have helped found the country. However, as time has progressed, there are new issues that expand the public’s definition of rights and liberties and gives them a new vision as to what they may or may not have a right to. One of these rights is the right to privacy, a right in which there are various opinions, all of which are relatively new, yet there is a hindrance of commentary on these issues. John Stuart Mill has written various pieces including but not limited to On Liberty and The Subjection of Women in which he writes about the rights people inherently have and the values that people should have within society. Although it could be assumed that Mill creates a private realm in which individuals pursue their higher faculties away from society, Mill’s view of privacy is extremely limited and whatever private realm there might be is subjected to teaching morals and values.

Based off an initial reading of Mill, it might be assumed that a private sphere might exist in order to develop higher faculties away from the public. For example, Mill notes that, “A person whose desires and impulses are his own—are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture—is said to have a character...Their thinking is done for them by men much like themselves, addressing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of the moment, through the newspapers” (Mill 1859, 67). From here the reader reasonably infers that Mill would advocate for individuals to remove themselves from the public in order to reach their higher faculties since if one is not in the public sphere, the conclusion is that they are in the private sphere. However, as Mill goes on to describe his argument, he uses various examples to explain his philosophy and how the issue of the private and public spheres should be addressed. In the end, he turns to uses his own harm principle to argue that the state and the government should intervene in instances where the decisions one makes affect the prospects and the lives of the people around them. Due to this belief, he argues that the private sphere is severely limited by the government’s interest to protect the people from other’s personal desires. Furthermore, Mill notes that “That, this being supposed, they cannot be acting wrongly in endeavoring to exclude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested, of instigators who cannot possibly be impartial—who have a direct personal interest on one side, and that side the one which the State believes to be wrong, and who confessedly promote it for personal objects only” (Mill 1859, 110). Alongside this argument, Mill describes several examples where government intervention is allowed when the decisions of the individual interfere with the lives and the decisions of other people. With that being said, there can be no existence of a private sphere for the government needs to protect individuals from the impulses they have that in Mill’s philosophy warrant punishment by the government. The problem with the discussion of Mill and the private sphere is that he does not make any explicit claim about the right to privacy because of the necessity of government intervention from his point of view.

Mill further describes this limited aspect of privacy in which the government is allowed to intervene so long as there is reason to intervene for the good of the rest of the population. For example, Mill writes that “The State, while it respects the liberty of each in what specially regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others” (Mill 1859, 116). This statement alone, despite not referring to the topic at hand, states clearly where he would stand on the issue of the right to privacy. One might claim that there could still be a private sphere especially since Mill does not dismiss the idea all together, but what is important to mention is that the state cannot intervene in matters of right and wrong without letting the individual be somewhat public. He names another example in which he claims “If the government would make up its mind to require for every child a good education, it might save itself the trouble of providing one. It might leave to parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased, and content itself with helping to pay the school fees of the poorer class of children, and defraying the entire school expenses of those who have no one else to pay for them” (Mill 1859, 116-117). In these matters, Mill claims that the government can control and regulate the way that children pursue their higher faculties through education since it is their liberty and goal to reach these faculties for the betterment of their character and overall well-being. Mill maintains this point of view that every individual has the right to live their best life, which he believes is attainable so long as people make decisions for themselves only and the state makes decisions to make sure that others cannot infringe on the lives of others. He recognized the ways that people’s individual private actions could injure one another, despite operating within this realm of personal liberty. He saw the way that life needed regulation based on the harm principle which allowed the government to intervene on private matters and push for a stronger public sphere to share ideas. Mill by no means wanted the government to control every aspect of the life of the individual, he wanted to merely hold the individual accountable for the way their decisions affected those around them.

Mill continues within his other works to paint a picture as to what he wants society to look like and describes the ways in which having a private or domestic sphere can create a form of the right to privacy. Within The Subjection of Women Mill notes that, “As regards the relations of private life it may be said generally, that their influence is, on the whole, encouraging to the softer virtues, discouraging to the sterner: though the statement must be taken with all the modifications dependent on individual character”(Mill 1861, 565-566). Mill’s main emphasis is on the morally correct and doing the necessary things in order to achieve this moral good, especially since he believes that the society around him is declining due to the lack of morality and tendency for people to avoid pursuing their higher faculties. Since women are subjected to the household and are not given a role within the public sphere, it could be argued that women then are responsible for what would have been the private sphere since the home is their responsibility to maintain. It could be asserted that there is a private sphere in which the women or those at home are responsible for the moral development of the children and those living within the home. Within his writing about the home, the government plays no role in dictating how the morals are taught, therefore alluding to this right to privacy based on the premise that the home is a private space in which the government cannot intervene. In addition, Mill adds that “There is no country of Europe in which the ablest men have not frequently experienced, and keenly appreciated, the value of the advice and help of clever and experienced women of the world, in the attainment both of private and of public objects; and there are important matters of public administration to which few men are equally competent with such women; among others, the detailed control of expenditure” (Mill 1861, 580). Here, Mill describes the full capacity of women within the public sphere and particularly within the government but understands that the standards that society have during his time leave no space for women publicly. He uses this line to reference the power and influence that women already have over the private sphere despite society’s perception of women. However, it should be noted that acting within their realm of liberty, they had this explicit right to privacy that allowed them to hold themselves accountable, therefore keeping the government out of their private lives. Therefore, Mill could take on the belief that if a private sphere should exist to develop and teach morals to children who then enter the public sphere and hopefully act within their best interests to pursue their higher faculties without intervening in the lives of others.

What might be something to keep in mind about Mill and his idea of the right to privacy is the sense of Victorian morality that he writes about and his overall response to rights of any kind. He writes both works from the Victorian moral point of view which in turn is reflected in the way that he believes that society should be run and would agree about the way that life would be instructed upon these morals. It is this sense of morality that would go against most things that one might believe is not the concern of the public and Mill would want to spread his single version of morality because everyone should be morally upright according to the same standard. Despite this observation, Mill would also claim that holding oneself accountable is necessary to maintain this moral standard because individuals do not and should not depend on one another. Other than the right to privacy, his perspective on rights aligns with those of earlier philosophers so long as they fall within the utilitarian model and therefore benefit most of the people. However, this creates somewhat of a dilemma since any action or inaction could be seen to benefit the majority. The government could infringe on the inherent rights one has and claim that it be for the betterment of society that they control religion, speech, and property despite these being protected by many other philosophers. In that sense, it is hard to define from the Mill point of view what people do and do not have the right to within their system of government. The right to privacy from Mill’s perspective is one that is hard to define and comes with various limitations that allow the government to intrude on the lives of the people.

Bibliography

Mill, John Stuart. “On Liberty.” In John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Essays, edited by John Gray. Oxford World’s Classics, 1991.

Mill, John Stuart. “The Subjection of Women.” In John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Essays, edited by John Gray. Oxford World’s Classics, 1991.

====Current Utilitarianism====
====Transcendentalism====
====Marxism====
====Early Sociology====
====Pragmatism====
====Weberian Thought====
====Process Philosophy====
====Social Darwinism====
====British Idealism (19th cen.)====
====Continental Philosophy/Frankfurt School====
====Behaviorism====
====Feminist Thought====
Various feminist theorists have often been forgotten because of their role as women and the fact that society sees their input as invalid because of the long history of their treatment. However, despite the oppression and the push to exclude them from political conversations, women have entered the conversation claiming that the true problem in life is patriarchy. Their commentary surrounds the involvement of men within the government and how the male-dominated government suppresses women. They can generally agree on most political discussions like the right to privacy, but that is not to say that it does not come without variation as all political theory usually does. The consensus among the feminists is that the private realm maintains the oppression of women and propose the elimination of the private realm to remedy the problem at hand, despite some thoughts on the return to the private realm once the problem has been solved socially first.

Most feminist political commentary and theory is centered around the critique of the relationship between the private and the public spheres that inherently treats women as less than compared to their male counterpart. In her political commentary Sexual Personae, Camille Paglia noted that “He has no personal life. He completely identifies private with public interest. Hence, he is unstoppable. Such men can be political geniuses or monsters” (Paglia 1990, 214). In fact, Bell Hooks would go as far to claim that men are told to dominate the private sphere despite giving women the belief that the home and the private realm will be theirs to dominate and to rule over (Hooks 1984, 120). Paglia and Hooks both demonstrate the point that the feminists paint a picture where the power of the public outweigh the power of the private and since women are taught that the private will be their realm, they are inherently less important compared to their male counterparts. Paglia also details something important in the fact that the men of society can either help or hurt women because of the power they possess in the public and the private, yet most feminists would argue that they choose to abuse women within their spheres because of the way that Hooks says that they are encouraged to dominate women any way that they can. These sentiments reflect the critiques of the relationship between the private and public spheres that dominates the arguments made by feminists on the matter of the right to privacy and hence why some are skeptical about maintain that right. Susan Moller Okin’s work Justice, Gender, and Family noted that, “If there were a clear sphere from which the state refrained from intruding, that sphere would have to be defined, and its definition would be a political issue. But in fact, the state has not just "kept out of family life. In innumerable ways, the state determines and enforces the terms of marriage” (Okin 1989, 129). To Okin, the dichotomy between the private and the public realms is central to her argument for the elimination of the private sphere because of the lack of justice maintained within this sphere. Okin uses this to further the point that there is no separation because of the state’s involvement in issues like women’s bodies and marriage that make the separation unrealistic since within the minds of men, the two are automatically linked without any clear distinctions. The feminists use examples of abortion and marriage to further prove that the lines between the state and the home are blurred and often nonexistent because the state makes decisions without consulting women or even acknowledging the boundary that should be there. Okin even claims that the boundary is artificial and only created based off the different principles that the men have on these matters. However, she highlights the lack of justice for women due to the difference in principles in men that allow them to abuse their women and belittle them from reaching their full potential within society.

Some theorists see the role of the traditional woman with her duties and her obligations to the family as invasive and a problem when it comes to the right to privacy for a woman. Written in 1903, Charlotte Perkins Gilman makes the claim that, “The mother—poor invaded soul—finds even the bathroom door no bar to hammering little hands. From parlour to kitchen, from cellar to garret, she is at the mercy of children, servants, tradesmen, and callers. So chased and trodden is she that the very idea of privacy is lost to her mind; she never had any, she doesn't know what it is, and she cannot understand why her husband should wish to have any "reserves," any place or time, any thought or feeling, with which she may not make free” (Gilman 1903, 36). Gilman makes the assertion that the role women have taken on within the home means that there is no such privacy for the woman whatsoever. It is because she has other obligations as a mother, as a wife, as a caregiver that something is always expected from her and that her needs are irrelevant because she “rules” the home. She claims that there is also no possibility for individual privacy because there is no specific space for just the individual unless they are living alone. However, within the family, the individual is crowded by those around, and as stated before the role of the woman is to serve everyone and everything according to the standards set by the man. She adds that if the individual was truly private, there would be no scrutiny or judgement because the individual is truly private about their thoughts and their feelings, but this concept of privacy is only applicable to the man who rules the home and is always free to express themselves within the home. It is the woman who is continuously repressed in and out of the home and is in constant contact with the other women and servants of the neighborhood with whom they share and continuously violate the idea of privacy. In Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach by Martha Nussbaum, Nussbaum noted that, “It goes without saying that in poor families where five or six people share a single room, there is no such thing as the privacy of the individual in the middle-class American sense – although poor people will frequently seek solitude for the purpose of defecation, walking considerable distances from their dwellings” (Nussbaum 2000, 259). Nussbaum and Gilman both illustrate the life of the woman in which she is subjected to the needs of the family and expected to run the household without being given the respect that should come with the role. She continues the argument by claiming that individuals have the right to privacy within their decisional liberties, but for women and in general the home limits the space where the individual can carry out their liberties simply because the lack of space. Nussbaum decides to remedy this by claiming that the state should be allowed to intervene so long as they do so to protect only the privacy the individual has in the form of decisional liberties the individual holds. Even though she speaks in broader terms about the individual, she emphasizes the fact, as Gilman points out, that the role of the women is far more extensive than that of the man within the home and therefore, her privacy is severely more limited than that of the man within the home. In the process of the state protecting the liberties of the individual, Nussbaum would claim that the needs of the woman need to be acknowledged and enforced in order to maintain her decisional liberties.

Alongside the critique of the public and private spheres mentioned above, theorists propose a reconstruction of the public and private life that would eventually liberate women from the abuse and violence they face. In her book, A Vindication of the Rights of Women with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects by Mary Wollstonecraft, she noted that “To render women truly useful members of society, I argue that they should be led, by having their understandings cultivated on a large scale, to acquire a rational affection for their country, founded on knowledge, because it is obvious that we are little interested about what we do not understand. And to render this general knowledge of due importance, I have endeavoured to shew that private duties are never properly fulfilled unless the understanding enlarges the heart; and that public virtue is only an aggregate of private” (Wollstonecraft 1792, 291). Part of the larger and general feminist argument for privacy is the reconstruction of the private and public realms so that there could possibly be the existence of the private sphere once the problems are addressed. For Wollstonecraft, part of the progression of women is to form the new public sphere around the education of the women in order to maintain the public happiness. Wollstonecraft claims that the means of some private virtue is the same as the public happiness since whatever happens within the private is brought out into the public. For that reason, Wollstonecraft argues that the public and the private are utterly the same since the state already tries to solve the problems that take place within the private space of the home. However, within the home, she notes that the role of the woman is to please the man and because of this she is denied her public and civil duties which again can be rectified by educating women and men about the opinions and the manner which society enforces. The Feminine Mystique by Betty Friedan noted that, “Their determination betrays women’s underestimated human strength and their urgent need to use it. But only the strongest, after nearly twenty years of the feminine mystique, can move on by themselves. For this is not just the private problem of each individual woman. There are implications of the feminine mystique that must be faced on a national scale” (Friedan 1963, 350-351). Friedan wanted to remedy the inequalities that she saw within the private life, by demolishing the line between the public and the private by exposing the inequalities that the women faced within the private life. In order to reform and reconstruct life to benefit women, her solution was to promote education and find something beyond the self to identify with. Her idea that was if women were able to reimagine themselves, they would be able to overcome the problems and show society the way that women should be treated. Freidan’s concept of the private however was aligned with Gilman and Nussbaum in that the duties of the woman prevent actual privacy, so she proposed another separate space away from the family in which the woman can achieve a sense of privacy. In order to reimagine themselves within the public, Friedan proposed private and public education like Wollstonecraft proposed, and suggested challenging the images of women proposed by the media. When it came to the media specifically, she wanted women to reimagine themselves using their own private image to facilitate what their version of what a woman looked like. Feminists in general proposed their own version of reconstructing the public to change the way women were viewed which usually involved exposing their problems to the public, completely ignoring the idea of the private individual.

Despite the constant call for the barrier between the public and the private to be broken, there are some claims to a right to privacy made by the feminists. Catherine MacKinnon noted this in her work Toward a Feminist Theory of the State when she claimed that “The law of privacy treats the private sphere as a sphere of personal freedom. For men, it is. For women, the private is the distinctive sphere of intimate violation and abuse, neither free nor particularly personal. Men's realm of private freedom is women's realm of collective subordination.” (MacKinnon 1989, 168). Most feminist theorists agree to some sort of concept of the private and what that might look like. Most feminists were skeptical of the private because of all the abuse that took place within this sphere, hence why they wanted the government to intervene in the matters of the private. However, as MacKinnon pointed out, the private provided personal freedom that the public could not provide, hence why it was important to revisit the private sphere once the woman was reimagined and re-envisioned for the better. MacKinnon acknowledged the fact that there were legal protections about privacy for women since there were these protections for men but based on examples surrounding abortion and marriage concluded that even though it was legally available for women, it was not enforced. Specifically, the government rulings on issues like Roe v. Wade gave women the private right to choose, but she recognized that the fact that the government had a say on this matter, was an invasion of the privacy of the women to choose. Even the discussion of whether the government would fund abortions became a matter of government involvement on a woman’s decision to choose. After her discussion of this matter, she established that the right to privacy was necessary and continuously violated by the government in order to maintain control over women. Carole Pateman extends this argument within her work The Sexual Contract when she notes that, “Shultz states that there is a strong argument that private contract should not override the criminal law but, she writes, 'the idea of enforceable private agreements concerning violent sexual conduct is less offensive than a state declaration that violent sexual conduct is automatically acceptable in marriage.' Such a response begs the question about limitations to and alternatives to contract” (Pateman 1988, 185). Pateman specifically notes that the relationship between the government and the people on matters of private and public is something that is important for the safety of women and for the natural liberties for the individual. She notes that what calls the sexual contract is something women are subjected to where their abuse accumulates at home and sometimes within the public. She called for government intervention on matters of legally maintaining women’s liberties and for intervention when men within the private life continuously abused women. Pateman noted that the line between the public and the private was indefinite and used the system of marriage as an example of how the government was involved. She claimed that because the government had to keep records of marriage contracts between private individuals, marriage could be considered public, despite the specific agreements within the marriage contract is a private matter talked and agreed upon by the different parties. She still notes in the end that the government had some obligation within the private lives to reform the treatment of women and the inequalities that women face within the home, an attitude shared by most of the feminist theorists.

The consensus among the feminists is that the private sphere is where women are subjects of abuse and inequalities that need to be exposed out in the public in order to help women overcome the view that men have of them. To these theorists' women face the same treatment within the public sphere as the patriarchy and the government make decisions on their behalf and subject them to the private life where they are expected to take care of the family. The primary role of the woman centers around the idea of the family and the way that the woman is supposed to take care of the family depriving her of her own privacy. Jean Bethke Elshtain adds an interesting perspective to this notion and considers that as women are liberated by their actions, the structure of the family will fall apart. She adds that the family dynamic is also changing as there are more single parent households or same-sex households that change the way the family has been thought of (Elshtain 1981, 323). This is an interesting notion as the thought of the private sphere changes for these women and the way that women are taking more charge within the world continuously challenging the private abuse at the hands of the man. The notion of the right to privacy is something constantly changing as situations change but should be broken down to expose the flaws within the system that negatively affect women.

Bibliography

Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought - Second Edition. NED-New edition, 2. Princeton University Press, 1981. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv131bvkg.

Friedan, Betty. The Feminine Mystique. Dell Publishing Company INC. 1973

Gilman, Charlotte Perkins. The Home. New York Charlton Company. 1910

Hooks, Bell. 1984. Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center. South End Press

Mackinnon, Catherine A. 1989. Toward a Feminist Theory of the State. Harvard University Press

Nussbaum, Martha C. 2000. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge University Press

Okin, Susan Moller. 1989. Justice, Gender, and the Family. Basic Books Inc.

Paglia, Camille. “Shakespeare and Dionysus: As You Like It and Antony and Cleopatra.” In Sexual Personae, 194–229. Yale University Press, 1990. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1bh4bwb.12.

Pateman, Carole. The Sexual Contract. Stanford University Press, 1988.

Wollstonecraft, Mary. 1792. A Vindication of the Rights of Women with Strictures on Political and Moral Subjects. Cambridge University Press

====Postmodernism====
===Are there any philosophical or moral traditions that dispute the classification of this right as a fundamental right?===
===What do the major legal theories (positive law, natural law, critical legal studies, etc.) say about this right?===
'''Positive Law'''

Positive law theory asks if the actions the government actor took would have been unlawful for a nongovernment actor to do in that jurisdiction (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1830, 1831). In other words, what does the written law allow? For instance, the model holds something to be a search if the government uses special legal powers to gain access to information (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1832). This model constrains the ability possessed by police to gain information from private parties while creating a predictable conception of privacy (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1856). Its use in the United States aims to add clarity to privacy expectations that is not had in the ''Katz'' test (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1869). Positive law theory was used in ''California v. Ciraolo'' and ''Florida v. Riley'' (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1867).

'''Natural Law'''

Locke is one of the primary natural law theorists. In his ''Two Treatises on Government: Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government'' (Essay Two) he discusses some of these rights which implicitly concern privacy in the State of Nature. In Chapter II: Of the State of Nature, he recognizes in section 6 that the laws of nature prevent “harm[ing] another in his life, health, liberty or possessions” (Locke, 1832, 107). All of these categories can be linked to laws today which protect privacy: mainly constitutional law in various countries, but also, for instance, the United States Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (1996).

'''Critical Legal Studies'''

Critical Legal Theorists believe law becomes intertwined with social issues causing each judge to have a somewhat different judgement in each case (Dworkin, 1977, 117). These differing torts and constitutional interpretations create varying implications in jurisdictions based on the weight precedents are given (Dworkin, 1977, 118). Dworkin recognizes that with this connection to social facts, the judiciary plays a bigger role in society (Waldron. 1999, 211). For instance, some judges may find a connection between the directly provided for protection of the right to liberty and implied right to privacy, while others may not (Dworkin, 1977, 117). Roberto Unger supports this example, writing in his essay ‘’Critical Legal Studies Movement’’ that some rights give individuals “a zone of unchecked discretionary action that others … may not invade,” reminiscent of Warren & Brandeis’s original claim to the right to privacy (Unger, 1983, 599).

'''Legal Positivism'''

Legal Positivism claims law depends on social facts, but the existence of law is not dependent on its merits or morals (Sevel & Leiter, 2010). H. L. A. Hart, a famed positivist, claimed that “law should be bound by limits and respect citizen’s privacy” (van der Sloot, 1). Moreover, the state could not and should not regulate private conduct unless there was harm (van der Sloot, 1). Robert Burt claims Hart essentially follows Louis Brandeis’s “right to be let alone” (Burt, 2004, 14).

'''Legal Realism'''

Legal Realism is reading laws “in the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question” (Macauley, 2005, 371). As such, legal realism expects the law to be constantly changing based on social conditions (Hall, 2005, 452). Calo claims privacy law exemplifies legal realism because of all of the exceptions, shifts with technology, and meanings dependent on other values and rights (Calo, 2019, 34). Despite privacy law’s beginnings being rooted in legal realism, he recognizes that privacy scholars have not expressly used this legal theory (Calo, 2019, 34, 40, 48).

'''United States Constitutional Theorists'''

One would think defining the appearance of privacy rights in the United States Constitution to be easy, especially given the language of ‘penumbras’ used in ''Griswold v. Connecticut'' rather than citing one specific clause constitutional (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, pars. 14-15). However, Scott Gerber demonstrated in his work ''Privacy and Constitutional Theory'' that all six of the constitutional theories of interpretation he presented can be used to find privacy rights in the Constitution (Gerber, 2000; Baker, 2004).

Originalists: In his writing, Gerber (2000) posits that if an originalist interpreter wants to find privacy rights in the constitution, they can (167). Generally, those who do find privacy rights in the Constitution cite the Ninth Amendment (Gerber, 2000, 171). This is what Justice Arthur Goldberg cited in his ''Griswold'' concurrence and has been cited as such since James Madison wrote the amendment (Gerber, 2000, 171, 172).

Living Constitutionalists (US): Living constitutionalists allow for precedents to be called upon. It can be argued this is what was done in ''Griswold v. CT'' and other substantive due process decisions on privacy, such as ''Boyd v. US'' in 1886 (Gerber, 2000, 178). In the ''Griswold'' majority opinion, Justice William Douglas argued that the Supreme Court had previously ruled on cases in which rights were not explicit in the Bill of Rights, but the rights were justifiable to the Court through the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965, par. 11).

Resources

Baker, T.E. (2004). Constitutional theory in a nutshell. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 13(1), 57-123. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1245&context=wmborj
Baude, W. & Stern, J.Y. (2016, May). The positive law model of the Fourth Amendment. Harvard Law Review 129(7), 1821-1889. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44072348
Burt, R. (2004). Moral offenses and same sex relations: Revisiting the Hart-Devlin Debate. Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series. https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/711/
Calo, R. (2019). Privacy Law’s Indeterminacy. Theoretical Inquiries in Law 20(1), 33-52. https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2019-0001
Dworkin, R. (1977). Taking rights seriously. Harvard University Press.
Gerber, S. (2000). Privacy and constitutional theory. Social Philosophy and Policy 17(2), 165-185. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500002156
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479
Hall, E.L. (Ed.). (2005). The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
Locke, J. (2008). Concerning the true original extent and end of civil government. In R. Hay (Ed.), The Works of John Locke: In 10 volumes (Vol. V). Cosimo Classics.
Macaulay, S. (2005). The new versus od legal realism: “Things ain’t what they used to be.” Wisconsin Law Review 2005(2), 365-403. From https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_8/tg2md/new_versus.pdf
Sevel, M. & Leiter, B. (2010). Legal Positivism. Oxford Bibliographies. https://doi.org/10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0065
van der Sloot, B. (2017). Privacy as secondary rule, or the intrinsic limits of legal orders in the age of Big Data. In M. Dehmer and F. Emmert-Streib (Eds.), Frontiers in Data Science. CRC Press. https://bartvandersloot.com/onewebmedia/Privacy%20as%20secondary%20rule.pdf
Unger, R.M. (1983, Jan.). The Critical Legal Studies Movement. Harvard Law Review 96(3), 561-675. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1341032
Waldron, J. (1999) Law and Disagreement. Oxford University Press.

==Culture and Politics==
===Is this right interpreted and exercised in different ways in different countries? Focus on particular countries in which the right is interpreted distinctively===
The right to privacy has been interpreted in various ways. The EU has strict legislation regarding data privacy and the Council of Europe has outlined in Article 8(1) of the ECHR (1950) the right to privacy in the four spheres of family life, private life, communication, and the home (Wolford, n.d.). On the other hand, the United States has outlined protections from government interference in the private sphere in the Bill of Rights, has comparatively less (& less encompassing) legislation on the issue, and has relied on the courts to protect people from private entities and in the home (U.S. Constitution; 1787, Amendment 4; Privacy, n.d.). These differences result in a more consistent application of privacy rights in Europe compared to the United States.

In the home, Europeans have had a safe, private space since 1950 (ECHR, 1950, Art. 8(1)). In the United States, this right wasn’t concrete until long after the Supreme Court began ruling on the privacy cases in the mid-1960s (Privacy, n.d.). However, it remains that Americans have a higher expectation of privacy in the home than in a public area (Electronic Surveillance, n.d.). In an extreme example of lack of privacy in the home, Albanians working for the Soviet government did not own anything in their homes – the state owned it all (Lubonja, 2001, 239).

Exceptions to privacy at home include police entering with and, in some cases, without a warrant. New Zealand also utilizes court-issued warrants to prevent officials from entering the home, but if officials are actively preventing a crime, enforcing a law, making an arrest, or aiding in an emergency, they do not need a warrant (Community Law, n.d.). Within the European Union, this warrant can come from a court within any part of the EU’s jurisdiction. The European Evidence Warrant (EEW) allows a warrant issued to gather evidence to be valid across the EU and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) applies this principle to the arrest of criminals taking exploiting the open borders within the EU (European evidence warrant, 2006; European arrest warrant, n.d.). EEWs can also be used to get cell phone records (The European evidence warrant, 2006). In the United States, a customer can ask for those records to be turned over to authorities or authorities can use a subpoena (FCC 2019).

The Prüm Convention demonstrates another aspect of inter-European collaboration in crime-solving efforts, leading to interesting implications for data privacy. Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Luxembourg, and Spain all signed this treaty, to which other nations can opt-in, in an effort to increase cross-border security (Prüm Convetion, 2005). At the roots, it allows the parties to ask each other for help solving crimes by sharing data from each nation’s crime database (Walsch, 2008, 86). By not creating an international crime database, each nation is required to ask other nations for the needed data (Walsch, 2008, 86). This method allows the shared data to be governed by each nation’s specific data privacy laws, but it lands in an unregulated grey area after the data transfer (Walsch, 2008, 85). Differences in privacy law become clear when looking at what personal data is collected from people. Some states collect DNA in all criminal cases, others only when the person has been in prison for over two years, and others do not collect DNA at all (Walsch, 2008, 86). In the context of solving international crime, these differences mean some states tend to be more helpful than others.

Resources

Community Law. (n.d.). Entry powers: When the police can come into your home. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://communitylaw.org.nz/community-law-manual/chapter-31-police-powers/entry-powers-when-the-police-can-come-into-your-home/entry-without-a-warrant-to-prevent-or-investigate-crimes/
Electronic Surveillance. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 20, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/electronic_surveillance
European arrest warrant. (n.d.). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/cross-border-cases/judicial-cooperation/types-judicial-cooperation/european-arrest-warrant_en
European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
European evidence warrant. (2006, June 1). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_06_168
European evidence warrant, The: The acquisition and admissibility of foreign evidence. (n.d.). Academy of European Law. Retrieved Sept. 20, 2021, from https://www.era.int/cgi-bin/cms?_SID=d241949ae554074b1e14fd12b7f05d3f5d1e38df00162723613600&_sprache=en&_bereich=artikel&_aktion=detail&idartikel=121538
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). (2019, Dec. 30). Protecting your privacy: Phone and cable records. https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/protecting-your-privacy
Lubonja, F. (2001). Privacy in a totalitarian regime. Social Research 68(1), 237-254. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40971449
Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
Prüm Convention. AT-BE-DE-ES-FR-LU-NL. May 27, 2005. 10900/05. https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/sites/default/files/docs/body/prumtr.pdf
U.S. Constitution. Amendment IV. https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript
Walsch, C. (2008, Nov. 9). Europeanization and democracy: Negotiating the Prum Treaty and the Schengen III Agreement. Politicka Misao, XVL(5), 81-90.
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

===Is this right exercised in different ways depending on the political governance regime in place (democracy, autocracy, hybrid regime)?===
Rhoda Howard and Jack Donnelly (1986) put forth six regime types: liberal, minimal, traditionalist, communist, corporatist (authoritarian), and developmental. When comparing regime type to the ‘valuation of privacy,’ liberal regimes are ranked highly, and minimal regimes are ranked very highly (Howard & Donnelly, 1986, 814). The other regime types, all communitarian regimes rather than individualistic, were ranked low or very low regarding privacy (Howard & Donnelly, 1986, 814). At their cores, communitarian regimes do not have privacy because it can be argued, as Howard and Donnelly (1986, 211) do, that the allowance of freedoms may lead to self-destruction. Thus, privacy is ignored (Howard & Donnelly, 1986, 211). Fatos Lubonja agrees with this sentiment, writing that privacy did not exist in Albania under the totalitarian regime, and cites his experience in Albanian prisons as an example (Lubonja, 2001). He also admitted to self-censorship in the private diaries which originally got him arrested, supposing many others had censored themselves in the same way (Lubonja, 2001, 247).

Resources

Howard, R.E., & Donnelly, J. (1986, Sept.) Human dignity, human rights, and political regimes. The American Political Science Review 80(3), 801-817. https://doi.org/10.2307/1960539
Lubonja, F. (2001). Privacy in a totalitarian regime. Social Research 68(1), 237-254. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40971449

===Is there general and widespread belief that this right is a fundamental right that should generally be protected (and that exceptions should be rare)?===
The right to privacy is expressed in many places: Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996), Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) (2009), and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (1950). Nationally, this right has been cited in the 1988 Brazil Constitution and United States case law (derived from the US Constitution). In India, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in 2017 that the right to privacy for all people falls under Article 21, which provides the “protection of life and personal liberty” (McCarthy, 2017; Mahaprata & Choudhary, 2017). However, many exceptions to privacy are also listed alongside the right to privacy in these supreme documents, despite the belief in its inviolability.

Article 8(2) of the ECHR provides that privacy interference can only occur in instances “of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Article 7 of the CRFEU can be breached by a search or arrest warrant issued by any EU state (European arrest warrant, n.d.; European evidence warrant, 2006). In Article 5 Sections X-XII, the Brazilian Constitution outlines the right to privacy in areas related to private life, the home, and correspondence. These sections also clearly outline exceptions; Section XI recognizes that officials can enter a home “in cases of flagrante delicto, disaster or rescue, or, during the day, with a court order,” and Section XII allows criminal proceedings to methodically breach this privacy. In the United States, privacy zones – derived from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments in ''Griswold v. Connecticut'' (1965) in conjunction with the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment – have extended privacy to Americans in various ways (Privacy, n.d.). Again, a court-issued search or arrest warrant may breach this right to privacy, especially in the home.

'''Data Privacy'''

The US has very little data privacy due to a lack of legislation and regard. Most data regulation is due to compliance with the 2018 implementation of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, which applies to any company collecting any data on European citizens or companies with a large number of customers based in Europe (Wolford, n.d.). On the other hand, the Brazilian Supreme Court extended these Article 5 protections to data privacy in 2020 (Bioni & Monteiro, 2020). Additionally, New Zealand’s Information Privacy Principles (IPP) in Article 22 of the Privacy Act 2020 protect data collection, but also provides some exceptions in IPP 11 and 12.

'''Relationships'''

In 2018, the Indian Supreme Court declared part of Section 377 unconstitutional against Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution (Rai, 2018). This ruling allowed those in LGBT relationships privacy in the home, but again, this privacy was not granted in public spaces (Rai, 2018). Similarly, the right to a private relationship went through the courts in the United States. First, it was granted to interracial couples in 1967 through ''Loving v. Virginia'' (1967) and then to same-sex couples through ''Obergefell v. Hodges'' in 2015. In Brazil, relationships are protected under Article 5(X), which states “personal intimacy, private life, honor and reputation are inviolable, guaranteeing the right to compensation for pecuniary or moral damages resulting from the violation thereof” (Brazil Constitution, 1988).

'''Communication'''

Private communication is protected under Article 5(XII) of the Brazilian Constitution (1988). In the United States, the right to private communication became convoluted with the 2001 USA PATRIOT ACT, which authorized the interception and disclosure of communication under certain circumstances.

Resources

Bioni, B.R. & Monteiro, R.L. (2020, June 9). A landmark ruling in Brazil: Paving the way for considering data protections as an autonomous fundamental right. Future of Privacy Forum. https://fpf.org/blog/a-landmark-ruling-in-brazil-paving-the-way-for-considering-data-protection-as-an-autonomous-fundamental-right/
Brazil Constitution. (1988). https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2017.pdf?lang=en
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Dec. 1, 2009. https://fra.europa.eu/en/eu-charter
Constitution of India. (1950). https://legislative.gov.in/constitution-of-india
European arrest warrant. (n.d.). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/cross-border-cases/judicial-cooperation/types-judicial-cooperation/european-arrest-warrant_en
European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
European evidence warrant. (2006, June 1). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_06_168

===Does public polling reveal insights about the right as experienced in different countries?===
'''Worldwide'''

A 2018 Deloitte survey has revealed that the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is having a positive international impact on the perception of data collection and storage even just six months after its implementation (Deloitte, 2018, 4). The GDPR has had a worldwide effect on privacy laws as it requires all companies which collect data on EU citizens to comply with the law, regardless of the location of their headquarters (Wolford, n.d.). At the most basic level, respondents felt companies have begun to care more about data protection (Deloitte, 2018, 6). Additionally, over 3 out of 4 respondents were aware of their rights under this law and some had already used this knowledge to alter what data companies were collecting about them (Deloitte, 2018, 13, 14, 19). On the other hand, 19% of those polled felt that organizations did not care about privacy (Deloitte, 2018, 6) and only 51% felt the law had put them in control of the personal data that companies have access to (Deloitte, 2018, 18).

'''European Union'''

In a 2019 European Union (including North Macedonia) study conducted a year after the implementation of the GDPR, the European Commission concurred with Deloitte in that the GDPR had made people more aware of their rights (Vandystadt & Voin, 2019). However, only 20% of these respondents knew which authority was responsible for protecting privacy rights (Vandystadt & Voin, 2019; Awareness of the general data protection regulation, 2019).

'''United States'''

In 2002, a Harris Poll found that 63% of respondents found the privacy legislation in place to be inadequate (EPIC, 2021). In 2019, 75% of those surveyed felt the government should regulate companies and their use of personal data (Auxier, 2020). In 2020, 79% of the population wanted national privacy legislation enacted (Auxier, 2020). It is clear that over time, Americans have become more concerned about the use of their personal data, especially in the private sector (Auxier et al., 2019; Auxier, 2020). Despite this fact, the United States has still not enacted sweeping privacy legislation at a national level. At the state level, California was the first state to enact privacy legislation in 2018, and at least nineteen other states have followed suit with the hope that it will signal the federal government to propose some sort of national privacy legislation for ease of compliance (Sabin, 2021). However, Americans seem to be fine with either approach, with polls showing around 70% find their state government to be responsible for this issue and the same percent find the federal government to be responsible (Sabin, 2021).

'''New Zealand'''

In 2012, the New Zealand Privacy Commissioner published a privacy study completed by UMR Research. This study found that 90% of people wanted the government to protect their data and be told by companies how their data was being used (Privacy Commissioner, 2012, 9). Interestingly, only 66% were concerned about the presence of their personal data online (Privacy Commissioner, 2012, 12). However, 88% of respondents wanted businesses to be punished if they were using data incorrectly, and 97% wanted the Privacy Commissioner to be able to reprimand companies if they were breaching the then enforceable 1993 Privacy Act (Privacy Commissioner, 2012, 23, 10). Since this study was published, the 1993 Privacy Act has been updated. Now, if an investigation reveals a breach of duty or misconduct, Article 96 of the Privacy Act 2020 requires the Commissioner to refer the matter to authorities, reflecting some of the public’s wants revealed in the 2012 poll.

'''British Columbia'''

In 2020, Canadian non-profit, Freedom of Information and Privacy Association or FIPA, worked with Ipsos and polled British Columbians surrounding their attitudes regarding privacy law. About half of them were unsure if the current laws were protective enough or admitted they thought current privacy laws were lacking (FIPA, 2020). When asked about the transparency of Canadian companies, 50% felt companies were not open about their data practices and 75% felt that Canadian companies may send their data to non-Canadian companies (FIPA, 2020). However, one-third of respondents from the same study knew British Columbian privacy law and its protections and three-quarters would like a public education initiative to teach these protections (FIPA, 2020).

Resources

Auxier, B. (2020, May 4). How Americans see digital privacy issues amid the COVID-19 outbreak. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/04/how-americans-see-digital-privacy-issues-amid-the-covid-19-outbreak/
Auxier, B., Rainie, L., Anderson, M., Perrin, A., Kumar, M., & Turner, E. (2019, Nov. 15). Americans and privacy: Concerned, confused, and feeling lack of control over their personal information. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/
Awareness of the general data protection regulation – one year on. (2019). European Commission. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2222
Deloitte. (2018). A new era for privacy: GDPR six months on. https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/risk/deloitte-uk-risk-gdpr-six-months-on.pdf
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). (2021). Public opinion on privacy. https://epic.org/privacy/survey/
FIPA. (2020, June 4). British Columbians want action on privacy protection: Polling results. https://fipa.bc.ca/2020-privacy-poll/
Privacy Act 2020, 2020 No. 31, (2021). https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2020/0031/latest/LMS23223.html
Privacy Commissioner. (2012, Apr.). UMR omnibus results. https://www.privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Surveys/Privacy-Commission-UMR-Omni-Results-Apr-2012.pdf
Sabin, S. (2021, Apr. 27). States are moving on privacy bills. Morning Consult. https://morningconsult.com/2021/04/27/state-privacy-congress-priority-poll/
Vandystadt, N., & Voin, M. (2019, July 24). GDPR shows results, but work needs to continue. European Commission. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/api/deliverable/download/file?deliverableId=69715
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

==Conflicts with other Rights==
===Are there other specific fundamental rights that tend to conflict with this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?===
As Warren & Brandeis suggest in ''The Right to Privacy'' (1890), the right to privacy directly conflicts with freedom of the press and speech. They wanted to protect people from writings beyond what defamation and publishing law covered. However, by proposing privacy protections that extended beyond these laws, they were inherently limiting what could be published. While this limitation was intentional, it was sure to be contentious as the First Amendment had been in place and protected for nearly 100 years and privacy rights were not prominent in any part of the world before this time. The First Amendment reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (US Constitution, 1787, Amd. 1).

The United States Supreme Court Cases offer plenty of examples of press and privacy rights conflicting, as “the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of the right to privacy” (''Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc.'', 1971). In some cases, privacy prevails, in others, the First Amendment. One of the cases was ''New York Times Company v. United States'' (1971) in which the ''New York Times'' published the Pentagon Papers but the Nixon administration argued that those should be kept private for national security concerns. In a 6-3 decision, the Court claimed that these were not to be considered private or secure and that the freedom of the press prevailed (NYT v. US, n.d.). Also in 1971, the Court ordered Branzburg to reveal his sources to a grand jury, despite the sources explicitly asking to not be revealed in ''Bransburg v. Hayes''. Had secrecy been maintained, the press would have more rights than individuals during the grand jury (Branzburg v. Hayes, n.d.). Additionally, other cases such as ''Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn'' (1975) and ''Florida Star v. BJF'' (1989) held that freedom of the press overtakes privacy rights when the information is lawfully and publicly available. ''Cohen v. Cowles Media Company'' (1991) granted privacy to press informants if they had been promised confidentiality with promissory estoppel because the principle applies generally not just to the press (Cohen v. Cowles Media Company, n.d.). The contrast of ''Branzburg'' and ''Cohen'' shows how interpretive and circumstantial privacy rights are, while ''NYT v. NASA'' (1991) reveals that privacy rights are dependent on the media used to publish the information. In this instance, the US District Court for the District of Columbia allowed for transcripts of the Challenger astronauts’ last words to be published by the ''Times'', but not the voice recordings (Mills, 2008, 36).

Privacy rights also conflict with the right to information. The government recognized this right with the Freedom of Information Act in 1966 (FOIA). This act granted anyone the ability to request access to federal agency records but not the records of private companies. The goal of having public records is to keep the government accountable, but this risks people’s privacy based on the nature of the information agencies collect (Mills, 2008, 50). However, nine exemptions and three exclusions in FOIA limit access to these records. The exclusions are narrow and related to law enforcement and ongoing intelligence investigations and are unaffected by FOIA. The exemptions authorize government agencies to withhold information from those requesting it (Freedom of Information Act, n.d). Luckily, the exceptions and exemptions and the Privacy Act of 1974 considered the right of privacy and aimed to prevent the collision of these rights (Mills, 2008, 51).

Privacy is also put aside when considering public security and health (Mills, 2008, 227). In the United States, this lack of priority became clear with the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and PATRIOT Act of 2001, which both expanded the ability of the FBI to have access to information on individuals that may or may not be a threat to the nation’s security. Many courts have upheld acts that place public security over personal privacy rights. To use an example less severe than terrorism, such is the case with the release of sex offenders (Mills, 2008, 224). While it hurts one’s reputation to have their name released in connection with this crime, it protects the greater community and their neighbors by alerting them.

Resources

Branzburg v. Hayes. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 12, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-85
Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc, 4 Cal. 3d 529 (CA Sup. Ct. 1971). https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/4/529.html
Cohen v. Cowles Media Company. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 12, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-634
Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-938
Florida Star v. B. J. F. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-329
Freedom of Information Act, The. (n.d.). Department of State. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://foia.state.gov/learn/foia.aspx
Mills, J.L. (2008). Privacy: The lost right. Oxford University Press.
New York Times Company v. United States. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 12, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1970/1873
U.S. Constitution. (1787). https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Are there other specific rights that are critical to the exercise of this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?===
“Privacy claims began gradually to be made independently of the trespass rules essential to property rights” (Heffernan, 2016, 102). The connection between these rights was recognized early on by Hixon (“the right to privacy…carried at least an implied right of property”) from Warren & Brandeis’s 1890 writing and by New York Court of Appeals judge John C. Grey (Hixon, 1987, 39). These rights are protected and exercised jointly in many constitutions and states, likely as privacy rights’ origins are rooted in property rights (Heffernan, 2016, 113). For instance, in Grenada Article 1(c) of the 1973 constitution protects both privacy and property (Constitute Project, Grenada 1973, reinst. 1991, rev. 1992). Without the right to privacy, property rights would be lessened as it would only grant the right to ownership and, barring other protections, leave the property vulnerable to searches that may expose private information. When exercised in conjunction with property rights, privacy protections expand. This is explicit in the constitution of Saint Kitts and Nevis, which, in granting privacy rights, also prevents the deprivation of property without compensation (Constitute Project, Saint Kitts and Nevis 1983).

The right to privacy also convenes with the right to be forgotten in some states. This right is “the right of a past individual to be forgotten by people in the present” (Gadja, 2018, 205). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in 2014 that the right to privacy granted in Europe extended to past economic troubles and that this lack of privacy that caused the lawsuit was harming his ability to move past these troubles (Gadja, 2018, abstract). This ruling allowed the past troubles to be forgotten. Since this ruling in 2014, the United States courts have also alluded to the right to be forgotten as a sect of privacy rights, despite many believing at the time “this right [would not] cross the Atlantic” because of the First Amendment and others believing this right was present before the conventional right to privacy (Gadja, 2018, 206). While the US Supreme Court has not ruled on this right, lower courts have, as the California Supreme Court did in ''Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association'' in 1971. ''Briscoe'' opined that while the reports of previous crimes were newsworthy, the “identification of the actor in reports of long past crimes usually serve[d] little independent public purpose” other than curiosity given the rehabilitation that had taken place (''Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association'', 1971). The plaintiff was allowed to have his past forgotten and the press was not allowed to take this right away, in this instance (Gadja, 2018, 212). However, this right is not internationally recognized, as other states such as Brazil have not supported this right (Library of Congress, 2021).

The right to be forgotten and property combine to create the right to one’s name and likeness which is especially important for those in the public eye (Mills, 2008, 220). It is accepted that people have a right to profit off of their own image, much like they have the right to profit off of their inventions or intellectual property (Mills, 2-008, 217-218). This right became clear in court cases soon after the 1890 publication of the Warren & Brandeis article, beginning with ''Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.'' in 1902 (Hixon, 1987, 39). Beyond this, of course, are other sects of privacy law that remain pivotal in the protection of privacy rights as it is known today.

Resources

Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc, 4 Cal. 3d 529 (CA Sup. Ct. 1971). https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/4/529.html
Constitute Project. (2021). Grenda 1973, reinstated 1991, revised 1992. https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Grenada_1992?lang=en
Constitute Project. (2021). Saint Kitts and Nevis 1983. https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Kitts_and_Nevis_1983?lang=en
Gadja, A. (2018). Privacy, press, and the right to be forgotten in the United States. Washington Law Review 93(1), 201-264. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3144077
Heffernan, W.C. (2016). Privacy and the American Constitution: New rights through interpretation of an old text. Palgrave Macmillan.
Hixon, R.F. (1987). Privacy in a public society: Human rights in conflict. Oxford University Press.
Library of Congress. (2021, Mar. 15). Brazil: Federal supreme court decides right to be forgotten is not supported by constitution. https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2021-03-15/brazil-federal-supreme-court-decides-right-to-be-forgotten-is-not-supported-by-constitution/
U.S. Constitution. (1787). https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript

===Is there a perception that this right is above or higher than other fundamental rights, or in general, that it has a particular place in a hierarchy of rights?===
Joseph Wronka posits that the UDHR has tiers of rights, arranged by article. Article 1, human dignity, is the first and foremost right. Articles 2-21, which includes the right to privacy in Article 12, are civil and political rights, protecting people from their government. The right to speech, press, religion, and vote are also protected in these articles (Wronka, 1994; UDHR 1948). Below these rights were the positive rights in which a government should provide “to ensure an existence worthy of human dignity” and solidarity rights (Wronka, 1994). So, there is some recognition of a hierarchy between fundamental rights, but nothing has been written on the hierarchy among rights of the same tier.

In practice, however, privacy seems to be overshadowed by other rights. On one hand, privacy rights can overtake rights such as the freedoms of speech and press. On the other hand, these rights have stifled privacy rights in many instances. Hixon suggests that privacy rights prevail in cases of information gathering but press and speech rights prevail during and after publishing (Hixon, 1987, 178). Mills suggests this difference in protection is due to the publication medium and the perceived benefit to the public (Mills, 2008, 36, 117).

In the United States, some scholars have noted that “free-speech and free-press rights almost always trump information privacy rights,” suggesting there is a hierarchy within fundamental rights in at least one nation (Mills, 2008, 108). Hixon referred to privacy as “at best a correlative right,” and “sociological notion,” while Milles calls it a “precondition” (Hixon, 1987, 44, 45; Mills, 2008, 116). Press freedoms only require a “newsworthy” and “public interest” standard to be upheld, while privacy rights have had to be fought for continuously in courts. In this fight, the inadequacy of American privacy law has shown through, stemming from the lack of explicit protection in the Constitution (Hixon, 1987, 76). Public figures continuously have information published about them, protected under free speech, leaving them vulnerable to the news cycles (Hixon, 1987, 133).

Resources

Hixon, R.F. (1987). Privacy in a public society: Human rights in conflict. Oxford University Press.
Mills, J.L. (2008). Privacy: The lost right. Oxford University Press.
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
Wronka, J. (1994). Human rights and social policy in the United States: An educational agenda for the 21st Century. Journal of Moral Education 23(3). https://doi.org/10.1080/0305724940230304

===What specific examples of hierarchies, manifestos, constitutions, or prioritized descriptions of rights cite this right’s high status? Low status? No status at all?===
The right to privacy is listed in many international treaties – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990), and Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). The consistency with which it is held as a fundamental right certainly suggests it’s high status. The consistency with which it is present in many national constitutions confirms this suggestion (see “What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right” above).

Resources

Convention on the Rights of the Child. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Nov. 20, 1989. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx
European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. UNGA. Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. UNGA. Dec. 18, 1990. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cmw.pdf
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

===How does federalism change, if at all, the exercise or application of this right? What examples of this can one point to?===
With federalism, there is often one state that leads the rest – in terms of privacy legislation, California leads the United States, and the German state Hessen led Germany and the European Union (Mills, 2008, 167; Petkova, 2016, 5, 4). Though the EU is not properly a federalist entity, federalism encouraged and promoted privacy as a fundamental right. Privacy rights began in Hessen, became federal law after German parliamentary action, and eventually became supranational as the EU passed encompassing privacy legislation in 1995 (Petkova, 2016, 4). Later iterations of the 1995 law led to the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation which has provisions that help regulate information privacy outside of EU borders, including in the United States.

In the United States, federalism clarifies and further protects the right to privacy. This is important because the federal right is still based on Supreme Court opinions rather than explicit constitutional provisions or legislation. This lack of explicit language allows states to “provide leadership in the privacy area because of the constitutional options available” and drive for change (Mills, 2008, 162; Petkova, 2017, 24). As of 2008, ten states in the US (Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington) explicitly protect privacy in their constitutions (Mills, 2008, Appendix II). At least twenty states have passed privacy legislation (with some overlap between the ten with constitutional provisions, namely California). State privacy legislation focuses on data privacy, improving security measures for storing personal information, notifying individuals of security breaches, and enabling security alerts and/or freezes on credit reports (Mills, 2008, 167). Most states hoped their passage would signal the federal government to pass privacy legislation (Sabin, 2021). Schwartz acknowledges that this legislation would be possible under the Commerce Clause, though the effects would depend on the text (2009, 922). Some scholars are wary of federal legislation as states have created a successful legal landscape based on experimentation and consequence, and federal legislation could disrupt the balance, create uncertainty, and be hard to amend (Bellia, 2009; Schwartz, 2009, 922-931).

Federalism results in the lack of consistent privacy laws and rights. For instance, in Germany, every company needs to have a data protection officer. In the EU, the GDPR only requires public companies and certain private companies to have this position, while allowing all other private companies to opt-in to having this role (Petkova, 2017, 20). These different laws can alter privacy protection outcomes based on the jurisdiction in which the incident took place, especially if the rights are challenged in courts. This was the case in Florida’s ''Rolling v. State''. Six college students were brutally murdered in Gainesville, Florida and their families hoped to prevent the press from releasing the photos of their bodies. Mills, who was asked to consult on the case, knew this would be a complex legal question as the Florida laws technically allowed for these records to be open to ensure police accountability, but he also knew the families would suffer severe harm were these photos to appear publicly. The Florida Supreme Court decided that the laws in place allowed for a compromise: the photos could be made available to the public by the records custodian upon a reasonable request provided there were restrictions on the copying and removal of the photos. Mills acknowledges that had the situation been occurred in another jurisdiction, the result would not have been the same and the photos likely would have been published (Mills, 2008, 247-251).

Resources

Bellia, P.L. (2009). Federalization of Information Privacy Law. Yale Law Journal 118(5), 868-900. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40389431
Mills, J.L. (2008). Privacy: The lost right. Oxford University Press.
Petkova, B. (2016). The Safeguards of Privacy Federalism. Lewis & Clark Law Review 20(2). https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Petkova%20The%20Safeguards%20of%20Privacy%20Federalsim_0.pdf
Petkova, B. (2017). Domesticating the “foreign” in making transatlantic data privacy law. International Journal of Constitutional Law 15(4), 1135-1156). https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Petkova%20Domesticating%20the%20Foreign%20in%20Making.pdf
Sabin, S. (2021, Apr. 27). States are moving on privacy bills. Morning Consult. https://morningconsult.com/2021/04/27/state-privacy-congress-priority-poll/
Schwartz, P.M. (2009). Preemption and privacy. Yale Law Journal 118(5). https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5155&context=ylj

==Limitations / Restrictions==
===What are the typical exceptions or limitations placed on this right?===
Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) presents exceptions to the right to privacy. Privacy is granted “except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (1950). The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996) allow for reasonable, non-arbitrary searches. These exceptions allow privacy to be breached with a court-issued warrant. Most exceptions stem from these documents and it should be noted that the United Nations extended the right to privacy to online spheres (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2013, I§5). Additionally, the European Union implemented the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which prevents the sharing of personal data with outside sources (Wolford, n.d.). The GDPR applies to any companies operating in or with the EU causing it to have international implications (Wolford, n.d.).

Resources

European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2014, June 30). The right to privacy in the digital age. A/HRC/27/37. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf
United States Constitution. 1787. https://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

===Under American jurisprudence, what permissible exceptions exist?===
The Fourth Amendment states “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (1791). While this amendment protects the right to privacy from the government, it also brings forth exceptions: reasonable search and seizure as well as infringements allowed by court-issued warrants seeking specific items or people. Other amendments used to extend privacy by the Supreme Court, namely the First, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth, do not have notable exceptions regarding privacy.

'''Limitations of Reasonability'''

Defining what constitutes a reasonable search has proven to be difficult. In ''Katz v. United States'' (1967) the Supreme Court ruled the Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places” and created the Katz test to determine where it is reasonable to expect privacy from law enforcement and a warrant is needed (''Katz v. United States'', 1967). This test examines whether the information was meant to be kept private and if it had been disclosed (Hu, 2018, 129). Prior to the ''Katz'' test, the court used the trespass test, a common-law approach to the Fourth Amendment in which physical intrusion can violate the Fourth Amendment. Fifty years after ''Katz'', the Court again relied on the trespass test in ''United States v. Jones'' (Hu, 2018, 130; ''United States v. Jones'', 2012). In doing so, the court claimed while the ''Katz'' test extended the right to privacy to people, it did not revoke the traditional common-law protections (''United States v. Jones'', 2012). Hu, citing Justices Sotomayor and Alito, feels that the Katz test ends before cyber-surveillance begins and recognizes the need for change (Hu, 2018, 139, 141).

In analyzing Fourth Amendment Supreme Court rulings, Orin Kerr found that four general models have been used to decide privacy cases (2017, 524). These models vary in scale (micro or macro) and normativity (normative or descriptive) and consider one of the following: how public the information is, what information was found, the actions that were taken, or whether or not government conduct should be regulated (Kerr, 2017, 506, 524). Kerr claims the last of these considerations was the basis for the ''Katz'' ruling (2017, 519). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has used all four of these models to both protect and deny privacy and has not provided clear guidance as to what is a reasonable search (Ker, 2017, 507, 508). Kerr concludes by suggesting there is no one size fits all test or model because of the importance of case facts (2017, 525). As such, Kerr would rather see many definitive models so that the limitations of reasonability are clear and contextualized for future court decisions at all levels (2017, 542).

'''Privacy Violations by a Non-Government Entity'''

The Supreme Court has rarely ruled on notable cases in which the privacy offender was not a government entity. However, in ''Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union'' (1937) the Court ruled that Senn could not invoke his privacy in work against the right to publicity of the union’s picketing (Richards, 1334). In the opinion of the Court, Justice Brandeis held that because it was a commercial dispute and affected the competition for customers, the right to privacy was not applicable (Richards, 1334). He also protected counter-speech in this opinion (Richards, 1334).

Resources

Hu, M. (2018). Cybersurveillance intrusions and an evolving Katz privacy test. American Criminal Law Review 55(1), 127-152. https://www.law.georgetown.edu/american-criminal-law-review/in-print/volume-55-issue-1-winter-2018/cybersurveillance-intrusions-and-an-evolving-katz-privacy-test/
''Katz v. United States'', 389 U.S. 347 (1967). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/389/347
Kerr, O. (2007). Four models of Fourth Amendment protection. Stanford Law Review 60(2), 503-552. http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2010/04/Kerr.pdf
Richards N.M. (2010, Oct.). The puzzle of Brandeis, privacy, and speech. Vanderbilt Law Review 63(5) 1293-1352. https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol63/iss5/3/
United States Constitution. 1787. https://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm
''United States v. Jones'', 565 U.S. 400 (2012). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/10-1259

===Under international human rights laws, what permissible exceptions (often called derogations) exist?===
Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) presents exceptions to the right to privacy – “except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (1950). The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948, Art. 12) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996, Art. 17) only prevent arbitrary and unlawful searches, allowing for reasonable searches.

Resources

European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

===Have political theorists or philosophers discussed the permissibility of exceptions to this right?===
'''Hobbes'''

Thomas Hobbes grappled with varying different situations of privacy. In ''Leviathan'', it was mostly concerning places in which privacy and the public overlap. Generally, the public and commonwealth rights overtake those of an individual, especially in times of war, but there are some exceptions (Hobbes, 1651/1965, 130). For instance, one had the right to protect themselves with their private strength without being a threat to the commonwealth (Hobbes, 1651/1965, 138). Additionally, men could own private property and goods without interference from the Church of England and hold their own beliefs, as long as they didn’t go against the Church (Hobbes, 1651/1965, 250, 345).

In ''De Cive'' (On the Citizen), Hobbes presents an interesting dilemma – once the people form a state, the people no longer exist and instead become subjects (Hobbes, 1642/1651, 39-40). He suggests this leaves the ruler of the state with no responsibility to the subjects, able to harm them as there is no direct contract between the ruler and subjects (Hobbes, 1642/1651, 40). Without obligation, there is certainly little to prevent the ruler from imposing on subjects and revoking their privacy.

'''Locke'''

In 1689, John Locke discussed privacy in his ''Letters on Toleration''. In this essay, Locke discusses privacy in relation to the Church of England. Generally, there is no privacy from the Magistrate in matters relating to the Church, however, in some instances, privacy is afforded to private matters (Locke, 1689/2010, 43, 46). For instance, Locke claims that one may take care of one’s health without much interference at all and prevents people from telling others what to believe in unless they are a clergyman (Locke, 1689/2010, 46. 129). Additionally, if one perceives an order by a magistrate to be unlawful, they can abstain from that law, and the magistrate cannot use their private judgment to impose laws but must refer back to God’s laws (Locke, 1689/2010, 58-59).

'''Kant'''

Immanuel Kant talks a lot about Enlightenment and the formation of states. Inherently, in the creation of these states, some rights are taken away to “[harmonize] with the freedom on everyone else” (Kant, 1970, 47, 55, 73). However, these rights that are given up usually have specific limitations (Kant, 1970, 45). The government in these societies could prevent some actions but, much like Warren & Brandeis later, felt that free-thinking and reasoning were of utmost importance in developing new ideas, and suggested they be protected (Kant, 1970, 59). However, Kant also suggests limiting the right to reason because it can still “expand to its fullest” while it is limited (Kant, 1970, 59).

In Warren & Brandeis’s terms of “the right to be let alone,” Kant, in his ''Theory and Practice'', instead proposes the right to coercion, meaning all who are a part of the state are held to the same standard (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 193; Kant, 1970, 75). This coercion is imposed uniformly on all subjects, but not the ruler (Kant, 1970, 75). As long as one was conforming to the laws, there was no reason to interrupt their actions, but once conformity was broken, there was a chance to impose and alter someone’s actions (Kant, 1970, 80). Kant recognizes that Hobbes feels differently, writing directly against Hobbes’ views as put forth in De Cive, in that the ruler has no obligations to the people and may treat them how he wishes – implying no right to be let alone (Kant, 1970, 84; Hobbes, 1651, 40).

'''Sieyes'''

In his essay titled ''Views of the Executive Means Available to the Representatives of France in 1789'', Emmanuel Sieyes claims rights are inherent to a person. However, in ''What is the Third Estate'', Sieyes claims that states may use the rights it was granted by the constitution and positive law to preserve the nation and community (Sieyes, 1788/2003, 136). In terms of privacy, these statements seem to imply that privacy may sometimes be taken away from some in the interests of the public. It is important to note, though, that these impositions may not go beyond the scope of the constitution in place (Sieyes, 1788/2003, 137).

'''Mill'''

John Stuart Mill, an English thinker, recognizes that English laws tended to interfere with privacy (Mill, 1859/2011, 15). However, Mill felt that separating church and state (“spiritual and temporal authority”) prevented more interferences of law within private life, somewhat facilitating what Warren & Brandeis would later call “the right to be let alone” (Mill, 1859/2011, 24; Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 193).

Resources

Hobbes, T. (1651). De cive (T. Hobbes, Trans.). UK Public Library. (Original work published 1642). http://www.public-library.uk/ebooks/27/57.pdf
Hobbes, T. (1965). Leviathan. Liberty Fund. (Original work published 1651). http://files.libertyfund.org/files/869/0161_Bk.pdf
Kant, I. (1970). Kant: Political writings (R.S. Reiss, Ed., 2003 ed.). Cambridge University Press.
Locke, J. (2010). A letter concerning toleration and other writings (M. Goldie, Ed.). Liberty Fund. (Original work published 1689). http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2375/Locke_1560_EBk_v6.0.pdf
Mill, J.S. (2011). On liberty. Project Gutenberg. (Original work published in 1859). https://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm#Page_1
Sieyes, E. (2003). Political writings (M. Sonenscher, Ed.). Hackett Publishing Company. (Original work published in 1788).
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Should this right be limited when limiting it would jeopardize democratic norms?===
Like many rights, privacy is not absolute (Siddiky, 2011, 224). It conflicts with and is compromised in the presence of other fundamental rights and democratic norms.

'''Speech'''

The right to privacy notably conflicts with the First Amendment’s right to free speech. In some cases, the right to privacy becomes limited and less protected, but, in others, it remains protected. This protective line between speech and privacy is thin. For instance, speech protections extend to allow employers, including the government in its capacity as an employer, to be able to restrict the speech of employees in certain matters (Volokh, 2000, 1095). However, in ''Connick v. Meyers'' (1983), the United States Supreme Court decided that, while working for the government, matters of public concern are protected and private while intraoffice grievances are not (Connick v. Meyers, n.d.; Volokh, 2000, 1095).

As Warren & Brandeis suggested in ''The Right to Privacy'' in 1890, the right to privacy conflicts with the First Amendment rights. In their writings about what is now known as ‘tort privacy’ (different from ‘constitutional privacy’), they advocate for the prevention of disclosures of private affairs to the public (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 195). This distinction is still maintained today, allowing for the publishing of ‘newsworthy’ stories about public figures (Volokh, 2000, 1088; Richards, 2010, 1307). However, the courts have not defined what constitutes newsworthy and have even left the definition to juries (Volokh, 2000, 1089).

Privacy has also been limited by the Supreme Court, despite being the institution that created the protection of the right. In ''Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union'' (1937), Senn had chosen to not join the labor union and the union members began picketing around him, beginning a labor dispute and causing Senn to call for his right to privacy (Richards, 2010, 1332-1333). In this case, Justice Brandeis wrote in the opinion’s footnote, Senn was not able to invoke his right to privacy against the union’s right to publicity (Richards, 2010, 1334). In essence, in the commercial sphere between competitors, the right to privacy became inapplicable in the interest of consumers (Richards, 2010, 1334).

On the other hand, privacy has remained protected in other instances. In ''Cohen v. Cowles Media'', the Supreme Court ruled that people can contract away their right to speech (Volokh, 2000, 1057). Volokh (2000) posits this privacy extends to implied contracts, especially in professions in which privacy can be reasonably expected. Thus, the federal laws requiring confidentiality have simply allowed for repercussions to be implemented, rather than creating a new area in privacy rights (1058). In publishing, the actions of private people are protected (Richards, 2010, 1307; Volokh, 2000, 1055). Volokh (2000) posits this protection extends beyond actions to embarrassing photos or stories which exhibit a lack of dignity (1094). Generally, this protection is expressed as the public concern test, in which privacy is granted to a party as long as the public is not affected (Volokh, 2000, 1097). This general protection of the right to privacy is consistent with Richards’ (2010) conclusion from Brandeis’ writings: that privacy protections allow for new ideas to be formed through development in private conversations (1347).

'''Right to Public Trial'''

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution directly conflicts with the implicit right to privacy by granting the right to a public trial. It is argued that the use of this court structure allows for the expression of public concern and prevents corruption while increasing public confidence in the system (Siddiky, 2011, 229).

Despite the right to a public trial, the juvenile justice system was created to protect the identity of minors who committed crimes in the hopes that this protection will allow them to become contributing members to society without the judgment of a criminal past (Siddiky, 2011, 207, 241). Even with this intention, there are exceptions to this privacy. First and foremost, juveniles’ privacy has previously been limited in favor of granting other constitutional rights, including 14th Amendment due process (Siddiky, 2011, 213, 227). Privacy may also be removed if they are charged as an adult, which requires meeting varying statutory criteria depending on the jurisdiction (Siddiky, 2011, 214). Additionally, there has been some movement surrounding the reform of juvenile courts which may remove their anonymity because of perceived coddling and the high recidivism rates among teens, potentially suggesting the need for different consequences (Siddiky, 2011, 215, 217).

Outside of juvenile courts, privacy is compromised more often for the sake of public trials. Something, though, the right to privacy prevails as a judge allows a party in a suit to file anonymously (Rastgoufard, 2003, 1009). These exceptions are rare and are not entrenched in the Federal Rule of Civil Procedures, but the United States Supreme Court has allowed anonymous suits to be decided (Rastgoufard, 2003, 1023). Most notably, anonymity was granted in Roe v. Wade in which ‘Jane Roe’ was allowed to remain anonymous as pregnancy was considered to be a very private matter. Juries have also been allowed to be anonymous (Rastgoufard, 2003, 1009).

'''Property Rights'''

The right to be left alone seems like it would go hand in hand with property rights. Your property, your privacy. However, it is easy to learn who owns a piece of real estate through public records (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 355). While this has benefits mostly related to the ease of buying or selling real estate, there are few-to-no processes in place to confirm the validity of deed filings or liens, especially in the United States (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 359). However, many involved in the industry have interests in limiting privacy in this area for their professional ease (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 374). In Europe, the only people that can file these records are notaries, but the US does not offer similar protections (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 372). These infringements on the right to privacy have become more accessible with digitized records, though this is not limited to this industry (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 375). Additionally, it is probably possible to buy a house anonymously, though there is limited academic literature on how.

'''Political Preferences'''

While one has the right to cast a vote in private and not tell anyone who they voted for, that doesn’t stop people from figuring out one’s political tendencies. With party alignment shrinking, the importance of micro-targeting has grown in campaigns. As such, political parties and candidates have gathered information on voters to determine who is a supporter, who could be persuaded, and who is not likely to be a supporter (Bennett, 2015, 372). At first, parties and candidates begin by looking at state and local party registration lists (Bennett, 2015, 372). From there, they use a variety of factors, such as social media, letters to elected officials, and campaign donations, to determine issues of importance to each voter (Bennett, 372, 2015, 378). While most of this is already public information or has been willingly put out on the internet by individuals, it is not being used in the intended way, and some of the information gathered is private (Bennett, 2015, 372; 11 CFR § 102.17(c)(4)). As such, this approach is illegal in Europe, though it has become prominent in other western nations beyond the United States, such as Canada (Bennett, 2015, 373).

Resources

11 FCR § 102.17(c)(4). (2021). https://www.fec.gov/regulations/102-17/2021-annual-102#102-17-c-4
Bennett, C.J. (2015). Trends in voter surveillance in western societies: Privacy intrusions and democratic implications. Surveillance & Society 13(3/4), 370-384. https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v13i3/4.5373
Connick v. Myers. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved September 28, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1251
Rastgoufard, B. (2003). Pay attention to that green curtain: Anonymity in the courts. Case Western Reserve Law Review 53(4), 1009-1040. https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1512&context=caselrev
Richards N.M. (2010, Oct.). The puzzle of Brandeis, privacy, and speech. Vanderbilt Law Review 63(5) 1293-1352. https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol63/iss5/3/
Roscoe, E. & Szypszak, C. (2017, Summer). Privacy and public real estates records: Preserving legacy system reliability against modern threats. The Urban Lawyer 49(3), 355-391. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44648036
Siddiky, L. (2011). Keeping the court room doors closed so the doors of opportunity can remain open: An argument for maintaining privacy in the juvenile justice system. Howard Law Journal 55(205), 204-246.
Volokh, E. (2000, May). Freedom of speech and information privacy: The troubling implications of a right to stop people from speaking about you. Stanford Law Review 52(5), 1049-1124. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1229510
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Is this right often perceived as threatening to government authorities?===
The Fourth Amendment has rarely been fully realized in its long history. While the Fourth Amendment guarantees privacy in search and seizure, the states originally did not want it to apply to their procedures and noted that it had yet to be applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1260). As such, lots of cases came forward to the Supreme Court, and the Exclusionary Rule was established (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). The Exclusionary Rule prevents trials from using improperly collected evidence, but it does not fully apply the Fourth Amendment and prevent searches (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). The rule has gone through a couple of iterations based on the amendments from which it is derived by the Court. It was originally established in ''Boyd v. US'' (1886), based in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, then evolved with ''Weeks v. US'' (1914), which claimed derivation from the Fifth Amendment but appeared to be based in the Fourth. Its current state results from ''Mapp v. Ohio'' (1961) when the Court held that the Fourth Amendment was an essential feature of privacy and decided that the standards of evidence collection should be consistent between federal and state jurisdictions (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1262). However, authorities can collect whatever evidence they wish and are not held to a legal standard unless they wish to have permissible evidence in the likely-upcoming judicial proceedings (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). Additionally, there are currently many cases that have developed in which a warrant is not needed, causing even Congress, via the Government Publishing Office, to admit there has been an expansion of power given to authorities (US GPO, 1992, 1208-1209). Beyond this expansion, it is known that authorities who perform acts that are not permitted by law are rarely reprimanded, especially with search and seizure and the ability to use the “good faith” defense (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1258). These facts prevent the right to privacy from being perceived as threatening to government authorities.

Resources

Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: Exclusionary Rule. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 9, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-4/enforcing-the-fourth-amendment-the-exclusionary-rule
US Government Publishing Office (US GPO). (1992, June 29). Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure (S. Doc. 103-6). https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CONAN-1992/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-5/summary

===Is this right often curtailed by government authorities for reasons other than those which are generally viewed as permissible?===

While the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is in place to protect people’s privacy, a fact continuously recognized by the Supreme Court, it continues to leave people vulnerable to the decisions of authorities due to a lack of clarity and accountability provided by the courts (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). The Fourth Amendment is explicit in that it prevents unreasonable search and seizure (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). However, it is hard to determine what is reasonable and the Supreme Court has claimed that the reasonableness of a search is situationally dependent (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1202). Various rules and exceptions to the right to privacy have been established.

Under the Exclusionary Rule, lots of searches are carried out which are later found to be unconstitutional by a court, at which point there is little that can be done to rectify the violation of privacy rights (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). These instances are not permissible exceptions, but rather instances in which it becomes clear after the fact that privacy was violated (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted in ways that cause the government’s regulatory interests to be placed over an individual’s interests (US GPO, 1992, 1204). These interpretations have created exceptions, creating situationally specific instances in which privacy is not necessarily protected. For instance, during the execution of a search warrant, if it does not include a search clause for those occupying the location, they may not be searched, but they can be detained (US GPO, 1992, 1227). For whatever reason, the courts have viewed detainment as less intrusive than a search, so it has become allowed, though it has been debated if it is a reasonable and permissible exception without a warrant (US GPO, 1992, 1227). This debate starts with the Court’s opinions in ''Terry v. Ohio'' (1968) and ''United States v. Mendenhall''(1980) that state seizure is either restraining liberty or the belief that one is not at liberty to leave (US GPO, 1992, 1231). The ''Terry'' decision was important in other ways as well, creating another standard for search and seizure without a warrant and probable cause - authorities may stop and frisk individuals if there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (US GPO, 1992, 1230). Recently, this standard has been applied less restrictively and more often, creating some tension between the right to privacy and public safety (GPO, 1992, 1231).

Exceptions don’t just result from court rulings. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 permitted information sharing between law enforcement agencies without notice, leading many to believe more privacy violations were occurring (Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.). However, some scholars argue while privacy is more elusive under the presence of this law, privacy is not hindered as most of us remain unconcerned about the information that may or may not be collected about us resulting in little or no behavioral change (Rubel, 2007, 148-149). At the same time, however, “lack of privacy bears upon how we act,” as does the knowledge that others may have access to our information, so the right becomes less protected under the PATRIOT Act (Rubel, 2007, 142, 153).

Resources

Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: Exclusionary Rule. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 9, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-4/enforcing-the-fourth-amendment-the-exclusionary-rule
Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act. (n.d.) Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm
Rubel, A. (2007, Mar.). Privacy and the USA Patriot Act: Rights, the value of rights, and autonomy. Law and Philosophy 26(2), 119-159. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-005-5970-x
US Government Publishing Office (US GPO). (1992, June 29). Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure (S. Doc. 103-6). https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CONAN-1992/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-5/summary
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001). https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/3162

===Is this right at times curtailed by private actors?===
'''Privacy Torts'''

Privacy violations under tort law was how Warren & Brandeis originally developed the right in 1890 (Citron, 2010, 1805). These violations, usually unwanted intrusions or disclosures can result from negligent or intentional actions and result in civil lawsuits rather than questions of constitutional legality (Citron, 2010, 1806; Tort, n.d.). Violations are hard to define as they change with technology (the original call for privacy was in relation to the ‘instant photograph’), which creates more and more opportunities for violations (Citron, 2010, 1809; Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 195). However, the law changes slower than technology creating some disconnect in legal remedies for new technology (Citron, 2010, 1810).

'''Constitutional Privacy'''

Constitutions only protect people from government actors and international covenants only affect the laws and regulations which governments put in place (Hudson, 2018; Dunn, 2009). Even so, most allowances of government invasions of privacy in the United States have evolved because the government mimicked the actions of private actors, placing private conduct at the baseline of privacy expectations (Kamin, 2004, 101, 115).

At a basic level, once information is willingly given to someone other than oneself, the courts have continuously ruled that there is no longer the expectation for privacy. This holds true with information that is given to both private companies and individuals (Kamin, 2004, 101). The ''Katz'' decision somewhat demonstrates this curtailment of privacy by creating the plain view doctrine. If something is in plain view, even in a private space, it is not private (Kamin, 2004, 104). This decision extrapolates on the theory that as long as someone else may reasonably have that information, it is an unprotected area under the Fourth Amendment (Kamin, 2004, 104). So, by letting someone into one’s home or publishing information online, one is inherently limiting their Fourth Amendment protections. As such, authorities can ask private companies to perform searches or subpoena these actors rather than those they are investigating, depending on the company’s privacy policies (Kamin, 2004, 102, 137).

In ''United States v. Jacobsen'' (1984) privacy protections were tested when officials were able to open a package that FedEx had damaged and opened for insurance purposes (Kamin, 2004, 99, ''United States v. Jacobsen'', 1984). Upon its opening, FedEx employees suspected the package contained cocaine (Kamin, 2004, 99; United States v. Jacobsen, n.d.). Had federal officials gotten to it first, it would not have been able to be searched, even if it was damaged, but the information provided by FedEx from the private search was enough to imply the plain view doctrine thus permitting a warrantless search by the DEA (Kamin, 2004, 100; United States v. Jacobsen, n.d.; ''US v. Jacobsen'', 1984). The Supreme Court upheld the granting of the search and subsequent arrest warrant which was obtained because the DEA confirmed the contents were cocaine based on the ‘tip’ from private actors (United States v. Jacobsen, n.d.). The Court said that “[w]hether those invasions were accidental or deliberate, and whether they were reasonable or unreasonable, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of their private character” (''US v. Jacobsen'', 1984). Kamin (2004) goes as far as to say that “[t]he fact that the private actor did something the government would not have been permitted to do simply did not covert the subsequent, otherwise reasonable, police conduct into a search that implicated the Fourth Amendment” (100-101). That is to say, after the package was opened due to the damage by a non-governmental party, privacy could no longer be expected, despite that it is reasonable to expect privacy during shipping (Kamin, 2004, 100).

Resources

Citron, D.K. (2010, Dec. 1). Mainstreaming Privacy Torts. California Law Review 98(6). https://www.jstor.org/stable/25799956
Dunn, C. (2009, Apr. 28). Applying the Constitution to private actors (New York Law Journal). NYCLU ACLU of New York. https://www.nyclu.org/en/publications/column-applying-constitution-private-actors-new-york-law-journal
Hudson, D.L. (2018, Oct. 20). In the age of social media, expand the reach of the First Amendment. Human Rights Magazine 43(4), n.p. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/the-ongoing-challenge-to-define-free-speech/in-the-age-of-socia-media-first-amendment/
Kamin, S. (2004, Dec. 1). The private is public: The relevance of private actors in defining the Fourth Amendment. Boston College Law Review 46(1), 83-147. https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2293&context=bclr
Tort. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 15, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tort
United States v. Jacobsen. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1167
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 US 109 (1984). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/466/109
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Is this right subject to specific limitations in event of emergency (war, brief natural disaster [weather, earthquake], long-run natural disaster [volcano, fire, disease])? Can such limitations be defined in advance with reference to the disaster in question?===
Privacy protections are typically limited in times of emergency, but the type of emergency seems to dictate its limitations.

'''Natural Disasters'''

A Wilson Center report from 2013 outlines various times in which natural disasters have elicited temporary easing of privacy rules to aid in searching for missing persons. The first examples were from Australia after the 2002 Bali earthquake and the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami. During the Bali earthquake, many governmental agencies had to spend time creating their own missing persons reports (Reidenberg, Gellman, Debelak, Elewa, & Liu, 2013, 12). This was recognized as a waste of resources in light of the disaster and the importance of timeliness (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 12). The 2004 tsunamis renewed this sentiment (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 12). In response to these impeded disaster responses, Australia passed Part VIA to the Australian Privacy Act in 2006 (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13). Part VIA allows for sharing of otherwise protected information through a government emergency declaration if “(1) the entity reasonably believes that the individual may be involved in the disaster; and (2) the collection, use or disclosure of personal information is for a permitted purpose related to the disaster” (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13, 14). It also has stipulations on how long these special provisions can be in place and works for events both in and out of Australian borders while specifically preventing disclosure to media outlets (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13-14)
.
Despite New Zealand’s comprehensive privacy laws, similar actions were taken in New Zealand after the 2011 Christchurch earthquake. There were stipulations in the Privacy Act to permit the sharing of information in some circumstances, it was unclear if they directly applied to natural disaster emergencies (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 15). This lack of clarity was impeding rescue efforts and the Privacy Commissioner, who is granted some discretion through the Privacy Act, took steps to allow temporary authorization of information sharing concerning the emergency at hand (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 16). Incidentally, many realized that this liberation of privacy issues reassured a variety of sectors’ information sharing in their emergency response (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 17). These reassurances caused the Privacy Commissioner to propose and pass the Civil Defence National Emergencies (Information Sharing) Code in 2013, allowing for these different privacy stipulations to be counted on during emergency planning (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 19).

The United States notoriously lacks privacy law. However, there is regulation in the medical field – Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1966 (HIPAA). HIPAA was somewhat suspended after Hurricane Katrina in light of nine of the eleven New Orleans hospitals incapacitated and people fleeing to surrounding states to receive medical attention (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 19-21). It prioritized providing treatment over payment and aided in locating missing persons by publishing facility directories (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 21). This privacy law alteration was less comprehensive than those in New Zealand and Australia after natural disasters, but it shows that the response regarding privacy exceptions is dependent on need.

All of these disasters culminated in the creation of the Missing Persons Community of Interest (MPCI), in which non-government actors collaborated to create standardized missing persons databases after disasters (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 25). At the time the report was written, there were five interlocking systems to record who was missing and try to connect these people with worried family (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 27). These systems were used multiple times from 2006 to 2012 when this report was written (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 27). The systems all have varying balances of access and privacy and, interestingly, one of these services is run by the International Committee of the Red Cross out of Geneva, Switzerland and is explicitly exempt from the Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 29, 35). Additionally, in 2011, the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners on Data Protection and Major Natural Disasters asked countries to review their privacy laws to make sure they were flexible in the event of a major natural disaster (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 73).

'''Disease'''

Rothstein (2020) suggests the following be considered when creating policy exceptions and interventions to health information during disease outbreaks: (1) necessity and effectiveness, (2) proportionality and minimal infringement, (3) purpose limitations, and (4) justice (1374). Policies that become altered during the outbreak should remain monitored for continued justification of the alteration and should discontinue at the end of the outbreak (Rothstein, 2020, 1375).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Canada realized the conflict between the creation of a public health database and data privacy law. Data privacy laws vary by province (some have legislation, others default to federal law), sector (public and private), and profession (i.e., healthcare data is strictly regulated) (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 454-455). Generally, data cannot be shared between provinces, though this is debated based on local and federal laws, nor used for purposes other than for which it was collected (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 455). However, all these limits can be loosened during public health emergencies. There are legislative carve-outs for combating health risks, and during COVID-19 the Privacy Commissioner allowed officials to forgo consent from each individual, a privilege that is repealed after the emergency (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 455).

'''War'''

McDonald (2020) describes privacy as a social good and notes there is a trade-off between privacy and national security, claiming these rights are dependent on context (380). As such, these privacy limitations can be toward individuals or society, but they usually come to light ex parte (McDonald, 2020, 385, 380). However, it is unclear who dictates when this trade-off between privacy and security begins, ends, or how invasive it is as war surveillance is largely unregulated; there is no law of war regarding privacy (McDonald, 2020, 385, 386). It seems feasible violations can be committed by both one’s own country and the opposition. By one’s own country in the sense that they don’t want traitors, resulting in actions similar to how the United States placed Japanese Americans into internment camps during WWI or passed the Sedition Act of 1798 (Share America, 2015). Alternatively, the opposition can somewhat feasibly be expected to also survey those they are at war against, especially when attacking and trying to avoid civilian injury (McDonald, 2020, 381). Enemies may also invade privacy through espionage and intelligence which isn’t necessarily legal under international law though it is not limited to wartime (Pun, 2017, 360-361, 364; McDonald, 2020, 384).

Resources

Bernier, A. & Knoppers, B.M. (2020, June 26). Pandemics, privacy, and public health research. Canadian Journal of Public Health 111(4), 454-457. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7318908/pdf/41997_2020_Article_368.pdf
McDonald, J. (2020). Information, privacy, and just war theory. Ethics & International Affairs 34(3), 379-400. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679420000477
Pun, D. (2017, Summer). Rethinking espionage in the Modern Era. Chicago Journal of International Law 18(1), 353-391. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol18/iss1/10/
Quinton, A. (1988, Autumn). Plagues and morality. Social Research: An International Quarterly 55(3), 451-462. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40970516
Reidenberg, J.R., Gellman, R., Debelak, J., Elewa, A., & Liu, N. (2013). Privacy and missing persons after natural disasters. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Commons Lab. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/privacy-and-missing-persons-after-natural-disasters
Rothstein, M.A. (2020, Aug. 12). Public health and privacy in the pandemic. American Journal of Public Health 110(9), 1374-1375. https://www.doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2020.305849
Share America. (2015, Apr. 6). Civil liberties in wartime. United States Department of State. Retrieved October 18, 2021, https://share.america.gov/civil-liberties-wartime/

==Utilitarian / Fairness Assessments==
===Is there a cost attached to protecting and enforcing this right? What kinds of costs are implicated?===
====Short-term economic cost in general====
====Long-term economic cost in general====
====Cost to those least able to economically absorb the cost====
====Cost to perceived democratic legitimacy====
====Cost to consistency or coherence of the law as a whole====
====Cost to the legitimacy or effectiveness of other rights====
====Cost to considerations of social equality====
====Cost to other non-material goods not so far specified====
===What are the financial consequences, if any, of making this right a legally protectable right?===
===Are there any groups that are uniquely disadvantaged by the exercise of this right?===
===Are there any groups that uniquely benefit from the exercise of this right?===
===Are there instances when this fundamental right can lead to unfairness or inequities?===
===Are there objective ways to measure the utilitarian nature of this right?===
===If so, where can one draw the line: when does this right stop being useful or economically viable?===
==Looking Ahead==
===How can we expect this right to change and evolve in the years ahead?===
===How is the future likely to shape the exercise of this right?===
===Will the exercise or protection of this right be affected by technological changes?===
===Under what conditions would this right become irrelevant?===
===Are questions of fairness and utility pertaining to this right likely to change in the years ahead?===
==Policy Recommendations==
===Can the practice or exercise of this right be shaped through executive action?===
===In the US context, are there particular parties with a stake or interest in amending or reconceptualizing this right?===
===In the US context, can this right be altered legislatively, or would it require a constitutional amendment?===
===Is this right best addressed at the national level? The sub-national level? The international level?===
===To what extent is this right shaped primarily by judicial decisions?===
===If this right is best addressed through the amendment process, how should it proceed?===
===If this right were unlimited, what might be the consequences (positive and negative)?===
===If this right were eliminated, what might be the consequences (positive and negative)?===

Source/Privacy Rights

2022-08-03T17:22:10Z

Kbrard: /* Millian Utilitarianism */

==History==
===What is the oldest source in any country that mentions this right?===
Most sources say that the first mention of this right is ''The Right to Privacy'' written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis and published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890. Both were Boston attorneys and Brandeis would go on to serve as a United States Supreme Court Justice for 23 years (Louis Brandeis, n.d.). In this essay, they note that the legal scope of rights broadens over time and posit that the right to life has expanded to “the right to be let alone,” which had become an increasingly difficult feat with new technologies (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 193, 195).

Warren and Brandeis (1890) acknowledge that, at the time, there was little-to-no legal protection of this right. They look at defamation law and determine while it alludes to privacy law, there are limitations to privacy protection from this area of law as it only considers a damaged reputation, not instances in which an individual wishes something remained secret (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 197; Bycer, 2014). They also looked at copywriting and publishing law, which only applies to one’s own work (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 199). They determine that the right to privacy can extend beyond these areas of law as the right should be able to wholly prevent the depiction of private life (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 218). In the last part of this essay, they set out limitations to the right of privacy – privileged information remains under defamation law (to allow for the operation of courts), privacy ceases with consent to publish, gossip is not in the realm of privacy law, and intention and truth do not prevent a breach of such right.

However, Warren and Brandeis cite at least two instances that predate ''The Right to Privacy'' which discuss the right to privacy. The earliest is the citing of an 1820 statement from Lord Cottenham, who, in agreement with Lord Eldon, felt that were a king’s illnesses recorded by a doctor and published while that king was still alive, a court would not permit its publishing, as he claimed this circumstance would breach the king’s privacy (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 205; Bycer, 2014). Additionally, they acknowledge that the right to privacy has already been regulated in France since 1868. Section 11 of the 1868 Loi Relative à la Presse (Press Law) says that all periodic writings about a private fact of life are violations punishable by a fine of 500 francs. Pursuit of the violation may only be undertaken by the affected party (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 214, footnote 1). Beyond what Warren & Brandeis cited as earlier mentions, there was also the 1801 Haitian Constitution which provided the home was inviolable from government invasion in Article 63 (Theodore, 2000).

Resources

Bycer, M. (2014). Understanding the 1890 Warren and Brandeis “The Right to Privacy” Article. National Juris University. Retrieved Sept. 10, 2021, from https://nationalparalegal.edu/UnderstandingWarrenBrandeis.aspx
Louis Brandeis. (2020, Nov. 9). Britannica. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.britannica.com/biography/Louis-Brandeis
Theodore, Charmant. (2000). Haitian Constitution of 1801 (English). Louverture Project. http://thelouvertureproject.org/index.php?title=Haitian_Constitution_of_1801_(English)
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right? BUILD IN COLLAPSE EXPAND TOGGLE===
====Afghanistan====
The 1964 Afghan Constitution protected only the right to privacy in the home in Article 28 (Constitute Project, “Afghanistan 1964 Constitution”). Today, Article 38 offers similar protections and Article 37 protects communications (Constitute Project, “Afghanistan 2004 Constitution”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Afghanistan_1964?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Afghanistan_2004?lang=en

====Albania====
Today, privacy is guaranteed in Articles 35 (data), 36 (correspondence), and 37 (home) of the 1998 constitution (Constitute Project, “Albania 1998 rev. 2016”). This appears to be their first protection of privacy rights.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Albania_2016?lang=en

====Algeria====
Today, the 2020 constitution protects the inviolability of the domicile in Article 47 and, in Article 46, private life and private communication (Constitute Project, “Algeria 2020”). Previously, these rights were protected in the 1976 Constitution in Articles 39 and 40 (International Constitutional Law Project, Algeria Constitution”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Algeria_2020?lang=en
https://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ag00000_.html

====Andorra====
Articles 14 and 15 of the first and only Andorran constitution protect privacy in the state. Article 14 protects privacy, honor, and reputation, while Article 15 protects the home and communications (Constitute Project, “Andorra 1993”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Andorra_1993?lang=en

====Angola====
Today, privacy rights are protected in Articles 32 (personal and family life), 33 (home), and 34 (correspondence and communication) of the 2010 constitution.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Angola_2010?lang=en

====Antigua and Barbuda====
In the constitution, Article 3, Section C protects the right to privacy in personal and family life, as well as the home (Constitute Project, “Antigua and Barbuda 1981”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Antigua_and_Barbuda_1981?lang=en

====Argentina====
Articles 18 & 19 of the 1853 constitution protect privacy. Article 18(2) reads, “The residence is inviolable, as are letters and private papers; and a law shall determine in what cases and for what reasons their search and seizure shall be allowed,” while Article 19 reads, “The private actions of men that in no way offend public order or morality, nor injure a third party, are reserved only to God, and are exempt from the authority of the magistrates” (Constitute Project, “Argentina 1832, reinst. 1983, rev. 1994”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Argentina_1994?lang=en

====Armenia====
The 1995 Armenian constitution protects three main privacy rights in Articles 31-33: personal life, home, and communication (Constitute Project, “Armenia 1995 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Armenia_2015?lang=en

====Australia====
Privacy rights are not prescribed in the Constitution of Australia (Australian Human Rights Commission, “How are human rights protected in Australia?”). Beyond the international covenants, such as the ICCPR, privacy was first protected in the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT Human Rights Commission, “Human Rights”).

https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/rights-and-freedoms/how-are-human-rights-protected-australian-law
https://hrc.act.gov.au/humanrights/

====Austria====
According to the Austrian Embassy in Washington, D.C., the ratification of the ECHR by Austria in 1958 gave the treaty constitutional law standing in the state. The ECHR is what protects the right to privacy in Austria.

https://www.austria.org/human-rights-and-the-council-of-europe

====Azerbaijan====
Today, Article 32 of the 1995 constitution protects privacy. It is quite detailed but protects personal privacy, family life, personal information, and correspondence. Article 33 extends privacy rights to the residence (Constitute Project, “Azerbaijan 1995 rev. 2016”). Previously, privacy rights had been protected by the 1977 Soviet Constitution (see below).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Azerbaijan_2016?lang=en

====The Bahamas====
Article 15(c) protects the right to privacy in one’s home. Article 21 extends this right to exist during searches (Constitute Project, “Bahamas (The) 1973”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bahamas_1973?lang=en

====Bahrain====
Articles 25 & 26 of the 2002 constitution protect privacy in the home and all types of communication (Constitute Project, “Bahrain 2002 rev. 2017”). This constitution was the first establishment of privacy rights in Bahrain.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bahrain_2017?lang=en

====Bangladesh====
Article 43 of the constitution grants the right to privacy in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Bangladesh 1972, reinst. 1986, rev. 2014”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bangladesh_2014?lang=en

====Barbados====
Article 11(b) of the constitution grants every person in Barbados privacy of their home. Article 20(1) prevents interference in correspondence (Constitute Project, “Barbados 1966 rev. 2007”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Barbados_2007?lang=en

====Belarus====
Article 28 of the constitution protects private life in Belarus (Constitute Project, “Belarus 1994 rev. 2004”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Belarus_2004?lang=en

====Belgium====
Since 1831, Belgium has had one constitution, only amended 33 times. Article 15 protects one’s privacy in the home. Article 22 protects private life. Article 29 protects private letters (Constitute Project, “Belgium 1831 rev. 2014”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Belgium_2014?lang=en

====Belize====
In its only constitution since its independence, Belize protects privacy rights in Article 3(c). It protects family life, personal privacy, one’s home, and their dignity (Constitute Project, “Belize 1981 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Belize_2011?lang=en

====Benin====
Today, the 1990 constitution protects privacy in the home and of correspondence in Articles 20 and 21, respectively (Constitute Project, “Benin 1990”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Benin_1990?lang=en

====Bhutan====
In 2008, a new constitution was passed, which protected privacy rights in Article 19. Article 19 reads: A person shall not be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence nor to unlawful attacks on the person’s honour and reputation” (Bhutan’s National Council, “The Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan”).

https://www.nationalcouncil.bt/assets/uploads/docs/acts/2017/Constitution_of_Bhutan_2008.pdf

====Bolivia====
Today, privacy rights are protected in Article 21(3). These protections are general, while Article 25 protects more specific privacy rights in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2009”). This document is the 17th constitution since 1826, but other versions in English could not be found, so privacy rights may have a longer history in Bolivia.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009?lang=en

====Bosnia and Herzegovina====
Privacy rights have been protected in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995 with their independence from Yugoslavia. The 1995 constitution protects these rights in Article 3(f). These protections include private and family life, home, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 rev. 2009”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bosnia_Herzegovina_2009?lang=en

====Botswana====
The 1966 constitution of Botswana includes privacy protections of the home in Article 3(c) and Article 9. Article 12, in protecting freedom of expression, also protects correspondence (Constitute Project, “Botswana 1966 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Botswana_2016?lang=en

====Brazil====
In its first constitution, Brazil only claimed the inviolability of private letters in Article 179(XXVII) (WikiSource, “Constitution of the Empire of Brazil”). Since then, privacy rights have expanded, and today personal privacy, the home, and correspondence are protected in Article 5(X-XII) (Constitute Project, “Brazil 1988 rev. 2017”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2017?lang=en
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Empire_of_Brazil

====Brunei====
Brunei lacks any legislation or constitutional provisions for privacy rights. The 1996 United States Department of State Report on Brunei Human Rights even says that law actively allows for intrusions of privacy.

https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/brunei.html

====Bulgaria====
The right to privacy, including family life, private life, honor, dignity, and reputation, is protected in Article 32 of the 1991 constitution (Constitute Project, “Bulgaria 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Bulgaria_2015?lang=en

====Burkina Faso====
The 1991 Burkina Faso Constitution protects privacy rights in Article 6. It reads, “The residence, the domicile, private and family life, [and] the secrecy of correspondence of every person, are inviolable. It can only be infringed according to the forms and in the cases specified by the law” (Constitute Project, “Burkina Faso 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Burkina_Faso_2015?lang=en

====Burundi====
The earliest mention of privacy rights in the Burundi Constitution is from the 1998 interim constitution. In this writing, privacy rights are contained in Article 23 and protect privacy, family, home, and correspondence (Constitution Net, “Constitution of Burundi”). Today, they are contained in Article 28 of the 2018 constitution (Constitute Project, “Burundi 2018”).

http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/transitional_national_constitution_and_transitional_constitution_act_1998-2001_0.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Burundi_2018?lang=en

====Cambodia====
The 1993 constitution contains privacy rights in Article 40: “The rights to privacy of residence, and to the confidentiality of correspondence by mail, telegram, fax, telex and telephone, shall be guaranteed” (Office of the Council of the Ministers of Cambodia, “Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia”).

https://pressocm.gov.kh/en/archives/9539

====Cameroon====
In the Preamble of the 1972 constitution, privacy is granted to the home and correspondence in points 5 and 6 (Constitute Project, “Cameroon 1972 rev. 2008”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cameroon_2008?lang=en

====Canada====
The Canadian Constitution has been in force since 1867 and is comprised of a couple of Acts. For privacy purposes, the most important is the Constitution Act of 1982, which contains the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In this section, Article 7 provides the most privacy protection that is seen in the constitution, protecting the right to life, liberty, and security of a person (Constitute Project, “Canada 1867 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Canada_2011?lang=en

====Cape Verde====
Article 33 makes violations of privacy inadmissible in court, while Article 38 grants the right to “personal identity, to civil rights, to a name, honor, and reputation, and to personal and family privacy”. Article 41 extends privacy rights to correspondence, and Article 42 extends it to electronic data privacy (Constitute Project, “Cape Verde 1980 rev. 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cape_Verde_1992?lang=en

====Central African Republic====
In 1994, a new constitution was passed in the Central African Republic. Article 13 granted private communications inviolable and Article 14 did the same for the private home (African Child Forum, “Constitution of the Central African Republic”). Today, private communication is seen in Article 16 and the home is inviolable in Article 19 (Constitute Project, “Central African Republic 2016”).

http://www.africanchildforum.org/clr/Legislation%20Per%20Country/CAR/car_constitution_1995_en.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Central_African_Republic_2016?lang=en

====Chad====
Both the 1996 and 2018 Chad Constitutions protect the right to privacy in Article 17 and the right to privacy in communications in Article 45 and 47, respectively (Constitute Project, “Chad").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chad_2015?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chad_2018?lang=en

====Chile====
The 1925 Chilean Constitution protected the inviolability of the home and correspondence in Article 10 Sections 12 & 13 (Constitute Project, “Chile 1925”). Today, the home is protected in Article 19 Section 5 (Constitute Project, “Chile 1980 rev. 2021”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chile_2021?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Chile_1925?lang=en

====China====
In 1975, the Chinese Constitution protected the right to privacy to the person and the home in Chapter III, Article 28 (Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 1975, 39). Today, Articles 38-40 protect privacy in China. Article 38 is for personal dignity, 39 for the home, and 40 for correspondence (Constitute Project, “China (People’s Republic of) 1982 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/China_2018?lang=en
https://china.usc.edu/sites/default/files/article/attachments/peoples-republic-of-china-constitution-1975.pdf

====Colombia====
The 1991 Colombian constitution is very explicit in its privacy protections in Article 15. Section 1 grants privacy to people and family life, section 2 is for data privacy, section 3 is for correspondence (Constitute Project, “Colombia 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Colombia_2015?lang=en

====Comoros====
Today, privacy provisions are in Article 26 and Article 27, which grant privacy in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Comoros 2018”). Before this constitution, similar clauses were in the 1996 constitutional preamble, drawn from the United Nations Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man (Constitution Net, “CONSTITUTION of the FEDERAL ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF THE COMOROS”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Comoros_2018?lang=en
http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/Comoros%20Constitution.pdf

====Democratic Republic of the Congo====
The personal right to privacy is granted in Article 31 of the 2005 Constitution, while the home is protected under Article 29 (Constitute Project, “Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 2005 rev. 2011”). Before this, the right to privacy in home and correspondence were granted in the Zaire 1990 constitution (amended from a previous version, though unclear which previous version) in Articles 22 & 23 (World Statesmen, “Complete Text of the Zairian Constitution After the Enactment of Law No. 90-002 of July 5, 1990 Concerning the Modification of Certain Provisions of the Constitution”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo_2011?lang=en
https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Zaire1990.pdf

====Republic of the Congo====
The only mention of privacy rights today is that of the home in Article 20 of the 2015 Constitution (Constitute Project, “Congo (Republic of the) 2015”). The same right appeared in the 2001 Constitution in Article 14 (Constitute Project, “Congo (Republic of the) 2001”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Congo_2015?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Congo_2001?lang=en

====Costa Rica====
Today, privacy rights are protected in Articles 23 (the home) and 24 (communications and intimacy) (Constitute Project, “Costa Rica 1949 rev. 2020”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa_Rica_2020?lang=en

====Croatia====
Article 34 of the 1991 constitution protects the home. Article 35 protects personal and familial life, as well as dignity. Article 36 protects correspondence (Constitute Project, “Croatia 1991 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Croatia_2013?lang=en

====Cuba====
The 2019 constitution protects personal and familial privacy in Article 48, the home in Article 49, and correspondence in Article 50 (Constitute Project, “Cuba 2019”). Privacy was not in the previous Cuban constitution of 1976 (Constitute Project, “Cuba 1976 rev. 2002”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2019?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cuba_2002?lang=en

====Cyprus====
Article 15 of the 1960 constitution reads: “Every person has the right to respect for his private and family life.” Article 16 expands these protections to the home, as Article 17 expands them to correspondence and communication (Constitute Project, “Cyprus 1960 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Cyprus_2013?lang=en

====Czech Republic====
Article 7(1) of the 1993 constitution guarantees the inviolability of persons and private life. Article 10 protects life from intrusion by others, and it also protects data privacy (Constitute Project, “Czech Republic 1993 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Czech_Republic_2013?lang=en

====Denmark====
Today, Article 72 protects the right to privacy in the home, while also preventing the search of private communications (Constitute Project, “Demark 1953”). The general form of the constitution derives from the 1849 Danish Constitution (Danish Parliament, “The Constitutional Act of Denmark”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Denmark_1953?lang=en
https://www.thedanishparliament.dk/en/democracy/the-constitutional-act-of-denmark

====Djibouti====
Today, the right to privacy in the home and communications are protected in the 1992 constitution Articles 12 & 13. Personal life is not protected (Constitute Project, “Djibouti 1992 rev. 2010”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominica_2014?lang=en

====Dominica====
Article 1(c) of the only constitution Dominica has had, written in 1978, protects the right to privacy in the home. Article 7(1) protects privacy during a search (Constitute Project, "Dominica 1978 rev. 2014").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominica_2014?lang=en

====Dominican Republic====
Today, Article 44 protects the right to privacy and personal honor. It reads, “All people have the right to privacy. The respect and non-interference into private and family life, the home, and private correspondence are guaranteed. The right to honor, good name, and one’s own image are recognized. All authorities or individuals who violate them are obligated to compensate or repair them in accordance with the law” (Constitute Project, “Dominican Republic 2015”). The subsections expand on these rights. In previous versions, this was the right to intimacy and personal honor (Constitute Project, “Dominican Republic 2010”). Previous constitutions could not be found in English.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominican_Republic_2015?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Dominican_Republic_2010?lang=en

====East Timor====
East Timor, or Timor-Leste, protects the right to private life, home, and communication during evidence collection in Article 34, privacy in general in Article 36, and privacy in the home and communication in Article 37 (Constitute Project, “Timor-Leste 2002”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/East_Timor_2002?lang=en

====Ecuador====
Article 11(3) enforces and protects the rights put forth by the constitution and international treaties: “The rights and guarantees set forth in the Constitution and in international human rights instruments shall be directly and immediately enforced by and before any civil, administrative or judicial servant, either by virtue of their office or at the request of the party”. In Chapter 6, Rights to Freedom, Article 66, Sections 11 and 19-22 set out more specific privacy regulations in terms of convictions, correspondence, the home, personal data, and privacy rights (Constitute Project, “Ecuador 2008 rev. 2021). There are 22 previous Ecuadorian constitutions, but English translations could not be found to investigate the presence of privacy rights.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ecuador_2021?lang=en

====Egypt====
The 1923 constitution of Egypt protects personal freedom in Article 4, privacy in the home in Article 8, and correspondence in Article 11 (Constitution Net, “Royal Decree No. 42 of 1923 On Building a Constitutional System for the Egyptian State”). Today, these rights are protected in Articles 57 & 58 (Constitute Project, “Egypt 2014 rev. 2019”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Egypt_2019?lang=en
http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/1923_-_egyptian_constitution_english_1.pdf

====El Salvador====
Article 2 of the 1983 constitution explicitly protects the “right to honor, personal and family intimacy, and one’s own image.” Article 6 allows for free communication as long as it does not violate the private lives of others. Article 24 protects correspondence (Constitute Project, “El Salvador 1983 rev. 2014”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/El_Salvador_2014?lang=en

====Equatorial Guinea====
Today, Article 13 of the 1991 constitution protects rights and freedoms. In section 1(g), the right to privacy in communications and the home is protected (Constitute Project, “Equatorial Guinea 1991 rev. 2012”). Translations of the 1968, 1973, and 1982 constitutions could not be found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Equatorial_Guinea_2012?lang=en

====Eritrea====
In its history, Eritrea has only had one constitution and it protects the right to privacy in Article 18. Specific privacies are not mentioned but it is an overarching declaration of the protection of the right: “Every person shall have the right to privacy” (Constitute Project, “Eritrea 1997”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Eritrea_1997?lang=en

====Estonia====
The 1920 constitution of Estonia protected personal privacy in Paragraph 8. Paragraph 10 protected the homestead and Paragraph 14 protected communications (Wikisource, “Constitution of the Esthonian Republic (1920)”). Today, privacy rights are guaranteed in Section 26 (Riigi Teataja, “The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia”).

https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/521052015001/consolide
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Esthonian_Republic_(1920)

====Eswatini====
Article 14(1) names and protects fundamental rights, and subsection C reads “protection of the privacy of the home and other property rights of the individual” (Constitute Project, “Eswatini 2005”). Previous iterations of the constitutions from 1967 and 1968 could not be found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Swaziland_2005?lang=en

====Ethiopia====
The 1931 constitution protects correspondence privacy in Article 26 (Ethiopian Legal Brief, “Ethiopian Constitution of 1931”). In Article 25, the home is claimed as private. Today, privacy rights are protected in Article 26 (Constitute Project, “Ethiopia 1994”).

https://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/ethiopian-constitution-of-1931.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ethiopia_1994?lang=en

====Fiji====
The 1970 Fiji constitution, its first after independence from Britain, protected the right to privacy in the home in Article 3(c) (Constitution Net, “Fiji Independence Order 1970 and Constitution of Fiji”). Today, the 2013 constitution expands the right to privacy from the home to include the right to private and family life, privacy in correspondence, and data privacy in Article 24 (Constitute Project, “Fiji 2013”).

http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/1970_constitution.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Fiji_2013?lang=en

====Finland====
Originally, the 1919 Finnish Constitution protected privacy in Section 8 (RefWorld, “Constitution Act of Finland”). Today, Section 10 of the Finnish Constitution protects the right to privacy with similar language. It says, “Everyone's private life, honour and the sanctity of the home are guaranteed. More detailed provisions on the protection of personal data are laid down by an Act. The secrecy of correspondence, telephony and other confidential communications is inviolable” (Constitute Project, “Finland 1999 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Finland_2011?lang=en
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b53418.html

====France====
The right to privacy in France is implied in Article IV of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 26 August 1789. Article IV reads, “Liberty consists of being able to do everything that does not harm anybody else: thus the exercise of the natural rights of every man has no boundaries except those that ensure to other Members of the Society the enjoyment of those same rights” (Hardt, Kiiver, Kristofertisch). The Declaration of the Rights of Man is still in force today due to the Preamble of the 1958 French Constitution.

Sascha Hardt, Phillip Kiiver & Gisela Kristofertisch. (2019). Comparative Constitutional Law Documents. “Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen [Declaration des Driots de L’Homme et du Citoyen] of 26 August 1789” and “Constitution of the V. Republic of 4 October 1958.”

====Gabon====
Article 1 of the constitution lays out fundamental rights granted within the state (Constitute Project, “Gabon 1991 rev. 2011”). Section 5 of Article 1 protects the privacy of correspondence. Section 12 claims the inviolability of the domicile. The current constitution is based on the 1961 constitution, though it was rewritten in 1991.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Gabon_2011?lang=en

====The Gambia====
Article 23 of the 1996 constitution says, “No person shall be subject to interference with the privacy of his or her home, correspondence or communications save as is in accordance with law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety of the economic well-being of the country, for the protection of health or morals, for the prevention of disorder or crime or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (Constitute Project, “Gambia (The) 1996 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Gambia_2018?lang=en

====Georgia====
Today, Article 15 in the 1995 constitution of Georgia protects the right to personal privacy, personal space, and privacy of communication. Additionally, Article 9 claims the inviolability of human dignity (Constitute Project, “Georgia 1995 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Georgia_2018?lang=en

====Germany====
German Basic Law, passed in 1949, provides for privacy in a couple of places. Article 1(1) protects an individual’s dignity, and Article 10 protects privacy in correspondence and telecommunications (Hardt, Kiiver, Rotering, & Kristofertisch). Article 13 protects the home.

Sascha Hardt, Phillip Kiiver, Gereon Rotering, & Gisela Kristofertisch. (2019). Comparative Constitutional Law Documents. “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany of 23 May 1949.”

====Ghana====
In the 1992 constitution, still in force today, the right to privacy in the home and correspondence is found in Article 18(2) (Constitute Project, “Ghana 1992 rev. 1996”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ghana_1996?lang=en

====Greece====
In the 1975 constitution, the Greeks protect the right to privacy in Article 9. This article protects the home, private, and family life. Article 9A provides constitutional data privacy protections (Constitute Project, “Greece 1975 rev. 2008”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Greece_2008?lang=en

====Grenada====
The 1973 constitution of Grenada, the country’s first, protected the right to privacy in Article 1(c) (Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, “The Grenada Constitution Order 1973”). Specifically, it protected the home and other property. Today, the 1973 constitution takes on similar language in Article 1(c) (Constitute Project, “Grenada 1973, reinst. 1991, rev. 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Grenada_1992?lang=en
https://www.cpahq.org/media/gq5dtcj5/gre_constitution.pdf

====Guatemala====
There are two provisions for privacy protection in the 1985 Guatemalan Constitution. Article 23 grants privacy in the home (vivienda) and Article 24 protects correspondence and other documents (Constitute Project, “Guatemala 1985 rev. 1993”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Guatemala_1993?lang=en

====Guinea====
The 2010 constitution of Guinea protects private life, correspondence, and the home in Article 12: “The domicile is inviolable. It may be infringed only in the case of grave and imminent peril, to evade [parer] a
common danger or to protect the life of the persons. All other infringement, all search may only be ordered by the judge or by the authority that the law designates and in the forms prescribed by it.
The secrecy of correspondence and of communication is inviolable. Each one has the right to the protection of their private life” (Constitute Project, “Guinea’s Constitution of 2010”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Guinea_2010.pdf

====Guinea-Bissau====
Article 44 of the 1984 constitution grants the right to protection of personal and private life. Article 48 grants privacy in the home and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Guinea-Bissau 1984 rev. 1996”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Guinea_Bissau_1996?lang=en

====Guyana====
In 1966, Guyana gained independence from Britain and, in the same order, passed its constitution. The 1966 constitution provided for protection in the home from others in Article 3(c) (Guyana Parliament, “The Guyana Independence Order 1966”).

http://parliament.gov.gy/new2/documents/bills/21123/statutory_instrument_guyana_independence_order_1966_no_575.pdf

====Haiti====
In 1801, the first constitution of Haiti protected the privacy of the home in Article 63 (Louverture Project, “Constitution of 1801”). Today, Article 49 of the 1987 constitution protect protects communications (Constitute Project, “Haiti 1987 rev. 2012”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Haiti_2012?lang=en
http://thelouvertureproject.org/index.php?title=Haitian_Constitution_of_1801_(English)

====Honduras====
The 1982 constitution provides for privacy protections in Article 76. In this text, one is granted “The right to honor, to personal privacy, to family, and to one's dignity” (Constitute Project, “Hungary 1982 rev. 2013").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Honduras_2013?lang=en

====Hungary====
The 1949 constitution was the first to include privacy rights. In Article 57, personal privacy, as well as privacy in the home and correspondence are protected: “he Hungarian People's Republic guarantees the personal freedom and privileges of the citizens, and respects the secrecy of correspondence and the inviolability of the home” (Princeton University, “CONSTITUTION of the People's Republic of Hungary - Budapest, 20th August 1949”). In the most recent constitution from 2011, these rights are protected in Article VI (Constitute Project, “Hungary 2011 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Hungary_2016?lang=en
https://lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/hungary/1949%20Hungarian%20constitution.pdf

====Iceland====
Article 71 says, “Everyone shall enjoy freedom from interference with privacy, home, and family life” (Constitute Project, “Iceland 1944 rev. 2013”). This article is in the 1944 constitution, which is largely based on the 1874 constitutional text that preceded it (Icelandic Human Rights Center, “Icelandic Law”).

https://www.humanrights.is/en/laws-conventions/icelandic-law
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Iceland_2013?lang=en

====India====
While not explicitly mentioned in the Indian constitution, the right to privacy has been recognized by the Indian Supreme Court. In 2017, they ruled unanimously that the right to privacy for all people falls under Article 21, which provides the “protection of life and personal liberty” (McCarthy; Mahapatra & Choudhary).

McCarthy, J. (2017, Aug. 24). Indian Supreme Court declares privacy a fundamental right. NPR. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/24/545963181/indian-supreme-court-declares-privacy-a-fundamental-right
Mahapatra, D. & Choudhary, A.A. (2017, Aug. 24). Right to privacy is a fundamental right, it is intrinsic to the right to life: Supreme Court. Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/right-to-privacy-is-a-fundamental-right-supreme-court/articleshow/60203394.cms

====Indonesia====
Article 28G grants the right to privacy. It reads, “Every person shall have the right to protection of his/herself, family, honour, dignity, and property, and shall have the right to feel secure against and receive protection from the threat of fear to do or not do something that is a human right” (Constitute Project, Indonesia 1954 reinst. 1959, rev. 2002”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Indonesia_2002?lang=en

====Iran====
While the constitution of Iran does not protect privacy, it does guarantee protection of the law which conforms with Islamic Law in Article 20 (Constitute Project, “Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1979 rev. 1989”). Islam provides such protections within the Quran (Hayat, M.H., “Privacy and Islam: From the Quran to data protection in Pakistan”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Iran_1989?lang=en
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13600830701532043?journalCode=cict20#:~:text=Islam%20not%20only%20prohibits%20entering,enter%20in%20one's%20own%20house.&text=We%20now%20come%20to%20rules,family%20circle%20in%20Islamic%20society.

====Iraq====
The 2004 constitution protects the right to personal privacy in Article 17(1) and the right to privacy in the home in Article 17(2) (Constitute Project, “Iraq 2005). Previously, only the home had been protected in the 1925 constitution (United Nations Archives, “Constitution of ‘Iraq (Organic Law)”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Iraq_2005?lang=en
https://biblio-archive.unog.ch/Dateien/CouncilDocs/C-49-1929-VI_EN.pdf

====Republic of Ireland====
Article 40(5) protects the inviolability of the dwelling (Constitute Project, “Ireland 1937 rev. 2017”). This same protection was afforded in Article 7 of the Constitution of the Irish Free State from 1922 (electronic Irish Statute Book, “Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) Act, 1922”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Ireland_2019?lang=en
https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1922/act/1/enacted/en/print

====Israel====
Privacy rights in Israel derive from the Basic Law Human Liberty and Dignity of 1992. In this law, Article 7 protects privacy, intimacy, private premises, and confidential communications (Constitute Project, “Israel 1953 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Israel_2013?lang=en

====Italy====
Articles 13-15 grant privacy to people, homes, and correspondence in the Italian Constitution from 1947 (Constitute Project, “Italy 1947 rev. 2020”). Previous constitutions are from 1848 and 1861, but translations were not found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Italy_2020?lang=en

====Ivory Coast====
The only specific privacy right mentioned in the constitution is that in Article 8, which inviolably protects the home (Constitute Project, “Côte d'Ivoire 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/countries/Africa/Cote_d_Ivoire?lang=en

====Jamaica====
Chapter III of the 1962 constitution protects the fundamental rights and freedoms of Jamaicans. In Section 3(j) of Article 13, privacy protections are granted to persons, property, private and family life, and communication (Constitute Project, “Jamaica 1962 rev. 2015”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Jamaica_2015?lang=en

====Japan====
Historically, the 1889 constitution of Japan protected the home and correspondence in Articles 25 and 26 (Constitute Project, “Japan’s Constitution of 1889 Historical”). Today, Article 35 protects the home (Constitute Project, "Japan 1946").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Japan_1889.pdf?lang=en
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Japan_1946?lang=en

====Jordan====
Article 7 of the 1952 constitution says, “1. Personal freedom shall be guaranteed. 2. Every infringement on rights and public freedoms or the inviolability of the private life of Jordanians is a crime punishable by law.” Article 18 protects communications and Article 10 protects the home (Constitute Project, “Jordan 1952 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Jordan_2016?lang=en

====Kazakhstan====
In their first formal constitution, Kazakhstan protected the right to privacy in Article 18. It says, “1. Everyone shall have the right to inviolability of private life, personal or family secrets, protection of honor and dignity. 2. Everyone shall have the right to confidentiality of personal deposits and savings, correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraph, and other messages. Limitation of this right shall be permitted only in the cases and according to the procedure directly established by law. 3. State bodies, public associations, officials, and the mass media must provide every citizen with the possibility to obtain access to documents, decisions and other sources of information concerning his rights and interests” (Constitute Project, “Kazakhstan 1995 rev. 2017”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kazakhstan_2017?lang=en

====Kenya====
In 1963, the Kenyan Constitution protected privacy in Article 14(c) (Kenya Law, “1963 Constitution”). Today, Article 31 of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution gives every person the right to privacy in their person, home, possessions, family life, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Kenya 2010 Constitution”).

http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/1963_Constitution.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kenya_2010?lang=en

====Kiribati====
Article 3 of the 1979 constitution calls for the protection of privacy in the home and Article 9 protects a person from searches (Constitute Project, “Kiribati 1979 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/countries/Oceania/Kiribati?lang=en

====Kuwait====
Kuwait’s 1962 constitution has been reinstated twice, but it does not mention privacy rights generally. It does, however, protect the inviolability of the home in Article 38 (Constitute Project, “Kuwait 1962 reinst. 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kuwait_1992?lang=en

====Kyrgyzstan====
The 2007 constitution, the first to be adopted after independence from the Soviet Union, protected privacy rights in Article 14 (Electoral Knowledge Network, “Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic”). Today, Article 29 protects the rights to privacy in private life, dignity, and correspondence in the 2010 constitution (Constitute Project, “Kyrgyzstan 2010 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Kyrgyz_Republic_2016?lang=en
https://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/asia/KG/kyrgyzstan-constitution-1993-2007/view?searchterm=russian

====Laos====
Privacy rights are scarcely protected in Laos. The revised 2015 constitution protects violations of life, body, integrity, and property in Article 42, which has been amended since the implementation of the constitution in 1991 (Constitute Project, “Lao People’s Democratic Republic 1991 rev. 2015”).

https://media.bloomsburyprofessional.com/rep/files/laos-constitution-1947-1949-englishx.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Laos_2015?lang=en

====Latvia====
Article 96 of the 1922 constitution states “Everyone has the right to inviolability of his or her private life, home and correspondence” (Constitute Project, “Latvia 1922, reinst. 1991, rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Latvia_2016?lang=en

====Lebanon====
The constitution provides no protections for general privacy rights. However, Article 14 does protect the inviolability of the home (Constitute Project, “Lebanon 1926 rev. 2004”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Lebanon_2004?lang=en

====Lesotho====
The 1993 constitution of Lesotho sets forth fundamental rights which are granted to each person in Lesotho in Article 4. In Section 1(g) of Article 4, the right to respect for family and private life is protected. In Article 11, this right is expanded upon and clarified (Constitute Project, “Lesotho 1993 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Lesotho_2018?lang=en

====Liberia====
The 1825 and 1847 constitutions of Liberia did not included mention of privacy rights. The first protection of privacy rights was in the 1986 constitution, Article 16. Article 16 states “No person shall be subjected to interference with his privacy of person, family, home or correspondence except by order of a court of competent jurisdiction” (Constitute Project, “Liberia 1986”).

http://crc.gov.lr/doc/CONSTITUTION%20OF%201847%20final.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Liberia_1986?lang=en

====Libya====
The interim constitution of 2011 is the first to grant privacy rights. It does so in Articles 11-13. These articles protect homes, private life, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Libya 2011 rev. 2012”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Libya_2012?lang=en

====Liechtenstein====
The 1862 constitution alludes to privacy rights in the home in Article 12 (Wright, “Constitution of 26 September 1862.”). Today, privacy rights go further under the 1921 constitution, with Article 32 guaranteeing “Personal liberty, the immunity of the home and the inviolability of letters and written matter” (Constitute Project, “Liechtenstein 1921 rev. 2011”).

https://books.google.com/books?id=kXBDAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA375&lpg=PA375&dq=1862+Constitution+of+Liechtenstein+full+text&source=bl&ots=6dAZ5MiCdX&sig=YurO0ujdxMdcKsMLT_DfGdxPCm0&hl=en&sa=X&ei=axZlU-b1KorroATU9oG4Cg#v=onepage&q=priva&f=false
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Liechtenstein_2011?lang=en

====Lithuania====
Articles 22 and 24 grant privacy rights in Lithuania. Article 22 declares the inviolability of the private life, including correspondence and data, and Article 24 protects the home (Constitute Project, “Lithuania 1992 rev. 2019”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Lithuania_2019?lang=en

====Luxembourg====
The 1868 constitution, since amended, protects private life in Article 3. In Article 15, it protects the home and in Article 28, correspondence (Constitute Project, “Luxembourg 1868 rev. 2009”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Luxembourg_2009?lang=en

====Madagascar====
Article 13(1) governs privacy rights in Madagascar. It assures each individual “the inviolability of their person, their domicile and of the secrecy of their correspondence” (Constitute Project, “Madagascar 2010”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Madagascar_2010?lang=en

====Malawi====
The 1994 Malawi Constitution protects personal privacy in Article 21. As defined in the article, personal privacy protects possessions, home, and property (Constitute Project, “Malawi 1994 rev. 2017”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malawi_2017?lang=en

====Malaysia====
The constitution is lacking privacy rights protections. The first privacy related writing was the Personal Data Protection Act of 2010. This law came into force in 2013 and is more about data privacy than privacy rights generally.

https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-privacy-data-protection-and-cybersecurity-law-review/malaysia
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malaysia_2007?lang=en

====Maldives====
Article 24 grants the right to privacy in the Maldives. It says: “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his private communications. Every person must respect these rights with respect to others” (Constitute Project, “Maldives 2008”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Maldives_2008?lang=en

====Mali====
Article 6 of the 1992 constitution protected the three main privacy rights: the home, correspondence, and the individual (Constitute Project, “Mali 1992”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mali_1992?lang=en

====Malta====
Article 32 of the Maltese Constitution protects the right to private and family life. Article 38 protects the home (Constitute Project, “Malta 1964 rev. 2016”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malta_2016?lang=en

====Marshall Islands====
Section 13 of the Marshall Islands’ constitution protects personal autonomy. It says: “All persons shall be free from unreasonable interference in personal choices that do not injure others and from unreasonable intrusions into their privacy” (Constitute Project, “Marshall Islands 1979 rev. 1995”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Marshall_Islands_1995?lang=en

====Mauritania====
Article 13(4) protects the right to privacy in Mauritania: “The honor and the private life of the citizen, the inviolability of the human person, of his domicile and of his correspondence are guaranteed by the State” (Constitute Project, "Mauritania 1991 rev. 2012").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mauritania_2012?lang=en

====Mauritius====
The sole constitution of Mauritius from 1968 is limited in what it says about privacy rights. It only protects a person and their property from a search in Article 9 (Constitute Project, "Mauritius 1968 rev. 2016").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mauritius_2016?lang=en

====Mexico====
Article 7 of the 1857 constitution prevents writers from writing about people’s private lives (World History Commons, “Federal Constitution of the United Mexican States of 1857”). Today, Article 16 of the 1917 constitution protects the privacy rights and data privacy in Mexico: “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, his/her family, papers, properties or be invaded at home without a written order from a competent authority, duly explaining the legal cause of the proceeding. All people have the right to enjoy protection on his personal data, and to access, correct and cancel such data. All people have the right to oppose the disclosure of his data, according to the law. The law shall establish exceptions to the criteria that rule the handling of data, due to national security reasons, law and order, public security, public health, or protection of third party’s rights” (Constitute Project, “Mexico 1917 rev. 2015”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mexico_2015?lang=en
https://worldhistorycommons.org/federal-constitution-united-mexican-states-1857

====Federated States of Micronesia====
Article IV Section 5 of the constitution of 1978 says “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and other possessions against unreasonable search, seizure, or invasion of privacy may not be violated. A warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized” (Constitute Project, “Micronesia (Federated States of) 1978 rev. 1990”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Micronesia_1990?lang=en

====Moldova====
Today, Articles 28-30 of the 1994 constitution protect privacy rights in Moldova. Article 28 grants privacy in private and family life, Article 29 in the home, and Article 30 in correspondence (Constitute Project, “Moldova 1994 rev. 2016”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Moldova_2016?lang=en

====Monaco====
The 1962 constitution, still in force today, protects the home in Article 21 and the general right to privacy in Article 22. Article 22 calls out private and family life as well as correspondence (Constitute Project, “Monaco 1962 rev 2002”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Monaco_2002?lang=en

====Mongolia====
Article 16(13) of the 1992 constitution protects the right to personal liberty and safety. It says, “The privacy of citizens, their families, confidentiality of correspondence and communication, and the inviolability of home residence shall be protected by law” (Constitute Project, “Mongolia 1992 rev. 2001).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mongolia_2001?lang=en

====Montenegro====
Article 20 of the 1992 constitution says, “physical and psychological integrity of man, his privacy and personal rights are inviolable” (Venice Commission, “Constitution of the Republic of Montenegro”). Today, Article 28 says “The inviolability of the physical and mental integrity of a man, and privacy and individual rights thereof shall be guaranteed” (Constitute Project, “Montenegro 2007 rev. 2013”).

https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2005)096-e
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Montenegro_2013?lang=en

====Morocco====
The 2011 Moroccan constitution was the first to have fundamental rights based on international treaties (Moroccan Government, “Constitution”). This made it the first to guarantee the right to privacy, which was achieved in Article 24 (Moroccan Government, “Constitution”; Constitute Project, “Morocco 2011”). Article 24 protects private life, the home, and correspondence (Constitute Project, “Morocco 2011”).

https://www.maroc.ma/en/content/constitution
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Morocco_2011?lang=en

====Mozambique====
The 1975 constitution of Mozambique granted “All citizens … the right to their honor, good name and reputation, as well as the right to privacy and to defend their public image” (RefWorld, “Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique”). This is echoed in Article 41 of the 2004 constitution (Constitute Project, “Mozambique 2004 rev. 2007”).

https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4f40.html
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Mozambique_2007?lang=en

====Myanmar====
Article 160 in the 1974 Burmese Constitution grants privacy for home, property, correspondence, and communications (Burma Library, “THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNION OF BURMA (1974)”). Today, these same protections are afforded in Article 357 (Constitute Project, “Myanmar 2008 rev. 2015”).

https://www.burmalibrary.org/docs07/1974Constitution.pdf?__cf_chl_jschl_tk__=pmd_uXw1EkLnkyq9T6FqkzA_NO9lvJaIhzdgyzAJ1J1s5Ko-1635431051-0-gqNtZGzNAiWjcnBszQjR
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Myanmar_2015?lang=en

====Namibia====
The 1990 constitution protects the right to privacy in the home and for correspondence in Article 13 (Constitute Project, “Namibia 1990 rev. 2014”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Namibia_2014?lang=en

====Nauru====
The preamble to Part II Fundamental Rights and Freedoms in the 1968 constitution grants everyone the “respect for his private and family life” (Constitute Project, “Nauru 1968 rev. 2015”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nauru_2015?lang=en

====Nepal====
The 1990 constitution was the first to protect privacy as a fundamental right. In Article 22: “Except as provided by law, the privacy of the person, house, property, document, correspondence or information of anyone is inviolable” (Constitution Net, “The Constitution of Nepal 1990”). In the 2015 constitution, the same language is used in Article 28 (Constitute Project, “Nepal 2015 rev. 2016").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nepal_2016?lang=en
https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/1990_constitution_english.pdf

====Kingdom of the Netherlands====
Article 10 of the 1814 Constitution grants privacy rights to persons in the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 10(1) states “Everyone has, save for limitations to be provided by or pursuant to statute, the right to respect for his private life.” Article 13 protects private correspondence and Article 12 protects the home (Hardt & Kiiver, 2019, 141).

Sascha Hardt & Phillip Kiiver. Comparative Constitutional Law Documents. “Constitution for the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 24 August 1815.”

====New Zealand====
New Zealand governs privacy rights with the 1993 Privacy Act, which has since been replaced with the 2020 Privacy Act.

https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0028/latest/DLM296639.html

====Nicaragua====
The 1974 constitution “guarantees the inviolability of the home, the dwelling, and of any other private premises of persons” in Article 58 (General Secretariat Organization of American States, Washington D.C., “Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua”). Article 80 protected correspondence. The 1987 constitution broadened privacy rights in Article 26 stating: “Everyone has the right to: 1. Privacy in his/her life and that of his/her family; 2. Respect of his/her honor and reputation; 3. Know about any information which private or public entities may have on record about him/her as well as the right to know why and for what purpose they hold such information; 4. Inviolability of his/her domicile, correspondence and communication of any kind.” (Constitute Project, “Nicaragua 1987 rev. 2014”).

https://books.google.com/books?printsec=frontcover&vid=LCCN77374018#v=snippet&q=inviolable&f=false
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Nicaragua_2014?lang=en

====Niger====
The 2010 constitution only protects the domicile of people in terms of privacy rights. This is done in Article 27 (Constitute Project, “Niger 2010 rev. 2017”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Niger_2017?lang=en

====Nigeria====
In 1960, the country’s first constitution protected the private life, home, and correspondence of each person in Article 22 (World Statesmen, “The Constitution of the Federation of Niger”).
Today, the same language is seen in Article 37 of the 1999 constitution (Constitute Project, “Nigeria Constitution 1999 rev. 2011”).

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/nigeria_const1960.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Nigeria_2011?lang=en

====North Korea====
Article 79 of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 1972 constitution grants that citizens and homes are inviolable and that communications are private (Constitute Project, “Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of) 1972 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Peoples_Republic_of_Korea_2016?lang=en

====North Macedonia====
Article 25 of the 1991 constitution states “Each citizen is guaranteed the respect and protection of the privacy of his/her personal and family life and of his/her dignity and repute.” Amendment XIX, altering Article 17, protects communications more heavily (Constitute Project, “North Macedonia 1991 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Macedonia_2011?lang=en

====Norway====
Norway has had one constitution since 1814, though it has been amended many times. Article 102 gives everyone “the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence” (Constitute Project, “Norway 1814 rev. 2016”). However, it appears this was amended sometime after 2004, as the version with amendments through 2004 does not have this language in Article 102 (Constitute Project, “Norway 1814 rev. 2004”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Norway_2016?lang=en
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Norway_2004.pdf

====Oman====
The Oman constitution, written in 1996, only constitutional protects the privacy of homes in Article 27 (Constitute Project, "Oman 1996 rev. 2011").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Oman_2011?lang=en

====Pakistan====
The 1973 constitution, reinstated in 2002, in Article 14 cites the inviolability of man’s dignity and privacy in the home as fundamental (Constitute Project, “Pakistan Constitution reinst. 2002, rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Pakistan_2018?lang=en

====Palau====
Article IV(4) of the 1981 constitution ensures “Every person has the right to be secure in his person, house, papers and effects against entry, search and seizure” (Constitute Project, “Palau 1981 rev. 1992").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Palau_1992?lang=en

====Panama====
Article 28 of the 1904 constitution keeps documents private (University of Michigan, “Constitution of the Republic of Panama”). The 1972 constitution reflects the same tone toward the privacy of documents in Article 29. Article 26 grants the home inviolable, though there is no blanket protection of privacy rights in the 1972 constitution (Constitute Project, “Panama 1972 rev. 2004”).

https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112104577715&view=1up&seq=12
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Panama_2004?lang=en

====Papua New Guinea====
Under the basic rights prescribed under Section 5(f), all citizens have the “protection for the privacy of their homes and other property” (Constitute Project, Papua New Guinea 1975 rev. 2016). Additionally, Article 49(1) gives “Every person has a right to reasonable privacy in respect of his private and family life, his communications with other persons and his personal papers and effects, except to the extent that the exercise of that right is regulated or restricted by law that complies with Section 38 (general qualifications on qualified rights).”

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Papua_New_Guinea_2016?lang=en

====Paraguay====
In the 1967 constitution, Article 68 makes the home inviolable, and Article 69 makes communications inviolable, barring investigation (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, “Constitution of the Republic of Paraguay 1967”. Today, according to Article 33 of the Paraguay Constitution, “Personal and family intimacy, as well as the respect of private life, is inviolable. The behavior of persons, that does not affect the public order established by the law or the rights of third parties[,] is exempted from the public authority.” Article 34 inviolably protects the home (Constitute Project, “Paraguay 1992 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Paraguay_2011?lang=en
https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/con00138.pdf

====Peru====
Today, Article 2(7) protects privacy rights in Peru for one’s honor, reputation, personal and family life, voice, and image (Constitute Project, “Peru 1993 rev. 2021”). Similar rights appear to have been listed in Article 2 of the 1979 constitution, but an English translation could not be found.

http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Peru-Constitucion%201979.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Peru_2021?lang=en

====Philippines====
The 1935 Constitution grants “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated” in Article III, Section 1(3) (Official Gazette, “The 1935 Constitution”). Today, similar language is used in Article II, Section 1(2) (Official Gazette, “The 1935 Constitution”).

https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/the-1935-constitution/
https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/

====Poland====
The 1921 Polish Constitution grants privacy in the home and communication in articles 100 and 106, respectively (Sejm Parliamentary Library, “Constitution of the Republic of Poland, March 17, 1921”). Today, Article 47 of the 1997 constitution protects the general right to privacy in Poland: “Everyone shall have the right to legal protection of his private and family life, of his honour and good reputation and to make decisions about his personal life.” Articles 49 and 50 extend these protections to communications and the home (Constitute Project, “Poland 1997 rev. 2009”).

http://libr.sejm.gov.pl/tek01/txt/kpol/e1921.html
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Poland_2009?lang=en

====Portugal====
Portugal’s first protection of privacy was in the 1976 constitution. Article 26(1) says “Everyone shall possess the right to a personal identity, to the development of their personality, to civil capacity, to citizenship, to a good name and reputation, to their likeness, to speak out, to protect the privacy of their personal and family life, and to legal protection against any form of discrimination.” Article 65 grants privacy in the home (Constitute Project, “Portugal 1976 rev. 2005).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Portugal_2005?lang=en

====Qatar====
From 1972-2003, Qatar was ruled by a temporary constitution. In this document Article 12 granted the sanctity of dwellings (Al Meezan, “The Amended Provisional Constitution of 1972”). Today, Article 37 of the Constitution claims “The sanctity of human privacy shall be inviolable, and therefore interference into privacy of a person, family affairs, home of residence, correspondence, or any other act of interference that may demean or defame a person may not be allowed save as limited by the provisions of the law stipulated therein” (Qatar Government Communications Office, “The Constitution”).

https://www.gco.gov.qa/en/about-qatar/the-constitution/
https://www.almeezan.qa/LawView.aspx?opt&LawID=4360&language=en#Section_14176

====Romania====
Today, Article 26 of the 1991 Romanian Constitution protects personal and family privacy: “(1) The public authorities shall respect and protect the intimate, family and private life” (Constitute Project, “Romania 1991 rev. 2003”). Privacy may have been protected in earlier iterations of the constitution (i.e., 1952, 1965, etc.), but English translations could not be found.

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Romania_2003?lang=en

====Russia====
In 1906, the Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire were the first to grant Russians “sanctity of the home and property.” This was the first time Russians were granted civil liberties (Boris Yeltsin Presidential Library, “‘Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire’ Approved”).

https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619222

====Rwanda====
The right to privacy in Rwanda is protected by Articles 23 and 34. Article 23 states “The privacy of a person, his or her family, home or correspondence shall not be subjected to interference in a manner inconsistent with the law; the person's honour and dignity shall be respected. A person's home is inviolable. No search or entry into a home shall be carried out without the consent of the owner, except in circumstances and in accordance with procedures determined by the law.” Article 34 states “Private property, whether owned individually or collectively, is inviolable” (Constitute Project, "Rwanda 2003 rev. 2015").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Rwanda_2015?lang=en

====Saint Kitts and Nevis====
Chapter II, Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, of the 1983 constitution entitles everyone to fundamental rights, including “protection for his personal privacy, the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation” (Constitute Project, “Saint Kitts and Nevis 1983”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Kitts_and_Nevis_1983?lang=en

====Saint Lucia====
Chapter I, Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, of the 1978 constitution immediately grants every person in St. Lucia “protection for his family life, his personal privacy, the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation” (Constitute Project, “Saint Lucia 1978”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Lucia_1978?lang=en

====Saint Vincent and the Grenadines====
In the preamble of their only constitution to date, Vincentians are promised safeguards to “the rights of privacy of family life, of property, and the fostering of the pursuit of just economic rewards for labor.” This is reaffirmed in Article 1 with the granting of fundamental rights and freedoms (Constitute Project, “Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1979”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Vincent_and_the_Grenadines_1979?lang=en

====Samoa====
There is no mention of privacy rights in the constitution, which has been updated as recently as 2017 (Constitute Project, “Samoa 1962 rev. 2017”). Section 50(2) of the Telecommunications Act 2005 protects the privacy of telecommunications customers (Samoa). This was the earliest found reference to privacy rights in Samoa.

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Samoa_2017?lang=en
https://www.regulator.gov.ws/images/Act/TELECOMMUNICATIONS_ACT_2005_-_Eng.pdf

====San Marino====
The 1974 Declaration of Citizens' Rights and of the fundamental principles of the San Marinese legal order is the first time privacy rights are alluded to in San Marino. Art. 6 grants civil and political liberties. It does not grant privacy except in communications.

https://www.legislationline.org/documents/section/constitutions/country/6/San%20Marino/show

====São Tomé and Príncipe====
Article 24 of the 1975 Constitution, still in effect today, states “Personal identity and the confidentiality of the intimacy of private and family life are inviolable” (Constitute Project, Sao Tome and Principe 1975 rev. 2003). Additionally, Article 25 grants that communications and one’s home are also private (Constitute Project, Sao Tome and Principe 1975 rev. 2003).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Sao_Tome_and_Principe_2003?lang=en

====Saudi Arabia====
The 1992 Saudi Constitution does not explicitly protect privacy but claims privacy in communications and homes in Articles 37 and 40 (Constitute Project, “Saudi Arabia’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2005”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Saudi_Arabia_2013?lang=en

====Senegal====
Senegal does not explicitly protect the right to privacy in its constitution. Article 7 of the 2001 constitution makes the claim to protect human rights but does not call out privacy. Article 13 provides for private correspondence and Article 16 makes the domicile inviolable (Constitute Project, “Senegal 2001 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Senegal_2016?lang=en

====Serbia====
The 2006 Serbian Constitution does not protect the right to privacy outright but allows for privacy in communication and data collection/sharing in Articles 41 and 42 (Constitute Project, “Serbia 2006”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Serbia_2006?lang=en

====Seychelles====
The 1976 Independence Constitution of Seychelles, under Chapter 3, Article 12(c) gives individuals privacy of their home and other property (Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative, “Constitution of Seychelles, 1976”).

https://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/constitution-of-seychelles-1976/

====Sierra Leone====
The 1978 constitution protected the privacy of the home and property under Article 12 (The Laws of Sierra Leone on the Sierra Leone Web, “The Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1978”).

http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/1978-12s.pdf

====Singapore====
No part of the constitution mentions a right to privacy (Privacy International, “The Right to Privacy in Singapore”). There are also no specific laws governing privacy within the state.

https://privacyinternational.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/Singapore_UPR_PI_submission_FINAL.pdf

====Slovakia====
Article 16(1) of the 1992 constitution states “The inviolability of the person and its privacy is guaranteed. It may be limited only in cases laid down by law” (Constitute Project, “Slovakia 1992 rev. 2017). Sections 2 and 3 of Article 19 protect private life and data collection and publication (Constitute Project, “Slovakia 1992 rev. 2017). Article 21 claims the home is inviolable, while Article 22 protects communications (Constitute Project, “Slovakia 1992 rev. 2017).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Slovakia_2017?lang=en

====Slovenia====
Articles 35 and 36 of the constitution speak to the right to privacy in Slovenia. Article 35 says “The inviolability of the physical and mental integrity of every person, his privacy and personality rights shall be guaranteed” (Constitute Project, “Slovenia 1991 rev. 2016”). Article 36 says “Dwellings are inviolable. No one may, without a court order, enter the dwelling or other premises of another person, nor may he search the same, against the will of the resident. Any person whose dwelling or other premises are searched has the right to be present or to have a representative present. Such a search may only be conducted in the presence of two witnesses. Subject to conditions provided by law, an official may enter the dwelling or other premises of another person without a court order, and may in exceptional circumstances conduct a search in the absence of witnesses, where this is absolutely necessary for the direct apprehension of a person who has committed a criminal offence or to protect people or property” (Constitute Project, “Slovenia 1991 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Slovenia_2016?lang=en

====Solomon Islands====
Article 9 of the Solomon Islands Constitution protects the privacy of the home and other property: “Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or his property or the entry by others on his premises.” (Constitute Project, “Solomon Islands 1978 rev. 2018”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Solomon_Islands_2018?lang=en

====Somalia====
Article 28 of the 1960 Constitution of Somalia grants “respect for the private home” in which "no home or private property of any one (sic) may be entered into or violated, save in the cases mentioned in Paragraphs 2, 3 and 5 of Article 25” (World Intellectual Property Organization, “The Constitution”).

https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/so/so002en.pdf

====South Africa====
The 1993 Interim Constitution of South Africa was the first to grant privacy rights. The right to privacy includes “the right not to be subject to searches of his or her person, home or property, the seizure of private possessions or the violation of private communications” (South African Government, “Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993”). Today, the 1996 Constitution offers similar protections in Article 14 (Constitute Project, “South Africa 1996 rev. 2012).

https://www.gov.za/documents/constitution/constitution-republic-south-africa-act-200-1993#13%20Privacy
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Africa_2012?lang=en

====South Korea====
Under the first constitution of the Republic of Korea in 1948, Articles 17 and 18 grant the right to privacy. Neither the privacy of a citizen nor communication may be infringed (Constitute Project, “Korea (Republic of) 1948 rev. 1987”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Republic_of_Korea_1987?lang=en

====South Sudan====
Article 22 of the 2011 South Sudan constitution protects the right to privacy: “The privacy of all persons shall be inviolable; no person shall be subjected to interference with his or her private life, family, home or correspondence, save in accordance with the law” (Constitute Project, “South Sudan 2011 rev. 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/South_Sudan_2013?lang=en

====Spain====
The 1978 Spanish Constitution was the first to present privacy rights in Spain. Section 19(1) protects “the right to honour, to personal and family privacy and to the own image,” while 19(2) protects the home, and 19(4) explicitly grants data privacy (Constitute Project, “Spain 1978 rev. 2011”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Spain_2011?lang=en

====Sri Lanka====
Sri Lanka’s constitution does not protect the right to privacy, though privacy is mentioned briefly in Article 14A(2) (Constitute Project, “Sri Lanka 1978 rev. 2015”). Sri Lanka is also lacking comprehensive privacy legislation, instead opting to write in provisions when regulating other industries (Data Guidance, “Sri Lanka – Data Protection Overview”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Sri_Lanka_2015?lang=en
https://www.dataguidance.com/notes/sri-lanka-data-protection-overview

====Sudan====
Privacy rights first appear in the 1973 Sudanese Constitution. Article 42 states “the private life of citizens is inviolable. The state shall guarantee the freedom and secrecy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communications in accordance with the law.” Article 43 protects dwellings in the same manner (The Democratic Republic of Sudan Gazette, “The Permanent Constitution of Sudan”). Today, these protections are combined into Article 55 of the 2019 Constitution, in which “No one’s privacy may be violated. It is not permissible to interfere in the private or family life of any person in his home or correspondence, except in accordance with the law” (Constitute Project, "Sudan 2019").

https://www.righttononviolence.org/mecf/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Constitution-Sudan-1973-+-amendment-1975.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Sudan_2019?lang=en

====Suriname====
The 1975 Suriname Constitution protected the home and private life in Article 14 (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1983, “Report on the Human Rights Situation in Suriname”). Today, these rights are protected under Article 17 of the 1987 Constitution (Constitute Project, “Suriname 1987 rev 1992”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Surinam_1992?lang=en
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Suriname83eng/chap.1.htm

====Sweden====
Constitutionally, privacy rights were introduced with the 1974 Swedish Constitution. Articles 2 and 6 present the right to privacy, while Article 20 allows the provisions in Article 6 to have some limitations (Constitute Project, “Sweden’s Constitution of 1974 with Amendments through 2012”). Sweden was also the first to introduce data privacy rights with the Data Act in 1973 (GDPRHub, “Data Protection in Sweden”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Sweden_2012.pdf?lang=en
https://gdprhub.eu/Data_Protection_in_Sweden

====Switzerland====
The 1992 Federal Act on Data Protection was the first formal protection of privacy in Switzerland (DLA Piper, “Data protection laws of the world: Switzerland”). This law has since been revised, but since then, the right to privacy was added to the 1999 Swiss Constitution in Article 13 (Constitute Project, “Switzerland 1999 rev. 2014”).

https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?t=law&c=CH
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Switzerland_2014?lang=en

====Syria====
The right to privacy was limited in the 1973 constitution, preventing only the private seizure of private property without judicial ruling (Carnegie Middle East Center, “The Syrian Constitution – 1973-2012”). Today, Articles 36 and 37 of the 2012 Constitution protect privacy rights. Article 36 protects private life and Article 37 protects communications (Constitute Project, “Syrian Arab Republic 2012”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Syria_2012?lang=en
https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/50255?lang=en

====Tajikistan====
Articles 22 and 23 of the 1994 Tajikistan constitution protect the right to privacy. Article 22 makes the home inviolable, and Article 23 forbids “The collection, storage, use, and dissemination of information about private life of a person without his consent” (Constitute Project, “Tajikistan 1994 rev. 2016”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Tajikistan_2016?lang=en

====Tanzania====
The 1965 constitution of Tanzania did not explicitly provide for privacy but defaulted “to safeguard the inherent dignity of the individual in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” during the preamble (World Statesmen, “The Interim Constitution of Tanzania”). Today, the 1997 constitution (as amended in 2005) privacy and personal security in Article 16 (Constitute Project, “Tanzania’s Constitution of 1977 with Amendments through 2005”).

http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Tanzania-Constitution-1965.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Tanzania_2005?lang=en

====Thailand====
The earliest mention of privacy is the 1997 constitution of Thailand. While they have had many constitutions since 1932, the earliest translation found was that of the 1997 text. Section 34 protects “A person’s family rights, dignity, reputation or the right of privacy” unless it is beneficial to the public (Ref World, “Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand”).

https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ae6b5b2b.pdf

====Togo====
Articles 27, 28, and 29 in the 1992 Togolese Constitution protect private property, the home, private life, and image, and correspondence. Article 28 is explicit to the right to privacy, while Articles 27 and 29 fit into the privacy penumbras subscribed by the United States (Constitute Project, “Togo’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2007”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Togo_2007?lang=en

====Tonga====
The Tonga constitution was written in 1875. Under Article 16, privacy is granted during searches, except for lawfully granted searches through a warrant (Constitute Project, “Tonga’s Constitution of 1875 with Amendments through 2013”).

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Tonga_2013.pdf?lang=en

====Trinidad and Tobago====
The 1976 constitution does not explicitly protect the right to privacy. However, Article 4 protects fundamental human rights, such as “the right of the individual to respect for his private and family life” and protection of the law (Constitute Project, “Trinidad and Tobago 1976 rev. 2007").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Trinidad_and_Tobago_2007?lang=en

====Tunisia====
In 1959, the constitution granted the right to privacy in Article 9. At some point between then and 2008, this article was amended to protect personal data, reflecting the changes in privacy rights with new technologies (Constitute Project, “Tunisia 1959 rev. 2008").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2008?lang=en

====Turkey====
The 1924 Turkish Constitution protects personal liberty except for the provision of law under Article 72 (World Statesmen, “The New Constitution of Turkey”). Article 71 protects the inviolability of the home, life, property, and honor. Article 81 allows for private communications.

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Turkeyconstitution1924.pdf

====Turkmenistan====
The 1992 Constitution protects against arbitrary interference of privacy in Article 25 (International Committee on the Red Cross, “Constitution 1992, as of 2008”).

Today, Article 37 of the 2008 constitution grants “the right to private liberty, personal and family secrets and their protection from arbitrary interference in their privacy” while Article 38 prevents the “Collection, storage and dissemination of information about private life of an individual” without consent (Constitute Project, “Turkmenistan's Constitution of 2008 with Amendments through 2016”).

https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl-nat.nsf/0/D9E58AFB0C841166C1256FFD0034016C
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Turkmenistan_2016.pdf?lang=en

====Tuvalu====
The 1996 constitution protects privacy rights under Articles 11(h) and 21 (Constitute Project, “Tuvalu Constitution of 1996”). Article 11(h) reads “Every person is entitled…to the following fundamental freedoms: […] (h) protection for the privacy of his home and other property” (Constitute Project, “Tuvalu Constitution of 1996”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tuvalu_1986.pdf?lang=en

====Uganda====
Article 17(c) of the 1962 constitution provides privacy rights protections in Uganda (World Statesmen, “Uganda Constitutional Instruments”). It protects “the privacy of his home and other property and from deprivation of property without compensation” as a fundamental right. Today, the 1995 Constitution grants these protections in Article 27 (Constitute Project, “Uganda’s Constitution of 1995 with Amendments through 2017").

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Uganda-const-1962.pdf
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Uganda_2017.pdf?lang=en

====Ukraine====
Articles 30, 31, and 32 of the 1996 Constitution grant the right to privacy (Constitute Project, “Ukraine’s Constitution of 1996 with Amendments through 2016”). Article 30 gives privacy in the home, Article 31 allows privacy protections to communications, and Article 32 prevents interference into personal and family life (Constitute Project, “Ukraine’s Constitution of 1996 with Amendments through 2016”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Ukraine_2016.pdf?lang=en

====United Arab Emirates====
The 1971 constitution protects privacy in communications in Articles 31 and Article 36 protects one’s home (Constitute Project, “United Arab Emirates 1971, rev. 2009").

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/United_Arab_Emirates_2009?lang=en

====United Kingdom====
The United Kingdom 1988 Human Rights Act entrenched the ECHR into United Kingdom law (Liberty, “The Human Rights Act”). It protects one’s privacy from unnecessary intrusion, among other rights. Additionally, in ‘’The Right to Privacy’’ Warren and Brandeis cite Lord Cottenham in 1820 who, in agreement with Lord Eldon, felt that were a king’s illnesses recorded by a doctor and published while that king was still alive, a court would not permit its publishing, as he claimed this circumstance would breach the king’s privacy (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 205; Bycer, 2014).

https://www.libertyhumanrights.org.uk/your-rights/the-human-rights-act/
Bycer, M. (2014). Understanding the 1890 Warren and Brandeis “The Right to Privacy” Article. National Juris University. Retrieved Sept. 10, 2021, from https://nationalparalegal.edu/UnderstandingWarrenBrandeis.aspx
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

====United States====
The first mention of this right is ‘’The Right to Privacy’’ written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis and published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890. Constitutionally, it was first found in the 1965 Supreme Court case ‘’Griswold v. Connecticut’’ (Privacy, n.d.).

Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

====Uruguay====
The 1966 constitution was the first translated into English to mention privacy rights. It is protected in Articles 10, 11, and 28. Article 10 grants individuals’ privacy, Article 11 makes the home private, and Article 28 protects communications (Constitute Project, "Uruguay 1966, reinst. 1985, rev. 2004").

https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Uruguay_2004?lang=en

====Uzbekistan====
Article 27 of the 1992 Constitution protects privacy and the inviolability of the home, requiring a prescription by law to allow a search of the home (Constitute Project, “Uzbekistan's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2011”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Uzbekistan_2011.pdf?lang=en

====Vanuatu====
Article 5(1)(j) in the 1980 Vanuatu Constitution protects privacy in the home and property (Constitute Project, “Vanuatu’s Constitution of 1980 with Amendments through 2013”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Vanuatu_2013.pdf?lang=en

====Venezuela====
Privacy is first alluded to in the Venezuelan Declaration of Independence and Constitution of 1812 in Art. 177, which grants privacy in the home from soldiers (Rice University, "Venezuelan Declaration of Independence and Constitution").
Today, privacy is strictly protected in Venezuela, going beyond the call of the ICCPR’s call in Article 17 under constitutional Articles 48 and 60 (Privacy International, “The Right to Privacy in Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of): Stakeholder Report, Universal Periodic Review,” 4).

https://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/venezuela_upr2016.pdf
https://scholarship.rice.edu/jsp/xml/1911/9253/1/aa00032.tei.html

====Vietnam====
The 1992 Vietnam Constitution was the first since its independence that recognized the “inviolability of personal privacy” in Article 21 (Constitute Project, “Viet Nam’s Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2013”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Socialist_Republic_of_Vietnam_2013.pdf?lang=en
https://constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-vietnam

====Yemen====
There are no explicit protections of privacy in Yemen, though Article 20 does not allow for private confiscation without legal judgment (Constitute Project, “Yemen 1991: Rev. 2015”).

https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Yemen_2015?lang=en
https://giswatch.org/en/country-report/communications-surveillance/yemen

====Zambia====
Privacy was protected in the first constitution of Zambia in 1964 in Chapter 3, Articles 13(c) and 19 (World Statesmen, “Laws of Zambia: The Constitution”).
Today, Article 11(d) and 17 of the 1991 Zambian Constitution protect the right to privacy (Constitute Project, “Zambia’s Constitution of 1991 with Amendments Through 2016”).

https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Constitution-Zambia1964.pdf
https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Zambia_2016.pdf?lang=en

====Zimbabwe====

The 2013 Zimbabwe Constitution grants “[e]very person has the right to privacy, which includes the right not to have: (a) their home, premises or property entered without their permission; (b) their person, home, premises or property searched; (c) their possessions seized; (d) the privacy of their communications infringed; or (e) their health condition disclosed” in Section 57 (Privacy International, “The Right to Privacy in Zimbabwe: Stakeholder Report, Universal Periodic Review,” 4). Before this, the 2007 Interception of Communications Act allowed for public information to be intercepted by authorities, something that has not been rectified since the implementation of the new constitution.

https://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/zimbabwe_upr2016.pdf

===Is there another noteworthy written source from the past that mentions this right?===
The right to privacy has diverged in many ways since its most notable first mention in ''The Right to Privacy'' by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. What started in 1890 as the idea of protection against gossip about oneself and the ability to enjoy life uninterrupted has evolved into various international and national conventions and laws.

The right to privacy was first enshrined at a supranational level before it was established in individual states (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 26). The right’s first appearance in legal documentation was in the United Nation’s (UN) 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR). Article 12 of the UDHR (1948) states “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” The UHDR is not a treaty, so the right was not yet entrenched and more of a suggestion for states to incorporate into their laws and practices.

Two years later, the Council of Europe passed the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) which has similar tones in Article 8, though with an exception for national security in Article 8 (2) but is legally binding (1950). Article 8 of the ECHR specifically protects one’s family life, personal life, correspondence, and home (Roagna, 2021, 9). Worldwide, the right to privacy became codified in 1966 with the passage of the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), in which Article 17 has almost identical language to the UDHR’s Article 12. In subsequent UN treaties, this right to privacy was explicitly granted to children and migrants as well (Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, Art. 16; International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990, Art. 14).

'''Complying with the ICCPR''': In the United States, the right to privacy was not originally codified but established through a variety of Supreme Court cases beginning in the 1960s (Privacy, n.d.). In 1965, the Court ruled on Griswold v. Connecticut. The majority opinion written by Justice Douglas claims that the express personal freedoms named in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments create an implied “zone of privacy” (Privacy, n.d.). Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, referenced in later Supreme Court privacy cases, claims privacy zones derive from the Fourteenth Amendment (Privacy, n.d.). Later, legislation was passed regulating specific sectors, beginning in 1974 with the Family Educations Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), which protects student data, and the Privacy Act which regulates the use of data by federal agencies (History of privacy timeline, 2021).

The European Court of Human Rights has refined the implementation of ECHR Article 8 through case law (Roagna, 2021, 7). In deciding these cases, the Court must decide if the complaint is related to Article 8 and, if so, if the right has been interfered with outside of the exceptions laid out in Article 8 (2) (Roagna, 2021, 11). For this reason, there is no clear-cut definition as to which national laws may conflict with Article 8 (Roagna, 2021, 12). The Court has provided protections for ‘quasi-familial’ relationships, relationships that may develop later (i.e., one has the right to adopt), the development of personality, photographs, and data collection, ruling these areas are part of private and/or family life (Roagna, 2021, 10-19). The Court has also provided lengthy protections to family life with a broad definition of family which evolves with European customs (Roagna, 2021, 27). The protection of a home has also been interpreted broadly, requiring continuous ties to a location, mostly due to the French translation of “home” to “domicile” (Roagna, 2021, 30-31). The Court rules for high protection of means of communication as it can be easily breached (Roagna, 2021, 32). This protection includes information gathered from monitored internet use and remains in places no matter the content of the message (Roagna, 2021, 32).

'''The Digital Era''': Since these international conventions have become effective and enforceable, there has been a lot of technological change and little change in these agreements (Human right to privacy, n.d.). The UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) noted in General Comment 16, adopted regarding ICCPR’s Article 17 in 1988, that the legislation in many states was not enough to ensure the “protection against both unlawful and arbitrary interference,” and that data collection “must be regulated by law” (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 27; UN Human Rights Committee, 1994, para. 2 & 10). In essence, this comment was requesting states enact more protective privacy law legislation, and, specifically, data regulation law, as the right to privacy evolved to be dominated by electronic data (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 27).

There have been two approaches to this call for better data privacy regulation: general regulation and regulation by sector. The European Union has taken the general regulation approach with the passage of the 1995 European Data Protection Directive and the 2016 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The GDPR affects people and companies worldwide, requiring that data collected is truly needed, accurate, processed safely, and that all of this is done in a clear, legal, and transparent way (Krishnamurthy, 2020; Wolford, n.d.). The United States has chosen to regulate privacy data by sector, beginning with FERPA in 1974 (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29; History of privacy timeline, 2021). This approach has led to some strict laws preventing unauthorized access to personal information in some areas regulated by specific legislation (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29). In areas without specific legislation, however, Americans take great liberties while collecting data (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29). Put in combination with the lacking legislation preventing interference or data attacks, some question how compliant the United States is with Article 17 of the ICCPR (Krishnamurthy, 2020, 29). However, as of 2020, 29% of states are still drafting or have yet to draft such legislation (UN Committee on Trade and Development).

'''Privacy in Former Sovereign States'''

It is worth noting that some states have always had some privacy rights since they gained independence because their previous constitution and laws contained such provisions. This is the case with states that were formerly in the Soviet Union. The 1977 Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which was then implemented in nearly identical form in the various republics as their own constitution, protected “the privacy of citizens, and of their correspondence, telephone conversations, and telegraphic communications” in Article 56 (USSR, 1982, 35). Additionally, Czechoslovakia protected privacy rights of the person, home, and correspondence in Article 30 & 31 in the 1960 constitution (Czechoslovakia, 1964, 233).

Resources

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://rm.coe.int/1680a2353d
Convention on the Rights of the Child. United Nations (UN) General Assembly (UNGA). Nov. 20, 1989. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx
Czechoslovakia. (1964). Constitution of Czechoslovakia July 11, 1960. Orbis: Prague. From https://www.worldstatesmen.org/Czechoslovakia-Const1960.pdf
History of privacy timeline. (2021). The University of Michigan. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://safecomputing.umich.edu/privacy/history-of-privacy-timeline
Human right to privacy in the digital age, The. (n.d.). American Civil Liberties Union. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.aclu.org/other/human-right-privacy-digital-age
International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. UNGA. Dec. 18, 1990. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cmw.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. UNGA. Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
Krishnamurthy, V. (2020, Jan. 6). A tale of two privacy laws: The GDPR and the International Right to Privacy. AJIL Unbound 114, 26-30. doi:10.1017/aju.2019.79
Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
Roagna, I. (2012). Council of Europe human rights handbook: Protecting the right to respect for private and family life under the European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. https://www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/Roagna2012_EN.pdf
UN Committee on Trade and Development. (2020). Data Protection and Privacy Legislation Worldwide. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://unctad.org/page/data-protection-and-privacy-legislation-worldwide
UN Human Rights Committee. (1994). General Comment 16. Thirty-third session. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 1 Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://undocs.org/HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
USSR. (1982). Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist States: Adopted at the Seventh (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Ninth Convocation, on October 7, 1977. Novosti Press Publishing House: Moscow. From https://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/constitution/1977/constitution-ussr-1977.pdf
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

===Is the identification of this right associated with a particular era in history, political regime, or political leader?===
===What specific events or ideas contributed to its identification as a fundamental right?===
===When was it generally accepted as a fundamental, legally-protectable right?===
===What historical forces or events, if any, contributed to a widespread belief in its importance? ===
==Legal Codification==
===Is this right protected in the Constitutions of most countries today?===
===Is it contained in the US Constitution?===
The right to privacy is not explicitly contained in the United States Constitution.

References

Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy

===Has it been interpreted as being implicit in the US Constitution?===
In the United States, the right to privacy was not originally codified but established through Supreme Court cases around the 1960s (Privacy, n.d.). Prior to this time, the Court recognized in ''Snyder v. Massachusetts'' (1934) that some concepts of fairness are fundamental, but not expressed. In 1965, the Court heard and decided ''Griswold v. Connecticut''. In the majority opinion, Justice William Douglas argues that the Court had previously ruled on cases in which rights were not explicit in the Bill of Rights, but the rights were justifiable to the Court through the First and Fourteenth Amendments (''Griswold v. Connecticut'', 1965, par. 11). Later in the opinion of the court, he states that in other cases, such as ''Boyd v. United States'' (1886), ''Mapp v. Ohio'' (1961), and ''Poe v. Ullman'' (1961), the court used the ‘penumbras’ of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments to make decisions on implicit liberties (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, pars. 14-15). Combined, these penumbras create what the Griswold v. Connecticut majority opinion calls “zones of privacy” (Privacy, n.d.). In a concurring ''Griswold'' opinion, Justice Arthur Goldberg argues that while liberties extend beyond the Bill of Rights, he, Chief Justice Earl Warren, and Justice William Brennan feel that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not include “all of the first eight amendments” (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, par. 21). However, in a different concurring opinion, Justice John Marshall Harlan found “[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands […] on its own bottom” (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, par. 53; Privacy, n.d.). Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion became the predominant argument used in later privacy cases (Privacy, n.d.).

In 1967, the Supreme Court decided the case of ''Katz v. United States'' (Katz v. US, n.d.). Katz, located in Los Angeles, had been using a public phone booth to inform bettors in Boston and Miami, and in an effort to convict him, federal agents tapped the phone booth (Katz v. US, n.d.). A lower court allowed this evidence to be admitted, but Katz claimed it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment (Katz v. US, n.d.). The Supreme Court sided 7-1 with Katz and establishes that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places” (Katz v. United States, 1967). In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan established the Expectation for Privacy Test (Katz v. US, n.d.; Expectation of Privacy, n.d.). This test is two-fold – the individual must have an expectation for privacy which is rooted in law and society finds that expectation for privacy to be reasonable – and has been used as a basis for privacy since (Expectation of Privacy, n.d.).

After these two cases, the Supreme Court has continued to extend the right to privacy, notably so in three landmark cases: ''Eisenstadt v. Baird'' (1971), ''Roe v. Wade'' (1972), and ''Lawrence v. Texas'' (2003) through the use of the Fourteenth Amendment and Justice Harlan’s concurring ''Griswold'' opinion (Privacy, n.d.). ''Eisenstadt'' extended the use of contraceptives beyond married couples to individuals (Privacy, n.d.). ''Roe'' extended the right to privacy to the women’s right to have an abortion (Privacy, n.d.). ''Lawrence v. Texas''' overturned ''Bowers v. Hardwick'' (1986) and extended privacy to private conduct (Privacy, n.d.).

References

Expectation of Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 13, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/expectation_of_privacy
''Griswold v. Connecticut'', 381 U.S. 479 (1965). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479
Katz v. United States. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved September 13, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/35
''Katz v. United States'', 389 U.S. 347 (1967). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/389/347
Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
''Snyder v. Massachusetts'', 291 U.S. 97 (1934). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/291/97

===Are there any exceptions in American law to this right?===
Most recent US legislation regarding the right to privacy concerns the collection, retention, and transfer of personal data. Under the Department of Justice, the Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties (OPCL) enforces privacy laws, recommends privacy policies (including exceptions), and responds to data breaches (Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties, n.d.).

'''Freedom of Information Act 1966 (as amended 2016)'''

In 1966, Congress passed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This act granted anyone the ability to request access to federal agency records but not the records of private companies. However, nine exemptions and three exclusions may prevent access to these records (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). The exclusions are narrow and related to law enforcement and ongoing intelligence investigations and are unaffected by FOIA (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). The exemptions authorize government agencies to withhold information from those requesting it (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). The nine exemptions prevent the sharing of information if it is classified for national security, part of internal rules or practices, prohibited through other laws (such as the Privacy Act, see below), a trade secret, legally protected, a medical file, law enforcement records, regarding bank supervision, or locational information (Freedom of Information Act, n.d.). FOIA was most recently updated with the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, which increased transparency and altered procedures (OIP Summary of the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, 2016).

'''Privacy Act 1974'''

The Privacy Act of 1974 was an effort to balance the “governments’ need to maintain information” and the “rights of individuals to be protected against unwarranted invasions of their privacy” (Walls, n.d.; Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, n.d.). It prevents agencies from disclosing records to any person or agency unless it falls into one of the twelve approved guidelines (Walls, n.d.; Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, n.d.). The most used reasons which allow for disclosure are subsections 1, 2, and 3 of 5 US Code § 552a(b) (Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition, 2021). Subsection One allows for the disclosure of information between agencies on a need-to-know basis. Subsection Two allows the FOIA to overrule the Privacy Act with regards to when to disclose information. Subsection Three allows for disclosure to another party if their use is similar to the use for which the data was originally collected. This third exception is quite broad, which causes controversy (Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition, 2021). Other exceptions include use for public record (used for the Census or National Archive data), or requests by law enforcement or the court system. In addition to putting forth information disclosure guidelines, this act requires agencies to keep accurate records of how, where, and why they sent information if they had sent information (Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, n.d.).

'''Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 1999'''

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) was passed to regulate the transfer of consumers’ “nonpublic personal information” by financial institutions (FDIC, 2021). At its core, the law says financial institutions cannot pass along personal data to third parties unless the customer is put on notice, given the opportunity to opt out, and they do not opt out (FDIC, 2021). Exceptions to this rule appear in Sections 13-15 (FDIC, 2021, VIII-1.3). Section 13 permits the transfer of some personal data to a third party if they are performing services on behalf of the financial institution, but they must be contractually bound to not do anything else with the data (FDIC, 2021, VIII-1.3). Section 14 allows the bank to disclose information as needed to perform banking functions initiated by the customer, while Section 15 extends that disclosure to normal financial institution acts, such as fraud detection (FDIC, 2021, VIII-1.3). Of these exceptions, only Section 13 requires the customer to be notified that their information is being shared (FDIC, 2021).

'''USA PATRIOT Act 2001 & USA Freedom Act 2015'''

Enacted less than two months after the 9/11 attacks, the PATRIOT Act was passed with the intention of increasing homeland security by allowing surveillance techniques used in local crime to be used to fight terrorism (Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.; USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.). Most importantly, this law allowed for the sharing of information between law enforcement agencies at various levels without notice (Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.). This law wasn’t the most protective of civil rights and liberties and to rectify that President Obama signed the USA Freedom Act in 2015, ending government collection of metadata (Patriot Act, n.d.; Fact sheet, 2015).

Resources

Fact sheet: Implementation of the USA Freedom Act of 2015. (2015, Nov. 27). Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.intelligence.gov/index.php/ic-on-the-record-database/results/787-fact-sheet-implementation-of-the-usa-freedom-act-of-2015
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). (2021, April). FDIC Consumer Compliance Examination Manual: VIII-1.1 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Author. https://www.fdic.gov/resources/supervision-and-examinations/consumer-compliance-examination-manual/index.html
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. (1966).
Freedom of Information Act, The. (n.d.). Department of State. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://foia.state.gov/learn/foia.aspx
Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act. (n.d.) Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm
Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties. (n.d.). Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/opcl
OIP Summary of the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016. (2016, Aug. 17). Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/oip/oip-summary-foia-improvement-act-2016
Overview of the Privacy Act: 2020 Edition. (2021, Feb. 16). Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/opcl/overview-privacy-act-1974-2020-edition/disclosures-third-parties
Patriot Act. (n.d.) History.com. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.history.com/topics/21st-century/patriot-act
Privacy Act of 1974. 5 U.S.C. § 552a. (n.d.). Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1279#vf4tzl
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). (1974).
USA PATRIOT Act. (n.d.). Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://bja.ojp.gov/program/it/privacy-civil-liberties/authorities/statutes/1281
Walls, T. (n.d.). FOIA v. Privacy Act: A comparison chart. IAPP. https://iapp.org/resources/article/foia-v-privacy-act-a-comparison-chart/

===Is this right enshrined in international and regional human rights treaties?===
==Philosophical Origins==
===What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?===
====Buddhism====
====Platonism====
====Aristotelian thought====
====Ancient Chinese Philosophy====
====Stoicism====
====Early Indian Philosophy====
====Miscellaneous Hellenistic Schools (epicureans, academics, skeptics, etc.)====
====Roman Legal and Political Thought====
====Early Christianity====
====Thomism and medieval Christianity====
====Medieval Islamic Thought====
====Medieval Judaism====
====Early Modern Rationalism====
====Absolute Idealism====
====Reformation Christianity====
====Hobbesian Thought====
====Lockean Thought/English Empiricism====
The issue of the right to privacy within the United States is a relatively new phenomenon following the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut in which the right to privacy was clearly established by the Supreme Court. However, it might be suggested that its origins and foundations can be traced back to the late 1600s when John Locke introduced the private sphere when it came to the conversation of religious tolerance. John Locke wrote “Letter Concerning Toleration” in 1689 that describes the way in which the right to privacy originates from the idea that the people can and should be separate from the government in certain aspects. Locke introduces the idea of a private sphere or the right to privacy when he discusses issues like religion since its discussion creates more problems preventing society from working efficiently.

Locke recognizes that there are very divisive issues that prevent people from working together effectively within society. Specifically referring to spreading religious beliefs, he wrote that “If by these means the offenders will not be reclaimed, and the erroneous convinced, there remains nothing further to be done but that such stubborn and obstinate persons, who give no ground to hope for their reformation, should be cast out and separated from the society” (Locke 1689, 30). Locke claims that the divisions within the public sphere over religion can be remedied by the complete separation of such matters from the state since religion is its own society. Religion dividing society is evident throughout history as nations and their people fought wars over their competing religious values and beliefs. For Locke the separation between the two and separating the state from religion was a way to avoid conflict within a nation and come to the general agreement that not everyone is going to agree on the matter of religion. However, Locke challenges his own idea of religious tolerance by saying that all religions except Atheists, Unitarians, and Catholics deserve tolerance because these groups prioritize religious law rather than political law. Locke recognizes the fact that a lot of the political issues revolve around religion and to focus on the commonwealth, matters of religion need to be subjected to the individual rather than being a concern of the state. Furthermore, upon the creation of the private sphere “...it will be urged still that civil assemblies are open and free for anyone to enter into, whereas religious conventicles are more private and thereby give opportunity to clandestine machinations” (Locke 1689, 51). Locke develops the idea that all religions must be tolerated within the government in the best interest of the commonwealth, leaving the political conversation open for political conversation as to how the government should be run. If the state sphere should interfere with the individual sphere, Locke claims that greater problems would arise as the government wields a seemingly tyrannical power. Locke proposes this idea of the private sphere in order to avoid problems within the political sphere, but alongside this proposal, he builds the foundation for a right to privacy that is valued so much today. The rest of his arguments include the point that there is a realm of privacy in which the individual makes decisions that they believe will best benefit them.

It was from Locke’s separation between the state and the individual that the right to privacy came to life off the premise that there is a place within society where the government should not be involved in the matters of the people. Locke continues for the advocation of a private sphere by claiming that, “In private domestic affairs, in the management of estates, in the conservation of bodily health, every man may consider what suits his own convenience and follow what course he likes best” (Locke 1689, 34). Throughout his letter of toleration, and through the rest of his theory, he is critical of government intervention in the affairs of the people and emphasizes this private sphere as a place to escape government intervention. This sort of foundation and sentiment expressed by Locke gave the people the perspective that the state is going to act within their own self-interest which might mean being involved in the actions of the people. Locke again remedies this problem with the private sphere as a space where the government cannot get involved in the choices of the individual when it comes to their lives. Specifically, Locke subtly turns the conversation slightly away from religion and into the idea of affairs, property, and health in general as a part of the private sphere that the government should not be a part of. To the rest of society, the government has always been involved in the lives of the people, so to have this idea proposed that people can and should be independent of government intervention changed the way the people saw the government and the power they had over the lives of the people. In addition, Locke then claims that when the magistrate makes laws, “...a private person is to abstain from the action that he judges unlawful, and he is to undergo the punishment which it is not unlawful for him to bear” (Locke 1689, 48). Locke paints a picture that the people can make decisions about the laws within this private realm that adds another dimension to the idea that the people have more power within their private space than they thought. Historically, the governments were involved in all affairs of the people, leaving them little room for voluntary actions that they wanted to pursue for themselves, and Locke’s sentiments provides them the space to become free thinkers outside of the government. Although his writings are in specific reference to religion being in the private sphere, the later sentiments expand to other areas of life that would be affected had religion been placed within the private sphere. This allows the people to believe that other aspects of their life that have been controlled by the government can enter the private sphere where the government will not have any control over the efforts of the people themselves. This created a life where the people had private lives, where the government was not involved in the lives of the people and where the people made decisions for themselves. As people saw the potential for the private sphere, the right to privacy became more prevalent as a boundary between the state and the people developed, despite the boundary between the public and the private being unclear sometimes. Although this line is imprecise, Locke’s notion of the private sphere when it comes to politics introduces the idea of the line in the first place and introduces a new level of understanding about the relationship between the people and the government.

Locke created the idea of the private sphere based on the premise that doing so might help prevent a lot of the conflict that had been around during the time that created the bad relationship between the state and the people. However, by proposing this idea he shines light on the paradox on the relationship between rights in general and the government. It is the duty of the government to act within the interest of the people by providing them access to their rights regardless of what they are, but at the same time the government also wants to act within their self-interest to maintain law and order within society and therefore might see rights as an obstacle to their end goal. Furthermore, Locke writes about this topic in a time period where the legal framework looks incredibly different from what is present today and therefore writes from the perspective that religion causes these huge wars within nations and between major parties. All these factors contribute to the idea that the right to privacy has existed throughout history and throughout theory as criticism of government is an ongoing conversation that has many different perspectives and points of view. Locke’s writings about creating a private sphere for religion only reflect the sentiments known today as the right to privacy that has changed the way that people have viewed the relationship between the people and the government.

Bibliography

Locke, John. 1983. “A Letter Concerning Toleration”, edited by James H. Tully. Hackett Publishing Company Inc.

====Physiocrats====
====Scottish Enlightenment====
====Modern Capitalism====
====Rousseau's Thought====
====Kantianism====
====German Idealism====
====Benthamite Utilitarianism====
====Millian Utilitarianism====
When it comes to the rights and liberties bestowed upon an individual, there are some that seem inherent according to society’s standards like the freedom of speech and religion, especially since some of these values are rooted in texts that have helped found the country. However, as time has progressed, there are new issues that expand the public’s definition of rights and liberties and gives them a new vision as to what they may or may not have a right to. One of these rights is the right to privacy, a right in which there are various opinions, all of which are relatively new, yet there is a hindrance of commentary on these issues. John Stuart Mill has written various pieces including but not limited to On Liberty and The Subjection of Women in which he writes about the rights people inherently have and the values that people should have within society. Although it could be assumed that Mill creates a private realm in which individuals pursue their higher faculties away from society, Mill’s view of privacy is extremely limited and whatever private realm there might be is subjected to teaching morals and values.

Based off an initial reading of Mill, it might be assumed that a private sphere might exist in order to develop higher faculties away from the public. For example, Mill notes that, “A person whose desires and impulses are his own—are the expression of his own nature, as it has been developed and modified by his own culture—is said to have a character...Their thinking is done for them by men much like themselves, addressing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of the moment, through the newspapers” (Mill 1859, 67). From here the reader reasonably infers that Mill would advocate for individuals to remove themselves from the public in order to reach their higher faculties since if one is not in the public sphere, the conclusion is that they are in the private sphere. However, as Mill goes on to describe his argument, he uses various examples to explain his philosophy and how the issue of the private and public spheres should be addressed. In the end, he turns to uses his own harm principle to argue that the state and the government should intervene in instances where the decisions one makes affect the prospects and the lives of the people around them. Due to this belief, he argues that the private sphere is severely limited by the government’s interest to protect the people from other’s personal desires. Furthermore, Mill notes that “That, this being supposed, they cannot be acting wrongly in endeavoring to exclude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested, of instigators who cannot possibly be impartial—who have a direct personal interest on one side, and that side the one which the State believes to be wrong, and who confessedly promote it for personal objects only” (Mill 1859, 110). Alongside this argument, Mill describes several examples where government intervention is allowed when the decisions of the individual interfere with the lives and the decisions of other people. With that being said, there can be no existence of a private sphere for the government needs to protect individuals from the impulses they have that in Mill’s philosophy warrant punishment by the government. The problem with the discussion of Mill and the private sphere is that he does not make any explicit claim about the right to privacy because of the necessity of government intervention from his point of view.

Mill further describes this limited aspect of privacy in which the government is allowed to intervene so long as there is reason to intervene for the good of the rest of the population. For example, Mill writes that “The State, while it respects the liberty of each in what specially regards himself, is bound to maintain a vigilant control over his exercise of any power which it allows him to possess over others” (Mill 1859, 116). This statement alone, despite not referring to the topic at hand, states clearly where he would stand on the issue of the right to privacy. One might claim that there could still be a private sphere especially since Mill does not dismiss the idea all together, but what is important to mention is that the state cannot intervene in matters of right and wrong without letting the individual be somewhat public. He names another example in which he claims “If the government would make up its mind to require for every child a good education, it might save itself the trouble of providing one. It might leave to parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased, and content itself with helping to pay the school fees of the poorer class of children, and defraying the entire school expenses of those who have no one else to pay for them” (Mill 1859, 116-117). In these matters, Mill claims that the government can control and regulate the way that children pursue their higher faculties through education since it is their liberty and goal to reach these faculties for the betterment of their character and overall well-being. Mill maintains this point of view that every individual has the right to live their best life, which he believes is attainable so long as people make decisions for themselves only and the state makes decisions to make sure that others cannot infringe on the lives of others. He recognized the ways that people’s individual private actions could injure one another, despite operating within this realm of personal liberty. He saw the way that life needed regulation based on the harm principle which allowed the government to intervene on private matters and push for a stronger public sphere to share ideas. Mill by no means wanted the government to control every aspect of the life of the individual, he wanted to merely hold the individual accountable for the way their decisions affected those around them.

Mill continues within his other works to paint a picture as to what he wants society to look like and describes the ways in which having a private or domestic sphere can create a form of the right to privacy. Within The Subjection of Women Mill notes that, “As regards the relations of private life it may be said generally, that their influence is, on the whole, encouraging to the softer virtues, discouraging to the sterner: though the statement must be taken with all the modifications dependent on individual character”(Mill 1861, 565-566). Mill’s main emphasis is on the morally correct and doing the necessary things in order to achieve this moral good, especially since he believes that the society around him is declining due to the lack of morality and tendency for people to avoid pursuing their higher faculties. Since women are subjected to the household and are not given a role within the public sphere, it could be argued that women then are responsible for what would have been the private sphere since the home is their responsibility to maintain. It could be asserted that there is a private sphere in which the women or those at home are responsible for the moral development of the children and those living within the home. Within his writing about the home, the government plays no role in dictating how the morals are taught, therefore alluding to this right to privacy based on the premise that the home is a private space in which the government cannot intervene. In addition, Mill adds that “There is no country of Europe in which the ablest men have not frequently experienced, and keenly appreciated, the value of the advice and help of clever and experienced women of the world, in the attainment both of private and of public objects; and there are important matters of public administration to which few men are equally competent with such women; among others, the detailed control of expenditure” (Mill 1861, 580). Here, Mill describes the full capacity of women within the public sphere and particularly within the government but understands that the standards that society have during his time leave no space for women publicly. He uses this line to reference the power and influence that women already have over the private sphere despite society’s perception of women. However, it should be noted that acting within their realm of liberty, they had this explicit right to privacy that allowed them to hold themselves accountable, therefore keeping the government out of their private lives. Therefore, Mill could take on the belief that if a private sphere should exist to develop and teach morals to children who then enter the public sphere and hopefully act within their best interests to pursue their higher faculties without intervening in the lives of others.

What might be something to keep in mind about Mill and his idea of the right to privacy is the sense of Victorian morality that he writes about and his overall response to rights of any kind. He writes both works from the Victorian moral point of view which in turn is reflected in the way that he believes that society should be run and would agree about the way that life would be instructed upon these morals. It is this sense of morality that would go against most things that one might believe is not the concern of the public and Mill would want to spread his single version of morality because everyone should be morally upright according to the same standard. Despite this observation, Mill would also claim that holding oneself accountable is necessary to maintain this moral standard because individuals do not and should not depend on one another. Other than the right to privacy, his perspective on rights aligns with those of earlier philosophers so long as they fall within the utilitarian model and therefore benefit most of the people. However, this creates somewhat of a dilemma since any action or inaction could be seen to benefit the majority. The government could infringe on the inherent rights one has and claim that it be for the betterment of society that they control religion, speech, and property despite these being protected by many other philosophers. In that sense, it is hard to define from the Mill point of view what people do and do not have the right to within their system of government. The right to privacy from Mill’s perspective is one that is hard to define and comes with various limitations that allow the government to intrude on the lives of the people.

Bibliography

Mill, John Stuart. “On Liberty.” In John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Essays, edited by John Gray. Oxford World’s Classics, 1991.

Mill, John Stuart. “The Subjection of Women.” In John Stuart Mill On Liberty and Other Essays, edited by John Gray. Oxford World’s Classics, 1991.

====Current Utilitarianism====
====Transcendentalism====
====Marxism====
====Early Sociology====
====Pragmatism====
====Weberian Thought====
====Process Philosophy====
====Social Darwinism====
====British Idealism (19th cen.)====
====Continental Philosophy/Frankfurt School====
====Behaviorism====
====Feminist Thought====
====Postmodernism====
===Are there any philosophical or moral traditions that dispute the classification of this right as a fundamental right?===
===What do the major legal theories (positive law, natural law, critical legal studies, etc.) say about this right?===
'''Positive Law'''

Positive law theory asks if the actions the government actor took would have been unlawful for a nongovernment actor to do in that jurisdiction (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1830, 1831). In other words, what does the written law allow? For instance, the model holds something to be a search if the government uses special legal powers to gain access to information (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1832). This model constrains the ability possessed by police to gain information from private parties while creating a predictable conception of privacy (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1856). Its use in the United States aims to add clarity to privacy expectations that is not had in the ''Katz'' test (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1869). Positive law theory was used in ''California v. Ciraolo'' and ''Florida v. Riley'' (Baude & Stern, 2016, 1867).

'''Natural Law'''

Locke is one of the primary natural law theorists. In his ''Two Treatises on Government: Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government'' (Essay Two) he discusses some of these rights which implicitly concern privacy in the State of Nature. In Chapter II: Of the State of Nature, he recognizes in section 6 that the laws of nature prevent “harm[ing] another in his life, health, liberty or possessions” (Locke, 1832, 107). All of these categories can be linked to laws today which protect privacy: mainly constitutional law in various countries, but also, for instance, the United States Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (1996).

'''Critical Legal Studies'''

Critical Legal Theorists believe law becomes intertwined with social issues causing each judge to have a somewhat different judgement in each case (Dworkin, 1977, 117). These differing torts and constitutional interpretations create varying implications in jurisdictions based on the weight precedents are given (Dworkin, 1977, 118). Dworkin recognizes that with this connection to social facts, the judiciary plays a bigger role in society (Waldron. 1999, 211). For instance, some judges may find a connection between the directly provided for protection of the right to liberty and implied right to privacy, while others may not (Dworkin, 1977, 117). Roberto Unger supports this example, writing in his essay ‘’Critical Legal Studies Movement’’ that some rights give individuals “a zone of unchecked discretionary action that others … may not invade,” reminiscent of Warren & Brandeis’s original claim to the right to privacy (Unger, 1983, 599).

'''Legal Positivism'''

Legal Positivism claims law depends on social facts, but the existence of law is not dependent on its merits or morals (Sevel & Leiter, 2010). H. L. A. Hart, a famed positivist, claimed that “law should be bound by limits and respect citizen’s privacy” (van der Sloot, 1). Moreover, the state could not and should not regulate private conduct unless there was harm (van der Sloot, 1). Robert Burt claims Hart essentially follows Louis Brandeis’s “right to be let alone” (Burt, 2004, 14).

'''Legal Realism'''

Legal Realism is reading laws “in the light of the purpose and policy of the rule or principle in question” (Macauley, 2005, 371). As such, legal realism expects the law to be constantly changing based on social conditions (Hall, 2005, 452). Calo claims privacy law exemplifies legal realism because of all of the exceptions, shifts with technology, and meanings dependent on other values and rights (Calo, 2019, 34). Despite privacy law’s beginnings being rooted in legal realism, he recognizes that privacy scholars have not expressly used this legal theory (Calo, 2019, 34, 40, 48).

'''United States Constitutional Theorists'''

One would think defining the appearance of privacy rights in the United States Constitution to be easy, especially given the language of ‘penumbras’ used in ''Griswold v. Connecticut'' rather than citing one specific clause constitutional (''Griswold v. CT'', 1965, pars. 14-15). However, Scott Gerber demonstrated in his work ''Privacy and Constitutional Theory'' that all six of the constitutional theories of interpretation he presented can be used to find privacy rights in the Constitution (Gerber, 2000; Baker, 2004).

Originalists: In his writing, Gerber (2000) posits that if an originalist interpreter wants to find privacy rights in the constitution, they can (167). Generally, those who do find privacy rights in the Constitution cite the Ninth Amendment (Gerber, 2000, 171). This is what Justice Arthur Goldberg cited in his ''Griswold'' concurrence and has been cited as such since James Madison wrote the amendment (Gerber, 2000, 171, 172).

Living Constitutionalists (US): Living constitutionalists allow for precedents to be called upon. It can be argued this is what was done in ''Griswold v. CT'' and other substantive due process decisions on privacy, such as ''Boyd v. US'' in 1886 (Gerber, 2000, 178). In the ''Griswold'' majority opinion, Justice William Douglas argued that the Supreme Court had previously ruled on cases in which rights were not explicit in the Bill of Rights, but the rights were justifiable to the Court through the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Griswold v. Connecticut, 1965, par. 11).

Resources

Baker, T.E. (2004). Constitutional theory in a nutshell. William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 13(1), 57-123. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1245&context=wmborj
Baude, W. & Stern, J.Y. (2016, May). The positive law model of the Fourth Amendment. Harvard Law Review 129(7), 1821-1889. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44072348
Burt, R. (2004). Moral offenses and same sex relations: Revisiting the Hart-Devlin Debate. Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series. https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/711/
Calo, R. (2019). Privacy Law’s Indeterminacy. Theoretical Inquiries in Law 20(1), 33-52. https://doi.org/10.1515/til-2019-0001
Dworkin, R. (1977). Taking rights seriously. Harvard University Press.
Gerber, S. (2000). Privacy and constitutional theory. Social Philosophy and Policy 17(2), 165-185. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052500002156
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479
Hall, E.L. (Ed.). (2005). The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
Locke, J. (2008). Concerning the true original extent and end of civil government. In R. Hay (Ed.), The Works of John Locke: In 10 volumes (Vol. V). Cosimo Classics.
Macaulay, S. (2005). The new versus od legal realism: “Things ain’t what they used to be.” Wisconsin Law Review 2005(2), 365-403. From https://media.law.wisc.edu/s/c_8/tg2md/new_versus.pdf
Sevel, M. & Leiter, B. (2010). Legal Positivism. Oxford Bibliographies. https://doi.org/10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0065
van der Sloot, B. (2017). Privacy as secondary rule, or the intrinsic limits of legal orders in the age of Big Data. In M. Dehmer and F. Emmert-Streib (Eds.), Frontiers in Data Science. CRC Press. https://bartvandersloot.com/onewebmedia/Privacy%20as%20secondary%20rule.pdf
Unger, R.M. (1983, Jan.). The Critical Legal Studies Movement. Harvard Law Review 96(3), 561-675. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1341032
Waldron, J. (1999) Law and Disagreement. Oxford University Press.

==Culture and Politics==
===Is this right interpreted and exercised in different ways in different countries? Focus on particular countries in which the right is interpreted distinctively===
The right to privacy has been interpreted in various ways. The EU has strict legislation regarding data privacy and the Council of Europe has outlined in Article 8(1) of the ECHR (1950) the right to privacy in the four spheres of family life, private life, communication, and the home (Wolford, n.d.). On the other hand, the United States has outlined protections from government interference in the private sphere in the Bill of Rights, has comparatively less (& less encompassing) legislation on the issue, and has relied on the courts to protect people from private entities and in the home (U.S. Constitution; 1787, Amendment 4; Privacy, n.d.). These differences result in a more consistent application of privacy rights in Europe compared to the United States.

In the home, Europeans have had a safe, private space since 1950 (ECHR, 1950, Art. 8(1)). In the United States, this right wasn’t concrete until long after the Supreme Court began ruling on the privacy cases in the mid-1960s (Privacy, n.d.). However, it remains that Americans have a higher expectation of privacy in the home than in a public area (Electronic Surveillance, n.d.). In an extreme example of lack of privacy in the home, Albanians working for the Soviet government did not own anything in their homes – the state owned it all (Lubonja, 2001, 239).

Exceptions to privacy at home include police entering with and, in some cases, without a warrant. New Zealand also utilizes court-issued warrants to prevent officials from entering the home, but if officials are actively preventing a crime, enforcing a law, making an arrest, or aiding in an emergency, they do not need a warrant (Community Law, n.d.). Within the European Union, this warrant can come from a court within any part of the EU’s jurisdiction. The European Evidence Warrant (EEW) allows a warrant issued to gather evidence to be valid across the EU and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) applies this principle to the arrest of criminals taking exploiting the open borders within the EU (European evidence warrant, 2006; European arrest warrant, n.d.). EEWs can also be used to get cell phone records (The European evidence warrant, 2006). In the United States, a customer can ask for those records to be turned over to authorities or authorities can use a subpoena (FCC 2019).

The Prüm Convention demonstrates another aspect of inter-European collaboration in crime-solving efforts, leading to interesting implications for data privacy. Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Luxembourg, and Spain all signed this treaty, to which other nations can opt-in, in an effort to increase cross-border security (Prüm Convetion, 2005). At the roots, it allows the parties to ask each other for help solving crimes by sharing data from each nation’s crime database (Walsch, 2008, 86). By not creating an international crime database, each nation is required to ask other nations for the needed data (Walsch, 2008, 86). This method allows the shared data to be governed by each nation’s specific data privacy laws, but it lands in an unregulated grey area after the data transfer (Walsch, 2008, 85). Differences in privacy law become clear when looking at what personal data is collected from people. Some states collect DNA in all criminal cases, others only when the person has been in prison for over two years, and others do not collect DNA at all (Walsch, 2008, 86). In the context of solving international crime, these differences mean some states tend to be more helpful than others.

Resources

Community Law. (n.d.). Entry powers: When the police can come into your home. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://communitylaw.org.nz/community-law-manual/chapter-31-police-powers/entry-powers-when-the-police-can-come-into-your-home/entry-without-a-warrant-to-prevent-or-investigate-crimes/
Electronic Surveillance. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 20, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/electronic_surveillance
European arrest warrant. (n.d.). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/cross-border-cases/judicial-cooperation/types-judicial-cooperation/european-arrest-warrant_en
European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
European evidence warrant. (2006, June 1). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_06_168
European evidence warrant, The: The acquisition and admissibility of foreign evidence. (n.d.). Academy of European Law. Retrieved Sept. 20, 2021, from https://www.era.int/cgi-bin/cms?_SID=d241949ae554074b1e14fd12b7f05d3f5d1e38df00162723613600&_sprache=en&_bereich=artikel&_aktion=detail&idartikel=121538
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). (2019, Dec. 30). Protecting your privacy: Phone and cable records. https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/protecting-your-privacy
Lubonja, F. (2001). Privacy in a totalitarian regime. Social Research 68(1), 237-254. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40971449
Privacy. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Sept. 8, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/privacy
Prüm Convention. AT-BE-DE-ES-FR-LU-NL. May 27, 2005. 10900/05. https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/sites/default/files/docs/body/prumtr.pdf
U.S. Constitution. Amendment IV. https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript
Walsch, C. (2008, Nov. 9). Europeanization and democracy: Negotiating the Prum Treaty and the Schengen III Agreement. Politicka Misao, XVL(5), 81-90.
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

===Is this right exercised in different ways depending on the political governance regime in place (democracy, autocracy, hybrid regime)?===
Rhoda Howard and Jack Donnelly (1986) put forth six regime types: liberal, minimal, traditionalist, communist, corporatist (authoritarian), and developmental. When comparing regime type to the ‘valuation of privacy,’ liberal regimes are ranked highly, and minimal regimes are ranked very highly (Howard & Donnelly, 1986, 814). The other regime types, all communitarian regimes rather than individualistic, were ranked low or very low regarding privacy (Howard & Donnelly, 1986, 814). At their cores, communitarian regimes do not have privacy because it can be argued, as Howard and Donnelly (1986, 211) do, that the allowance of freedoms may lead to self-destruction. Thus, privacy is ignored (Howard & Donnelly, 1986, 211). Fatos Lubonja agrees with this sentiment, writing that privacy did not exist in Albania under the totalitarian regime, and cites his experience in Albanian prisons as an example (Lubonja, 2001). He also admitted to self-censorship in the private diaries which originally got him arrested, supposing many others had censored themselves in the same way (Lubonja, 2001, 247).

Resources

Howard, R.E., & Donnelly, J. (1986, Sept.) Human dignity, human rights, and political regimes. The American Political Science Review 80(3), 801-817. https://doi.org/10.2307/1960539
Lubonja, F. (2001). Privacy in a totalitarian regime. Social Research 68(1), 237-254. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40971449

===Is there general and widespread belief that this right is a fundamental right that should generally be protected (and that exceptions should be rare)?===
The right to privacy is expressed in many places: Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996), Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU) (2009), and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (1950). Nationally, this right has been cited in the 1988 Brazil Constitution and United States case law (derived from the US Constitution). In India, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in 2017 that the right to privacy for all people falls under Article 21, which provides the “protection of life and personal liberty” (McCarthy, 2017; Mahaprata & Choudhary, 2017). However, many exceptions to privacy are also listed alongside the right to privacy in these supreme documents, despite the belief in its inviolability.

Article 8(2) of the ECHR provides that privacy interference can only occur in instances “of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Article 7 of the CRFEU can be breached by a search or arrest warrant issued by any EU state (European arrest warrant, n.d.; European evidence warrant, 2006). In Article 5 Sections X-XII, the Brazilian Constitution outlines the right to privacy in areas related to private life, the home, and correspondence. These sections also clearly outline exceptions; Section XI recognizes that officials can enter a home “in cases of flagrante delicto, disaster or rescue, or, during the day, with a court order,” and Section XII allows criminal proceedings to methodically breach this privacy. In the United States, privacy zones – derived from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments in ''Griswold v. Connecticut'' (1965) in conjunction with the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment – have extended privacy to Americans in various ways (Privacy, n.d.). Again, a court-issued search or arrest warrant may breach this right to privacy, especially in the home.

'''Data Privacy'''

The US has very little data privacy due to a lack of legislation and regard. Most data regulation is due to compliance with the 2018 implementation of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, which applies to any company collecting any data on European citizens or companies with a large number of customers based in Europe (Wolford, n.d.). On the other hand, the Brazilian Supreme Court extended these Article 5 protections to data privacy in 2020 (Bioni & Monteiro, 2020). Additionally, New Zealand’s Information Privacy Principles (IPP) in Article 22 of the Privacy Act 2020 protect data collection, but also provides some exceptions in IPP 11 and 12.

'''Relationships'''

In 2018, the Indian Supreme Court declared part of Section 377 unconstitutional against Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution (Rai, 2018). This ruling allowed those in LGBT relationships privacy in the home, but again, this privacy was not granted in public spaces (Rai, 2018). Similarly, the right to a private relationship went through the courts in the United States. First, it was granted to interracial couples in 1967 through ''Loving v. Virginia'' (1967) and then to same-sex couples through ''Obergefell v. Hodges'' in 2015. In Brazil, relationships are protected under Article 5(X), which states “personal intimacy, private life, honor and reputation are inviolable, guaranteeing the right to compensation for pecuniary or moral damages resulting from the violation thereof” (Brazil Constitution, 1988).

'''Communication'''

Private communication is protected under Article 5(XII) of the Brazilian Constitution (1988). In the United States, the right to private communication became convoluted with the 2001 USA PATRIOT ACT, which authorized the interception and disclosure of communication under certain circumstances.

Resources

Bioni, B.R. & Monteiro, R.L. (2020, June 9). A landmark ruling in Brazil: Paving the way for considering data protections as an autonomous fundamental right. Future of Privacy Forum. https://fpf.org/blog/a-landmark-ruling-in-brazil-paving-the-way-for-considering-data-protection-as-an-autonomous-fundamental-right/
Brazil Constitution. (1988). https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2017.pdf?lang=en
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Dec. 1, 2009. https://fra.europa.eu/en/eu-charter
Constitution of India. (1950). https://legislative.gov.in/constitution-of-india
European arrest warrant. (n.d.). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/cross-border-cases/judicial-cooperation/types-judicial-cooperation/european-arrest-warrant_en
European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
European evidence warrant. (2006, June 1). European Commission. Retrieved Sept. 21, 2021, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_06_168

===Does public polling reveal insights about the right as experienced in different countries?===
'''Worldwide'''

A 2018 Deloitte survey has revealed that the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is having a positive international impact on the perception of data collection and storage even just six months after its implementation (Deloitte, 2018, 4). The GDPR has had a worldwide effect on privacy laws as it requires all companies which collect data on EU citizens to comply with the law, regardless of the location of their headquarters (Wolford, n.d.). At the most basic level, respondents felt companies have begun to care more about data protection (Deloitte, 2018, 6). Additionally, over 3 out of 4 respondents were aware of their rights under this law and some had already used this knowledge to alter what data companies were collecting about them (Deloitte, 2018, 13, 14, 19). On the other hand, 19% of those polled felt that organizations did not care about privacy (Deloitte, 2018, 6) and only 51% felt the law had put them in control of the personal data that companies have access to (Deloitte, 2018, 18).

'''European Union'''

In a 2019 European Union (including North Macedonia) study conducted a year after the implementation of the GDPR, the European Commission concurred with Deloitte in that the GDPR had made people more aware of their rights (Vandystadt & Voin, 2019). However, only 20% of these respondents knew which authority was responsible for protecting privacy rights (Vandystadt & Voin, 2019; Awareness of the general data protection regulation, 2019).

'''United States'''

In 2002, a Harris Poll found that 63% of respondents found the privacy legislation in place to be inadequate (EPIC, 2021). In 2019, 75% of those surveyed felt the government should regulate companies and their use of personal data (Auxier, 2020). In 2020, 79% of the population wanted national privacy legislation enacted (Auxier, 2020). It is clear that over time, Americans have become more concerned about the use of their personal data, especially in the private sector (Auxier et al., 2019; Auxier, 2020). Despite this fact, the United States has still not enacted sweeping privacy legislation at a national level. At the state level, California was the first state to enact privacy legislation in 2018, and at least nineteen other states have followed suit with the hope that it will signal the federal government to propose some sort of national privacy legislation for ease of compliance (Sabin, 2021). However, Americans seem to be fine with either approach, with polls showing around 70% find their state government to be responsible for this issue and the same percent find the federal government to be responsible (Sabin, 2021).

'''New Zealand'''

In 2012, the New Zealand Privacy Commissioner published a privacy study completed by UMR Research. This study found that 90% of people wanted the government to protect their data and be told by companies how their data was being used (Privacy Commissioner, 2012, 9). Interestingly, only 66% were concerned about the presence of their personal data online (Privacy Commissioner, 2012, 12). However, 88% of respondents wanted businesses to be punished if they were using data incorrectly, and 97% wanted the Privacy Commissioner to be able to reprimand companies if they were breaching the then enforceable 1993 Privacy Act (Privacy Commissioner, 2012, 23, 10). Since this study was published, the 1993 Privacy Act has been updated. Now, if an investigation reveals a breach of duty or misconduct, Article 96 of the Privacy Act 2020 requires the Commissioner to refer the matter to authorities, reflecting some of the public’s wants revealed in the 2012 poll.

'''British Columbia'''

In 2020, Canadian non-profit, Freedom of Information and Privacy Association or FIPA, worked with Ipsos and polled British Columbians surrounding their attitudes regarding privacy law. About half of them were unsure if the current laws were protective enough or admitted they thought current privacy laws were lacking (FIPA, 2020). When asked about the transparency of Canadian companies, 50% felt companies were not open about their data practices and 75% felt that Canadian companies may send their data to non-Canadian companies (FIPA, 2020). However, one-third of respondents from the same study knew British Columbian privacy law and its protections and three-quarters would like a public education initiative to teach these protections (FIPA, 2020).

Resources

Auxier, B. (2020, May 4). How Americans see digital privacy issues amid the COVID-19 outbreak. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/05/04/how-americans-see-digital-privacy-issues-amid-the-covid-19-outbreak/
Auxier, B., Rainie, L., Anderson, M., Perrin, A., Kumar, M., & Turner, E. (2019, Nov. 15). Americans and privacy: Concerned, confused, and feeling lack of control over their personal information. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-confused-and-feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information/
Awareness of the general data protection regulation – one year on. (2019). European Commission. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2222
Deloitte. (2018). A new era for privacy: GDPR six months on. https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/risk/deloitte-uk-risk-gdpr-six-months-on.pdf
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). (2021). Public opinion on privacy. https://epic.org/privacy/survey/
FIPA. (2020, June 4). British Columbians want action on privacy protection: Polling results. https://fipa.bc.ca/2020-privacy-poll/
Privacy Act 2020, 2020 No. 31, (2021). https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2020/0031/latest/LMS23223.html
Privacy Commissioner. (2012, Apr.). UMR omnibus results. https://www.privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Surveys/Privacy-Commission-UMR-Omni-Results-Apr-2012.pdf
Sabin, S. (2021, Apr. 27). States are moving on privacy bills. Morning Consult. https://morningconsult.com/2021/04/27/state-privacy-congress-priority-poll/
Vandystadt, N., & Voin, M. (2019, July 24). GDPR shows results, but work needs to continue. European Commission. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/api/deliverable/download/file?deliverableId=69715
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

==Conflicts with other Rights==
===Are there other specific fundamental rights that tend to conflict with this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?===
As Warren & Brandeis suggest in ''The Right to Privacy'' (1890), the right to privacy directly conflicts with freedom of the press and speech. They wanted to protect people from writings beyond what defamation and publishing law covered. However, by proposing privacy protections that extended beyond these laws, they were inherently limiting what could be published. While this limitation was intentional, it was sure to be contentious as the First Amendment had been in place and protected for nearly 100 years and privacy rights were not prominent in any part of the world before this time. The First Amendment reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” (US Constitution, 1787, Amd. 1).

The United States Supreme Court Cases offer plenty of examples of press and privacy rights conflicting, as “the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of the right to privacy” (''Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc.'', 1971). In some cases, privacy prevails, in others, the First Amendment. One of the cases was ''New York Times Company v. United States'' (1971) in which the ''New York Times'' published the Pentagon Papers but the Nixon administration argued that those should be kept private for national security concerns. In a 6-3 decision, the Court claimed that these were not to be considered private or secure and that the freedom of the press prevailed (NYT v. US, n.d.). Also in 1971, the Court ordered Branzburg to reveal his sources to a grand jury, despite the sources explicitly asking to not be revealed in ''Bransburg v. Hayes''. Had secrecy been maintained, the press would have more rights than individuals during the grand jury (Branzburg v. Hayes, n.d.). Additionally, other cases such as ''Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn'' (1975) and ''Florida Star v. BJF'' (1989) held that freedom of the press overtakes privacy rights when the information is lawfully and publicly available. ''Cohen v. Cowles Media Company'' (1991) granted privacy to press informants if they had been promised confidentiality with promissory estoppel because the principle applies generally not just to the press (Cohen v. Cowles Media Company, n.d.). The contrast of ''Branzburg'' and ''Cohen'' shows how interpretive and circumstantial privacy rights are, while ''NYT v. NASA'' (1991) reveals that privacy rights are dependent on the media used to publish the information. In this instance, the US District Court for the District of Columbia allowed for transcripts of the Challenger astronauts’ last words to be published by the ''Times'', but not the voice recordings (Mills, 2008, 36).

Privacy rights also conflict with the right to information. The government recognized this right with the Freedom of Information Act in 1966 (FOIA). This act granted anyone the ability to request access to federal agency records but not the records of private companies. The goal of having public records is to keep the government accountable, but this risks people’s privacy based on the nature of the information agencies collect (Mills, 2008, 50). However, nine exemptions and three exclusions in FOIA limit access to these records. The exclusions are narrow and related to law enforcement and ongoing intelligence investigations and are unaffected by FOIA. The exemptions authorize government agencies to withhold information from those requesting it (Freedom of Information Act, n.d). Luckily, the exceptions and exemptions and the Privacy Act of 1974 considered the right of privacy and aimed to prevent the collision of these rights (Mills, 2008, 51).

Privacy is also put aside when considering public security and health (Mills, 2008, 227). In the United States, this lack of priority became clear with the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and PATRIOT Act of 2001, which both expanded the ability of the FBI to have access to information on individuals that may or may not be a threat to the nation’s security. Many courts have upheld acts that place public security over personal privacy rights. To use an example less severe than terrorism, such is the case with the release of sex offenders (Mills, 2008, 224). While it hurts one’s reputation to have their name released in connection with this crime, it protects the greater community and their neighbors by alerting them.

Resources

Branzburg v. Hayes. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 12, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-85
Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc, 4 Cal. 3d 529 (CA Sup. Ct. 1971). https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/4/529.html
Cohen v. Cowles Media Company. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 12, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1990/90-634
Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1974/73-938
Florida Star v. B. J. F. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 15, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1988/87-329
Freedom of Information Act, The. (n.d.). Department of State. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://foia.state.gov/learn/foia.aspx
Mills, J.L. (2008). Privacy: The lost right. Oxford University Press.
New York Times Company v. United States. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved November 12, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1970/1873
U.S. Constitution. (1787). https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Are there other specific rights that are critical to the exercise of this right? Can you identify specific examples of this?===
“Privacy claims began gradually to be made independently of the trespass rules essential to property rights” (Heffernan, 2016, 102). The connection between these rights was recognized early on by Hixon (“the right to privacy…carried at least an implied right of property”) from Warren & Brandeis’s 1890 writing and by New York Court of Appeals judge John C. Grey (Hixon, 1987, 39). These rights are protected and exercised jointly in many constitutions and states, likely as privacy rights’ origins are rooted in property rights (Heffernan, 2016, 113). For instance, in Grenada Article 1(c) of the 1973 constitution protects both privacy and property (Constitute Project, Grenada 1973, reinst. 1991, rev. 1992). Without the right to privacy, property rights would be lessened as it would only grant the right to ownership and, barring other protections, leave the property vulnerable to searches that may expose private information. When exercised in conjunction with property rights, privacy protections expand. This is explicit in the constitution of Saint Kitts and Nevis, which, in granting privacy rights, also prevents the deprivation of property without compensation (Constitute Project, Saint Kitts and Nevis 1983).

The right to privacy also convenes with the right to be forgotten in some states. This right is “the right of a past individual to be forgotten by people in the present” (Gadja, 2018, 205). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in 2014 that the right to privacy granted in Europe extended to past economic troubles and that this lack of privacy that caused the lawsuit was harming his ability to move past these troubles (Gadja, 2018, abstract). This ruling allowed the past troubles to be forgotten. Since this ruling in 2014, the United States courts have also alluded to the right to be forgotten as a sect of privacy rights, despite many believing at the time “this right [would not] cross the Atlantic” because of the First Amendment and others believing this right was present before the conventional right to privacy (Gadja, 2018, 206). While the US Supreme Court has not ruled on this right, lower courts have, as the California Supreme Court did in ''Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association'' in 1971. ''Briscoe'' opined that while the reports of previous crimes were newsworthy, the “identification of the actor in reports of long past crimes usually serve[d] little independent public purpose” other than curiosity given the rehabilitation that had taken place (''Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association'', 1971). The plaintiff was allowed to have his past forgotten and the press was not allowed to take this right away, in this instance (Gadja, 2018, 212). However, this right is not internationally recognized, as other states such as Brazil have not supported this right (Library of Congress, 2021).

The right to be forgotten and property combine to create the right to one’s name and likeness which is especially important for those in the public eye (Mills, 2008, 220). It is accepted that people have a right to profit off of their own image, much like they have the right to profit off of their inventions or intellectual property (Mills, 2-008, 217-218). This right became clear in court cases soon after the 1890 publication of the Warren & Brandeis article, beginning with ''Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.'' in 1902 (Hixon, 1987, 39). Beyond this, of course, are other sects of privacy law that remain pivotal in the protection of privacy rights as it is known today.

Resources

Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc, 4 Cal. 3d 529 (CA Sup. Ct. 1971). https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/4/529.html
Constitute Project. (2021). Grenda 1973, reinstated 1991, revised 1992. https://constituteproject.org/constitution/Grenada_1992?lang=en
Constitute Project. (2021). Saint Kitts and Nevis 1983. https://constituteproject.org/constitution/St_Kitts_and_Nevis_1983?lang=en
Gadja, A. (2018). Privacy, press, and the right to be forgotten in the United States. Washington Law Review 93(1), 201-264. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3144077
Heffernan, W.C. (2016). Privacy and the American Constitution: New rights through interpretation of an old text. Palgrave Macmillan.
Hixon, R.F. (1987). Privacy in a public society: Human rights in conflict. Oxford University Press.
Library of Congress. (2021, Mar. 15). Brazil: Federal supreme court decides right to be forgotten is not supported by constitution. https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2021-03-15/brazil-federal-supreme-court-decides-right-to-be-forgotten-is-not-supported-by-constitution/
U.S. Constitution. (1787). https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/constitution-transcript

===Is there a perception that this right is above or higher than other fundamental rights, or in general, that it has a particular place in a hierarchy of rights?===
Joseph Wronka posits that the UDHR has tiers of rights, arranged by article. Article 1, human dignity, is the first and foremost right. Articles 2-21, which includes the right to privacy in Article 12, are civil and political rights, protecting people from their government. The right to speech, press, religion, and vote are also protected in these articles (Wronka, 1994; UDHR 1948). Below these rights were the positive rights in which a government should provide “to ensure an existence worthy of human dignity” and solidarity rights (Wronka, 1994). So, there is some recognition of a hierarchy between fundamental rights, but nothing has been written on the hierarchy among rights of the same tier.

In practice, however, privacy seems to be overshadowed by other rights. On one hand, privacy rights can overtake rights such as the freedoms of speech and press. On the other hand, these rights have stifled privacy rights in many instances. Hixon suggests that privacy rights prevail in cases of information gathering but press and speech rights prevail during and after publishing (Hixon, 1987, 178). Mills suggests this difference in protection is due to the publication medium and the perceived benefit to the public (Mills, 2008, 36, 117).

In the United States, some scholars have noted that “free-speech and free-press rights almost always trump information privacy rights,” suggesting there is a hierarchy within fundamental rights in at least one nation (Mills, 2008, 108). Hixon referred to privacy as “at best a correlative right,” and “sociological notion,” while Milles calls it a “precondition” (Hixon, 1987, 44, 45; Mills, 2008, 116). Press freedoms only require a “newsworthy” and “public interest” standard to be upheld, while privacy rights have had to be fought for continuously in courts. In this fight, the inadequacy of American privacy law has shown through, stemming from the lack of explicit protection in the Constitution (Hixon, 1987, 76). Public figures continuously have information published about them, protected under free speech, leaving them vulnerable to the news cycles (Hixon, 1987, 133).

Resources

Hixon, R.F. (1987). Privacy in a public society: Human rights in conflict. Oxford University Press.
Mills, J.L. (2008). Privacy: The lost right. Oxford University Press.
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
Wronka, J. (1994). Human rights and social policy in the United States: An educational agenda for the 21st Century. Journal of Moral Education 23(3). https://doi.org/10.1080/0305724940230304

===What specific examples of hierarchies, manifestos, constitutions, or prioritized descriptions of rights cite this right’s high status? Low status? No status at all?===
The right to privacy is listed in many international treaties – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990), and Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989). The consistency with which it is held as a fundamental right certainly suggests it’s high status. The consistency with which it is present in many national constitutions confirms this suggestion (see “What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right” above).

Resources

Convention on the Rights of the Child. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Nov. 20, 1989. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx
European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. UNGA. Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
International Covenant on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. UNGA. Dec. 18, 1990. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cmw.pdf
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

===How does federalism change, if at all, the exercise or application of this right? What examples of this can one point to?===
With federalism, there is often one state that leads the rest – in terms of privacy legislation, California leads the United States, and the German state Hessen led Germany and the European Union (Mills, 2008, 167; Petkova, 2016, 5, 4). Though the EU is not properly a federalist entity, federalism encouraged and promoted privacy as a fundamental right. Privacy rights began in Hessen, became federal law after German parliamentary action, and eventually became supranational as the EU passed encompassing privacy legislation in 1995 (Petkova, 2016, 4). Later iterations of the 1995 law led to the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation which has provisions that help regulate information privacy outside of EU borders, including in the United States.

In the United States, federalism clarifies and further protects the right to privacy. This is important because the federal right is still based on Supreme Court opinions rather than explicit constitutional provisions or legislation. This lack of explicit language allows states to “provide leadership in the privacy area because of the constitutional options available” and drive for change (Mills, 2008, 162; Petkova, 2017, 24). As of 2008, ten states in the US (Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington) explicitly protect privacy in their constitutions (Mills, 2008, Appendix II). At least twenty states have passed privacy legislation (with some overlap between the ten with constitutional provisions, namely California). State privacy legislation focuses on data privacy, improving security measures for storing personal information, notifying individuals of security breaches, and enabling security alerts and/or freezes on credit reports (Mills, 2008, 167). Most states hoped their passage would signal the federal government to pass privacy legislation (Sabin, 2021). Schwartz acknowledges that this legislation would be possible under the Commerce Clause, though the effects would depend on the text (2009, 922). Some scholars are wary of federal legislation as states have created a successful legal landscape based on experimentation and consequence, and federal legislation could disrupt the balance, create uncertainty, and be hard to amend (Bellia, 2009; Schwartz, 2009, 922-931).

Federalism results in the lack of consistent privacy laws and rights. For instance, in Germany, every company needs to have a data protection officer. In the EU, the GDPR only requires public companies and certain private companies to have this position, while allowing all other private companies to opt-in to having this role (Petkova, 2017, 20). These different laws can alter privacy protection outcomes based on the jurisdiction in which the incident took place, especially if the rights are challenged in courts. This was the case in Florida’s ''Rolling v. State''. Six college students were brutally murdered in Gainesville, Florida and their families hoped to prevent the press from releasing the photos of their bodies. Mills, who was asked to consult on the case, knew this would be a complex legal question as the Florida laws technically allowed for these records to be open to ensure police accountability, but he also knew the families would suffer severe harm were these photos to appear publicly. The Florida Supreme Court decided that the laws in place allowed for a compromise: the photos could be made available to the public by the records custodian upon a reasonable request provided there were restrictions on the copying and removal of the photos. Mills acknowledges that had the situation been occurred in another jurisdiction, the result would not have been the same and the photos likely would have been published (Mills, 2008, 247-251).

Resources

Bellia, P.L. (2009). Federalization of Information Privacy Law. Yale Law Journal 118(5), 868-900. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40389431
Mills, J.L. (2008). Privacy: The lost right. Oxford University Press.
Petkova, B. (2016). The Safeguards of Privacy Federalism. Lewis & Clark Law Review 20(2). https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Petkova%20The%20Safeguards%20of%20Privacy%20Federalsim_0.pdf
Petkova, B. (2017). Domesticating the “foreign” in making transatlantic data privacy law. International Journal of Constitutional Law 15(4), 1135-1156). https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Petkova%20Domesticating%20the%20Foreign%20in%20Making.pdf
Sabin, S. (2021, Apr. 27). States are moving on privacy bills. Morning Consult. https://morningconsult.com/2021/04/27/state-privacy-congress-priority-poll/
Schwartz, P.M. (2009). Preemption and privacy. Yale Law Journal 118(5). https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5155&context=ylj

==Limitations / Restrictions==
===What are the typical exceptions or limitations placed on this right?===
Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) presents exceptions to the right to privacy. Privacy is granted “except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (1950). The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996) allow for reasonable, non-arbitrary searches. These exceptions allow privacy to be breached with a court-issued warrant. Most exceptions stem from these documents and it should be noted that the United Nations extended the right to privacy to online spheres (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2013, I§5). Additionally, the European Union implemented the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which prevents the sharing of personal data with outside sources (Wolford, n.d.). The GDPR applies to any companies operating in or with the EU causing it to have international implications (Wolford, n.d.).

Resources

European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2014, June 30). The right to privacy in the digital age. A/HRC/27/37. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf
United States Constitution. 1787. https://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights
Wolford, B. (n.d.). What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law? GDPR EU. Retrieved Sept. 9, 2021, from https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/

===Under American jurisprudence, what permissible exceptions exist?===
The Fourth Amendment states “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (1791). While this amendment protects the right to privacy from the government, it also brings forth exceptions: reasonable search and seizure as well as infringements allowed by court-issued warrants seeking specific items or people. Other amendments used to extend privacy by the Supreme Court, namely the First, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth, do not have notable exceptions regarding privacy.

'''Limitations of Reasonability'''

Defining what constitutes a reasonable search has proven to be difficult. In ''Katz v. United States'' (1967) the Supreme Court ruled the Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places” and created the Katz test to determine where it is reasonable to expect privacy from law enforcement and a warrant is needed (''Katz v. United States'', 1967). This test examines whether the information was meant to be kept private and if it had been disclosed (Hu, 2018, 129). Prior to the ''Katz'' test, the court used the trespass test, a common-law approach to the Fourth Amendment in which physical intrusion can violate the Fourth Amendment. Fifty years after ''Katz'', the Court again relied on the trespass test in ''United States v. Jones'' (Hu, 2018, 130; ''United States v. Jones'', 2012). In doing so, the court claimed while the ''Katz'' test extended the right to privacy to people, it did not revoke the traditional common-law protections (''United States v. Jones'', 2012). Hu, citing Justices Sotomayor and Alito, feels that the Katz test ends before cyber-surveillance begins and recognizes the need for change (Hu, 2018, 139, 141).

In analyzing Fourth Amendment Supreme Court rulings, Orin Kerr found that four general models have been used to decide privacy cases (2017, 524). These models vary in scale (micro or macro) and normativity (normative or descriptive) and consider one of the following: how public the information is, what information was found, the actions that were taken, or whether or not government conduct should be regulated (Kerr, 2017, 506, 524). Kerr claims the last of these considerations was the basis for the ''Katz'' ruling (2017, 519). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has used all four of these models to both protect and deny privacy and has not provided clear guidance as to what is a reasonable search (Ker, 2017, 507, 508). Kerr concludes by suggesting there is no one size fits all test or model because of the importance of case facts (2017, 525). As such, Kerr would rather see many definitive models so that the limitations of reasonability are clear and contextualized for future court decisions at all levels (2017, 542).

'''Privacy Violations by a Non-Government Entity'''

The Supreme Court has rarely ruled on notable cases in which the privacy offender was not a government entity. However, in ''Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union'' (1937) the Court ruled that Senn could not invoke his privacy in work against the right to publicity of the union’s picketing (Richards, 1334). In the opinion of the Court, Justice Brandeis held that because it was a commercial dispute and affected the competition for customers, the right to privacy was not applicable (Richards, 1334). He also protected counter-speech in this opinion (Richards, 1334).

Resources

Hu, M. (2018). Cybersurveillance intrusions and an evolving Katz privacy test. American Criminal Law Review 55(1), 127-152. https://www.law.georgetown.edu/american-criminal-law-review/in-print/volume-55-issue-1-winter-2018/cybersurveillance-intrusions-and-an-evolving-katz-privacy-test/
''Katz v. United States'', 389 U.S. 347 (1967). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/389/347
Kerr, O. (2007). Four models of Fourth Amendment protection. Stanford Law Review 60(2), 503-552. http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2010/04/Kerr.pdf
Richards N.M. (2010, Oct.). The puzzle of Brandeis, privacy, and speech. Vanderbilt Law Review 63(5) 1293-1352. https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol63/iss5/3/
United States Constitution. 1787. https://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm
''United States v. Jones'', 565 U.S. 400 (2012). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/10-1259

===Under international human rights laws, what permissible exceptions (often called derogations) exist?===
Article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) presents exceptions to the right to privacy – “except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others” (1950). The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948, Art. 12) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1996, Art. 17) only prevent arbitrary and unlawful searches, allowing for reasonable searches.

Resources

European Convention on Human Rights. Council of Europe. Nov. 4, 1950. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Dec. 16, 1996. https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. UNGA. Dec. 10, 1948. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

===Have political theorists or philosophers discussed the permissibility of exceptions to this right?===
'''Hobbes'''

Thomas Hobbes grappled with varying different situations of privacy. In ''Leviathan'', it was mostly concerning places in which privacy and the public overlap. Generally, the public and commonwealth rights overtake those of an individual, especially in times of war, but there are some exceptions (Hobbes, 1651/1965, 130). For instance, one had the right to protect themselves with their private strength without being a threat to the commonwealth (Hobbes, 1651/1965, 138). Additionally, men could own private property and goods without interference from the Church of England and hold their own beliefs, as long as they didn’t go against the Church (Hobbes, 1651/1965, 250, 345).

In ''De Cive'' (On the Citizen), Hobbes presents an interesting dilemma – once the people form a state, the people no longer exist and instead become subjects (Hobbes, 1642/1651, 39-40). He suggests this leaves the ruler of the state with no responsibility to the subjects, able to harm them as there is no direct contract between the ruler and subjects (Hobbes, 1642/1651, 40). Without obligation, there is certainly little to prevent the ruler from imposing on subjects and revoking their privacy.

'''Locke'''

In 1689, John Locke discussed privacy in his ''Letters on Toleration''. In this essay, Locke discusses privacy in relation to the Church of England. Generally, there is no privacy from the Magistrate in matters relating to the Church, however, in some instances, privacy is afforded to private matters (Locke, 1689/2010, 43, 46). For instance, Locke claims that one may take care of one’s health without much interference at all and prevents people from telling others what to believe in unless they are a clergyman (Locke, 1689/2010, 46. 129). Additionally, if one perceives an order by a magistrate to be unlawful, they can abstain from that law, and the magistrate cannot use their private judgment to impose laws but must refer back to God’s laws (Locke, 1689/2010, 58-59).

'''Kant'''

Immanuel Kant talks a lot about Enlightenment and the formation of states. Inherently, in the creation of these states, some rights are taken away to “[harmonize] with the freedom on everyone else” (Kant, 1970, 47, 55, 73). However, these rights that are given up usually have specific limitations (Kant, 1970, 45). The government in these societies could prevent some actions but, much like Warren & Brandeis later, felt that free-thinking and reasoning were of utmost importance in developing new ideas, and suggested they be protected (Kant, 1970, 59). However, Kant also suggests limiting the right to reason because it can still “expand to its fullest” while it is limited (Kant, 1970, 59).

In Warren & Brandeis’s terms of “the right to be let alone,” Kant, in his ''Theory and Practice'', instead proposes the right to coercion, meaning all who are a part of the state are held to the same standard (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 193; Kant, 1970, 75). This coercion is imposed uniformly on all subjects, but not the ruler (Kant, 1970, 75). As long as one was conforming to the laws, there was no reason to interrupt their actions, but once conformity was broken, there was a chance to impose and alter someone’s actions (Kant, 1970, 80). Kant recognizes that Hobbes feels differently, writing directly against Hobbes’ views as put forth in De Cive, in that the ruler has no obligations to the people and may treat them how he wishes – implying no right to be let alone (Kant, 1970, 84; Hobbes, 1651, 40).

'''Sieyes'''

In his essay titled ''Views of the Executive Means Available to the Representatives of France in 1789'', Emmanuel Sieyes claims rights are inherent to a person. However, in ''What is the Third Estate'', Sieyes claims that states may use the rights it was granted by the constitution and positive law to preserve the nation and community (Sieyes, 1788/2003, 136). In terms of privacy, these statements seem to imply that privacy may sometimes be taken away from some in the interests of the public. It is important to note, though, that these impositions may not go beyond the scope of the constitution in place (Sieyes, 1788/2003, 137).

'''Mill'''

John Stuart Mill, an English thinker, recognizes that English laws tended to interfere with privacy (Mill, 1859/2011, 15). However, Mill felt that separating church and state (“spiritual and temporal authority”) prevented more interferences of law within private life, somewhat facilitating what Warren & Brandeis would later call “the right to be let alone” (Mill, 1859/2011, 24; Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 193).

Resources

Hobbes, T. (1651). De cive (T. Hobbes, Trans.). UK Public Library. (Original work published 1642). http://www.public-library.uk/ebooks/27/57.pdf
Hobbes, T. (1965). Leviathan. Liberty Fund. (Original work published 1651). http://files.libertyfund.org/files/869/0161_Bk.pdf
Kant, I. (1970). Kant: Political writings (R.S. Reiss, Ed., 2003 ed.). Cambridge University Press.
Locke, J. (2010). A letter concerning toleration and other writings (M. Goldie, Ed.). Liberty Fund. (Original work published 1689). http://files.libertyfund.org/files/2375/Locke_1560_EBk_v6.0.pdf
Mill, J.S. (2011). On liberty. Project Gutenberg. (Original work published in 1859). https://www.gutenberg.org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm#Page_1
Sieyes, E. (2003). Political writings (M. Sonenscher, Ed.). Hackett Publishing Company. (Original work published in 1788).
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Should this right be limited when limiting it would jeopardize democratic norms?===
Like many rights, privacy is not absolute (Siddiky, 2011, 224). It conflicts with and is compromised in the presence of other fundamental rights and democratic norms.

'''Speech'''

The right to privacy notably conflicts with the First Amendment’s right to free speech. In some cases, the right to privacy becomes limited and less protected, but, in others, it remains protected. This protective line between speech and privacy is thin. For instance, speech protections extend to allow employers, including the government in its capacity as an employer, to be able to restrict the speech of employees in certain matters (Volokh, 2000, 1095). However, in ''Connick v. Meyers'' (1983), the United States Supreme Court decided that, while working for the government, matters of public concern are protected and private while intraoffice grievances are not (Connick v. Meyers, n.d.; Volokh, 2000, 1095).

As Warren & Brandeis suggested in ''The Right to Privacy'' in 1890, the right to privacy conflicts with the First Amendment rights. In their writings about what is now known as ‘tort privacy’ (different from ‘constitutional privacy’), they advocate for the prevention of disclosures of private affairs to the public (Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 195). This distinction is still maintained today, allowing for the publishing of ‘newsworthy’ stories about public figures (Volokh, 2000, 1088; Richards, 2010, 1307). However, the courts have not defined what constitutes newsworthy and have even left the definition to juries (Volokh, 2000, 1089).

Privacy has also been limited by the Supreme Court, despite being the institution that created the protection of the right. In ''Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union'' (1937), Senn had chosen to not join the labor union and the union members began picketing around him, beginning a labor dispute and causing Senn to call for his right to privacy (Richards, 2010, 1332-1333). In this case, Justice Brandeis wrote in the opinion’s footnote, Senn was not able to invoke his right to privacy against the union’s right to publicity (Richards, 2010, 1334). In essence, in the commercial sphere between competitors, the right to privacy became inapplicable in the interest of consumers (Richards, 2010, 1334).

On the other hand, privacy has remained protected in other instances. In ''Cohen v. Cowles Media'', the Supreme Court ruled that people can contract away their right to speech (Volokh, 2000, 1057). Volokh (2000) posits this privacy extends to implied contracts, especially in professions in which privacy can be reasonably expected. Thus, the federal laws requiring confidentiality have simply allowed for repercussions to be implemented, rather than creating a new area in privacy rights (1058). In publishing, the actions of private people are protected (Richards, 2010, 1307; Volokh, 2000, 1055). Volokh (2000) posits this protection extends beyond actions to embarrassing photos or stories which exhibit a lack of dignity (1094). Generally, this protection is expressed as the public concern test, in which privacy is granted to a party as long as the public is not affected (Volokh, 2000, 1097). This general protection of the right to privacy is consistent with Richards’ (2010) conclusion from Brandeis’ writings: that privacy protections allow for new ideas to be formed through development in private conversations (1347).

'''Right to Public Trial'''

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution directly conflicts with the implicit right to privacy by granting the right to a public trial. It is argued that the use of this court structure allows for the expression of public concern and prevents corruption while increasing public confidence in the system (Siddiky, 2011, 229).

Despite the right to a public trial, the juvenile justice system was created to protect the identity of minors who committed crimes in the hopes that this protection will allow them to become contributing members to society without the judgment of a criminal past (Siddiky, 2011, 207, 241). Even with this intention, there are exceptions to this privacy. First and foremost, juveniles’ privacy has previously been limited in favor of granting other constitutional rights, including 14th Amendment due process (Siddiky, 2011, 213, 227). Privacy may also be removed if they are charged as an adult, which requires meeting varying statutory criteria depending on the jurisdiction (Siddiky, 2011, 214). Additionally, there has been some movement surrounding the reform of juvenile courts which may remove their anonymity because of perceived coddling and the high recidivism rates among teens, potentially suggesting the need for different consequences (Siddiky, 2011, 215, 217).

Outside of juvenile courts, privacy is compromised more often for the sake of public trials. Something, though, the right to privacy prevails as a judge allows a party in a suit to file anonymously (Rastgoufard, 2003, 1009). These exceptions are rare and are not entrenched in the Federal Rule of Civil Procedures, but the United States Supreme Court has allowed anonymous suits to be decided (Rastgoufard, 2003, 1023). Most notably, anonymity was granted in Roe v. Wade in which ‘Jane Roe’ was allowed to remain anonymous as pregnancy was considered to be a very private matter. Juries have also been allowed to be anonymous (Rastgoufard, 2003, 1009).

'''Property Rights'''

The right to be left alone seems like it would go hand in hand with property rights. Your property, your privacy. However, it is easy to learn who owns a piece of real estate through public records (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 355). While this has benefits mostly related to the ease of buying or selling real estate, there are few-to-no processes in place to confirm the validity of deed filings or liens, especially in the United States (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 359). However, many involved in the industry have interests in limiting privacy in this area for their professional ease (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 374). In Europe, the only people that can file these records are notaries, but the US does not offer similar protections (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 372). These infringements on the right to privacy have become more accessible with digitized records, though this is not limited to this industry (Roscoe & Szypszak, 2017, 375). Additionally, it is probably possible to buy a house anonymously, though there is limited academic literature on how.

'''Political Preferences'''

While one has the right to cast a vote in private and not tell anyone who they voted for, that doesn’t stop people from figuring out one’s political tendencies. With party alignment shrinking, the importance of micro-targeting has grown in campaigns. As such, political parties and candidates have gathered information on voters to determine who is a supporter, who could be persuaded, and who is not likely to be a supporter (Bennett, 2015, 372). At first, parties and candidates begin by looking at state and local party registration lists (Bennett, 2015, 372). From there, they use a variety of factors, such as social media, letters to elected officials, and campaign donations, to determine issues of importance to each voter (Bennett, 372, 2015, 378). While most of this is already public information or has been willingly put out on the internet by individuals, it is not being used in the intended way, and some of the information gathered is private (Bennett, 2015, 372; 11 CFR § 102.17(c)(4)). As such, this approach is illegal in Europe, though it has become prominent in other western nations beyond the United States, such as Canada (Bennett, 2015, 373).

Resources

11 FCR § 102.17(c)(4). (2021). https://www.fec.gov/regulations/102-17/2021-annual-102#102-17-c-4
Bennett, C.J. (2015). Trends in voter surveillance in western societies: Privacy intrusions and democratic implications. Surveillance & Society 13(3/4), 370-384. https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v13i3/4.5373
Connick v. Myers. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved September 28, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1982/81-1251
Rastgoufard, B. (2003). Pay attention to that green curtain: Anonymity in the courts. Case Western Reserve Law Review 53(4), 1009-1040. https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1512&context=caselrev
Richards N.M. (2010, Oct.). The puzzle of Brandeis, privacy, and speech. Vanderbilt Law Review 63(5) 1293-1352. https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol63/iss5/3/
Roscoe, E. & Szypszak, C. (2017, Summer). Privacy and public real estates records: Preserving legacy system reliability against modern threats. The Urban Lawyer 49(3), 355-391. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44648036
Siddiky, L. (2011). Keeping the court room doors closed so the doors of opportunity can remain open: An argument for maintaining privacy in the juvenile justice system. Howard Law Journal 55(205), 204-246.
Volokh, E. (2000, May). Freedom of speech and information privacy: The troubling implications of a right to stop people from speaking about you. Stanford Law Review 52(5), 1049-1124. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1229510
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Is this right often perceived as threatening to government authorities?===
The Fourth Amendment has rarely been fully realized in its long history. While the Fourth Amendment guarantees privacy in search and seizure, the states originally did not want it to apply to their procedures and noted that it had yet to be applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1260). As such, lots of cases came forward to the Supreme Court, and the Exclusionary Rule was established (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). The Exclusionary Rule prevents trials from using improperly collected evidence, but it does not fully apply the Fourth Amendment and prevent searches (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). The rule has gone through a couple of iterations based on the amendments from which it is derived by the Court. It was originally established in ''Boyd v. US'' (1886), based in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, then evolved with ''Weeks v. US'' (1914), which claimed derivation from the Fifth Amendment but appeared to be based in the Fourth. Its current state results from ''Mapp v. Ohio'' (1961) when the Court held that the Fourth Amendment was an essential feature of privacy and decided that the standards of evidence collection should be consistent between federal and state jurisdictions (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1262). However, authorities can collect whatever evidence they wish and are not held to a legal standard unless they wish to have permissible evidence in the likely-upcoming judicial proceedings (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). Additionally, there are currently many cases that have developed in which a warrant is not needed, causing even Congress, via the Government Publishing Office, to admit there has been an expansion of power given to authorities (US GPO, 1992, 1208-1209). Beyond this expansion, it is known that authorities who perform acts that are not permitted by law are rarely reprimanded, especially with search and seizure and the ability to use the “good faith” defense (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1258). These facts prevent the right to privacy from being perceived as threatening to government authorities.

Resources

Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: Exclusionary Rule. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 9, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-4/enforcing-the-fourth-amendment-the-exclusionary-rule
US Government Publishing Office (US GPO). (1992, June 29). Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure (S. Doc. 103-6). https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CONAN-1992/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-5/summary

===Is this right often curtailed by government authorities for reasons other than those which are generally viewed as permissible?===

While the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution is in place to protect people’s privacy, a fact continuously recognized by the Supreme Court, it continues to leave people vulnerable to the decisions of authorities due to a lack of clarity and accountability provided by the courts (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). The Fourth Amendment is explicit in that it prevents unreasonable search and seizure (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). However, it is hard to determine what is reasonable and the Supreme Court has claimed that the reasonableness of a search is situationally dependent (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.; US GPO, 1992, 1202). Various rules and exceptions to the right to privacy have been established.

Under the Exclusionary Rule, lots of searches are carried out which are later found to be unconstitutional by a court, at which point there is little that can be done to rectify the violation of privacy rights (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). These instances are not permissible exceptions, but rather instances in which it becomes clear after the fact that privacy was violated (Enforcing the Fourth Amendment, n.d.). Beyond the Exclusionary Rule, the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted in ways that cause the government’s regulatory interests to be placed over an individual’s interests (US GPO, 1992, 1204). These interpretations have created exceptions, creating situationally specific instances in which privacy is not necessarily protected. For instance, during the execution of a search warrant, if it does not include a search clause for those occupying the location, they may not be searched, but they can be detained (US GPO, 1992, 1227). For whatever reason, the courts have viewed detainment as less intrusive than a search, so it has become allowed, though it has been debated if it is a reasonable and permissible exception without a warrant (US GPO, 1992, 1227). This debate starts with the Court’s opinions in ''Terry v. Ohio'' (1968) and ''United States v. Mendenhall''(1980) that state seizure is either restraining liberty or the belief that one is not at liberty to leave (US GPO, 1992, 1231). The ''Terry'' decision was important in other ways as well, creating another standard for search and seizure without a warrant and probable cause - authorities may stop and frisk individuals if there is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity (US GPO, 1992, 1230). Recently, this standard has been applied less restrictively and more often, creating some tension between the right to privacy and public safety (GPO, 1992, 1231).

Exceptions don’t just result from court rulings. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 permitted information sharing between law enforcement agencies without notice, leading many to believe more privacy violations were occurring (Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act, n.d.). However, some scholars argue while privacy is more elusive under the presence of this law, privacy is not hindered as most of us remain unconcerned about the information that may or may not be collected about us resulting in little or no behavioral change (Rubel, 2007, 148-149). At the same time, however, “lack of privacy bears upon how we act,” as does the knowledge that others may have access to our information, so the right becomes less protected under the PATRIOT Act (Rubel, 2007, 142, 153).

Resources

Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: Exclusionary Rule. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 9, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-4/enforcing-the-fourth-amendment-the-exclusionary-rule
Highlights of the USA PATRIOT Act. (n.d.) Department of Justice. Retrieved Sept. 14, 2021, from https://www.justice.gov/archive/ll/highlights.htm
Rubel, A. (2007, Mar.). Privacy and the USA Patriot Act: Rights, the value of rights, and autonomy. Law and Philosophy 26(2), 119-159. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-005-5970-x
US Government Publishing Office (US GPO). (1992, June 29). Fourth Amendment: Search and Seizure (S. Doc. 103-6). https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-CONAN-1992/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-5/summary
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001). https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/house-bill/3162

===Is this right at times curtailed by private actors?===
'''Privacy Torts'''

Privacy violations under tort law was how Warren & Brandeis originally developed the right in 1890 (Citron, 2010, 1805). These violations, usually unwanted intrusions or disclosures can result from negligent or intentional actions and result in civil lawsuits rather than questions of constitutional legality (Citron, 2010, 1806; Tort, n.d.). Violations are hard to define as they change with technology (the original call for privacy was in relation to the ‘instant photograph’), which creates more and more opportunities for violations (Citron, 2010, 1809; Warren & Brandeis, 1890, 195). However, the law changes slower than technology creating some disconnect in legal remedies for new technology (Citron, 2010, 1810).

'''Constitutional Privacy'''

Constitutions only protect people from government actors and international covenants only affect the laws and regulations which governments put in place (Hudson, 2018; Dunn, 2009). Even so, most allowances of government invasions of privacy in the United States have evolved because the government mimicked the actions of private actors, placing private conduct at the baseline of privacy expectations (Kamin, 2004, 101, 115).

At a basic level, once information is willingly given to someone other than oneself, the courts have continuously ruled that there is no longer the expectation for privacy. This holds true with information that is given to both private companies and individuals (Kamin, 2004, 101). The ''Katz'' decision somewhat demonstrates this curtailment of privacy by creating the plain view doctrine. If something is in plain view, even in a private space, it is not private (Kamin, 2004, 104). This decision extrapolates on the theory that as long as someone else may reasonably have that information, it is an unprotected area under the Fourth Amendment (Kamin, 2004, 104). So, by letting someone into one’s home or publishing information online, one is inherently limiting their Fourth Amendment protections. As such, authorities can ask private companies to perform searches or subpoena these actors rather than those they are investigating, depending on the company’s privacy policies (Kamin, 2004, 102, 137).

In ''United States v. Jacobsen'' (1984) privacy protections were tested when officials were able to open a package that FedEx had damaged and opened for insurance purposes (Kamin, 2004, 99, ''United States v. Jacobsen'', 1984). Upon its opening, FedEx employees suspected the package contained cocaine (Kamin, 2004, 99; United States v. Jacobsen, n.d.). Had federal officials gotten to it first, it would not have been able to be searched, even if it was damaged, but the information provided by FedEx from the private search was enough to imply the plain view doctrine thus permitting a warrantless search by the DEA (Kamin, 2004, 100; United States v. Jacobsen, n.d.; ''US v. Jacobsen'', 1984). The Supreme Court upheld the granting of the search and subsequent arrest warrant which was obtained because the DEA confirmed the contents were cocaine based on the ‘tip’ from private actors (United States v. Jacobsen, n.d.). The Court said that “[w]hether those invasions were accidental or deliberate, and whether they were reasonable or unreasonable, they did not violate the Fourth Amendment because of their private character” (''US v. Jacobsen'', 1984). Kamin (2004) goes as far as to say that “[t]he fact that the private actor did something the government would not have been permitted to do simply did not covert the subsequent, otherwise reasonable, police conduct into a search that implicated the Fourth Amendment” (100-101). That is to say, after the package was opened due to the damage by a non-governmental party, privacy could no longer be expected, despite that it is reasonable to expect privacy during shipping (Kamin, 2004, 100).

Resources

Citron, D.K. (2010, Dec. 1). Mainstreaming Privacy Torts. California Law Review 98(6). https://www.jstor.org/stable/25799956
Dunn, C. (2009, Apr. 28). Applying the Constitution to private actors (New York Law Journal). NYCLU ACLU of New York. https://www.nyclu.org/en/publications/column-applying-constitution-private-actors-new-york-law-journal
Hudson, D.L. (2018, Oct. 20). In the age of social media, expand the reach of the First Amendment. Human Rights Magazine 43(4), n.p. https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/the-ongoing-challenge-to-define-free-speech/in-the-age-of-socia-media-first-amendment/
Kamin, S. (2004, Dec. 1). The private is public: The relevance of private actors in defining the Fourth Amendment. Boston College Law Review 46(1), 83-147. https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2293&context=bclr
Tort. (n.d.). Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Retrieved Oct. 15, 2021, from https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tort
United States v. Jacobsen. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved October 13, 2021, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1983/82-1167
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 US 109 (1984). https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/466/109
Warren, S. & Brandeis, L. (1890, Dec. 15). The right to privacy. Harvard Law Review 4(5), 193-220. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0017-811X%2818901215%294%3A5%3C193%3ATRTP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

===Is this right subject to specific limitations in event of emergency (war, brief natural disaster [weather, earthquake], long-run natural disaster [volcano, fire, disease])? Can such limitations be defined in advance with reference to the disaster in question?===
Privacy protections are typically limited in times of emergency, but the type of emergency seems to dictate its limitations.

'''Natural Disasters'''

A Wilson Center report from 2013 outlines various times in which natural disasters have elicited temporary easing of privacy rules to aid in searching for missing persons. The first examples were from Australia after the 2002 Bali earthquake and the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami. During the Bali earthquake, many governmental agencies had to spend time creating their own missing persons reports (Reidenberg, Gellman, Debelak, Elewa, & Liu, 2013, 12). This was recognized as a waste of resources in light of the disaster and the importance of timeliness (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 12). The 2004 tsunamis renewed this sentiment (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 12). In response to these impeded disaster responses, Australia passed Part VIA to the Australian Privacy Act in 2006 (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13). Part VIA allows for sharing of otherwise protected information through a government emergency declaration if “(1) the entity reasonably believes that the individual may be involved in the disaster; and (2) the collection, use or disclosure of personal information is for a permitted purpose related to the disaster” (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13, 14). It also has stipulations on how long these special provisions can be in place and works for events both in and out of Australian borders while specifically preventing disclosure to media outlets (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 13-14)
.
Despite New Zealand’s comprehensive privacy laws, similar actions were taken in New Zealand after the 2011 Christchurch earthquake. There were stipulations in the Privacy Act to permit the sharing of information in some circumstances, it was unclear if they directly applied to natural disaster emergencies (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 15). This lack of clarity was impeding rescue efforts and the Privacy Commissioner, who is granted some discretion through the Privacy Act, took steps to allow temporary authorization of information sharing concerning the emergency at hand (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 16). Incidentally, many realized that this liberation of privacy issues reassured a variety of sectors’ information sharing in their emergency response (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 17). These reassurances caused the Privacy Commissioner to propose and pass the Civil Defence National Emergencies (Information Sharing) Code in 2013, allowing for these different privacy stipulations to be counted on during emergency planning (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 19).

The United States notoriously lacks privacy law. However, there is regulation in the medical field – Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1966 (HIPAA). HIPAA was somewhat suspended after Hurricane Katrina in light of nine of the eleven New Orleans hospitals incapacitated and people fleeing to surrounding states to receive medical attention (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 19-21). It prioritized providing treatment over payment and aided in locating missing persons by publishing facility directories (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 21). This privacy law alteration was less comprehensive than those in New Zealand and Australia after natural disasters, but it shows that the response regarding privacy exceptions is dependent on need.

All of these disasters culminated in the creation of the Missing Persons Community of Interest (MPCI), in which non-government actors collaborated to create standardized missing persons databases after disasters (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 25). At the time the report was written, there were five interlocking systems to record who was missing and try to connect these people with worried family (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 27). These systems were used multiple times from 2006 to 2012 when this report was written (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 27). The systems all have varying balances of access and privacy and, interestingly, one of these services is run by the International Committee of the Red Cross out of Geneva, Switzerland and is explicitly exempt from the Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 29, 35). Additionally, in 2011, the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners on Data Protection and Major Natural Disasters asked countries to review their privacy laws to make sure they were flexible in the event of a major natural disaster (Reidenberg et al., 2013, 73).

'''Disease'''

Rothstein (2020) suggests the following be considered when creating policy exceptions and interventions to health information during disease outbreaks: (1) necessity and effectiveness, (2) proportionality and minimal infringement, (3) purpose limitations, and (4) justice (1374). Policies that become altered during the outbreak should remain monitored for continued justification of the alteration and should discontinue at the end of the outbreak (Rothstein, 2020, 1375).

During the COVID-19 pandemic, Canada realized the conflict between the creation of a public health database and data privacy law. Data privacy laws vary by province (some have legislation, others default to federal law), sector (public and private), and profession (i.e., healthcare data is strictly regulated) (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 454-455). Generally, data cannot be shared between provinces, though this is debated based on local and federal laws, nor used for purposes other than for which it was collected (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 455). However, all these limits can be loosened during public health emergencies. There are legislative carve-outs for combating health risks, and during COVID-19 the Privacy Commissioner allowed officials to forgo consent from each individual, a privilege that is repealed after the emergency (Bernier and Knoppers, 2020, 455).

'''War'''

McDonald (2020) describes privacy as a social good and notes there is a trade-off between privacy and national security, claiming these rights are dependent on context (380). As such, these privacy limitations can be toward individuals or society, but they usually come to light ex parte (McDonald, 2020, 385, 380). However, it is unclear who dictates when this trade-off between privacy and security begins, ends, or how invasive it is as war surveillance is largely unregulated; there is no law of war regarding privacy (McDonald, 2020, 385, 386). It seems feasible violations can be committed by both one’s own country and the opposition. By one’s own country in the sense that they don’t want traitors, resulting in actions similar to how the United States placed Japanese Americans into internment camps during WWI or passed the Sedition Act of 1798 (Share America, 2015). Alternatively, the opposition can somewhat feasibly be expected to also survey those they are at war against, especially when attacking and trying to avoid civilian injury (McDonald, 2020, 381). Enemies may also invade privacy through espionage and intelligence which isn’t necessarily legal under international law though it is not limited to wartime (Pun, 2017, 360-361, 364; McDonald, 2020, 384).

Resources

Bernier, A. & Knoppers, B.M. (2020, June 26). Pandemics, privacy, and public health research. Canadian Journal of Public Health 111(4), 454-457. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7318908/pdf/41997_2020_Article_368.pdf
McDonald, J. (2020). Information, privacy, and just war theory. Ethics & International Affairs 34(3), 379-400. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679420000477
Pun, D. (2017, Summer). Rethinking espionage in the Modern Era. Chicago Journal of International Law 18(1), 353-391. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol18/iss1/10/
Quinton, A. (1988, Autumn). Plagues and morality. Social Research: An International Quarterly 55(3), 451-462. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40970516
Reidenberg, J.R., Gellman, R., Debelak, J., Elewa, A., & Liu, N. (2013). Privacy and missing persons after natural disasters. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Commons Lab. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/privacy-and-missing-persons-after-natural-disasters
Rothstein, M.A. (2020, Aug. 12). Public health and privacy in the pandemic. American Journal of Public Health 110(9), 1374-1375. https://www.doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2020.305849
Share America. (2015, Apr. 6). Civil liberties in wartime. United States Department of State. Retrieved October 18, 2021, https://share.america.gov/civil-liberties-wartime/

==Utilitarian / Fairness Assessments==
===Is there a cost attached to protecting and enforcing this right? What kinds of costs are implicated?===
====Short-term economic cost in general====
====Long-term economic cost in general====
====Cost to those least able to economically absorb the cost====
====Cost to perceived democratic legitimacy====
====Cost to consistency or coherence of the law as a whole====
====Cost to the legitimacy or effectiveness of other rights====
====Cost to considerations of social equality====
====Cost to other non-material goods not so far specified====
===What are the financial consequences, if any, of making this right a legally protectable right?===
===Are there any groups that are uniquely disadvantaged by the exercise of this right?===
===Are there any groups that uniquely benefit from the exercise of this right?===
===Are there instances when this fundamental right can lead to unfairness or inequities?===
===Are there objective ways to measure the utilitarian nature of this right?===
===If so, where can one draw the line: when does this right stop being useful or economically viable?===
==Looking Ahead==
===How can we expect this right to change and evolve in the years ahead?===
===How is the future likely to shape the exercise of this right?===
===Will the exercise or protection of this right be affected by technological changes?===
===Under what conditions would this right become irrelevant?===
===Are questions of fairness and utility pertaining to this right likely to change in the years ahead?===
==Policy Recommendations==
===Can the practice or exercise of this right be shaped through executive action?===
===In the US context, are there particular parties with a stake or interest in amending or reconceptualizing this right?===
===In the US context, can this right be altered legislatively, or would it require a constitutional amendment?===
===Is this right best addressed at the national level? The sub-national level? The international level?===
===To what extent is this right shaped primarily by judicial decisions?===
===If this right is best addressed through the amendment process, how should it proceed?===
===If this right were unlimited, what might be the consequences (positive and negative)?===
===If this right were eliminated, what might be the consequences (positive and negative)?===