- User contributions [en]

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Gabon

2024-08-12T04:39:58Z

Jkochan1:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Religion
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Gabon
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=Gabon’s Constitution of November 14, 1960, granted its citizens the right to freedom of religion in its texts. The second point of the First Article establishes freedom of religion and conscience to all (“Constitution du 14 novembre 1960” 1960).Under the 1991 Constitution of Gabon, Articles 1.2, 1.13, and 2 grant religious freedom, equality, and prohibits religious discrimination, and Article 2 declares Gabon a secular state.

“Constitution du 14 novembre 1960” 1960. Digithèque MJP
https://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/ga1960.htm

Constitution Project. “Gabon's Constitution of 1991 with Amendments through 2011.” Constitute. POGO, April 27, 2022. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Gabon_2011.pdf?lang=en&lang=en.
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Serbia

2024-08-07T19:29:12Z

Jkochan1: Reverted edits by ThbigO (talk) to last revision by Jkochan1

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Religion
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Serbia
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia was ratified November 8, 2006. Article 5, 21, 39, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 57, 79, and 81 grant extensive religious freedom, equality, and prohibit religious discrimination. Article 11 declares Serbia a secular state and creates a separation of church and state. The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia. “CALLING A REPUBLIC REFERENDUM TO ENDORSE THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA.” Government of the Republic of Serbia . Last modified 2006. Accessed June 28, 2022. http://www.parlament.gov.rs/upload/documents/Constitution_%20of_Serbia_pdf.pdf.
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Haiti

2024-08-05T00:40:45Z

Jkochan1: Reverted edits by Kj47 (talk) to last revision by Tonazinn

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Religion
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Haiti
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=Haiti enacted its first constitution in 1801 which asserted the Catholic religion, Roman and Apostolic, to be the only religion “publicly professed,” (Mitch Abidor 2019). In 1805 however, Haiti enacted a new constitution that effectively retracts the Catholic religion as the official religion of the country. Furthermore, it states that “The freedom of worship is tolerated.” (“Haiti: 1805 Constitution” 1805).

Sources
Mitch Abidor. 2019. “Constitution of 1801 by Haiti 1801.” Marxists.org. 2019.
https://www.marxists.org/history/haiti/1801/constitution.htm.

“Haiti: 1805 Constitution.” 1805. Faculty.webster.edu. 1805.
http://faculty.webster.edu/corbetre/haiti/history/earlyhaiti/1805-const.htm.
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Kantianism

2024-08-03T01:31:24Z

Jkochan1: Replaced content with "{{Right section |right=Freedom of Religion |section=Philosophical Origins |question=Tradition contributions |questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right? |breakout=Kantianism |pageLevel=Breakout |contents=free religion null }}"

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Kantianism

2024-08-03T01:27:28Z

Jkochan1: Undo revision 22286 by Kj47 (talk)

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=Philosophical Origins
|question=Tradition contributions
|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
|breakout=Kantianism
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=The right to free expression is a notion central to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. In his eyes, the unrestricted, public articulation of one's ideas is of vital importance: it is a prerequisite for humanity to realize its social and political ends. At the outset, we must be careful not to assume that Kant shares in our modern, liberal conception of this right. We must also refrain from implying a unified interpretation of this freedom among nations where it is constitutionally codified. This would be empirically false: the form and scope of free expression varies widely across liberal democracies. However, a general account might be gleaned by examining the definitions given by well-established international human rights organizations. Article 19 of the United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers" (UDHR, 1946). Generally put, freedom of expression is the right to publicly voice one's opinions, especially critical ones, without state interference. There are several exceptions to this principle, including public expression that incites violence, threatens national security, promotes indecency, is libelous, or constitutes hate speech. These restrictions arise from a practical tension between the necessity of free expression and the dangers it poses to society and the state. Kant's view on freedom of expression is no exception. His arguments balance the rational need for guaranteed free expression with our duty to respect the will of civil authorities.

Kant's treatment of the freedom of expression is inextricably linked to the project of the European Enlightenment. In his essay "An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?," Kant describes the titular epoch, defining it by its motto of "Sapere Aude! Have the courage to use your own understanding” (Kant 1784, 1). The era of Enlightenment constituted an awakening from Europe’s long-held state of "immaturity," in which institutional dogmatism monopolized public thought (Kant 1784, 1). Individuals had historically put their faith in public institutions and authorities, whether political, religious, medical, academic, or otherwise, to shape their beliefs and way of life (Kant 1784, 1). Enlightenment was the end of such dependency; it was the process of learning to use one's own reason or to think for oneself. To Kant, this promulgation of critical thinking was necessary for humanity's social and political progress; without it, humankind threatened to become ideologically stagnant.
Kant claims that the sole condition for this awakening is the freedom of expression. In his own words: "nothing is required for this enlightenment, however, except freedom; and the freedom in question is the least harmful of all, namely, the freedom to use reason publicly in all matters" (Kant 1784, 2). Overcoming blind dogmatism demanded that people voice their ideas without legal restriction (Kant 1784, 2). Without this protection, the light of reason could neither spread nor become practically meaningful, as critical thinking only benefits society if it can be publicly communicated. This view constitutes Kant's general conception of freedom of expression, the right to express one's opinion publicly.

However, Kant distinguishes two forms of expression to address the tension between public criticism and civil obedience. Kant is a staunch defender of public reason, but he defines this concept narrowly. Public reason is the "use that anyone as a scholar makes of reason before the entire literate world" (Kant 1784, 2). This contrasts with the "private use of reason," by which Kant means acts of intellectual dissent within a civic bureaucracy, a form of expression he forbids (Kant 1784, 2). For instance, police officers are obligated to enforce laws even if they agree with them, with the only alternative being resignation (Kant 1784, 3). They may criticize the legal system outside their post but must faithfully perform their roles when 'on the job.' Kant argues that for civic institutions to effectively achieve their intended ends (i.e., to preserve the commonwealth, protect rights, and promote collective happiness in accordance with personal freedom), they must not be obstructed by those appointed to operate them (Kant 1784, 3). Qua citizen, critique is healthy and necessary, but qua official, censure both practically obstructs and formally contradicts the very notion of a political appointment (Kant 1784, 3). We see here that freedom of expression has an inherent potential for conflict with public authority, one which Kant hopes to solve by differentiating public and private reason.

Kant takes this concern further by describing the ideal relationship of the sovereign to free expression. To him, a good ruler neither represses discourse nor caves to public opposition. Instead, they follow the policy: "argue as much as you like, but obey!" (Kant 1784, 2). Public reason allows citizens to voice criticisms of a regime, which is essential for a monarch to bring his rule in line with civil freedom and the public good (Kant 1784, 2). However, this does not justify recalcitrant resistance to the government. In his essay “Theory and Practice,” Kant argues that subjects should only exercise the "freedom of the pen… within the limits of esteem and love for the constitution," meaning their criticisms should proceed with respect for both the public good and the sovereign's authority in mind (Kant 1793, 302). In-kind, a ruler must listen to the voice of his subjects but never cede his own interpretation of justice to theirs (unless their appeals convince him) (Kant 1793, 302). The sovereign is a trustee and not a delegate of the people. Even when he errs, obstruction and rebellion are never justified, only the exercise of public reason.

The degree of overlap between Kantian and contemporary conceptions of freedom of expression is difficult to parse. Because Kant never specifically treats freedom of expression vis-a-vis speech, the press, peaceful assembly, petition, and association, we need to extrapolate from his larger argument to infer his views on the matter. Because he expresses no specific restrictions on the mode of expression, freedom of speech, peaceful assembly, press, association, and petition appear permissible as long as they are peaceful and lawful. But other forms of expression less universally accepted as a right, such as conscientious objection, are a more complicated matter. As we have seen, Kant suggests that if a civic worker's duties conflict with his ethical obligations, he must resign. But in the case of conscription, there is no such option: one serves or faces the penalty, creating a conflict between one's political and ethical obligations. Moreover, Kant does not directly discuss the typical restrictions of 'public reason,' when it constitutes a danger to individual safety or national security. Because our modern understanding of these rights is the product of two centuries of evolving political thought, it may be useless to judge precisely what Kant would say of them. But regardless, there is still something to be gained in this comparison. By examining Kant's discussion of "public reason," we can clarify the foundational motivations and conflicts that inform debates surrounding this freedom today: the right to free expression is essential for societal flourishing, yet this must be balanced with the social and political consequences it presents in its extreme forms.

References:

Kant, I., & Wood, A. (1996). On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice (1793). In M. Gregor (Ed.), Practical Philosophy (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, pp. 273-310). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511813306.011

Kant, I., & Wood, A. (1996). An answer to the question: What is enlightenment? (1784). In M. Gregor (Ed.), Practical Philosophy (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, pp. 11-22). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511813306.005

United Nations. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Kantianism

2024-08-03T01:23:18Z

Jkochan1: Reverted edits by Jkochan1 (talk) to last revision by Kj47

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=Philosophical Origins
|question=Tradition contributions
|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
|breakout=Kantianism
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=Kantianism influences conceptualizations about freedom of religion through an emphasis on the fundamental principle of autonomy in fostering religious liberty. Although he is often regarded as a secular philosopher and did not dedicate entire treatises explicitly about freedom of religion like many other Enlightenment philosophers such as Voltaire or Locke, his philosophical theories address the roots of inalienable rights. In particular, his 1793 Theory and Practice and his 1792 Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone provide insight into his thoughts on freedom of religion. Examining his notions of autonomy, the role of rationality in religious belief, and the function of the state in ensuring individual rights offers deeper understanding of the moral significance of freedom.

Kant’s principle focus on the concept of autonomy underscores his belief in the right to religious liberty and morality. To Kant, freedom is the basis of all actions. Thus, freedom of religion should inherently be granted to everyone – morally and legally – as religion is an assertion of moral agency. Which religious tradition is practiced is not as important as the level of choice one has in practicing it. Therefore, “It is freedom that sanctions religion, not religion that sanctions freedom” and “when a clash between freedom and religion takes place, it is religion that has to step aside” (Klein 2018, 37). Individual liberty in choosing or not choosing a religion is more important than allowing for religion to be practiced in a society. In his 1793 essay Theory and Practice Kant explains, “No-one can compel me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare of others, for each may seek his happiness in whatever way he sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of others to pursue a similar end which can be reconciled with the freedom of everyone else within a workable general law – i.e. he must accord to others the same right as he enjoys himself” (Kant 1793). It can be interpreted from this statement that religion is an individual choice that can develop one’s greater morality and happiness, and therefore is an autonomous decision so long as it does not impose on others. As a secular philosopher, Kant did not speculate much about beliefs within religious traditions, but he did talk about the development of good and evil. He stated, “Man himself must make or have made himself into whatever, in a moral sense, whether good or evil, he is or is to become. Either condition must be an effect of his free choice; for otherwise he could not be held responsible for it and could therefore be morally neither good nor evil” (Kant 1793). No higher power defines one’s sense of self nor one’s ability to express this morality; this is an agentic stance on the responsibility that accompanies freedom.

Kant utilized rational thought to understand humanity and therefore analyzed religion within a logical framework. His 1792 work Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone examined how religion would fit within his world of ethics (MacKinnon 1975, 132). His disinterest in learning about religion alone is elaborated on: “It is not that he regarded the questions on which devoutly religious men and women differed from one another as trivial or even as impossible of settlement. It is rather that he supposed the moral outrage committed by any attempt to impose one set of beliefs against another as more evident than any of the competing systems” (MacKinnon 1975, 134). Again, he believed moral principles like autonomy were more influential in moral agency than religious beliefs themselves. Logically then, he concluded that “if any form of religion is to be acknowledged valid, it can only be one that does not dispute this sovereignty” (Mackinnon 1975, 134). Holding sovereignty over one’s choices is more critical to a society than the sovereignty and validity of religious traditions.

In terms of the role of the State in enshrining the right to freedom of religion, Kant believed in the infrastructure of laws to grant autonomy. Religious liberty could be treated as a political concept, as it can be regarded as “an immediate consequence of every human’s innate right to freedom, which is both the objective but also the limit of all state power” (Guyer 2020, 276). Kant was both a liberal and a republican, creating a duality in how he views protection of freedom. Based on the former stance, scholars have presumed he thought that freedom of religion is an inalienable right; based on the latter stance, he could have understood that this right must be actively and institutionally protected through law (Klein 2018, 37). The one condition that Kant speculated about was the imposition of religion on others. He concluded that freedom of religion is not equally granted to those who “fail to grant the same moral rights to others” (Klein 2018, 37). If a group fails to respect another religion and imposes discriminatory laws against them, that group should no longer be afforded the freedom to practice their religion either. Freedom of religion is contingent upon everyone respecting the moral value of this right. There is a fine line, however, between state protection and state imposition. The acceptance of religious pluralism is crucial to maintaining everyone’s agency. Political leaders do not have the right to impose or favor a certain religion. As a general principle, “whatever a people cannot impose upon itself cannot be imposed upon it by the legislator either” (Kant 1793).

Kant’s thoughts on religious intolerance stems from the morality of practicing a faith. Scholars posit three criteria for fostering religious tolerance; non-coercive force of religious beliefs, truthfulness about the practices, and the capacity to be a public religion (Klein 2018, 25). Non-coercive force of religious belief surrounds Kant’s idea that religion must be theoretically and morally separate from force; truthfulness regarding matters of faith involves providing freedom to ourselves and to others by not lying to them about faith so they may make autonomous, informed decisions; publicity of the religion relates to the capacity for people to legally exist and to foster public education in order to expand institutionally. Meeting these conditions promotes freedom of religion in the public sphere, simultaneously encouraging religion to be free from government interference while also being protected in a legal framework. If a group becomes intolerant of other religions or attempts to impose its own beliefs on others, it may not be granted the same freedoms (Klein 2018). Tolerance must precede freedom of religion.

Overall, Kant’s philosophy provides a robust framework for understanding freedom of religion through the lenses of autonomy, rationality, and moral law. His arguments for the enshrinement of freedom of religion surround debates over morality and agency. By protecting the right to exercise religion and promoting religious tolerance, Kant supports a pluralistic society that is governed by rationality and harmonious respect.

References

Guyer, P. “Freedom of Religion in Mendelssohn and Kant” in Reason and Experience in Mendlessohn and Kant. Oxford Academic (2020): 276-301. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198850335.003.0011.

Kant, I. Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone. 1792. https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/ethics/kant/religion/religion-within-reason.htm.

Kant, I. Theory and Practice. 1793. https://users.sussex.ac.uk/~sefd0/tx/tp2.htm.

Klein, J. “Kant on Religious Intolerance.” Philosophica, 51 (2018): 25-38. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/286788933.pdf.

Pasternack, L. and Fugate, C. “Kant’s Philosophy of Religion.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2022). https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=kant-religion.

Pera, M. “Kant on Politics, Religion, and Secularism” in Universal Rights in a World of Diversity (2012): 546-676. https://www.pass.va/content/dam/casinapioiv/pass/pdf-volumi/acta/acta17pass.pdf#page=529.

MacKinnon, D. M. “Kant’s Philosophy of Religion.” Philosophy 50, no. 192 (1975): 131–44. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749503.
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Kantianism

2024-08-03T00:13:16Z

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Kantianism

2024-08-03T00:09:42Z

Jkochan1: Reverted edits by Kj47 (talk) to last revision by Qll27

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Thomism and medieval Christianity

2024-06-26T19:46:34Z

Jkochan1:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Religion
|section=Philosophical Origins
|question=Tradition contributions
|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
|breakout=Thomism and medieval Christianity
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=Freedom of religion, as one understands it today, is a relatively modern concept that arose from the work of Enlightenment philosophers in the 17th and 18th centuries. However, despite its relative modernity, theoretical arguments related to freedom of religion in its most simplified sense (i.e., the right to accept or deny faith in any sense) have existed for centuries. Medieval Europeans did not enjoy freedom in choosing or refusing religion, as ecclesiastical structures were employed and amended to bolster political systems. Symbiotic relationships between church and state were a key characteristic of Medieval Europe and were seen to be a natural continuation of their respective roles in society. In analyzing the extent to which freedom of religion was respected or restricted in the Medieval period, one cannot expect to find evidence for the clear pro or contra argument in texts and sources. One can, however, apply modern logic and understanding of what freedom of religion constitutes to theoretically comprehend how Medieval theologians would have viewed and treated freedom of religion. By analyzing the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas and Francisco de Vitoria from the 13th and 16th centuries, respectively, one can see the theoretical beginnings of freedom of religion as a natural right to be enjoyed by all peoples.

Thomism refers to the teachings and beliefs of Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), a prominent Catholic theologian and philosopher whose works were heavily influenced by classical Greek and Roman thought. Much of Thomas’ work is based on a reconciliation of faith and reason to obtain true knowledge of the world and, if employed properly, of God. Freedom of religion was a nonexistent concept during the period Aquinas lived through. Despite this, one can see that spiritual arguments of the 13th century were focused on personal interpretation versus the organizational doctrine of Christianity. His magnum opus, Summa Theologica, is a systematic theological tome of what Aquinas believed to be the sum of all known learning. He employs Aristotelian logic processes to explain the relationship between God and man and how man can use faith and reason to understand God's natural world and workings.

It is important to note that while Aquinas forms his arguments for a Christian audience, he does offer insight into broader faith-centered topics, like how to define heresy and man’s right to a free conscience. To Aquinas, heresy was something that only Christians could commit, as “heresy is the species of unbelief that belongs to those who profess the Faith of Christ but corrupt its dogmas” (Summa Theologica II-II, q. 11, a. 1). Those who are not Christian cannot be heretics, based on the definition of heresy being inherent to the Christian faith. Aquinas explains further that “it is irrelevant to the corruption of the Christian Faith if someone holds a false opinion in matters that do not belong to the Faith, e.g., in geometrical matters or others of this sort, which cannot in any way pertain to the Faith. Rather, it is relevant only when someone has a false opinion with respect to the things that belong to the Faith” (ST II-II, q. 11, a. 2). Therefore, through omission, Aquinas acknowledges that peoples of other faiths are not contrary (or heretical) to Christianity, but rather believers of something else entirely. This is not to be confused with unbelief, which according to Aquinas, is a sin since that implies unbelievers are completely “without faith” (ST II-II, q. 10, a. 1).

If we can infer from the Summa that only Christians are capable of heresy, where does that leave Thomist views of freedom of religion? As established earlier, freedom of religion in our modern sense was not understood in the same way by Medieval Europeans. However, it is important to establish that Aquinas believed in a moral order that “is prior to and superior to the legal order; and this moral order is what he calls the ‘natural law’" (Thiry, 174). Humans can't act contrary to this human or natural law, as Aquinas “conceived of human beings as… possessing natural liberty in terms of self-mastery, or natural dominium” (Cornish, 559). In synthesizing Aquinas’ arguments, he “contended that all human beings, Christian or not, had a moral obligation to follow even an erroneous conscience. This principle applied to everyone never previously exposed to the Christian message… [however] it did not apply… to Christian defectors—heretics and apostates—who… should be punished” (Little). Therefore, we can conclude that while not a proponent of freedom of religion per se, Saint Thomas Aquinas did believe in the idea of a free conscience that man was obliged to follow, so long as he was not committing Christian heresy or living with an absence of faith.

Several decades after Aquinas’ death and prompted by the actions of the insurgent French King Philip, Pope Boniface VIII issued the Papal bull, Unam Sanctam, or “One Holy.” In the theoretical context of the extent of freedom of religion in Medieval Europe, this declaration put square limitations on the operational ability of political capabilities when challenged by spiritual controls. While the Unam Sanctam changed little for the average European Christian, it marks a turning point in the way in which organized religion interacted with temporal structures. Boniface explained that:

"We are informed by the texts of the gospels that in this Church and in its power are two swords; namely, the spiritual and the temporal. For when the Apostles say: ‘Behold, here are two swords‘ [Lk 22:38] that is to say, in the Church, since the Apostles were speaking, the Lord did not reply that there were too many, but sufficient. Certainly the one who denies that the temporal sword is in the power of Peter has not listened well to the word of the Lord commanding: ‘Put up thy sword into thy scabbard ‘[Mt 26:52]. Both, therefore, are in the power of the Church, that is to say, the spiritual and the material sword, but the former is to be administered for the Church but the latter by the Church; the former in the hands of the priest; the latter by the hands of kings and soldiers, but at the will and sufferance of the priest" (Papal Encyclicals Online).

Here for the first time in Christian history, the pope ordained that the political and temporal “sword” should be squarely subordinated and at the mercy of the Catholic church. In concluding his bull, Boniface stated, "Furthermore, we declare, we proclaim, we define that it is absolutely necessary for salvation that every human creature be subject to the Roman Pontiff" (Papal Encyclicals Online). Every human creature, regardless of race, creed, location, or language, was now to be governed by the spiritual (and political through subjugation) sword of the pope in Rome. While this bull was issued after Thomas Aquinas lived, this document would prove to be an instrumental point of contention for neo-Thomists in the late-Medieval period when the question of freedom of religion ceased to be purely theoretical and began to have practical implications due to the colonization of the New World.

Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546) was a crucial figure in the Spanish Scholasticism movement and a founder of the School of Salamanca, a neo-Thomist school of thought that produced innovative analyses and teachings on Spanish colonialism, Catholic superiority, and natural rights of all peoples. While Vitoria and Aquinas are formidable religious theorists, their philosophies emerged within different social, political, and religious contexts. While neo-Thomist in nature, Vitoria's works were heavily influenced by the social and political issues created by Spanish colonialism and its interactions with indigenous (non-Christian) Americans.

Drawing on Thomist beliefs in freedom of conscience and the superiority of human (or natural) law to temporal powers, Vitoria was a staunch advocate for respecting the inherent humanity of those that the Spanish encountered in the New World. Vitoria “treated [the] law as made by ‘reason and enlightenment’, not just the will. Natural law, derived from eternal law by reason, was binding on all humanity; its principles applied to mutable situations and different peoples. God was the indirect cause of human laws, which were binding on the conscience of individuals” (Izbicki et al., 2019). So, despite the different faiths of the Spaniards and indigenous Americans, human law was omnirelevant in neo-Thomist philosophy.

The second part of Vitoria’s theoretical argument focuses on the limitations of the Pope as the head of Christendom and the spiritual and temporal controls available to him. Vitoria’s arguments were set directly against what was laid out in the Unam Sanctum of 1302; he argued that the Pope did not enjoy infallible temporal and spiritual power over non-Christians. Vitoria was keen to point out that “…the Pope 'has no temporal power over the Indians or over other unbelievers’” … because “Christ had no temporal power, and so neither can his representative [i.e., the Pope] on earth’” (Ruston, 11). Unlike the two-sword metaphor used to explain the powers available to the Pope in the early 14th century, Vitoria draws the line to exclude “unbelievers” and removes them from the Pope’s jurisdiction. Here again, we see the vital importance of man’s free conscience and the role of natural law in rudimentary accounts of freedom of religion. However, Vitoria did not believe that temporal power was superior to spiritual, just that Christian laws from the Pope did not bind all humanity equally (Izbicki et al., 2019). Vitoria was a Christian and a contemporary of Saint Thomas Aquinas by two and a half centuries. Still, he was able to remove personal religiosity from his political and social opinions in a way that did not become conventional until much later in history. Vitoria took Thomist beliefs of human law and free will one step further than Aquinas in his practical arguments related to the protections indigenous Americans should enjoy in the face of the Spanish conquistadors exploring the New World.

The arguments presented by Saint Thomas and Francisco de Vitoria have surprisingly modern applications in examining their theoretical applications to contemporary understandings of human rights and freedoms. As expressed earlier, because it would be impossible to draw a straight conclusion to support or contradict how they viewed freedom of religion within the social, political, and religious climates of Medieval Europe, we must analyze their works from a theoretical perspective. Suppose we can take the (neo-)Thomist emphases on the importance of free conscience as the primary basis of freedom of religion and man’s right to have a clear conscience. In that case, we can conclude “that when a government seeks to delimit the range of free behavior so that religious beliefs and practices regarding God are excluded or suppressed, the state necessarily acts against the very structure of deliberative human freedom itself, with respect to both its deepest initial inclinations and its ultimate transcendent horizon" (White, 1159). While Thomas and Vitoria would not have shared our contemporary understanding of freedom of religion, their appreciation for the necessity of free conscience over that of ecclesiastical or political restrictions translates well to modern arguments for freedom of religion as a natural and inalienable right to be enjoyed by everyone.

References:

Aquinas, Thomas. New English Translation of St. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae (Summa Theologica). Translated by Alfred Freddoso. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame, 2023. https://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/summa-translation/TOC.htm.

Cornish, Paul J. “Marriage, Slavery, and Natural Rights in the Political Thought of Aquinas.” The Review of Politics 60, no. 3 (1998): 545–61. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1407988.

Gundacker, Jay, and Noah Rosenblum. “Historical Context of Thomas Aquinas.” Historical Context of Thomas Aquinas; The Core Curriculum. Accessed June 20, 2023. https://www.college.columbia.edu/core/content/historical-context-thomas-aquinas.

Izbicki, Thomas and Matthias Kaufmann, "School of Salamanca", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/school-salamanca/>.

Keys, Mary M. “Aquinas’s Two Pedagogies: A Reconsideration of the Relation between Law and Moral Virtue.” American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 3 (2001): 519–31. https://doi.org/10.2307/2669236.

Little, David. “Christianity and Religious Freedom in the Medieval Period (476 – 1453 CE).” Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs. Accessed June 20, 2023. https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/essays/christianity-and-religious-freedom-in-the-medieval-period-476-1453-ce.

O’Neill, Taylor Patrick. “Self-Destruction and the Sin of Heresy.” Church Life Journal, November 26, 2020. https://churchlifejournal.nd.edu/articles/to-choose-where-there-is-no-choice-self-destruction-and-the-sin-of-heresy/.

Pagden, Anthony. “Human Rights, Natural Rights, and Europe’s Imperial Legacy.” Political Theory 31, no. 2 (2003): 171–99. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3595699.

Pope Boniface VIII. “Unam Sanctam (1302).” Unam Sanctam One God, One Faith, One Spiritual Authority, April 27, 2017. https://www.papalencyclicals.net/bon08/b8unam.htm.

Ruston, Roger. “Justice, Peace and Dominicans 1216-1999: IV—Francisco Vitoria: The Rights of Enemies and Strangers.” New Blackfriars 80, no. 935 (1999): 4–18. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43250200.

Sarmiento, Edward. “HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE THOUGHT OF VITORIA.” Blackfriars 27, no. 319 (1946): 378–87. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43701441.

Thiry, L. “The Ethical Theory of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Interpretations and Misinterpretations.” The Journal of Religion 50, no. 2 (1970): 169–85. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1201784.

White, Thomas Joseph. “The Right to Religious Freedom: Thomistic Principles of Nature and Grace.” Nova et Vetera 13, no. 4 (2015): 1149–84. https://www.academia.edu/27787560/The_Right_to_Religious_Freedom_Thomistic_Principles_of_Nature_and_Grace.
}}

Freedom of Expression/Limitations - Restrictions/Private curtailment

2024-06-26T19:43:23Z

Jkochan1:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=Limitations - Restrictions
|question=Private curtailment
|questionHeading=Is this right at times curtailed by private actors?
|pageLevel=Question
|contents=In the USA, freedom of expression is a concept that applies to the state rather than to private companies. Furthermore, Section 230 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act describes the circumstances under which internet companies, social media websites, and the like may regulate speech offered by third parties through the platforms or other auspices of these companies.

References:
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Noteworthy written sources

2024-06-25T19:43:02Z

Jkochan1:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Religion
|section=History
|question=Noteworthy written sources
|questionHeading=Is there another noteworthy written source from the past that mentions this right?
|pageLevel=Question
|contents=The Edict of Milan came two years after the Edict of Toleration by Galerius and granted religious toleration within the Roman Empire.

References:

Reference needed here
}}

Freedom of Expression/Fundamentally accepted

2024-06-25T19:09:12Z

Jkochan1:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=History
|question=Fundamentally accepted
|questionHeading=When was it generally accepted as a fundamental, legally-protectable right?
|pageLevel=Question
|contents=augment with new material

expression answer for demonstration
}}

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Guinea-Bissau

2024-06-25T18:39:52Z

Jkochan1:

Freedom of Expression/Fundamentally accepted

2024-06-25T18:36:54Z

Jkochan1:

Freedom of Expression/Fundamentally accepted

2024-06-25T18:11:27Z

Jkochan1:

Freedom of Association/History/Country sources/Platonism

2024-06-25T17:36:01Z

Jkochan1: Created page with "{{Right section |right=Freedom of Association |section=Philosophical Origins |question=Tradition contributions |questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right? |breakout=Platonism |pageLevel=Breakout |contents=content }}"

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Association
|section=Philosophical Origins
|question=Tradition contributions
|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
|breakout=Platonism
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=content
}}

Freedom of Expression/Fundamentally accepted

2024-06-25T16:40:32Z

Jkochan1: Created page with "{{Right section |right=Freedom of Expression |section=History |question=Fundamentally accepted |questionHeading=When was it generally accepted as a fundamental, legally-protectable right? |pageLevel=Question |contents=content content etc. }}"

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Social Darwinism

2024-06-25T16:07:28Z

Jkochan1:

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Social Darwinism

2024-06-25T16:06:59Z

Jkochan1: Created page with "{{Right section |right=Freedom of Expression |section=Philosophical Origins |question=Tradition contributions |questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right? |breakout=Social Darwinism |pageLevel=Breakout |contents=Test }}"

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Absolute Idealism

2024-06-11T13:41:27Z

Jkochan1:

Freedom of Religion/Philosophical Origins/Tradition contributions/Aristotelian thought

2024-05-31T23:45:47Z

Jkochan1:

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Behaviorism

2024-05-31T19:23:16Z

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Absolute Idealism

2024-05-31T16:38:26Z

Jkochan1:

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Absolute Idealism

2024-05-31T16:36:45Z

Jkochan1: Replaced content with "{{Right section |right=Freedom of Expression |section=Philosophical Origins |question=Tradition contributions |questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right? |breakout=Absolute Idealism |pageLevel=Breakout }}"

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Absolute Idealism

2024-05-31T16:34:10Z

Jkochan1: Reverted edits by Jkochan1 (talk) to last revision by RightspediaAdmin

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Absolute Idealism

2024-05-31T16:32:33Z

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Absolute Idealism

2024-05-31T16:13:04Z

Jkochan1: Reverted edits by RightspediaAdmin (talk) to last revision by Qll27

About Rightspedia

2024-03-04T14:01:29Z

Jkochan1: Created page with "Welcome to Rightspedia, your comprehensive resource dedicated to exploring and promoting global rights. Rightspedia is a platform committed to providing an in-depth understanding of rights in the USA and around the world. Rightspedia, which is powered by the Sunwater Institute, presents resources relevant to understanding the critical importance of rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of religion, the right to vote, and the right to privacy. Our mission is to s..."

Welcome to Rightspedia, your comprehensive resource dedicated to exploring and promoting global rights. Rightspedia is a platform committed to providing an in-depth understanding of rights in the USA and around the world.

Rightspedia, which is powered by the Sunwater Institute, presents resources relevant to understanding the critical importance of rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of religion, the right to vote, and the right to privacy. Our mission is to serve as the primary source of information on these essential rights, offering insights, analyses, and resources to empower individuals and communities in advocating for and safeguarding their rights.

Whether you're a student, activist, policymaker, or simply someone interested in understanding the intricacies of global rights, Rightspedia is here to support your research. Through our curated content, we aim to foster informed discussions, raise awareness, and inspire action towards creating a more just and rights-respecting world. Join us in our commitment to promoting and defending the rights that help form the very foundations of liberal democracy.

Explore Rightspedia today and gain a deeper understanding of rights!

About

2024-03-04T13:07:45Z

Jkochan1:

About Rightspedia

Welcome to Rightspedia, your comprehensive resource dedicated to exploring and promoting global rights. Rightspedia is a platform committed to providing an in-depth understanding of rights in the USA and around the world.

Rightspedia, which is powered by the Sunwater Institute, presents resources relevant to understanding the critical importance of rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of religion, the right to vote, and the right to privacy. Our mission is to serve as the primary source of information on these essential rights, offering insights, analyses, and resources to empower individuals and communities in advocating for and safeguarding their rights.

Whether you're a student, activist, policymaker, or simply someone interested in understanding the intricacies of global rights, Rightspedia is here to support your research. Through our curated content, we aim to foster informed discussions, raise awareness, and inspire action towards creating a more just and rights-respecting world. Join us in our commitment to promoting and defending the rights that help form the very foundations of liberal democracy.

Explore Rightspedia today and gain a deeper understanding of rights!

About

2024-03-04T13:07:28Z

Jkochan1: Created page with "About Rightspedia Welcome to Rightspedia, your comprehensive resource dedicated to exploring and promoting global rights. Rightspedia is a platform committed to providing an in-depth understanding of rights in the USA and around the world. Rightspedia, which is powered by the Sunwater Institute, presents resources relevant to understanding the critical importance of rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of religion, the right to vote, and the right to priva..."

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/New Zealand

2023-10-06T06:23:31Z

Jkochan1:

Freedom of Association/History/Country sources/Andorra

2023-10-06T06:14:07Z

Jkochan1:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Association
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Andorra
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=Andorra Freedom of Religion
}}
{{Country query
|breakout=Andorra
|right=Freedom of Association
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Denmark

2023-10-05T20:55:27Z

Jkochan1:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Religion
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Denmark
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=Denmark has protected freedom of expression since their 1953 constitution was adopted.

“Denmark's Constitution of 1953 - Constituteproject.org.” 2022. Accessed September 28. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Denmark_1953.pdf?lang=en&lang=en.
}}

Freedom of Association/History/Noteworthy written sources

2023-09-05T18:41:22Z

Jkochan1: Reverted edits by Jkochan1 (talk) to last revision by Import-sysop

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Association
|section=History
|question=Noteworthy written sources
|questionHeading=Is there another noteworthy written source from the past that mentions this right?
|pageLevel=Question
|contents=Pope Leo XIII forcefully argued for free association in Section 51 of Rerum novarum ([[Probable year:: 1891]]) , an extremely influential text in Catholic thought.

"Private societies, then, although they exist within the body politic, and are severally part of the commonwealth, cannot nevertheless be absolutely, and as such, prohibited by public authority. For, to enter into a "society" of this kind is the natural right of man; and the State has for its office to protect natural rights, not to destroy them."

}}

Freedom of Association/History/Noteworthy written sources

2023-09-05T18:40:37Z

Jkochan1:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Association
|section=History
|question=Noteworthy written sources
|questionHeading=Is there another noteworthy written source from the past that mentions this right?
|pageLevel=Question
|contents=Pope Leo XIII forcefully argued for free association in Section 51 of Rerum novarum ([[Probable year::1891]]) , an extremely influential text in Catholic thought.

"Private societies, then, although they exist within the body politic, and are severally part of the commonwealth, cannot nevertheless be absolutely, and as such, prohibited by public authority. For, to enter into a "society" of this kind is the natural right of man; and the State has for its office to protect natural rights, not to destroy them."

References:

Rerum Novarum, Encyclical of Pope Leo XII On Capital and Labor
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Bolivia

2023-09-01T02:35:19Z

Jkochan1:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Association
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Bolivia
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=Freedom of conscience is recognized in Title II of Bolivia’s 1826 Constitution, which also states that the country’s religion is Catholicism. However, the Constitution has since gone through 16 iterations, with the most current adopted in 2009. It protects the right in Article 4, and separates church from state.

“Bolivia (Plurinational Republic of) 2009.” Constitute. Accessed July 20, 2023. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Bolivia_2009

“Constitution of the Bolivian Republic.” World Constitutions Illustrated, Heinlonline. Accessed July 20, 2023. https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.cow/zzbo0003&i=1
}}

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Austria

2023-08-20T02:57:52Z

Jkochan1: Created page with "{{Right section |right=Freedom of Expression |section=History |question=Country sources |questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right? |breakout=Austria |pageLevel=Breakout }}"

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Armenia

2023-08-20T02:54:11Z

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Antigua and Barbuda

2023-08-20T02:53:16Z

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Algeria

2023-08-20T02:52:25Z

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Albania

2023-08-20T02:41:36Z

Freedom of Expression/History/Country sources/Angola

2023-08-20T02:40:39Z

Voting Rights and Suffrage/Philosophical Origins/Tradition contributions/Weberian Thought

2023-08-07T16:07:44Z

Jkochan1:

{{Right section
|right=Voting Rights and Suffrage
|section=Philosophical Origins
|question=Tradition contributions
|questionHeading=What have religious and philosophical traditions contributed to our understanding of this right?
|breakout=Weberian Thought
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=Through the democratic process in which citizens elect their representatives to government, Weberian Thought held the promise that it would be possible to rewrite the historically authoritarian regime of Prussia (Germany at Weber’s time) perpetuated by Junkers, wealthy conservative landowners, and monarchists before the war. (Maley, [[Probable year:: 2011]], p.76). Weber envisioned his model as a counterpoint to both the left's Social Democrats and the right's monarchists and Junkers.

According to Weber, equal suffrage meant equal universal voting rights for working classes who had historically been barred from voting. In his writings on equal suffrage in modern citizenship, he clearly states that equal suffrage is “closely related to the equality of certain fates which the modern state as such creates” (Weber, [[Probable year:: 1994]], p. 105). He explicitly focuses on returning soldiers’ rights, and argues that the equality of the modern state functions in the way that people are equal before death, because the
“most basic needs [of physical existence] on the one hand and, on the other, that most solemn and lofty fact of all are encompassed by those equalities which the modern state offers all its citizens in a truly lasting and undoubted way: sheer physical security and the minimum for subsistence, but also the battlefield on which to die” (Weber, [[Probable year:: 1994]], p.105, para.2)

Weber does not emphasize on women’s suffrage, he does, however, say that women should have the right to vote as long as “they too are ‘fighting’ the war if they do their duty” (Weber, [[Probable year:: 1994]], p.78, line.14). Moreover, in “Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology”, Weber notes that “the woman is dependent because of the normal superiority of the physical and intellectual energies of the male” (Weber, [[Probable year:: 1978]], p.[[Probable year:: 1007]]) . The Weberian Thought on voting was aiming to correct historical gender and class inequities or might at least mitigate the most severe exclusions of women, the urban working class, and the rural peasantry from power and government.

Weber's ideas for equal suffrage might be viewed as a partial erasing of historical discriminatory markings. Weber's suggestions have a deeper element to them than the more neutral sounding ‘counterweight’ to bureaucratic dominance (Weber, [[Probable year:: 1994]], p.104). Equal suffrage emerged as a valuable counterbalance to both types of inequity. Weber saw that the inequities created by capitalism might be just as persistent as those created by prior, more feudal social systems. Against both, Weber advocated for a ‘positive politics’ in which “equal voting rights” means that the individual “is not considered in terms of the particular professional and family position he occupies, nor in relation to the differences of material and social situation, but purely and simply as a citizen” (Weber, [[Probable year:: 1994]], p.103).

During the Russian revolution, enraged workers, students, and returning soldiers took to the streets in protest of the existing regime's ruler, Tsar Nicholas II, who had obstructed their enfranchisement and rights prior to the war and then ordered mass slaughter on the battlefield. Weber recognized their outrage at the collapsing regime, but he dismissed their demands for more revolutionary, far-reaching reform as immature. Although Weber understood the anger of Russian revolutionists against the crumbling regime, he saw it as immature and ‘childish’ (Maley, [[Probable year:: 2011]], p. 99). Weber was concerned that under the Russian revolutionary circumstances of [[Probable year:: 1918]]– 19, people would respond out of anger and rage, which would be doubly harmful. In “Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Political Order”, Weber had already wondered “whether such explosions unleash yet again the familiar and usual fear of the propertied classes; in other words, it depends on whether the emotional effect of undirected mass fury produces the equally emotional and equally undirected cowardice of the bourgeoisie” (Weber, [[Probable year:: 1994]], p. 232)

In his wartime newspaper writings, Weber made a strategic case for the Social Democratic Party's participation as a disciplined working-class party. Though Weber considered the working class to be too “immature” to take on the role of a ruling class, he praised the discipline and self-control of the Social Democrats' political partners, the trade unions. He said approvingly that “organizations like the trade unions, but also the Social Democratic Party, create a very important counterbalance [not only against the right, but] to the rule of the street which is so typical of purely plebiscitary nations and so prone to momentary and irrational influences” (Weber, [[Probable year:: 1994]], p. 231).

References:

Maley, T. ([[Probable year:: 2011]]) . Democracy and the Political. In Democracy & the Political in Max Weber's Thought (pp. 77-120). Toronto; Buffalo; London: University of Toronto Press. Retrieved July 16, [[Probable year:: 2021]], from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3138/j.ctt2ttgq2.7

Weber, M. ([[Probable year:: 1994]]) . Weber: Political Writings. United States: Cambridge University Press.

Weber, M. ([[Probable year:: 1978]]) . Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology. University of California Press.
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Denmark

2023-08-04T14:20:38Z

Jkochan1: Reverted edits by RightspediaAdmin (talk) to last revision by Jkochan1

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Denmark
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=Denmark has protected freedom of expression since their 1953 constitution was adopted.

“Denmark's Constitution of 1953 - Constituteproject.org.” 2022. Accessed September 28. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Denmark_1953.pdf?lang=en&lang=en.
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Albania

2023-07-30T13:25:42Z

Jkochan1:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Religion
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Albania
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=The Albanian constitution grants religious freedom in Article 10. The Constitution of the Republic of Albania was ratified on November 28th, [[Probable year:: 1998]]. The preamble declares the country a secular state. Constitution Project. “Albania [[Probable year:: 1998]] (Rev. [[Probable year:: 2012]]) Constitution.” Constitute, POGO, 27 Apr. [[Probable year:: 2022]], https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Albania_[[Probable year:: 2012]]? lang=en.
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Albania

2023-07-30T13:24:15Z

Jkochan1:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=History
|question=Country sources
|questionHeading=What is the oldest written source in this country that mentions this right?
|breakout=Albania
|pageLevel=Breakout
|contents=The Albanian constitution uses article 22 to guarantee the freedom of expression. This has been the case since the constitution was ratified in 1998.

“Albania 1998 (Rev. 2016) Constitution.” Constitute. Accessed September 14, 2022. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Albania_2016?lang=en.
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Albania

2023-07-30T13:22:06Z

Jkochan1:

Freedom of Expression/Conflicts with other Rights/Status

2023-07-28T18:47:10Z

Jkochan1:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=Conflicts with other Rights
|question=Status
|questionHeading=What specific examples of hierarchies, manifestos, constitutions, or prioritized descriptions of rights cite this right’s high status? Low status? No status at all?
|pageLevel=Question
|contents=In 1919, Justice Holmes, in his dissent regarding the case of Abrams v. United States which saw the arrest of Russian immigrants convicted for handing out anti-war leaflets in New York City, stated that “the right to freedom of expression is at the very foundation of our constitutional theory. The expression of competing ideas in the marketplace of ideas is the best means of discovering the truth.” (Civic 119, 1997). Holmes advocated that the truth is at the “foundation of pursuit of the ultimate good, and pursuit of the ultimate good is the theoretical framework of the Constitution. Therefore, through free expression and the search for the truth, the ‘purpose’ of American liberty and democracy is realized” (Civic 120, 1997).

Almost 20 years later, Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo wrote in the majority opinion of the 1937 case of Palko v. Connecticut (which questioned whether Palko’s second conviction of a crime violated the Fifth Amendment’s protection against double jeopardy) the first explicit hierarchal ordering of human rights (Pacelle Jr.). The verdict of this case caused to Cardozo write that “some Bill of Rights guarantees--such as freedom of thought and speech--are fundamental, and that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause absorbed these fundamental rights and applied them to the states. Protection against double jeopardy was not a fundamental right” (Oyez 2020). Cardozo argued further that certain fundamental rights, including the rights to freedom of speech, religion, and press were the “very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty”(Pacelle Jr., 2020). The next year, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone argued in Footnote 4 of the majority opinion in United States v. Carolene Products that the Court should allow civil and individual rights to occupy a “preferred position” when dealing with economic disputes that also affect fundamental rights (Pacelle Jr., 2020).

Ultimately, from these Supreme Court rulings, one can gather that freedom of expression is a fundamental right that “also underpins most other rights and allows them to flourish. The right to speak your mind freely on important issues in society, access information and hold the powers that be to account, plays a vital role in the healthy development process of any society” (Index on Censorship, 2013). As Amartya Sen writes in his book “Development as Freedom,” access to the freedom of expression is a necessity in the development process of a society and is a developmental goal of its own. The freedom is “both the primary end and the principal means of development” (Index on Censorship, 2013).

References:

Preferred Position Doctrine, Richard L. Pacelle Jr., The First Amendment Encyclopedia, Free Speech Center at Middle Tennessee State University, Murfreesboro.

The Right to Freedom of Expression as the Principal Component of the Preservation of Personal Dignity: An Argument for International Protection Within All Nations and Across Borders, Mélanne Andromecca Civic, 118-120, 134, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, 1997 Philadelphia.

Why is access to freedom of expression important?, Index on Censorship, 2013 United Kingdom: https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2013/03/why-is-access-to-freedom-of-expression-important/#:~:text=Freedom%20of%20expression%20is%20a,development%20process%20of%20any%20society.
}}

Freedom of Religion/History/Country sources/Angola

2023-07-28T16:43:20Z

Jkochan1:

Freedom of Expression/History/Noteworthy written sources

2023-07-28T16:40:52Z

Jkochan1:

{{Right section
|right=Freedom of Expression
|section=History
|question=Noteworthy written sources
|questionHeading=Is there another noteworthy written source from the past that mentions this right?
|pageLevel=Question
|contents=This right is mentioned in several historical noteworthy written sources, some of which include John Locke's extremely influential and fundamental Second Treatise of Government. Along that same vein, noted philosophers have written commentaries on laws, freedoms, and political theory; these include works by Michael Foucault, particularly in his lecture series at Berkeley, Montesquieu in his commentary the Spirit of the Laws, Sir William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, and John Stuart Mill's noteworthy work On Liberty.

Many international treaties, charters, and conventions also work to avidly incorporate the freedom of expression in its foundations. The UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

References:

John Locke, Second Treatise of Government
}}